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
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THE  
**BIBLICAL REPOSITORY**

AND

**CLASSICAL REVIEW.**

**CONDUCTED BY REV. J. M. SHERWOOD.**

**THIRD SERIES.**

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**ERRATA**—On page 431, line 17, after "meridians of," read, 155 1-2  
and

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## ERRATA.

Through the absence of the authors and the loss of a part of the copy, a few slight errors crept into the articles by Drs. Cheever and Beecher, which we are enabled to correct.

Page 576, line 36, for *secured*, read *seemed*. P. 579, line 27, for *thus*, read *this*; line 36, for *Pavier*, read *Pavia*. P. 583, line 29, for *interpretation*, read *interpolation*. P. 588, line 1, for *manicheism*, read *manicheism*; line 37, for *Pelageans*, read *Pelagians*. P. 589, line 7, and p. 595, line 24, for *Hagenback*, read *Hagenbach*. P. 592, line 29, before *decree*, read *the*. P. 594, line 10, omit *that*, after *rejoice*. P. 671, line 25, for *judgings*, read *findings*. Do. line 46, before *deserved*, read *sense of*. P. 673, line 9, for *mighty wrath*, read *righting wrong*. Do. line 37, for *some*, read *one*. P. 674, line 27, after *touch*, read *upon*. Do. line 31, for *natural*, read *mental*. P. 675, line 37, for *his* read *her*. P. 677, line 13, for *on*, read *and*. P. 707, line 46, for *these*, read *three*. P. 712, line 17, for *the*, read *but*. P. 718, line 28, for *used*, read *fixed*. P. 719, line 15, for *his*, read *they*. P. 720, line 24, for *Thaumaturges*, read *Thaumaturgus*. P. 721, line 25, for *Jn. 14: 16*, read *14—16 chaps*. The same p. 726, line 8. P. 731, line 17, for *it*, read *he*.

THE  
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY  
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THIRD SERIES, NO. XVII.—WHOLE NUMBER, LXXIII.

JANUARY, 1849.

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ARTICLE I.

OLD AND NEW SCHOOL PRESBYTERIANISM.

By REV. SAMUEL T. SPRAR, BROOKLYN, N. Y.

*Differences between Old and New School Presbyterians.* By  
REV. LEWIS CHEESEMAN, Rochester. Published by Erastus  
Darrow.

IN the following Article it is proposed to make some comments on the Book, designated by the above title. The book carries with it the name of John C. Lord, D.D., of Buffalo, for a voucher; besides which, it has already received a favorable notice from the Biblical Repertory, as well as from several religious journals of the day.

It may perhaps be well to inform the reader in the outset, that, although the reviewer is conscious of no special love for the work of criticism, still he need not expect to find many commendations in this article. The book has many faults, and but few virtues; and to review it with justice is to criticise it with pointed severity. In the above opinion we may not agree with Dr. Lord, and some others, who think the work a valuable performance, an important addendum to the religious literature of the age. If so, then this will be an illustration of *subjective* "differences," not *objective*, surely, since the printer has given us but *one* book to read, though the readers be many.

We should be quite willing at once to submit the "doctrinal" points, and join the issue of orthodoxy and truth with the author in regard to them; and this would be our course, were there not some important preliminary matter, whose inspection is requisite to a just understanding of this strange assault upon "New School Presbyterians," and virtually also upon the entire body of orthodox Congregationalists in New England. Some attention to this branch of the subject will be no loss to the reader.

THIRD SERIES, VOL. V. NO. 1.

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I. The first circumstance worthy of note, is the *personal paternity* of the book under review. It is sometimes interesting to know *where* a thing comes from. It is especially so in the present case, since the paternity of the book is not the least remarkable among its many remarkable qualities; since also when the former is well understood, common minds will be much aided in comprehending the latter. It is true, that this inquiry is somewhat *exterior* to the work itself; and needs light from some other source, very happily and timely supplied by a recent and able review from the pen of the Rev. William C. Wisner. This review tells us *who* Dr. Lord, and the Rev. Mr. Cheeseman, the joint producers of this book, are, by a few fragments of important history; and inasmuch as it may not fall under the reader's eye, we propose to introduce some facts, exegetical of these authors, upon the authority of Mr. Wisner. The *main* fact is, that both of them are *neophytes* in the ways, manners, customs, doctrines, &c., of "Old School Presbyterians," as they choose to style one of the divisions of the Presbyterian Church; in respect to one of whom the Presbyterian thinks this an advantage on the score of "a disinterested testimony." The singular, complicated, and withal strangely involved texture of this main fact, will best appear by a few items of history.

In respect to Dr. Lord, then the Rev. John C. Lord, it may be observed that when the excising act was enacted in 1837, he was a member of the Synod of Genesee; and of course in the *infected* district; and therefore among the number of those to whom that act applied. He was himself excised with the rest of his western brethren. In regard to his views and preferences, touching the well-known controversies and agitations in the Presbyterian Church, prior to the famous act of excision, it is not material to inquire. It is sufficient to observe the Rev. John C. Lord at, or about the time of this notable event. In his introductory chapter, he gives us his *modern* version of a class of Christians, passing under the cognomen, the *proper* name of "New School Presbyterians;" applies to them the most opprobrious and offensive language; denies their orthodoxy; questions their honesty; and most seriously implicates even their right to be called after the name of Christ. This is Dr. Lord's published opinion in 1848, as we shall show when examining the "Introduction." Now we must confess, that such opinions strike us as not a little remarkable in view of their *source*. We wonder that he has so soon forgotten his *former* self; that the oblivious shade of total silence, without the remotest allusion to the past, should have veiled in forgetfulness the events of by-gone time. Any little note of explanation, anything in the shape of an apology, the faintest sign of penitence for former deeds, would have lessened this wonder, but, as it is, we must wonder on till the emotion shall exhaust itself.

He does not pretend that "New School Presbyterians," whom he now castigates in such unmeasured terms, have changed since he was *one of them*. From this hypothesis he has *excised* himself by the chronological era specified in his denunciatory language. No: this is not his idea. Has the Dr. himself undergone any changes in the course of ten years? Let all candid persons consider the following facts:—

In 1837 the Rev. John C. Lord was a member of the Synod of Genesee, and acted as its moderator at a meeting held in October of this year. At this meeting he gave his *apparently* hearty concurrence to the adoption of the report of a committee of which Dr. Bull was a member; in the preparation of which report, it was well understood at the time that these two brethren "were the principal agents." After its unanimous adoption, "brothers Lord and Bull led the Synod in prayer and thanksgiving to Almighty God, for the great unanimity which had characterized their action." This document is inserted at full length in Mr. Wisner's review; and, among other things, is unequivocally declarative of the fact, that the Synod of Genesee is sound in the faith, and maintains an "unwavering attachment to the doctrines and discipline of the Presbyterian Church, notwithstanding the suspicions which have been extensively and industriously circulated against us"—so sound, that the members (Rev. John C. Lord among the rest,) had no idea of being thrust out of the Presbyterian Church by an "unconstitutional" excision. This is what the brother *said* he thought in October, 1837. Be it further observed, that the Presbytery of Buffalo, of which he was then a member, in responding to a *certain* "circular," inviting the Presbytery, or a minority of its members, to be represented in a certain "convention," about to be held in Philadelphia, did also, Jan. 31st, 1837, *unanimously* adopt the report of a committee of which the Rev. Mr. Lord was the *chairman*, and, therefore, presumptively the writer of said report. This is also given in Mr. Wisner's review. From it we learn, upon the authority of the brother himself, corroborated by all his peers, that the charges made against the orthodoxy, good order, and sound Presbyterianism of the "New School" are not true; that the "controversies have not resulted from a *difference in doctrinal belief*," but, among other causes, "*from the love of power, and the disposition to dictate*," on the part of *some* persons, not very ambiguously hinted at, who are fraternally exhorted to practice "the wisdom of confining their efforts to their own charges," namely, their respective churches. We shall have occasion to refer to this report in another connection; we now use it simply to show *who* Dr. Lord once was, and *what* he once thought, and would still think, had not some very material changes happened in his history.

Here, then, are some of the *facts* which excite our wonder;



and the emotion is so peculiar, that we cannot resist the tendency to let it subside into the *interrogative* phase of human thought. Was the Rev. Mr. Lord, in 1887, *mistaken* in respect to his "New School" brethren? If so, then, in all-candor, as an act of justice to himself and the world, he ought, *ipsissimis verbis*, to say so; and tell us in 1848 of the ways and means by which his honest, but incorrect impressions have been rectified. We can hardly think he was mistaken; he knew them; and they knew him as they thought. We are the more confident in this view, since we have the authority of the "Presbyterian" to support the opinion, that "an ecclesiastical connexion with one of the excinded synods" may be regarded as having furnished "a favorable position" for knowing the whole truth. We will not assume this plea, until the Dr., declaring it, shall claim its benefit; and then we should feel disposed to that mode of reasoning, called *argumentum ad hominem*; and would barely suggest, that if the Dr. has been mistaken *once*, he may be *twice*—yea, not improbably, since such a phenomenon when he was one of them, would be more remarkable than when he is *not* of them, by a very plain law of optics. Being of the number now accused, we want to know how this matter stands; we claim the right to know *who* this accuser is, and whether any changes, and if so, then what, have occurred to himself. Again, was the Rev. Mr. Lord *insincere* (we make the supposition simply to complete the circle of an argument), in his professed confidence in the orthodoxy, &c., of the "New School" brethren in 1837, touching the points in controversy between them and the "Old School?" If so, then we think the stool of repentance his proper place; and that he should bring forth fruits meet for repentance, by a public confession of the fact, since his act was public, before he introduces another such book to the world with his endorsement, himself imitating, *multum in parvo*, its most offensive, unjust, and even *slandorous* qualities. When he so plainly repudiates his own paper, we wish him to explain himself. When he so violently assails his *old* friends, his ecclesiastical kindred, and makes common cause with their and his former antagonists, himself the boldest gladiator in the use of hard words, we feel startled into the interrogative mood of philosophy. Novel events suggest the doctrine of causation; and we must be indulged a moment longer. What did the Dr. think of these "heresies," when the case of Mr. Barnes was fully traversed before the General Assembly in 1836, and he voted to *sustain* the appeal of Mr. B.? What means this strange transition? and how has it come to pass? Did anything occur to make the Dr. uncomfortable, "restive and uneasy," among his former associates? Had he lost their "confidence," and was "his influence" among them for any reasons on the decline? Had he any struggles of mind, any doubtful self-disputations, to settle the question *where* he should

go? Is it that he is a *fresh* hand, that his conversion is so recent, that he must make up for *lost* time? How is it, and what is it? Is there any danger of a re-union between the two sections of the Presbyterian Church? Are there "any in our church, who are disposed to discuss the possibility of a union between the two bodies?" Is the Dr. displeased with the doctrine? Have he and Mr. Cheeseman written to veto it? Would he prefer to *absorb* "New School Presbyterians," rather than *unite* with them? Again, we say, how is it, and what is it? We want light: give us light. Here is a mystery for the Dr. to explain—no less a one than to settle his own accounts with himself. We would respectfully suggest as a thesis for the editor of the "Presbyterian," that he unravel these incongruities, these mysteries over which we have travelled, "in endless mazes lost;" since he thinks, that "the introductory chapter, by Dr. Lord, is in his *usual frank and manly* style, and forms an appropriate preface." The "introductory chapter" is materially embarrassed in the essential quality of *credibility* by the novel position of its author; and be it remembered, that this quality is peculiarly essential, since the "chapter" itself is one of the strangest pieces of composition with which a sensible man ever saluted the public ear. It must receive a mighty impulse from the *author*; or its fate it would not require the son of a prophet to predict. Here is work for the friends of the book, those who blazon its fame. We hope they will attend to it, and not pass it *sub silentio*.

In respect to the Rev. Lewis Cheeseman, the other item in this matter of personal paternity, we also have a synopsis in the review of Mr. Wisner. It appears that he was once a member of the Presbytery of Rochester; and that just prior to the excising act he was placed at the bar of this Presbytery, on a trial of charges preferred against him by a member of his own church. He was unanimously acquitted, "with the exception of a slight censure for indiscretions." Soon after this trial, he "retired" for a season from public labors, as a minister of the gospel. When the excision of 1837, and after this, the division of 1838 came along, he *escaped* from the "New School connexion;" and then came, out, in the language of Mr. Wisner, "a valiant Old School Presbyterian;" his relation with the "New School" being rather "irksome" "*upon far different grounds than unsoundness in the faith*" among these brethren.\* Since this period, he also, judging from his book, has given full proof of his change—leaving not the slightest doubt to rest upon any "unprejudiced" mind, that he is *now*, whatever he may *once* have been, an "Old School" man. Whether he will continue remains to be settled by time; the inference from the past is as little favorable to himself as to his co-

<sup>1</sup> See Wisner's Review.—pp. 19–21.

<sup>2</sup> The *italics* are by the reviewer.

<sup>3</sup> Presbyterian.

<sup>4</sup> Wisner's review, pp. 22–24.

adjutor. Changeable things are very liable to change; and it is not possible always to account for their freaks, or guess with certainty what the next one will be.

The reader will now perceive the propriety and purport of a previous remark, that the personal paternity of the book is not the *least* remarkable among its many remarkable qualities. No one would have supposed that such a tissue of facts was in the rear of these brethren; that they had been so recently matriculated, having hardly had time to shed the *exuviae* of their former state. Their modern repugnance to "New School Presbyterians" is really a curiosity. Dr. Lord tells us, that the "New School" hold "the theological tenets of the Papacy." Did he hold these "tenets" when himself was a "New School" man, and in 1836 gave his vote to sustain the appeal of Mr. Barnes, that is, "the theological tenets of the Papacy?" Mr. Cheeseman assures us, that the "New School" are about the same thing as "Unitarians:—" does he speak from his own past experience?

If the reader shall inquire, why we disinter the decayed and mouldering identity of these once living men? we shall be very happy to attend to the question. That which is simple to some, is not therefore as simple to all. The facts, we suppose, were well known to Presbyterians in Western New York; but they were not so well known to ministers and Christians in other sections of the country. Among many the inquiry was current: *Who is this Mr. Cheeseman?* Even the editor of the "Presbyterian," though receiving "an intimation that such a book was in preparation," "had but little personal knowledge of its author," and therefore "felt some solicitude on the subject."<sup>1</sup> The simple truth is, that in respect to a very large circle, the book was an *advertisement* of the author's existence, ministerial and personal. It is, therefore, due to a just estimate of the spirit and tone of the work, that the history of the *Old Schoolism* of these brethren, as well as their modern aversion towards the "New School," should be known. The Rev. Mr. Wisner, being on the ground, has performed a service in this respect, with which no candid mind ought to be displeased, in letting the *remoter* public look a little into the interior of this matter. We thank him for the use of his eyes. Could his historical facts be added to the "Introduction," as a note of explanation, they would greatly perfect the work. "New School Presbyterians," having some sensibilities, have felt themselves injured, so far as this book can harm any one—grossly "caricatured"—vilified and aspersed, not treated with Christian candor or decency; they have felt this injustice on account of the endorsement not only of Dr. Lord, but of others; and it is but natural that they should desire to know *whose* lips have uttered these strange responses with such oracular infallibility. The history of the oracle itself is a

<sup>1</sup> The *italics* are added by the reviewer.

very pertinent inquiry in this discussion. We have seen enough of this *one-sided*, small, not to say, *mean* business, for which some think themselves so well-fitted, that when we see a new specimen, we like to know where it comes from; and if we are not remarkably obsequious, it is because we have no very great relish for the thing. The "Presbyterian" thinks the book a very discriminating and "thorough investigation"—"a desideratum"—not rendered unnecessary even by "Professor Wood's book on the same subject," distinguished by "acuteness" and "heartfelt earnestness," too profound for a newspaper "analysis"—"worthy of being read by every Presbyterian clergyman," "not as a matter of curiosity," but of deep study—"irresistible and unanswerable" by "those who may feel irritated at its conclusions," but who, nevertheless, must give the author "credit for sincerity"—"especially" important "to be read by those, if there be any such in our church, who are now disposed to discuss the possibility of a union between the two bodies." But, as all this is merely a matter of opinion, and as freedom of thought is one of the glories of the age, we choose to say that we differ not a little with the editor of the Presbyterian, and in due season expect to give our reasons. The production is anything but a candid, fraternal, and well-sustained statement of the "differences" in question. It is rather a *Cheese-manism sui generis*. Such a work ought to be willing to tell *where* it came from; and as this information was not supplied, we confess our obligations to Mr. Wisner for his labors in this department of the public service. His explanatory note we cordially adopt as our explanation of the foregoing remarks. "We regret exceedingly to be compelled to make even the slightest allusion to these painful circumstances; but, when an individual assumes the attitude of a *public and wholesale accuser* of his brethren, it sometimes becomes necessary, in self-defence, to show the *quo animo* of his course, by exposing his real position." If not necessary, it is lawful. Such an "accuser" has no right to complain. He makes himself public property; invites inspection; and is the last man to read lessons of charity to the accused, gracious in him according to the ratio of his own arrogance. We do not propose to let him *pilfer* the logical advantage of saying to us "you are heretics," in order that we may try our skill in dialectics to convince him, and such as himself, to the contrary. Some men have the talent to get on the safe side of the *onus probandi*—to play the game of accusation, so that the accused must appear as *respondents*, while they, the *plaintiffs*, of course are not to be questioned, since to question them is by no means *the* question. Not at all; it is not *their* question. The labors of Dr. Lord and Mr. C. furnish a very luminous specimen of this kind of skill; and not even Dr. Beecher himself can escape their "insatiable thirst" to find

heresy ; yea, more than this, for President Edwards, that prince of theologians, and acute metaphysician, by his "treatise on the nature of virtue," infected New England with the fundamental principle of the "New School" heresies. Since all depends upon the authority of these brethren, candid men, who have no *party* purposes to serve, or spleen to gratify, wish to know what is the degree of *credibility* properly belonging to that authority. This is a vital question in estimating testimony ; and for its solution we are compelled to study the history of the witnesses. The reader, perhaps, has enough of this history, to answer all the purposes of a practical judgment.

II. The next circumstance, claiming attention, is the *local and special mission* of this modern attack upon "New School Presbyterians." It appears from a correspondence between the *principal* author and Mr. Gabriel Longmuir and others, that what is now a *book*, was originally delivered as a series of "lectures" to his own people in Rochester. Those, who having heard them requested their publication, declare that they had listened to them "with no little degree of interest ;" also express the opinion, "that their publication at *this* time will do great good to the cause of truth in *Western New York*,"<sup>1</sup> The lectures impressed these gentlemen, in one respect, as the work will, doubtless, the general reader, that the author had *Western New York* particularly in his eye—primarily, perhaps the Presbytery of Rochester, and, by a little elongation of his vision, the Synod of Genesee. The book is a production about matters and things professedly general, yet bearing very distinctly the imprint of *locality*.

What occasion there was for these "lectures" in *Western New York*, what was the special purpose they were to serve, the "great good" they were to accomplish, we shall show at large, when examining the *quo animo* of the author himself. To avoid repetitious quotation of the same matter, we will for the present state a conclusion, and ask the reader to note our pledge to prove its truth in a future stage of this review. The conclusion is simply this ; that Mr. C., being an "Old School" Presbyterian, by some means received an impression, that there were here and there scattered in the Synod of Genesee, individuals, churches, and perhaps ministers, who, though according to Dr. Lord "sound in the faith," were, nevertheless, strangely obstinate or ignorant in remaining in the "New School connexion ;" and, furthermore, that these said individuals, churches, and ministers were susceptible of being sifted or *warned out* ; in which event they would "at once unite with the Synod of Buffalo," the "Old School" banner in *Western New York*. This objective appearance was the *outward* circumstance, the occasional cause, which called the

<sup>1</sup> The *italics* are added by the reviewer, as in very many other passages to be hereafter cited—simply for greater perspicuity.

author from his comparative retirement. And that there is more truth than poetry in this view, we expect to show in due season, taking the book for our sole authority. It is a book for the *times*, and for *Western times*, revealing its birth-place by other evidences than the residence of the author.

If the "lectures" and the book contain the same matter, then the author, when the preacher, must have supposed, that "these brethren," these "decided Presbyterians," were within *hearing distance*; for surely he would not have lectured them so gravely over the backs of a little congregation in Rochester, by an arrogant misnomer styled the "*First Presbyterian Church*;" or, he must have had a hint, perhaps a dream, at least a faint suggestion, that what was "at first prepared for the *pulpit*, and not for the *press*," might, having done some service in the first, also do another service in the second capacity. He certainly *preaches* as if he expected to *publish*—addressing his own people and at the same time "these brethren"—confirming the one, and inviting the other to connect themselves with "*our cause*." All this may be in admirable congruity with the plan; but, in view of the nature of the "*subject*," we exceedingly doubt its wisdom, if truth be the object, and light the medium. The subject of "*differences*" is one having so many sides, attended with so many difficulties—requires such elaborate argument and acute discrimination—that, if not merely a popular impression, but a clear eclaireissement of the truth be the object, most men would choose at once to make a book, and not preach a series of "lectures." It may be a very fair question, also, whether such a discussion is not likely to be very much embarrassed by the *local* and *peculiar* purpose it is to serve. To argue the "*differences*" under the influence of such a moral *diathesis*, to say the least, is not favorable to the equilibrium of the logic. The author has chosen for himself an unhappy position to accomplish his *professed*, though it may not be in view of his *real*, object. A wider induction, a broader sweep of observation, more extended research and reading, the citation of authorities, "Old School" as well as "New," their minute comparison, definitions and distinctions, proofs and not mere assertions; all this might have so modified and increased the *space-penetrating* power of the author's vision, that, instead of seeking out "these brethren" wandering by a mistake in the "New School" Presbyteries of Western New York, and providing for them a safe ingress into his own ecclesiastical encampment, where their "*position*," "*efforts*," and "*influence*" will be favorable to "*our cause*;" instead of this merely local work, he might have given us a book on "*Differences*" for the country, if not for the world—a book convenient for future use, a light to shine long after his "*cold remains*" shall have mouldered "*underneath the clods of the valley*." We

<sup>1</sup> See page 21.

deny not the author's ability to execute this Herculean task; but he has not done it—not even *tried* it; he did not start right. It is very plain, that his book is not destined to immortality; it comes into the world with the ghastly omen of death upon it; and like much of the merely *readable* literature of the age it must run a short race. It requires a writer of no ordinary parts to convert a *past* into a *present* tense; and keep up the pleasing illusion from age to age. He must have a great subject, and do it ample justice.

III. We come now to an examination of the "Introductory Chapter" by Dr. Lord. This chapter is an endorsement, and recommendation to the public, of Mr. Cheeseman's labors; so that although the latter should have prepared the work without any *fraternal* aid, it goes forth with all the authority which the name of Dr. Lord can impart. He does not criticise a single passage; but makes the whole his own by a legitimate construction. He tells the public to take it for truth, adding much that is spicy upon his own responsibility. We hold him *morally* answerable to God—*logically* to the world for this service. As compared with Mr. C., he is the more public man; and inasmuch as this business of recommending books is really a very serious matter, where not personal favoritism, or party affinities, but truth and righteousness ought to reign, we propose to give the reader a somewhat extended exegesis of the "Introduction."

A small part of it (namely, the first sentence and the last paragraph) is *directly commendatory*; and the analysis of this, somewhat in the way of item by item, will be our first work.

The *first* idea in his commendation of a book professedly treating of things as grave as "doctrinal differences," things which have taxed and even embarrassed the soundest and strongest understandings, strikes us as a singular conception. We would not notice it if it were not the vertebral column, on which his commendation mainly rests, whether consciously or unconsciously on his part we cannot tell. The idea is that of the "MANNER," in which "Mr. Cheeseman has presented his subject." The attribute of this manner is, that it "appeals to the pious *feelings*, to the Christian *emotions* of every renewed heart." We have no objection to such appeals in their proper place; on the contrary, we think very much of them; yet, we had been in the habit of supposing, that in regard to the matters contained in Mr. C's "subject" the appeal was to be made, not to *feelings*, to mere *emotions* of any kind, but to the understanding. We suggest the question, Who is right, the Dr. or the reviewer? For example; is it a question to be settled by "pious feelings," "Christian emotions," whether our Saviour literally suffered the penalty of the law; or, what is the connection between Adam and his posterity in the matter of sinfulness; or, on which side of the "*doctrinal*"

differences" is the truth in respect to the constitutionality of the excising act? These, and such like, belong to Mr. Cheeseman's "subject;" and are we in this nineteenth century to erect "feelings," "emotions" of any kind, into a tribunal for the trial of such causes? We take the liberty to deny the jurisdiction of the court. This mode of settling theological questions, we know, is a very convenient way to prove one's orthodoxy, provided the "feelings" are of the right stamp—a very short route to find heresy; it saves the trouble of that tedious work some people call *argument*; and compensates for the absence of the capacity to reason, whether hermeneutically or otherwise. It is, however, a mere *trick*, where the question is essentially one of thought and biblical exegesis, not of feeling. We grant that Mr. C. has a somewhat *pious* way of saying very hard, and sometimes very *bad* things; but we have lived too long in the world and seen too much of the different phases of human spleen, to be caught with such a "manner." The Dr. is quite certain, that Mr. C's. "manner" appeals (we suppose he means *favorably*) to the pious feelings "of *every* renewed heart." "EVERY RENEWED HEART" is a large idea; and taking him as he writes, we infer that those to whom the "manner" does *not* thus appeal, either have no hearts, or if so, then not *renewed* hearts; a new test of human nature on the one supposition, and of Christian character on the other. We will not mutilate the sentence by any deductions or unauthorized interpolations; but suggest, that it had better be returned to its author for farther consideration, and, perhaps, improvement.

The Dr. continues his commendation by informing us, that Mr. C. "*may* not have avoided *all* the severity which controversy engenders, but he has succeeded beyond *my expectations* in giving a *practical* character to the work." This is a curious passage in its relation to the labors of Mr. C. Let us see:

Who are the controversialists liable to be decoyed into "the severity which controversy engenders;" and into which Mr. C. himself "*may*" have fallen? They are Mr. C. on the one hand, and the "New School Presbyterians" on the other. It is admitted that two such personages exist, and that between them there *might* be a "controversy." Well, *was* there any such controversy when the Dr. penned his hypothesis? The simple truth is, that, to a very great extent, the latter did not know that the former, namely, Mr. C., had lighted upon this mundane sphere, until they heard of his coming under the banner of Dr. Lord, and in the most furious gladiatorial array—a *recently* enlisted champion of "Old School Presbyterians," as proved by a light (Mr. Wisner's Review) that burst upon his rear—engaged, at his own charges, in the amiable work of aspersion. The Dr's. implied assumption that the "New School Presbyterians" were under *arms*, is false. He must not think that all are men of *war*, because he is. The



"New School" did not know this modern Achilles; they had no "controversy" with this *persona incognita*. What the Dr. calls a "controversy" we call an *attack*, an *assault vi et armis*, for a purpose about as lovely as the mode is ingenuous and honorable. Yes; after the Dr. has himself imitated the very worst features of Mr. C.'s "manner"—going along as an *endorser*, while holding a sword in both hands, he very graciously tells the public, that his fellow-laborer "*may* not have avoided *all* the severity," &c. Be patient, gentlemen; you know it is *our* privilege to have a "controversy" when, and where, and with whomsoever we will; it is only necessary for us to begin the work of *accusation*, and then any hard things we may say, are to be imputed not to a bad spirit, but the heat of debate. Yes; "New School Presbyterians" can, of course, afford to be patient; for, although they did not call off Mr. C. from the *onerous* cares of the "*First Presbyterian Church*," of Rochester, to make an attack upon their orthodoxy, still the Dr. has consented to console them with whatever comfort there "*may*" be in a bare possibility. In plain words, we do not like his *salve* any better than his *false assumption*.

The passage is also a little *mysterious*. What does the author mean by the declaration, that Mr. C. "*has succeeded beyond my expectations?*" Has the Dr. accidentally *leaked* out the idea, that besides the "Introduction," he has had something to do with "*the work*" itself? How much? Something, we conclude, else we cannot understand why he should have had any "*expectations*" in regard to it. To what extent is he modestly recommending himself? It does seem as if a *part* of a fact were rising above the surface. We know not what it was that troubled his expectations; but, if it were something in the *author*, then Mr. C. must settle the account with his endorser; if it were something in the "*subject*" itself, then for once, at least, even Dr. Lord is not perfectly clear, as to the "*practical character*" of such a "*subject*." What was it?

Again, the passage contains what is to us, at least, quite a *novelty*. We have no bias or troubles on the score of previous "*expectations*;" but we must confess, that if we take "*the work*" as embodying the Dr.'s conception of a "*practical character*," here, also, we have another *new* idea. The "*practical character*" of the work relates to the effect it is intended to produce, and having read it with some care, we judge this to be the effect; namely, the practice of having "*these brethren*," these "*decided Presbyterians*" leave their "*New School connection*," and come over to the benefit of "*our cause*." This would be *one kind* of practice, no doubt. How much of this practice Mr. C. "*has succeeded*" in generating we cannot tell; but we venture the opinion that the *adaptations* of "*the work*" for such results will depend quite as much on the *condition of the subject*, as upon the

skill of the author. If any of "these brethren" should happen to think Mr. C. right, because he speaks so *positively*, has so little occasion to fortify his opinions by argument, and can quote Scripture without showing its application; if they should think "New School Presbyterians" about the same thing as "Unitarians," because Mr. C. says so, though they had not conjectured it before; then possibly such persons will adopt the practice of not leaving "their names, their property, and their offspring" to "be lost to *our* church." Beyond this circle (we hope for the credit of human nature, it is not very large) we apprehend "the work" will not be as "practical," as a strong fancy and perhaps as strong a *wish* have led the Dr. to imagine. In what *other* sense it has a "practical character" we confess a total inability to understand. It is not an exhortation to repentance or faith; but, from first to last, a direct attack upon the orthodoxy and honesty of "New School Presbyterians"—a *wholesale* accusation of a large class of ministers and Christians, for a purpose that is as obvious as the sun at noon-day. The author begins with this object, and he ends with it in a very grave and earnest "Plea for union among Presbyterians." Really, in plain words, it is a species of "barefaced" sectarian *Jesuitism*, not uncommon among Romanists, but quite a curiosity in the habits and manners of Protestants. If the reader think this a severe remark, he may be assured, that "all the severity" lies in its *truth*; let him read the first, ninth, and tenth chapters for the *quo animo* of the author, and, after this, the intermediate chapters for the *modus operandi*. To dignify such a production with the honor of a "practical character," is a misnomer. In the good and usual sense of this phrase it has no such "character." The sense in which it is "practical," may be a very captivating charm to Dr. Lord; yet, probably, but few men will sympathize with all his idiosyncracies.

The Dr. closes the commendation by observing: "He makes the practical power of the doctrines of grace and redemption so manifest, that the eyes of all *unprejudiced* persons can hardly fail to be opened, and if I *mistake* not, there will be left upon the mind of every reader, an impression of the importance of *these* great truths for which *we* stand in a day of darkness and rebuke." We ask the reader to pause and sift this language in its *intended* application. "These great truths for which *we*" (Dr. Lord and Mr. C., certainly, and how many others he does not say,) "stand in a day of darkness and rebuke." What are they? Why, the truths in controversy between "Old School and New School Presbyterians," according to the *modern* version of that controversy by these brethren; in regard to which truths the "New School" being a "corrupted" "portion of the Presbyterian communion," "*artfully*" concealing "under various *disguises* from the eyes of multitudes of pious persons" their real sentiments, rejecting the

"distinctive doctrines and features of the Westminster confession," while *nominally*, and therefore *hypocritically* retaining it as their symbol of faith—the "New School" are entirely *wrong*, bloated with heresy to a perfect plethora; while "we," who are "in a day of darkness and rebuke"—yes, "we," being orthodox, as a matter of course, are as certainly right. They have all the heresy—and "we" all the orthodoxy! A very modest strain of bigotry and arrogance, decked in pious phrase! We must say it, because we think it; yes, this—just this, after the Dr.'s poem of accusation. The *self-complacency* of the passage will do for a specimen in a cabinet of moral curiosities. Besides this, it is instructive to see how some men can nurse their fury, and grow both wise and certain, when they have the privilege of saying what they please. The Dr.'s first idea was, that "the doctrines of grace and redemption," namely, "these great truths," &c., shone so brightly in the hands of Mr. C., "that the eyes of all *unprejudiced* persons can hardly fail to be opened." If therefore some, or all of "that large and respectable body of members of the Presbyterian church, who, though sound in the faith, yet remain in the New School connexion," (their "eyes" being *shut* while they so remain,) should have the misfortune *not* to have their eyes "opened," so as to embody the Dr.'s idea of the "practical character;" if this should be, then they might plead *prejudice*, that darkest of mental opacities. No; not even this; for the Dr. has just caught a *second* thought, and fastened all such characters beyond the possibility of escape. Unless he is *mistaken*, this new and bright light will leave its impression "upon the mind of *every* reader"—piercing the thickest veil of prejudice, disclosing to all "these great truths for which *we* stand in a day of darkness and rebuke."

We are not prompted by any *hypercritical* spirit in these strictures upon the Dr.'s commendation. We think we understand him. It is not the first time "New School Presbyterians" have had occasion to observe this *peculiar* style of certain men, very mild, and even sometimes evangelical on the *surface*, yet having an *under-current* that is acid and corrosive. When a minister of the gospel gravely, and in a public manner, as the Dr. has done, assails his brethren, attacks their orthodoxy, impugns their honesty, attempts the *odium theologicum*; when he does this, his language deserves to be sifted, its purport well weighed, and its intended use carefully searched. We like such proceedings none the better, because couched in pious phrase; and choose to express ourselves without any of those "disguises" which he thinks to be so congenital among "New School" men.

The *commendation* of Mr. C. is perhaps the least offensive part of the "Introductory Chapter." Besides this, the author adds very many things upon his own responsibility. Some of these may be fitly characterized, by calling them *revelations of his state of mind*

in regard to "New School Presbyterians." The knowledge of them will aid us in settling the question, with what degree of forbearance, allowance, and charitable construction we ought to contemplate the Dr.'s *modern infirmities*. For this purpose let a few passages be cited:—

After adverting to the design of Mr. C., he informs us that these "differences," in respect to the "New School" side of the same, are not *modern* errors, but substantially "*the ancient heresies* which have been privily brought in, and which have corrupted so large a portion of the Presbyterian communion," that these heresies "are still *artfully* concealed under various *disguises* from the eyes of multitudes of pious persons who, could they be made to see them in their true deformity, would not tarry a night under their shadow."—p. 7. Again, "With a strange yet characteristic inconsistency, they *caricature the doctrines of grace and of the confession of faith as though they embodied all that was inconsistent, perverse, and monstrous.*"—p. 7. Again, "The foundation of the atonement is subverted, the work of the Holy Spirit is despised, and man is brought to himself, and to his own efforts and works for salvation, rather than to God and to Christ."—p. 10. Again, "As in Germany, France, Switzerland, and England, the formulas of the Reformation are still professed by churches which are either Arminian or Socinian, and have long been known to be such; so the Westminster confession is still retained by those who reject its distinctive features and doctrines. There are two reasons for this: the one is, error does not appear well in the consecutive order of a confession of faith; it does not bear exposure, and so shrinks from the light. The other is found in the *advantages gained by assailing truth under the shelter of an orthodox creed.*"—p. 11.

There is much more of this same kind of matter in the "Introduction;" let this, however, suffice on the score of *revelations*. We hardly know in what way to make a comment upon such language. Without at all touching the question of the Dr.'s *moral veracity*, we say in respect to its *objective* truth, that greater *untruths* were never published. Will the reader carefully examine the passages? The attack is made upon the orthodoxy not only, but also the honesty and sincerity of "New School Presbyterians;" yea, it even seriously implicates their Christian character. He charges them with artful "*disguises*;" understands perfectly the *baseness* of their motives; is acquainted with their *perjury*, and its wicked reasons, when they adopt and continue *nominally* to retain the confession of faith. Theirs, according to him, is the horrid deed of caricaturing the precious "*doctrines of grace*," despising "*the work of the Holy Spirit*," and sending a sinner to "*his own efforts*," rather than to Christ, for salvation. They are, in fact, no church of the living God, except in the

name. They do not believe their own standards ; they *profess* this faith, only that they may more effectually deceive the pious public, and secure "the advantages gained by assaulting truth under the shelter of an orthodox creed." In the ear of earth and heaven, Dr. Lord proclaims these allegations—these *subjective* phenomena of *himself*. The moral question of *evil-speaking* we shall leave his conscience and the judgment-day to settle ; we simply say, that he has uttered these *calumnies*, without the slightest effort to prove their truth. Though bitter, they are very *harmless* words. The speaker has once upon his oath of office and character disaffirmed them all. They much more surprise than grieve us.

We are well aware, that the Dr. may say that all these charges are supported, because the "New School" do not explain every word, phrase, and sentence of the Confession of Faith, according to *his* ideas ; because they do not adopt his philology and philosophy as part of the word of God. When he will give us suitable proofs of his *inspiration*, or his infallibility as a philosopher or a philologist, then we shall be prepared to take things upon his authority, asking no questions. When he will show his right to speak *ex cathedra*, in expounding the standards, we shall try to pay all due respect to the same. Is it necessary to be in *exact* conformity to him, in order *not* to be justly the subject of his accusations ? Has not *the* General Assembly, the final judge of the standards, in more than one instance, decreed judgment against the Dr.'s *present* self, his *former* self once aiding in that decree ? Is it indispensable to an honest subscription to the standards, that we take the *ipse dixit* of Dr. Lord for their import ? Alas ! which of his *ipse dixits* must we adopt ? History informs us that he has uttered more than one. Must we assume, in the outset, that his version of the Westminster confession is the Westminster confession ; or be justly obnoxious to the charges of heresy and dishonesty ? If we will not adopt the Dr. as our exegetical oracle, will he indicate his displeasure by resorting to the old game of a hue and cry ? To illumine his perceptions on this subject, we propose to make a brief extract from the Biblical Repertory, an authority he will not call in question.

Speaking of a subscription to the standards, as contended for by some, who "are disposed to interpret it so strictly as to make it not only involve the adoption of all the doctrines contained in the confession, but to preclude *all diversity* in the manner of receiving and *explaining* them ;" the authority thus proceeds : "They are, therefore, disposed to regard those who do not in *this* sense adopt the Confession of Faith, and yet remain in the church, as guilty of a departure from moral honesty. This, we think, an extreme and a mischievous one. Because it tends to the impeachment of the character of many *upright* men, and because its application would split the church into innumerable fragments." "It

is making the terms of subscription imply more than they literally import. Two men may, with equal sincerity, profess to believe a doctrine, or system of doctrines, and yet differ in the mode of understanding and explaining them. Such a degree of uniformity never was exacted, and never has existed. The Confession, as framed by the Westminster divines, was an acknowledged compromise between two classes of theologians. When adopted by the Presbyterian church in this country, it was with the distinct understanding that the mode of subscription did not imply strict uniformity of views. And from that time to this, there has been an open and avowed diversity of opinion, on many points among those who adopted the Confession of Faith, without leading to the suspicion of insincerity or dishonesty. It is clearly impossible that any considerable number of men can be brought to conform so *exactly* in their views, as to be able to adopt such an extended formula of doctrine *precisely in the same sense.*" From the same high authority we learn, that there is a distinction to be made between the *leading* or *essential*, and the merely *explanatory* parts of a confession. "There are, with regard to every doctrine, certain *constituent*, formal ideas, which enter into its very nature, and the rejection of which is the rejection of the doctrine; and there are certain others which are merely *accessory*, or *explanatory*," that is to say, the *human philosophy* pertaining to the doctrine, in regard to which a subscription does not "imply strict uniformity of views." It may serve further to eclaireise this subject to the Dr.'s perceptions, if we refer him to what President Davies says of the *practice* in his day. "We allowed the candidate to maintain his objections against any part of the confession, and the judicatures judged whether the articles objected to were *essential to Christianity*; and if they judged they were *not*, they would admit the candidate, notwithstanding his objections." A farther elucidation of this subject may be drawn from what is historically known as the "Adepting Act," of the synod of Philadelphia, in 1729. "And we do, also, agree that the Presbyters shall take care not to admit any candidate but what declares his agreement in opinion with *all the essential and necessary* articles of said confession. And in case any minister or candidate shall have any scruples with regard to any article of said confession or catechisms, he shall declare his sentiments to the Presbytery or Synod, who shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, if they shall judge his *scruples* or mistakes to be only about articles not *essential* and necessary in doctrine, worship, and government. And the Synod do solemnly agree, that none of us will *traduce, or use any opprobrious terms*,

<sup>1</sup> Bib. Rep., vol. iii., p. 521, 522, 523, cited in Barnes' Defence, p. 130, 131.

<sup>2</sup> Cited in the Christian Spectator for March, 1835. Article: "Remarks on the Act and Testimony."

towards those who differ from us in those *extra-essential*, and not *necessary* points of doctrine, but treat them with the same friendship, kindness, and brotherly love, as if nothing had happened.”<sup>1</sup> As observed by Dr. Parker, “the collisions” between the “Scotch party” and the “Puritan party,” in the Presbyterian Church, happily subsided by the force of this “Adopting Act;” to be renewed again, however, on the part of the former, leading to a “schism of the Presbyterian church in 1741, and to the formation of the Synod of New York in 1745.” These two Synods were united in 1758, agreeing “to adopt the Confession of Faith, Catechisms, and Directory, as they had been adopted in 1729;” so that, as Mr. Barnes correctly observes, “the act of the Synod” (the “Adopting Act” of 1729) “was the basis of union in 1759; and this proviso has never been withdrawn or repealed; and is, in fact, an essential part of the standards of the Presbyterian Church.”<sup>2</sup>

We have indulged in this brief digression, not to concede or deny that Dr. Lord is nearer the *true* meaning of the Confession, “as containing the *system* of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures,” than are the “New School Presbyterians.” He *thinks* he is much nearer, no doubt; he evinces a *new* theory on this whole subject, embracing the following assumptions: namely, that he has exactly the *animus imponentis* in subscribing to the standards, and that all who do not adopt them precisely after him as a model, are heretics and insincere, against whom it is lawful for him to launch accusations at his pleasure. Were he to apply his theory to his “Old School” brethren, it is quite likely that “the General Assembly” would need another “dismemberment;” and were he to pursue the work, he might in the end constitute himself into “the Presbyterian church,” *solus in loco*. It is the Dr.’s heresy in regard to the *animus imponentis*, coupled with a little item of self-assumption, that in these modern days has opened his battery. Cure this disease; and his diction will at once be more lovely, while the ideas will not be the less luminous. If we must be in exact conformity to him, though he gives no proof of his inspiration, no evidence of his infallibility, no acts of the General Assembly authenticating his interpretation of the standards; or bear the weight of his accusations; then between two evils, one of which we must suffer, it will be wise to choose the least. If logical gravity will turn the other way, to give the Dr. a full opportunity to have his *say*, then of course mundane particles must take care of themselves, and the “New School” among the rest. If “New School Presbyterians” refused to subscribe to the Confession, then, of course, the Dr. would cite the refusal as proof of heresy. If, on the other hand, they adopt it, then they do so only

<sup>1</sup> Taken from the “History of all the Religious Denominations in the United States.”—p. 612.

<sup>2</sup> Barnes’ Defence.—p. 125.

in name, and that too on account of "*the advantages gained by assaulting truth under the shelter of an orthodox creed.*" To say that we look with a profound abhorrence upon this part of the Dr.'s performance, is no greater sin than simply to speak the truth.

Here we should be glad to pause, and let the reader exert his fancy for the balance of the "Introductory Chapter," if we could, and do justice to the work we have undertaken. Duty, however, requires us to go on; and we proceed to subjoin to the *revelations* some specimens to which we will apply no severer epithet than that of *mere mistakes*. We design to look at three of these.

The *first* mistake we attribute to the Dr. is that the "New School Presbyterians" are *theologically* the same sort of people as the Romanists of the sixteenth century. He informs us, "that the theological contest between the Reformers and the Romanists in the sixteenth century is the *same* now waged between Old and New School Presbyterians." "The doctrines maintained by all the reformed churches have been *rejected* by them (the "New School" for the *theological tenets of the Papacy*." This is the Dr.'s thesis; and upon his authority we proceed to infer, that "New School Presbyterians" hold to the supremacy of the Pope, the doctrine of apostolic succession, transubstantiation, canonization of the saints, penance, the seven sacraments, the use of images in Christian worship, &c., &c.! All "under various disguises!" A curious secret to be kept secret so long! Let us see how the Dr. makes out this wonderful discovery.

Be not surprised, reader, (let nothing surprise you,) when you learn that "The ability for which Eck and the Romanists contended against the Reformers, is precisely, both in *form and substance*, the same as that insisted upon by the New School divines." —p. 8. To say nothing of the *matter*, observe the beauty of the *formal* logic! The "New School" agree with Eck and the Romanists of the sixteenth century in maintaining "*the ability*;" therefore, the "New School" hold "the theological tenets of the Papacy!" *General principle* :—whoever agrees with another in *one* particular, agrees in *all* particulars. *Specific example* :—Dr. Lord agrees with Leo X. in having eyes; therefore, Dr. Lord agrees with Leo X. in being the Pope of Rome, or exactly like him. Alas! for the Reformers, the Dr. himself not excepted, when such logic fulminates in their rear! The Dr. has not told what is the nature of this "*the ability*," whether *natural* or *moral*, whether "*the ability*" to be justified by works of self-merit, or to comply with the terms of the gospel, so as to be justified through Jesus Christ, that proves the theological identity of Romanists and "New School Presbyterians." It is "*the ability*!" The "New School" are Romanists; there you have it! Distinctions are very troublesome, where ambiguities will better serve a turn.

<sup>1</sup> Page 8.



\* To clinch this modern discovery, and make it sure, the author, in the manner of a *rhetorical flourish*, refers to one or two short passages in D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation. Had he consented to give us the volume and the page where said passages could be found, it would have saved us the trouble of looking for them in vain. We presume they are *there*; but we have not succeeded in finding *where*, after some time spent in the search. We ask, why did not the author tell us, in precise and accurate terms, what "*the ability*" was for which the Romanists contended? also, what "*the inability of man*" was which Luther and the Reformers asserted in opposition to the Romanists? This knowledge plainly is indispensable to the proof of the doctrinal identity of the "New School" and the Romanists, even on this single point. Was it a *legal, meritorious* ability? an ability to be justified by self-merit? The Romanists, we know, greatly mutilated the gospel on this point, and the Reformers shed the true light, in teaching the scriptural doctrine of justification by faith in Christ, without creature-merits of any kind or grade. Well, does the Dr. mean to imply, that on this point the "New School" are identified with the Romanists? We hope not, simply for his own credit. He has the most ample means of knowing that such an implication would be grossly false; and for such a blunder the most elastic partiality could hardly consent to hold him innocent. "The substitution of a scheme of merits in place of the grand truth of grace and amnesty" by Jesus Christ, the "New School" repudiate with as much earnestness and honesty as Dr. Lord himself, even in his most orthodox moments. They hold to the absolute "inability of man," touching this vital question, and we challenge him for the shadow of a proof to the contrary.<sup>1</sup>

Again, was "*the ability*" in question, *the ability of free agency*? We will not distress the reader's patience with an historical or metaphysical account of the doctrine of free-will, as developed in the contest between the Romanists and the Reformers. We have a more appropriate place for the discussion of this subject. Suffice it to say, that the "New School," with the orthodox divines of New England, and nearly all Presbyterians in all past time, hold to

<sup>1</sup> The Dr. informs us that "New School" men "seem to think the whole gospel is in the dogma of human ability, as though the atonement was a free, full, and sufficient sacrifice, *not in its own nature*, but in the nature and ability of man himself."—p. 11. This *thing* (for it is nothing more,) depends upon the Dr.'s confusion of ideas. "New School" men do not hold, that "human ability," in the strict sense, is any part of the gospel. If it be a reality at all, it is a reality in the *nature of man*; and however perfect or imperfect it may be, it cannot avail for his salvation, for two reasons; first, the fact that he is a sinner; secondly, that no sinner, immaterial what are his powers as a moral agent, can be justified by the works of the law. However strongly "New School" men may hold to an ability, in opposition to Dr. Lord, they hold to no ability of *self-justification*, superseding the atonement; they teach no such doctrine.

the reality of the distinction between natural and moral ability and inability.<sup>1</sup> In respect to *natural* ability, they hold with the Confession of Faith, that "God hath endued the will of man with that *natural* ability, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature, determined to good or evil." In respect to *moral* ability, they hold that "man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of *will* to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a *natural* man, being altogether *averse* from that which is good and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or prepare himself thereto." In behalf of "New School" men, we affirm these two points of faith; since this is their profession, and we have no disposition, without evidence, to impeach their sincerity in that profession. Has the Dr. any objection to this part of the "New School" creed about "*the* ability," in application to free-will? Will this convict them of holding the "theological tenets of the Papacy," in opposition to the Reformers? If so, then even the Dr. himself is a Romanist, or a "New School" man, or a heretic. It is quite immaterial to this issue what were the psychological conceptions of the Romanists and Reformers about "*the* ability," since "New School" men are satisfied with those of the Confession of Faith? Is the Dr. himself also satisfied? When he asks, with a triumphant air, "Who stands with Luther now?" we feel like asking, who stands with the Confession of Faith now? Does he mean to join Dr. Wilson,<sup>2</sup> and deny what the Confession plainly affirms—namely, the *natural* ability of man, for the sake of being with Luther, and not with the Romanists, as he seems to imagine might be doubtful, unless he took this course? This perhaps is, for the present, sufficient on the score of "New School" Romanism.

Before passing to other mistakes, we cannot forbear to allude to the peculiar grace with which some men, for certain purposes, are in the habit of referring to the *Reformers*. The Reformers said so and so! namely, all infallibility is in the *past*, and all fallibility in the *present*! We yield to no one in a reasonable respect for those noble and holy men; but we have no sympathy with stupid rhapsodies over any form of uninspired humanity. We remember that they were but *men*, just emerging from the darkness of Papacy, liable to err; and that in many things they did err. We suppose no one but an insane *traditionalist* is ready to shut his eyes and adopt all the opinions of the Reformers, without thought, investigation, selection, or discrimination. This *cant* about antiquity is neither scholar-like nor Christian-like; it is rather the *small* ammunition of *small* minds, or great minds *doing* small

<sup>1</sup> We assume that the reader is familiar with the *nature* of this distinction; and will attend to the question of its *truth* hereafter.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. ix., sec. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Beecher's Views in Theology.—p. 17.

things. For want of space to do more than simply allude to this subject, we commend to the reader some very valuable observations by the author of "The Triangle."—p. 56-79.

A *second* mistake, worthy of notice, relates to the act of excision in 1837, and the division in 1838. In a very dolorous strain, he informs us, "that the principles for which *the* General Assembly contend, and in the defence of which they intended to bear their testimony in the excision act of 1837, are the same maintained by Paul, the apostle, against the gainsayers of his day, the same afterward defended by Augustine against Pelagius, and the same which were revived by Luther, and with which, as with a battle-axe, he smote the gates of the great apostacy;" and farther, that could "that large and respectable body of members of the Presbyterian Church, who, though sound in the faith, yet remain in the New School connexion," be made to see this, "they would not, and could not give support and countenance, aid and comfort, to the enemies of the truth by remaining an hour within the ecclesiastical walls of the New School General Assembly."—p. 7, 8. Again: "Here was the cause of the division in the Presbyterian Church." "The act of the General Assembly" "was believed to be necessary to a suitable defence of the faith once delivered to the saints." "It was upon *doctrinal* questions, deemed fundamental, that the Presbyterian church consented to the dismemberment of nearly one half her entire connexion."—p. 9. The *accusatory* strain of these observations, though justly obnoxious to the most scorching criticism, we shall pass without comment. The subject is confessedly a very large one, having many items; and, for the purpose of saving time, we propose to let the Rev. John C. Lord of 1837 manage the cause with Dr. Lord of 1848.

Will the reader refresh his recollections in regard to that report, unanimously adopted January 31st, 1837, by the Presbytery of Buffalo, forgetting not that the Rev. John C. Lord was *chairman* of the committee making said report, and therefore, by a

<sup>1</sup> The last sentence is a rare instance of the Dr.'s accuracy in making statements. If by "the dismemberment," he means the *excision*, then it was nothing like "one-half her entire connexion;" it was *only* 4 Synods, about 500 ministers, 600 churches, and 60,000 communicants! If he mean, the *division* in 1838, then whom does he mean by *the* Presbyterian Church. If the "Old School" party, when was it that "*the* Presbyterian church consented," &c.? The truth is, "*the* Presbyterian church" were satisfied with excising in 1837 four Synods, as this would ever afterwards secure a majority on one side; whereas, if all this was founded "upon *doctrinal* questions deemed fundamental," a number of *other* Synods and Presbyteries *ought* to have fallen by the same blow, with the proviso that any *orthodox* members would be welcomed back again. How is this? Was the consent to "dismemberment" a plan first to secure a permanent majority in the General Assembly, and then afterwards to sift out "New School" men by the process of discipline? This is a strange way to settle "*doctrinal* questions." The sentence is justly liable to exceptions upon any construction of which it is susceptible.

fair presumption, its *writer* ! Among other things, he, acting with others, did solemnly publish and declare the following:—namely, “nor do we believe that the *controversies* which have arisen in our church, have resulted from a *difference in doctrinal belief* ; but, in our opinion, they have arisen partly from a diversity of views in relation to the policy to be pursued by the benevolent operations of the day, and partly from *the love of power and the disposition to dictate*, which, we are constrained to believe, has been manifested for many years by a *portion* of the Presbyterian Church ;” also that there is no truth “in the complaints of the *spread of false doctrines* ;” also that “the great doctrines of grace, as held by Edwards, and Bellamy, and Dwight, are *uniformly received* ;” also that “*we should be found false witnesses for God, were we to bear a different testimony.*”

These two classes of perceptions, in such palpable contradiction of each other, suggest the Latin adage:—*Tempora mutantur, et nos in illis mutamur*. We feel, though for a different reason, somewhat as did Cicero, when opening his first oration against Cataline:—“*Quousque tandem abutere, Catalina, patientia nostra?*” When Dr. Lord of 1848 shall satisfactorily explain the conduct of the Rev. John C. Lord of 1837, we shall be ready to call additional witnesses to settle the question at issue: until which period we claim the privilege of looking on very quietly, not seeing the Romanism, the perversion of these “principles,” &c., which he *now* thinks he saw, though *when* he saw he thought otherwise. He is an admirable witness against himself. To those who place any confidence in his modern testimony, we commend his testimony in 1837 ; we do this with the more assurance, since in 1837 he was an eye-witness, and had as yet undergone no *metamorphoses*.

To reply to what the Dr. *now* says of the causes of the excision and division, would be to write a volume. It is a plain fact of history, that the excision was concocted in an extra-constitutional convention ; and that one of the chief leaders of this measure did on the floor of the General Assembly urge its adoption upon the ground, that it was necessary to secure an “Old School” majority, in future Assemblies. As to the division, it is also historically true, that its ground, so far as the “New School” had any participation in the act, was the refusal of the officers of the previous Assembly constitutionally to organize the body, by admitting to their seats all the commissioners ; but for which refusal there would have been no division by their action. The Dr. calls this division “a dismemberment ;” according to the diction of Mr. C. it is “*that secession*”—“a new organization.” It were well if these brethren were a little more *modest* upon this tender point. Have they forgotten, that *the only tribunal where this subject was ever tried*

<sup>1</sup> Wisner's Review.—p. 12.

upon its naked merits, decided that the act of the "New School" was no "secession," or "division," but a *constitutional organization of the General Assembly*? Have they forgotten, that though the court in Banc did grant a motion for a new trial, yet, in the case of the Presbyterian Church of York, Pennsylvania, this same court, by the lips of its Chief Justice, did refer to its previous action in the following *explanatory* manner: "It was not because the minority were thought to be anything else than Presbyterians, but because a popular body is known only by its government, or head:

\* \* \* \* Indeed, the measure (the excising violence), would seem to have been as decisively *revolutionary*, as would be an exclusion of particular states from the Federal Union, for the adoption of an *anti-republican* form of government. \* \* \*

That the Old School party acceded to the privileges and property of the Assembly, was not because it was more Presbyterian than the other, but because it was stronger; for had it been the weaker, it would have been the party excluded." Have they forgotten that after the order for a new trial, several suits were instituted by "Old School" minorities in "New School" churches, with a view to take the church property by force of law; and that every one of these was decided in favor of the "New School?" The above are matters of fact: and when Mr. C. shall have leisure to read page 209 of his work, we commend to him the consideration of these facts. "Here," (that is in the Papacy of the "New School"), says the Dr. "was the cause of the division in the Presbyterian Church." No: say history and truth; this cause was the excision (pronounced "revolutionary," by Chief Justice Gibson), with other measures as unconstitutional as itself. "On the one side," (the "New School") says Dr. Lord, "were numbers, wealth, and power, on the other, the truth," but not "numbers, wealth, and power," to make the contrast symmetrical. If so, then, according to Chief Justice Gibson, the "New School" would be "*the General Assembly*." It is very true that "the controversies" led to the excision; but we have the authority of the Rev. John C. Lord for referring to "*the love of power, and the disposition to dictate*," in explanation of those controversies, a theory not unsuitable to the painful and mournful facts of the past. We should be very glad to omit any reference to these things; and would do so, if the Dr. did not compel the reference by the grossness of his mistakes. His *modern* theory of "the division," is not only not his *former* theory, but it lacks the essential element of truth. It is *unfortunate* that the Dr. should have been the man to write the "Introduction." This work might have been committed to one in less embarrassed circumstances.

We proceed to charge him with a *third* mistake. "Yet with some reservations, evasions, and apologies, the New York Evan-

<sup>1</sup> History of all the Religious Denominations in the United States.—p. 622.

gelist, *the organ of the New School Presbyterians*, (!!) substantially vindicates this denial of "the faith once delivered to the saints," and caricatures, after the manner of the Romish divines, the very doctrines which are plainly taught in the Confession of Faith, which every Presbyterian minister subscribes at his ordination."—p. 13, 14.

In the trial of a cause, entitled "Dr. Lord *versus* the New York Evangelist," we have no disposition to meddle with the one or the other. What the plaintiff says, the defendant may take as he pleases, and treat as he likes, having evinced a sufficient degree of editorial ability not to be in any special need of foreign help. We desire, however, to say in his behalf, one thing; namely, of whatever offences he may be guilty, he is not guilty of being the editor of "*the organ of the New School Presbyterians*." He speaks not upon their, but upon his own authority. The simple and plain truth, without any poetry, is, that they have no "organ," and never have had, unless it be the Confession of Faith. They do not own the value of a dollar in the New York Evangelist, or control a paragraph, any more than the Congregationalists of New England. They have never made it *their* "organ" by any act. It does not speak by their authority, or responsibly represent them. If, therefore, the Dr. in his *weekly* reading of this paper shall find anything wrong, we hope he will settle the account with the editor, and leave the "New School Presbyterians" to answer for themselves. We do not like such a *fruitful fancy* in the grave matters of orthodoxy and honesty. We would not notice this, if it were not the way in which some men throw out *hints*, intending that they shall answer as a substitute for facts.

Having noted three of the Dr.'s mistakes, we now propose to look at his *anecdote* about Massachusetts, Andover, &c., and having done this, we shall bid the "Introduction" farewell. We will give the anecdote to the reader just as the Dr. gives it to the public. It is an extract from the Presbyterian. As it appears in the Introduction, it seems that *somebody*, without a name, whether a minister or not, or even a Christian, is not said—only *somebody*, no less a personality than one certain "Me," happened to witness, *somewhere* in Massachusetts, the examination of a candidate for the ministry, by a certain "council," also without a name; in which were developed "views of theology," "generally understood to be the same as now taught at Andover." This Mr. "Me" narrates these "views," as he "understood" them, with his comments; namely, he gives his *impressions*, not the questions of the council, or the answers of the candidate; he submits "this bold denial of the faith," not, as he affirms, "without note or comment," for the whole story is nothing but note and comment. The Dr. *picks up* this newspaper rumor with avidity, and introduces it to the pub-

lic with the following *premonitory* symptom: "But that all may see that we are dealing with realities, and speaking of things not of a former age, or among another generation, the following account of a recent examination of a candidate in theology is extracted from the Presbyterian;" and then closes with an expression of horror: "The Romish doctors who resisted Luther, never departed so far from the truth. The theology of the Council of Trent is hardly so corrupt, or so barefaced a denial of the doctrines of the gospel."—p. 12, 13.

How shall his case be met!! Suppose it to have been much worse than it was, according to the impressions of this *unknown observer*; we would respectfully ask what has all this to do with heresy among "New School Presbyterians?" Where are we in this nineteenth century, when men are themselves not only, but almost everybody else, if they happen to be "New School" men? We might dismiss this anecdote by simply saying, that it is about the *weakest*, though not the *worst*, item in this notable "Introduction." We feel, however, inclined to suggest, for the consideration of impartial men, the equity of picking up a *hear-say* story, that has not even the name of a responsible author, and *blazoning* it abroad as a *specimen* fact. We apprehend that the "new professor of theology at Andover," the council and the candidate, would much prefer to state their own opinions, and be judged by them. It is no wonder that a man who takes this course, can see heresy; the wonder is that he can see anything else. The Dr. does not seem to dream that the views may have been discolored, and even caricatured by the *medium* through which they came. If he wants such proofs that Andover is unsound, and "the new professor" worse than the "Romish doctors," we can put him in the way of getting them to almost any extent; yet we will not pledge him the public confidence in the use of them.<sup>1</sup> We would suggest, also,

<sup>1</sup> In the "Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review," for Oct., 1848.—p. 619, the reader will find some very appropriate comments, touching the very point, in reference to which we think Dr. Lord not free from a just censure. The comments appear in an editorial notice of two sermons, entitled, "The Fathers and their Children," preached by the Rev. W. W. Eells, of Newburyport. "In a prefatory note," the author of the Sermons observes, in regard to the doctrinal defections of orthodox Congregationalists in New England, "the doctrinal defections set forth have been taken from the notes of lectures delivered by a most popular professor of theology." Upon this mode of gaining "evidence," the Biblical Repertory remarks, "We must express our disapprobation of any such method of attaining evidence. No man should be held responsible for the notes of a hearer. Every teacher knows that he is liable to be misapprehended even from notes literally correct. Much depends on the connexion, and much on the explanations given at the moment. It is, however, not merely on account of a liability to error that we object to this method, but we regard it as unfair to the lecturer." It is a striking coincidence, that the correspondent who furnished for the columns of the Presbyterian the story about "Theology in Massachusetts," over the initials "W. W. E.," and who was subsequently

that this terrible fire against "New School Presbyterians," by no very equivocal signs applies equally to the orthodox Congregationalists of New England. They come in for a share in the *therapeutic* efficacy of this modern western panacea.

Had we the time, it would be an interesting work to draw up a schedule of the Dr.'s ideas of orthodoxy, by taking the opposite of the "views" stated in this anecdote, and by him pronounced to be heresy. This would be too long a work. Take a specimen or two of the heresy. "The law of God will stand forever a broken law, having never received the obedience which it demands, nor the penalty which it denounces against the transgressor." This said the candidate, as saith the reporter. Is it heresy to affirm that when a man has broken God's law, *he has broken God's law*, and that this fact will forever remain a fact; and that if he is pardoned he will not be punished? Then common sense is heresy. Give us the chapter in the Bible, or the Confession of Faith, to prove the heresy of such an affirmation. Again, "sin was defined to be actual transgression exclusively," though the candidate held to "original sin," in the sense of "a disordered state," "a *bias*" to sin. Not to discuss this matter in the present connection, we will submit to the Dr. an "Old School" definition of sin. "This is what we mean by sin. I know of *no other sin* in the empire of Jehovah except this. When we say that men are *sinner*s, we *mean* to say, they are the *doers and perpetrators* of this foul deed." This is one of the points in the candidate's "barefaced" denial of the truth; and in the "dissertation" of Dr. Spring it is presented more strongly, than by the candidate himself, according to the reporter's impressions. Is Dr. Spring also a heretic? We will not follow this analysis; we only wish to show what *might* be done, if this were the place for it. It is really a logical misfortune that the Dr.'s eye met this anecdote. It makes up nearly one-fourth of the whole "Introduction." But we are done with this "Introduction;" the reader may now take it, and form his own opinions, dissenting or agreeing with the thoughts of the reviewer, as shall best suit his sense of truth.

announced as the Rev. W. W. Eells, of Newburyport, is the identical man, whose second performance of a similar character is the ground of the preceding rebuke. We would respectfully commend the language of this rebuke to the attention of Dr. Lord.

<sup>1</sup> Dissertation on Native Depravity by Gardiner Spring, D.D. New York, p. 9. In this "Dissertation," Dr. Spring holds, that all sin is resolvable into the *actions* of moral agents; that there is "no other sin in the empire of Jehovah except this," differing from Drs. Hopkins, Emmons, Dwight, Woods, Professor Stuart, &c., in maintaining that infants *act sinfully from the first moment after their birth*—agreeing with the New Haven divines as to the *nature* of sin, but asserting a proposition as to the *period of its commencement*, which they neither affirm nor deny; also rejecting the doctrine of *original sin*, as held by a certain class of Calvinists. We commend this "Dissertation" to Dr. Lord and Mr. C., as a very good theme for another book on "Differences."



IV. The next field upon which we purpose to enter, is the *quo animo* of this entire performance. This will be sufficiently ascertained by attentively studying the first, the ninth, and tenth chapters. That the reader may have a fair opportunity to judge for himself, and not trust to the impressions of the reviewer, we will submit these chapters in the form of an abridgement, adding some exegetical remarks to make the text more lucid.

Chapter I.—Assuring us, that “the divisions” between “Old and New School Presbyterians,” are very properly the occasion of painful “emotions,” the author concludes, that “whatever can be done to *unite in one body* those who are already united in their views of Church government, and of doctrinal and experimental religion, ought to be done by the friends of Zion.” Passing from this very liberal posture, he explains the nature of the excision in 1837; where we learn that though supposed to involve the excision of “four synods,” still, “it really separated no single Presbyterian minister or church from the General Assembly.” The “secession,” as he terms the constitutional Assembly of 1838, “cannot be believed to have” resulted from “the act of 1837.” Commenting upon this “new organization,” with other incidental matters, he hastens to give us a pretty bold *hint* of what we shall hear more in ‘due season. “What great and good end has been attained by these various novelties in Presbyterianism? and what can *we* expect to gain by that other proposed novelty, an *independent* Synod in *western* New York? If brethren are dissatisfied with their present connection with the synod of *Genesee*, why do they not at once unite with the synod of Buffalo?” Accompanying this inquiry with a little of his peculiar logic, he then tells the “brethren,” that they will never “join *us* in a body.” “If they ever resume their connection with *our* church, they will do it as others have done it; they will do it as individuals and as churches.” “If they wait until the *Rochester Presbytery*, or any other Presbytery in the Synod of Genesee, shall, as a *body*, correct its errors, abandon its Pelagianism, and resume its connection with the General Assembly, they *may* wait till their cold remains and mine shall moulder underneath the clods of the valley.” Diverging for a running comment on “organizations,” “excision,” “secession,” “truth,” and “error,” the state of things once in “Judea,” “the Church of Rome,” “the council of Constance,” the respective policies of “Whitfield” and “Wesley,” *et cetera*; he returns to his task. “Those Presbyterians, who *remain* in the *New School* organization to reform it, or who unite with it from *our* body for that purpose, are worse than dead to *us*, and to the cause of reform.” Arguing this thesis from the history of the past, and “the impropriety of the course itself,” he observes, “no enlightened friend of *our* church can pursue it long, with an *honest* design to benefit *our* cause; which thought he enforces by adding, that “he places

himself at once in opposition to it (our cause) by his *position*, his *efforts* and his *influence*. Disposing of the first two reasons, he comes to the *third*, the one of "influence." "Those also who are in an *unsound* connection by this influence will remain there from the same cause, and their *names*, their *property*, and their *offspring*, will be lost to *our* church. In a few more years, the present incumbents of these (western) pulpits will be no more; and however useful they may have been in their personal ministry, they cannot control the succession. That is in other hands, and will be much more likely to take its complexion from the living than from the dead; from the body in which they have left their churches than from the *pastor's* remembered wishes." Having thus exploded the insane policy of "these brethren," whether laical or clerical, who remain in the "New School" connection, and do not "at once unite with the synod of Buffalo," he is prepared to blow the trumpet of war. He declares, that "the churches" are deceived, having in Western New York heard but "one side of the question;" that they do not know where they are, *ecclesiastically*, thinking themselves to be in the Presbyterian Church, when they are not, but in "a new organization," and that did they know this, "there are many *decided* Presbyterians who would not long remain where they are, but would avail themselves of the earliest favorable opportunity of carrying out the provisions of the act of 1837, and would resume their connection with *our* church." He then presents a fearful object: namely, "men (ministers we suppose), who tremble in their places lest the truth should be known on this subject;" and having lectured them for suppressing "inquiry," and deceiving these "decided Presbyterians" by "scandalous imputations," and "false issues," himself disclaiming the use of all "such weapons," he bringeth his first lesson to a close.

To say nothing of mistakes in regard to facts, false reasonings, and "scandalous imputations" against "New School Presbyterians," we feel inclined to ask the reader this simple question;—*What do you think Mr. C. very much wishes to accomplish, if he can?* Is it not apparent, that his eye is turned especially towards *Western* New York; that in this region there is a Synod called "the Synod of Buffalo," "Old School," by an unquestionable presumption; that in Mr. C.'s opinion there are ministers, churches, and private Christians, who, though connected with the Synod of Genesee, might perhaps be persuaded to join the Synod of Buffalo? Unless Mr. C., endorsed by Dr. Lord, has become a strange dreamer, the affirmative of these questions must be true? All this may be very simple to *Western* Presbyterians. What then is the burden of this song about "Pelagianism" and other heresies of the Presbytery of Rochester and the other "New School" Presbyteries? In plain speech, proceeding solely upon the authority of

Mr. C., we would express our conceptions in the following paraphrase:—

Gentlemen ;—"decided Presbyterians" that you are—members of the Synod of Genesee, or of churches under its care ; you are not where you ought to be, since said Synod is neither Presbyterian, nor orthodox, but connected with a "new organization," and that, too, heretical. If you stay where you are, then your *names*, your *property*, and your *offspring* will not accrue to the benefit of *our* cause. The Synod of *Buffalo*, though a modern growth, yet, being connected with *THE* Assembly, and, therefore, presumptively and by *our* authority orthodox, is your proper home. Being dissatisfied with the heretical and Pelagian Synod of Genesee, why do you not at once unite with the Synod of Buffalo, especially since the former did not rebuke their Moderator for preaching in his Synodical Sermon, the awful heresy, *that Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law* ? You have been told, that the act of 1837 put you *out* of the Presbyterian Church ; but this is a mistake : you are not out, but *in* ; and that you are *in*, you can easily prove by *coming in* ; namely, by resuming your connection with *THE* General Assembly ; namely, by at once uniting with the Synod of *Buffalo*, not waiting to come as a body, but being contented to come as individuals and churches. In this way you will control the *succession*. It is very important that *we*—namely *you* and *ourselves*—not differing in doctrine, should be united in one body. Come, and you shall have *our* confidence ; otherwise you shall not.

What of all this ? says the reader. *Nothing—just nothing, in one sense*. If the author wants these "decided Presbyterians," and they want him or his "cause," we have not the least objection to their mutual gratification in the use of fair means. We have no zeal for "our cause" that would be offended, if there were *forty* Synods of Buffalo, and as many Mr. Cheesemans, provided they would attend to their legitimate work. We could rejoice in their prosperity, with not the slightest pleasure in their adversity, if they were founded upon Christ. But, should they assail us as a means to a *sectarian end*—should they write a book bearing this mark as plainly as it did a title page—should *third* persons choose to commend this lovely performance ; then, peradventure, we might deem a reply appropriate, and in that reply some exposure of the *quo animo* not out of place. This will help all candid and honest men, not excepting these "decided Presbyterians," to judge a righteous judgment in the premises. "New School Presbyterians" have been made the objects of a certain kind of *slang* from certain sources, quite long enough to establish a good reputation for *patience*. Some of their accusers have been far more famous for preaching against *heresy*, than for preaching the *truth* ; for *alarming* the churches, than for *winning* souls to

Christ; for making a *noise*, than for exerting a *sanctifying* power in the community. The *spirit* of these accusations is not an immaterial matter, though we shall not forget in due season to notice the sublimated pseudo-orthodoxy of their authors.

Chapter IX. Having waded through seven chapters on "Doctrinal Differences," the author at length reaches the "Basis of Union among Presbyterians," which is the theme of Chapter IX., containing the following index of matter—"What it is—The New School have departed from it—A return necessary to union." With some diffusiveness of thought and irregularity of logical gait, extending from page 204 to nearly the bottom of page 208, we are brought to the conclusion, that the Confession of Faith is the "Basis of Union among Presbyterians;" and that an *honest* subscription to the same is the duty of every one who professes to adopt it. All we have to say upon this work is, that it is labor *lost*. No one denies either proposition. If the author's logic was meant to imply any doubt on these points, in respect to the "New School" brethren; then as we did not need the logic, so we cannot thank him for the unjustifiable and false insinuation. Gravely to prove for the hearing of third persons what an opponent does not deny, is a very mean subterfuge. It is manufacturing a man of *straw* for the sake of shooting him, that somebody may hear the thunder of arms.

We admit the author's basis, and claim it for our own, and wish also to ask, Why he could not, in a scholar-like and Christian manner, state it, without on pp. 206, 207 mingling with that statement a gross caricature of "New School Presbyterians?" Whether the "Old School" will take his exposition of their faith, we shall leave them to decide; but his picture of the "New School," if not untrue in *all* respects, is yet untrue in so *many*, that it is a *slander*. We do not choose to have Mr. C. state our faith; if he does it, he must do it in *our* words, and not his own. We ask again, Why he could not give the "Basis" without the following *contemptible* aspersion. "If the New School *desire* a union with *us*, they ought first to retract their errors, and make an *honest* subscription to our standards?" p. 207. Very spicy seasoning to relieve the insipidity of an argument about union! Has it come to this, that there is no *decency* among professedly Christian men, even though they are writing for *sectarian* purposes? We let this pass, knowing as we do *where* it came from.

Having found the "Basis," the author seems to have picked up a *stray* thought (we wonder it did not occur to him in the first chapter); namely, that perhaps "these brethren," these "decided Presbyterians," may have a little *prejudice* against at once uniting with the Synod of *Buffalo* on account of the uncereceremonious manner of their excision in 1837. The memory of this event may not make them as hopeful subjects as could be desired. This

cause, according to Mr. Wisner, liked to have lost to the "Old School" the services of Dr. Lord himself, and carried him, *toto corpore*, into the Dutch Reformed Church.<sup>1</sup> Here is a difficulty, a *real* one; it must be met; Mr. C. is equal to the task. "To approve or condemn it (the excision) is not, with *us*, an article of faith, or a condition of union. We do not believe in the infallibility of Ecumenical Councils, or of General Assemblies," &c. "But whether our views on this subject (the excision) are correct or not, can be but of *small* moment," since "each one has but to comply with the order and direction of the Assembly, and avail himself of the provisions made for him in the act itself, by uniting with the nearest contiguous presbytery, and *every difficulty is overcome*." This special pleading takes counsel from the late war with Mexico, and cautions patriotic feeling not to be treasonable, though it condemn the war. These "decided Presbyterians" must do likewise; namely, so far as Mr. C. is concerned; think what you please about the excision; we shall not be particular upon this point, if you will only come to the "benefit" of "*our* cause."

Thus, we understand the allusion to, and argument upon the excising act. For what other logical purpose he could bring it into this connection, than to prepare a plausible *cataplasm* to soften the rigidity of some Western prejudices, we are not able to see. A man's logic sometimes shows his heart. Whether the remedy will be equal to the disease, we cannot tell; yet, as a gentle modifier of its action, we commend to these "decided Presbyterians" the other doctrine of Mr. C., namely that a man should seek to occupy such an ecclesiastical position, as will most faithfully express his views; leaving them to decide whether the excision be a suitable case for the application of this rule.

The reader will be patient, for we are coming to the point; all this is to get the door open, to get the difficulties out of the way. The door is open—"already thrown open as wide as it ought, and as wide as it can be." Mr. C. having by much labor found the "Basis," and having vanquished the western prejudice by kindly consenting to accommodate it, is ready to carry all before him. He lets off a whole *broadside*, going on nearly to the end of the chapter, against the "New School Presbyterians." They have done almost everything that is bad; made "breaches;" "entered the bosom of our peaceful family, and bred heresy, strife, and debate in it;" "*trodden in the dust the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the valley*;" "broken down our hedges, *led away our children, and decoyed our people*;" they have done evil;" "they have departed;" have gone out from us; they are "the aggressors," "their suit at law" "originated wholly with themselves," and in it they were not "brotherly or peaceable;" "their cause is wanting in integrity;" let them repent; "to make reparation

<sup>1</sup> Wisner's Review, pp. 20, 21.

belongs to them," &c., &c. Read page 209, and onward, for a declaration of grievances; and if you have tears to shed, prepare to shed them now.

But, be calm; let us ask, What does all this mean, as part of a chapter upon the "Basis of Union among Presbyterians," and after such cautious preparation for a thorough cannonading? We have been watching this *manœuvre*, and trying to catch the *animus* of this *portentous whine*, and being somewhat collected, have perceived, as we think, the order of battle. Mr. C. now proposes to *scare out* these "decided Presbyterians," by telling them once more among what an *awful* people they are ecclesiastically living. Of course, they can no longer maintain a union with such a people; neither need they do so, for Mr. C. is before them with the "Basis" in one hand, and the compromise of prejudice in the other, and *the Synod of Buffalo is not far off*; the whole "difficulty is overcome." There never was a clearer case! For fear, however, they may not come, he sweeps down "Drs. Cox, Beman, Beecher, Duffield, and Mr. Barnes;" and when these *chieftains*, some of them *venerable*, are no more, then a regular enflaming fire scatters dismay and death among the "New School" Presbyterians; opening wide their agitated columns; all for the benefit of these "*decided Presbyterians!*" Surely now they can get out, and they *will* get out. They have the combined advantages of concussion and light. Being themselves "sound in the faith," though by a mistake caught in a "new organization," and, withal, not upon the "Basis," as they had supposed, they will at once take up their departure. They stay there! Not they, until the will ceases to be determined by the greatest apparent good. This mighty war of words is not a converting benediction to win these "New School" heretics, though, peradventure, they would all be orthodox if they would only come. These "decided Presbyterians" are the men whom the author, by his own showing, wishes to help into the Synod of Buffalo. If they can once be separated from the "New School," and then taught to avoid the foolish novelty of "*an independent Synod in Western New York,*" the way will be clear for them to "resume their connection with *our church.*" And as to the "New School" themselves, if they "desire a union with us," the plan is very simple; they must "retract their errors, and make an honest subscription to our standards." Mr. C. surely has one merit; *he tells us very plainly what he wants*—for what he wrote his book; giving us the opportunity to take this knowledge into the account for the benefit of all parties, *himself not excepted*. We ask those who have commended his labors in somewhat flattering terms, whether they have read Chap. IX., and if so, whether they really mean to make themselves parties to the slanders of his pen?

Chapter X.—This is a "*Plsa* for union among Presbyterians"

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—the next thing in the order of nature to a "Basis of Union." The preliminary matter goes back to first principles; and is designed to illustrate two propositions; namely, "A union desirable—Division among Christians an evil." We shall not burden this paper with all the *sundries* of this argument; for we have no special objections to urge, at least, in the present connection. The author finally reaches "the grand remedy" for divisions, which is "to elevate among *ourselves* the standard of orthodoxy and piety." Having become somewhat familiar with his *ecclesiastical pathology*, we at once supposed this idea was to be turned to a special purpose, and by reading on found that the conjecture was not far from the truth. Let us then listen to the "Plea for union among *Presbyterians*."

To the first thought, as an abstract thesis, we are disposed to say, amen. It is the general principle, that when practicable and not prevented by higher considerations (conditions omitted by the author) "every minister and every communicant ought to express truthfully their respective (we suppose he means *peculiar*) views, by their position in the visible church." For the application of this thought, he observes—"No man can, without a change in his sentiments, be an Old School Presbyterian in one end of the State, and a New School Presbyterian in the other, and be an honest man." Many circumstances may make it *expedient* for a man who has been connected with an "Old School" church in one end of the State, to be connected with a "New School" church in the other, and *vice versa*; and we would not in all cases declare such a transition to be a breach of honesty. The fact is, *theologically* considered, there are a great many "Old School" men in the "New School" connection, and perhaps as many "New School" men in the "Old School" connection. They are passing and re-passing from the one to the other. We will not, as does the author, assume the responsibility of a *condemnatory* judgment in all these cases; nevertheless, we ask no favors for those who make the transition merely as a matter of selfish policy, who are "in the market to be bought for a piece of bread." They are a class of men with whom we have no sympathy, and for whom no respect—a *genus* of humanity, whose principles do not bear transportation. It becomes the author, however, to speak very *modestly* of such men, lest he may be justly involved in the same condemnation; for, as saith the Biblical Repertory, he "was once a zealous New School and New Measure man;" and has, therefore, once, *at least*, turned his coat. A man who had never been guilty of the transition, might, perhaps, have cleaner hands, and speak of "these pliable consciences" with more authority.

Having proposed the above thesis for the hearing of these "decided Presbyterians," Mr. C. is now ready to give them a hint in very general terms, with a very pithy reference to a *local* allusion.

"Those Old School Men who come into places where the New School have the *majority*, in wealth and influence, and unite with them on that account, must expect to lose *cast* with their former brethren ; if they claim that they have changed their friends only, and not their sentiments, they publish their own shame." After more of the like, excepting that some of it is a little more *pathetic*, especially the reference to "their *suffering* brethren" (a sad thing to be an "Old School" man living where the "New School" have the majority!!), he observes—"it is a blessing to any denomination, to be quit of all such unstable, not to say unprincipled adherents." So far the "Plea" is a mixture of pathos, indignation, denunciation, moral appeal, with the addition of the doctrine of "*cast*"—to borrow Ovid's description of chaos, a very "*rudis indigestaque moles*." All this applies to "those Old School men who come"—whether he means who *have* come, or *are* coming, or *will* come, or all three, is not exactly clear. At any rate, they "come into places where the New School have the majority."

We think the inside of this whole matter may be seen without the gift of *clairvoyance*. Mr. C. lives in a region in which, if we are correctly informed, the "New School" have a very decided "majority" over their brethren of the "Old School," in the important article of ministers and churches, as the latter have over the former in other regions. We state this as a fact, without any special joy or grief. We suppose in this age, it is no uncommon occurrence for "Old School" men to "come into places where the New School have the majority," and, not thinking as badly of the latter as does Mr. C., to connect themselves with "New School" churches ; since they cannot find those of their *first* preference within a convenient distance. This common practice of both Schools is a living proof of their mutual confidence. We of the "New School," having no piques or prejudices against these migrating brethren of the "Old School," are willing in all charity to receive them, if this be their desire—hoping, in the meantime, that they will not join us, because we "have the majority in wealth and influence." We act on this principle because we believe that the *essential, substantial* Christianity of the two Schools is one. It does not, however, seem to have occurred to Mr. C.; that these "Old School men" could unite with "New School" churches for any reason, but the *contemptible* one he names : or that possibly they might not agree with him as to the orthodoxy of said churches ; forgetting on the one hand that even "Old School men" have *bodies*, and cannot, therefore,

<sup>1</sup> It is a circumstance that will not escape the notice of the careful reader, that the author's reasoning respects the transition from Old School to New. What would be the nature of a transition from New School to Old, he is not so particular to consider. What position of mind this indicates, let every man judge for himself.



move over long distances on the Sabbath ; and assuming on the other, that they are all upon the identical line of himself. We offer the above suggestion slightly to abate his horror at the obliquity of the deed. For ourselves, having less disposition to strain denominational lines, or make a foolish glorification over our excellent standards of doctrine and polity, we have less occasion to send thunderbolts after those who leave us. We will not guess evil of their motives ; but bid them God-speed if they stay, and God-speed if they go—hoping to meet them all in heaven in either case.

Among the arguments presented in this wonderful "Plea," is the doctrine of "cast." This seems to have peculiar charms with the author, as he takes no little pains to press it home. "If we unite with the New School body, or *remain* in it, and expect to be *regarded* as Old School men, our expectation is no compliment either to our understanding or to our integrity ; our motives will be duly appreciated in the end, and our moral worth weighed in the balances." Rather a *low* level of argumentation with these "decided Presbyterians !" Politicians might, perhaps, do something at this level—hinting that the dispensation of "spoils" was yet to come, and that a *name* might then be worth something to a man ; but it will not be easy to corner *Christian* men in this way. It is a kind of argument that proves best when not uttered *too loud*. The better way is not to publish, but to whisper it. Suppose that "we" care very little about the *name* of "Old" or "New School," that we are ashamed of neither, and do not specially glory in either, that "we" have not excogitated any particular expectations about the mere name, that "we" are too old to be caught by theological *cant* ; then, alas, the author will have spoken in vain ; he may then weigh us in whatever "balances" he chooses. "We" shall not be particularly anxious to know how many *ounces* of "New School," or "Old," he detects in our composition.

The author has a closing word for a certain "*third* party," claiming to be "no party," favoring "an independent Synod in Western New York." He gives them a short lecture. They "are not believed to be what their professions imply," they "are regarded as imbittered partizans." They are not working for a "union of Presbyterians," but for "a new division of the *church*," for which there is "no demand." He tells the "third party," that there is "no call for the organization of an independent Synod in Western New York ;" and explains his motive for saying this—"I say this to take away the apology from those who profess to be Old School Presbyterians, and yet refuse to unite with us, because they expect to have a third organization. I do not say it to *prevent* such an organization—it needs nothing to prevent it, for it will never exist. The very idea itself has almost ceased to amuse the fancy of any sober man, in the shape

of a rational probability." It is amusing to see how some men can contradict themselves, almost in the same breath. The author began as if this "third party" was really a formidable affair, and, yet, after taking a turn or two, he virtually says: Nonsense! Why, the "third party" is dead! yes, dead! "the very idea itself has almost ceased to *amuse the fancy of any sober man*, in the shape of a rational probability!" The nature of his objection to this "third party," that is, and is not at the same time, is quite as clear as the objection itself. He does not like it, because, peradventure it might absorb some *material* which he wishes to work into the Synod of Buffalo. "I say this to take away the apology from those who profess to be *Old School* Presbyterians, and yet refuse to *unite with us*, because they expect to have a third organization."

We have now finished the analysis of the three chapters, in which we proposed to seek the *quo animo* of this whole performance. It is nothing more or less than a new crusade against a large and respectable portion of the church of Christ, for a *local, sectarian* purpose. If this be not the fact, then it is perfectly unaccountable that it should carry with it so many evidences of such a fact. These chapters, properly speaking, have no more relation to the subject of "Doctrinal Differences," than to the nebula in Orion, except as such a relation shall be created by the author's state of mind. Himself is the connecting link. We do not complain that he is an "Old School Presbyterian;" we know very many such whom we love and admire; but we do complain of his *abuses*. Even these, bad as they are, might have been passed *sub silentio*, had they not been *seconded* by others, who had they studied his work more, would perhaps have commended it less. If any *other* denomination of professing Christians, "occupying an independent position, and not necessarily involved in the controversy between the divided branches of the Presbyterian Church," though "by no means an uninterested spectator," is prepared to make itself *particeps criminis* in this matter, by commending the book to the "friends of truth," on account of its "able discrimination and sound reasoning;" we hope such denomination will first *read*, and then inwardly digest; and if after this the commendation is to be continued, we can only say, but not without much grief of heart, and vivid sense of the injustice—*so let it be*. Those who hold "the theology current in the New School body," will perhaps by and by conclude themselves to be *lawful* prey, at least, so far as their "hidden evasions and indirections, and concealed and guarded opposition to truth" may be concerned.<sup>1</sup> The endorsement of such a book, if intelligently made, made after a thorough reading and full understanding of its contents and design, is not merely a *discourtesy*; it is the infliction of a serious wrong upon

<sup>1</sup>Remarks in the Christian Intelligencer.

those whom the book accuses. The author's production is, from first to last, an acrimonious philippic against, and misrepresentation of, "New School Presbyterians," as the *modus operandi* of a purpose, which he has had neither the modesty nor the wisdom to conceal. The Biblical Repertory fails to perceive "any acrimony of style or bitterness of spirit in this composition." We suppose there were none in the exhortations of the Romish inquisitors; but *that all was very pious*. For ourselves we love *calumny* and *sectarianism* neither more nor less, because wrapped in a holy envelope.

In offering the foregoing strictures upon the "Introductory Chapter," of Dr. Lord, and also the first, ninth, and tenth chapters, by Mr. Cheeseman, we desire to be distinctly understood as not meaning, even by the remotest implication, to apply them to "Old School" Presbyterians, as a *body* of Christian men. We are well aware that there are many *kinds* of "Old School" Presbyterians, as well as "New School;" that none of them are perfect; and that some of both classes seem much farther from this desirable state than others. We belong to that comparatively retired class of Presbyterians (we think it includes the great majority both of ministers and laymen in the two sections of the Presbyterian church), who do not, and never did believe, that there were any "doctrinal differences" of so serious a character, as to demand the painful rupture which has occurred. We are prepared to admit that there were, and still are, "differences," greater or less according to the particular specimens of "Old and New School" men that shall be taken as the basis of comparison. The time never was, and perhaps, in this world, never will be, when all these "differences" shall cease to exist. In the language of the Biblical Repertory, we say, "The Confession, as framed by the Westminster divines, was an acknowledged compromise between two classes of theologians. When adopted by the Presbyterian Church in this country, it was with the distinct understanding that the mode of subscription did not imply strict uniformity of views. And from that time to this there has been an open and avowed diversity of opinion, on many points among those who adopted the Confession of Faith, without leading to the suspicion of insincerity or dishonesty."—vol. iii. These diversities, to a great extent, have related to "the decision of some point in mental or moral science." Hence it is that they "are in a great measure confined to *professed* theologians, clergymen, or laymen." Hence we should learn "to separate the *human* from the *divine* element in our theology; and to be careful not to clothe the figments of our minds with the awful authority of God, and denounce our brethren for not believing him, when they do not agree with us."—Bib. Reper., vol. ii., new series. Not *all* differences, though real, are fundamental. We suppose that the members—ministers

and laymen, that constitute the "Old School" portion of the Presbyterian church, would be found to differ very considerably, upon a minute and detailed comparison of views. The same is true of the "New School"—true of any denomination that ever did, or ever will exist on the earth. A mere title, however much it may be coveted by some, or repudiated by others, makes no difference as to the facts. Men are men: and they have their ideas; and no system of ecclesiastical consolidation and congregation can destroy what is peculiar and specific in those ideas, or make that which is common any *more* common than God's grace has already made it. Christians of the same sect, and of different sects, though not liberal against the truth, need to look at this subject with catholic minds and charitable hearts. Those who are polemical, who become leaders of a party in the church, who write books to magnify "differences," are in great danger of striving about "words to no profit." Leaders are of great service when they lead in the *right* direction, and of as little service when they lead in the *wrong* direction. They have the infirmities of men, and the dangers of position; and they need great grace to do good, and not harm. Believing, as we do, that the real differences between "Old and New School Presbyterians" should never have alienated and separated brethren from each other, we are compelled to believe that the *manner* in which those differences have been treated, perhaps by both parties, is capable of great improvement. The want of a proper spirit of moderation and Christian charity led to the division of the Synod of Philadelphia, resulting in the formation of the Synod of New York, in 1745. The two Synods continued separate till 1758, when they were united in one body, taking the name of the "Synod of New York and Philadelphia." In the plan of union agreed upon between the two Synods, they speak of "*compromising* those differences, which were agitated many years ago with too great warmth and animosity." They earnestly recommended to all under their care, "that instead of indulging a contentious disposition, they would love each other with a pure heart fervently, as brethren who profess subjection to the same Lord, adhere to the same faith, worship, and government, and entertain the same hope of glory."—Records of Presbyterian church, pp. 286, 288. These, we think, were their "sober second thoughts," creditable alike to their wisdom and piety.

Cherishing the views expressed in the above paragraph, we confess we have felt a sense of grief and sorrow, while reading Mr. Cheeseman's book. His purpose we have endeavored to expose; and if in our construction of that purpose we are mistaken, then we should despair of ever learning from a book the design of its writer. His argumentative skill, his fidelity in the statement of facts, his copious use of authorities to prove what are the doctrinal sentiments of the respective schools; these are matters for

future consideration. Had we no means of judging besides that furnished by Mr. C., we should suppose that the two Schools were as wide apart as the poles—that they hardly held anything in common, not even the grace of Christian honesty. How diametrically opposed, however, is his picture to the plain facts! The translation, by certificate, of church members from one section to the other of the Presbyterian church, is a matter of daily occurrence. The exchange of pulpits is a very common practice among the ministers of these respective branches of our once united church. We have known repeated instances, in which candidates for the ministry have been licensed to preach the gospel in one School, and ordained in the other, without the slightest change of theological sentiments. These facts testify loudly, very loudly, against the clamorous cry of heresy, Papacy, Unitarianism, Pelagianism, &c., in vociferating which a few brethren spend so much of their time and breath. The fact is, the great majority of both Schools, ministers and laymen, act, and always have acted, except in the heat of controversy, as if there was not a word of truth in all this noise. That there are some “differences” we have already confessed; but that they are not incompatible with an honest subscription to the same standards, and the saving power of Christianity in the heart, is what both parties (with a few exceptions), *practically* confess, in a great variety of ways. If theologians would learn to distinguish the divine from the human element in their doctrinal tenets, and assign to each its proper place; if they would learn that their interpretation of a creed, as individuals, has just as much authority, and no more, as the reasons they can furnish to establish its correctness; if they would learn not to impute to others sentiments they do not hold; if they would treat each other’s opinions with perfect candor in the sight of God, keeping their hearts free from the spirit of party; they would, without any laxness of doctrine, disturb the piety of the church less, do less harm, and much more good in this ruined world. We hope, in the progress of human thought and sound piety, the day will come when sectarianism, and differences in the church of Christ will have fewer bigots and narrow minds to vaunt their inglorious excellence. We close this article by expressing a deep-seated disapprobation of Mr. Cheeseman’s performance.

(To be continued.)

## ARTICLE II.

## BLASPHEMY OF THE HOLY GHOST.

By Rev. D. B. Cox, New York.

THE remarkable declaration of our Saviour respecting this sin, is recorded, with little variation, by the three evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke.—(Matt. 12 : 31, 32 ; Mark 3 : 28, 29 ; Luke 12 : 10.) The commonly-received interpretation of these passages is embarrassed with many difficulties, and has led to much practical error and mischief. We propose, therefore, to call to notice, and to defend, another interpretation, which has had some respectable advocates, but which, it seems to us, is not duly considered and appreciated.

Most modern commentators suppose, that blasphemy of the Holy Ghost consists in ascribing the Saviour's miracles, which were wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost, to satanic agency, and that blasphemy against the Son of Man, consisted in reviling Him for those acts which did not necessarily imply Divine interposition.

In opposition to this view, we maintain, that all the blasphemies uttered against the Saviour personally, were peculiarly against the "Son of Man," but that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is peculiar to the times subsequent to the promised advent of the Comforter, and to those persons who "do despite to the spirit of grace."

It is assumed by those who advocate the former view, that Christ designed to teach the Pharisees, with whom He was conversing, that their calumnies and revilings constituted the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. This assumption is based upon the *connection* between the record of their blasphemies and this declaration of our Saviour. In Matthew this declaration is introduced by the formula, "Wherefore," (*οὖν τοῦτο*). Mark, after recording the whole transaction, adds:—"Because they said he hath an unclean spirit." The connection, in both cases, clearly implies, that Christ considered the language of the Pharisees blasphemous, and that this blasphemy *occasioned* the remark under consideration ; but how this proves that their blasphemy was against the "Holy Ghost," rather than against the "Son of Man," it is not easy to see.

If any argument is to be built upon this connection, it surely weighs *against* the interpretation in favor of which it is urged.

Bloomfield speaks of "the extreme harshness of supposing that what was said in immediate connection with the sin of the Pharisees, was meant not to be understood of that, but of another offence which bore an affinity to it." But *two* forms of blasphemy are spoken of, in comparison with each other, and the question is, in which of the two shall the sin of the Pharisees be sought? The connection is more intimate, and the transition more natural, if we suppose that the former member of the comparison refers to the sin which gave occasion for making the comparison. The blasphemy just uttered, occupies the Saviour's thoughts. He has just instituted an argument to exhibit the absurdity it involves; and now, in comparing the enormity of this sin, with that of blasphemy in another form, He would naturally introduce *first* in the comparison that already under consideration. The harshness, therefore, belongs solely to the other interpretation.

While, therefore, the connection in which this passage stands, does not require us to find the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost in the language of the Pharisees, but rather discountenances this interpretation; there are other considerations which show that this view is entirely inadmissible.

1. The blasphemies of the Pharisees were designed to bring into contempt *the personal character and claims of the Son of Man*. For this purpose they attributed His miraculous works to satanic agency. They said that He cast out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils. How could they have pointed their malice more directly against the Son of Man? But it is said, that although these calumnies were aimed at Christ, and were designed to expose Him to public scorn; yet, as His miracles were wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost, the sin of attributing them to Beelzebub was blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. To this we reply, that this sin, as Christ asserted in a subsequent verse, was brought forth from "the evil treasure of their hearts," and must therefore have received its direction from the *malice* of their hearts against the Saviour. Constructive blasphemy is a crime with which Papists and polemics are wont to charge their opponents, but we are not aware that such charges are preferred in the Word of God; and if they were, it is hardly credible that a constructive sin, should be distinguished as alone beyond the reach of pardon. If blasphemy against the "Son of Man" was a possible crime, the Pharisees, in the case before us, must have committed it.

2. The Pharisees, in their blasphemies, not only had no reference to the Holy Ghost, but they were, in a great measure, at least, ignorant of His personality and offices. Since the Holy Ghost is one of the persons of the Godhead, there is a sense in which all sin is against Him. But Christ speaks of blasphemy as being uttered against each of two persons of the Trinity, in a sense in which it is not uttered against the others. Such blasphemy im-

plies a knowledge of the peculiar relations and office of the person to whom it refers. Blasphemy against the "*Son of Man*," implied a knowledge of His personal claims, and was uttered in disparagement of them; and blasphemy against the "*Holy Ghost*," implies the same knowledge and design in reference to *His* peculiar work in the scheme of redemption. But when this sin was committed, the Holy Ghost had not yet commenced His peculiar work. The nature of His office and agency, had been but obscurely announced. It was subsequent to this time, that Christ predicted His mission, and defined His work, (John 16: 7-11.) It is probable, therefore, that the Pharisees had very little knowledge of the promised mission of the Comforter, and that they had no reference to Him.

To this argument Bloomfield replies, that though the Holy Ghost was not yet given to men, "to Christ it was given perpetually, and without measure." But if this fact rendered the blasphemy of the Pharisees, *constructive* blasphemy against the Holy Ghost; then, since this principle applies equally in all other cases, blasphemy against the Son of Man is impossible, and the distinction which our Saviour has made is without foundation.

3. There is nothing in the sin of the Pharisees which could give it such peculiar enormity, as is predicated of the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. There is nothing recorded of the conduct or language of the Pharisees that indicates a greater degree of malice than was manifested on other occasions. Archbishop Secker pronounces the sin of the Pharisees, "the greatest and most wilful obstinacy in wrong that can be imagined." Dr. Chalmers, after showing that the sin against the Holy Ghost was not peculiar to the life-time of our Saviour, but is, on the other hand, emphatically the sin of those who live under the ministration of the Spirit; still admits, that in the case of the Pharisees, there was a spiteful malignity, a sullen, immovable hardness, which might raise an eternal barrier against that faith, and that repentance, and that obedience, through which alone forgiveness is extended to a guilty world." Although the conduct of the Pharisees evinced much "spiteful malignity," yet it must be admitted that there were mitigating circumstances in their case, which do not exist since the advent of the Comforter. Of this sort were the erroneous views prevailing among the Jews concerning Christ, which made Him a stumbling-block to them, and which were corrected only by His death and resurrection. But when many of the prophecies and traditions which they misunderstood, were explained by developments subsequent to the events in question; when the evidence of Christ's messiahship had been greatly increased by the crowning miracle of His resurrection (Rom. 1: 4), by the promised descent of the Spirit (Acts 5: 32), and by the wonderful fruits of His advent, *then* the rejection of this additional evidence, and this Divine



Agent would not only involve peculiar guilt, but would be in a peculiar sense *against the Holy Ghost*.

4. Christ's subsequent treatment of the Pharisees, is evidence that He did not consider them beyond the reach of pardon. He still followed them with warnings, entreaties, reproofs; still labored to convince them of His messiahship,—promising *these very individuals* another proof of it, (Matt. 12: 40). Even after they had accomplished all that their malice could suggest, and had nailed Him to the cross, He offered His dying prayer for their forgiveness. It is probable, moreover, that some of them, under the strivings of the Spirit, and the preaching of the apostles, were among the converts to Christ, and received that forgiveness of sin, which is denied to blasphemers of the Holy Ghost.

5. It was not the custom of our Saviour thus to pronounce beforehand the final doom of individual sinners. Though foreseeing the final impenitence and perdition of many whom He addressed, He did not see fit to announce it. He did indeed foretell the inevitable destruction of the *city and temple*, and the dispersion of the Jewish *nation*. He uttered fearful warnings, implying that those to whom He addressed them were in extreme danger. He said, "*If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins,*" but when, unless it be in the case under consideration, did He single out individuals, and pronounce, unconditionally, their final sentence?

6. If the sin of the Pharisees was blasphemy of the Holy Ghost, then, though the language of Christ is in a general form, and in the future tense, it can have no bearing upon times subsequent to His death, because none can commit the sin who were not personal spectators of His miracles. So some maintain. Wesley says, "there is no more danger of committing the unpardonable sin, than of plucking the sun out of heaven." But, that they who have not only all the evidence of the truth of the gospel which the Jews possessed, but the proofs which have been constantly accumulating for eighteen hundred years; and, in addition, the teachings and strivings of the Holy Spirit, should be incapable of attaining to the same degree of guilt, it is hard to believe. If it be said that the same form of blasphemy of which the Pharisees were guilty, would be unpardonable now, then it follows that the salvation of modern Jews must be regarded as hopeless; for they, like their ancestors in the time of Christ, are accustomed to account for His miracles by attributing them to satanic agency. This is a consequence of the view we are opposing, to which Christians will be slow to assent.

These are some of the obvious objections to the common interpretation of our Saviour's language, respecting the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. The other interpretation alluded to, avoids these difficulties. According to this view, Christ pronounces the sin of

the Pharisees to be blasphemy against the "Son of Man," and intimates that it may be forgiven; but in speaking of the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost, He points forward to the approaching advent of this Divine Agent, and forewarns His hearers that whoever shall blaspheme this heavenly Comforter, as they have blasphemed Him, shall never be forgiven.

In favor of this interpretation it may be said,

1. It gives to the language employed by Christ its ordinary import. According to the other view, the term "Son of Man," refers merely to the *human nature* of Christ, and the term Holy Ghost is equivalent to the phrase "Spirit of God," in verse 28, and refers to that Divine power by which His miracles were wrought. But it is not true that the phrase, "Son of Man," is employed to denote His humanity, in distinction from His divinity. It is used in reference to His whole complex being, while the term, "Holy Ghost," is usually applied to the third person of the Godhead, in His relation as Comforter and Sanctifier. Whitby asserts, that "there is a plain difference between the operations of the Spirit in miracles, and the agency of the Holy Ghost as Comforter and Sanctifier." In the former sense he was already given to Christ, (v. 28) and to His disciples; in the latter sense, He was not yet come, (John 7: 39). Our Saviour, therefore, in distinguishing between sins committed against Himself in His mediatorial office, and those committed against the Holy Ghost, must have referred to the treatment of that Divine Agent, *after His personal mission should commence.*

2. This interpretation furnishes a basis for the distinction which Christ makes between the two forms of sin. According to the common view of the passage, the peculiar guilt of the Pharisees consisted in the fact, that their blasphemous language had reference to His *miraculous* works. Their contempt for His humble birth, and obscure connections; their ridicule of His teachings; the bitter scorn and insults with which they followed Him through life; the fiendish malice and cruelty with which they conducted His mock trial; and the brutal indignities with which they aggravated His dying agonies, were all so unlike in spirit, and so inferior in turpitude, to this one act of attributing His miracles to Satan, as to justify the broad distinction announced by our Saviour. Now, wherein the incomparable enormity of this act consisted, we cannot discover, but that this and all other acts of contempt and scorn for our Saviour personally, should be regarded as far less heinous than such a spirit manifested under the clearer light of the Spirit's teaching, and against the more powerful restraints of the Spirit's striving, we can easily believe. And as the latter would frustrate the final effort for the sinner's salvation, there is a manifest ground for the assertion, "it shall not be forgiven him."

3. Our interpretation is sustained by the analogy of Scripture teaching. Not only did Christ labor and pray for the salvation of all His enemies, even after He uttered this declaration, but He promised to send the Comforter to strive with all. He commanded His disciples to preach to all, commencing on the very spot where He had been blasphemed and murdered. This they did, and with glorious success. It was not until the Jews had rejected the Saviour, under the ministration of the Spirit, "contradicting and blaspheming" (Acts 13 : 45), that their case is spoken of as desperate. *Then* Paul warns them : "Beware lest that come upon you which is spoken of in the prophets ; Behold, ye despisers, and wonder, and perish." *Then*, "Paul and Barnabas waxed bold and said, It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing ye put it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles." (Acts 13 : 45, 46.)

It is evident from numerous other passages in the New Testament, that peculiar guilt attaches to the sin of resisting the gracious strivings of the Holy Spirit. When Paul compares the guilt of despising Moses' law with that of treading under foot the Son of God, he mentions, as that which gives to the latter its peculiar turpitude, the fact that it is "doing despite to the Spirit of grace." The same thing is implied in His repeated warnings against the sin of grieving the Holy Ghost.

II. The declaration of our Saviour concerning this sin deserves a brief consideration, "It shall not be forgiven him."

The blasphemy of the Holy Ghost is usually termed the *unpardonable sin* ; and the prevailing idea respecting it undoubtedly is, that pardon for it cannot be obtained, even though it be sought in penitence and faith. But the term "unpardonable" is not employed in the Scriptures, and in the sense above referred to, is not properly applied to this or any other sin. Great as the guilt of this sin undoubtedly is, it does not transcend God's infinite mercy. "Thy mercy is great above the heavens." Nor is it beyond the cleansing power of Christ's blood. "He is able to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by Him." Nor does it destroy the power of repentance and faith, in him who commits it, for "God now commands all men everywhere to repent." And were it penitently confessed and forsaken, God would not fail to blot it from His book (Acts 2 : 38). In the want of such repentance, we must find the only reason why it hath no forgiveness. It indicates a height of rebellion from which the sinner is never brought down to the foot of the cross. The wilfulness, malignity, and obduracy which it involves place him beyond the power of all converting influences, and, *therefore*, beyond the reach of pardon. He has trodden under foot the Son of God ; he has done despite to the Spirit of grace ; and the heavenly dove has taken

His final flight. How can there be forgiveness in such a case? "There remaineth no more sacrifice for sins." God has no other Son to make another and greater atonement. There is no other Spirit to strive more powerfully in the heart. It has withstood all the means which Infinite Wisdom has provided, and nothing more remains to be done. Hope turns back her weary pinion, and despair settles upon the soul. It hath no repentance, and *therefore* no forgiveness.

To this it may be objected, that in the same sense, not only blasphemy, but every other sort of sin which procures the final withdrawal of the Spirit, is alike unpardonable; whereas Christ asserts that "all manner of sin," except this, shall be forgiven. It is true that Christ affirms, (Matt. 12: 31), that "all manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men, but the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men." The following verse is explanatory of this: "Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man," &c., showing that by the foregoing phrase, "all manner of sin and blasphemy," He meant such as was committed peculiarly against the Son of Man. His design, therefore, was not to make a distinction between blasphemy and other forms of sin; but between "all manner of sin" committed against *Himself personally*, and that committed under the *approaching* dispensation of the Spirit. Blasphemy alone is *specified*, because this was the sin of which His hearers had just been guilty, and which gave occasion for these remarks, but that this is unpardonable, in any sense that applies to no other sin, is neither expressed nor implied. To any other aggravated form of sin, or obstinate persistence in it, which resists all the measures of God's converting grace, and procures the final withdrawal of the Spirit's influence, the same language is equally applicable. It is not of blasphemers that the apostle says, "it is impossible to renew them again to repentance," nor is it to blasphemers that he says, "there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation;" yet these are manifestly cases in which there is no forgiveness.

But does not John allude to one sin, as being alone "unto death?" (1 John 5: 16). Admitting what is by no means certain, that the phrase "unto death," is equivalent to the phrase, "it shall not be forgiven him," it does not follow that John refers to one particular *form* of sin, and that form *blasphemy*. The language is equally descriptive of a peculiar *degree* of obduracy, as Jeremy Taylor says, "a state and grandeur of impiety that is desperate," "such a pitch of hardened opposition as constitutes the sin unto death,—a sin for which no intercession will avail, no prayer of weeping relatives be lifted with efficacy to heaven."

We conclude our remarks by quoting Whitby's paraphrase upon Chalmers on the nature of the sin unto death.

Christ's words, as embodying substantially, the views of this subject which we have advocated. "You have represented me as a wine-bibber, and as a friend of publicans and sinners, and as one who casts out devils by Beelzebub; and you will still go on, after all the miraeles which I have done among you, to represent me as a false prophet and a deceiver of the people, but, notwithstanding, all these grievous sins shall be forgiven you, if that last dispensation of the Holy Ghost, which I shall, after my ascension, send among you, shall prevail with you to believe in me. But if, when I have sent the Holy Ghost to testify the truth of my mission, and of my resurrection, you shall continue in your unbelief, and shall blaspheme the Holy Ghost, and represent him also as an evil spirit, your sin shall never be forgiven, nor shall there anything be farther done to call you to repentance."

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ARTICLE III.

STRICTURES ON WILSON ON THE MODE OF BAPTISM.

By REV. EDWARD BEECHER, D.D., BOSTON.

THE title page of this work\* informs us that in addition to a discussion of Infant Baptism, the Mode of Baptism is also to be considered. This, however, is in fact the main part of the work; 334 pages out 534 being devoted to it. We propose in our remarks to consider only the discussion of the Mode of Baptism.

We are encouraged to hope that it is the purpose of God to produce by the present deeply interesting discussions a final decision of this important question. The investigations of Dr. Carson, Prof. Stuart, Prof. Goodwin, Dr. Halley and others, have accumulated a vast mass of evidence from the Greek classics, and much evidence from the Fathers has of late been added. The usages of the Septuagint; the New Testament, and the Apocrypha, have been long before the church. All needed evidence seems thus to have been produced. For this reason it would seem Prof. Wilson has not so much labored to add new testimony to this mass of evidence, as to classify it, and subject parts of it to a critical scrutiny. He has in fact selected and commented on a relatively small part of the testimony that others had already adduced.

\* Infant Baptism, a Scriptural Service, and Dipping unnecessary to its Right Administration. By the Rev. Robert Wilson, Professor of Sacred Literature for the General Assembly, Royal College, Belfast. London and Belfast, 1848.

He appears as a decided opponent of Dr. Carson, and he avows his purpose not only to refute his main position that dipping or immersion is essential to Baptism, but also to expose so many of his gross errors in criticism and translation, as may be necessary in order to rebuke his dogmatism, and to reduce the undue authority of his mere name over the minds of his admiring and spell-bound disciples. Thoroughly has he performed this work. He has also manfully rebuked what he does not hesitate to call the abuse of Dr. Carson towards his antagonists. At the same time, however, he bears a decided testimony to his own conviction of the general excellence of his Christian character, and to his unquestionable abilities as a critic. The spirit of Prof. Wilson himself is excellent, and his style of thought manly and dignified. We have read his work with pleasure and profit, although compelled to dissent from some of his conclusions. Although, as we have stated, Prof. Wilson employs himself for the most part in criticising the evidence adduced by others, yet he has on some points added important evidence from his own researches, especially in his reply to Dr. Carson's dissertation on *λούω*. Dr. Carson had argued that since Baptism was called *λουτρὸν*, a bathing, it was in fact an immersion, since the common mode of bathing was by immersion. Prof. Wilson has thoroughly investigated the evidence on this point, and clearly proved that the common mode of bathing, in Greece and Egypt, was not by immersion, but that the bathers stood naked by a *λουτήρ* and washed themselves, and had water poured or dashed on them by a *παραχύτης*. He also points out the manner in which this practice must have influenced the sense of *λούω* in the Septuagint, and the New Testament, in such a way that all logical arguments from *λούω* and *λουτρὸν* in favor of dipping or immersion, are clearly at an end.

Some of his discussions of passages which have been much canvassed in this controversy, are very able. This is especially true of the celebrated passage in Dan. 4: 30, in which it is said of Nebuchadnezzar *τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἐβάφθη ἀπὸ τῆς δροῦσου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* "his body was wet with the dew of heaven." With great learning and philological acumen he exposes the errors of Dr. Gale and Dr. Carson, and completely dissipates into airy nothing, Dr. Carson's theory that here "one mode of wetting is figured as another mode of wetting by the liveliness of the imagination."

As opposed to Dr. Carson's demand for exclusive dipping, we consider his argument decisive. By this we mean, that he succeeds in showing "that sufficient grounds have been laid for refusing to be fettered by the modal exclusiveness of our Baptist friends." He proves that dipping and immersion are not essential to baptism, because decisive instances can be produced of the use of *βαπτίζω* where there is and can be no immersion.

But in attempting to fix upon the real import of *βαπτίζω* in the  
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ordinance, he is not successful. He has rejected the sense, to purify, and vainly tried to fix upon a universal sense that denotes neither to dip, nor to immerse, nor to pour, nor to sprinkle, but some external state more generic than any of these.

We should, however, do him injustice did we not add, that he has, without seeming to be aware of it, effectually refuted his own false theory, and sustained ours. This, in its place, we shall show. But this, cannot alter the fact that he repudiates the sense to purify. In one point of view we rejoice that the Prof. has taken this ground. A universal and instantaneous reception of the sense, to purify, without dissent or opposition by the anti-Baptists, might create an apprehension that party bias had produced too ready an acquiescence in arguments that appeared favorable to sectarian interests, and not allowed them to be subjected to a thorough scrutiny. The dissent of some of the opponents of the Baptists from our views, will give cheering evidence that a spirit of free and independent thought exists, and remove all such apprehensions. Indeed, so far are we from deprecating such opposition, that we earnestly request that any one who can, Baptist, or anti-Baptist, will thoroughly expose the insufficiency of our arguments. The more thoroughly this is done, if it can be done, the better. One thing only do we deprecate—an effort to destroy the lawful power of argument by invidious personal attacks, and by the authority of names. The only tendency of such a course, is to produce a contempt of truth without enquiry. To effect this purpose it has been said, that no really respectable scholars believe our views, and other arguments equally highminded and logical have been employed.

Indeed, a review of the leading Baptist arguments against the doctrine in question which this country has thus far produced, is truly edifying. One learned scholar seemed to regard the fact that the writer of the articles in the Biblical Repository resided in the West, as having great weight to evince the falsehood of the doctrine advanced by him. Another found a powerful argument in the fact that Prof. Stuart, a much *older* man than the author, had, in his article in the Biblical Repository, previously advanced an opposite doctrine. We are now told<sup>1</sup> that it will be a great waste of precious time for the Baptists to answer our arguments till we have convinced such men as Profs. Stuart and Schmucker that we are correct in our views. It would have been a happy thing if Dr. Carson, confessedly the most able Baptist writer of the age, had discovered this compendious mode of reasoning in season to save so great a waste of his own time as has been made in his fruitless efforts to reply to our facts and arguments. We will, also, add, that the actual opinions of Prof. Stuart and Prof. Schmucker we do not know, but we do know what the facts and

<sup>1</sup> By the Editor of the Christian Watchman and Reflector, Boston.

arguments are. Again, we will say that the principles and practice of Prof. Stuart, in other cases, sustain our positions, so that he cannot condemn us without condemning himself, as will manifestly appear in the course of our remarks.

It seems, then, that the argument against the sense purification from names, ages, and places, has been, in this country, the only reliance of the Baptists. We, therefore, regret it the more that Prof. Wilson has done nothing better for them than to add another name to their list, for he has not attempted to furnish an answer to a solitary argument advanced by us.

In this state of the case we cannot better express our views than by quoting the following manly remarks of his own, which we heartily endorse, as of the highest importance. "The investigation and defence of truth universally appear to us to demand that mere names and authorities be placed upon their proper level. \* \* \* Far be it from us to trifle with the rights and immunities of a well earned reputation, or in any department, civil, ecclesiastical, or literary, to refuse honor to whom honor is due; but when lofty character in the walks of authorship, instead of merely commending certain views to respectful consideration, is employed for the purpose of rendering further discussion superfluous or hopeless, \* \* \* where a name, however great and good, is put forward to lay an arresting hand on the spirit of free enquiry, it becomes a solemn duty to employ all legitimate means for breaking the spell of mere authority and subordinating the influence of names to the supremacy of truth," pp. 66, 67. "Now we hold it incumbent on every friend of truth to resist this summary mode of determining controversies, on all subjects which fall under discussion, and this course we maintain to be especially indispensable in the present crisis of the Baptist controversy. Again and again are we tauntingly informed by our opponents that the giants of literature have settled the dispute in their favor, and the ghosts of these giants are called up, as if to put us in bodily fear."

In accordance with these views he deems it his duty to prove by a searching exposure of his errors, that Dr. Gale "may be safely matched on the score of false criticisms and humiliating errors in translation, against any learned advocate of infant baptism, living or dead." He pursues the same course towards Dr. Carson.

He thus concludes his remarks on this point, "We are not, then, to be overawed by names, however distinguished, nor to permit authorities, however numerous or weighty, to interpose between us and the thorough and fearless investigation of the subject. Conducted in this spirit, the discussion occupies a prominent place in our regards, and is calculated to realize important results. We may safely take little interest in the mere contest of



party—the battle of man against man—Pædo-baptist against Anti-Pædo-baptist; but in the noble strife of solid facts and sound reasonings, it should be our ambition to come off victorious," pp. 68, 69.

Inasmuch, then, as the learned Professor has, not very consistently, arrayed the mere authority of his own name against our doctrine, refraining entirely from "the noble strife of solid facts and sound reasonings," "we hold it incumbent on every friend of truth to resist this summary mode of determining controversies—and this course, we maintain, to be especially indispensable in the present crisis of the Baptist controversy."

The learned Professor, then, will, we are sure, take no offence if, in defending the great and sacred cause of truth, we undertake, in imitation of his own example, to place the authority of his name also "upon its proper level."

In order to do this, it is necessary to produce from his own work, internal evidence that he had not thoroughly studied either the doctrine against which he has arrayed himself, or that which he professes to defend; that he is not consistent with himself in his assertions against our doctrine; that he is bound to reject his own principles and proceedings, or else to confess that the doctrine is rational, and has been fully proved; that the position which he has assumed in place of our doctrine, is inconsistent with facts admitted or proved by himself; and that it involves the cause he has undertaken to defend in inextricable difficulties.

Let no one suppose that we intend to call in question the real and distinguished abilities of the Professor. He avows, and no doubt with the utmost sincerity, a very high opinion of the learning and acumen of Dr. Carson; yet, in speaking of one of his expositions, he says, "it bristles with inconsistencies which we defy mortal ingenuity to reconcile;" again, he pronounces his main position false and proves it so, and with great assiduity he has labored to expose his other numerous and great errors in fact and argument. In like manner, while we admit the distinguished learning and abilities of Prof. Wilson, inasmuch as he has chosen to throw the authority of his name against what we deem one of the most important doctrines of the age, an imperious sense of duty calls on us, in like manner, to expose his inconsistencies, unsound reasonings, and errors.

The main and controlling considerations by which the learned Professor was induced to reject the doctrine that *baptizo* means to purify, were two. 1. That he had not seen any proof of the existence of that sense, and 2d that to adopt it would involve an absurdity.

The last of these reasons is obviously the most weighty, and deserves our first consideration; for if it be well founded, it is of

no use to make any effort either to adduce or to canvass proof, for that which involves an absurdity cannot be proved.

What, then, is the basis of the absurdity alleged to forbid us to assign to βαπτίζω the sense to *purify*? We will endeavor to present it in the clearest possible light. It is this, although purification may be the result, in some cases, of the process denoted by βαπτίζω, yet it is not the only possible result. To use his own words, "A contrary result, far from being impracticable, we find occasionally exemplified, as in Aquila's translation of Job, 10: 31. 'Εν διαφθορᾷ βαπτίζεις με, "Thou baptizest me in corruption." One such instance, even apart from the obvious nature of the case, proves that the result will be either defilement or purification, according to the character of the baptizing element," p. 184. These, then, are the premises of the Professor. Are they correct, and truly and accurately stated? We reply, they are. We fully and amply concede their truth. We long ago said, "To pour, sprinkle, immerse, or dip, convey in themselves no idea at all of cleansing. The effect of the action depends mainly on the fluid, not on the action, and may be either to purify or to pollute. So Job says, 'If I wash myself with snow-water, and make my hands never so clean, yet shalt thou plunge me (Greek βάπτω, Heb. בָּטַל) in the ditch, and my own clothes shall abhor me.' Here the effect of plunging is pollution, because it is not into clean water but into filthy." § 6, p. 20.<sup>1</sup>

A very exact and happy agreement, then, exists between us and Prof. Wilson, so far as his premises are concerned.

Let us now proceed to consider his conclusion. "Consequently, if we would avoid the absurdity of attaching opposite meanings to the same term, we must employ the verb to denote simply the *process*, without including the *result*, which is necessarily implied in purification," p. 185. Let us, then, closely scrutinize this passage; What is the usage supposed to involve an absurdity, which the learned professor condemns? It is this, using a verb which indicates a process, to denote that process including one result, if an opposite result is possible. To avoid the absurdity involved in this, we must employ the verb to denote simply the *process* without including the *result*.

To this we make three replies:

1. None of the defenders of the sense purification advocate the usage here condemned. They do not use βαπτίζω to denote the process of immersion, including the result, purification. On the contrary, it is the very essence of their doctrine that βαπτίζω is sometimes used, not to denote any process e. g. to immerse, or to envelop, but, that it denotes to purify, *without any reference to*

<sup>1</sup> We refer to the pages of a recently published volume, containing our articles in the Repository, and a final reply to Dr. Carson, entitled, *Baptism with Reference to its Import and Modes*. John Wiley, New York, 1848.

*the mode of purification.* This is the statement first made by us as the great point to be proved, "that as thorough purification or cleansing is often the result of submersion in water, so the word βαπτίζω has come to signify to purify or cleanse thoroughly, without any reference to the mode in which it is done," § 3, p. 11.

2. Although it is not essential to our defence, yet still, for the sake of the truth, we are bound to add, that the usage condemned would not, if it were employed, involve the absurdity alleged. For example; suppose that any one should assign to βαπτίζω the sense to cleanse by immersion, it would not involve the necessity of attaching to the same term the opposite meaning of polluting by immersion. For those who use a language may see fit to include the process and one result in the import of the word, and to exclude all other possible results of the process, and if they do in fact so use a word, then that is its sense, and no absurdity is involved.

The learned Professor, on another occasion, seems to have quite forgotten that any absurdity was involved in such a use of the word כָּבַס. On pp. 27, 28, he tells us that this verb primarily denoted to tread or to trample. This, surely, is a process; he then proceeds to state that this verb is "a term commonly applied to the washing of garments by treading upon them." Now it is perfectly plain that pollution may be the result of treading upon garments in filthy water, or in corrupt matter, as well as washing, when they are trodden in pure water. And yet, according to the judgment of the Professor, common usage did employ the word to denote the process of treading, including the result washing, and that excluding the opposite result, pollution. We trust Prof. W. will feel the force of this, at least, as an "*argumentum ad hominem*."

But although the fact alleged by him in the case of כָּבַס is one that might easily have occurred, involving as it does no absurdity of principle, yet we are obliged to call in question the accuracy of the statement itself. The verb כָּבַס in our judgment did pass from the meaning, *to tread*, to the sense, *to wash*, irrespective of mode, just as βάπτω passed, even in the judgment of the Professor, from the sense, *to dip*, to the sense, *to dye*, irrespective of mode. Certainly this is true of its figurative use in Ps. 51: 2, 7, and Jer. 4: 14, where this verb is used. David when he uses it certainly does not mean to pray to God to wash him *by treading*, nor does God, when he uses it, intend to command the Jews to wash their hearts *by treading*. This view is also sustained by Gesenius. But, however this may be decided, the authority of the Professor, at least, is in favor of so using the verb as to include both the process of treading and the result, i. e., washing, and that, although the opposite result of defiling might be effected by the same process,

in a filthy element. It is not, therefore, consistent for him to condemn such a usage as of necessity involving an absurdity.

3. But our main defence is this, that in assigning to βαπτίζω the sense, to purify, irrespective of mode, we proceed on principles fully sanctioned by the authority, and by the practice of the learned Professor himself, as well as of Dr. Carson and all the leading scholars of the age. They admit that βαπτίζω denotes 'a process, i. e., to dip. Of this process one of the effects is to color or to dye. On this ground they hold that the verb has, in fact, passed to the sense to color or to dye, irrespective of mode. And yet, it is well known that in many cases immersion in pure water will discharge colors. The process of bleaching is, also, extensively effected by immersion. This result is directly opposite to dyeing. Moreover, as the fluid varies, the effects of immersion will constantly vary. Dr. Carson furnishes instances of dipping into honey, wax, fire, ointment, wine, vinegar, blood, oil, &c. In all these cases the results are unlike, yet the Professor sees no absurdity in believing that the Greeks selected the effect, to color or dye, and established it as a sense of the word βαπτίζω, without reference to mode.

We are, then, fully authorized by his principles and practice to believe that, in like manner, the sense, to purify, irrespective of mode, could, without the slightest absurdity, become a sense of βαπτίζω, even if in certain circumstances the result of the process denoted by that verb may be pollution, or may vary as the fluid varies, as in the case of βαπτίζω.

The cases in principle are so exactly alike, that the Professor must, of necessity, renounce and condemn his own labored effort to prove that βαπτίζω means, to dye, as involving an absurdity, or else concede that there is no necessary absurdity in assigning to βαπτίζω the sense, to purify. The true state of the case was long ago thus set forth by us, even at the very opening of this discussion.

After illustrations of the transitions of βαπτίζω, tinge, and other words to secondary senses, we proceeded to say: "Now, with such facts before us, to increase the number of which indefinitely were perfectly easy, who can say that there is the slightest improbability in the idea that the word βαπτίζω should pass from the sense, immerse, to the sense, to purify, without respect to mode? Can βαπτίζω, tinge, and wash, pass through similar transitions, and cannot βαπτίζω?"

But what secondary sense shall be adopted cannot be told *a priori*, but must be decided by the habits, manners, customs, and general ideas of a people, and sometimes by peculiar usages for which no reason can be given," § 4, p. 18.

The only question in the case, is this simple question of fact, is there proof that the transition alledged was made? We are thus

brought to the second allegation of the learned Professor,—“That the case on behalf of purification, we think, might be equitably disposed of by the Scottish verdict of “not proven,”—thus leaving the way perfectly open for the reception of any new evidence which its advocates may have in their power to bring forward.” p. 134.

With respect to this statement we beg leave respectfully to offer the following considerations. We are accustomed to suppose that a doctrine which involves an absurdity, is more than “not proven.” It is, in our judgment, placed beyond the limits of rational investigation. The way is not open to present or to receive new evidence. The case is decided against us, and there is no new trial, and no appeal.

But in the judgment of the Professor, purification is not baptism, because it involves an absurdity to use the word to denote anything besides simply, *the process*, denoted by that word, exclusive of effects, and yet he is of opinion that the way is perfectly open to bring forward evidence to prove that it did mean something else, even its effects.

2. The considerations in view of which the verdict of “not proven,” is delivered, are merely unproved opinions of the Professor, viz: “We are able to produce what we conceive to be decisive instances of the use of βαπτίζω, where there is, and can be no immersion; but never, even in a solitary instance, have we encountered it in the sense of purification. That meaning, as it appears to us, cannot be extracted from the verb, without recourse to questionable analogies and reasonings, which betray a larger measure of theological ingenuity than of philological acumen.”—p. 184. Now, if these declarations had followed a thorough and critical scrutiny of the proofs alledged, and a proof of their insufficiency, if any analogies or reasonings had been pointed out and proved to be of a questionable nature, if any lack of philological acumen, and recourse to theological ingenuity in place of it, had been proved in a single instance, they would have had the full weight of logical deductions from evidence. But in this instance, the author has departed from the course pursued in every other part of the discussion. He has sustained his opinions on other points, even on some of far less moment than this, by an extended and critical scrutiny of evidence. To the discussion of βαπτίζω in the Sybilline verse he devoted seven pages; to that of εβύφω in Dan. 2: 30, fifteen pages; and with similar minuteness he discusses other passages adduced in proof by the opposing parties.

But these sweeping assertions as to the sense, to purify, are sustained by no proof. Not a passage is examined, not an argument is scrutinized, not an error is detected, not a questionable analogy

or argument is pointed out. The Professor throws himself solely on the weight of his own name.

Moreover, he is not in his verdict of "not proven" consistent with his sweeping assertions, for if the sense, to purify "*cannot* be extracted from the verb without recourse to questionable analogies and reasonings, which betray a larger measure of theological ingenuity than of philological acumen," then, the simple verdict of "not proven," is not a fair disposal of the case. It ought to be "incapable of proof, by unquestionable reasonings, and with true philological acumen;" and 'if this is so, then again we say, the way is not perfectly open to receive proof. The case is prejudged, and decided against us, and what is still worse, decided by mere authority without argument. But since the Professor has chosen thus to throw himself on the mere weight of his name, it now becomes necessary for us to say, as the result of the investigation so far, that he has furnished decisive proof against himself, that he had not thoroughly studied or mastered the argument against which he has assumed to pronounce judgment. He himself informs us that in forming his own opinions, he was mainly influenced by a belief that to assign to *baptism* the sense, to purify, involves an absurdity. Could he have thoroughly studied the subject and not see that it involves no principle or practice which he has not abundantly sanctioned by his own authority? Moreover, the whole passage relating to this point, as we have shown, is full of inconsistencies and self-contradictions, as well as of errors. Without, therefore, calling in question the general scholarship of the Professor, we shall take the liberty to say, that no weight ought to be attached to the mere authority of his name, on a point which he had not so thoroughly studied as to be able to deliver his opinions without involving himself in inconsistencies so obvious, radical, and irreconcilable.

We shall next proceed to consider Prof. Wilson as the antagonist of the opinion which he has advanced in opposition to ours. And, although we are not called on to prove our proofs till they have been disproved, yet as the occasion is fairly offered, we shall attempt to show that, according to the principles of Prof. W., our proof is abundant, and of the highest kind.

We remark then, first, that the learned Professor has in a most thorough and masterly manner exploded his own position, and established ours, especially by some of his results, of which we have already spoken in high terms. We refer to his investigations on II. Kings, 5 : 14, and his reply to Dr. Carson's dissertation on *leues*. He refers to the results of these investigations in his preface, with a justifiable satisfaction; for they are among the most important parts of his work. But as he does not seem to have been fully aware of the importance of these results, nor of their

bearing upon his whole theory, it becomes necessary that we should make a few remarks on these points.

On the import of *βαπτίζω* in its classic usage, we and the Professor are perfectly agreed. Our original statement was, that the common idea in all cases of classic usage was "a state of being enveloped, or surrounded by, a fluid, or anything else adapted to produce such a result."—§ 3, p. 9. The modes of producing this result specified by us in Bib. Repos. for Jan., 1840, were, immersion in a fluid, the flowing of the fluid over an object, the pouring it over an object, and the sinking of an object into it. The cases referred to for illustration were, the overflowing of the sea-shore by the tide, the overwhelming of men and cattle by a river, the pouring of water on Elijah's altar, and the sinking of a ship in the sea. But we saw fit, afterwards, to withdraw the example of pouring water on the altar of Elijah, finding evidence that it was a case of purification.

Prof. W. still retains that case, and his statement is this: "Let the baptizing element encompass its object, and in the case of liquids, whether this relative state has been produced by immersion, affusion, overwhelming, or in any other mode, Greek usage recognizes it as a valid baptism. Thus the sea-coast is baptized when the tide flows over it, cattle are baptized when the rush of an "overflowing flood" comes upon them and drowns them, and the altar built by Elisha was baptized when his attendants poured upon it the required quantity of water."—pp. 96, 97.

As to classic usage, therefore, we perfectly agree. But the point where we are at issue is precisely this, is this the exclusive use of the word in the Greek Scriptures, and in the Fathers, or does it pass from this sense to the sense, to purify, without respect to mode? Prof. W. affirms the first position, we affirm the second.

It has, we confess, seemed to us surprising beyond measure that the learned Professor could take such a position in defiance of the facts which he himself has clearly proved. But that he has done so is plain. True, he rejects Dr. Carson's theory as to the only possible mode of proving a secondary sense. He admits that words do easily change from one age to another; he also sanctions our refutation of Dr. Carson's principle, and states that the early classic usage of a word is of subordinate moment in settling its sense in the New Testament. But, after all, he declines to use this principle, for on p. 84, he says, "We are not aware that there is any important difference between the earlier and the later testimonies upon the subject." And on p. 97, he says, after the statement first quoted, "In attaching to the verb this generic sense, (i. e. to encompass, envelop, overwhelm, or immerse), we take our stand upon the solid foundation of the usage of the Greek language, *through all periods concerned, including the Classical, the Biblical, and the Patristic.*"—p. 97. But the fact that he endorses Dr.

Gale's doctrine, as a correct view of the universal use of βαπτίζω, is a still clearer proof of his true position. "Dr. Gale's doctrine is this: "The word βαπτίζω perhaps *does not so necessarily express the action of putting under water, as in general a thing's being in that condition, (i. e. under water), no matter how it comes so, whether it is put into the water, or the water comes over it; though, indeed, to put into the water is the most natural way, and the most common, and is, therefore, usually, and pretty constantly, but it may not be necessarily, implied.*"—p. 97.

This view he tells us, to our very great surprise, "any Pædo-Baptist might safely adopt, almost without modification." The only modification which he suggests is, that it shall not be limited to fluids, but be so generalized as to include all substances that can produce the state of envelopment described. With especial reference to this modification, he says, "there is no difficulty in generalizing the definition of Dr. Gale, so as to make it *co-extensive with the actual usage of βαπτίζω.*"—p. 98. This is certainly explicit.

When we come to consider his proofs, it must be admitted that whilst investigating the classic use, he finds an abundance of sound arguments. And his translations and comments are full of such words as "*overwhelmed,*" "*cover with water in any mode whatever;*" "*the overflowing water surrounded and overwhelmed them;*" "*to immerse;*" "*the wave falls upon and covers;*" "*baptized in the sense of being covered with the waters,*" &c., and at the end he says, "The usage of philosophers, historians, and poets, as we have shown, forces the admission of considerable latitude as to mere mode, by applying the term indiscriminately to the immersion of an object in the baptizing substance, and to the bringing of the baptizing substance upon or around an object." Josephus also furnishes new proof of the soundness of this view.

So far we are not at issue. We concede it all. But now comes the tug of war. He is to prove that this sense is "*co-extensive with the actual usage of βαπτίζω.*" He is to prove that "there is not any very important difference between the earlier and the later testimonies upon the subject." He is to prove that "we must employ the verb to denote simply *the process*, without including *the result*, which is necessarily implied in purification." In short, he is to take his own definition, and that of Dr. Gale, which he has endorsed, and carry them through the Septuagint, the New Testament, and the Fathers, as he has through the classics and Josephus.

Here is precisely the field of our proofs of another sense, differing in very important respects from that of the classics, even purification without respect to mode.

And now we affirm that instead of proving his own position and refuting ours, he employs all of his talents and resources in effec-



tually refuting his own position, and proving ours. For, in the first place, except in explaining some figures, he at once drops such words as overwhelm, overflow, immerse, cover, and inundate, and adopts a new mode of expression, viz: to wash; to perform ablution, washings, ablutions, to express the import of baptize and baptisms. Why this sudden and remarkable change in translation, if there is no change of sense? Yet, excepting figures, from p. 145 to 337, overwhelm, and its fellows, do not meet us at all, there is nothing but wash, washings, and ablutions. Dr. Halley pointed out the fact that after all that the Baptists have said of, *to dip*, as the exclusive sense of βαπτίζω, they do not consistently use it in translating the classics, but use other words not implying that mode. Prof. Wilson speaks of this as a new and important source of evidence against that mode, first offered to the world by Dr. Halley. No doubt it is evidence. But if it is, the full force of the principle is irresistibly arrayed against the Professor. He does not, he cannot translate this word in the Septuagint, the New Testament, and the Fathers, as he does in the classics.

Of the Baptists, he says, p. 131, "In the translation of those passages, which constitute the chosen testimony of the Baptists to the truth of their System, how often do they shrink from the bounden and delightful duty of placing before an intelligent Christian public, the English, *dip*, as the representative of the Greek βαπτίζω? How often, as if haunted by the consciousness of some secret misgiving, do they substitute other words, not altogether synonymous, if not to relax the stringency of their doctrine, at least to render the mode of its exhibition less unnatural and more palatable? Dip has all the ground to itself in theory, but it can seldom find a resting place for the sole of its foot in their translations." In view of such facts, he exclaims, on p. 141, "Alas! poor *dip*." In like manner may we exclaim, alas! poor *encompass*, poor *overwhelm*, poor *cover*, poor *immerse*; in theory they have all the ground to themselves, but they can seldom find a resting place for the soles of their feet, in these translations of the Professor.

But this is not all. The Professor, as already stated, goes to work with great learning, and severe and resistless logic, as utterly as possible to explode his own positions; and he has done it so thoroughly that we are entirely relieved from all labor on the subject. We need only to state his results.

His first step is to fix the import of λούω; his next, is to identify the sense of βαπτίζω with that of λούω. Let us consider his views of λούω.

Dr. Carson, in his reply to us, had said that none of our examples of the use of λούω proved that the thing washed was not covered with water; and then adds, "This is all we want: the water might be applied by sprinkling, or by pouring, or in any

other way." On this, Prof. Wilson remarks, "by the expression 'covered with water,' we presume the author intended to represent the body, as placed in a bath, or convenient receptacle, where it is covered with water, as the result either of *immersion* or of an affusion so copious that every part is overwhelmed; in fact, that the body is covered, as the sea-coast is covered by the full tide."

Hear now the triumphant refutation of this view by the Professor, p. 162. "Now when the Greeks bathed in a standing posture, beside the *λουτήρ*, having water poured on them by the attendant *παραχέτης*, as has been incontestibly evidenced from the representations on ancient vases, we would gladly be informed how large an affusion would have covered their bodies, so as to exemplify the modern Baptist signification of the word." Again, he says, "The sculptured testimonies, happily preserved from the wreck of time, exhibit in the Grecian bath, the pouring of water on the body, but no immersion of the body in water; they present from real life the details of cold and warm bathing, but *no covering of the body with water*," p. 162. Again, on p. 163, he speaks of "irresistible proof that the ordinary system of bathing, prevalent in ancient Greece, knew no immersion, and embraced *no covering of the body with water*." On p. 166, he proves that Egyptian bathing was performed in the same way, and hence infers, that in Greece and Egypt *λούω* did not imply immersion or covering the body with water. Moreover, as the authors of the Septuagint translation resided there, that their understanding of *λούω* would be the same, and that under their influence, and that of Greece, the evangelists and apostles would use it in the same sense.

Having thus fixed the sense of *λούω* he next proceeds, on pp. 176, 177, to state that Jerome, and the author of the Syriac version, did not hesitate to identify the sense of *λούω* with that of *βαπτίζω* in the case of Naaman, II. Kings, 5: 14. In this he sees a conclusive proof of the *usus loquendi* of the age, and from this time onward he does not hesitate to translate *βαπτίζω*, *to wash*, and *βαπτισμοί*, *washing* and *ablutions*. The baptism of Judith he calls her "*nightly ablution*," and appeals to the ancient Syriac, which renders the verb *βαπτίζω* by a term signifying in general *to wash*. He also quotes Schleusner as considering *lotio*, or *washing*, to be the primary signification of all the New Testament occurrences of *βαπτισμός*, and adds, "in this he merely echoes the finding of the great mass of lexicographers."

Nor is this all. On p. 173, he decides as follows: "It seems not unreasonable to conclude that the washing was partial." That the leprosy was local he infers from the expectation of Naaman that Elisha would strike his hand on the *place*, and recover the leper. He adds, "The man of God was consulted respecting a certain local disease, and on principles of reason and common sense, the remedy he prescribed—the washing he com-

manded, would be limited to the seat of the disease." Hence, according to the Professor, his whole person was not even washed. Let it now be distinctly remembered that the theory of Dr. Gale, endorsed by Prof. Wilson, is precisely this; that βαπτίζω, even if it does not always denote "*to put under water*," yet does denote *always* the state of *being under water*, and, of course, of being covered by it, and encompassed with it. This sense the Professor, also, assures us is co-extensive with the actual usage of βαπτίζω. And, yet, as if for the express purpose of utterly exploding this theory, he has proved that βαπτίζω is here synonymous with a word commonly used to denote a washing in which there neither was, nor could be, immersion or covering with water, and in which, of course, there could not be that state of being under water which Dr. Gale claimed. And, as if to make assurance doubly sure, he tells us that the washing in question was not even a washing of the whole person, as in the case of Greek bathing by a λουτής, but a local washing of a part of the person.

Where, now, is the idea of encompassing Naaman with the baptizing fluid? Where is the idea that he was under water? Where is poor overwhelm and its fellows? Alas! they and their fortress have been blown up and scattered to the four winds of heaven, and that by their own general; and we venture to say that it has been done so thoroughly, that no man can collect the fragments, or rebuild the fortress again.

If the learned Professor had not made the washing of Naaman local and limited, if he had placed him naked by a λουτής and had employed a πασιχάτης to dash or pour water on his head, then he might have said, though only in a loose and popular sense, that he was encompassed with water, or was under water. But even this would not meet Dr. Gale's obvious sense, for a *state of being under water* means more than that a pailfull of water is poured on the head, or dashed on one side of the body, and then on the other.

Such a process is *washing*; it is not enveloping or encompassing in water, *in the classic sense*. Nor did Origen, to whom Professor W. refers, speak of the pouring of the water on the wood of the altar as an encompassing with water in any sense, certainly not *in the classic sense* but as a *washing*—ξύλα δεόμενα λουτροῦ, "*the wood needing washing*," are his words, and they undeniably prove our assertion.

But even this vain retreat is excluded by the Prof.'s decision that the washing of Naaman was local and limited. He was not, therefore, *encompassed by water*, or *under water*. He was solely *washed* on a part of his body.

Nothing, then, can be more complete than Prof. Wilson's refutation of himself. His theory is entirely exploded and scattered in remediless ruin.

Nor is this all. He also regards the baptism expected of Christ

in Luke 11 : 38, as a partial ablution, as a mere washing of the hands, and refers to a passage quoted by us from Theophylact, for proof. He says also that "in our language we speak of *washing*, without specifying any part, yet every one understands the ablution to be partial."—p. 233. But if this is true in our language of the word *wash*, it is not true of such words as *overwhelm*, *envelop*, *encompass*, *immerse*. Even if a man had enveloped or immersed his hands in water, or overwhelmed them with water, we should not say of the man that he was immersed, or that he was enveloped, or surrounded with water, or overwhelmed by water. But in the case of Naaman, it is said he baptized himself, and in the case of Christ it is said that He was expected to baptize Himself.

On the other hand it is true that we speak of persons as *washed*, or as *purified*, even when the purifying act, or the washing, relates to a part of the body. But this only shows, that some great change has happened to βαπτίζω since its birth and education in the regions of classic antiquity. And Prof. Wilson's learned argument on II. Kings 5 : 14, has conclusively proved this. We have already spoken in terms of high approbation of this part of his work, and we again recommend a careful study of the passage from p. 144, to p. 177, as one of the most interesting, learned, and able in the book.

At the close, he says of Jerome, and the Syriac version, his chief witnesses as to the identity of sense between βαπτίζω and λούω, "their testimony should inculcate on all a lesson of controversial humility." On all who agree with Dr. Gale's views, including, of course, the Professor, they may well inculcate such a lesson. But as for others, though they may ardently desire to learn humility daily, yet these results are not specially adapted to teach it to them. Years ago it was stated and proved by many, that, βαπτίζω and λούω are often synonymes, and it does not tend particularly to humble them, to have it so clearly proved by new evidence that they were right. Yet we trust that they will not be unduly exalted by the result.

We have now, under the guidance of Prof. Wilson, passed the Jordan that separates the classic usage of βαπτίζω from the sacred, and have entered the Canaan of *Washing*. Let us next survey the new territory into which we have come. In the first place then, all the grand peculiarities of the classic sense have disappeared; and, in the second place, a new and striking idea has revealed itself as included in the word. Overwhelming, encompassing, enveloping, covering with water, are gone, and in their place the new idea of cleansing, has revealed itself. Look for a moment at classic usage. When the ocean overwhelms the seashore, when a lofty wave overwhelms and sinks a ship, when a river overwhelms and destroys men and cattle, no idea of cleansing is conveyed to the mind, nor in mere immersion is there such an

idea, the effect depending on the fluid. But in *λοῖω*, to wash, the radical idea is to *cleanse*, and that it implies neither immersion, overwhelming, nor covering with water, Professor Wilson has demonstrated. Moreover, *βαπτίζω* is a synonyme of *λοῖω*. We have then also entered the Canaan of *cleansing*. Under the same general we now propose to subdue and take possession of the land in behalf of *purification*, and to expel from it all Gentile intruders. For beyond all doubt, if the leading idea of *λοῖω*, to wash, is, to *cleanse*, then it is also, to *purify*, and on this basis there is ample room to erect, with imperishable materials, the indestructible and unconquerable towers of PURIFICATION.

That the radical idea of *λοῖω* is, to cleanse, is plain from the testimony of all lexicographers, as well as from actual usage. It is translated in Hebrew by *רחץ*, in Latin by *lavo*, in English by *wash*. And Prof. Wilson, from the time of passing the Jordan, as we have before remarked, entirely abjures such words as overwhelm, and in their place uses only such words as, to wash, washings, ablutions, and to perform ablution, in translating *βαπτίζω*, *α βαπτισμοί*. Now, in all these words, *cleansing*, or *purification*, is the radical idea. Schleusner gives as the primary sense of *λοῖω*, *lavo*, *abluo*, *mundo a sordibus physicis quibus res aliqua commaculata est*; to wash, to perform ablution, to cleanse from any physical pollution with which anything is polluted. Bretschneider also defines it by *lavo*, *abluo*, to wash, to perform ablution. Wahl, the same. Liddell and Scott, to wash. Robinson's Wahl, to wash, to cleanse. Robinson, to bathe, to wash.

In like manner, the English lexicographers assign to *wash*, as its primary idea to cleanse. Johnson, Walker, and Webster, agree in this. Forcellini defines *lavo* by *λούω*, *νίπτω*, *πλύνω*, *abluo*, *aqua purgo*. The English *wash*, the Latin *lavo*, and the Hebrew *רחץ*, are all perfectly equivalent, and are alike in taking the place in translation of either *λούω νίπτω, πλύνω*. The Greek alone has separate words for washing, 1, the body, or, 2, hands, face, and feet, or, 3, the clothes. But in all these languages, and through all these words, the radical idea is to cleanse, and they are sometimes interchanged.

To this it must be added, that in English; the words *cleanse*, *purify*, and *purge*, have all the same radical idea. Webster defines *cleanse* thus—to purify, to make clean, to remove filth. *Purge* he defines by to cleanse, or purify. *Purify*, by to make pure, or clear: To free from pollution ceremonially; to remove whatever renders unclean and unfit for sacred services. Worcester defines *cleanse*, to make clean or pure, to purify. To *purify*, he defines to make pure, to cleanse. *Purge* he defines to make clear or pure, to cleanse. Johnson defines *cleanse*, to free from filth, *purge*, to *cleanse—purify*, to make pure. Hence the radical idea of *wash*,

*cleanse, purify, and purge*, is the same. For this reason it is that Schleusner, not only defines βαπτισμός by *lotio* as Prof. Wilson has correctly stated, but he also defines it by "*purgatio*," PURIFICATION. He also defines καθαρισμός as "*purgatio corporis externa*," an *external purification of the body*. He also defines it, "*mundatio physica a sordibus et inquinamentis*," a *physical cleansing from filth and defilement*. He also defines it by βαπτισμός. We are not however to suppose that there is no difference between the words *to wash*, and *to purify*. *To purify* denotes to cleanse by any purifying agent. *To wash*, to cleanse by a purifying fluid, and most commonly by water. Hence Webster defines wash, "to cleanse by ablation, or by rubbing in water." Johnson and Walker, "to cleanse by ablation." Worcester, "to cleanse with water." Forcellini defines *lavo*, "aqua purgo"—to cleanse with water.

Yet, although the use of water is generally implied, if no other fluid is specified, it is not essentially included in the word, else the oft-repeated injunction to wash *with water*, in the Old Testament, would be tautological. All that is implied is the use of a cleansing fluid of some kind.

To wash, then, is to perform with some fluid a process that cleanses, and as water is the universally diffused purifying fluid, it generally implies the use of water. Again, if nothing in the context forbids, the word *wash* always denotes that the process designed to cleanse, is effectual. Sometimes the context renders it impossible to avoid the idea of an effectual cleansing. Thus Cant. 5: 3. "I have washed my feet, how shall I defile them?" Here it is implied, of necessity, that the spouse means to assert that she has actually made her feet clean, and cannot endure the thought of defiling them. In this place רָחַץ, λούω, and lavo, represent the word to wash, and all denote an effectual cleansing. The same is always to be understood, *if the context does not forbid*.

But, in some cases, the context limits us to an *effort* to cleanse. Thus of a very filthy garment it may be said, I washed it, but still it is not clean. Here we are obliged by the context, to understand an effort to cleanse. This, however, is not peculiar to wash. Purify is used in the same way. In Ezek. 24: 13, God says to Israel: "I have purified thee and thou wast not purified," or as our version has it, "I have purged thee and thou wast not purged." On this Rosenmuller remarks, "a verb denoting an action or an effect is sometimes to be understood of the effort to produce the result." Thus God means to say, "I used with thee a process, adapted and intended to purify, but thou wast not purified." Here he refers to His providence and to His Word, and to the admonitions and warnings of the prophets, designed to produce repentance. Rosenmuller refers also to other cases of a similar usage.

If now we were to stop here, the result would be that βαπτίζω

denotes not simply to purify, but to purify with a fluid. But as βαπτίζω is applied to the mind as well as to the body, and as it is also applied to cleansing by blood and water mixed with ashes, which are not fluids adapted to produce a real cleansing, we must, of necessity, go beyond this sense.

Let us then leave the physical sense of λούω, *lavo*, wash, and βαπτίζω, and pass into the region of the spirit. Here they are used metaphorically, and a very striking result is seen. The possibility of physical cleansing in a fluid is excluded, and nothing but the sense to purify remains. Hence Bretschneider defines λούω in its metaphorical sense by *expurgo*. Wahl, *purum reddo*, Robinson, *to cleanse, to purify*. Hence βαπτίζω, even as a synonyme of λούω, means simply to purify as soon as it enters the regions of the spirit. The baptism of the Holy Spirit is, therefore, simply a *mental purification*. This view is sustained by high authority. Prof. Wilson himself is that authority. He expressly identifies in sense, *to wash, to purify, and to cleanse*, when applied to the spirit. He says, p. 289, "*Spiritual purification* is what it (baptism), is designed *principally to represent*," and a few lines after, "*spiritual washing* is the *leading thought symbolized* in water baptism," on p. 305. He speaks of "*spiritual cleansing*" as symbolized by the rite. Hence he identifies in sense the words, *washing, purification, and cleansing*, when applied to the mind. Accordingly, on p. 288, he says, "Its (the Bible's), staple disclosures point out the ordinance as a *figure of spiritual washing, or purification*."

Now let it be considered that even external baptism is not designed to be an actual bodily washing, for the sake of making the body physically clean, nor even a ceremonial washing for the sake of removing ceremonial pollution, but a symbolical use of water designed to show forth the moral purification of the mind from the pollution of sin, by the Holy Spirit, and its sacrificial purification through the blood of Christ, from its guilt, and is there not every reason to believe that when βαπτίζω had already gone so far as to reach, in the spiritual world the sense of moral purification, and of sacrificial purification, it would be applied in the sense purification to a rite which was not an actual physical washing, but merely a symbolical representation of purification? Ought not the word in both parts of the antithesis to be the same? If the Holy Spirit purifies, ought not water, the symbol, to be spoken of as purifying? Baptism is, in fact, not a proper washing, but merely a symbolic purification. βαπτίζω then must take that sense.

But our general having led us thus far does not desert us here. He leads us on to still more decisive proofs of the actual completion of the change alledged.

He admits that the sprinkling of blood was called by the Fathers, and is, in fact, a baptism. He also admits that the sprinkling

of ashes and water was a baptism. Now, in this case, it is plain to a demonstration, that there was no actual bodily cleansing by a fluid, nor was there an effort to wash, in the proper sense of the term. Nay, so far as the blood and ashes were concerned, there was a bodily pollution. But there was a symbolic purification, typical of the sacrificial and moral purification of the soul by the blood of Christ. "If the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling the unclean, *sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh*, how much more shall the blood of Christ *purge your conscience from dead works*, to serve the living God."

This typical purification then, excluding, as it does, immersion, overwhelming, affusion, encompassing with water, putting under water, or being under water, excluding, also, actual bodily cleansing by a purifying fluid, this purification is called, and is a baptism. The Professor quotes from us two striking passages to prove this point, and then assures us, that "we find passages of this nature profusely scattered over the pages of the Fathers."—p. 326. We submit then to all candid men, whether the Professor has not totally exploded Dr. Gale's theory and his own; for they are in essence the same, and fully and clearly established our position, that βαπτίζω did pass to the sense to purify or cleanse, irrespective of mode.

And now if any please still to call such rites as sprinkling with the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of a heifer, *washings*, or *ablutions*, as Prof. Wilson does, we will not object: but it is plain that, in this case, they abstract from the words all but the radical idea, purification. An actual bodily cleansing is not there. A sacrificial purification by blood or ashes is all that is there.

In like manner if λούω and πλύνω are used to denote the agency of the Holy Spirit in baptizing the mind, we do not hesitate to translate them either, to wash, or to purify, abstracting from wash, in the first case, all idea of a fluid, and leaving to it the sense, to purify. Of this sense of the word to wash, an instance occurs in Prov. 30: 12; "There is a generation that are *pure* in their own eyes, and yet are not *washed* (i. e. purified), from their own filthiness." So in Jeremiah 4: 14. "Oh Jerusalem, *wash* thy heart from wickedness," i. e. purify or cleanse. Also Ps. 51: 2, "*Wash* me from mine iniquity and *cleanse* me from my sin." So in I. Cor. 6: 11. "Such were some of you, but ye are *washed*," i. e. purified; and Webster defines wash, to purify, on this authority.

In like manner, when the author of the gospel of Nicodemus, chapter 19, says of Christ, Καὶ ἐπέινος ὕδατι καὶ πνεύματι αὐτοῦ πλύνει, "he shall *wash* them with water and the Holy Spirit,"—we take πλύνω in the general sense to purify. In the same way Cyril of Alexandria, uses νίω and νίπω, abstracting all idea of washing the hands, face, and feet, to denote simply the purification of the mind. He also uses πλύνω in the same way, with no reference to clothes. Thus, ῥύπον προακονίζων τῆς ψυχῆς—ζων ἐκνευμιμμένην—ἀπονίζοντος



νηστῶς τοὺς ἐν ἀκαθαρσία—ἀπονήψιν ἣν ὁ Χριστὸς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐργάσατο—τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ μολυσμῶν τὸν μῶμον ἐκπλύνουσα—τὸδ' ἐν ταῖς δ'ιανοαῖς διαπλύνει μολυσμῶν.

Origen also uses λούω in the sense, to purify, in a very striking case. Commenting on the statement of John concerning Christ, "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire, he says, that "one class he baptizes with the Holy Ghost, and the other he washes with fire, λούει ἐν πυρὶ."—§ 28, p. 71. Here no one can introduce the idea of water, or of any fluid but liquid fire, and this simply purifies, or purges by heat.

We indeed prefer the word *purifications*, to denote the diverse baptisms of the Jews, because among them were *sprinklings of blood and of ashes*, and these are not washings in the common sense of the term. But if any one will still call them *washings*, meaning thereby *purifications*, we will not dispute about words.

But Prof. Wilson has not only aided us by his own proof of our point, we are equally obliged to him for the aid of his principles. By the aid of these we shall now proceed to show that our own proof is abundant and of the highest kind.

We cannot, of course, enter into a minute examination of all our proofs. We shall rather select some to which the Professor's principles peculiarly apply. He states that there is "an element of proof which, if not more convincing in its nature than others, is at least calculated to afford higher gratification to the mind of the true philologist. We allude to the interesting fact that the secondary meaning, instead of hanging loosely upon the outskirts of clauses and sentences, has seized upon their most intimate connections, and entered deeply into the structural fabric of the Greek language. This he illustrates by a long quotation from Dr. Halley, the essence of which is in the following words: "The best proof of a complete change of meaning, is a corresponding change in the syntax, accommodating itself to the deflection of sense." He illustrates it by the fact that when βάπτω passes to the sense, to dye, it develops a new syntactical power. It now governs an accusative denoting the color dyed: as when we say to dye a purple, or, as in the Greek of Plato, βάπτω χερμάρα. We may speak of dipping wool, but not of dipping colors: colors are not dipped, but dyed. Therefore, when βάπτω governs an accusative of the color, it must have passed to the sense to dye.

Now we allege, that in the case of βαπτίζω there is, in the words of Dr. Halley, "the best proof of a complete change of meaning," that is "a corresponding change in the syntax, accommodating itself to the deflection of sense." No part of a language is more vitally connected with its syntactical fabric than the use of prepositions. The relations of space, of time, and of causality, are denoted by prepositions, and these elements enter deeply into the vital structure of every language.

Now it is, to use the words of the learned Professor, an interesting fact, that the secondary meaning of βαπτίζω, (i. e. to purify) instead of hanging loosely upon the outskirts of clauses and sentences, has seized upon their most intimate connections, and entered deeply into the structural fabric of the Greek language," by producing, at least, four distinct classes of syntactical changes in the use of βαπτίζω with prepositions, all of them such as would proceed from, and accommodate themselves to, the alleged change of meaning from the primary sense of βαπτίζω, to the sense to purify.

We will proceed to specify one of them. βαπτίζω in its primitive sense to immerse, or encompass, or overwhelm, implies *contact and union* between the person baptized, and the baptizing fluid, and is followed by no prepositions inconsistent with the idea of union. Purifying, on the other hand, implies *separation* between the person purified, and the pollution, of whatever kind it may be, from which he is purified, and is followed by prepositions adapted to denote the idea of *separation*.

Of these prepositions ἀπό is one. It is particularly specified by Wahl, in his *Lexicon of the New Testament*, as coming after words denoting separation, and among these he specifies verbs and adjectives denoting purification. He illustrates his own conviction of the importance and of the controlling power of this principle, in a striking case. γαρτίζω confessedly denotes to sprinkle. It implies contact and union between the object sprinkled and the sprinkling fluid. So long, therefore, as it means to sprinkle, it must be followed by prepositions consistent with that idea.

But as the effect of sprinkling as a religious rite was to purify, so the word γαρτίζω could pass to that sense. Now not only Wahl, but also Bretschneider, Schleusner, and Robinson, the leading modern lexicographers of the New Testament, men of acknowledged "philological acumen," all assert that γαρτίζω did pass to the secondary sense, to purify. On what grounds? Because of a change of syntactical construction demanding that sense. And what was that change? It took after it the preposition ἀπό denoting separation, in Heb. 10: 22, ἐγχαρισμένοι τὰς καρτίας ἀπὸ συνειδήσεως σοφῆας. This they all translate "*purified, as to our hearts from an evil conscience,*" and justify themselves by appealing to the use of ἀπὸ. Prof. Stuart also translates the passage, "*being purified as to our hearts from a consciousness of evil.*" Moreover, in his commentary on the passage, he thus appeals to this principle for defence: "The construction ἐγχαρισμένοι . . . ἀπὸ . . . shows that the participle ἐγχαρισμένοι is to be taken in the secondary or metaphorical sense, i. e. *purified from, cleansed from.*" The lexicographers above mentioned still further evince the correctness of the assertion that γαρτίζω had assumed the secondary sense to purify, by appealing to the fact that in Ps. 51: 9, כִּבְּרִי which,

beyond all controversy, denotes to purify or cleanse, is in the Septuagint translated by βαπτίζω. A higher proof cannot be given of the deep conviction of these illustrious scholars, of the reality, and of the resistless power of the great philological principle, so clearly stated, and so ably defended, by Dr. Halley and Prof. Wilson.

And now, by the authority of this principle, we claim that the question as to the sense to purify, is decided in our favor, beyond the power of appeal—for, in our first reply to Dr. Carson, we adduced in evidence a passage from Justin Martyr, exactly similar to this, and involving the same identical principle, the supreme power of which Dr. Halley and Prof. Wilson not only concede, but earnestly assert and proclaim. §. 50, p. 155, also, §. 90. p. 195.

In that passage, βαπτίζω relates to the mind, and is followed by ἀπό, denoting separation, βαπτισθητε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας, ἀπὸ φθόνου, ἀπὸ μισοῦς, καὶ ἰδοὺ τὸ σῶμα καθαρὸν ἔσται.

Note here the earnest and emphatic repetition of ἀπό before the various forms of pollution by which the soul is defiled, and from which it is to be purified. Notice the antithetic term καθαρὸν applied to the body, clearly deciding that a purification of the soul was enjoined in the other member of the antithesis, and then let Prof. Wilson summon all his "philological acumen" and tell, if he can, why the sentence should not be translated, "BE PURIFIED as to your soul from anger, and from covetousness, from envy, and from hatred, and, lo, your body is PURE." He cannot translate it in any other way without renouncing evidence which Dr. Halley, sustained by his own endorsement, has pronounced "the best proof of a complete change of meaning," evidence, the full weight of which is felt and acted on, not only by Prof. Stuart, but by all the leading modern lexicographers of the New Testament.

That the learned Professor may feel the more deeply the force of this argument, we would refer him to the fact that he professes to have exhibited in his statement of evidence from the Greek classics *every variety* of structure occurring in the classic use of βαπτίζω. "We are not aware (says he) that any variety of structure has been omitted in the discussion." And yet he may search through the whole field of classic usage, as stated by himself, and not find a case like that in Justin Martyr. Nay, more, he may search through the catalogues of instances of classic usage given by Prof. Stuart, Prof. J. H. Godwin, Dr. Carson, H. Stephens, and all other writers on this subject, and he cannot find such a case. It is no part of the classic usage of the word. It is found only in those religious uses of the word, in which the same causes existed to change its sense to the meaning, to purify, as existed in the case of βαπτίζω, and changed its sense to the same meaning.

We have now arrived at a point from which we can take a connected view of the Professor's mode of dealing with the celebrated passage, Sirach 31: 26, βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ καὶ πάλιν ἀπτόμενος αὐτοῦ τί ὠφέλησε τῷ λουτρῷ αὐτοῦ. "When one is baptized from a dead body and touches it again, of what avail is his cleansing." Taking it all in all, the passage from p. 182 to p. 186, is the most remarkable specimen of critical and controversial writing, that it has ever been our lot to meet.

To this passage we had appealed as a proof of the sense purification in βαπτίζω. Our arguments were. 1. The regimen of βαπτίζω demands the sense to purify. It is followed by ἀπὸ denoting separation, and therefore requires before it a verb denoting, to purify. The force of this kind of evidence we have developed and shown that it has the sanction of Prof. Wilson himself, as the very best. Prof. Stuart felt it, and translated accordingly. Dr. Carson so felt its power, that although he translated βαπτιζόμενος, immersed, yet he introduced by ellipsis the verb, to purify, "immersed to purify from"—thereby confessing that ἀπὸ demands before it the sense, to purify.

2. The circumstances, historial and ceremonial, demand that sense. The chief purifying agent in the case is the ashes of a heifer. Paul refers to these alone as purifying. So does Josephus. So does Philo, in describing this purification. Cyril of Alexandria, also speaks of baptizing with ashes. Now the real import of this part of the process is not a corporeal cleansing, for ashes, thus used, do not cleanse physically. It is an ideal *purification*; that is, a ceremonial and symbolical purification. A sense as generic as purify, can include this, and the washing too—one less generic cannot. Hence both the regimen and the circumstances, historical and ceremonial, demand that sense.

Let us now take a connected view of the learned Professor's criticism on this argument.

He admits that the process of cleansing, to which βαπτιζόμενος refers, does include both the sprinkling with ashes, and the washing with water; moreover, he admits that "on a first inspection, the case seems strong for President Beecher, and the entire class of purifiers, who certainly occupy a respectable position in the baptismal controversy."—p. 183.

He rejects the sense to purify here merely because, in his opinion, it has not been elsewhere independently proved. This, of course, assumes that the evidence for that sense in the passage itself is insufficient. But this ought to have been shown and not assumed. But he does not attempt to show it. He makes no efforts to point out the weak points of the argument. He merely assumes that it is devoid of strength, without an effort at proof. His general assertions that he has seen no proof of the

sense in question, and that it *cannot* be extracted from the verb, on sound philological principles, followed by the assertion that the way is perfectly open to receive new evidence in favor of that sense, and then by the assertion that to assign that sense to the verb involves an absurdity, we have already considered. We have also shown that this last assertion is at war with his own principles and practise in the case of כָּבַשׁ and βάπτω. We now add that this assertion is also in direct contradiction of his proof that βαπτίζω is a synonyme of λούω, for λούω includes the idea of cleansing, or purifying, which he declares must be excluded from βαπτίζω, in order to avoid an absurdity. Either then it is not absurd to assign that idea to βαπτίζω, or else that is absurd which he has proved to be an undoubted matter of fact.

Again, his giving to baptism, the generic sense of a "process of applying water," whilst "the mere baptism does not inform us of the mode of application," or of its effects, is another manifest contradiction of his theory, that baptism implies being *under the water, and encompassed by it*, and that this sense is co-extensive with its actual usage. The classic ideas, to encompass, to overwhelm, to cover, &c., have, according to him, all disappeared, and baptism now conveys merely the generic idea of any process of applying water, without reference to mode or effects. Of mode and effects the word tells us nothing, we must look at the circumstances and the context for light on these. According to this, if water, clean, or filthy, is applied in any quantity, and in any way, and with any results, it is a baptism. Whether true or false, this is certainly not the classic sense of the word.

Having thus excluded all idea of purifying from the word baptism, to sustain himself, he strangely appeals to the authority of Schleusner and Robinson, both of whom include that idea in this word, as his own quotation from Schleusner shows, "Qui abluit se a mortuo." "He who has washed or cleansed himself from a dead body." Schleusner also defines βαπτισμός, *purification*. The Professor no less strangely appeals for support to the construction; for the preposition ἀπό demands the sense to cleanse, or purify, before it, as we have shown. And to crown all, he appeals to the circumstances, historical and ceremonial, all of which, as we have shown, demand the sense to purify.

At all events, until he has shown not only that ἀπό and the circumstances, do not demand the sense claimed by us, nay more, until he has shown that they forbid it, neither of which can he do, he has no right to appeal to them in support of his view. They testify not for him but for us. Surely the author of such criticism and philology should not be severe on others as it regards "philological acumen."

But this use of ἀπό does not exhaust the full force of the argument, it is but a small part of it; for besides this one change of syn-

tactical structure, there are three others, of which the same things are true, namely, that they are entirely unknown to classic usage, and, also, that they have come into use just where causes were in operation tending to change the primary sense of βαπτίζω, to the sense to purify, and still farther, that these changes of syntax correspond with and accommodate themselves to the change alleged, and obviously proceeded from it.

It is admitted on all hands, that certain prepositions are used to denote in certain circumstances the relation of causality. By them the connection of an effect with its cause is denoted. Now according to our doctrine the verb βαπτίζω has passed from *the process* denoted by its original sense to *the effect* of that process, that is, purification. It would be reasonable, then, that a form of syntax should come into existence adapted to trace this effect to its causes.

Such is the fact. There are two such forms: one employing the preposition *ἀπό*, the other the preposition *ἐκ*, for this purpose. Basil, in his commentary on Is. 4: 4, speaks of τὸ βάπτισμα ἐξ ὕδατος and τὸ βάπτισμα ἐκ πνεύματος.—§ 55, p. 171. Now these are forms of syntactical construction totally unknown to the classical writers of Greece. They are not at all adapted to describe the process denoted by the primary sense of βαπτίζω. They are exactly adapted to trace the relation of an effect to its cause. Chrysostom thus uses the same syntactical structure with Καθαίρω, to purify, to denote that relation, ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος καθαίρομεθα, "we are purified by water, and by the Spirit." Basil, in the same passage, uses it with Καθαρισμός thus τοῦ ἐκτοῦ πυρὸς καθαρισμοῦ. "The purification which is effected by fire." Are not all the conditions of Dr. Halley here fulfilled? Is there not an entire change in the syntax from classical usage? Does it not exactly correspond to the alleged change of sense, and accommodate itself to it? Then we have here, according to Dr. Halley and Prof. Wilson, "*the best proof*" of the change of meaning alleged.

Let us now consider a similar use of the preposition *ἀπό*. Origen held to a purification by fire after death, in the case of such as defiled themselves after baptism in this world. The case of such he regarded as peculiarly miserable. But that of such as did not need this purification as thrice happy. μακάριος ὁ μὴ δεόμενος βαπτίσματος τοῦ ἀπὸ πυρός. Happy is he who does not need the purification which is to be effected by fire.—§ 86, p. 262. Here again we have undeniably an entire departure from every usage of classical syntax in the case of βαπτίζω. But it is a change corresponding to the sense, to purify, and perfectly "accommodating itself to that deflection of sense." Of this the proof is easy. Chrysostom says, ἀπὸ δακρῶν καὶ ἐξομολογήσεως καθαίρομεθα. "By tears and confession we are *purified*." Basil also speaks as before, of those who need τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος καθαρισμοῦ, "the *purification* effected by water." Dr. Halley then, and Prof. Wilson, are our authority for

asserting that there is here also the best proof of that sense of βαπτίζω, for which we contend.

Let us now proceed to the last instance of this kind. The primitive sense of βαπτίζω denotes in the classics, as all admit, a process. But in the classics διά never connects it in regimen with the baptizing fluid. The classic world has been searched in vain for such an instance. But as soon as we come into the region of the alleged religious use of βαπτίζω to denote *the effect* purification, then the structure of the language changes, and διά is found after βαπτίζω and always uniting it in regimen with the genitive of a purifying *cause* of some kind. Now let it be well noted, that this is the very construction which is assumed in like cases by Καθαρίζω.—Πολλοὶ διὰ δακρύων ἐκαθαρίσθησαν, says an author who assumed the name of Athanasius. Following the same syntactical law, we find such cases as, βαπτίζω δια πνεύματος, or δι ὕδατος, or διὰ πυρός, or διὰ μετανοίας, or διὰ παθοῦς, or διὰ δακρύων, or δι αἵματος, —to purify by the Spirit, or by water, or by fire, or by repentance, or by suffering, or by tears, or by blood.—§ 64, p. 206. In such cases as to baptize by repentance, or by suffering, it is peculiarly clear that no idea of the process denoted by the primary sense of βαπτίζω is at all admissible, and in every one of the preceding cases, the sense to purify is clearly demanded on the principles of Dr. Halley and Professor Wilson.

One case from Gregory Thaumaturgus, "ex abundantia," is all that we need to quote.—§ 80, p. 263. He represents Christ as saying to John, βάπτισόν με τὸν μέλλοντά βαπτίζειν τοῖς πιστεύοντι δι ὕδατος, καὶ πνεύματος καὶ πυρός. That he does not here denote the process implied in the primitive sense of βαπτίζω is plain, because in immediate connection he denotes that by Καταδύω to immerse. It is plain also, because he shows in the close of the sentence, that he is referring solely to the purifying effect of the spirit, water, and fire. These considerations, taken in connection with the use of an entirely new syntactical structure, "accommodating itself to the deflection of sense," authorize us once more to say, that we have here "the best proof of a complete change of meaning" in βαπτίζω.

Now, if in any of the preceding cases, the context seemed to gainsay the grammatical structure, it might seem to cause us some perplexity. But it is far otherwise. In every instance, without exception, the context strongly favors the sense which the syntactical structure demands. Particularly is this true in the cases taken from Basil, § 55, p. 170.—He declares, in the context, an exact agreement in meaning between the prophecy of Isaiah, that the Messiah should purify by the spirit of judgment and the spirit of burning, and that of John, that he should baptize with fire. Nay more, in the same connection he explicitly defines βάπτισμα as meaning purification. Origen also, in his context, clearly evinces that in speaking of τοῦ βαπτίσματος τοῦ ἀπὸ πυρός he refers to

purification as an effect of fire, and not to a process of envelopment or immersion. He speaks of him who needs this baptism as coming to the fire, and of the fire as trying him, and finding wood, hay and stubble, and consuming them. This is purification. It is not immersion. In accordance with this, Basil says in another place, *De Spirit, Sanct.*, Cap. 15, that this trial by fire at the judgment spoken of by Paul, in *I. Cor. 3 : 16*, and just referred to by Origen, is the baptism of fire, τὸ τοῦ πυρὸς βάπτισμα.

We will now call the attention of the learned Professor to a class of facts well adapted still more thoroughly to test his doctrine, that, to avoid an absurdity we must confine the sense of βαπτίζω to the process denoted by its primitive usage, and not use it to denote the effect purification.—§ 65, p. 200. Origen *Homil. 2 on Jer.*, speaks of the happiness of the man who preserves the baptism of the Holy Spirit, ὁ τηρήσας τὸ βάπτισμα τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου. In *Homil. 7, on Judges*, he says that few are so happy as to preserve it unspotted to the end of life. Is it necessary for us to say that the process denoted by the primitive sense of βαπτίζω is not of a nature to be preserved at all? How can a man preserve a process of immersion, or of overwhelming, or of envelopment? If he does not desire to be drowned in his baptism, it must of necessity be temporary. Did any sane man ever try to keep himself in a process of perpetual immersion from and after the hour of his baptism until death, taking pains to keep the water clean so as to preserve his immersion unspotted?

Is it not plain that there is no way to avoid the absurdity of such an idea, but to assign to βάπτισμα the sense purification, an effect which we can consistently speak of as preserved, and preserved unspotted to the end of life?—The cases quoted from Origen are not solitary instances. It were easy to multiply them. The idea of preserving baptism unspotted till the close of life pervaded all patristic antiquity.

In order still further to test the Professor's doctrine that we are to confine βαπτίζω to a process, and to exclude the idea of the effects of that process, we would ask his attention to a passage from the author of the *Opus Imperfectum* on Matthew, formerly and extensively regarded as a Latin translation of a work of Chrysostom. The Romish church, Popes, and authors of theological summaries, quote it as Chrysostom's. Manhusius regards it as Chrysostom's, but needing correction. Baronius, Tillemont, Erasmus, and Montfaucon do not regard it as the work of Chrysostom. There is, however, internal evidence that it is a translation from some Greek author—particularly the use of the Latin *in* as a translation of the Greek ἐν, even in cases where ἐν is equivalent to διὰ or the Latin *per*. The work was written after Theodosius the Great, between the years 400 and 600.

He describes a baptism by fire, different in idea from that of Origen and of Basil, §. 61, p. 189. By fire he understands the



severe trials of life, the fire of the furnace of affliction. By this fire he says that the servants of God *are baptized*, and the servants of the devil *are not baptized*. He gives the reasons of this statement. In the case of a child of God, "*in fornacem tentationis missus, depositis peccatis sanctificatur*," "being placed in the furnace of affliction, he renounces his sins and is sanctified." The proof that the servants of the Devil "*non baptizantur in igne*," "are not baptized by fire," is this, "*Quia non potest fieri ut depositis sordibus emundetur qui totus est sordidus*." "Because he who is totally *impure* cannot thus lay aside his sins and *be purified*." Is it not plain to a demonstration that this argument proves that in one case the *effect* purification takes place; in the other, it does not? Is it not equally plain, that if this proves that baptism takes place in one case and not in the other, that baptism and purification mean the same thing?

Still more clearly does this appear by the illustration which he uses. He compares a child of the devil to a brick or tile made of clay, and applies to him the Latin proverb, "*laborem perdit qui laterem lavat*," he loses his labor who washes a brick, thus, "Begin to wash a brick in water; will it ever be made clean? No: but by stirring up the clay it is rendered more polluted." And as the result of the whole, he thus sums up the matter, "*for he is purified (mundatur) in whom is something good by which he can be purified*."

Let us put this in the form of a syllogism.

Major. He only is purified by the fire of trials in whom is something good, by which he may be purified.

Minor. In the children of the devil there is nothing good, but they are all polluted.

Conclusion. Therefore, the children of the devil, are not and cannot be *baptized* by the fire of trials.

Now, it is never right to ascribe to a man of common sense, a gross blunder in logic, if his words admit of a sense consistent with sound reasoning. Assign to baptize the sense to purify, and the reasoning is sound, and the only way in which Prof. Wilson can escape that sense is by inexcusably stultifying the author upon whose words we are commenting.

There is a similar case in Ambrose (§. 53, p. 167), in which he declares that the washings of the heathen are not baptisms, because they do not really purify the soul, but rather pollute it. "*Lavacra sunt, baptismata esse non possunt*." "They are washings, baptisms they cannot be." But why can they not be baptisms? Listen to his reason: "*caro lavatur, non culpa diluitur, immo in illo lavacro contrahitur*." "The flesh indeed is washed, but sin is not washed away, nay, in that washing sin is contracted." Let the Professor, if he can, show that here the word baptism denotes merely a process, without reference to its effects. Ambrose could not more effectually refute that doctrine. He tells us in these

words where purification is, there is baptism, where it is not, there baptism cannot be, for the mere external process of applying water to the body is not a baptism. This assertion of Ambrose, as we have remarked, has especial reference to the purification of the mind. In the highest sense, no man is baptized till his mind is purified from sin, let him go through whatever external cleansing he may. But when he is purified from sin, then he is truly baptized. Here, then, Ambrose pointedly removes the idea of an external process from the word, and limits it solely to an internal effect, that is purification.

The coincidence of these views with the passage of Justin on which we have commented, is too obvious to need remark. "Be baptized," says that father, "as to your mind, from anger, and from covetousness, from envy, and from hatred, and, lo, your body is pure." External processes are of no avail till the mind is baptized from sin, but if the mind is baptized from sin the body is pure. Here, too, all external processes are excluded and the mind is fixed on purification as the exclusive sense of *βαπτίζω*.

For the present, we will suspend this process of commenting on evidence, not because our store is at all exhausted, but still farther to test the Professor's own theory of the meaning of *βαπτίζω*.

Let us, then, consider the practical effects of his theory. If the command is not to purify, but to encompass with water, or to envelop in water, then, after all, the Baptists can well demand of the Professor, what better mode of fulfilling this command can be found than immersion? They may well say, "suppose that we give up the absolute necessity of dipping to baptism, and only insist on encompassing the baptized person with water, or enveloping him in water. Would you gain anything by trying to overwhelm him with water, or to pour water over him properly located in a vessel, till he is encompassed with and under it? Is not our mode of enveloping in all respects the most decorous and the most convenient?"

Sure we are, that to such an argument the learned Professor could make no logical reply.

In classic usage, that which is said to be baptized is always all enveloped in the baptizing fluid, unless some part is excepted. If soldiers are described as baptized not totally, but partially, it is said that they were baptized to their waist, or to their breast, &c. So far, then, as they were baptized they were entirely enveloped in water. For proof of this we refer to the Professor's own examples. Nor is this all. The word implies that all parts that are baptized are simultaneously in a state of envelopment. When soldiers are said to be baptized up to their breast, it does not mean that water is poured first on one side of the body and then on the other, and then behind, and then before; but all parts, so long as they are baptized, are simultaneously surrounded by the fluid. Hence, even if a man were to be sprinkled on all parts of his body

in succession by water, or blood, or ashes, still, he would not be baptized in the classic sense of the word. In a shower-bath, he might be, for a time, encompassed with water, but even then he would not be under water, in Dr. Gale's sense, and if he was, this would be no improvement on the Baptist mode of baptizing.

To sum up all in few words, if the Professor's theory is true, the common mode of sprinkling is no baptism at all, and there is no mode of baptizing so good as that of the Baptists.

The learned Professor seems to be aware that he is liable to an assault from this quarter. Indeed, he tells us that Baptists urge strongly that even if the mode of immersion cannot always be made out in *βαπτισμῷ*, yet it confessedly indicates a far more copious application of water than consists with sprinkling. In view of this, he says, if Baptists are prepared to make a transition from *mode* to the *quantity* of the baptizing element, we are not without hope that the *quaestio vexata* between us and them, will reach a speedy and felicitous adjustment. That it would, on Prof. Wilson's ground, reach a *speedy* adjustment does not seem to us at all improbable, for there is but one reasonable result on that ground, viz., that all shall adopt the Baptist mode of encompassing or enveloping with water. For the question does not refer merely to the quantity of water, but to the thing commanded, which is, by the Professor's own statement, to *encompass* the baptized object with the baptizing element. But though such an adjustment might be "speedy," we should by no means regard it as "felicitous" and we very much doubt whether the Professor himself would so regard it.

Thus far we have said nothing of the "questionable analogies, and theological ingenuity," which Prof. W. opposes to "philological acumen." We have been content to test our argument and his acumen, on his own chosen ground.

But we are far from admitting that the great analogy on which a main part of our argument rests, is at all questionable. The Professor has, indeed, carefully avoided all use of it, but in so doing he has fatally obscured that fundamentally important subject, the baptism of the Holy Ghost. But there is not time, at present, to consider this momentous theme, and with it, the true relations of the theology to this great argument.

But as it is our purpose soon to make some remarks on the work of Dr. Halley, to which Prof. Wilson so often refers as his guide, we shall reserve a full consideration of these parts of the subject till that time. We will conclude by remarking, that although we regret that the Professor should give the influence of his name against us to those who rely more on names than on arguments, still it is a consolation that he has never assailed our opinions with any arguments at all, but that on the few points wherein he differs from us, he has assailed and overthrown his own opinions with arguments of the most unanswerable kind. He is, in fact, entirely

on our side, though not apparently aware of it; and as it is hard to maintain opposing positions, or to advocate both sides of the question, we trust that he will soon free his views from those few errors by which a treatise, otherwise very able, is rendered so contradictory and self-destructive.

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ARTICLE III.

OUR AGE—ITS PROGRESS, PROSPECTS, AND DEMANDS.

By REV. ROBERT BAIRD, D. D., New York.

THE Age in which we live is emphatically one of PROGRESS. Throughout the civilized world there has been a marked advance; not equally in all directions; not equally in any direction; but still in all a real, decided, palpable advance. Let us consider some of those subjects in which this Progress is most marked; or rather, in which the interests of humanity are most deeply involved:—beginning with those things that most concern the *material interests of mankind*.

1. Observe the progress which is seen in the development of the resources of Nature. What an advance is making in agriculture; in the modes of increasing the fertility of soils; in the application of the principles of chemistry to the accomplishment of this end; as well as in the great improvements that have been effected in all the implements of husbandry. What changes are occurring in this respect; changes which are diminishing the labor, increasing the leisure, and consequently improving the opportunities of the farmer! What progress in augmenting the means of sustaining human existence, and the capacity of our earth to support an immense population. Who can tell how great that capacity will prove, when all the resources of the earth shall have been fully developed by the aid of science combined with art? What man can venture to assert that he sees the limits which the almighty Creator has fixed, saying: "*Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther?*"

If those political economists who are so much troubled at the thought that this globe is in danger of being overstocked with inhabitants, and who see, or think they see, nothing but wide-spread famine and wretchedness in reserve for them, could but obtain a prophetic glance at the immense progress which the world is evidently destined to make in this respect, perhaps their gloomy forebodings would give place to cheerful hope and sustaining confidence; or at any rate, they would find the fulfilment of their apprehensions postponed to a period beyond the reach of human foresight.

2. Nor is this advance less worthy of observation, in respect to its development of the means by which human existence is rendered comfortable. How wonderful has been the increase of man-

ufactures, and the consequent augmentation of the well-being and happiness of mankind, within the last half century! There are few, if any, countries in the civilized world, where there has not been some progress in this respect; a progress which has not only increased the wealth of those countries, but also improved the health, contributed to the longevity, and materially multiplied the enjoyments of all classes of the people. It is a fact which no one can deny, that the poorer, as well as the middle classes, in many countries, are far better clad and housed, and in every sense live more comfortably, at a less expense, than they did in former times.

3. The Progress of our Age is seen in the augmented facilities for intercourse,—national, international, œcumenical, we might almost say. If we begin by noticing the common roads, how great an improvement has taken place in almost every portion of the civilized world. If we look back one-hundred years, the roads of England (and the same is true of the Continent as it was even fifty years ago), were in a most wretched condition. In this respect the advance has been as great in France, in Germany, in Italy, in Russia, in Denmark, and in Spain. In fact there is scarcely a country, within the pale of civilization, where there has not been a great amelioration in this matter. The influence it has exerted upon the facilities and convenience of travel is obvious.

But half a century has elapsed since the invention of the steam-boat; and already how extensive is the use that has been made of it! Not to speak of our own country, on every river, lake, and bay of which it is to be found, we meet with it in almost every other region. On the waters of the Amazon, the Orinoco, and La Plata—along the coast of Peru, New Granada, and Chili—from Panama to California and Oregon; “its lines have gone out through all the earth.” Whilst in Europe there is not a navigable river, or sea, or lake, on which there are not steamboats running. In Great Britain and the continental countries, the number is great, and constantly increasing. There are thirty on Lake Malar, in Sweden; there are seventy or eighty on the Danube; they are to be seen urging their way along the distant Wolga; they plough the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, and thread their course amid the archipelagos that bound the southeastern coast of Asia. Such too has been the history of the rail-road, which, like a vast net-work, has already covered our own country, and is daily extending itself over the plains of Europe and South America.

Who indeed can accurately calculate and nicely weigh all the influences, political, social, economical, intellectual, and religious, which these increased means and facilities of intercourse, in commerce and in travel, are destined to exert upon mankind? When fully developed, and made to pervade the nations, as they will ere long, they will constitute bonds of amity stronger than iron, and more durable than brass, to hold the nations together. Is not this

the manifest tendency of things—the glorious destiny of the human race?

4. As a result, perhaps, of this increasing intercourse among the nations, or at least as one of the exponents of the progress which marks our age, we mention the growing spirit of freedom of commerce, which is eminently in accordance with the spirit of our Christianity. We have no political aims in these remarks. What is technically called “Free Trade,” may not be reducible to practice, in its most unrestricted sense. But we are persuaded that the best interests of the great family of nations, which, after all, constitute but one race, will be advanced in proportion as their several economies are made to coincide with the Divine economy, as displayed in the original and providential arrangement of the affairs of this world; in its variety of climate, soil, and productions; and in the consequent diversity of habits in the human race, adapted to this variety. It is susceptible of demonstration that the more extensively a reciprocally beneficial intercourse can be established among the nations, the more effectually and delightfully will the best interests of humanity entire be promoted. It is in this way that is to be extended and maintained throughout all the world, a universal brotherhood, established through the heavenly influences of a Christianity which teaches us that *God has “made of one blood all nations of men, to dwell on all the face of the earth;”*<sup>1</sup> that every member of the human race is our brother; and that every individual of that race to whom we can do any good thing is our neighbor.

5. Among the manifestations of progress which mark our Age, should be placed the increased interest which is felt in behalf of the unfortunate and miserable. Of this we have a striking proof in the humane establishments founded on the best bases, and under the best influences, which have sprung up in so many countries, and in none more extensively than in our own. We refer to the “Asylums,” and other institutions for the deaf and dumb, for the blind, for the orphans, for exposed youth, for the deranged; and others that might be placed in the same category. We refer also to the increased attention given to “Prison Discipline,” or the right treatment of men undergoing confinement for their crimes. In some countries great progress has been made in relation to all these subjects; whilst in others there is only a beginning. Upon the whole, there has been much advance throughout the civilized world, in this respect, within the last fifty years. This is certainly a most auspicious omen, and a delightful pledge of future advancement.

6. The progress of our era is seen in the increased attention devoted to the subject of popular education in so many countries. How full of hope are the efforts made with so much success to

<sup>1</sup> Acts 17: 26.

promote the instruction of the "masses," as they are called (not always in a Christian spirit); in Prussia and all the rest of Germany, including at least the Germanic and Italian portions of the Austrian Empire, in Holland, Belgium, France, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Greece, as well as in some other portions of the civilized world. This blessed cause is awakening interest, to a greater or less extent, in all Christendom, yea, beyond it; for a most laudable disposition is manifested even in Turkey to introduce an effective system of popular education. Among ourselves, the subject has received much attention, and much is being done. In our own happy land, as well as in Great Britain, and some other countries, Sunday-schools have done much to diffuse the blessings of a moral education among millions of youth. That the influence of all these agencies is beginning to be felt in the increased taste for books, in the desire for instruction by means of public lectures and discussions, is most certain. Its effects in arousing the human mind to inquiry are leading to momentous results, and are too manifest to be lost sight of any longer.

That what is called "higher education," is also advancing in many portions of the civilized world, is no less certain; and it is ominous of great good for coming times. In this, reference is made to the increasing number and superior character of High schools and Academies for the youth of both sexes, and of Colleges and Universities adapted to the demands of the times. This is emphatically the case in our own country. It is also true of some others, among which we may mention the kingdom of modern Greece. That unhappy country, which is, even now, barely emerging from the desolation of the long and bloody Revolution by which she became emancipated from Asiatic despotism and barbarism, has done wonders in the way of educating her indigent but intelligent youth. She has her Normal School, her four Gymnasias, her University, with its twenty-five professors, and two hundred and fifty students; and her four hundred common schools. And we know of nothing more noble than the deep interest manifested by some rich Greeks living in Smyrna, Constantinople, Salonica, Vienna, and Corfu, in the subject of education in the land of their fathers, though, in some cases, it is not the land of their nativity. A certain Greek merchant gave one-hundred thousand dollars to found the University of Athens; another forty or fifty thousand to erect an admirable Observatory; another one hundred thousand to establish a Theological Seminary in Athens; several have given largely to found the Gymnasias, and support the common schools to which we have referred. Does not this speak well for the "degenerate" children, as they are often termed, of the land of ality—of origin and language.

10. But if this age be marked by struggles in the political world, by efforts to regain the civil rights which God has granted to Humanity, it is not less illustrious for another struggle—not yet

inventions testify to this. The discoveries in science in our own times have not been surpassed by those of any other era. Nor have they been wholly of a speculative or impracticable character. Those in relation to Electricity and Galvanism have resulted in the construction of the Electro-magnetic Telegraph, one of the most remarkable inventions of any age, and which is destined to exert great influence upon the business of men as well as to facilitate their intercourse.

8. And in this connection we would notice the increasing freedom and influence of the Press. In this, reference is not made so much to the publication of books, although that topic is also worthy of remark, as to the growing freedom and influence of the periodical press, and especially what is commonly called the "newspaper press." How singular the changes that are now occurring in many parts of the world in this respect. Would that the progress manifested in some directions were equal in all! This is far from being the case. In our own country the press is free, and its influence almost omnipotent. But in some countries it is still greatly shackled. Blessed be God, those shackles are in one nation after another, falling to the ground. Nor is the day very distant when the press will, in all civilized lands, stand disenthralled and free.

Nor is it irrelevant to the subject to dwell with so much interest on this topic; for, whatever some may think or say, it is the newspaper, in one form or another, that is to instruct and mould the people of our Age. Books are of use, of great use; and they will continue to be the depositories of knowledge; but the masses have, as a general thing, neither the disposition nor the time to read books. They can, however, find leisure to peruse daily a column or a paragraph of a newspaper; and in the course of a year, such reading will not be inconsiderable in quantity. And though, in many instances, the quality may not be what it ought, yet, in most cases, it will be profitable. If the press be liable to abuse, so is every other discovery. And if the wicked employ it in disseminating evil, the virtuous, the patriotic, the righteous can employ it, if they will, for counteraction, by doing good.

It is interesting to notice how rapid has been the increase in the number of newspapers throughout the world, within the last fifty, and even within the last twenty-five years. To say nothing of our country and Great Britain, in both of which this increase has been immense, how wonderfully these vehicles of thought and knowledge have multiplied in France, Germany, and Italy, especially within the last few months. Two years ago there was one newspaper in Rome, and that of an insignificant size and character; now there are several published daily. In the poor country of Norway, which has institutions more essentially free than any other on the Continent, there are more than one hundred and twenty newspapers.



In Greece, notwithstanding the extreme poverty of the people, there are twenty-four newspapers, eighteen of which are published at Athens—several of them daily papers, and many of them conducted with much talent. The editors of these papers, in conjunction with the professors in the University, are performing a great and unparalleled work; they are effecting the purification of the modern Greek, expelling from it foreign and barbarous words, and bringing it as near, and as fast as possible to the model of the ancient Greek—the glorious language of Homer, of Herodotus, and of Demosthenes.

9. Intimately connected with, and in fact consequent upon, this wide and rapid diffusion of opinion, of argument, of light, we behold a mighty awakening of the human mind to question and investigate anew every subject. There is an increasing disposition to take nothing on authority, to receive nothing merely as tradition. Everything in science, morals, religion, politics, economy, and even law, must be re-examined, re-judged, and re-decided. A momentous revolution is going forward in the moral, religious, and scientific world. Whatever cannot stand the test of the most rigid scrutiny, is rejected as useless, if not pernicious.

In this great movement and collision of mind, what a change is coming over the political world! Nations are rising up to interrogate the tyrants who have held them in subjection, and to compel them to concede the just rights of the people, or retire from their thrones. At length, mankind are assuming an erect posture, and demanding that the governments which they must obey shall be such as they themselves shall choose to establish. They are beginning to think that whilst it is unquestionable that God has ordained order and government for the nations, He has left its forms and details to those who are to be its subjects.

To what mighty changes, also, are the adoption and propagation of these principles giving rise! Revolution after revolution has swept over some of the fairest portions of the civilized world, and shaken to its most vital recesses the very structure of civil society. In some countries the regal dominion is suffered to preserve little more than a nominal existence. In others, thrones are overturned, and popular governments have planted themselves in their stead. A wonderful conflict has commenced, the end of which lies in the unknown future. "On one side," as it has been eloquently said, "are hereditary and absolute power, military organization, the dominion of force; on the other, the practical recognition of the great doctrines of equality and justice." And there is now to be seen a reconstruction of governments, founded on the basis of nationality—of origin and language.

10. But if this age be marked by struggles in the political world, by efforts to regain the civil rights which God has granted to Humanity, it is not less illustrious for another struggle—not yet

so widely engaged in, but incomparably more important—a struggle for freedom of the conscience and the soul, in all matters that concern religion. In this struggle, hierarchical despotism is often united with the secular, or rather makes use of the latter as its instrument, as its slave, to do the drudgery of suppressing Religious Liberty. On the one side, stands hoary tradition, ecclesiastical authority, priestly ambition; on the other, the unsophisticated reason, the common sense and impulse of mankind, and the Word of God.

11. And lastly, our Era is characterized by the waking up of the church of God, to the great work of diffusing Christianity throughout the unevangelized nations of the earth. The spirit of primitive zeal is, in some measure, revisiting the church, and the desire is beginning to be felt to obey the Saviour's last command, to "preach the gospel to every creature."

Not only so, but the providence of God is opening the Heathen and Mohammedan world—as it never was before—for the reception of the glorious gospel. So that scarcely one of the twelve hundred missionaries, who have gone forth from Great Britain, the United States, and other Protestant countries, to preach Christ, can be said to be exposed to violence at the hands of those whom they are laboring to save; whether in Asia, in Africa, in the islands of the Indian Archipelago, and of the Pacific Ocean, or among the aboriginal tribes on our Western frontier. What period can compare with the present in this respect?

And further, the same Saviour-King who ruleth over all, is also opening the Papal world, to re-commence, in this nineteenth century, the glorious Reformation of the sixteenth. And, in some portions of it, the work has fairly begun.

Still more: whilst this great movement proceeds, God is resuscitating the Truth in the decayed Protestant churches of the continent, and, indeed, of the whole Protestant world. Millions of Bibles, and religious tracts and books, have been disseminated among the Protestant nations of Europe and our own hemisphere. Spiritual life is returning—slowly, alas, yet certainly—to the churches of the Reformation.

Such, then, is a brief sketch of the characteristics of the Age in which we live, and which mark its Progress. And who, in taking a retrospective view of what has been accomplished during this Age, and a survey of what is now doing, can fail to conclude that its Prospects are glorious?

There is something cheering in the very sound of the word Progress. It sustains hope, and encourages effort. We have all felt its magic influence when, however fatigued in pursuing a toilsome way, we were reminded that every step we took was bringing us nearer to the desired end of our journey. The student is conscious of its charm, when he reflects, in the weary moments

of midnight study, that however severe the efforts he is compelled to make, they are securing his advance towards the goal set before him, in the proper culture and discipline of his faculties, and the acquisition of the knowledge which his profession will demand. So it is delightful to know that this Age is one of Progress; that everything in it that is valuable to human happiness and the elevation of the human race, is in a condition of progress; that all the great interests of humanity are advancing, not retrograding. And this is precisely the true state of the case; and it is a most cheering and hope-inspiring fact.

Who can fail to rejoice at the thought of the progress which the world will yet see, and at no distant day, in the vast development of the resources of nature—in the great accumulation of the means of subsistence to man and beast, which the application of science is destined to effect? What has been accomplished in this respect may be as nothing in comparison with that which remains to be seen. In the implements of agriculture, and all the machinery connected with it, almost equally-remarkable progress is to be expected. The day will come when there will be a vast improvement in this respect, in such countries as Spain, South America, Mexico, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, and in all the uncivilized and semi-civilized lands. Of this there is at present great need. In Greece, the plough which they still use can be no other than that which Triptolemus, the father of agriculture, according to classic fable—invented! How delightful the thought that the day is not far distant, when the abundant productions of the earth—the cotton and silk of the warmer climates, the flax and wool of the temperate and colder ones—shall, through the aid of improved manufacturing processes, supply the whole human family with comfortable clothing; when an unclad savage shall be seen no longer on continent or island. Is there not something cheering in this? Our Age will witness the near approach of this grand consummation. It will witness the diffusion, among the people of every shore and nation, of the blessings of commerce, of the arts, of social intercourse—the dissemination of civilization and Christianity among all the human race—the equalization of the advantages which God has destined for mankind—the reconstruction of a real and universal Brotherhood!

And certainly an increasing light and progress in the correct principles of political economy will lend a powerful concurrence to hasten the day when the nations of this world will be bound together by universal intercourse, by reciprocally advantageous commerce, and by the manifestation of all the sympathies and the kindness which the religion of Jesus Christ enjoins. The progress already made by our Age in this respect will fully justify us in entertaining the hope of far greater things. Nor need we doubt

that there will be equal progress in all that tends to alleviate the sufferings of Humanity.

When we consider the progress made in popular education since the commencement of this century, who can undertake to define the limits it may attain before its close? It would be safe to assert that the number of persons who can read has increased ten fold within the bounds of Christendom since the epoch of the Reformation—or little more than three centuries and a quarter ago. We have already indicated the countries in which this progress has been most remarkable within our day. But who can tell us what that progress will be, not only in popular education, but also in the higher culture of the human mind, and the development of its vast powers during the next fifty years? And who can predict to what discoveries and inventions this development may lead?

If there has been progress likewise in the liberation of the press, and in the application of its great resources to the diffusion of all sorts of knowledge among the people, what may we not expect in the course of a few years? Are not the days of despotism over the Press numbered? And when it shall be unfettered in all lands, how wonderful will be its influence upon the destinies of the human race!

And what shall I say of the prospects of this Age in respect to civil and political freedom? Are there not bright signs of progress here? Let the upheaving of the nations, the overturning of thrones in the old world, within the last six months, answer that question. The æmè of this movement is yet far in the distance; nor is there any symptom of a disposition on the part of humanity to return to the despotism of by-gone ages, whatever may be the evils of the transition through which it is passing.

Sixty-five years ago there were, besides our own newly-established Republic, but nine constitutional governments in the whole world; two monarchies, Great Britain and Sweden; and seven republics, Holland, Switzerland, and the five free cities of Germany.<sup>1</sup> But how stands the case now? Of the sixty-six or seven states in Europe (fifty-five of which are, properly speaking, independent) all but two have obtained constitutions, or will obtain them in the course of a few weeks. These two exceptions are Russia and Turkey; countries in which there still is more of Asiatic barbarism than of European civilization.

And when will this great movement end? When all men throughout the world shall have wrested from the hands of despotism those rights with which their common Maker has endowed them; among which is the choice of rulers and the making of laws in accordance with which the government is to be carried on

<sup>1</sup> HAMBURG, LUBECK, BREMEN, FRANKFORT (on the Maine), DANTZIC. The last named has since been absorbed by Prussia.

among them. This work has been commenced. Many and severe struggles are to be met: much blood, there is reason to fear, will flow; many a martyr must die for that glorious cause, in which a Russell and a Sydney mounted to the scaffold, and a Hampden fell on the battle-field. But in the end, that glorious cause will triumph. The contest will be long and dreadful, but the prize is worthy of it all; for, next to the despotism of Satan, that of our corrupt fellow-men is not only the most inveterate but the most odious. Yes, this great movement will advance. No doubt, many mistakes will be made; many a temporary defeat will be experienced; hypocritical friends, imprudent advisers, ignorant and incapable advocates and guides, as well as avowed enemies, will give it many a severe blow; but it will surmount all obstacles, and Humanity entire will be redeemed from tyrannical governments.

Nor will the struggle for Religious Freedom be less successful. It is less advanced than that of Political Liberty; but this glorious cause is making progress; and that progress has been greatly augmented by the revolutions of the last few months in the old world.

In the Protestant world (to the glory of the principles of the gospel, which the Reformation revived wherever it prevailed) there has been a far greater progress than in the other portions of Christendom. All the real, effective Religious Liberty in the world, until very recently, has been found in Protestant countries. Alas, some of them have disgraced the glorious Faith which they profess by a mean bigotry, and a rigid intolerance, unworthy of the present Age, or, indeed, of any age. Blessed be God, the times of that ignorance and injustice which Protestants had inherited from Rome, are now rapidly passing away; and the day is drawing near when all men will be free to profess such religious faith, and render such external evidences of it, as may commend themselves to their judgment and conscience, without hindrance from the Civil Power.

And how cheering is the prospect of our Age in relation to the work of spreading the gospel, both at home and abroad—both within Christendom and beyond it! It is true, we are called upon to mourn that so little is yet doing, in comparison with what the world demands, with what might be done, and with the resources and means of those who profess to be Christians, and do really hold the great and fundamental doctrines of the gospel. On this point there is much cause for sorrow. But we must look at the bright as well as the dark side of the picture. Compared with the past there is much to encourage in what is at present doing by the church of Christ. It is cheering to see that every evangelical and true branch of that church, by whatever denomination called, and whether great or small as to numbers and influence, is every year

becoming more and more interested in the work of extending the kingdom of God at home and abroad. The existence of this missionary spirit, and the efforts to which it is leading, constitute one of the most interesting and important characteristics of our Age—as we have said in another place—and one of the most sacred pledges for the future. We cannot but hope and believe that the good work of missions will go on until the blessed gospel shall be known throughout the world.

It is true, that for all success we must depend upon the outpouring of the Spirit from on high. It is certainly true that God, provoked by the sins of His people—their pride, their worldliness, their avarice, their want of heartfelt interest in His cause, their backsliding, and their abandonment of the truth for specious and “damnable heresies”—might, by withholding His Holy Spirit, render all attempts on the part of His people to build up His kingdom, utterly vain. But we hope for better things. Looking at the prophecies and declarations of His Word, in connection with His wonderful providential dealings with the world in our day, we cannot but believe that the *latter day of glory* is drawing near. A great work is yet to be done; but there is an Almighty Being to do it, and our agency cannot be inefficient, both because it is one which He has designed to employ, and because He has determined to render it efficient by His own infinite sufficiency. In view of all these things, may we not say with truth, that the PROSPECTS of our Age are full of encouragement?

But if the times in which we live have their encouragements, have they not also their DEMANDS? To say the Age has demands on all, is merely to assert that God expects all men, in their respective spheres, to glorify Him, in the fulfilment of their duties to their fellow-men, as individuals, as communities, and as nations. That those duties are substantially the same, in all ages and in all circumstances, will be denied by none. But it will also be conceded, with an equal unanimity, that some eras and epochs demand a larger amount of effort of a certain kind, and in certain directions, than is required at other times and in other circumstances.

It is not less obvious that whilst the Age has demands on all, these demands are not the same, in form or extent, for all. They are determined by the position, degree of intelligence, character, and amount of talent and extent of influence which men may possess. Our subject leads us to speak particularly of the claims of our Age upon those who have entered upon the pursuit of literary or professional life. Of such persons it may be said with truth, that they cannot be indifferent to anything which concerns even the *material* interests of mankind. It cannot but be gratifying to those to know that those interests are advancing; to perceive that there is progress in everything that relates to the

development of the resources of a country, to the augmentation of human happiness, to the well-being of all classes of the people, to the relief and comfort of the unfortunate and miserable. And they will be ready by word and deed, to render all the aid which their position in society, pecuniary means, and appropriate duties, will permit them to devote to the promotion of such interests.

But there are *Intellectual*, *Political*, and *Moral* Interests which have superior claims upon most men, and especially upon literary men. Yet these interests have in many respects, very intimate relations with those which are material; and the promotion of the one advances the other. Still, as even these interests have for their chief object the well-being of men in this world—though they have also a most important if not direct influence upon his future existence—they may be classed with what are called his material interests. Yet these demand much at our hands. We cannot be indifferent to the claims of Education, of whatever grade; nor to those of the Press, which needs to be in able hands, and under all those proper influences which are required to render it what it ought to be. Nor can we be indifferent to Political liberty, for this is necessary, not as a means or an end, but as a condition of progress in all that concerns the best interests of man, both in the present and a future life. But the highest interests of Humanity are those which are *Moral* and *Religious*, or, in other words, its *SPIRITUAL* interests. These have the strongest claims, in the view of enlightened reason, to say nothing of conscience, upon our attention and efforts. And they have the most intimate connection with those interests which are material, for these contribute most powerfully to their successful prosecution and their proper enjoyment. There can be but little hope of well-founded and well-regulated political institutions, especially those of a republican form, without a general prevalence of Virtue; and there can be but little that deserves the name of Virtue without the powerful and fundamental influence of Religion, or what we should call a pure Christianity.

A careful inquiry into facts would conclusively show, we think, that the material and spiritual interests of mankind have not advanced equally in our Age. It would not be difficult to establish the position that the *material* interests have made altogether greater progress in our times, than those which are *spiritual*. This is especially true of Europe; and hence no little of the evil which is now experienced in that part of the world. There is a desire for political institutions which men are not fit to receive, nor capable of maintaining, because of the little progress which their spiritual interests have made. The mind has been enlightened to some extent; certain vague notions of liberty have been received; but the *heart* has not been brought under the salutary and powerful moral influences of the gospel. Human control—

despotic enough, in many cases cruelly so—has been rejected ; but the government of the ever-blessed God has not been submitted to, and, of course, there are none of the elements of a proper self-government. For they who are not willing that God should reign over them, cannot govern themselves, and are only fit to be the slaves of a tyrant.

Even in our own favored country, it is deplorable to see how much the attention is absorbed by material interests ; how much more highly they are valued than those which are spiritual ! And yet the voice of their Maker, the voice of reason and conscience, ought to convince men that the very reverse of this ought to take place. Alas, how often do we see those who profess to be children of God, and who we would fain believe are such, bestowing upon the worldly concerns of themselves, and of those who are dear to them, a degree of care and eagerness quite disproportionate to that which they devote to spiritual things. They pursue the material with a step as steady as time, and an appetite keen as death ! But the spiritual, alas ! how little does it attract them. Whole communities are actuated by similar considerations. To construct a railroad, to build a factory, to establish a line of steamers or packet ships,—all excellent enterprises without doubt in their place,—what vast sums of money can be raised, and raised promptly ; because there is the hope of material gain, and the advancement of material interests. But how few comparatively seek to acquire, by a right use of their wealth, those riches which are the first fruits of a well-directed beneficence towards their fellow men—those riches which consist in treasures laid up in heaven, which no vicissitude of earth can by any possibility reach. O, if right views were generally held respecting the relative importance of the material and spiritual interests of men, would there not be money enough forthcoming to carry forward rapidly all the enterprises by which the spiritual, and as well as the material interests of our race may be promoted ?

There are at this moment two great struggles going on in the world—the like of which the world has never before seen. One is the mighty movement which men are making in behalf of political liberty ; the other is that which is making in some directions in behalf of religious freedom. Of these two movements, as might be expected, that which relates merely to political liberty, to that which is material, is much more powerful than that relating to the spiritual. Whole nations are rising up to shake off the yoke of despotism beneath which they have so long groaned. In this great movement, it is not simply the struggle of the higher classes—the nobles and other powerful citizens—the “upper ten thousand” of society—who are striving to throw off a superior despotism which rests heavily upon them. But it is the “masses,” the despised masses, who have in many countries been crushed to the ground



by feudal tyranny. It is the poor, degraded, ignorant people, who had but little encouragement given them to attempt to rise above the abject condition in which they were born, and who have been trodden into the very dust by the heel of a proud and insolent aristocracy.

In the struggle for political liberty which is now agitating old Europe to its very centre, those who have taken the lead have, in some countries, had the good sense to advocate religious freedom also. This has particularly occurred in those nations in the bosom of which there has been a Protestant element, to enlighten in some measure the minds of the people on this subject, and to demonstrate that Romanism is not the only form of Christianity. In some cases, nothing more than *toleration* can be hoped for. In a third class of countries—such as Spain and Portugal, Sicily, all the southern part of peninsular Italy, (including the Pope's dominions, notwithstanding his boasted love of liberal institutions), not even *toleration* has yet been secured, and hierarchical despotism will be permitted to flourish by the side of popular liberty! Vain attempt! Time will soon show that it is utterly useless to hope for the permanent existence of such institutions without religious freedom, and that aid which nothing but a pure Christianity can give.

In relation to this grand popular movement, this uprising of the nations, to which we have just referred, it may be interesting to inquire: *What is the true mission of Christianity?* We answer unhesitatingly: It is to espouse the interests of the masses; to seek their enlightenment, their happiness, their elevation in society to the possession of their proper social and political position and rights. This is the path of duty for Christianity, and it is the path of sound policy and safety, or, we would rather say, of true wisdom. There is in this no danger whatever, no radicalism to subvert the established order of things, array the poor against the rich, and fuse all the existing distinctions of society into one vast mass of Communism. It is true that Christianity, rightly understood, and as exhibited in the doctrines of its glorious Founder, does in one sense bring down the great and powerful by teaching them a proper humility in view of their sins and deficiencies, and a becoming benevolence and kindness towards their fellow-men who are in less favorable circumstances. Would, that its legitimate tendency and influence in this respect were fully comprehended and more deeply felt! Would, that rich Christians understood the just claims which humanity has upon them! What benefactors they might and would be were such the case! With how strong a bond might they attach the masses to them, and what a rich inheritance they might secure in heaven, against that day when everything on earth must be abandoned!

But it is one of the chiefest glories of Christianity that it levels up, as well as levels down; that it raises up the poor and lowly,

the degraded and down-trodden, by requiring that they should be treated as men, with proper sympathy and kindness, and furnished with the means of self-education, on the part of those whose position is more favorable. The great Author of Christianity was one of the people—born of poor and humble parents, brought up to labor, and all His life long associated, not with the aristocracy and the rich, but with the poor and humble. And whilst the rich and the great, for the most part turned away with scorn from His heavenly instructions, the “COMMON PEOPLE,” we are told, “heard him gladly.” Here is the true field for the labors of Christianity; here the true scene of its triumphs—both because the PEOPLE are the great bulk of mankind and ever will be, and because their position render them more accessible to the gospel, and is more favorable to the cultivation of piety. For it will ever remain true, that “they who will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition.” Whilst to the truly humble, or the “poor in spirit,” is promised the “kingdom of heaven.”

We are far from thinking that Christianity has failed to execute its proper mission as regards the people. Even before it ascended the throne of the Cæsars, it must often have restrained proconsular and prætorian insolence and injustice, and so defended the feeble against the powerful. Its bishops and priests did often, in the Middle Ages, take the part of the poor, the enslaved, the ignorant serfs and vassals, against the barons and other great proprietors; and frequently resisted even the tyranny of the prince, in their behalf. And when the Reformation brought back the true gospel to a portion of Christendom, it is certain that popular liberty began to gain a foothold in the world. From this source sprung the free institutions of Great Britain, the struggles of our fathers for their rights, and ultimately the independence of these United States. Since that event, and as effects produced by the same cause, revolution has succeeded revolution, in the old world and the new, until the papal countries, almost without exception, have undergone very important changes. By these revolutions the people have gained much, though far from all that is their due.

But admitting all this, we must confess that Christianity has by no means achieved for the masses all that it should have done. Not from its own fault, but from the faithlessness of those who were its leaders, it has in all ages manifested too little sympathy for the masses, and too strong an affinity for the great, for the aristocracy, for the civil power. The union of the church with the state, effected by Constantine the Great, did much to destroy the independence of Christianity, and render it at once the friend and the slave of the civil power, instead of being the friend and the

<sup>1</sup> Mark 12 : 36.

<sup>2</sup> I Tim. 6 : 9.

<sup>3</sup> Matt, 5 : 3.

vindicator of the down-trodden people. Even Protestantism, although it has done infinitely more to raise up the masses than Romanism, has been far from fulfilling its whole duty in this respect. It wants even yet, we must say, that confidence in the masses which it owes to humanity, as well as to its Divine Author. It has been slow to learn that the "many," when rightly instructed, and deeply pervaded by its legitimate influences, are much more to be relied on than the privileged "few." And hence it has made many and very serious mistakes, whose influence has been disastrous, and whose effects it will require much time and effort to repair.

To the young men of the present Age, in particular, God has assigned an important position in the history of the world. May they study well the times in which they live, and the demands to which they are liable. Every Age has had its grand characteristics. In every Age there have been great movements which affect extensively the interests of Humanity. Our own is marked, we have already asserted, by a double struggle for political and religious Freedom. In that struggle, the young men of our Age and country must take part, each in the sphere in which God has placed him, and according to the measure of influence possessed by him. To such we would say, Enter with courage into this conflict, and hesitate not to throw the weight of your sympathy and your efforts into the scale of the People. Do all you can for their elevation, their happiness, their usefulness, their just position in society. In pursuing this course you will but follow in the footsteps of Him who "was born in a stable and died on a cross;" of Him whose claim to a heavenly mission was established by the fact that it was the "poor" to whom His gospel was preached.

But allow us to say, that to promote effectually the interests of the people, it is not necessary to become brawling *political demagogues*. Of them we have enough already; and they are among the greatest curses from which our country suffers. No: the friend of the people must employ his influence for their benefit in all practicable ways; encourage them in all proper efforts for improving their temporal condition; and promote the effective education of all classes. He will advocate all those measures for diffusing knowledge that require associated effort. He will be the earnest supporter of public worship; for the influence of the pulpit is, in this land of ours, of incalculable power in diffusing general information, and especially in cultivating the *morals* of the people, to say nothing of their *spiritual* interests. He will be the friend of all proper measures for reclaiming the erring, for delivering the oppressed, for raising up the fallen. He will lend his aid to render the press of our country, which is so powerful, still more efficient in behalf of every good enterprise.

We have in this country about fifteen hundred newspapers and

other periodical publications, every one of which has a sphere of greater or less extent. What an amount of aid might be given to the conducting of these periodicals, and what a powerful influence might be exerted through their pages for the instruction of the people and the good of the nation, if the well-educated men,—ministers, lawyers, and others—who reside in their neighborhood, would, by contributing to their columns, impart that aid and influence! It is a matter of great regret that so little real interest is felt in this subject, so little tact and facility manifested in the matter.

We have spoken only of that influence which should be exerted in our own country. For although this country is greatly in advance of all others, as regards the twofold struggle which has been referred to, yet, if we would preserve and perfect what we possess, we have a great work to do. Our population is increasing, by natural processes, at a fearful rate, and Europe is sending to our shores vast crowds of emigrants every year. If therefore, we would avoid retrograding, we must make great exertions. But to *advance*, not to keep our ground, must be our object. Besides we have a high mission to fulfil, in exhibiting to the world the happy influence, as well as the stability, of our institutions, political and religious. But that influence need not, must not be confined to our own country, important as it is as a field of exertion. There is a world to be blest, to be regenerated, to be saved. Can we not aid in the most effectual manner the struggle which is now going on in the old world, against the double despotism of the prince and the priest? A despotism which, wherever it exists in perfection, makes of the masses the veriest slaves, leaving them nothing to do but on the one hand to *obey* what they are commanded, and on the other to *believe* what they are taught. A despotism which deprives them of that happiness which is their right in this world, and cheats them out of that which Heaven in its mercy offers them for the next!

We can do much for the down-trodden millions, in the Old World and the new, by sending them the Bible, and employing suitable men, natives of the several countries, to carry it to those who do not possess it, to read it to those who cannot read, and to explain its sacred contents to all. We can do much to impart the blessed gospel, the best friend of the people, to the nations that are now struggling for popular liberty, but who, alas, are at present so incapable to comprehend, to acquire, or to maintain it. The gospel is, though they do not know it, the very thing they need; for it is the only hope of free institutions.

Let us leave to the politician and the man of the world, the task so easily executed, of gazing, speculating, and wondering at the movements in the Old World which are now attracting all eyes. Let ours be no barren sympathy, but a prompt an effective one—

not exhibited in the noisy declamations of popular meetings, but in the overflowings of a heart full of love to our fellow-men, and prompting to earnest prayer and efficient effort in their behalf.

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#### ARTICLE V.

### REVIEW OF FINNEY'S THEOLOGY.

By REV. GEORGE DUFFIELD, D.D., Detroit, Michigan.

*Lectures on Systematic Theology, embracing Lectures on Moral Government, Atonement, Moral and Physical Depravity, Regeneration, Philosophical Theories and Evidences of Regeneration.* By REV. C. G. FINNEY, Professor of Theology, in the Oberlin Collegiate Institute.

(Concluded from p. 746, last volume.)

#### MORAL AND PHYSICAL DEPRAVITY.

THE main issue to be met on this point is very simple. Is there any tendency, bias, inclination, or disposition, call it what you please, whether simple or complex, negative or positive, which operates, with determining influence, as a cause or reason why men, uniformly and invariably, in all the appropriate circumstances of their nature, choose to do evil? Does the existence of such a causative influence determining to sin, imply a physical necessity and impair the freedom of the will appropriate to man as a moral agent? Our author, virtually, if not explicitly, denies the former and affirms the latter. Some, in affirming the former, may have erred in their illustrations, calling it taste or instinct, and comparing it with that which renders the serpent venomous, the tiger ferocious, the canine and feline tribe carnivorous, and the like; and they may have prosaically or poetically expressed themselves so as to be obnoxious to the charge of believing or teaching, that there flows a poisonous hue, from parent to child, or there exists a fever in the blood, or some physical entity, which is sinful *per se*. But to avoid an error in this extreme, must we run so far to the other as to deny all causative influence determining to sin, and insist that freedom of will consists alone in absolute sovereignty and independence? Our author says explicitly, "Moral depravity is *sin itself*, and not *the cause of sin*;" nor, of course, a cause of sin; which is in effect to resolve all moral depravity into acts of will, and rebuke the common sense notions of mankind, who distinguish between a state of the affections and passions affecting the will, and the acts of the will, and predicate moral depravity of both in given cases. Dr. Dwight will not

give a name to that specific particular state of the affections, &c., which determines the will to sin—which, in other words, renders it pleasant and agreeable to sin, which finds enjoyment in this and the other thing God forbids, and is pained and affected with aversion by that which He requires. But that such a state exists, and is culpable, men almost universally assume; and they generally estimate the degree of a man's moral depravity, by the degree of satisfaction experienced in doing wrong, and of aversion to doing what is right. In estimating moral depravity, we must not confine our attention to the volition, choice, purpose, or ultimate intention merely; but embrace also the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction had in doing wrong, and of pain or aversion to do what is right. We think, speak, and judge of it as the working of a mind, will, and heart, or affections and passions averse from God, and unaffected by His love, or regard for Him—which finds its satisfaction in opposing His will, and not in doing it. So the Scriptures describe it, and call it "enmity against God," which from the very first is morally certain to manifest itself in all the race.

Our author may say that this is but what he means by selfishness, or that it means nothing more. We are willing, for the sake of argument, to admit it. But in analyzing that selfishness, in resolving it into its constituent elements, we differ widely from him, and believe, that to describe it as consisting wholly in generic purpose, ultimate intention and choice, operating in successive executive volitions, will not tell all the truth, nor will it help the matter to make self-gratification the end on which choice terminates. For the question comes back, and must be met and satisfactorily answered by our author, before he is done with his analysis of moral depravity, why do men, universally and invariably, from the very first, find their pleasure in gratifying self, and not in doing the will of God, in pleasing self rather than in pleasing God? What is it, in other words, that uniformly from the first, makes man choose self-gratification as the ultimate end, instead of "the good of God and the universe?" We answer, that such is the condition in which we are born into this world, such the derangement of our moral powers, and the original moral constitution of the race produced by the sin and apostasy of our first parents, that selfishness is natural to man. It ensues by virtue of our connection with, and descent from, a guilty progenitor, that under whatever circumstances we may be born, in all the appropriate conditions of our being, sin will be preferred to holiness—man will find it more natural and agreeable to serve himself than to serve God. And of man thus related, affected, and conditioned, we predicate moral depravity.

Our author ascribes the uniformity and universality of sinful choice, "to the influence of temptation, or to a physically-depraved

constitution, surrounded by the circumstances in which mankind first form their moral character, or put forth their first moral choices." Whatever he may say to the contrary, he thus, in reality, admits that some causes operate to determine the will to sinful choice, and that they are permanent, uniform, and efficient to secure the total depravity of the race. For he says, "We can also *predict* that with a constitution physically depraved, and surrounded with objects to awaken appetite, and with all the circumstances in which human beings first form their moral character, they will seek to gratify themselves universally unless prevented by the Holy Spirit." His predictions rest on fixed operative causes, according to this showing. Of course, therefore, his free-will, after all, is not absolutely sovereign and independent; but is influenced, affected, and determined by antecedent thoughts or feelings. Some causative influence is operative; and whether it be physical depravity, temptation, circumstances, or what not, or all together, we care not. His philosophy fails him, and he gains nothing, nor approximates one step nearer than we do to a solution of the fact of the universal depravity of the human race, which, we frankly confess, is like many other phenomena in the moral government of God, totally inexplicable by human reason. Why have these things operated so uniformly for near six thousand years, so that there is not a solitary exception in the developments of Adam's race, except the babe of Bethlehem, miraculously conceived, but "they have all together become corrupt, there is none that doeth good, not one." If the will possesses that sort of self-originating, self-determining power, that, of its own simple unaided sovereignty, it acts, and this is the freedom he claims for it, then why are there not some found who from the first are wholly uncontaminated by sin? Let him answer this consistently with his philosophy. If physical depravity, together with temptation and outward circumstances, operate uniformly to render men sinners, then may he be truly charged, equally with those he condemns, with teaching that man sins by a law of physical necessity. "His philosophy of free will," in contradistinction to that of a necessitated will, relieves him not. We will not suffer him to escape in the fog of his metaphysics, but demand of him that he tell us, in terms which cannot be misunderstood, what he means by the freedom of the will. The exceeding obscurity and defectiveness of his definition, we pointed out in our first article, when examining simply the claims of what he calls a superior philosophy. The freedom of the will has long been a subject of theological as well as a metaphysical discussion, and our author has produced nothing new, but rather revived the old Armenian philosophy, which Edwards and Owen before him so effectually exposed. He must be much more explicit and tell us precisely in what it consists, and not play fast

and loose between the Calvinistic and Armenian schemes, if he would have us respect the consistency and honesty of his teachings. To claim to be a Calvinist and appear in Arminian dress, to profess to hold substantially to the doctrines of the Westminster Confession of Faith, as he has very recently done, and yet ridicule and abuse it and its framers, does not well agree with our ideas of consistency or morality. But we judge him not. If the freedom of the will, in his judgment, be the absolute unqualified power of its self-determination—unaffected, uninfluenced, uncaused by anything whatever antecedent in the mind—the liberty of indifference—let him speak it out openly and manly, that we may place him with the school to which he seems to belong, and cease to discourse to us about motive or end, or any other reason for willing than the will's own sovereign independent determination or choice. Universal consciousness will oppose effectual barriers against such a philosophy. The veriest child will rebuke our philosopher. By self-determination, therefore, he must mean something different from absolute independent self-originated acts of will—the liberty of indifference, or of contingency. Honesty requires that on this point he define his position.

"If the freedom of the will," says Dr. Dwight, "is the freedom of contingency, then plainly its volitions are all accidents, and certainly the chances, arithmetically considered, are as numerous in favor of virtuous volitions as of sinful ones. There ought, therefore, on this plan, to be, and ever to have been, as many absolutely virtuous persons in the world as sinful. Plainly all ought not to be sinful. If the freedom of the will is the freedom of indifference, the same consequence ought to follow: for if there be no bias in the mind towards either virtue or sin, at the time immediately preceding each of its volitions, and the freedom of each volition arises out of this fact, then, certainly, there being no bias either way, the number of virtuous, and of sinful volitions, must naturally be equal, and no cause can be assigned why every man, independently of his renovation by the Spirit of God, should be sinful only. If the liberty of the will consist in self-determination, and the mind, without the influence of any motive, first wills that it will form a second volition, and this volition depends for its freedom on the existence of such a preceding one; then it is plain, that from these preceding volitions as many virtuous as sinful ones ought to be derived; because the preceding or self-determining volitions, are, by the supposition, under no influence or bias from any cause whatever. Thus it is evident, that, according to all these suppositions, there could be no preponderancy, much less an universality, of sin in the world."<sup>1</sup>

This learned and sober theologian has well observed, in addition to the above, that the liberty of the will and consequently the moral

<sup>1</sup> Dwight's Theology, I. 485.



agency of man in this world, is the same in kind with that of the spirits of just men made perfect in heaven, of the holy angels, and of the man Christ Jesus. Whence then comes it to pass that the same moral agency in heaven is developed universally and invariably in holiness, but on earth in sin? Our author is bound to answer this, consistently with his philosophy of the freedom of the will. We say, with the Bible for our guide, that the moral depravity of man results inevitably and naturally from the fall of our first parents; that causes then were brought into action which gave such a bias to sin that it can only be counteracted and overcome by the atonement of Jesus Christ, and the regenerating and sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit. It is not in man, ruined and depraved by nature, to reform and purify himself, and to perfect holiness without the Spirit of God.

With this subject our author's views of ability and inability, are intimately connected. They also are shaped by his philosophy. The distinctions made by Dr. Twisse, prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of divines, by Phillip Henry, and President Edwards, and all the chief theologians of New England, between moral and natural ability and inability, he rejects and ridicules, and insists that liberty is ability or power, and power or ability is liberty. "Natural ability, and natural liberty to will, must be *identical*," says our author. "If he (man) has power by nature to will directly as God requires, or by willing to avail himself of power so to will, he is naturally free and able to obey the commandments of God. Then let it be borne distinctly in mind, that natural ability, about which so much has been said, is nothing more nor less than the freedom or liberty of the will, of a moral agent. No man knows what he says, or whereof he affirms, who holds to the one and denies the other, for they are *truly and properly identical*."

The reader will notice the modesty here betrayed in thus, by his definition, confounding things that differ, and dogmatically pouring contempt on some of the profoundest thinkers, and most erudite writers who, on a subject confessedly complicated, and of difficult apprehension, have both used and carefully explained the import of terms long current in theology. Our author has not defined so well wherein consists the freedom of the will, nor rendered his subject so clear as to carry with it the proof of his accuracy and truth in the premises, and authorize him to stultify those, who, with the Shorter Catechism, affirm, that "no mere man is able in this life perfectly to keep the commandments of God," and yet teach, with the Westminster Confession, that "God hath endowed the will of man with that natural liberty that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil."

The words, power or ability, and liberty or freedom, are not synonymous; neither are the things they represent identical.

Our author teaches that man has full ability perfectly to keep the commandments of God. Will he pretend to say that this ability is the liberty wherewith Christ hath made His people free? If the will of man naturally is perfectly free, perfectly able to keep the commandments of God, then what is the bondage from which Christ emancipates His people? Wherein, in this particular of the freedom of the will, do they differ from the unregenerate? And upon what just ground do the Scriptures represent men by nature to be led captive by the Devil at his will, to be his bond-slaves, to be in bondage to corruption? It will not do to say, these are mere metaphorical expressions. They must, even if this were admitted, have some foundation in real resemblance. The will of man is not naturally as free to choose holiness as it is to choose sin, and hence the necessity and infinite value to us of the *redemption* which there is in Jesus Christ. Man has not naturally equal power to produce the fruits of holiness, that he has of iniquity. If so, he would need no help of the Spirit, and could, at any moment, without the grace and power of God enabling him to will and do, emancipate himself from the bondage of his lusts, and perfectly keep the commandments of God. The whole work of the Spirit, so important and absolutely indispensable, according to the showing of the Scriptures, in order to the deliverance of sinners from the power of their lusts and the tyranny of the Devil, is altogether unnecessary, and an improper interference with man's liberty. Our author's philosophy places him directly in opposition to the Word of God, which teaches that but for Christ's interposition, and the grace of His Spirit, sin will reign in men's mortal body to their obeying it in the lusts thereof.—Rom. 6: 12. Our author may express his amazement and abhorrence, talk of God's injustice and tyranny, and seek by a burst of passion, or a *ruse* upon the feelings, to storm the judgment. But this is an artifice that can only impose upon those whose reason is controlled by passion, and who are as ignorant of the principles of sacred logic as they are of the Scriptures. The reverential and believing student of the Bible will not fail to see, that the bondage of man's will in sin, his deep *moral* depravity, is set forth, not only as his crime, his personal guilt, but also as the awful calamity and curse of God, in which every one of the human race has been involved by the sin and fall of our first parents. In consequence of their transgression, we come into existence under circumstances, exposed to influences, and with a bias to evil that operate to determine our wills to sin, and most inevitably will ruin us for ever, if God interferes not, by the atoning blood and renovating spirit of Jesus Christ, to rescue our wills from the bondage of our lusts, as He enables us to renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil, and to become the freemen of Christ Jesus. This may be pronounced mere *figurative* language, and improper to be quoted on a subject properly

*philosophical*. But the freedom of the will is a subject eminently *practical*, and however the Scriptures may employ analogical terms, and the tropes of speech, their strict truthfulness, as the Word of God authorizes us to take it for granted, that there is and must be some real resemblance between the bondage and slavery among men and the enthrallment of the will by the lusts of the flesh and the desires of the mind. The common sense of men—where any appetite, passion, propensity, desire, or habit determines the will in sinful choices—leads them to pronounce those *enslaved* who indulge them. The subjects, too, of such appetites, &c., as the drunkard, the sensualist, and the vile, when reprov'd and warn'd of the danger of their conduct, will promptly say, they cannot resist, temptation overcomes them. But neither do themselves nor others conclude that they are removed beyond the reach of accountability, and are free from guilt; nay, they judge that this very enthrallment of the will, according to its degree, graduates their criminality. The freedom of the will, of which consciousness has cognizance, is not absolute and independent; but is consistent with subordination and dependence, agreeably to the laws and conditions by which God as Creator has limited the mind or soul of man, in the exercise of those powers with which He has endowed it. Our moral nature does, indeed embrace the elements both of ability and freedom; but they are distinct and different things, although our author, with many others, has confounded them.

The words power and liberty represent abstract ideas; and although we are incapable of defining their import or describing the nature of the things for which they stand, yet are we conscious that, by some necessary law of our minds, by some original suggestions that invariably, under certain circumstances or on certain occasions, arise, we form the idea of power, and, also, that of liberty as distinct from it. The idea in both cases being simple, is not susceptible of definition; but resulting necessarily from the action of the mind, or laws of mental activity, under given circumstances, is referable to the sovereign constitution of our Creator, and, of necessity, to be regarded as the representative of an immutable reality. The idea of power implies that of cause, and cause, according to Edwards, that of some foundation or reason out of itself, why that which did not exist begins to be. We say that we have power to move, walk, run, &c., meaning that some energy excited by our wills, or put forth by our minds in the act of willing, causes these motions, or, in other words, that by some ordained and established law of the Creator, the antecedent act of will produced the motions or acts of walking, &c. God Himself, by the word of His power, the energy of His will, created and upholds all things. To a certain extent, He has endowed us, His rational creatures, and all moral agents, with a similar energy by the acts of our wills, to produce or give rise to or cause other

events which we hold to be related, as their appropriate effects. The extent to which that power or energy may be exerted is that of our liberty or freedom. The will is but the exponent of the mind's or soul's energy, or the channel through which it operates. But this is not omnipotent. Its exercise is bounded and restrained by certain established laws and conditions, necessary in the nature of things which God has created. Hence arise our notions of ability or inability, natural and moral, and also of liberty or freedom of the will. The laws and conditions intended by God to limit the exercise of the mind's power, are either natural or moral; the former determining simply the *possibility*, so far as the nature of things is concerned, and the other, the character, rightful or improper, lawful or unlawful, of those acts or effects which the mind or soul of man may produce. When the mind, without hindrance or resistance, acts in its appropriate sphere, that is, in the sphere prescribed by God for its actions, we say, learning the reality from our consciousness, that it is free. God has not only prescribed the natural or physical laws of the will's actings, but, also, the moral. He has adjusted, in His wisdom and benevolence, the manner in which the mind of man, with the powers He has conceded to it, shall be affected and brought into action. The relations of intellect and sensibility to each other and to the will, and designed to regulate their actings, in the first man, Adam, who was created perfect, were not left at random, but prescribed by God, so as to preserve, when not violated, an harmonious exercise. The circumstances, too, or conditions under which those powers should be exercised, and the precise way in which, in those circumstances or conditions, man should exert his powers and put forth his volitions, being regulated by God's law, or the constitution which formed the charter or grant of those powers, it is obvious that human liberty, the freedom of the will, is not and cannot, in the nature of things, be absolute, but is restrained within the limits prescribed by God, our Creator, Lawgiver, and Judge. Provided the harmony of the mind be not disturbed, that is, provided each part or power operates in its appropriate and legitimate sphere, or, in other words, conforms to the law prescribed for it, and thus fulfils the great intents of the Creator, in the exercise of no one part or power infringing on another, but performing through each its proper functions, and the whole thus moves harmoniously, equally according to its proportions, in its proper place and relation, we are conscious of that state of things we call liberty. There is no unavoidable perplexity in the mind itself, and no restraint or infringement from any source without it. Beyond this consciousness we have no knowledge of liberty. Wherever this harmony is disturbed, this infringement takes place, and, according to the degree to which it prevails, we naturally, and as it were, intuitively talk of man being enslaved. Thus we

speak of the drunkard being enslaved to his cups, the lecherous to his lusts; and the like, where appetite has become inordinate. He is regarded as less free than the man whose appetites have not been vitiated. So say the Scriptures. It is the language of common sense. Yet no one dreams, in so saying, that the man is absolutely, irredeemably, irrecoverably, beyond all possibility of reformation, and free from the obligation to conform humbly to the laws of God, which define, and are designed to protect his liberty. Whether he ever will spontaneously so conform himself, without some external help or movement of God's providence and grace, changing the actual circumstances and condition which, by the inordinate indulgence of his appetite, he himself has produced, is a question that the Word of God most unequivocally answers for us. He will not. He has sold himself to work iniquity; he needs Divine help to restore him to liberty and virtue, to rescue him from the world, the flesh, and the devil, by whom he is led captive at his will. Yet has the man certain capacities or powers appropriate to him as a moral creature, which, by the help of God, may be placed under circumstances, and in a condition for self-recovery, that is, for a restoration to liberty and virtue.

It is on this actual state of things of which human consciousness takes cognizance, whatever may be men's metaphysical philosophy, that those distinctions are made, and that style of speech employed, which our author repudiates and ridicules as unmeaning, absurd, and false, but which are to be found in the writings of many, both cis and trans-atlantic divines, who speak of natural and moral ability and inability. It is worthy of attention to notice, how the same contempt of this distinction founded, in the very nature of things, has led our author, and certain ultra "Old School" writers to opposite extremes. While the one teaches, that man has full ability by his own spontaneous and unaided self-determining power of will to change his heart, and become a new man in Christ Jesus, the other utterly and absolutely denies all ability whatever in man, resembling him to a block of wood or stone, or a lifeless corpse, until a literal new creation by the Spirit of God, impart to him new power or capacity for spiritual or holy acts. We would avoid both extremes, believing that the truth lies between them, and that the divine counsel here is what common sense gives in many other matters, *in medio tutissimus ibis*. While such men as Edwards and Bellamy, and New England divines generally, have carefully drawn out and stated the distinction, such men as Davies and Witherspoon, and many other devoted ministers of Christ have actually assumed it in all their urgent exhibitions of truth upon the consciences of their hearers. "The deplorable and naturally helpless state of sinners," says Dr. Witherspoon, "takes not away their obligation to duty; the *moral inability*, under which sinners now lie, as a consequence of the fall, is not of such

nature as to take away the guilt of sin, the propriety of exhortation to duty, or the necessity of endeavors after recovery."<sup>1</sup>

The words ability and power are by no means synonymes of liberty or freedom. They are of mutable import, like many others, to be determined always by a reference to the nature of the subject of which the thing they express is predicated. The careful reader of the Scriptures will not fail to notice numerous shades of meaning in which they are used—sometimes denoting, when applied to God, that attribute or energy by which He can accomplish His will—and when applied to man, to notice no other of its generic applications, sometimes the faculties of mind or body, one or all, or in other words the natural capacity which adapts man, as a creature, for certain kinds of actions, sometimes the force or energy exerted in the use of those faculties, sometimes the means or condition necessary in the nature of things for the exercise of that energy, sometimes the moving cause or reason, or motive influence that excites and determines to its exercise, sometimes the right or privilege or authority for its exercise, and sometimes several or all of these together. It is obvious, therefore, what a wide opportunity is afforded, through the varied signification of these words, ability or power, in their varied applications and use, for the indulgence of sophistry, where either ignorance, pride, obstinacy, perverseness, selfish or improper designs, or want of logical accuracy, may employ it, to the great confusion, deception and injury of those who are not accustomed closely to discriminate and view the import of words, in their proper connections, and shades of import, as indicated by the nature of the subject. Our author seems to be skilful in this sort of skirmishing, indulging in remarks and a style of reasoning eminently calculated to mislead and bear away uneducated minds, by taking terms in loose popular senses and using them as the technics of his philosophy.

Our senses are capacities of nature for taking cognizance of various properties or modes of operation pertaining to material things, and so we speak of being able to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, and to feel. Our mental faculties are capacities for operations appropriate to mind; as are our muscular and animal powers to body, to the nature we possess in common with the animal tribes. We mean, that God has so constituted our minds, that under certain circumstances and conditions, we are able to think, reason, feel and will; and also our bodies, according to established laws of connection with our minds, that we can stand, walk, run and perform those various muscular and animal movements dependent on organization. Using the word in the same sense of capacity, we say that we are able to will and call into exercise the various mental and physical faculties or powers for action, with which we are endowed by our Creator. But the capacity to

<sup>1</sup> Witherspoon's Works, I. 142.

will is one thing, and our ability actually to exercise it in given cases is another, and very different thing. Our author confounds them.

Our capacity or power to will, depends on the law of our constitutional being or organization. It has its foundation in nature and hence is called natural ability. The actual exercise of that power depends on certain circumstances or conditions, as well determining the mode in which the will shall act, as being prerequisite, in the very nature of things. We have power to walk, but not to fly, will to do so as we may, God having never endowed us with capacity for such action. In reference to all those actions for which we have been furnished with the natural capacities, men say without fear of being misunderstood, that they have power to perform them. Yet may there be circumstances which prevent us from exercising those powers so that we shall naturally say, we have not liberty to do so. What tyro in philosophy or logic would *therefore* identify power and liberty?

The actual exercise of a natural power depends not merely on the possession of such capacity. It is indeed an essential circumstance or condition; but there are many actions of a complex character, for which there must be outward favorable concurring circumstances, and necessary means and conditions, without which the power or capacity will no more be exerted than if we were destitute of it. Thus at this present time I say, that I have power to pass the next hour into Canada, meaning that I have the natural capacities of mind and body to will to rise up and walk and perform all the actions necessary on my part, to take me voluntarily there. But having done so, on reaching the river and finding no means of transit procurable, or if procurable; happening to be destitute of funds and none at hand from whom to procure them, or credit failing me, and being unable to man the boat myself or to obtain help from others; in view of any one or all of these circumstances and conditions necessary for the accomplishment of my purpose, I naturally turn away and say, I have not power to cross into Canada. This latter declaration does not contradict the former. The former was founded on my knowledge of the existence of public and well-established means or facilities of passage, which, at moderate and fixed prices are afforded every five minutes, or thereabouts, during the day, and I meant no more, than that I had the natural capacity to avail myself of the means and helps, the conditions requisite to visit Canada, should I purpose or choose to do so. The latter was founded on the unusual and unexpected absence and failure of those means and necessary conditions. Our author in this latter case, however, according to his philosophy, and with characteristic good breeding would say, "you fool, you had no such power at all, you lied in saying you had." According to his idea of power, as being identical with liberty, he must

embrace in it all that Pascal represents the Thomists and the Jesuits meant by the "*pouvoir prochain*," or next power. So when he says that we have power to keep the commandments of God perfectly, and if not we are not free, he must mean that we have all and always every requisite concurring circumstance and condition, means and motives, not only to execute our will when thus exercised, but also to determine the will itself to choose to do so. His idea of power admits of no distinctions between the capacity to act, the requisite concurring means and conditions, the motive influence determining the will to act, and the acting of the will itself, but loosely comprehends them all. "The human will is free," says he, "therefore men have power or ability to do all their duty,"—alias, to be perfect! He is a fool, according to our author, who denies the inference; a very easy sort of logic, truly!

The proposition, *the human will is free*, is not, as an absolute proposition, true; for it is not independent, being restrained and limited in its exercise by certain laws and conditions. Our author must be more explicit, and tell us precisely what he means by liberty or freedom of will. It cannot, as has been shown, be volition totally self-originated, without any causative influence of desire, feeling, or motive, or whatever determines the mind to put forth the volition. Nor can it be volition without reason or end, or any connection with a previous state of mind; for human consciousness contradicts such an idea of liberty. Our author predicates moral obligation and character, of the ultimate intention or choice of an end; but this choice when analyzed, amounts to nothing more than an act of will determined by the causative power of motive. The end or object to be obtained moves or determines the man to will. He is not independent and possessed of absolute sovereignty over his actions. External things, and suggestions of mind, affect and excite to act. Inclination, or the tendency of desire or wish, aversion or disgust, toward particular objects and acts, moves to act. When choice is in accordance with such inclination, and no obstacle interferes to frustrate or prevent from acting according to it, men generally say they act freely. "The unlearned," says Dr. Burton, "define liberty in different words, yet their definitions amount to the same thing. And their definition is the result of their feelings and experience; and of course is as just as any given by the learned. They commonly say, *to act as they please* is liberty. So far and so long as they can act as they please, or as they have a mind to act, they enjoy all the liberty they can conceive of, and all they desire. Perhaps a better definition than this cannot be given." This author comprehends under the idea of pleasure those agreeable senses produced by external objects, or suggestions and sentiments which awaken wishes and desires for the objects, or whatever produces them. Accordingly, the corrupt

! Burton's Essay, pp. 116, 117.



and vicious, who feel that the law of God imposes restraints upon the indulgence of their wishes and desires in many respects, regard Him as being opposed to their liberty, and find it difficult, or, as they say, impossible, to resist self and conform to His will. On the other hand, those who find pleasure in doing the will of God, although solicited to evil, make no complaints of trespasses from God upon their liberty, but account themselves never more free than while yielding to the determining influence of His spirit, they say, as did Joseph, "how can I do this thing and sin against God?"

Every man feels when he chooses or wills in a given case, that he might have chosen or willed the contrary, that is, that he has capacities of mind and will, which might have been differently determined; but there having been no constraint upon him, and having acted according to his wishes and desires, consciousness affirms his freedom, and he says he had ability or power to have chosen or acted otherwise. And yet the same man will say, in view of the motives by which he was actuated, and under the influence of the feelings, the desires and wishes by which he was affected at the time, that he could not do otherwise. In so saying he does not mean that he was a mere machine, governed and turned about by fixed laws, like those of mechanism, or those of physical organism, but merely that there was such an incompatibility between the desires and wishes, which at the time actually determined his choice or volition, and those which his conscience told him ought to have prevailed, that without resisting, renouncing, and overcoming the one, the other was impossible. The desires, wishes, and feelings, that determined to self-indulgence in sin, were stronger than any antagonistical influences or considerations brought to bear upon his conscience, or feelings and desires thence awakened. He might have exerted his intellect and powers of perception, so as to have summoned to his aid opposing thoughts, and feelings, and motives; he might have turned away his eyes, or closed his ears, from the sights and sounds that were fascinating and bewitching him; he might have yielded himself to the direction and control of other motives, and resisted the massive power that temptation was exciting. There was nothing in the constitution of his mind, or the nature of things to prevent it. But he did not.

The question is, why did he not? Our author, according to his short-hand patent philosophy, will reply, because he chose not to do so. But why did he not choose? The will is not a despot acting from caprice, without motive, or end, or any causative influence or reason why its actions are thus and not otherwise. It is indeed, as our author says, an executive power; but the very idea of executive power implies a judgment or purpose, which, in the nature of things, is precedent, and for the time being forming the law or mandate of the mind the will obeys.

The distinction between generic purpose, or what our author calls the choice of an ultimate end, and executive volitions, is of no avail here. For what is the choice of an ultimate end? According to our author, it is but a benevolent or selfish choice. This, it is obvious, is not a simple element or act. It is a complex state of mind, a choice determined by motive, and in this respect differs not radically from an executive volition. Consciousness teaches us, that the mind first forms a judgment of what it deems right or best, under the circumstances in which it is called to act, and, thus judging, throws its energy out in the way of choice or will. The affections and passions, or sensibilities, also exert a determining influence or power. The mind's judgment is greatly influenced by them, and thence the choice of the will. Every passion and affection may be resolved into two elements or operations of the soul, the one a sensation which is either painful or pleasant, the other a desire to avoid it if the former, or obtain or enjoy it if the latter. What we call emotions, are kindred sensations or feelings, or movements of the soul, arising, not so immediately from external objects present producing sensations, as from thoughts, views, considerations, or pictures of fancy, which the mind itself may form, and these are resolvable as the former.

Between the mind's judgment and the passions, affections or emotions—the sensibilities, there is often a direct antagonism. The mind is convinced, and judges that the will should act thus and thus; but the passions and affections—the sensibilities, oppose. Impulses, inducements, or motives, to will one way and the contrary, operate together. To assist us, God has given us His law, the expression of His will, and the counsels of His word, through which, He, by His Spirit, throws in a motive influence to do what He requires. He holds us responsible to do His will in all things, and threatens to punish if we refuse. Thus He restricts our liberty to what is rightful, and seeks to bring an influence to bear upon us to determine our wills to what is right. But our passions and affections, or sensibilities, exerted by external objects or suggestions of thought, oppose, and we feel aversion from what He requires and desires, for what He forbids. Still further to aid us in doing His will, to counteract the influence of feeling, and to prevent us from exalting our own desires, or pleasures, or will, as supreme, He has endowed us with conscience, by means of which both the intellect and sensibility, the judgment of the mind, and the feelings of the heart, may combine to determine the choice of the will. According to that power or property of the soul, which we denominate conscience, the mind sits in judgment on its own acts, compared with the standard of right, whereupon a feeling of approbation, satisfaction, or pleasure, arises when conformed to it, but of dissatisfaction, displeasure, or pain, when the contrary. The will of God is the absolute and supreme rule of moral right and obli-

tion. Conforming to His will, yielding our wills to the determining influence, direction, and control of His law, we have peace. No check, no restraint whatever from God, is thrown in to prevent us from acting according to the desires and wishes, or feelings thus inclining. When the contrary course is pursued, we have pain. Thus constitutional provision is made, by means of conscience, for combining the motive influences of the mind's judgment and the heart's sensibilities, in determining the will to what is right. Such are the bounds or restraints which God interposes, beyond which liberty is not conceded to us—morally or constitutionally. But besides conscience, God has placed in the human mind another sentinel, to guard and protect from evil. Natural instinctive regard for personal safety or well-being operates continually; and, in all cases of corporal or physical danger and detriment, intuitively lends its impulses to direct and control the will. On moral subjects, through the feebleness of intellect from want of information, and other causes, it does not intuitively direct and control. The mind often forms a wrong judgment of what is right and best, and the sensibilities equally take a wrong direction. This derangement and tendency to sin, exist from the beginning of our moral agency, and are incident to our descent from fallen parents, and to the condition in which we are born into this world. Left to ourselves, without the Spirit's illumination and aid, the choice of the will will be selfish, in favor of selfish indulgence, for the gratification of some present desire, or wish leading from God, or opposed to His will, rather than to Him, and for His glory. This is what is commonly called native depravity, sometimes original sin, sometimes the corruption of our whole nature, and sometimes total depravity. All men's natural powers or capacities are excited, influenced, directed, and swayed,—or, in other words, the will is determined in the exercise of them,—in a way that either falls short of, or is opposed to, God's requirements. The state of the mind and heart adapt the man to be determined by selfish and sinful motives. There is not that positive directing influence of love to God, which He requires, but, on the contrary, the want of it. In that state, the disposition or tendency being to sin, the motive influences—that give pleasure, and excite desires and wishes tending to determine the will in sinful choices—being against, and not for God and his claims; and there being an actual incompatibility between them, the man naturally says, while conscious of his selfish desires, he cannot do the will of God; not that he is devoid of the natural or physical capacities for it, but, in the absence of other motives, and of helps to excite and give a different direction to his will, he is morally unable. He falls short of God's requirement, and is guilty. Thus from the first all are found sinners.

Our author may think to entrench himself behind a few favorite postulates and defy attack. He may allege, that sin having been

defined, in Scripture, to be "the transgression of the law," it must, therefore, be voluntary and a positive act; and that this is the whole of it. But we have another scriptural definition of sin, which must not be overlooked. "All *unrighteousness* is sin"—that is, all want of conformity to the law. Defects in the way of omission and failure in duty, forgetfulness of God's requirements, inattention to them, neglect to meet them at the right time, and in the right way, and to their full extent, and whatever; in the state of the mind and feelings of the heart, unfits and turns away from them, is sin. We therefore predicate moral depravity, not only of the voluntary acts of disobedience, but also of the anterior state of mind—the disposition, which fits the man to be affected and actuated by selfish rather than benevolent motives. It is unrighteousness, a coming short of God's commands—"a want of conformity to the law of God," and therefore sin.

Our author, identifying disposition and choice, confounds and virtually denies all moral connection between the moving, exciting influence of particular objects or considerations operating on the mind and heart, and leading to sin, and the act of choice between the predisposition or fitness to be thus excited and determined to evil, and the intentional choice of the will. But however he may judge this to be the simplest and truest philosophy, neither are the judgments nor the consciences of men generally satisfied with the casuistry founded on it. Despite of all our author's attempts to relieve them from any sense of moral depravity, irrespective of ultimate intention, they feel that the disposition, standing related to choice as its pre-determining cause, forms part and parcel of the guilt, which renders us justly obnoxious to the punishment of an holy God. Their very inability of themselves, without Divine aid, to will or choose contrary to the motive urgent desire determining to sin, of which inability they are wont to complain, they feel does but indicate the degree of their depravity, the measure of their guilt. It is often affirmed, in self-condemnation, and in proof of the depth of their moral defilement. And when our author, and teachers of his school, will tell them it is just as easy to will contrary to their present sinful inclinations, as it is to yield to them, as easy to believe, repent, and love God, as it is to rise up and walk, or pass from their seats to one appointed, the more intelligent and deeply convicted, knowing it is false, turn away with disgust and alarm from those who thus make light of the evidence their own consciousness gives them, of their dependence upon God for the aid of His Spirit. They feel themselves powerfully determined to evil, and truly described as the "bond-slaves of Satan," "led captive by the devil at his will;" and their cry is "help, Lord, or we perish." Conversions, where such experience has not in some degree been developed, may be from gross crimes, from

<sup>1</sup> I. John, 3: 4.

<sup>2</sup> I. John, 5: 17.

outward sins of life, and habits of sinful action in given cases, to a self-complacent and self-confident reliance on the strength of human resolution, a mere *reformation*, but not that saving change of heart which the Spirit of God, by his regenerating influence alone can secure. We make no more account of them as genuine conversions to God, than we do of those produced by the moral and ethical lectures of the old Greek philosophers, or the preaching of Unitarian divines. Deeper must be the views of depravity, and more powerful the convictions of sin, than such casuistry will secure, in order to convert a sinner from the error of his ways, and save a soul from death. We deprecate greatly, on this very point, the tendency of our author's philosophy, and we think, not without cause, already seen in the developments of character it has produced in the churches, in the sad, painful, and numerous forms of current self-deception, and in the crowds of self-conceited, censorious, inconsistent, and corrupt professors of religion it has mustered into the ranks of Christ's followers. They are but the legitimate practical results of making power or ability, and liberty or freedom of the will identical, and of rejecting those distinctions which men commonly make in the subject of natural and moral ability and inability,—distinctions which accord with consciousness and the teachings of Scripture, which recognize, and foster a sense of dependence on the Spirit of God, and which give intensity and power to their convictions of guilt.

Our author has attempted by various means to account for the fact, "that so many men have denied the liberty of the will, or ability to obey God." In doing so, he has paid little or no attention to this point in the experience of awakened sinners, but arrayed himself against Locke and Edwards, and the great mass of Calvinistic divines with their hearers," who, he says, "have denied the freedom of the will, because they have loosely confounded the will with the involuntary powers—with the intellect and sensibility." We account not our author good authority for the assertion, that "since *they* did not in theory distinguish between the sensibility and the will proper, they denied in theory the freedom of the will." We have never understood or regarded them as confounding desires and emotions with the actings of the will. They did indeed teach that they had a relation to, and influence in, determining the will, and were, in so far under the control of the will as to make us responsible and justly punishable for them when wrong, but they did not confound them. They were much more careful in their discrimination than our author. In applying the dogma of his philosophy to practical matters, he says, in reference to the actings, or the intellect and sensibility, in the way of blasphemous and unkind thoughts of God, "the will *abhors* them, and struggles to suppress them, but for the time-being finds itself *unable* (mark,

<sup>1</sup> III. 52.

<sup>2</sup> III. 53.

the will, he says, finds itself *unable*), to do *anything more* than to fight and resist them." He endorses the teaching of "ministers of all schools," who tell such tempted persons, "your will resists them, and this proves that you are unable, for the time-being, to avoid them." Of course then, the man's liberty, for the time-being, according to our author, is gone, and his obligation destroyed. Accordingly, he says, "you are therefore *not responsible* for them, while you resist them with all the power of your will, any more than you would be guilty of murder, should a giant overpower your strength, and use your hand against your will, to shoot a man." Far otherwise do we, along with the holy men whom our author condemns, believe and teach. In such cases of Satan's molestation,—who adapts his temptations to the mood of the mind, or state of the heart, or condition of the body, at the time, and exerts his influence mediately,—God holds us responsible to put forth appropriate faith in Himself, which is the only way successfully to "resist the devil," and so doing, He has assured us, "he will flee from you." Our blessed Redeemer has set us an example here for our imitation. And the apostle Paul tells us that faith is the shield wherewith "we shall be able to QUENCH ALL the fiery darts of the wicked." It is by no means strange, therefore, that our author's will resisting leaves him powerless. It is in exact accordance with the view we take of our inability in ourselves, and of our dependence on the Spirit's aid. But resistance of will is not all that God requires in such a case. He has sinned by failing to perform the duty appropriate, and required in the circumstances, just as did our first mother in her conflict with Satan. His will, his heart, it is true, have not consented to, and approved of the wicked suggestions, and made those blasphemous and unkind thoughts his own; but their renewance and continuance prove that he has *failed* in discharging the appropriate duty of faith in Jesus Christ. His own power is inadequate to overcome the evil one. He has resisted in his own strength, not in Christ's, and that is his sin, for "whatsoever is not of faith is sin." We regard our author's casuistry here as exceedingly erroneous and dangerous; but it is the legitimate result of his philosophy, which exalts itself, and idolizes free-will, to the rejection of Christ, and to the exclusion of a sense of dependence on the Spirit of God. He affirms, that "to hold that men are always responsible, because they loosely think themselves to be so, is absurd." Thus does he set aside, by one stroke of the magic wand of his philosophy, all the experience which has entered so deeply into the formation of the character, and development of the piety, of such men as Owen, Bunyan, Halyburton, and others, as pitiable errors. It is absurd; they supposed themselves to be responsible when they were not!

<sup>1</sup> III. 55, 56.

<sup>2</sup> Eph. 6 : 16.

<sup>3</sup> III. 56.

<sup>4</sup> Rom. 14 : 23.

<sup>5</sup> II. Jam. 4 : 7

<sup>6</sup> III. 56.

Not so does the Word of God instruct us. "He that doubteth," says the apostle, "is damned if he eat," notwithstanding his conscience may in reality be too scrupulous. "In cases of temptation," says our author, "such as that just supposed, as soon as the attention is directed to the fact of inability to avoid those thoughts and feelings, and the mind is conscious of the will's resisting them, and of being unable to banish them, it readily rests in the assurance that it is not responsible for them." A flat contradiction of Paul's judgment in such a case. "For I know that in me, (that is, in my flesh), dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not that I do. Now, if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. Oh wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" It makes but little difference, so far as this question is concerned, whether our author's opinion be correct or not, as to the interpretation of this passage. We unequivocally dissent from it, however, as by no means proved by the authorities to which he refers. Whether Paul be understood to personate an unconverted Jew, or to recite his own experience as a Christian, he distinctly teaches, that freedom of will, and ability or power, are very different things. The conviction of weakness, helplessness, inability, guilt, and ruin, which commingles with the will's resistance of Satan's temptations, and which is so totally at war with our author's whole system of religion as interpreted by his philosophy, the apostle regards, and presses as important and essential to the exercise of that faith in Jesus Christ which brings succor to the mind, through the light and power of God, so indispensable for the right performance of our duty, and for triumph over the adversary. Paul, though involved in conflicts, which developed his own weakness, nevertheless was victorious, and praised God for the grace and overcoming power, obtained through faith in Jesus Christ. What he could not do naturally by mere strength of will, he nevertheless could do through the grace of Christ. "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me." The reason he assigned for his energy was not the native power of his freewill, but the strength and grace of Christ which by faith he realized. "He said unto me, my grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in weakness. Most gladly, therefore, will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in

<sup>1</sup> Rom. 14 : 23.

<sup>2</sup> III. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Rom. 7 : 16. 24.

<sup>4</sup> Phil. 4 : 10.

persecutions, in distresses, for Christ's sake; for when I am weak then am I strong."

Our author acknowledges the fact of our dependence on the grace of Jesus Christ, and of their need of help and support from the Holy Spirit, who "seriously undertake their own reformation." But, according to his teaching, the need of that help is "in consequence of their physical depravity, and because of the great strength of their habit of self-indulgence;" and the aid of the Holy Spirit consists in illumination merely. Yet does he speak with strange inconsistency, and vagueness, if not self-contradiction, when he attempts to explain that sense of dependence and weakness which he is constrained to admit, men generally express by alleging their inability. "They are prone," says he, "*as is natural*, to express their sense of dependence on the Divine Spirit in strong language, and to speak of this dependence as if it consisted in a real inability, when in fact they do not really consider it as a *proper* inability. They say, in respect to many things, *I cannot*, when they mean only *I will not*, and never think of being understood as affirming a *proper* inability. The inspired writers expressed themselves in the common language of men upon such subjects, and are doubtless to be understood in the same way. In common parlance, *can not* often means *will not*, and perhaps is used as often in this sense as it is to express a *proper* inability." This is just what Edwards, and that class of divines whom he condemns as necessitarians, mean carefully to express by their distinction between natural inability, or destitution of the capacity to act, moral inability, or the absence of motive considerations or influence sufficient to determine the will; and the mind's conviction of incompatibility between the state of the will as at present determined by prevalent motives, and that state to which opposing but ineffectual or powerless motives urge it. According to our author, such distinctions are false and worthless. Liberty is power, and power is liberty. If the man has not equal power to do the right thing, and at the same moment, that he has to do the wrong, he has no power at all, and is therefore, in that instance, not a free agent. This is an error too palpable, and fraught with fatal practical results, to be openly affirmed. Our author's own mind would revolt from it when plainly stated; and therefore, in his explanations, he abandons his favorite position, and virtually avails himself of the distinction between an absolute physical or natural impossibility, and a moral inability, concealing his own inconsistency from himself, by talking of a *proper* inability. According to his philosophy, there must be no qualifications here—no such distinctions on the subject of inability as "*proper*" and improper, total and partial, absolute and relative, natural and moral. But thus to carry out his philosophy of the freedom of the will consistently, he would out-

\* III. 62.

† II. Cor. 12; 9, 10.



rage common sense and universal consciousness, and, therefore, after his facile manner, conveniently cheats himself and his reader by sophistically changing the meaning of his terms and propositions.

We will give the reader some of his comments on Paul's experience, as recorded in the seventh chapter of Romans, that he may see his inconsistency. "The fact is, he (Paul) was portraying a legal experience, and spoke of finding himself unable to keep selfish resolutions of amendment in the presence of temptation. His will was in a state of committal to the indulgence of the propensities. In the absence of temptation his convictions and fears and feelings were the *strongest* impulses, and under their influence *he would form resolutions* to do his duty, to abstain from fleshy indulgences, &c. But as some other appetite or desire came to be more strongly excited, he yielded to that *of course* and broke his former resolution." What can our author, according to his philosophy, mean by the use of such language as "the strongest impulses," and yielding to them "of course?" If, according to his showing, liberty is ability, and there is no causative influence determining the mind to will thus or thus; if the will is absolutely and sovereignly free, that is, possessed of full power to originate its own acts, as he teaches, it is altogether out of place, and foreign to his philosophy, to talk of impulses *stronger* or *weaker*, and the stronger *of course* prevailing to determine the choice. The phrase, "of course," in such connection, if used by Edwardean divines, would be interpreted by our author to mean, of necessity, that is a *physical* necessity; whereas, it and the phrase necessity, with them means no more than moral certainty. What else does or can our author mean? and why shall he put a construction on their language, and give it a meaning they disavow, and yet, while constrained to admit these facts, claim to use words which, implying a causative influence in determining the will, denote the very same thing. His explanations, conflicting with his theory of the freedom of the will so palpably, his censures recoil with accumulated force upon himself. He does in reality teach, that man is brought into existence, and placed under responsibilities as a moral creature, under circumstances or in a condition, where, naturally, the desires and wishes, the propensities and inclinations, produced by physical depravity, give the strongest impulses to his will, and "*of course*," by determining his will, render him morally corrupt. We see nothing in Edwards that assigns so unequivocally as this does, our moral depravity to a physical necessity as its proximate cause. Apart from the revelation and grace of the gospel, our author formally admits, that human nature is destitute of ability—that is in his full and unqualified sense, of *all* ability to keep the commandments of God, and that by reason of physical depravity. We see not, therefore, wherein he differs from

the Arminian, who teaches that the gospel imparts to each a modicum of ability, which, if only exercised and improved, will render availing and efficient the power of God on his behalf. For the inability, which by nature, i. e. left in their natural condition—mankind labor under, he avers is removed by the gospel. "Under the light of the gospel," say he, "and with the promises in our hands, God does require of us what we should be unable to do, and be, but for these promises and this proffered assistance. Here is a real inability to do directly in our own strength all that is required of us upon consideration of the proffered aid. We can only do it by strength imparted by the Holy Spirit. That is, we cannot know Christ and avail ourselves of his offers and relations, and appropriate to our own souls his fullness, except as we are taught by the Holy Spirit. The thing immediately and directly required, is to receive the Holy Spirit by faith to be our teacher and guide, to take of Christ, and show it unto us. This confidence we are able to exercise. Who ever really and intelligently affirmed that he had not power or ability to trust or confide in the promise and oath of God? Much that is said of inability, in poetry, and in the common language of the saints, respects not the subjection of the will to God, but those experiences and states of feeling that depend on the illuminations of the Spirit just referred to. The language that is so common, in prayer and in the devotional dialect of the church, respects generally our dependence upon the Holy Spirit for *such* discoveries of Christ *as to charm* the soul into a steadfast abiding in him. We feel our dependence on the Holy Spirit to *so* enlighten us as to *break up forever* the power of sinful habit and *draw us away* from our idols, *entirely* and forever." "This dependence does not consist in a *proper* inability to will as God directs, but, as I have said, partly in the power of sinful habit and partly in the great darkness of our souls in respect to Christ and his mediatorial work and relations. All these together do not constitute a *proper* inability, for the plain reason, that through the right action of our will, which is always possible to us, these difficulties can all be directly or indirectly overcome. Whatever we can do or be, directly or indirectly by willing, is possible to us. But there is no degree of spiritual attainment required of us that may not be reached directly or indirectly, by right willing. Therefore, these attainments are possible." But, says our author, "a right state of the will constitutes, for the time being all, that strictly speaking, the moral law requires." The moral law, "in a less strict and proper sense, requires all those acts and states of the intellect and sensibility, which are connected by a law of necessity with the right action of the will. Of course it also requires that *cleansing* of the sensibility and all those higher forms of Christian experience that result from the indwelling of

<sup>1</sup> III. 63.<sup>1</sup> III. 63, 64.

the Holy Spirit. That is, the law of God requires that these attainments shall be made when the means are provided and enjoyed, and as soon as, in the nature of the case, these attainments are possible. But it requires no more than this."<sup>1</sup>

All this is totally inconsistent with our author's teaching elsewhere, that man, of himself, naturally, with his natural powers, is able or free perfectly to do the entire will<sup>2</sup> of God, and of course without the Holy Spirit. If such freedom or ability in the full sense in which he uses the words, exists, man must find it *as easy*, at any and every moment, to obey as to disobey: no motive influence must sway his will one way or the other. His own sovereign power over his will must be of itself sufficient, even in his fallen state, to meet the full requirement of God; and if so, what does he want more? Where is his need of the Holy Spirit?

According to our author, that Spirit does not exert his influence and help, till the sinner has willed to receive him. His obligation afterwards rises and falls, narrows and widens, just as that Spirit, by His revelation varies the amount of light and instruction, and the proffer of needed grace and help. "The Scriptures," says he, "abound with assurances of light and instruction and of all *needed* grace and *help*, upon condition of a right will or heart, that is, upon condition of our being really willing to obey the light, *when and as fast* as we receive it."<sup>3</sup> A right state of the will being *the condition* of the Spirit's influence and instruction, light and assistance, how is the will, in the first instance, to be brought into that right state? Not, according to our author, by the Holy Spirit, for His help can only be had on this very condition: the right willing must precede, and until that is done, no help is to be expected or will be vouchsafed from the Spirit. The sinner must, by the energy of his own will, convert himself, and afterward the Spirit will take him up! He must first "*cleanse*" his sensibility, by the right action of his will, and then the Spirit will develop in him all those higher forms of holiness that result from His indwelling! We know not what our author can mean by *cleansing* the sensibility, unless it be from physical depravity, for he does not allow moral corruption to be predicated of anything but acts of the will, the sensibility following a law of necessity. To it there can pertain no moral character, except as it is under the direct or indirect control of the will. "It is denied, at least by me, that either reason or divine revelation affirms moral obligation or moral character of any state of mind that lies wholly beyond both the direct and the indirect control of the will."<sup>4</sup> And yet the mass of mankind will affirm, that the will follows the inclination; that the wishes and desires determine the will; and that only in acting according to their dictates do they recognize and acknowledge themselves to be free, however often mistaken in the fact. We see not but that our author cuts off depraved and

<sup>1</sup> III. 64.<sup>2</sup> III. 67.<sup>3</sup> III. 64.<sup>4</sup> III. 32.

ruined man forever from the grace and help of the Holy Spirit. We need His influence and aid to *make* us willing, and to *keep* us willing; nor do we know of anything in all the teachings of the Word of God, which sanctions the idea that man has ample power, in and of himself, in his present fallen state, by any energy of his own unaided will, to meet the requirements either of the law or of the gospel. The will is naturally opposed to God—the heart is enmity against Him, and the carnal mind is neither subject to the law of God nor can be. Unless the Spirit of God, by His efficacious energy counteract, overcome, and renew our stubborn wills and dispose us to receive His grace and help, we shall not only at first, but continue for ever to rebel and resist the Holy Ghost. Such is the deplorable condition into which we have been brought by the apostasy of our first parents, and such the native depravity of the human heart, that the powerful grace of God is indispensable to change his heart and renew a right spirit within him. In this condition, his case is hopeless and helpless, and left to himself, he must remain to all eternity a damned rebel, justly obnoxious to the same treatment his guilty primogenitor deserved. By no unaided spontaneity of will can he lift himself to God—nature's help is utterly ineffectual.

Our author, however, adapts the law of God to man's fallen nature—brings it down to the level of human weakness and depravity, and denies that it requires him to be what it did his prime progenitor, or that "sinners be just in all respects what they might have been had they never sinned." It is contented with vastly less, and does not require of them "as high and perfect a service as if their powers had never been abused by sin." For God to hold up to us the law given to our first parents, in all the length and breadth that He did to them, our author protests would be absurd and unjust, and that with as much show of reason and as much authority He might require of all sinners, to "*undo* all their acts of sin and to substitute holy ones in their place." "Why may not God as well require one as the other? They are *alike* impossibilities, originating in the sinner's own act or fault."<sup>a</sup> They are not. There is as wide a difference between them as between the past and future, between a natural impossibility and a moral inability. It is not an absolute physical impossibility but a relative one,—like to that we sometimes predicate of vision, where the atmosphere has been rendered dense by fog or imperious by darkness. External means may disperse the fog—light may be diffused through the medium of vision, and then the natural eye can discern what no such change would make perceptible to the man devoid of the power or faculty of vision. So in the sinner's case. He is fallen in darkness, prejudice, ignorance, errors, and hosts of things to which he is exposed by reason of the

<sup>1</sup> III. 57.<sup>a</sup> III. 58.

apostasy of the parents of the race, interfere with and prevent him from exercising his natural capacities, according to the requirements of the law. The law has not been changed by the fall. It is not a fluctuating *gnomon*, like the gauge of a steam engine, indicating always the degree of power. It remains forever immutable like its Author. Man's corruption and ruin are incident to his relation to guilty progenitors, descending as he does from them, originally placed under a moral constitution that makes no provision in nature for his help or recovery after it had been violated. Our author's objections and reasonings are founded on the assumption, that there is no federal relation between our first parents and their offspring, and that God does not deal with men morally through a public Head or representative, but that each one born into this world is placed under a similar probation with Adam's before he fell. This we regard as the *πρωτον ψευδος* of his theology. Consistently carried out, it cuts us off from all hope of redemption through Jesus Christ the second Adam, our newly constituted covenant Head and representative, who has obeyed the law and suffered for us, and thus accomplished what our fallen parent failed to do ; or perverts the whole gospel scheme from a system of grace extended to those elected of God the Father, brought into union with Christ the Son, and adopted children of His family, into a mere modified moderated system of moral government, which adapts the law's requirements to human weakness and corruption. The *gospel* is thus rendered a galling yoke of bondage ; and our author's philosophy, while denying native depravity subverts it entirely, and robs us of the grace of God. We cling to the precious Word of God, and rest satisfied and thankful for its revelations, which, finding us ruined and helpless, inheriting corruption, misery and death, from Adam, points us to Christ, and tells us, not of works or legal righteousness, not of a modified and moderated system of moral government, but of salvation, "redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches" of divine grace,—of justification freely by faith without the works of the law, which brings the influence and aid of the Spirit of God, to work in us the work of faith with power—to enable us to put that confidence in God for acceptance, which previously was morally impossible, and which, lifting us from deep degradation and damnation, and placing us in the situation, with means and under influences through which we may attain to the higher developments of holiness, leads from strength to strength, until we arrive at the perfect stature of manhood in Christ Jesus.

Our author evidently gains nothing by his philosophy but sacrifices everything of value in the gospel. His rejection of native depravity, so far from relieving from embarrassment and difficulty, only increases them. Nor has he placed himself on such vantage ground as to give him just occasion to ridicule as he does, the

faith of those who with the Westminster divines believe, that the natural inclination, the bias of our nature, is to sin, and who account this part and parcel of our moral corruption. He brings man into the world, the subject of physical depravity, with debilitated powers of mind, and a sensibility that needs cleansing, and so renders it a matter of course that he will sin. We see not but that he is as veritably, if not equally, obnoxious to the charge of teaching a moral depravity transmitted "by ordinary generation," as he holds they do whose Confession of Faith and teachings he condemns. For if by a law of necessity the developments of intellect and sensibility are effected, and the will, without the Spirit's aid, "of course" yields to the strongest "impulses," and if the impulses thence imparted, are undeniably stronger than any natural bias to God and holiness, he plainly teaches the doctrine of sinning by necessity of nature as veritably as those whom he charges with believing and teaching, that the corruption of man's moral nature is propagated and descends by natural generation from Adam.

#### REGENERATION.

Our author's views of Regeneration also take their shape from his philosophy. Regeneration is variously represented in the Scriptures: sometimes as the beginning of a sinner's new life; as his awakening out of the sleep of death; his rising from the death of trespasses and sins; his being translated out of the kingdom of darkness into light, and his entering upon a life of holiness. It is hence tropically called the new birth, a new creation. Again it is described as a change of heart, and by many theologians is spoken of as the proximate cause of conversion, or faith and repentance. By others it is regarded as synonymous with conversion. Our author is of this last class, and denies any distinction between them. He sees no propriety in the distinction made by those who use the phrase regeneration or the new birth, to denote the Spirit's agency in changing the sinner's heart, and that of conversion the sinner's activity in the process or rather act of that change. The facts of importance here to be noticed are, the total depravity of man, rendering a radical change of moral character indispensable to salvation: man's obligation to be and to act holy, to change his heart, to transfer his supreme affection from self to God: the certainty that if left to himself, he will never spontaneously effect that change within himself: the necessity of the Spirit's agency in order to produce it: the voluntary agency of the sinner in yielding to and concurring with His influence: and the consequent developments of holy character. Our author has expressed himself generally on this subject as a point of faith, distinctly and definitely, in accordance with orthodox divines and evangelical Christians. But in applying his philosophy to the subject of regenera-

ting influence, and describing the nature of the change produced in the sinner, he gives occasion to fear, that practically he may differ in his views of what constitutes its nature. According to his philosophy, it consists in a change in the attitude of the will, or a change in its ultimate choice, intention or preference, a change from selfishness to benevolence; from choosing self-gratification as the supreme and ultimate end of life, to the supreme and ultimate choice of the highest well-being of God and of the universe; from a state of entire consecration to self-interest, self-indulgence, self-gratification for its own sake or as an end, and as the supreme end of life, to a state of entire consecration to God and to the interests of His kingdom, as the supreme and ultimate end of life." The sensibilities, according to our author, following a law of necessity, undergo a change as a natural consequence of the change of the will. The will having power to change itself, no causative power can be brought to bear upon it, that shall determine its choice without destroying its liberty. The intellect also follows a law of necessity and can only be indirectly controlled by the will. Of course neither intellectual views of truth, nor sensitive emotions, according to him, can have any determining influence upon the will. It originates its own acts, by the fiat of its own sovereignty. Intellectual views of truth may be a condition of the will's acting; but no more. Whatever emotions or feelings may exist anterior to the change of the will, being selfish, are opposed to God, and can have no causative influence in determining its choices. It follows, therefore, from these positions of our author, that the agency of the Spirit can consist only, in arranging the condition necessary for the mind's willing, that is, in presenting the truth before it. But the presentation of the truth, according to his theory, can exert no causative influence whatever. The will being itself the sole cause of its own actions, and being sovereign and free, it has equal ability, at any moment, to will the opposite. The sinner, therefore, is the prime and sole author of this change of will, whereupon, but not till then, the law of necessity begins to operate, and passions and affections, emotions and actions, correspondent, all follow as a matter of course. He is indeed changed, but he has changed himself, and the Spirit of God had no other agency in the matter than to present truth to the mind, that is, to supply the necessary condition of the will's action. To say that the Spirit, under such circumstances, is the author of regeneration, that the new-born soul is a new creature, created anew in Christ Jesus unto good works, is altogether a misnomer. The Spirit of God, according to our author's philosophy, does but afford the occasion, and is not the cause of the sinner's regeneration. As to His having the regeneration of the sinner as an end, specifically in view, and operating specially with that design—appropriately and

powerfully to secure that end—our author says not a word. It falls not within the range of, and is utterly inconsistent with, his philosophy, being, according to his view, a violation of the liberty of the sinner's will. He does indeed speak of the Spirit's *so* presenting truth, that the will shall decide for God, and of a suasive urgent overcoming power on His part, subduing the sinner's corruption, swaying his affections, and making him willing, which things are wholly inconsistent with his idea and philosophy of the freedom of the will. But when he speaks on the subject, his language becomes mystical and offensively extravagant. "I have often feared," says he, "that many professed Christians knew Christ only in the flesh, that is, that they have no other knowledge of Christ than what they obtain by *reading* and *hearing* about Him, without any *special revelation of him to the inward being* by the Holy Spirit." "O how infinitely blind he is to the fulness and glory of Christ, who does not know himself, and know Christ, as both are revealed by the Holy Spirit. When we are led by the Holy Spirit to look down into the abyss of our own emptiness—to behold the horrible pit and miry clay of our own habits, and fleshy and worldly and infernal entanglements; when we see, in the light of God, that our emptiness and necessities are infinite; then and not till then, are we prepared wholly to cast off self and to put on Christ." (The reader will notice here how he contradicts all his teaching about the first act of entire consecration to God, being perfectly holy, full, entire obedience, the total renunciation of self, by thus making a preparation of the Spirit's teaching, which, as we have seen, according to his view, is consequent on faith, and our entire consecration to God, indispensably necessary, in order "wholly to cast off self and to put on Christ!") "The glory and fulness of Christ," he continues, if we understand his language, truly as we believe and teach, "are not *discovered to* (?) (he must mean *disclosed* or made known to) the soul until it discovers its *need* of him. But when self, in all its loathsomeness and helplessness, is fully revealed, until hope is utterly extinct, as it respects *every kind and degree of help in ourselves*, and when Christ, the all and in all, is revealed to the soul as its all sufficient portion and salvation, then and not till then, does it know its salvation. This knowledge is the indispensable condition of appropriating faith, or of that act of receiving Christ or that committal of all to him that takes Christ home to dwell in the heart by faith, and to preside over all its states and actions." "We need to have Christ *so* revealed as to so completely ravish and engross our affections, that we would sooner *cut our own throats (!)* or suffer others to cut them than to sin against him. Is such a thing impossible? Indeed it is not. Is not the Holy Spirit able and willing, and ready thus to reveal him *upon condition of our asking it in faith*? Surely

1 III. 261.

2 III. 262.

3 III. 259.



He is."<sup>1</sup> Our author, as we think, in the above quotations, suffering his heart rather than his intellect to speak, has betrayed that deep sense of dependence upon the Spirit of God, for the right and sanctifying exercise of faith, that forms an essential trait of every truly humble Christian. But in the first, his language is so mystical as to be capable of sustaining the veriest fanatic in his claim to extraordinary revelations. In the second, he obviously is betrayed by his feelings into the use of the strongest hyperbolical language; and in the third, into strains as offensive to meek Christian sensibility as to good taste. While at one moment he seems to make the Spirit's influence of incalculable importance and indispensable as preparatory and in order to our regeneration, which is, according to him, entire sanctification, perfect holiness, for the time-being, at another moment he affirms that influence to be the *result* of appropriating faith, or the act of receiving Christ, the *condition* to be fulfilled previous to its being had. Regeneration with him is but the choice of the will, the first act of a sinner's consecration of himself to God. The change of the affections, what he calls the ravishing of the affections, &c., is no part of it, but consequent on special revelations, made by the Spirit in answer to the prayer of faith, until which takes place, the regenerated sinner is liable to fall into sin and condemnation, just like the impenitent sinner. The will has been changed, but the physical depravity of the sensibility has not been corrected; and for this, "entire sanctification" is necessary, which he teaches to be a permanent state of the will swaying the affections, the man "*established, confirmed, preserved continued in a state of entire consecration to God.*"<sup>2</sup> "One great thing," says he, "that needs to be done, is to *correct* the developments of our sensibility. The appetites and passions are *enormously* developed in their relations to earthly objects. In relation to things of time and sense, our propensities are greatly developed and are *alive*; but in relation to spiritual truths, and objects, and eternal realities, we are naturally as *dead as stones*. When *first* converted, if we knew enough of ourselves and of Christ, to thoroughly develop and *correct* the action of the sensibility, and *confirm* our wills in a *state* of entire consecration, we should not fall."<sup>3</sup>

Thus our author again contradicts himself, as he conforms to universal experience, and admits that the sensibility here does not follow the decisions or choices of the will by a law of necessity. The Spirit of God has something to do to correct it; but how it is to be cleansed he does not say. Instead of imparting, in regeneration, in His own inexplicable and inscrutable way, some sensitiveness to the human conscience and sensibility, instead of giving power to the truth to change the mind and heart from enmity to love, which evangelical ministers believe and teach, he makes the office of the Spirit to consist, simply and exclusively, in revealing

<sup>1</sup> III. 201.<sup>2</sup> III. 259.<sup>3</sup> III. 266.

Christ and himself to the sinner. The consecration of himself to God, in which he makes regeneration to consist, results from the passive perception of the truth presented by the Spirit, for, that "He exerts any other than the influence of Divine teaching and illumination, is sheer assumption." Yet again he contradicts himself. The office of the Spirit, in regeneration, according to his view, is to reveal enough of self and of Christ to the sinner, to make him consecrate himself entirely to God. But what that *making* is, and what amount of knowledge is *enough* for it, he does not say. At one moment, merely illumination or teaching is sufficient, as though the knowledge of Christ and of the sinner's self, obtained from the revelation of the Spirit, was itself adequate. Again it is something more. "For when we sin," he says, "it is because of our ignorance of Christ." "In most, if not in all instances, the convert is too ignorant of himself, and of course knows too little about Christ to be established in permanent obedience." A great deal more knowledge, it seems, is necessary to keep the convert presently perfect from sinning, than to regenerate the sinner. "It must not be inferred that the knowledge of Christ in all relations, is a condition of our coming into a state of entire consecration to God, or present sanctification," that is, of being born again. Temptation occurring subsequent to regeneration, is the occasion of revealing the present and pressing necessity of the soul, and "the Holy Spirit is always ready to reveal Christ in the particular relation suited to the newly-developed necessity. The perception and appropriation of him in this relation, under these circumstances is the *sine qua non* of our *remaining* in a state of entire consecration." So then, according to this view of the matter, there is no change whatever produced in the nature, the inclination, or bias, and sensitiveness of the sensibilities—the taste or relish, by whatever name it may be called, in reference to sin and holiness, the world and God—that will prove permanent, and exert a determining influence on the will. All depends on the free will of man. He must *first* apply to the Spirit for revelations in his necessity, when tempted. For want of the knowledge which the Spirit imparts, he, a sinner, in the first instance, and even when, by the exercise of his free will, having made choice of the good of God, and of the universe, as his ultimate end, he has become regenerated—passed into a state of present sanctification, and received thereon the Spirit's aid, for want of still further and fuller knowledge of himself and of Christ, he will not, and cannot remain permanently so consecrated, and be established in a state of "entire sanctification." "He needs," says our author, "renewed conviction of sin, to be revealed to himself, and to have Christ revealed in him the hope of glory, before he will be steadfast, always

<sup>1</sup> II. 518.

<sup>2</sup> III. 266.

<sup>3</sup> III. 266.

abounding in the work of the Lord." We are accustomed to believe and teach that this is not the *condition* prerequisite, but the *cause* necessary and efficient to secure this result. Without the Spirit's aid we can do nothing, and shall certainly stumble and fall. But so far from the sinner's commencing by his freewill, the Spirit begins the work of bringing him to God; and when by regeneration, he becomes "His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God had before ordained that we should walk in them," He does not abandon His work and leave man to his own free will to work and keep himself, but exercises His powerful and sanctifying watch and care to keep him through faith unto everlasting life. Paul's teaching on this point was directly the reverse of our author's. He gives the Spirit of God precedence in the work of salvation, and makes the permanency of the relation into which the regenerated sinner is brought to Jesus Christ, and established as a child of God under His fatherly watch, and care, and discipline, motives for his zealous, prayerful, and persevering efforts to increase and abound more and more in the fruits of holiness, "*Being confident of this very thing, that He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ.*" Equally strong, and opposed to our author, is Peter's testimony on this subject. He blesses the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, according to His abundant mercy, hath *begotten us again* unto a lively *hope*, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, *to an inheritance* incorruptible and undefiled, and *that fadeth not away*, reserved in heaven for you, *who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed* IN THE LAST TIME, wherein ye greatly rejoice, though NOW, *for a season*, (if need be), ye are in heaviness through manifold temptations, *THAT the trial of your faith*, being much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, *might be found unto praise, and honor, and glory*, AT the *appearing of Jesus Christ.*" No language can be more explicit and pointed, to express the blessed truth, that salvation from beginning to end, is the work of God. The fact is, He renews the sinner's mind and heart as He brings him to exercise faith in a once crucified, but risen Saviour, and that He keeps him, through the exercise of faith, continually persevering and maturing for the glorious consummation of his state and perfection of his being and glory, at the second coming of Jesus Christ. The Spirit is the author of regeneration: the Spirit is the author of our sanctification: the Spirit is the author of our perseverance; the Spirit is the author of our triumph, and the consummation of our glory. The free will of man is not left to its own absolute unaided spontaneities, but is influenced, determined, renewed, and established by the Spirit's agency in the choice of Christ and cordial obedience to

<sup>1</sup> II. 266.

<sup>2</sup> Eph. 2: 10.

<sup>3</sup> Phil. 1: 6.

<sup>4</sup> I. Pet. 1: 3—8.

God. Glory be to God for "the exceeding riches of His grace in his kindness to us through Christ Jesus." Our author's system and philosophy invert the whole order of the causes of salvation, and making the Spirit of God but the subsidiary of man's freewill, give Him the second place. According to him, man's free will converts itself; sanctifies itself; perfects itself; and keeps itself; and even uses God, and grasps his energies, and clothes itself with His almighty and infinite attributes! "When a soul can be found who thoroughly knows, and has embraced and appropriated Christ, he is a host of himself. That is, he has appropriated the attributes of Christ to himself, and his influence is felt in heaven, earth, and hell." We make all due allowance here for rashness and extravagance of diction, and yet it is in perfect keeping with our author's philosophy of the freedom of the will. There is no security whatever in any change of heart experienced, for the regenerate man's "entire sanctification," or establishment in a permanent state of holy obedience, or for his final salvation. By yielding to temptation and relapsing into sin, he falls into death again, legally and morally, and needs just as much to be born again the second and third time, and no one can tell how many times, before, if ever he gets into the kingdom of heaven. Such are the legitimate results of his attempt to engraft his philosophy on the Calvinistic faith, which, most inconsistently, he professes yet to maintain. We should respect both himself and his theology vastly more, if he would come out at once, openly and fully, and place himself on Arminian or Pelagian ground, to one or other of which his philosophy, and his exalting of the power of freewill, inevitably must lead him and his followers.

If we may judge of the tendency of any system by the developments of sentiment and practise among those who adopt it—which according to our Saviour's rule, viz., "by their fruits shall ye know them," we are bound to do—we shall be at no loss to give the author his true place. The doctrines of God's sovereign election unto everlasting life, of the efficacious influence and agency of the Spirit of God to renew, sanctify, and render meet for it, those whom He "did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his son," and of the final perseverance of the saints, are as openly and avowedly opposed and slandered by teachers emanating from our author's school, as ever they were by those who repudiated altogether the Calvinistic faith. Arminius, himself had many redeeming features in his system, and never went to the extent in error to which Episcopius, Grotius, Limborch, Vossius, Casaubon, Le Clerc, and their followers have gone. He retained much more of the semblance and spirit of the gospel, than does our author's system; and we confidently anticipate a wide-spread and fatal defection from the truth, as it is in Jesus,

<sup>1</sup> Eph. 2 : 7.

<sup>2</sup> III. 263.

<sup>3</sup> Rom. 8 : 29.

at no distant day, through its influence. *Facilis descensus averni. Sed revocare gradum—hic labor hoc opus.* We fear that all attempts to counteract its fatal influence will prove too late and ineffectual. The churches and ministry had need awaken to a sense of the danger. Its practical results already display themselves to some extent, and they commend it no more to us, than do its theological features.

If ever a system of dialectics was eminently adapted to stultify the intellect, and to sear the conscience, we think it is precisely that which has received the favor of our author, and is so pertinaciously advocated and propagated by him. The spirit appropriate and peculiar to his philosophico-theological system, may commend itself to those who are fond of what is coarse and severe, and who account these things plainness and faithfulness, but cannot fail to offend the meek and gentle, as well as persons of refinement and delicacy. Its introduction and indulgence in the pulpit, have degraded it, and done more than all its enemies had accomplished, to bring contempt upon the ministry of reconciliation. We write with real pain and deep sorrow of heart; but cannot withhold the expression of our sober conviction, that seeking immediate effect, and mistaking mere dramatic power for the power of the truth, through its influence a very serious deterioration, in the style of preaching, has been produced, which has brought the pulpit, to some extent, to the level of the stage, and engendered that mercenary spirit in many churches which prompts them to "hire" ministers for times and occasions. A flippant air and irreverent manner of speaking on sacred things, by ministers of the gospel, prepare the way for profanity on the part of those whose minds are not affected by the fear of God. Abounding in anecdote, the familiar use of the dialogue and other dramatic methods for the exhibition and illustration of truth, relieve from the necessity of careful thought, and by the aid and power of the imagination, give impulse to passion. Pride, arrogance, extravagance, and self-conceit are incident to its developments. Censoriousness and denunciation, with all the disputes and divisions, suspicions and schisms, ever sure to follow in their wake, find abundant aliment in the style and manner of applying its principles of casuistry, for the analysis of character. In reverence toward God in prayer, and the absence of all that courtesy toward man, and the winning tenderness of that sympathy and charity which the gospel so much commends, betray themselves in the style and manner of expression.

We deprecate the influence and spirit of this system, and think they have long since been well described by the great New England Patriarch, whose home is in the West, and who yet lingers on the shores of mortality to bless the churches with his cheering voice, as a spirit of spiritual pride, censoriousness, and insubordination to the order of the gospel. Our author's attempt to develop

a system of philosophy and theology in which it has found its permanent lodgment, and through which it has made its prurient developments, has contributed not only to increase the prejudices against evangelical religion in the minds of persons of taste and education, and to drive them off to other denominations where they will not be offended by rudeness and vulgarity in the pulpit, but to repel even the friends of the pure, unadulterated truth of the gospel. The very names of revivals and spiritual religion, as well as the religious profession of multitudes, have been rendered a taunt and a reproach. We attribute the present dearth of Divine influences, and the absence of the true spirit of revival, to the influence of this man-exalting and God-dishonoring philosophy, which has attempted to naturalize religion, if we may so speak, denied the very office and grieved the blessed Spirit of God. Its prevalence will prove but the pioneer of a mere natural religion to foster Deism, Unitarianism, and Infidelity.

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#### ARTICLE VI.

### THE PREACHING OF JONAH.

By the REV. GEORGE SHEPARD, D.D., Professor at Bangor.

THE Saviour speaks, in one place, of the preaching of Jonah. From this it appears that Jonah was a preacher. From the little specimen we have of his preaching, and its effects, we wish we knew more of him in this calling. We know very little; still we may, perhaps, derive some benefit from the brief notices of his character, and the dim intimations of his labors.

Respecting his early history, his education, and training, we are very much in the dark. He was the son of Amittai—was a Galilean, and prophecied in the reign of Jeroboam II., king of Israel.

He was sent of the Lord to Ninevah, to cry against it, because its wickedness had come up before the Lord. Ninevah, without doubt, was then in its glory; an exceeding great city of three days journey—nearly sixty miles in circumference. The prophet did not, at first, proceed in obedience to the injunction he had received, but foolishly attempted to flee from the presence of the Lord. He took ship to Tarshish; but the Lord sent out a great wind into the sea, and there was a mighty tempest in the sea, so that the ship was like to be broken. The prophet, as the cause of the trouble, was cast into the sea, and swallowed by a monster of the deep, which God had prepared for the purpose, and thus became a type of Christ, who was three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. The prophet, when thrown upon the land, pro-

ceeded to discharge the duties of his commission. He went and preached the preaching God bid him; he began to enter into the city a day's journey, and said—"yet forty days and Ninevah shall be overthrown."

In regard to the *character of the preacher*, we may glean something. He does not seem to have been wanting in courage, physical or moral. Though he had received a perilous commission—to go, an unguarded stranger, into the midst of a great city, and denounce its speedy and utter overthrow, yet he did not falter on this account—did not flee because he feared the consequences to himself, of delivering such a message; but because he thought the Lord might repent him of the evil, and in view of the reformation of the people, spare the devoted city; and, in that case, he would be found a false prophet.

The prophet seems to have been greatly wanting in that compassionate feeling—that true benevolence, which rejoices in the deliverance, and the highest welfare of others. There appears in him a sort of vindictive spirit, insisting that the ruin he had denounced, should be, to the letter, executed. He placed himself in a slightly position, that he might witness that sublime stroke of the Divine justice, which should sweep to destruction all the dwellers in the vast city before him.

And here his petulance comes out. He was greatly displeased; was positively angry; not with his brother, and without a cause, but with his Maker, and for a cause which should have filled his soul with adoration and thankfulness. The prophet, to say the least, was greatly wanting in social amiableness; he seems to have been peevish and sullen; a man of few words, and not all those uttered advisedly.

Much appears in his history, and the development of his character which is inconsistent with true religion. We must believe, however, that he was a good man with many infirmities. He was probably in a back-slidden state: the fact of his attempting to flee from the presence of the Lord, and of his stupidly sleeping in circumstances which constrained even his pagan companions to pray, indicates that he was in such a state. Traits of the good man appear in his prompt confession, his readiness to be sacrificed for the good of the whole, his prayer and ascription of praise from the depth of his trouble.

When we come to the *preaching of Jonah*, we find that there was very little of it; more probably than is recorded; but we have doubtless the substance of it. It was brief, abrupt, sententious, and repetitious. It was altogether in keeping with the morose and taciturn prophet; his iterated cry was,—"Yet forty days and Ninevah shall be overthrown."

The message was one of unmixed, unmitigated severity. It was simple denunciation—a declaration of the Divine purpose to

destroy the guilty city. There appears no revelation of mercy—no intimation or promise that repentance and reformation would avail to avert the threatened doom. It was only, that in a definite time, the place should be destroyed.

The message of the prophet does not appear to have been sustained by any external evidence. So far as we know, God wrought at the time no miracles by the hand of Jonah, as proof that his commission was from above. The people might have had some knowledge of his miraculous deliverance from the belly of the whale, and this have been a sign to them. Still there was nothing directly before their eyes to convince them that God had sent him. How natural that he should have been taken as some wandering lunatic, and so have become the sport of the boys, and been gazed at and jeered at by all. How utterly improbable was the message, according to all the appearances of the case. Who, amongst the people, would believe such words, coming from a stranger having no seal to his commission,—who believe that that great city, protected by an impregnable wall, one hundred feet in height, covered with towers, and those filled with the brave; a city of six hundred thousand inhabitants, at a time when everything was thus secure within, and no menacing foe without, and nothing appeared against it but the voice of this brawling intruder,—who believe, that in forty days it would be overthrown?—Such was the preacher, and the character of the message—both to human view quite unauthoritative and unpromising.

But the effect produced was indeed wonderful. The message, though unattested, was believed by the people; and they put on sackcloth, from the greatest to the least. Even the king came down from his throne, laid aside his robe, covered himself with sackcloth, and sat in ashes; and proclaimed that there should be a fast throughout the land, and that the people cry mightily unto God, and turn every man from his evil way and from the violence that is in his hands. How deep and permanent this repentance was, we do not know. In many instances it may have been to life eternal. But all the people were humbled at the time. The scene is, perhaps without a parallel in history—the king and his subjects clothed in sackcloth, abstaining from food, and calling upon God, if peradventure he will turn from his fierce anger that they perish not. God did regard their cries and their repentance, and forbore to inflict the doom He had pronounced. The result was the continuance of this great city for about a century and a half longer. Their tranquility was thus lengthened out, because they believed the Divine message, and demeaned themselves accordingly.

Are there any points of practical or homiletical instruction, suggested by this ancient preacher and his preaching?

1. It strikes us, in studying this notable case, that the efficacy of



a message does not always depend upon the amount or quantity of it. Jonah's discourse was unquestionably a short one: yet it came with great power upon the minds of the people. It is often the case now, that a few words, fitly spoken, will accomplish what the most labored and extended oratory fails to accomplish; occasionally, the simplest and briefest sentence of truth, uttered, and no more thought of it by the author, becomes the power of God to the salvation of some listening hearer. In this fact we see the wonderful power of God's Word. Such the *doctrinal* inference. It is light; a single ray of it reveals the darkness and recovers the wanderer. It is a fire; a single spark of it commences a moral conflagration; sweeping the wood, the hay, and stubble; resulting in a new creation—a new heavens and a new earth. It is seed; a single grain of it germinates and brings forth a harvest to life everlasting. The *practical* inference is—in the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening withhold not thine hand, for thou knowest not whether shall prosper this or that; or whether they shall be alike good. If it be but a single seed, sow it; if it be but one word, utter it appropriately, and it may prove an arrow in some heart for the great physician to abstract—the preparation and beginning of spiritual health, of life eternal, to some waiting soul.

2. The religious teacher should be careful in his work, to avail himself of the help—the concurrence of conscience. In the language of Paul, let him so speak as to commend himself to every man's conscience in the sight of God. This plainly implies, that every man has a conscience which can be reached and put upon its duty. What the apostle here taught, our sententious preacher had ages before practised. He came straight into the recorder's house, as Bunyan has it, and stirred the sharp and accusing energies of the uncorrupt dweller there. He did not undertake to prove anything; there was not even the shadow of argument in what he said. It was only stark denunciation; no premises; no process. Nothing but the bald and appalling conclusion, that they would all soon perish. But it struck deep, and prostrated and humiliated every soul; because it was authenticated by the inner voice. And shall the preacher now lay aside argument because his hearers have consciences? Certainly not. Paul did not, but *reasoned* with the Jews out of the Scriptures, *proving* that Jesus was Christ. There ever has been reasoning in the pulpit, and there ever must be; if not its artistic forms, its strength and spirit. Unquestionably, the best reasoning for this place, often, and for the ends to be gained, is, to talk rationally—in such a way as to bring out the response of every heart, not utterly perverted, to the truth of what is said. The lips, in compressed sullenness, may refuse to confess; the heart, in its set obduracy, may refuse to relent; God's voice declares it so; and the whole man knows it to be so. Some of the great facts and doctrines which lie at the foundation of the system

of redemption, are so written on the front frame-work of God's administration—written on the face and the whole body and structure of society—written on the imperishable tablets of the very soul of man by the finger of his Maker, that he is an imbruted fool who always needs an argument, and then cannot believe. The fool has said in his heart "there is no God;" and the same sort of fool undertakes to say a good many other things in these last days. But what he says meets voices against it from above and all around—from the book of God, the great book of nature, and the living book of the soul.

3. It is suggested, in this connection, that the preacher should have confidence in the truth he is entrusted with, and should utter it with the strength, and unshrinking and unqualified style of declaration, this confidence begets. The subjunctive mood has rather a small place in the grammar of his sermons. Not, that it *may* be so, but direct and authoritative, it *is* so. Much of this ancient preacher's power, doubtless, was in his bold, unqualified utterance—not *perhaps*, but, in forty days Ninevah shall be overthrown. "But would you not have men modest and cautious? Would you set them to denouncing and dogmatizing; a course very uncharitable and very unlovely."—We would do no such thing; the remark leads to no such thing. John was the beloved disciple; his character the prototype of the mild and gentle. But hear him—"We know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness; and we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us understanding, that we may know him that is true, and we are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life." There are certain things we know, we do not guess; we do not merely believe, we *know* them. When the preacher says so, in the proper tone and spirit, there is no more dogmatism in it, than when it is said, at noon-day, we know the sun is in the meridian, and shining in his strength. He opens the inspired Book and reads it; not as a book of myths and enigmas, but as a book from God; not sent to puzzle and mock him, but as a revelation; all its essential things most plainly written; he reads and takes the clear, the obvious meaning; the meaning the language bears; the meaning all serious readers, of all ages and Christian denominations, have taken; the meaning, all who have believed God, and truly prayed and wrought righteousness, have received and rejoiced in,—and here he finds it, again and again, with all clearness, that the whole world lies in wickedness, the whole race depraved, every member of it in utter moral ruin by transgression—that Christ, the eternal Son, has come to save, that His death was vicarious, and made an atonement, that every one must be born again, be justified by faith in Christ, and sanctified through His truth and Spirit, that there is to be a death and resurrection of the body, a day of judgment at the end of the

world, an eternal blessedness to the righteous, and an eternal punishment to the wicked; when now the preacher comes forth, with God's Book in one hand, unquestionably declaring these things; with God's commission in the other hand, to preach these things, shall he come with apologies, and doubts, and queries; speaking faintly, half-heartedly? No. We believe, therefore we speak. With confidence we speak, for God gives the truth; with authority we speak, for God gives the commission; with earnestness we speak, for infinite interests are at stake.

4. The case before us legitimately assigns a high importance to penalty as a motive in preaching. There is, however, a great deal said against it at the present time; strong efforts are made to raise a prejudice against it. It is sometimes called preaching terror. It is said by many, "we do not hold to this frightening people into religion." And how was it with Jonah? So far as it appears, he preached nothing but terror—utter and speedy ruin, with no indicated way of escape; and the effect was universal and simultaneous—a humbled and reformed nation. It was a true message, written in their very hearts, that they were guilty, and that a fearful retribution was before them; hence the effect these words had upon them.

Punishment, as the desert of sin, and its sure award, is to be preached because it is true—it is in the Bible. If it be not here—if God's statute-book holds not forth penalty—the positive infliction of punishment upon the evil doer, then no statute-book has it; nor can any reach or combination of language get out the idea, that a wicked man shall be punished for his wickedness. But the question comes round: why preach it? Because God reveals it, and commands the utterance. "Preach the preaching I bid thee." Why preach it? Because men are made with fears, and the doctrine in question starts those fears, and stirs up their souls to think about an escape from the impending ruin. There is a part of man's nature, which nothing else will reach—here, of course, a work, nothing else will do. Let the preacher throw away this consideration, this stern feature of truth, this crowning sanction of Heaven, or decline to use it, and his authority, his power, his hold upon godly men goes with it. Preachers do tell us, as matter of experience, that this is the doctrine, this terrible aspect of truth is the one, which awakens the sinner, whenever he is awakened; he begins to consider by beginning to be afraid. It, certainly, cannot be expedient to drop this disturbing element, and hush every whisper of a reckoning to come, as a threatened doom. Then, there is nothing left but promise, and the cry of peace; peace to the wicked—every road ends in heaven—all kinds of conduct alike crowned with glory and blessedness. Will this do? In a world like this, of high-handed wrong, peopled everywhere with the daring and the vile, and where the tendency

of all hearts is to evil, is there a sober man who believes it will do, to blot out penalty and cover up the pit? Then you may do what you please—commit any crime in the long and gory catalogue; only keep clear of human justice, there is no other to fear; and if, perchance, you are too hard-pushed by the human avenger, and are likely to suffer, you can take the friendly steel and open the vital passage, and your imprisoned soul shall go clear, and go up where the Being who rules over all awaits it, and who will open heaven to your blood-stained spirit, and kindly say, “thou persecuted one, come in hither, I will protect you, for I am the friend of liars, and murderers, and adulterers, and all such.” Is God such a being? Is such a message true? Will it do good? Will it restrain men? Will it humble them and make them feel that sinning is bad business, and that sin is an abominable thing, and bring them to repentance, and reform them, and make them holy? There is no need of any words on this point. There is power in fear—in the fear of hell: and ministers must be allowed to preach the doctrine of hell, or all their preaching will be vain and nugatory. Let it be done in the just proportion; above all, let it be with the right spirit—a tender spirit. The denouncing prophet ought to be a weeping prophet; his warnings and uttered woes accompanied with his tears; then will there be a melting and subduing efficacy.

5. We are now brought to the pre-eminence of the gospel as a store-house of influence—a system of reform and redemption. It is perfect—absolutely complete. The gospel does not drop the motive of fear; it keeps it, and adds thereto the motive of hope. The danger abides. Hell is not abolished, but burns still. But the way of escape is opened, and made clear and adequate for all who will go in it. Here are good news; the Saviour come; atonement made; the love beyond degree; the free invitations; the great and precious promises; fields of hidden wealth; pearls of greatest price; unsearchable riches, victories, kingdoms, and crowns of eternal glory—all spread out and attracting, one would think, with resistless force. Here the whole Deity is known; here the whole plan is unfolded; here the whole man is addressed, not one motive, but all motives that can have power on character or conduct, meet and press him. Here the Christian preacher’s privileged position; and what might not we expect now, as the result of his reasonings and appeals? If the one message of wrath bore down those guilty myriads, what will not be the case in these days, when that message of wrath comes strengthened and doubled by the added voice of mercy? If he who spake from earth, was so heard, how will not he be heard, who now speaks from heaven?

It were easy here to turn and charge upon the great mass now living, an unwonted obduracy, hearing the gospel as they do and

still repenting not. "They repented at the preaching of Jonah and, behold, a greater than Jonah is here." They repented under an unmixed message of, condemnation, when they knew not that repentance would avail to deliver them. You have been addressed—have been apprized of the coming ruin, and assured of the full and overflowing redemption; and, yet, you have not repented. They had but a single warning—the same, bare, gloomy iteration—"forty days and ye perish;" and they repented. Ye have had line upon line, precept upon precept, argument linked with argument, motive piled on motive, sermon coursing sermon, for years upon years of Sabbaths, and still have not repented.

And here we strike upon one of the great difficulties of preaching, on these old foundations. It lies in the fact, that preaching has been so long, and frequent, and faithful. Jonah's was a new message; uttered in unaccustomed ears; at the first sound of it, those ears were eager and erect, and those limbs shook with the fear of the coming woe. It was so well adapted, and all so fresh, that the people were arrested and most deeply affected. But, now, truth, which came down divinely arrayed, has grown threadbare from age and use, is cast out and goes begging. The people have had so much of it that they do not care much about it; they have come to hold it very cheap. They, have heard it, till hearing is mere habit, or decency, or ceremony. It has been heard, till it has lost much of its power to interest and amuse the mind. That oft-used phrase—*gospel-hardened*, is, perhaps, rhetorically barbarous, but it is terribly significant—*gospel hardened!* hardened by such an instrument, by such a manifestation, a revelation of love, God's solicitude for the soul, His invitations and earnest wooings to win it, His melting influence upon it, how could these harden but by perversion and resistance? The guilt of such a course, who can tell? And the condemnation, who can describe or indicate its severity and weight?

#### ARTICLE VII.

### SICKNESS IMPROVED.

By REV. JONATHAN BRACE, New Milford, Conn.

*Sickness Improved.* American Sunday School Union, Philadelphia, 1848.

We have been interested, and we hope profited, by the perusal of this little volume. It is intended for the chamber of sickness,—to dispel the gloom which often shrouds that place, by letting in the light of heavenly truth.

We have felt the need, which this book, published by the American Sunday School Union, is fitted to supply. Often have we cast about in vain, for some appropriate evangelical treatise which we might put into the hands of sick and convalescent ones. As trouble is the lot of mortals, as man is born unto it, so is he born to illness. Few there are who have never known what sickness is,—few who have never been taken from their business and pleasures, and prostrated upon a bed of pain; while many of the children of men, are “all their lives long subject” to those “woes, which sickly flesh and shattered nerves impose;” and to such, a volume adapted to their case, will prove a welcome, and by the aid of Divine grace, a blessed visitor. It is not, however, every one who can write such a volume. In addition to other qualifications, the writer must have been himself a patient,—experimentally known what it is to have had “days of illness and wearisome nights appointed unto him,”—have a disciplined spirit, chastened, refined, and exalted by suffering. For the truth which meets the deep yearning wants of a sick chamber, must come from such a chamber. “They breath truth that breath their words in pain.”

“There is a great want,” says the pious McCheyne, “about all Christians, who have not suffered. Some flowers must be broken or bruised, before they emit any fragrance. All the wounds of Christ sent out sweetness,—all the sorrows of Christians do the same. Commend me to a bruised brother, a broken reed,—one like the Son of Man. To me there is something sacred and sweet in all suffering—it is so much akin to the “Man of sorrows.” And we may add, that it is these, these bruised ones, who have acquired experiences which health fails to impart, who are alone qualified to address seasonable words, to those exercised with sickness.

It is a fact, that God’s most devoted people do suffer, and have, from the time that Lazarus—“he whom Christ loved was sick”—until the present hour; nor can it be doubted, that wise and good purposes have been subserved by their sickness. As there is something of good in the worst of men, there are likewise advantages in the worst of evils. No evil is so unmixed as to be without an attendant blessing. A great law of compensation runs throughout the universe. Afflictions and losses have their corresponding returns, are balanced by more or less benefits. This is true of the couch of disease and pain. Even from thence often flows good, and great good to the suffering patient, and to others. There are *advantages of sickness*; and it will comport with the design of this brief article, to mention what these advantages are.

1. God, then, designs by sickness, to reveal to us our true character as sinners.

There would have been no sickness, had there been no sin. Jehovah whose justice is inflexible, and whose benevolence is boundless, would not afflict His innocent creatures. He afflicts not those

angelic intelligences who maintained their allegiance when others rebelled, and are now rejoicing on high. That high and holy order of beings, know not by experience what sickness is, and continuing undefiled, will never know. It is the guilty only who suffer. Trouble is wedded to sin. Hence is our heritage of woe. This our Maker would have us realize, and brings upon us sickness that we may realize. The mere fact that disease fastens itself upon us, and we are bowed under its power, proves conclusively that all respecting us is not right,—that we have sinned, and are obnoxious to Him who hates sin. God intends that we shall acknowledge and feel this fact: and well knowing that when the mind is engrossed with the active concerns of life, we are not in a favorable condition to do it, sends the shaft of sickness, to bring us to our senses and to truth.

2. Sickness, also, naturally leads to self-examination. There is nothing to which mankind are more prone, than to a stupid forgetfulness of themselves. They are so absorbed in making provision for the body, that they cannot be brought to pause in their career, and attend to the interests of their souls. They cannot be made to meditate upon their state as rational and immortal creatures, nor contemplate the solemn relations which connect them to God, their neighbors, and eternity. Fancying that the stream on whose bosom the unthinking multitude are borne rapidly forward, is setting towards the realms of bliss; they pass heedlessly and unconsciously along, deaf to invitations and remonstrances. But when sickness takes hold of them, they are forced to stop. Removed from the busy, tumultuous crowd, from their vices and follies, and confined to the chamber and the couch, the mind naturally turns in upon itself. The man emphatically “comes to himself,”—enters his own heart and sees what is there. He has leisure to do it; business is at a distance. He has facilities for doing it; his dwelling is still and tranquil. He has motives to do it; he knows not what will be the issue of his sickness. How many can attest the benefit of illness to them in this particular! There is nothing like it, to make one acquainted with his real condition. A person learns more about himself during a few weeks of sickness,—so this sickness is not so severe as to lock up his mental faculties in inactivity,—than he ever knew before. He enquires as to the nature of his past feelings, and how he came thus to feel; what has been the character of his past conduct, and how he came to behave thus;—and what is likely to become of him, if the icy hand of death, following that of disease, should touch, chill, and consume his vitals. The silent, solitary, sick-room, is of all places and schools the best, to learn that hallowing wisdom embraced in the adage, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*.

3. Sickness likewise shows us, how frail and dependent we are.

When in perfect health, the sinews knit in strength, the nerves strung harmoniously, the blood coursing the veins with an easy,

placid flow, and the entire frame robust and vigorous, we are insensible to our actual weakness. We forget that "our breath is in our nostrils;" that we are "crushed before the moth,"—that the veriest trifle may disorder our tabernacles, put these cunningly-formed instruments out of tune, and make them send forth discord and groans. We are apt to think that "our mountain stands strong, and that we shall never, and can never be moved." But when a penitential blast passes over us, our sinews become relaxed, and our blood creeps so sluggishly as apparently to stagnate or drives so furiously along its channels as to rack and tear the system; when the pulse beats high, the heated temple throbs, and the feverish tongue gives an uncertain, unpalatable taste to everything it touches; then we feel differently—our staff is broken, and our presumption is gone. The languor and agonies of illness, convince us of our frailty,—that we are indeed feeble, impotent mortals.

At such a time, too, we feel how utterly dependent we are. How dependent we are upon God, as the Author and Preserver of life,—the Being "in whom," as inspiration most significantly expresses it, "we live, and move, and have our being;" the Being who can any instant recall our breath, "change our countenances," and convert us into a corpse. How dependent also upon our fellow creatures; for what more helpless and pitiable than a sick man! No matter how proud he was when in health, how haughty his bearing, how elastic his step, how in all respects self-sufficient; let but torturing, excruciating, prostrating disease seize him, and lay him low; and he sues for the compassion and kindness of the most illiterate and the meanest. "Ay," says Cassius of Cæsar, when in such a situation:

"Ay, and that tongue of his, that bade the Romans  
Mark him, and write his speeches in their books.  
Alas! it cried, *give me some drink*, Titinius,  
*As a sick girl*."

Yes, Cæsar, the noble Cæsar, *sick*—"that eye of his, whose bend did awe the world, lost its lustre," and that muscular arm of his, which swayed the sceptre of empire over trembling millions, a child might govern!

A sick fellow mortal is the weakest of the weak, and in the hour of his weakness, he must be obliged to others, yes, *obliged* to them for their assistance, or die. It is good for man to feel this dependence. It is good for him to feel that his sufficiency is not of himself,—that he needs "under him the everlasting arms;" that he requires too, his neighbor's services, and must so conduct, as that in the day of trial, he can have those services. The tie of dependence binds man to man. It is a chain of sympathy. In sickness we know the worth of friends. Gold may purchase attentions—for gold in such a world as this, is almost omnipotent—but gold cannot purchase genuine love; a love which delights in self-denials to make you happy. Gold will purchase medicines, and the nurse's care; but as that nurse lifts the draught to your lips, you know that



the cup is brought there, not by friendship, but by the hope of gain; that he or she who tenders it, cares less for you, than for your money; that it is "all hire and salary," not ardent, unadulterated affection. And the difference between the feelings of a recipient in the two cases, is heaven-wide; as he who has been sick at home, and among friends, and away from home, and in a land of strangers, can bear witness.

4. Sickness, further, softens the heart, quickens the sensibilities, and often endears us to others, and others to us. It softens the heart—makes us feel more keenly for the sufferings of others. It quickens the sensibilities,—makes us more alive to the woes of humanity, and more cheerfully and bountifully to realize these woes.

Beautifully has Virgil expressed the connection between personal discipline of grief, and deep heartfelt sympathy for others.

Me quoque per multos similis fortuna labores  
Jactatam, hæc demum voluit consistere terrâ.  
Non ignara mali, miseris succurrere disco.

*ÆN.* 1. 628.

For I myself like you have been distressed,  
Till heaven afforded me this place of rest:  
Like you, an alien in a land unknown,  
I learn to pity woes so like my own.

DRYDEN

Who is the person that is usually the most ready to sympathize with the sick poor? Is it not he who has been sick? Who is he, who on meeting with one sick, abroad,—in his travels—a fellow passenger perhaps,—interests himself most in his case,—sees that he has suitable accommodations, and wants nothing to make him well again? Who, but he who knows what it is thus to suffer in such a place? Yes, it is these once afflicted ones, who like the good Samaritan, "bind up the bleeding wounds of the stranger, pouring in oil and wine;" take care of him; and if he is unable to pay the host, like the same good Samaritan, open their purses, and defray every expense.

And who so well calculated to minister in the chamber of suffering,—“a ministering angel, when pain and anguish wring the brow”—as he who has lain in such a chamber during a long and tedious sickness? Such an one knows what to do for the patient. With numberless little nameless soothing things, of which others are ignorant, he is familiarly acquainted. Such an one knows how to prepare refreshments, smooth the pillow, anoint the aching limb, raise the drooping head, and bathe the burning forehead. And how often do these kind offices add new strength to the bonds of consanguinity, and unite those in fellowship who before were separated? What so attaches a person to you, as his devotion to you in your sickness? Nothing. Nothing more endears one to us, than to have him show a friendly heart and hand, when we are repressed and laid aside, suffering under bodily disease. By being able to

say of one, "I was sick and he visited me," has been the commencement of a friendship which has gone on ripening to the grave.

There is something too, in the sick one, which makes him loved by those who wait upon him. We dislike to feel that we are throwing away our time and care upon a worthless object, and so we invest the individual for whose comfort we expend time and care to contribute, with a worth and good qualities, which perhaps he does not possess. Leighton observes, "that God hath many sharp cutting instruments and rough files, for the polishing of his jewels; and those he especially esteems, and means to make the most resplendent, he has oftenest his tools upon:"—and when we behold one subjected to the action of these instruments, by the appointment unto him of pain and debility, wearisome days and nights;—*we* also "esteem" him, as a chosen and refined one—a "jewel."

Which child is to the mother most dear? Is it not that delicate, feeble one, that little patient sufferer, whom she has nursed during years of solicitude? Yes, he is the darling of the flock; the lamb whom not the fond parent only, but all the members of the family, commend and delight to cherish.

Nor let it be thought that these benefits of sickness are small,—too unimportant to be mentioned. It is not so. Anything which softens such hearts as ours, and makes keen such blunted sensibilities as ours, and leads us to commiserate and befriend our species, is not unimportant. It is not unimportant to be able to impart consolation by language which goes right to the heart, when others are silent, or speak to no purpose; and administer relief when others know not what to do. It is desirable, very desirable, in a world of trouble,—a world where we are not isolated beings, but parts of a whole whose happiness should be dear to us;—to be able to exclaim with Paul, "Who is weak, and I am not weak." So to do, is not only humane, but Christ-like—divine. For it is one of the most pleasing and striking features in the achievement of redemption, that the eternal Son of God, who wrought out that redemption, became "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief,"—put himself on a level with us in this particular, "took upon him our infirmities, and bore our sicknesses;" that thus he might sympathize with us from having himself suffered. "Forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; for it behooved him in all things to be made like to his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, He is able to succor them that are tempted." This companionship of Jesus in the woes of suffering humanity, peculiarly fits Him to enter into their trials, and impart all needed consolation.

And he whose breast is easily moved with pity, has something heavenly in it, something which allies its possessor to that Saviour who once trod this vale of sorrow, and who, though now on the throne of the universe, is "touched with the feeling of our infirmities."

5. Sickness, too, shows us the utter emptiness of the world.

It is natural for man, a wanderer and exile from God, to seek for that happiness which his immortal nature demands in the world; and he is slow to believe that the world is incapable of affording that which is the object of his search. It is, however, utterly inadequate and empty; and this, disease preying upon our bodies, effectually teaches. What to him whose "trembling house of clay, languor and disease invade,"—what to him is the whole pantheon of idols which the world worships? Can those vain amusements in which he once indulged, tranquilize his mind? Can riches bribe disease to extract its sting? Or can human applause cause him to forget his anguish? Oh no. He now sees pleasures, wealth, and fame, undisguised,—as they are. He sees that they are impotent, unsatisfactory, and perishable; that in the day of adversity, the incursions of illness, they cannot deliver; that miserable comforters *then*, are they all. How silly, to him who is stretched upon the couch of pain, sinking with debility, and apparently drawing near to death; how silly to him do the multitude appear, who are panting after earthly objects? If in a city, as the hum of business is borne upwards from the street through the windows of his chamber, it falls on his ears as the hum of folly. He regards the eager, anxious crowd, as a collection of children, laying up their toys and treasures with great care upon the margin of the beach at ebb-tide, forgetting that the waters will soon flow again, and sweep their vanities and themselves away.

6. It enables us likewise to appreciate the value of religion.

It is the beauty and glory of the religion of Christ, that it fails not when all things else fail; or rather, that when all things else fail as sources of comfort and support, its abundance and richness are for the first time fully realized. It is in sickness, that he who in health scoffed at religion, feels the want of it. He now needs something which the world could never give, and even what the world could once give, is now gone from him. When human arms fail him, he needs a super-human arm to bear him up. When the skill of human physicians is baffled, he needs the Divine physician. When the earth rolls from under his feet, he needs "the skies on which to fasten his hand." When the storm rages and beats, he needs the revealed hiding-place for a covert and a shelter. When a violent malady suddenly seizes and enfeebles us, the consciousness of being reconciled to God, and having His favor, is a blessing for which nothing can be substituted. To be sick, and know that we are "those whom Christ loveth," is in a sense to be well.

It is in dangerous sickness, especially, that He "manifests himself unto His disciples as He doth not unto the world," breaks the natural sympathy between their debilitated suffering bodies and their minds, revives the remembrance of His precious promises and past tokens of His love, and makes celestial visions to throng around their pillows. Then it is, that the Christian feels God's distinguishing kindness towards him, in converting him from the error of his ways, justifying him by His grace, and sealing him by His Spirit. Then he finds "godliness to be indeed profitable for the life which now is," receives the benefit of a close walk with his Creator, and enjoys the luxury of an approving conscience.

7. In sickness also, Christians often glorify God, and are made the instruments of much good.

Many careless, unbelieving ones have received their first serious impressions from viewing the deportment of devoted Christians in the season of illness. In the humility and cheerful submission of these pious ones, in their spirituality, strong confidence, and lively joy; the impenitent have seen something which they had not, and which they were sensible that they wanted and must have. Thus have multitudes been "chosen in the furnace of" others' "afflictions,"—there had their attention arrested, their hearts touched and changed, and their "affections set on things above." Many trembling timid believers too, have been cheered and animated in their heavenly course, by the sight of their brethren sustained under severe bodily pains by the truths of their common religion. "They know" anew "in whom they have believed,"—are convinced that their foundation is sure, and that the same grace, the signal triumphs of which they now witness, will not be withheld from them, when placed in similar circumstances. Thus in the sickness of Christians, as in that of Lazarus, is "the Son of Man glorified," truth established, and religion honored. Thus does sickness "yield the peaceable fruits of righteousness," to other than "those who are exercised thereby."

8. Nor must we fail to mention another advantage of sickness; viz.: that it makes us more highly to prize health.

"Blessings brighten as they take their flight;" and it is not till sickness is experienced that health is valued. Our common mercies too often cease to be considered mercies, because they are common. He whose teeth are sound thinks not of his teeth, and he whose eye-sight is perfect thinks not of his eyes. The absence of all trouble respecting them, and all sensations except that of constant pleasure, makes them unheeded. So with health. It is he who has been an invalid, alone, who properly appreciates it. A short respite from pain awakens in his breast emotions of gratitude; and it is to him that nature is decked with charms, by others unseen, who for weeks and months has been shut out from beholding them by the walls of a sick-room. With what feelings does

such an one walk abroad for the first time after his illness! All nature is music to the ear, and fragrance to the sense. The smiling sun makes him smile. "The arched sky, expanding his soul into sublimity, lifts it up to the great Spirit; and his heart leaps with impulses wild and glad, as he looks over the swelling hills and sloping vales of the earth, sees the trees waving their foliage, and inhales the balm with which the cool wind comes charged. It is the *convalescent* one; whose bosom a glow of thankfulness pervades; and it is he who when well once more, carefully avoids those excesses and exposures which would bring on sickness again.

9. And to mention but one other advantage of sickness,—it endears unto the Christian, heaven.

There, we are told, "the inhabitants shall not say I am sick." This, the Christian believes; and, as he lies upon his couch of distress, "faith brings that better world to view," and makes it more desirable and delightful from contrast. Here, there may be darkness, but there, light; here, restlessness, but there, ease; here, distraction, but there, peace; here, tears, but there, "sorrow and sighing flee away;" here, clouds and storms, but there, the genial rays of the Sun of Righteousness shine constantly and always.

To return to the volume which has suggested these remarks; it has two divisions; *thoughts in sickness, and during convalescence*. We know not the author, but he wields a graceful pen, has been comforted in sickness, and now would "comfort others with the comfort wherewith he himself hath been comforted of God." With an extract from the second division of the book, which will give some idea of its style and matter, we close our article.

"The Master having raised thee up, calleth thee to return to that little flock, the Sunday-School, from which sickness has separated you so long, and, there, as an evidence of your love to Him, to feed his lambs, and though thou dost but follow in "the footsteps of the flock," far behind most of thy companions, yet, if thou art diligently and faithfully following, the kind Shepherd will often "pass that way," and grant thee an approving smile. Delightful work to sow the good seed in so susceptible a soil—to devise ingenious plans to arrest and fix attention, and to study the best forms of presenting divine truth to the tender mind. Yet, even here, there are discouragements, and these must be sustained by the promise, that "they that sow in tears shall reap in joy," and that though a Paul plant and an Apollos water, it is God that giveth the increase.

Indeed, obey *quickly* the summons to any new duty; and not only engage in it with alacrity, but endeavor to economize time, in order to have more to spend in the immediate service of thy Saviour. Not merely giving what thou canst conveniently spare of any of the talents committed to thee, but with an ardent gratitude consecrating ALL to Christ. Continually looking for

opportunities of doing good, many will be thereby found which would be otherwise overlooked.

Go, and endeavor to deserve the appellation which Christ gave His disciples when he said, "Ye are the light of the world." Reflect how much is comprehended in this metaphor, and feel how great a responsibility resteth upon thee. Go, and "be faithful unto death," that thou mayest receive "a crown of life."

pp. 85, 90.

Kind and wise counsel to one, brought up by Divine grace from a bed of sickness. And did our limits permit, we would gladly make other quotations from a book, whose contents are the natural gushings of a smitten heart.

#### ARTICLE VIII.

### AN ANALYSIS OF ECCLESIASTES.

By REV. JAMES M. MACDONALD, Jamaica, L. I.

#### *Subject.*

THE vanity, on the supposition that there is no hereafter, of life and the present world; or the insufficiency of the world to afford happiness, if men are without religion. The Preacher proposes this subject at the outset, as a sort of text, repeats it and refers to it, in every part, and formally re-announces it at the close.

#### *Management of the Discourse.*

As to the management of the discourse, there are two things worthy of distinct notice as giving it its peculiar character. 1. The Preacher constantly refers to his own *experience*. Solomon was not a misanthrope, disappointed in his attempts to obtain worldly happiness, but a rich and powerful king, who had made trial of the most costly pleasures. The Book was undoubtedly written late in life, after he had been drawn from his allegiance to God, by idolatrous women (I. Kings 11: 1-14 and 23-40), and may be regarded, like the fifty-first Psalm of David, as his standing confession, which, in consideration of his eminent position and grievous fall, it is the will of God should be read in the church over the whole world and to the latest ages. Let those who would find some license or apology for their sins in the sad defections of Solomon, and his more illustrious father, behold these royal transgressors, as they stand daily in the church, penitently confessing and deploring their folly. 2. It is in the main what

may be styled a *hypothetical* discourse; i. e., he seems to admit the monstrous doctrine of the infidel, or the implied position of the thoughtless worldling, whose conduct is an emphatic disavowal of belief in a future state, and then employs the *argumentum ex absurdo* with overwhelming effect: "all is vanity," or all would, indeed, be vanity if there be no hereafter, if life has no higher end than sensual and worldly pleasure. When Solomon says, "vanity of vanities, all is vanity," it is not his object to disparage temporal blessings, or to advance a doctrine different from that of another inspired writer, that "every creature of God is good and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving, being sanctified by the word of God and prayer" (1. Tim. 4: 4, 5); but he means to answer the question, "Hast thou made all men in vain?" (Ps. 89: 47) affirmatively—he means that even the creation of the world itself was a signal blunder, if there be no state of retribution to succeed the present. But let us proceed with our proposed analysis.

*The subject announced.*—Ch. 1: 1, 2.

<sup>1</sup> The words of the Preacher, the son of David, king of Jerusalem. <sup>2</sup> Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities! all is vanity.

As Solomon was the only son of David who was king of Jerusalem, he is here as distinctly pointed out as the author of this sermon, as if his name had been given. We have a king for a preacher, and his discourse is worthy of his reputation for wisdom. HENRY shrewdly suggests, that while he conceals his name, because of the reproach which his sins had brought on himself, his kingdom and the cause of his God, he refers to his parentage and his office, as greatly aggravating his wicked conduct. The second verse is the text; it contains the proposition which the royal preacher proceeds to establish, illustrate, and apply, in this discourse, viz.:

THAT ON THE SUPPOSITION OF THERE BEING NO FUTURE STATE, TO WHICH THIS IS TO BE REGARDED AS BUT PRELIMINARY, THE WHOLE SCENE OF HUMAN AFFAIRS IS NOTHING MORE THAN A VAIN AND EMPTY SHOW, AND THE CREATION OF THE WORLD, AND OF MAN, MUST BE PRONOUNCED A BLIND MISCARRIAGE.

*Introduction.*—Ch. 1: 4-11.

<sup>4</sup> One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth for ever. <sup>5</sup> The sun also, ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose. <sup>6</sup> The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits. <sup>7</sup> All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full: unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again. <sup>8</sup> All things are full of labour; man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing. <sup>9</sup> The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done, is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. <sup>10</sup> Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new?

it hath been already of old time, which was before us. "There is no remembrance of former things; neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after.

We have here a graceful and exceedingly appropriate introduction—appropriate, because it bears directly upon the main position laid down as the basis of this discourse. If the principles of Rhetoric require that unity should be preserved throughout, in the introduction as well as in other parts of a discourse, we have them exemplified here. From the full soul of the Preacher there comes, at the first opening of his lips, a burst of eloquence, not for display, or merely to arrest attention, but which agrees admirably with the argument; nay, which seems to suggest the method by which it is conducted, in the body of the discourse. In this respect, it is one of the happiest models which modern preachers can study.

He looks upon the stage of human action, and sees generation follow generation,

"Like shadows o'er the plain,"

and asks, what purpose, if this be the only stage on which these beings are to appear, worthy of their creation, or of the toil and suffering to which they are subjected, is answered? The earth which abideth for ever is but a great theatre, where this empty pageant—this mock tragedy—is to be enacted without end. He glances at the vast machinery of the universe; the sun making his daily and annual course through the heavens; the wind veering from point to point of the compass; the rivers coursing through almost every valley of the earth; the ocean ebbing and flowing, and sending up its exhalations to supply the rills and mighty streams which feed, but never fill it: "All things are full of labor; man cannot utter it." And age after age the same thing is enacted over and over again;—nothing new. If it be but a theatrical show, got up and maintained at so vast an expense, why not, like players, change the scene? why this dull uniformity? But who can believe that God created this great universe; lighted up that mighty sun to rise and set, to go from tropic to tropic; bespangled the heavens with stars; channelled out the rivers; set to the heaving ocean its bounds; and gave ordinances to the shifting wind, only to build and embellish a splendid stage, on which poor, short-lived men, generation after generation, might labor, and struggle, and die? or only to erect a stately mausoleum for entombed and annihilated nations? Is this universe such an aimless thing, and its Maker so blind a trifler?

*Arg. 1. The vanity of great learning if man be not immortal.—*  
Ch. 1: 12–18.

<sup>12</sup> I the Preacher was king over Israel in Jerusalem <sup>13</sup> And I gave my heart to



seek and search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven : this sore travail hath God given to the sons of man to be exercised therewith. <sup>14</sup> I have seen all the works that are done under the sun ; and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit. <sup>15</sup> That which is crooked cannot be made straight ; and that which is wanting cannot be numbered. <sup>16</sup> I communed with mine own heart, saying, Lo, I am come to great estate, and have gotten more wisdom than all they that have been before me in Jerusalem : yea, my heart had great experience of wisdom and knowledge. <sup>17</sup> And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly : I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit. <sup>18</sup> For in much wisdom is much grief ; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.

By "wisdom" the Preacher here means knowledge. He excelled in learning all his predecessors in Jerusalem ; he excelled, too, all the literati of Egypt (I. Kings 4 : 30), a country which boasted of being the mother of the arts and sciences. In addition to the wisdom contained in his thousands of proverbs and his songs, he paid great attention to natural science ; for he "spake of the trees, from the cedar-tree that is in Lebanon even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall ; he spake also of beasts, and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes" (I. Kings 4 : 33). Such was his reputation for learning, that all the kings of the earth sent their learned men to be instructed by him. In answer to Solomon's prayer, God gave him a wise and understanding heart. He gave him "wisdom and understanding exceeding much, and largeness of heart, even as the sand that is on the sea-shore" (I. Kings 4 : 29). He was, moreover, a most diligent student ; he gave the closest application of mind to the investigation of difficult and curious subjects. He possessed great original talents, and he faithfully improved the advantages for mental cultivation which his station and wealth conferred upon him. "The Preacher was king." If great learning be sufficient, of itself, to make men happy, Solomon, who tried the experiment on a magnificent and royal scale, must have been the happiest of men. But what does he say ? "Behold all is vanity and vexation of spirit." He found problems, as all other philosophers still do, which set at defiance the wisdom of the wisest. His knowledge was not sufficient to enable him to correct the many political evils and social defects, even within his own dominions, which arise from the corruption of human nature. And, if we adopt the theory of the avowed skeptic, or practical atheist, then all his study only served to convince him that the whole scene of human affairs is but a paltry pageant, rendered gorgeous and imposing by the sublime works and magnificent arrangements of an almighty Architect. Well might a philosopher weep, and aver that in much wisdom is much grief, if death be the end of man ; if the result of all his studies be that the world is but a great charnel-house, and the business of scholars only to interpret its curious devices and decorations. Hence it appears that science is not only insufficient to produce happiness, but if there be no hereafter, it becomes a source of pain to those who make the greatest attainments in it.

## 2. *The insufficiency of luxury and worldly splendor to yield true happiness.*—Ch. 2: 1-17.

<sup>1</sup> I said in my heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth; therefore enjoy pleasure: and behold, this also is vanity. <sup>2</sup> I said of laughter, It is mad; and of mirth, What doeth it? <sup>3</sup> I sought in my heart to give myself unto wine, yet acquainting my heart with wisdom; and to lay hold on folly, till I might see what was that good for the sons of men, which they should do under the heaven all the days of their life. <sup>4</sup> I made me great works; I builded me houses; I planted me vineyards; <sup>5</sup> I made me gardens and orchards, and I planted trees in them of all kind of fruits; <sup>6</sup> I made me pools of water, to water therewith the wood that bringeth forth trees; <sup>7</sup> I got me servants and maidens, and had servants born in my house: also I had great possessions of great and small cattle above all that were in Jerusalem before me; <sup>8</sup> I gathered me also silver and gold, and the peculiar treasure of kings, and of the provinces; I gat me men-singers and women-singers, and the delights of the sons of men, as musical instruments, and that of all sorts. <sup>9</sup> So I was great, and increased more than all that were before me in Jerusalem; also my wisdom remained with me. <sup>10</sup> And whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them, I withheld not my heart from any joy; for my heart rejoiced in all my labour; and this was my portion of all my labour. <sup>11</sup> Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do; and behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun. <sup>12</sup> And I turned myself to behold wisdom, and madness, and folly; for what can the man do that cometh after the king? even that which has been already done. <sup>13</sup> Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light excelleth darkness. <sup>14</sup> The wise man's eyes are in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness; and I myself perceived also that one event happeneth to them all. <sup>15</sup> Then said I in my heart, As it happeneth to the fool, so it happeneth even to me; and why was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also is vanity. <sup>16</sup> For there is no remembrance of the wise more than of the fool for ever; seeing that which now is in the days to come shall all be forgotten. And how dieth the wise man? as the fool. <sup>17</sup> Therefore, I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me: for all is vanity and vexation of spirit.

He leaves the study for the gay world. "He adjourns," as Henry, with great elegance observes, "out of the library, the laboratory, the council-chamber, into the park and the play-house, his garden and summer-house; exchanges the company of the philosophers and grave senators, for that of the wits and gallants, and the beaux esprits of his court, to try if he could find true satisfaction among them." v. 1, 2.

He pushes the experiment, and proceeds from the pleasures of the fancy to luxury. He tried the exhilaration of the wine-cup, still acquainting his heart with wisdom; i. e., he made use of his knowledge that he might discover whether the chief good was to be found by the sons of men in the indulgence of the lower appetites, v. 3. He next proceeded to build him palaces, to lay out gardens, orchards, and vineyards, to dig artificial lakes, and build superb reservoirs; he increased his retinue, his flocks, and herds, and amassed imperial treasures of silver and gold, and employed bands of musicians, and choirs of singers, that as he and his gay courtiers wandered through the gardens and the groves, or reclined to enjoy the delicious coolness of the fountains, or were bathing in the pools, their ears might be regaled with the choicest music. What a picture of oriental luxury! Few, if

any of our modern Epicureans, can ever hope to equal this princely style of life. Nothing was wanting that the most consummate art could furnish. "Whatever mine eyes desired I kept not from them; I withheld not my heart from any joy." But what was the result of the experiment? Listen to the sad response, wailed out from every vista of his enchanting bowers; VANITY AND VEXATION OF SPIRIT, vv. 4-11.

The Preacher is next led to compare earthly splendor and luxury with learning, as independent sources of happiness, and to give the preference to the latter. He concludes that a man who has knowledge and a cultivated intellect is better off than one who has palaces and pleasure-grounds, and all the luxuries of wealth at his command, who is at the same time destitute of knowledge. But although knowledge is better than something else, it is not the chief good; he still adheres to his former conclusion, that, if there be no future state, learning is a most vain thing. There is but little difference between a wise man and a fool, if death be the end of both; and he might well be sick of life, if its highest aim be to increase that knowledge which can only serve to strengthen the conviction that he must shortly sink into the same oblivion as the ignorant slave, or an infant which knows not its right hand from its left, vv. 12-17.

• 3. *The vanity of a life of activity, and successful worldly enterprises, without a revealed religion.*—Ch. 2: 18-26.

<sup>18</sup> Yea, I hated all my labour which I had taken under the sun; because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me. <sup>19</sup> And who knoweth whether he shall be a wise man or a fool? yet shall he have rule over all my labour wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have shewed myself wise under the sun. This is also vanity. <sup>20</sup> Therefore I went about to cause my heart to despair of all the labour which I took under the sun. <sup>21</sup> For there is a man whose labour is in wisdom, and in knowledge, and in equity, yet to a man that hath not laboured therein shall he leave it for his portion. This also is vanity and a great evil. <sup>22</sup> For what hath man of all his labour, and of the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath laboured under the sun? <sup>23</sup> For all his days are sorrows, and his travail grief; yea, his heart taketh not rest in the night. This is also vanity. <sup>24</sup> There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink, and that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labour. This also I saw, that it was from the hand of God. <sup>25</sup> For who can eat, or who else can hasten hereunto more than I? <sup>26</sup> For God giveth to a man that is good in his sight, wisdom, and knowledge, and joy; but to the sinner he giveth travail, to gather and to heap up, that he may give to him that is good before God. This also is vanity and vexation of spirit.

No matter how enterprising a man may be in his business, it must greatly embitter his gratification, when he reflects that he "toils for heirs he knows not who." His children, without any restraints of religion, may squander in dissipation what he lays up for them, and thus his estates soon pass into the hands of strangers, or perhaps of enemies. Some Rehoboam, who does not inherit the enterprising spirit or the sagacity of his father, may so manage affairs, that another, who has had no labor therein, shall seize the

inheritance for his portion, vv. 18-21. Besides, what a life of vexation does that man lead who is immersed in the perplexities of trade, who plans, and toils, that he may have the name of possessing great wealth! "All his days are sorrows, and his travail grief; *yea, his heart taketh not rest in the night.*" What a life-like picture! There is many a man on "Change" or the busy wharves, or in the more quiet counting-room, who needs no commentary on the meaning of these words. And is this all the happiness within the reach of mortals? this the *summum bonum*? this the only paradise known to the creed of the infidel, or the hopes of the thoughtless sensualist? What emphasis, then, have the Preacher's words, *THIS IS ALSO VANITY*, vv. 22, 23.

Wealth has its uses. It is a blessing, when properly used, and no more to be despised than learning, the fine arts, the refined pleasures of elegant society, or the lawful gratification of our senses. "God giveth to a man that is good in his sight (a pious man), wisdom, and knowledge, and joy." He may find good in every thing. Money is also "from the hand of God;" and the servant of God should employ it with a grateful heart, in supplying his daily wants, and those of others dependent on him, and in furnishing food and the bread of life to such as are ready to perish. But to the sinner, who makes gold his god, and lives as if there were no heavenly treasures to be secured, it is a great curse; and, in due time, God, whose are the silver and the gold, will wrest it from the hands of all such, and commit it to those who will use it for His glory, vv. 24-26.

4. *The vicissitudes of the world prove how inadequate it is as a portion, to make men truly happy.*—Ch. 3: 1-15.

<sup>1</sup> To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven.

<sup>2</sup> A time to be born, and a time to die;

A time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted.

<sup>3</sup> A time to kill, and a time to heal;

A time to break down, and a time to build up.

<sup>4</sup> A time to weep, and a time to laugh;

A time to mourn, and a time to dance.

<sup>5</sup> A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together;

A time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing.

<sup>6</sup> A time to get, and a time to lose;

A time to keep, and a time to cast away.

<sup>7</sup> A time to rend, and a time to sew;

A time to keep silence, and a time to speak.

<sup>8</sup> A time to love, and a time to hate;

A time of war, and a time of peace.

<sup>9</sup> What profit hath he that worketh in that wherein he laboureth? <sup>10</sup> I have seen the travail, which God hath given to the sons of men, to be exercised in it.

<sup>11</sup> He hath made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end. <sup>12</sup> I know that there is no good in them, but for a man to rejoice, and do good in his life. <sup>13</sup> And also that every man should eat and drink, and enjoy the good of all his labour; it is the gift of God. <sup>14</sup> I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it: and God doeth it, that men should fear before him. <sup>15</sup> That which hath been is now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God requireth that which is past.

\* Human history is full of sudden antitheses ; nothing is fixed, nothing stable. Human society is like the ocean on whose inquiet bosom, the light glances from point to point, in ever ceaseless change. Men love and hate ; they go to war and then make peace. A period of union is succeeded by one of disunion ; a season of silence by one of clamor. Fortunes are amassed, and then lost ; some hold their possessions with an avaricious grasp ; others squander them with a prodigal hand. We weep, and then laugh ; we mourn, and then rejoice. We demolish, and then build up ; the friend whom we had learned to trust, proves false. What we have labored to plant with great pains, is ruthlessly plucked up. Now prosperity reigns, and then the earth is desolated with judgments. We scarcely begin to live, before we begin to die. And dost thou look for happiness, O vain man, to such an inconstant world as this ? Will the fairest inheritance here, where there is so much change, if you have nothing in reversion beyond, satisfy your soul ? vv. 1—8.

These changes are not the result of mere accident, or because the Governor of the universe has left the world to itself. They constitute the travail, which God has given to the sons of men to be exercised therein. This is the moral discipline which he has instituted. So religion teaches. But if we despise its light, whither shall we look for comfort, tossed to and fro, as we are, upon this inquiet and often tempestuous sea ? What madness there is in skepticism and irreligion ! O tell me not that we are adrift like floating sea-weed, or sailors on the splintered spars of a wreck, without helm, compass, or chart. God reigns. His hand is in our very reverses ; "He hath made everything beautiful in his time." Trials do not mar the divine picture ; they constitute its darker shades, and are not only essential to its perfection, but to the picture itself. The painter must make as much use of shadow, as of light, in his wonderful art ; it is the shadow by which he brings out the light, and gives outline and proportion to the objects on which his pencil is employed. If every part of some admired painting were concealed from our view, but certain dark clouds belonging to it, we should certainly discover nothing to awaken our admiration ; and so if we see not the complete beauty of Providence, by reason of the vicissitudes and sorrows to which we are at present subject, it is because "we see but parts of one extended whole." Events must be contemplated in their tendencies, relations, and seasons, and by the light of Divine Revelation, in order to understand how God hath made everything beautiful in its time. This the rejecters of revelation, and all who live without God in the world, fail to do ; and hence the course of Providence is an enigma to them. They cannot find out the work of God. And even of the believer it may be true, that he cannot "find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end ;" but he has never-

theless learned to refer all to His hand, to acquiesce in His will, and to wait until the mystery is cleared up in the light of eternity. He has learned not only to be satisfied with his lot, but to rejoice in it, whatever it may be; amidst this scene of uncertainty to maintain his cheerfulness, to "eat and drink and enjoy the good of all his labor;" assured that all the allotments of Divine Providence, have reference to a future and immortal state, where, to all who have learned in the present, to fear the Lord, all enigmas will be solved, and all knots untied. To murmur against Providence will not alter the course of God's government. The changes to which we are exposed are no new thing; they are the means in part which He of old hath used to wean His creatures from earth, and fit them for heaven. vv. 9—15.

*5. Civil Government and Jurisprudence cannot, independently of revealed religion, heal the disorders of the world, or divest it of its vanity, as the portion of the soul.—Ch. 3: 16, 17.*

"And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there. <sup>17</sup> I said in my heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked: for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work.

It was very natural for Solomon, who was a king and judge, to glance at this subject. Some might be ready to contend that when the science of laws and government was better understood, and more faithfully applied, those social evils which render an earthly portion so vain, would be corrected. But he avers that without the influence of a Divine religion, there will be corruption in the seat of judgment, and iniquity will coil itself up in the very place of righteousness. Men who betake themselves to magistrates and courts of justice, for redress, shall only receive greater wrong. Judges must be made to feel, that they must give account in the day of judgment to the great Judge of all men. It is a sense of their responsibility to God alone, which can make them faithful to their obligations to men. They are mere dreamers who expect that Literature, the Fine Arts, Polite Manners, or the more stringent arm of Courts, and Parliaments, will so mend this crazy fabric, shattered and scathed by sin, as to take off the reproach of vanity that now rests upon it.

*6. Men who discard religion, and live in utter disregard of their immortality, have no pre-eminence above the beasts that perish.—Ch. 3: 18—22.*

"I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and they might see that they themselves are beasts. <sup>19</sup> For the which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast; for all is vanity. <sup>20</sup> All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. <sup>21</sup> Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth? <sup>22</sup> Where-

fore I perceive that there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoice in his own works; for that is his portion: for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?

The Preacher wished that it might be made manifest to the sons of men, that in living as if there were no hereafter, they reduced themselves to a level with the brute creation. If there be no immortality, and men are justified in living as if their only portion were here below, then the life of a man is of hardly more value than that of a beast, and his death hardly more to be considered. They both go to one place; they return to dust and that is the end of them. If we admit no knowledge but that which the boasted reason of man discovers; if we give the lie to God's Word, then who knows, and who can tell us whither the spirit takes its mysterious flight, when it forsakes this earthly tabernacle? Solomon proves, by implication, that unbelievers, and sensual and worldly-minded men, who love this world supremely, have not so good a claim to happiness, as the very beasts who are destitute of reason, and therefore exempt from the forebodings of evil, and the vexations of life, and are not amenable to that account to which God will hold all intelligent creatures. He gives the great doctrine of Immortality its proper place. It is this more than Reason which gives to man his pre-eminence above a beast. Life is of no value, nay it becomes a curse, if there be no hereafter, for which we may become prepared by the fear of God.

Τί μοι τὸ ὄφελος; εἰ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται.—I. Cor. 15; 32.

It is religion which puts us in possession of future and everlasting happiness, and thus solves the enigma of our being; which teaches us to fill up life with such works as we can rejoice in now, and in the day of the Lord; and divests us of all undue anxiety respecting those events which are concealed by the curtain of Futurity.

*7. The vanity of the world as a source of true happiness, by reason of the imperfections in men themselves.—Ch. 4: 1—8.*

<sup>1</sup> So I returned, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun; and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of the oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter. <sup>2</sup> Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive. <sup>3</sup> Yea, better is he than both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun. <sup>4</sup> Again, I considered all travail, and every right work, that for this a man is envied of his neighbor. This is also vanity and vexation of spirit. <sup>5</sup> The fool foldeth his hands together, and eateth his own flesh. <sup>6</sup> Better is a handful with quietness, than both the hands full with travail and vexation of spirit. <sup>7</sup> Then I returned and I saw vanity under the sun. <sup>8</sup> There is one alone, and there is not a second; yea, he hath neither child nor brother; yet is there no end to his labour; neither is his eye satisfied with riches; neither saith he, For whom do I labour, and bereave my soul of good? This is also vanity, yea, it is a sore travail.

Mark the oppression that fills the world! The bitter cup of slavery has been pressed to the lips of millions, by those on whose

side was power. Behold the tears which have moistened the soil in which they have digged, or the pillow where they have sought a momentary forgetfulness of their woes. Poor wretches! they have had no comforter. In many countries the mass of the people have been held in a state of servile dependence, bought and sold, like sheep and oxen, with the very soil which their own labor had purchased. See the injustice which is often perpetrated in the most civilized communities, where the government is administered by rulers as wise, and as just as Solomon; the strong taking advantage of the necessities of the weak; widows and orphans despoiled of their homes, and of the very bread they were about to put into their mouths. Such is the selfishness, such the cruelty of man. Now, if there be no God, who is the Patron of the oppressed, the Husband of the widow, and the Father of the fatherless—no hereafter—well might the Preacher of Jerusalem, and the preachers of Europe, and America, too, praise the dead, because he has not seen what they have seen, the evil work that is done under the sun. If death be an eternal sleep, happy are those who are done with life's "few pleasures and its many pains." They no longer drag that chain of which every minute of their lives was but a heavy link. But death is not an eternal sleep; and, therefore, to the believer, life wears not so gloomy an aspect. The light which is reflected on it from eternity dissipates its gloom.—vv. 1—3.

But look farther; not only are the weak and the oppressed examples of that vanity which is stamped on everything below, but those whom, (to speak after the manner of men) fortune favors, find the happiness, which they have so zealously sought in a worldly portion, greatly impaired by the imperfection which exists in men themselves. So that if the good which they seek were really to be found, where they seek it, this imperfection would hinder its enjoyment. Let a man be enterprising and shrewd in a legitimate business, or right work, as Solomon styles it; let him be successful and amass a princely estate, he will be envied by his neighbors; he will be disliked, hated even, because of his success. So that whether a man be classed among those who are stripped of liberty and property, or those who have the power and luxuries of wealth at command, in either condition, he will be constrained to bewail the vanity and vexation of spirit to which he is exposed.—v. 4.

The Preacher gives us another portrait. It is that of an idle man, who foldeth his hands together, and, because he sees his industrious and thrifty neighbor envied, refuses to work; languidly exclaiming, "Better is an handful with quietness, than both the hands full, with travail and vexation of spirit." He will doubtless escape the vexation of being envied, but will he escape a worse sorrow, when he has reduced himself to such poverty that he has nothing to eat save his own flesh,—vv. 5, 6.

Another portrait, sketched too by a master-hand; it is that of a



*miser.* He is alone in the world. He is as completely bound up in himself as if he were the solitary inhabitant of the earth. Although he may not be able to boast that not a drop of his blood flows in another's veins, he acknowledges no kindred; he has neither child nor brother. All the finer sensibilities of his soul have been blunted; the love of gold has produced a complete apathy in regard to the wants and sufferings of others. "The tale of woe, the houseless wanderer shivering in rags amidst the blasts of winter, the wants and distresses of the surrounding poor, and the claims of indigent friends and relatives, make no impressions on that heart, which is encircled, as by a wall of adamant, with the immoderate love of gain. On such a heart the tears of the unfortunate, and of the widow and orphan, will drop in vain." Yet there is no end of his labor to gain that which does him or others so little good: and his eye is never satisfied with counting over his hoarded gold; he never asks, for whom do I labor and deprive myself of the comforts, and even the necessities of life. Just so far as this fell spirit of avarice prevails, it tends to the utter destruction of society. Well then might Solomon exclaim, in view of it, "Vanity," and add, "*Yea it is a sore travail.*"

8. *The pleasures of friendship and society are not sufficient to compensate for the imperfection that marks all things here, if there be no better inheritance beyond.*—Ch. 4 : 9–16.

\* Two are better than one; because they have a good reward for their labour.  
 10 For if they fall the one will lift up his fellow: but wo to him who is alone when he falleth; for he hath not another to help him up. 11 Again, if two lie together, then they have heat: but how can one be warm alone? 12 And if one prevail against him, two shall withstand him; and a threefold cord is not quickly broken. 13 Better is a poor and a wise child, than an old and foolish king, who will no more be admonished. 14 For out of prison he cometh to reign; whereas also he that is born in his kingdom becometh poor. 15 I considered all the living which walk under the sun, with the second child that shall stand up in his stead. 16 There is no end of all the people, even of all that have been before them: they also that come after shall not rejoice in him. Surely this also is vanity and vexation of spirit.

From considering the dreadful tendency of the covetous principle, as carried out to its full consequences in the miser, which would be nothing less than to disband society, and even depopulate the earth, the transition with the Preacher was easy to this topic. Friendship and society are blessings which no wise man will despise; but what are they without religion, among creatures characterized by so much selfishness and inconstancy? But even on the supposition that human friendship were a more perfect thing, among those unenlightened or uninfluenced by Divine revelation, it is not sufficient to make amends for the vanity of the fairest portion earth can yield, if there be no hereafter. We readily admit that if anything that at all deserves to bear the name of friendship, is to be found among the heathen, or is known among infidels, it is a good thing so far as it goes. Viewing life in the

light of its miseries and accidents alone, "two are better than one." One unhappy mortal may help another unhappy mortal, and by thus sharing, they may do something to alleviate each other's woes. But we would not give much for this world's friendship, where the gospel has not exerted its softening and refining influence. This influence is felt, indirectly, in Christian lands, by multitudes who are strangers to the life and power of godliness. Those who have had the largest experience in the world, the most extended acquaintance and intercourse with men, have been most painfully impressed with human selfishness. Even those fraternities and associations, professedly based on benevolence, are bound together by self-interest, and whenever this fails they inevitably languish and die. The church of God is the only home of love, where all the best and most sacred affections of the soul are clustered and cherished. Send love forth from this ark, and like Noah's dove, she will not find a place to rest the sole of her foot; nor so much as an olive leaf to bring back to invite to another voyage over the gloomy waste. A worldly poet doubtless expressed the sentiments of his own heart, and of thousands of others, who, from trusting, have learned to despise this world's friendship, when he sung,

"And what is friendship but a name,  
A charm that lulls to sleep,  
A shade that follows wealth or fame,  
And leaves the wretch to weep."—GOLDSMITH.

And when we revert to the hypothesis of their being no hereafter, we may say, with added emphasis, what is it but a name? and may well question whether we can attribute to it so much as "a charm that lulls to sleep." The more refined and exquisite the pleasures of society, the more fearful must seem the silence, loneliness, and eternal oblivion of the grave.—vv. 9–12. Society, in the palaces of kings, or that regard which their subjects profess for them, has no exemption from the imperfection which mars friendship in the cottages of the poor. The wisest rulers, and the most righteous administration of the laws of a land, will not prevent subjects from welcoming a change of governors; as they hope that their burdens will be less, and their prosperity advanced by the change. A youthful Rehoboam will have more favor than an old king who is judged to have become superannuated, however prosperous may have been his reign. Solomon has been supposed to be making here a pathetic allusion to that propensity, which has been said to prevail in monarchical countries, to "prefer the heir-apparent to the reigning prince." He foresaw, that after his death his reign would be bitterly complained of, (I. Kings, 12: 4), and that the same voices which had often shouted, "Long live the king," would be heard giving vent to most unjustifiable reproaches. He foresaw also, that his successor, however popular he might be

at the start, would be a victim of the same fickleness; "they also that come after shall not rejoice in him. (I. Kings, 12: 16-18.—vv. 13-16.

9. *Such is the vanity of mankind that even that religion, by which heaven has revealed a future state, and given rules to teach us how to rise superior to the imperfection of our present condition, is liable to be turned into a mere round of ceremonies, leaving men strangers to vital godliness.*—Ch. 5: 1-8.

<sup>1</sup> Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God, and be more ready to hear, than to give the sacrifice of fools; for they consider not that they do evil. <sup>2</sup> Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thy heart be hasty to utter any thing before God; for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth; therefore let thy words be few. <sup>3</sup> For a dream cometh through the multitude of business; and a fool's voice is known by a multitude of words. <sup>4</sup> When thou vowest a vow unto God, defer not to pay it; for he hath no pleasure in fools; pay that which thou hast vowed. <sup>5</sup> Better is it that thou shouldst not vow than that thou shouldst vow and not pay. <sup>6</sup> Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin; neither say thou before the angel, that it was an error; wherefore should God be angry at thy voice, and destroy the work of thy hands? <sup>7</sup> For in the multitude of dreams and many words there are also divers vanities; but fear thou God. <sup>8</sup> If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter; for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they.

Such is the imperfection of man, that the best things are liable to abuse in his hands. Hence, we infer, that with all the imperfections of the natural world, it would be a far happier abode if the character of its inhabitants were less imperfect. The Preacher proceeds to give several admonitions to prevent mistakes in regard to that religion which, it is his object to show, has been expressly revealed to redeem the creation from the charge of being formed in vain. They are all founded on the truth that God is a Spirit, and must be worshipped in spirit and truth. Public worship, prayer, and the making of vows, when they become mere ceremonies with men, will defeat the great design of religion, by degrading it, and identifying it with imperfect human things, so that we shall be constrained to say, even of it, "vanity and vexation of spirit." In other words, religion, where it ceases to be spiritual, loses its Divine character, and becomes part and parcel of that on which is inscribed, "VANITY AND VEXATION OF SPIRIT." A ceremonial religion does not meet the great wants of human nature. Its imposing displays and appeals to the senses, are no better than dreams—vain dreams. We must fear God,—this is the substance of true religion,—and trust in Heaven to rectify all oppression of the poor, and perversion of judgment. This attempt of the inspired Preacher to impart to men some correct ideas of that religion which is the only remedy for the vanity, of which all are so ready to complain, and to guard them against so perverting it that it shall become just as vain as everything else, comes in very naturally and with great force, at this point in his discourse, before he proceeds to a new stage in the argument. In all that goes before, his design

is simply to show the insufficiency of the world to make men truly happy; he now advances to higher ground, and shows that the good things of this life are not merely insufficient, but, without religion, are real obstacles to our tranquility of mind. He particularly shows that this is true of great riches. The argument may be formally expressed thus:

10. *Great wealth, without religion, is not only insufficient to make men happy, but it is a real obstacle to their happiness.*—Ch. 5: 9–20. Ch. 6.

Moreover, the profit of the earth is for all; the king himself is served by the field. <sup>10</sup> He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver; nor he that loveth abundance with increase; this is also vanity. <sup>11</sup> When goods increase, they are increased that eat them; and what good is there to the owners thereof, saving the beholding of them with their eyes? <sup>12</sup> The sleep of a labouring man is sweet, whether he eat little or much; but the abundance of the rich will not suffer him to sleep. <sup>13</sup> There is a sore evil which I have seen under the sun, namely, riches kept for the owners thereof to their hurt. <sup>14</sup> But those riches perish by evil travail; and he begetteth a son, and there is nothing in his hand. <sup>15</sup> As he came forth of his mother's womb, naked shall he return to go as he came, and shall take nothing of his labour, which he may carry away in his hand. <sup>16</sup> And this also is a sore evil, that in all points as he came, so shall he go; and what profit hath he that hath laboured for the wind? <sup>17</sup> All his days also he eateth in darkness, and he hath much sorrow and wrath with his sickness. <sup>18</sup> Behold that which I have seen; it is good and comely for one to eat and to drink, and to enjoy the good of all his labour that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life, which God giveth him; for it is his portion. <sup>19</sup> Every man also to whom God hath given riches and wealth, and hath given him power to eat thereof, and to take his portion, and to rejoice in his labour; this is the gift of God. <sup>20</sup> For he shall not much remember the days of his life; because God answereth him in the joy of his heart. Ch. VI. <sup>1</sup> There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and it is common among men; <sup>2</sup> A man to whom God hath given riches, wealth, and honour, so that he wanteth nothing for his soul of all that he desireth, yet God giveth him not power to eat thereof, but a stranger eateth it; this is vanity and it is an evil disease. <sup>3</sup> If a man beget an hundred children, and live many years, so that the days of his years be many, and his soul be not filled with good, and also that he have no burial; I say that an untimely birth is better than he. <sup>4</sup> For he cometh in with vanity, and departeth in darkness, and his name shall be covered with darkness. <sup>5</sup> Moreover he hath not seen the sun, nor known any thing; this hath more rest than the other. <sup>6</sup> Yea, though he live a thousand years twice told, yet hath he seen no good; do not all go to one place? <sup>7</sup> All the labour of man is for his mouth, and yet the appetite is not filled. <sup>8</sup> For what hath the wise more than the fool? what hath the poor, that knoweth to walk before the living? <sup>9</sup> Better is the sight of the eyes than the wandering of the desire; this is also vanity and vexation of spirit. <sup>10</sup> That which hath been is named already, and it is known that it is a man; neither may he contend with him that is mightier than he. <sup>11</sup> Seeing there be many things that increase vanity, what is man the better? <sup>12</sup> For who knoweth what is good for man in this life, all the days of his vain life which he spendeth as a shadow? for who can tell a man what shall be after him under the sun?

Under the third argument, it was shown, that the happiness to be found in activity, or the diligent and successful pursuit of wealth, as an occupation, is greatly impaired, because it can be possessed for so short a time, and must become the inheritance of those who make an indiscreet use of it. The preacher here leaves the active, bustling man of the world, and contemplates one whose most sanguine hopes, as to the acquisition of property, have been realized;

so that he can retire from the crowded walks of commerce, to enjoy a dignified repose. Such a man, without a sense of religion, he argues, instead of finding his possessions a source of enjoyment, will learn from sad experience that they are an obstacle to repose. So long accustomed to see his estates enlarged, by successful speculations, although he has thousands, or perhaps millions, he will not be satisfied. He must have an expensive establishment, and a great number of dependents; and when he discovers the only good of his overgrown estates to be the beholding of them with his eyes, he will learn that if he had been satisfied with less, he would have had less perplexity, and therefore been more happy. High living, and the want of active employment, robs him of that sleep, on his bed of down, which the laboring man finds sweet on his pallet of straw.—vv. 9–12.

But great riches often inflict a more direct injury still on their possessors. "They that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. For the love of money is the root of all evil; which while some coveted after, they erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows." (I. Tim. 6: 9, 10.) And again, "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!" (Mark 10: 23). They that trust in riches, or love their money supremely, cannot be the friends of God. Their hearts are drawn away from God; they are tempted to be vain, overbearing, and oppressive towards the poor, and to be so satisfied with their portion in this world, as to neglect to lay up treasures in heaven. And what a curse is their wealth very apt to be to their children! They grow up with very grand ideas of the riches that await them, to disdain labor or any useful and honorable calling in life; "but those riches perish by evil travail," and then what is the condition of these pampered children? They have nothing; they know not how to get anything or to keep it, if they happen to be successful. They see those who have been trained up in habits of industry and economy, rising to respectability and influence in life, while they, at every step, are taking a lower place. All their days, they eat in darkness, and when their last sickness comes, poverty spreads their bed, if bed it may be called, in its forsaken hovel. They brought nothing into this world, they carry nothing out; they enter into the presence of God to give an account of their stewardship; to answer to the Lord of the talents for having squandered them in vices, or in prodigal living.—vv. 13–17.

Solomon does not mean to speak disparagingly of riches, when used, with a pious heart for pious ends; but to declare that riches, without religion, are a real obstacle to true happiness. It is the fear of God which makes poverty endurable, and it is the same which must prevent riches from being a curse, and enable their

possessors to eat and drink, and enjoy them in a rational, grateful, and humble manner.—vv. 18, 19.

The Preacher continues this course of reasoning throughout the sixth chapter. He supposes the rich man to have honor, and to want nothing for his soul that he desireth; he supposes him to have a prosperous family, long life, nay, if he were to live a thousand years twice told, in uninterrupted worldly prosperity, yet if his soul were not filled with the good, or the blessedness which arises from religion, he would still possess nothing deserving the name of happiness. The longest life must end. If a man were to outlive the antediluvians, still the time must come when his centuries would expire; and he would be found only the more wretched for having lived so long in wickedness. If there be nothing beyond this life, and religion nothing but priestcraft, or a cunningly devised fable, it would be better to perish like a still-born child than to live thousands of years in this world, with all its riches and honors upon us, if we must take also their perplexities and sorrows; for we should only drag through this prolonged existence without seeing any good, and come to the grave at last, with the sickening and withering thought that we were to sink into everlasting oblivion. "Better the fruit," says Henry, "that drops from the tree ere it is ripe, than that left to hang till it is rotten."—vv. 1-6. The Preacher further alludes to the vanity of wealth viewed as the means of gratifying the fleshly appetites. The rich man, for all his toil and pains, has no advantage over his poorer neighbor. The food as well as the sleep of the laboring man is rendered all the sweeter for his toil; his humble fare is eaten with as high a relish as the more costly viands which load the tables of the rich. Thus is the point fully established, that riches, without religion, are an obstacle to genuine happiness; their increase, unless coupled with the fear of God, is an increase of vanity and vexation.—vv. 7-12.

#### *Nature and Importance of True Religion.—Ch. 7 : 12.*

The Preacher now proceeds to what may be considered as the Second Part of his discourse; answers the question which he propounds in the last verse of the chapter, which has just been considered, "Who knoweth what is good for man in this life, which he spendeth as a shadow?" He holds up religion more distinctly as the chief good; and in its light clears up many of those mysteries by which we are sadly perplexed without it. He lays down certain great truths which would be paradoxical, or clearly absurd, if there were no hereafter. Particularly

*He shows that it is only as men estimate things in the light of eternity that they can discover what is for their real good. Having proved, by the foregoing arguments, the utter vanity of the world and the life of man, on the presumption that he is not immortal,*

*he now proceeds to hold up religion as the sovereign antidote which a merciful God has provided for our relief in the present state of vanity and vexation.*

<sup>1</sup> A good name is better than precious ointment;  
And the day of death than the day of one's birth.

A good name, i. e. virtue or religion, is more desirable than the choicest of earthly blessings, and the death of those who are prepared, as it brings their temptations, imperfections, and afflictions to an end, is better than the day of their birth, which introduced them into a world of so much sin and sorrow.

- It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to go to the house of feasting,  
For that is the end of all men;  
And the living will lay it to his heart.
- Sorrow is better than laughter;  
For by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better.
- The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning;  
But the heart of fools is in the house of mirth.
- It is better to hear the rebuke of the wise,  
Than for a man to hear the song of fools;
- For as the crackling of thorns under a pot,  
So is the laughter of the fool : this also is vanity.

Religion makes a visit to the house of mourning, which the unbeliever, or lover of worldly pleasure would shun as pervaded with unmitigated gloom, most profitable. The Christian will prefer such a house to one that echoes to the song and laughter of fools. He is reminded of that immortality which is forgotten in the house of mirth.

- <sup>7</sup> Surely oppression maketh a wise man mad :  
And a gift destroyeth the heart.
- <sup>8</sup> Better is the end of a thing than the beginning thereof ;  
And the patient in spirit is better than the proud in spirit.
- <sup>9</sup> Be not hasty in thy spirit to be angry :  
For anger resteth in the bosom of fools. [these ?
- <sup>10</sup> Say not thou, (What is the cause that the former days were better than  
For thou dost not inquire wisely concerning this.

It is true that oppression may cause a good man to become greatly excited, and the prospect of some temporary advantage may tempt him to swerve from the right, but his religion teaches him to look to the end, where he will discover that it is better to be patient in spirit than to indulge in anger, or to depart in any respect from the path of the strictest rectitude. And piety, too, teaches the believer when he becomes old, not to indulge in a fault-finding spirit, as though the world were degenerating, and nothing were as good as in former years, and all believers never to reflect sinfully on the wisdom and goodness of God, in the government of the world.

- <sup>11</sup> Wisdom is good with an inheritance ;  
And by it there is profit to them that see the sun.
- <sup>12</sup> For wisdom is a defence, and money is a defence ;  
But the excellency of knowledge is,  
That wisdom giveth life to them that have it.

<sup>13</sup> Consider the work of God;

For who can make that straight which he hath made crooked ?

<sup>14</sup> In the day of prosperity be joyful;

But in the day of adversity consider;

God also hath set the one over against the other,

To the end that man should find nothing after him.

That "fear of the Lord," which is wisdom, is better than an inheritance, as the margin renders it. It teaches us to submit to the dispensations of Divine Providence, as beyond our control, and to feel our dependence on God, whether we are in adversity or prosperity.

<sup>15</sup> All things have I seen in the days of my vanity : there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that longeth his life in his wickedness. <sup>16</sup> Be not righteous over much ; neither make thyself over wise ; why shouldest thou destroy thyself ? <sup>17</sup> Be not over much wicked, neither be thou foolish ; why shouldest thou die before thy time ? <sup>18</sup> It is good that thou shouldest take hold of this ; yea, also from this withdraw not thy hand : for he that feareth God shall come forth of them all. <sup>19</sup> Wisdom strengtheneth the wise more than ten mighty men which are in the city. <sup>20</sup> For there is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not. <sup>21</sup> Also take no heed unto all words that are spoken ; lest thou hear thy servant curse thee ; <sup>22</sup> For oftentimes also thine own heart knoweth that thou thyself likewise hast cursed others.

"Consider the work of God," for it is by His appointment that a good man should perish in his righteousness, and goes to an early grave, and the wicked man lives long in his wickedness. A coming world will reconcile these seeming inconsistencies. But do not abuse religion by running into extravagances, or carrying it to hurtful extremes. The path of holiness lies equally removed from fanaticism and impiety. The fear of God, is the best guide and safe-guard in this sinful and crooked world ; it is the perfection of wisdom. It is strength to the weak ; it is light to the blind ; while it makes us acquainted with human nature in general, it imparts that highest kind of knowledge, the knowledge of our own hearts.

<sup>23</sup> All this have I proved by wisdom ; I said I will be wise ; but it was far from me. <sup>24</sup> That which is far off and exceeding deep, who can find it out ? <sup>25</sup> I applied my heart to know, and to search, and to seek out wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness ; <sup>26</sup> And I find more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands ; whose pleaseth God shall escape from her ; but the sinner shall be taken by her. <sup>27</sup> Behold, this have I found saith, the Preacher, counting one by one, to find out the account ; <sup>28</sup> Which yet my soul seeketh, but I find not ; one man among a thousand have I found ; but a woman among all those have I not found. <sup>29</sup> Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright : but they have sought out many inventions.

In this part of his confessions Solomon makes a most penitent allusion to his attachment to many strange women. "I said, I will be wise ; but it was far from me ;" i. e. he fell into a state of religious declension. His reminiscences were more bitter than death. He spoke from experience. He, the Preacher, not pleasing God, had been taken in the snares and nets of bad women.



What weight have the words of a reformed libertine, who, as he describes the miseries of vice, and warns others, can say

quæque ipse miserrima vidi,  
Et quorum pars magna fui.

His harem, to which he here unquestionably refers, was "the chief monument of his folly, and the cause of his declension from true religion." No wonder that he pronounced his course of life foolish and mad, and that his mind was lacerated with the keenest anguish when he thought of it. The Preacher pleads with men by his own sad experience, not to seek for happiness in lascivious indulgences.

<sup>1</sup> Who is as the wise man? and who knoweth the interpretation of a thing? a man's wisdom maketh his face to shine, and the boldness of his face shall be changed. <sup>2</sup> I counsel thee to keep the king's commandment, and that in regard of the oath of God. <sup>3</sup> Be not hasty to go out of his sight; stand not in an evil thing; for he doeth whatsoever pleaseth him. <sup>4</sup> Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may say unto him, What doest thou? <sup>5</sup> Whoso keepeth the commandment shall feel no evil thing; and a wise man's heart discerneth both time and judgment. <sup>6</sup> Because to every purpose there is time and judgment, therefore the misery of man is great upon him. <sup>7</sup> For he knoweth not that which shall be; for who can tell him when it shall be? <sup>8</sup> There is no man that hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit: neither hath he power in the day of death: and there is no discharge in that war; neither shall wickedness deliver those that are given to it. <sup>9</sup> All this have I seen, and applied my heart unto every work that is done under the sun: there is a time wherein one man ruleth over another to his own hurt: <sup>10</sup> And so I saw the wicked buried, who had come and gone from the place of the holy, and they were forgotten in the city where they had so done; this is also vanity. <sup>11</sup> Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil.

The excellence of religion is still the Preacher's theme; it exerts so benign and heavenly an influence in the soul, that it will shine in the countenance, and impart to it a sweet and devotional expression. It makes its possessor attentive to all relative duties; it makes him a good citizen, and teaches him to be subject to the powers that are ordained of God, and to discharge all his duties, in their appropriate time and place, and thus avoid the miseries consequent on disobedience. It is thus that he is prepared for death, that final contest, from which there is no discharge, while the wicked are carried to their graves without hope, having abused the long-suffering of God, and wasted their probation.

<sup>12</sup> Though a sinner do evil an hundred times, and his days be prolonged, yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God, which fear before him; <sup>13</sup> But it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow; because he feareth not before God. <sup>14</sup> There is a vanity which is done upon the earth; that there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked: again, there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous; I said that this also is vanity. <sup>15</sup> Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry; for that shall abide with him of his labour the days of his life, which God giveth him under the sun. <sup>16</sup> When I applied my heart to know wisdom, and to see the business that is done upon the earth; (for also there is that neither day nor night seeth sleep with his eyes:) <sup>17</sup> Then I beheld

all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun; because though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; yea further; though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it. <sup>1</sup> For all this I considered in my heart even to declare all this, that the righteous, and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of God: no man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them. <sup>2</sup> All things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to the unclean: to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not; as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath. <sup>3</sup> This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead.

Although the wicked may long go unpunished we know that it shall be ill with them, and we also know that it shall at length be well with the righteous although for the present they may have many trials. We know this from that revelation, the light of which the infidel rejects, and the sensualist despises. The present is not a state of retribution, and therefore we often see just men to whom it happens according to the work of the wicked, and wicked men to whom it happens according to the work of the righteous. Now shut up the Bible, or reject it as a fable, and this mystery is inexplicable. The deist cannot reconcile this unequal condition of men with the wisdom and goodness of the Governor of the world. He may give neither sleep to his eyes nor slumber to his eyelids—he may apply his mind most earnestly to solve the problem, yet shall he not be able to find it out. If we are to conclude that there is no state of retribution, then a life of mirth, and the indulgence of the appetites, is man's highest wisdom. And we might well say, let us be epicures,

πάγωμεν καὶ πίνωμεν, αἰῶνον γὰρ ὑποδύσκομεν.

But Divine truth puts a new aspect on affairs. There may seem to be little difference now in the allotments of Providence, between the friends and enemies of God; nay, we may see the former, often in great affliction, and the latter enjoying peculiar prosperity; but Solomon understood this when he went into the "sanctuary," and there saw the end, the dreadful end of the wicked. The mystery was all cleared up. God will hereafter reconcile these inequalities, and in the light of eternity it will appear how they stood related to the most important results.

<sup>4</sup> For to him that is joined to all the living there is hope: for a living dog is better than a dead lion. <sup>5</sup> For the living know that they shall die; but the dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward; for the memory of them is forgotten. <sup>6</sup> Also their love and their hatred, and their envy is now perished; neither have they any more a portion for ever in any thing that is done under the sun.

Life is the only season of hope, "the time to ensure the great reward." This religion which the Preacher so highly commends, must be sought and obtained before the brittle thread of life is forever severed. It is a future state of probation against which he

argues. No pardon is offered, nor "acts of pardon passed" beyond the grave.

<sup>7</sup> Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for God now accepteth thy works. <sup>8</sup> Let thy garments be always white; and let thy head lack no ointment. <sup>9</sup> Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of the life of thy vanity, which he hath given thee under the sun, all the days of thy vanity; for that is thy portion in this life, and in thy labour which thou takest under the sun. <sup>10</sup> Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest.

He holds up religion in a light designed to render it eminently attractive to the young, to whom he appears in this discourse particularly to address himself. It is not opposed to, but promotes true cheerfulness; it encourages genuine refinement, and the cultivation of the social affections. But if we would have our piety make us cheerful, we must be active in doing good. "We must run glittering like a brook in the open sunshine."

"An angel's wing would droop if long at rest,  
And God himself inactive were no longer blest."

And we should be stimulated to activity by the reflection, that what we do for God's glory among men must be done in this short life.

<sup>11</sup> I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. <sup>12</sup> For man also knoweth not his time; as the fishes that are taken in an evil net, and as the birds that are caught in the snare; so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth suddenly upon them.

He warns against procrastination, and shows that, however swift a man may be in the race, or strong in the battle, if he puts off the concerns of his soul beyond the accepted time, he will be taken in an evil, and snared in an evil time. He will not know when his last opportunity is arrived. By procrastination, he may grieve the Spirit forever away. And if such doom befall thee, expect not premonitions of its approach. Look not for it to be foretokened in visions and dreams of the night. Expect not to hear whisperings in the darkness, saying, BEWARE; or that the stone shall cry out of the wall, and the beam out of the timber, shall answer it, saying, THINE HOUR IS COME. Great and momentous as will be the event, it will take place without interrupting the ordinary course of affairs. You may cross that invisible line,

"The hidden boundary between  
God's patience and His wrath,"

while the fire of ambition still lights your eye, the rose of health still blooms on your cheek, and physical vigor still nerves you with strength for the battle, or swiftness for the race. Worldly enterprises may still prove successful; friends may caress; the flowers of love still bloom in your path; every fear be quelled; and no-

thing admonish you that the last sands of that awful hour which closed your probation, have already fallen.

<sup>13</sup> This wisdom have I seen also under the sun, and it seemed great unto me.  
<sup>14</sup> There was a little city, and few men within it; and there came a great king against it, and besieged it, and built great bulwarks against it. <sup>15</sup> Now there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city; yet no man remembered that same poor man. <sup>16</sup> Then said I, Wisdom is better than strength; nevertheless the poor man's wisdom is despised, and his words are not heard.

That intellectual and moral excellence which religion secures, is a great blessing to a country; and it is a great blessing to men in fitting them to serve their country well. Religion may be despised—a preached gospel may be neglected—but it is that which gives value to civil institutions, by the security which it confers on them, and the purity and good morals which it tends to diffuse.

<sup>17</sup> The words of wise men are heard in quiet,  
 More than the cry of him that ruleth among fools.

<sup>18</sup> Wisdom is better than weapons of war;  
 But one sinner destroyeth much good.

Ch. 10. <sup>1</sup> Dead flies cause the ointment of the apothecary to send forth a stinking savour:  
 So doth a little folly him that is in reputation for wisdom and honour.

<sup>2</sup> A wise man's heart is at his right hand:  
 But a fool's heart is at his left.

<sup>3</sup> Yea, also, when he that is a fool walketh by the way,  
 His wisdom faileth him, and he saith to every one that he is a fool.

<sup>4</sup> If the spirit of the ruler rise up against thee, leave not thy place;  
 For yielding pacifieth great offences.

<sup>5</sup> There is an evil which I have seen under the sun,  
 As an error which proceedeth from the ruler.

<sup>6</sup> Folly is set in great dignity,  
 And the rich sit in low place.

<sup>7</sup> I have seen servants upon horses,  
 And princes walking as servants upon the earth.

<sup>8</sup> He that diggeth a pit shall fall into it;  
 And whoso breaketh a hedge, a serpent shall bite him.

<sup>9</sup> Whoso removeth stones shall be hurt therewith;  
 And he that cleaveth wood shall be endangered thereby.

<sup>10</sup> If the iron be blunt, and he do not whet the edge,  
 Then must he put to more strength;  
 But wisdom is profitable to direct.

<sup>11</sup> Surely the serpent will bite without enchantment;  
 And a babbler is no better.

<sup>12</sup> The words of a wise man's mouth are gracious;  
 But the lips of a fool will swallow up himself.

<sup>13</sup> The beginning of the words of his mouth is foolishness:  
 And the end of his talk is mischievous madness.

<sup>14</sup> A fool also is full of words:  
 A man cannot tell what shall be;  
 And what shall be after him who can tell him.

<sup>15</sup> The labour of the foolish wearieth every one of them,  
 Because he knoweth not how to go to the city.

<sup>16</sup> Wo to thee, O land, when thy king is a child,  
 And thy princes eat in the morning!

<sup>17</sup> Blessed art thou, O land, when thy king is a son of nobles,  
 And thy princes eat in due season,  
 For strength, and not for drunkenness!

<sup>18</sup> By much slothfulness the building decayeth;  
 And through idleness of the hands the house droppeth through.

- <sup>19</sup> A feast is made for laughter, and wine maketh merry ;  
 But money answereth all things.  
<sup>20</sup> Curse not the king, no, not in thy thought,  
 And curse not the rich in thy bed-chamber ;  
 For a bird of the air shall carry the voice,  
 And that which hath wings shall tell the matter.

Here we have a collection of proverbs, which, like the book of Proverbs, by this same author, are designed to recommend religion (which he has shown is the only remedy for the vanity which is impressed on all earthly things), and to show how it is to be applied to the most common affairs of every-day life. We have almost as many distinct subjects presented as we have proverbs ; we have not space, therefore, nor is it absolutely necessary for the purposes of the present Analysis, to notice them in detail. It is only necessary to bear in mind that they are designed to recommend, and to show the eminently practical character, of that religion which is Heaven's remedy for the imperfection, which stamps all things below the sun.

- <sup>1</sup> Cast thy bread upon the waters ;  
 For thou shalt find it after many days.  
<sup>2</sup> Give a portion to seven, and also to eight ;  
 For thou knowest not what evil shall be upon the earth.  
<sup>3</sup> If the clouds be full of rain, they empty themselves upon the earth,  
 And if the tree fall towards the south, or towards the north,  
 In the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be.  
<sup>4</sup> He that observeth the wind shall not sow ;  
 And he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap.  
<sup>5</sup> As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit,  
 Nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child ;  
 Even so thou knowest not the works of God who maketh all.  
<sup>6</sup> In the morning sow thy seed,  
 And in the evening withhold not thy hand ;  
 For thou knowest not whether shall prosper, either this or that,  
 Or whether they both shall be alike good.

The Bible requires us to do good with our property. In this way, it will contribute far more to our happiness than if miserly hoarded, or expended on our lusts. We must give in faith, looking forward to the harvest, when, if we have sown bountifully, we shall reap also bountifully. If the objects of charity are many, we must give to many ; we must not say, these applications come too frequently ; our duty is determined not by their frequency, but by their character ; if they are objects of charity, and God has made us stewards of the things of this life, we must give to each a portion. Our religion informs us that money thus bestowed is not thrown away. Circumstances may change with us ; we know not what evil shall be upon the earth. "Give, and it shall be given unto you ; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall men give into your bosom" (Luke 6 : 38). Religious considerations tend to overcome those objections and excuses which selfishness suggests against making a charitable use of our possessions. The truly liberal man will sow under discouraging prospects, in the morning

and in the evening, that he may be sure of being interested in something which shall prosper under the blessing of Heaven. It is most instructive to observe how the Preacher holds up the religious life as one of active benevolence. The friends of God are the best servants of their fellow-creatures.

## APPLICATION.

1. *The subject is applied very briefly to the aged.*—Ch. 11: 7, 8.

<sup>7</sup> Truly the light is sweet,

And a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun.

<sup>8</sup> But if a man live many years, and rejoice in them all;

Yet let him remember the days of darkness;

For they shall be many. All that cometh is vanity.

Life is sweet. And it has been said to be not the less so, for being prolonged. The aged, some have maintained, cling to life more firmly than the young; and this opinion is in accordance with our observation. We sometimes see a youth of twenty, with all the bright hopes and inviting prospects of life before him, yielding to the stern decree more cheerfully and composedly than the man of three score. But let the man who has lived many years, and rejoiced in them all, and even in his old age finds life sweet, remember the days of darkness, and prepare for death. But Solomon appears rather to have had before his mind an image of the aged infidel or sensualist, who has wasted life in sinful pleasure. What a melancholy spectacle is such a man! Let him reflect on the days of darkness that are before him. As he rejects the doctrine of immortality, let him think, and be startled at the thought, of standing on the brink of annihilation. The Preacher has shown that all that is past is vanity; and according to the skeptic's cheerless creed, "All that cometh is vanity."

2. *To the Young.*—ch. 11: 9, 10. Ch. 12: 1-7.

<sup>9</sup> Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth;

And let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth,

And walk in the ways of thy heart,

And in the sight of thine eyes;

But know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment.

<sup>10</sup> Therefore remove sorrow from thy heart,

And put away evil from thy flesh;

For childhood and youth are vanity.

Ch. 12.<sup>1</sup> Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth,  
While the evil days come not, nor the years draw nigh,  
When thou shalt say I have no pleasure in them.

<sup>2</sup> While the sun, or the light,

Or the moon, or the stars, be not darkened,

Nor the clouds return after the rain:

<sup>3</sup> In the day when the keepers of the house shall tremble,

And the strong men shall bow themselves,

And the grinders cease because they are few,

And those that look out of the windows be darkened.

<sup>4</sup> And the doors shall be shut in the streets,

When the sound of the grinding is low,

And he shall rise up at the voice of the bird,

And all the daughters of music shall be brought low;

- 5 Also when they shall be afraid of that which is high,  
 And fears shall be in the way,  
 And the almond-tree shall flourish,  
 And the grasshopper shall be a burden,  
 And desire shall fail; because man goeth to his long home,  
 And the mourners go about the streets :  
 6 Or ever the silver cord be loosed,  
 Or the golden bowl be broken,  
 Or the pitcher be broken at the fountain,  
 Or the wheel broken at the cistern.  
 7 Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was ;  
 And the spirit shall return unto God who gave it.

This entire discourse appears to have been prepared with special reference to the young. And the Preacher proceeds to a most animated and moving appeal. He had presented the most weighty arguments, and had illustrated and enforced them from his own experience; and now the aged Preacher, with a pathos which is irresistible, makes a personal appeal to his youthful auditors. In imagination, he has before him a giddy youth, who says, or seems to say, "It may all be as you represent; religion may be a very good thing, and necessary to my happiness; and the world may be a very vain and unsatisfying portion without religion: but I choose to try it for myself. You tried it yourself. According to your confession, you have run the whole round of this world's pleasure. I choose to make the experiment for myself, rather than take your testimony. Just cease your melancholy bodings—let me alone—let me try it for myself." "Then try it for yourself," saith the Preacher, "rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes; but know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment. Be a sensualist; give the reins to every lust; but hear, O hear the warning which I will not cease to cry, there is a day of awful reckoning." There is not so much irony in Solomon's words as has been sometimes supposed; or it is *irony* of that fearful kind which harmonizes well with the awful seriousness of his theme. It is one of the most startling warnings that was ever expressed in the language of men. Or perhaps we are rather to regard the youth who is so solemnly apostrophized as an avowed freethinker. His mind is poisoned with infidel sentiments; he does not believe in religion; he thinks, or tries to think, that death is the end of man; and therefore he resolves to give himself up to the unrestrained indulgence of his appetites and passions. Solomon throws himself in the path of such a young man, and beseeches him to pause and reflect; he assures him that there will be a future state, and that it will be one of retribution. God will open the books in which all the actions of life are registered, and enter into solemn judgment with all intelligent creatures. He then proceeds to urge the young to attend to religion during the season of youth, as the best means of bringing their passions under proper control; he reminds them

that it is a fleeting period, and far more favorable to our becoming truly religious than a later period of life. Especially, he takes occasion, from a consideration of the infelicities of old age, to entreat them to remember their Creator in the days of their youth. The general scope of the tropical language which he employs, is perfectly obvious, although it may not be so well understood as it was in his day. The heavenly bodies obscured, and the clouds returning after the rain, refer to the faculties, both bodily and mental, which it is the tendency of age greatly to impair. What a striking emblem of the wasted energies of the old is a cloud returning after the rain! If the body be the house (I. Cor. 5: 1.) then the intellectual faculties may be regarded as its keepers or tenants; they tremble. The blossoms of the almond-tree are white and are a striking metaphorical representation of the hoary head of an aged man. The grasshopper or locust, was poetically used among the ancients as figurative of old age. Let youth be admonished before these infirmities come upon them, to attend to their souls' concerns. Religion can make old age, with all its burdens, happy, and youth is the period to attend to religion. It is the rashest folly to postpone attention to it to that late period, when we shall have lost our interest in almost everything, and our ability properly to attend to anything, even the most trivial affairs.

\* Vanity of vanity, saith the Preacher; all is vanity. \* And moreover, because the Preacher was wise, he still taught the people knowledge; yea, he gave good heed, and sought out, and set in order many proverbs. <sup>10</sup> The Preacher sought to find out acceptable words; and that which was written, was upright, even words of truth. <sup>11</sup> The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails fastened by the masters of assemblies, which are given from one shepherd. <sup>12</sup> And further, by these my son, be admonished; of making many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh. <sup>13</sup> Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter; Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man. <sup>14</sup> For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.

Solomon closes his sermon by a formal repetition of his text. The great subject that filled his mind when he first opened his lips, filled it now that he was about to close them. He intimates that this was not his only attempt to do something to counteract the pernicious example which he had set. He still taught the people knowledge; and he was permitted to have some evidence that his words were not altogether in vain. He appends a striking summary of religion, that religion which can alone redeem the world from the charge of being utterly worthless, and once more carries the mind forward to that awful future, in the light of which he would have us contemplate the present, and seek to understand its mysteries, but especially its duties, and amazing responsibilities: "For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil."

NOTE.—For the convenience of the reader I have taken the liberty to add "Des Voeux's Analysis," and that also of "Holden," both esteemed as among the most judicious writers on the book of Ecclesiastes.



## DES VOEUX'S ANALYSIS OF ECCLESIASTES.

PROP. I. "No labor or trouble of men in this world, can ever be so profitable as to produce in them a lasting contentment, and thorough satisfaction of mind."

- Ch. 1: 4—11. 1st proof—The course of nature.  
 12, &c. 2d proof—Men's Occupations.  
 16—18. 1st head—Wisdom or Philosophy.  
 Ch 2: 1, 2. 2d head—Pleasure.  
 3—10. Both jointly.  
 11. General conclusion of the second proof. A review of the second proof, with special conclusions relating to every particular therein mentioned, viz:  
 12—17. I. Wisdom.  
 18—23. II. Riches.  
 24—26. III. Pleasure.  
 Ch. 3: 1 &c. 3d proof—Inconstancy of man's Will.  
 9. Conclusion of third proof. A review of the second and third proofs considered conjointly with special observations and corollaries.  
 10, 11. 1st observation—God is inculpable.  
 Ch. 3: 12—15. 2d observation—God is the author of whatever befalls us in this world.  
 16, 17. 1st corollary—God will redress all grievances.  
 19—21. 2d corollary—God must be exalted, and man humbled.  
 22. 3d corollary—God alloweth men to enjoy the present.  
 Ch. 4: 1. 4th—Men's neglect of proper opportunities evidenced in several instances, viz:  
 1—3. I. Oppression.  
 4. II. Envy.  
 5, 6. III. Idleness.  
 7—12. IV. Avarice.  
 13—16. V. Misapplication of esteem and regard.  
 Ch. 5. N. B. Verses 1—9, is a digression containing several admonitions, in order to prevent any misconstruction of the foregoing remarks.  
 10—12. VI. Expensive living.

PROP. II. "Earthly goods, and whatever we can acquire by our utmost trouble and labor in this world, are so far from making us lastingly happy, that they may even be regarded as obstacles to our ease, quiet, and tranquility."

- Ch. 5: 14—17. 1st proof—Instability of riches.  
 Ch. 6: 1, 2. 2d proof—Insufficiency of riches to make one happy  
 3—6. The fate of an abortive is preferable, upon the whole, to that of him who lives without enjoying life.  
 Ch. 6: 7—9. 2d proof—Man's insatiableness.  
 10, 11. General conclusion from the first and second proposition.

PROP. III. "Men know not what is or is not truly advantageous to them: because they are either ignorant or unmindful of that which must come to pass after they are dead."

- Ch. 7: 1—8. 1st proof—Wrong estimation of things. A digression intended (like that in verses 1—9) to prevent any misconstruction of the foregoing observation, and containing several advices, together with a strong commendation of him who gives them, in order to enforce the observation of the rules laid down by him.  
 9—12. 1st advice—Do not blame Providence.  
 13. 2d advice—Do not judge of Providence.  
 14, 15. 3d advice—Submit to Providence.  
 16—20. 4th advice—To avoid excesses.  
 21, 22. 5th advice—Do not heed idle reports.  
 23—25. Commendation of the foregoing advices, from the author's application to examine everything; and especially,  
 26—29. I. Wickedness and Ignorance.  
 Ch. 8: 1—8. II. Wisdom.  
 2d proof—Anticipated judgments.

- 9—14. I. That sin shall not go unpunished because it is so in this world.  
 Ch. 9: 1—6. II. That life is preferable to death.  
 7—9. 1st corollary—Earthly enjoyments are not criminal.  
 10. 2d corollary—We must make a proper use of our faculties.  
 11—15. 3d proof—Judgments that

are seemingly right, yet entirely false.

- 16, &c. 4th proof—Little regard paid to wisdom.  
 16. I. Past services are forgotten.  
 Ch. 9: 17 } II. The least fault is taken  
 Ch. 10: 1—4 } notice of.  
 5—19 II. Favor gets what is due to merit.  
 20. A caution to prevent abuse of the foregoing remarks.

#### PRACTICAL INFERENCES.

- Ch 11: 1—4. I. From the first proposition: We must give unto earthly goods, that stability which they are capable of.  
 5, 6. II. From the first and second proposition: We must in our conduct, conform to the design of Providence concerning us, and leave the success to God.  
 7—10. III. From the three propositions, but especially  
 Ch. 12: 1—8. from the third, we must seek for happiness beyond the grave.  
 9—12. Commendation of the work from several considerations.

- 13, 14. THE CONCLUSION of the whole:—That there must be a state of true and solid happiness for men in a future state. In other words, the fear of God, and keeping his commandments, is the whole of man, that is, his chief good, his whole interest, privilege, honor and happiness, as well as duty: for after this vain life is past, another scene will succeed, and men shall be judged, and recompensed according to their conduct, secret as well as open, and whether it may have been good or evil.

### HOLDEN'S ANALYSIS.

#### PART I.—THE VANITY OF ALL EARTHLY CONDITIONS, OCCUPATIONS AND PLEASURES.

- SECT. I. The vanity of all earthly things. (1. 2.)  
 SECT. II. The unprofitableness of human labor, and the transitoriness of human life. (1. 3—11.)  
 SECT. III. The vanity of laborious inquiries into the ways and works of man. (1. 12—18.)  
 SECT. IV. Luxury and pleasure are only vanity and vexation of spirit. (2. 1—11.)  
 SECT. V. Though the wise excel fools, yet, as death happens to them both, human learning is but vanity. (2. 12—17.)  
 SECT. VI. The vanity of human labor in leaving it they know not to whom (2. 18—23.)  
 SECT. VII. The emptiness of sensual enjoyments (2. 24—26.)  
 SECT. VIII. Though there is a proper time for the execution of all human purposes, yet are they useless and vain; the Divine counsels, however, are immutable. (3. 1—14.)  
 SECT. IX. The vanity of human pursuits proved from the wickedness prevailing in courts of justice, contrasted with the righteous judgment of God. (3. 15—17.)  
 SECT. X. Though life considered in itself, is vanity, for men die as well as beasts, yet in the end, it will be very different with the spirit of man and that of beasts. (3. 18, 22.)  
 SECT. XI. Vanity is increased unto men, by oppression. (4. 1—3.)  
 SECT. XII. The vanity of prosperity. (4. 4.)  
 SECT. XIII. The vanity of folly, or of preferring the world to True Wisdom. (4. 5—6.)  
 SECT. XIV. The vanity of covetousness. (4. 7—8.)  
 SECT. XV. Though society has its advantages, yet dominion and empire are but vanity. (4. 9—16.)  
 SECT. XVI. Errors in the performance of divine worship, which render it vain and unprofitable. (5. 1—7.)

- SECT. XVII. The vanity of murmuring at injustice ; for though the oppression of the poor, and the perversion of judgment greatly prevail, they do not escape the notice of the Almighty. (5. 8—9.)
- SECT. XVIII. The vanity of riches ; with an admonition as to the moderate enjoyment of them. (5. 10—20.)
- SECT. XIX. The vanity of avarice. (6. 1—9.)

PART II.—THE NATURE, EXCELLENCE, AND BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF WISDOM, OR RELIGION.

- SECT. XX. Since all human designs, labors, and enjoyments are vain, it is natural to inquire, What is good for man? What is his Supreme Good? (6. 10—12) The answer is contained in the remainder of the book.
- SECT. XXI. The praise of character and reputation. (7. 1.)
- SECT. XXII. Affliction improves the heart and exalts the character of the wise. (7. 2—10.)
- SECT. XXIII. The excellence of wisdom. (7. 11—14.)
- SECT. XXIV. An objection with the answer. (7. 15 : 8. 7.)
- SECT. XXV. The evil of wickedness shows the advantage of true wisdom. (8. 8—13.)
- SECT. XXVI. An objection with the answer. (8. 14 : 9. 1.)
- SECT. XXVII. An objection with the answer. (9. 2 : 10. 17.)
- SECT. XXVIII. The banefulness of sloth. (10. 18.)
- SECT. XXIX. The power of wealth. (10. 19.)
- SECT. XXX. An exhortation against speaking evil of dignities. (10. 20.)
- SECT. XXXI. Exhortation to charity and benevolence. (11. 1—10.)

ARTICLE IX.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S RELIGIOUS VIEWS.

Translated from the German, by REV. WILLIAM HALL, New York.

*Introductory Remarks.*

SCHLEIERMACHER is one of those peculiar writers who should be permitted, as far as possible, to speak for himself. And, therefore, as he is frequently referred to by eminent authors at the present time, and as his theological views are exerting an important influence in various quarters of the moral and Christian world, it will not be inappropriate to give the readers of the Repository a translation of some of the leading principles of his dogmatic system, as they stand in his most celebrated theological work, called, "The Christian Faith, &c." Previous to so doing, a few biographical and general observations respecting this distinguished divine and philosopher, may not be unacceptable.

Frederick Schleiermacher was born at Breslau, Silesia, Nov. 24, 1768. The earlier part of his education was received in the community of the *Unitas Fratrum*, or Moravians. And the religious instructions and impressions thence derived, had undoubtedly much to do in the formation of his Christian character, and practical tendency of thought. After completing his education at Halle, he rose through several subordinate positions to be Court

and University preacher and professor in that city. In 1809 he was appointed pastor of Trinity Church, and professor in the University at Berlin. He died in that city, Feb. 12, 1834, shortly after joining with expressions of the most affecting devotion, in that Holy Supper which seals the union of the faithful with Christ and all His true church.

The works of Schleiermacher are comprised in thirty or forty octavo volumes. His activity, as University teacher and preacher, was most happy ; with the most beautiful manner, and a rare facility and elegance of elocution, he combined a profound richness of thought. His discourses are models of a clear, vigorous, and impressive style, although addressed less to the sensibility than to the reflectiveness of his hearers. We are informed, by a distinguished countryman who heard him in Germany, Rev. Dr. Robinson, of New York, that as a preacher, Schleiermacher was not so unduly philosophical as a mere foreign student of his speculative works might suspect. He is said, also, to have been the means of leading many minds from the dreary regions of skepticism to those of a warm evangelical faith. But, conceding all we can to the merits of this admirable man, who saw so much truth so clearly, and felt it so deeply, we think him justly chargeable with a want of deference to the sole authority of the Scriptures, in their wholeness, as a fully inspired canon of religious faith. Here was the loose spoke in his wheel. He was guided, we should humbly judge, too much by Plato, too little by Paul, in the formation and expression of his Christianity. He does not honor the *ipsissima verba* of the sacred writers, palpably and simply enough to suit our religious sympathies. But it is possible to do him injustice even here. We must remember that to be truly *scriptural*, is to be penetrated with the spirit of God's Word, and to seize its mighty revelations with the eye of the soul's own consciousness, and to incorporate it into the life of our own thoughts and wills.

With respect to some of the following translations, it must be premised, that as exceedingly condensed and aphoristic statements, they will, of course, present obscurities and difficulties that will both demand the reader's patience and necessitate possibly some research and inquiry on his part, in order to do them that justice which is every writer's due. If they awaken *thought*, if they lead us, even by evoking protest and contradiction, to a more positive perception of "what our evangelical faith is," they will fulfil the great desire and hope of the true-hearted and magnanimous author. We further add, that the propositions will be given in the order in which they stand in the original, and that none will be omitted. What lies between, of illustration and explanation, constituting the great body of the book, must, for the most part, be passed by.

In the first place, we have a general *introduction*, or preliminary discourse, occupying about a fifth part of the whole which, as the

author observes, "has no other object than partly to give the exposition of a dogmatic lying at the foundation of the work itself, partly to propound the method and arrangement followed in the same." This, therefore, is divided into two chapters, the first of which contains an exposition of the Dogmatic, set forth as follows:

1. Since the Dogmatic is a theological *discipline*,<sup>1</sup> and thus has its relation solely to the Christian church: therefore what *it* is, can be explained, only when we have come to an understanding upon the notion of the Christian church.

2. The piety which constitutes the basis of all churchly communities, considered purely in itself, is neither a knowledge (*Wissen*), nor an act (*Thun*), but a determination of the Feeling, or of the immediate self-consciousness.

3. The common element of all expressions of piety, however various, whereby they at once distinguish themselves from all other feelings, therefore the invariable essence of piety, is this, that we are *conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent*, or what will amount to the same, as being in relation with God.

4. The feeling just described, forms the highest degree of human self-consciousness, which, nevertheless, in its actual forth-coming, is never separated from the lower, and through union with the same in a oneness of moment, also shares in the opposition of pleasure and pain.

5. The pious self-consciousness, like every essential element of human nature, will also, in its development, necessarily constitute a community; and, in fact, on the one hand, an unequally fleeting one, and on the other, a definitely limited one, i. e. a church.

6. The different definitely limited religious communities making their appearance in history, are related to one another partly as different degrees of development, partly as different kinds.

7. Those formations of piety in which all pious conditions of spirit express the dependence of everything finite upon One Highest and Infinite Being, i. e. the monotheistic, take the highest rank, and all others are related to them as subordinate, from which it has been the allotment of man to pass over to that higher condition of spirit.

8. As being different in nature, those formations of piety are removed farthest from one another, which, as it respects the pious emotions, subordinate in a contrary manner, *some*, the natural in human conditions to the moral, *others*, the moral to the natural.

9. Every individual formation of community-piety, is one in part, *externally*, as an impulse going out from a definite epoch, according to the truth of history, in part, *internally*, as a peculiar modification of all that which also arises in every cultivated mode of faith of the same kind and degree, and therefore the characteristic

<sup>1</sup> The italics are added by the translator to indicate key-thoughts or peculiar terms.

essence of every such formation, can be discovered only by taking the two elements together.

10. Christianity is a monotheistic mode of faith belonging to the teleological (i. e. morally perfective) tendency of piety, and is distinguished from all others by this, that everything in it is referred to the redemption accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth."

We will here make a pause with our author's *propositions*, in order to present the reader with his *comment* on the second of the series here given, viz; that piety is essentially a feeling,—a doctrine which deeply underlies the whole structure of Schleiermachiian theology, and about which metaphysical heads in our own land have been somewhat embroiled.

1. "That a church is nothing else but a community, having reference to piety, is for us evangelical Christians certainly put beyond all doubt, since we impute it to a church equally as a degeneracy, when it charges itself with anything else than this, whether it be the affairs of science or of external arrangement; as we also always rise in resistance, when the leaders in the State or those in science as such, would likewise regulate the affairs of piety. On the contrary, we may not forbid the latter to observe and to judge from their stand-point, as well piety itself as the community that stands related to it, and to define their proper place in the general sphere of human life, in so far as piety too and church are a material for knowledge; indeed we are here ourselves entering upon such observation. So also we do not forbid statesmen to establish the external relations of pious communions according to the principles of civil order, which nevertheless by no means implies, that this communion should proceed from the State, or should be a constituent part of the same. But not only we, but also such church-communions, which do not attempt so strictly to separate Church and State, or churchly and scientific communion, will still be obliged to agree to our exposition; for they can certainly attribute only indirectly to the church an influence upon such communions, but can consider as its essential business, only the preservation, regulation, and promotion of piety.

2. Although feeling and self-consciousness are here put in juxtaposition, as if one and the same thing, the design of this is by no means to introduce universally a usage of language absolutely equalizing both expressions. The expression *feeling* has in the language of common life long been customary in our sphere; but for scientific language, it needs a more accurate definition, and this is to be given to it through the other word. Does, therefore, any one take the expression feeling, in so wide a sense, as to embrace even unconscious conditions thereunder; then must he be reminded, that it is here to be abstracted from such a use. Again there has been added to the expression *self-consciousness*, the definitive *immediate*, in order that no one may think of such a self-consciousness

which is no feeling, when for instance, we name a self-consciousness, that consciousness of ourselves, which resembles more an objective consciousness, and is an idea of ourselves, and as such is produced by means of self-observation. Does such a conception of ourselves, as we find ourselves in a certain portion of time, thinking e. g. or willing, approach very near, or even quite transpire the individual moments of the condition: then this self-consciousness seems as if *accompanying* the condition itself. But every proper unmeditated self-consciousness, which is not representation, but in a peculiar sense feeling, is by no means always only *accompanying*; not only so, but there is attributable to every one in this respect, a two-fold experience. At one time, that there are moments in which all thought and will, step back behind a somewhat determined self-consciousness; but then also that sometimes the same determination of the self-consciousness continues unchanged during a series of promiscuous acts of thought and will, is consequently not related to these, and therefore does not in a proper sense, accompany them. Thus are joy and sorrow, these specially important movements for the religious sphere, peculiar states of feeling in the above sense; on the contrary, self-approbation, and self-disapprobation, viewed apart from the fact that they afterwards pass over into joy and sorrow, in and for themselves belong more to the objective consciousness of self as products of an analysing observation. No where perhaps, do both forms stand nearer to each other, but precisely, therefore, does also this juxtaposition put the difference in the clearest light.

3. The proposition seems to pre-suppose that there is no fourth principle, to knowing, doing, and feeling. It does this, however, not in the sense, as if it laid claim to be an apagogical demonstration; but it puts the two former only in connection with the latter, in order with the given exposition at the same time to take up and to discuss existing, deviating expositions—so that we could let the question whether there is such a fourth principle, lie wholly apart, were it not partly of necessity—material to us to convince ourselves whether indeed there exists another place which could be assigned to piety, and secondly were we not compelled to prepare ourselves to comprehend clearly the relation which obtains between Christian piety in itself, and as well Christian faith, so far as it can be brought into the form of knowledge, as also Christian action. Were now the relation of those three principles any where set forth in a universally recognized manner, then we should need only to appeal to such exposition. But as it is, what is necessary upon this point must here be said, but still only as something borrowed from psychology, and it is well to remark, that the truth of the case, namely, that piety is a feeling, remains wholly independent of the following examination. Life is to be conceived of as an alternation of self-immanency (*Inrichbleiben*) and a

self-egression (*Aussichheraustrreten*) of the subject. Both forms of the consciousness constitute the self-immanency, on the contrary the act proper is the self-egression; in so far then knowledge and feeling stand together opposed to action. But although knowledge as a *have-known* is self-immanency of the subject, it is nevertheless as present perception realizable only by a self-egression of the same, and is so far forth an act. Feeling, on the contrary, is not only in its continuance as a *have-been-moved* (*Bewegtwordensein*) a self-immanency, but is also as a *being-moved* (*Bewegtwerden*) not affected by the subject, but is merely affected in the subject, and is therefore, since it belongs wholly to the susceptibility, also wholly a self-immanent: and in so far it stands alone opposed to both the others, viz: knowledge and action. If now the question arises, whether there is, in addition to these three, feeling, knowledge, and action, a fourth, or to those two, self-immanency and self-egression, a third state or element; then we may certainly say that the unity of these is neither of the two or three; but no one surely can put this by the side of those as such a third or fourth, such as they themselves are, but this unity is the essence of the subject itself, which makes itself known in those reciprocally opposing forms, and therefore, as we may call it in this special relation, the common ground of the same. Just so on the other hand, is every real moment of life, according to its united contents, one made up of those two or three elements, although two of them will always have arisen only as vestiges or as germs. But a third to those two, of which the one has again been bi-parted, it will be hardly possible to grant.

4. If therefore, these three being supposed, feeling, knowledge, and action, the already often-propounded assertion is here again affirmed, that of these three, piety belongs to feeling; it is thereby, as already follows from the above, by no means excluded from all union with knowledge and action. Much more, if in general the immediate self-consciousness mediates the transition between moments in which knowledge and those wherein action prevails, in that e. g. out of the same knowledge, according as one or another determination of self-consciousness enters, a different act comes forth in one person, from that in another: then it will also belong to piety, to awaken knowledge and action; and every movement in which piety prevailingly appears, will enclose in its bosom both, or one of both as germs. But this is precisely the truth of our position, by no means an objection to it; because were it otherwise, then pious moments could certainly not unite themselves with others in one life, but piety would be something by itself without any influence upon the other spiritual functions of life. But in this truth, our position, by which its peculiar sphere in union with all the rest is secured to piety, goes against the diverse assertions, that piety is a knowledge, or an act, or both, or a condition com-



posed of feeling, knowledge, and act, and in this polemical reference, our position is still more accurately to be considered. Shall now piety consist in knowledge, then were it indeed pre-eminently the same knowledge wholly, or the substance of it, which is propounded as the contents of the doctrine of faith, or it must be thoroughly false, that we are here inquiring after the essence of piety, for the sake of such a doctrinal belief. Is now piety this knowledge, then the measure of this knowledge in a man must also be the measure of his piety. Because, that which in its rise and fall is not the measure of the perfection of an object, cannot constitute its essence. Therefore, under the proposed hypothesis, the best possessor of the Christian doctrinal system, would also always be at the same time, the most pious Christian. And this certainly no one will assume, even though we equally premised, that that best is only he who adheres also most to the essential, through all collaterals and outworks, but rather grant that with equal perfection of that knowledge, different degrees of piety can arise, and with equally perfect piety, very different degrees of this knowledge. Still perhaps one objects, that the assertion that piety is a knowledge, means not so much the contents of that knowledge, as the certainty co-inhabiting the ideas, so that the cognition of the doctrines of faith, is piety only by reason of the certainty attributed to them, and therefore of the strength of the conviction; that a possession of the same without conviction is on the contrary no piety at all. In this case, therefore, were the strength of the conviction the measure of the piety; and this, indeed, is chiefly the idea of those, who prefer to explain the word *faith* by truth of conviction. But in all other peculiar spheres of knowledge, conviction itself has no other measure than the clearness and perfection of thought itself. Is it indeed so with *this* conviction; then we have certainly come back to the former consequent, that he who conceives of religious doctrines, in the clearest and most consistent manner, singly and in their connection, must also be the most pious man. Is this now to be rejected, and the supposition still to stand; then the certainty here spoken of must be of another kind, and have another measure. Let their piety be ever so closely connected with this *certainty*, it is not therefore united in the *same* manner with that *knowledge*. But is, however, the knowledge which forms the doctrinal of faith, still related to piety; then this is thus reconcilable, viz. that piety is certainly the end of that knowledge, but that this knowledge can be developed only so far as a certainty dwells in the determinings of the self-consciousness.

On the contrary, does piety consist in action: then it is plain, that the act constituting it cannot be determined by its contents; for experience teaches, that side by side with that which is beautiful, what is also most hideous, and by that which is fullest of value, what is emptiest and most insignificant, is done as pious, and out

of piety. We are consequently only referred to the form, to the quality and manner of the act. But this is to be comprehended only from the two *extremes*—(viz. the *terminus a quo*, and the *terminus ad quem*.—Trans.), the impulse lying at the foundation as the point of commencement, and the result aimed at as final object. But now no one will call an action more or less pious on account of the greater or less degree of perfection with which the contemplated result is reached. But are we cast back upon the initial impulse : then it is obvious, that there lies at the root of every impulse a definite state of the self-consciousness, be it now pleasure or pain, and that in this subject one impulse is in the clearest manner distinguishable from another. Accordingly, an act will be pious so far as the determinate state of the self-consciousness, the feeling which has become effect and has gone over into the impulse, is a pious one. Both suppositions therefore lead back to the same point, viz., that knowledge and action belong to piety, but that neither makes out the essence of the same, but they belong to it only so far as the awakened feeling now comes to rest in a thought that fixes it, now pours itself into an out-speaking act. Finally, no one will deny, that there are states of feeling, such as godly sorrow, contrition, confidence, joyfulness, which we call pious in and for themselves, without respect to a knowledge and action proceeding from them, although we certainly expect, both that they will exhibit it themselves in variously furthered activities, and will become subject to observation.

5. From what has been hitherto said, we are prepared to form a judgment upon the position that piety is a condition, in which knowledge, feeling, and action, are bound together. We, of course, refer them back to one another, when feeling is said to be derived from knowledge, in like manner as action from feeling. But is no subordination at all to be expressed : then it is just as well the description of every other quite clear and living moment, as of a pious one. For although the objective conception of an act goes before the act itself, it likewise attends it continually, and the proportion between both expresses itself likewise in the self-consciousness by a greater or less degree of satisfaction and repose of mind, so that here too in the collective whole of the condition all three are combined. Just so it is with knowledge. Because as a happily ended operation of the thinking activity, it expresses itself in the self-consciousness as a confident certainty. But, at the same time, there will be a struggle to bind up the recognized truth with others, or to seek after cases for its application : and this is the ever similarly originated beginning of an act, which perpetually unfolds itself in the offered opportunity, and so we find here also in the aggregate condition, knowledge, feeling, and action together. But as now the first described condition is, notwithstanding, essentially an act, and the second a knowledge, thus

piety, too, in its different expressions, remains a state of the feeling. This, then, will also be taken up into the thought, but only in proportion as every one so determined in himself, is likewise inclined to thought and practised in it; and in the same manner only, and according to the same measure, this inward determination also comes forth in living movement and representative action. It also follows, from this view, that under feeling neither anything confused, nor anything unreal, is to be thought of, since on the one hand, it is strongest in the most living instants, and mediately, or immediately, lies at the ground of all expressions of the will, and on the other, can be grasped by observation, and conceived of as it is. But if others will exclude feeling entirely from our sphere, and therefore describe piety only as a knowledge, generating actions, or as an act proceeding from a knowledge; then would such be obliged not only at first to settle among themselves, whether now piety is to be said to be the knowledge or the act; but they must also show us, how then out of a knowledge an act can arise without a determination of the self-consciousness intervening. And, if they are compelled at last to grant this, then will they be convinced, from the foregoing, that if such an *interweaving* bears in itself the character of piety, then the knowledge therein is certainly not, and the action therein no more the piety, in and for itself, but this is exactly the determination of the inter-mediating self-consciousness. But this can also always be stated in a converse manner; action is not yet piety in *all the cases* in which a definite self-consciousness arises out of a previous knowledge, and knowledge is not any more piety, in and for itself, if it has no other contents than such determination adopted in the *thought*."

We close this article with the significant motto on the title-page of the work from which these extracts are taken, and from which we may present, in a future number of the Repository, Schleiermacher's views more fully and clearly. As we advance with him into the great field of thought, which he has labored upon with so powerful a hand, we shall find his peculiar obscurities, as a writer and a reasoner, lessening at every step, and his *veil* growing thinner. His motto, properly understood, contains, certainly, a great and divine principle. May it ever be ours, also, to adopt, and to apply, in asking the high and holy question, "What is truth?"

Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam qui nom crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget.

Anselm. Prosol. 1. de fide trin, 2.

## ARTICLE X.

## CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Orators of the American Revolution.* By E. L. MAGOON. New York : Baker & Scribner. 1848.

This is a book that will find many readers, and deservedly. What American patriot or Christian but that feels a deep interest in those great and noble men whose eloquence, wisdom, and energy, accomplished so much good for this nation during, and subsequent to, the war of the Revolution. Their virtues were great; their abilities superior; their sacrifices many; and ever precious be their memory to the great heart of this happy nation. We have here graphic sketches of Otis, Samuel Adams, Quincy, Hancock, Warren, John Adams, Patrick Henry, Lee, Hamilton, Ames, Pinkney, Wirt, Emmet, and Randolph, with a few specimens of their oratory. Nor are Davies, Caldwell, Clarke, Witherspoon, and other distinguished patriots of the Pulpit, forgotten.—The execution of this agreeable task is creditable to the Author. He has evidently a just appreciation of the characters and services of those great men, and gives, on the whole, fair and striking portraits of them. His style is a little too ambitious and ornate perhaps, but still it is lively, graphic, original, and energetic. Our only regret in reading it—and it is one that is felt throughout, and we know not that the Author could have supplied the deficiency—is, that we have so few, and those imperfect and unsatisfying, *specimens* of their oratorical peculiarities and powers. Could more of these have been given, it would have added greatly to the value and interest of the work. But as it is, we heartily commend the book, believing that it will tend to inspire in the hearts of our citizens, a profounder reverence and regard for those patriotic orators and statesmen, to whom, under God, we owe our national liberty, and wise and beneficent form of government.

- 2.—*Principles of the Interior or Hidden Life; designed particularly for the consideration of those who are seeking assurance of Faith and perfect love.* By THOMAS C. UPHAM. Eighth Edition. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1848.

This work of Professor Upham's, has already reached the *eighth* edition, showing that it is having an extensive circulation in the religious community. And we think it speaks well for our day, that a book of this character—eminently spiritual, and pervaded by the principles and spirit of holy living—should find so many readers. The truth is, there is a felt deficiency in the piety of the present day; and this feeling is limited to no class of Christians, to no schools or denominations: there is a longing on the part of thousands of God's people, for a higher development of holiness—a reaching forth to something above and beyond the present attainment of the church. It was this that led many devout persons to embrace the erroneous views of Prof. Finney, on the subject of Christian perfection; and the same inward conviction of the necessity of a purer and deeper piety, is creating a demand for Prof. Upham's works, all of which aim to illustrate and urge a life of holiness.—This work is divided into three parts: On the Inward Life in its connection with Faith and Love: The Life of Faith and Love followed by the crucifixion of the Life of Nature: On inward Divine Guidance. There is very much that is good in the book. It may be read by the soul that is hungering and thirsting after righteousness, with great profit. Its analyses of Christian experience, and its discriminations on many points of doctrine, are able, just, thorough, and instructive. We have read it with no ordinary interest, and we advise every Christian to read it, and weigh well its teachings. We by no means intend to endorse the peculiar views of Prof. Upham, as they are brought out with greater or lesser distinctness in all

his works, and we presume are well understood. He is one of those writers that needs to be read with watchfulness, and prayer, and rigid discrimination,—and being thus read, we know of few living writers from whom the soul is likely to receive more benefit.

- 3.—*The Life of Faith ; In three parts.* By THOMAS C. UPHAM, D.D. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1848.

Another work by Prof. Upham on the same general subject, and to some extent, kindred in its nature, with his previous work on the Interior Life. "The leading object of both works," he tells us, "is the promotion of practical holiness. I have no doubt that the object will meet with favor; but have less confidence, that the manner of executing it will be approved." Both works maintain the same views; indeed the same religious ideas are reproduced, in one form or another, in all the Professor's religious writings. He evidently has one grand end in view, and is putting forth all his strength to gain it.—The first part of this new work, embracing "*Some of the Philosophical and Scriptural Principles and Doctrines of Faith*," we regard as very able, discriminating, and instructive. Part second traces "The Power or Effects of Faith in the regulation of man's Inward Nature." And part third shows "The relation of Faith to the Divine Guidance, or the operation of the Holy Ghost in the soul." We are far from subscribing to all the views he herein advances; we think some of them are "contrary to sound doctrine," and pernicious in their tendency; while the spirit and general tone of the work are eminently Christian. While we commend the religious writings of Prof. Upham, for very much that is eminently spiritual, and instructive, and promotive of holiness in the hearts and lives of Christians, we decidedly dissent from some of his favorite views, both of Christian doctrine and experience, believing that, while they may not embrace absolute errors, their tendency, especially on certain classes of minds, is to foster and develop a piety not in all respects scriptural.

- 4.—*Life of Madame Catharine Adorna. Including some leading facts and traits in her Religious Experience. Together with explanations and remarks, tending to illustrate the doctrine of Holiness.* By THOMAS C. UPHAM, D.D. Third Edition. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1848.

We have here, though in a condensed form, the counterpart of Madame Guyon. The subject of this memoir, was an Italian, of the 15th century, generally known as Saint Catharine of Genoa. She was of the illustrious family of the Fieschi, and greatly distinguished for her holiness and active piety. She lived and died in the communion of the Romish church. There is nothing strange or of special interest in her memoirs, aside from her religious character. She is brought forward by Prof. Upham simply to illustrate the doctrine of holiness—"as an instance of assurance of faith, and pure or perfect love." She was evidently a pure-minded and eminently devout Christian. That she was "perfect," we do not for a moment believe; indeed her Biographer does not insist upon our so regarding her. She belonged to the school of the Quietists, which Prof. Upham, we are sorry to say, looks upon with favor, and, as we think, distinctly advocates in this work. We think it the least valuable of any of his productions; and yet there is much in it to edify and urge to higher attainment, the discriminating reader.

- 5.—*The Pilgrim's Progress from this world to that which is to come ; delivered under the similitude of a dream.* By JOHN BUNYAN. American Tract Society, New York.

This is certainly one of the most beautiful and splendid specimens of book-making that we have ever seen. The illustrations are striking and elegantly

executed; the printing is done in the most perfect style of the art, on superb paper, and it is bound in beautiful gilt binding. The Society has certainly tried its best on the "Elstow-tinker," and has now given to the world Bunyan's immortal work, in a form and dress worthy of its great excellence and popularity. It is sold also at an astonishing low price, considering its style and size, and must quickly supersede, both on account of its beauty and economy, all the other editions that have appeared in this country. Great pains have been taken in collating this edition with other copies, in order to render it a correct reprint of the original work. The original side-notes, which often throw much light upon the text, have been preserved. It embraces the autobiography of the Author in his "*Grace Abounding*."

The great essayist Macauley, speaking of this book, says, "The style of Bunyan is delightful to every reader, and invaluable as a study to every person who wishes to obtain a wide command over the English language. The vocabulary is the vocabulary of the common people. We have observed several pages which do not contain a single word of more than two syllables. Yet no writer has said more exactly what he meant to say. For magnificence, for pathos, for vehement exhortation, for subtle disquisition, for every purpose of the poet, the orator, and the divine, this homely dialect, the dialect of plain working men, was perfectly sufficient. There is no book in our literature on which we would so readily stake the fame of the old unpolluted English language; no book which shows so well how rich that language is in its own proper wealth, and how little it has improved by all that it has borrowed." And again, "Though there were many clever men in England during the latter half of the 17th century, there were only two great creative minds. One of these minds produced the *Paradise Lost*, the other the *Pilgrim's Progress*."

6.—*Poems by William Cowper. With a Biographical and Critical Introduction, by the Rev. Thomas Dale. With numerous splendid Engravings. In two volumes.* New York: Harper & Brothers.

COWPER deservedly ranks among the first of English Poets. Others far surpassed him in imaginative powers, in depth and reach of original thought, in lofty genius, but few have equalled, none perhaps surpassed him, as the Poet of affection, of elevated religious sentiment and experience, and of social beauty and enjoyment. There is an artlessness, a naturalness, a pathos and sweetness in his poetry, that lends to it a peculiar charm, and gives it a most happy influence on one's tastes and moral feelings. If we could have but *one* of the great English Poets, we would, all things considered, take COWPER. His religious and devotional poetry, especially, is pre-eminently excellent and valuable.

The HARPERS have here given us a most superb edition of this great Poet. It is a finished and perfect copy. We have seldom if ever seen a book got up in better taste and style. It is illustrated by seventy-five beautiful engravings, and is printed and bound in that finished and elegant manner for which these publishers are distinguished. We are glad that they are giving to the world, in so attractive a form, the *Standard British Poets*. They have already given Shakespeare, Thompson, Goldsmith, Milton, and now Cowper; and we trust the series will be extended. As a gift-book, to any person of sense or true feelings, this single copy of Cowper is worth more than all the *Annals* of the season, or a cart-load of the popular literature of the day.

7.—*History of France, from the Conquest of Gaul, by Julius Caesar to the reign of Louis Philippe; with Conversations at the end of each chapter.* By MRS. MARKHAM. Prepared for the use of schools by the addition of a Map, Notes, Questions, and a Supplementary Chapter, bringing down the History to the present time. By JACOB ABBOTT. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1848.

This is a very valuable History. It is admirably adapted to the school-room.

and will be found to be an entertaining narrative to the general reader. It gives a clear, concise and condensed account of the leading events which have transpired in that remarkable country, from the Conquest of Gaul by Cæsar, to the close of the recent eventful Revolution. The conversations by the Authoress, at the end of each chapter, are sure to arrest the attention and interest the mind of the pupil, and tend to fix the leading facts of the history in the memory. The Maps, Notes, Questions, and Supplement, by Mr. Abbott, add very much to the interest and value of the work.

- 8.—*Wreaths of Friendship.* By T. S. ARTHUR, & F. C. WOODWORTH. New York: Baker & Scribner.

It is a noble work to entertain, in a rational way, and instruct, the youthful mind; to teach useful and pious lessons in a winning and attractive manner. Few living writers are more successful in this department, than are the joint Authors of this elegant Annual. And they have herein twined many a chaste and beautiful "Wreath" of thought and affection, as a gift for their favorite ones. It was a happy thought that suggested this rational festival, for their numerous young friends, and no little tact and wisdom is manifest in carrying it out. It is a book of short stories, which will not only be read with interest but cannot fail to make a pleasing impression. Parents will find it an admirable gift-book for the younger members of their family. We heartily bid it god-speed in its mission of friendship and rational entertainment.

- 9.—*First Book in Greek; containing a full view of the Forms of Words, with Vocabularies and Copious Exercises, on the method of constant Imitation and Repetition.* By JOHN MCCLINTOCK, D.D., & GEORGE R. CROOKS, A.M., Profs. of Languages in Dickinson College. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1848.

This book is prepared on the same plan with the "First Book in Latin," from the same authors. That work was generally received with high approbation; was recommended by high authority, and we believe has been pretty extensively adopted as a school-book. We should think, from the examination we have given this First Book in Greek, that its merits were equal to that, and that it is a decided improvement upon previous works. We are highly pleased with its arrangements and execution, and should think that it was the best book for beginners in Greek, to be found in this country.

- 10.—*Count Raymond, of Toulouse, and the Crusade against the Albigenses, under Pope Innocent III.* By CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. Illustrated edition. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1848.

THIS work will always possess a sort of melancholy interest to the public, it being the last production of the gifted and lamented authoress, and written, also, under circumstances of the most painful character. We do not think it equal, in point of intrinsic interest and power, to many of her other works; still it is characteristic; and will be read and treasured by her many admirers. The style of it is beautiful: the picture drawn of the condition of the church in the 12th century; of Papal tyranny and persecution; and of the sufferings of the poor Albigenses, under Innocent III., is truthful and graphic, and leaves a sad impression on the reader's mind. Mr. Dodd has brought it out in an elegant form.

- 11, *Important Doctrines of the True Christian Religion, Explained, Demonstrated, and Vindicated from Vulgar Errors: Being a Series of Lectures delivered at the New Jerusalem Church, London.* By the Rev. S. NOBLE; with an Introduction by GEORGE BUSH. New York: John Allen, 1848.

THIS is an octavo of nearly 600 pages. It contains lectures on the follow-

ing subjects: The Lord's Second Advent: The Divine Character, Unity, Trinity, and Person; The Assumption of Humanity, and putting forth thereby, of the Power of Redemption: The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and Salvation by His Blood; His Mediation and Atonement: The Justification of a Sinner: Harmony with the Doctrine of a Plurality of worlds.—A strange mixture truly, of truth and error, sober piety, and the wildest extravagance, are these Lectures. There is much in them that is good, true, ingenious, and able, with very much that is crude, erroneous, visionary, and utterly subversive of the one true Faith. It is an earnest and labored attempt to draft a system of theology on the principles and vagaries of Swedenborg. Mr. Noble has long been known as a distinguished, and probably the ablest living advocate and expounder of the faith of that remarkable man. He has evidently here done his best; but alas! it is essentially "another gospel," that he has given to us; a gospel without a Trinity—without a vicarious Atonement—without Justification by faith—without an interceding Mediator—without a Holy Ghost—with scarcely one feature of the faith which Christ and His apostles taught. He begins at the *foundation*, and affirms, "that God has not existed in three persons, but in one, and that an atonement made by one Divine person to Himself, is a glaring absurdity." "The foundation swept away," says Prof. Bush, in his Introduction, with solemn gravity and evident satisfaction, "the superstructure totters down. To the clarified vision of the man of the New Church the entire fabric of the doctrinals of the old system passes over the stage as a solemn phantasmagoria, a spectral array of synodical and sacerdotal sanctities, which flit and disappear forever, as embodying any substantial truth." And upon such a foundation the New Jerusalem Church is to be built! Alas, for Truth and Religion, when they fall into the hands of vain dreamers or rash speculators!

12. *A Manual of Morals for Common Schools.* Andover: W. H. Wardwell. Boston: J. P. Jewett & Co. New York: M. H. Newman & Co., 1848.

THE design of this book is one of no little importance. What lesson more needful for all the children of this great Republic to learn, than "the fear of God;" the principles of a sound scriptural morality. And if not taught in the common school, this much needed lesson will never be taught to multitudes of our children and youth. "Some work on morals," says the Hon. Horace Mann, "which shall excite the sympathies as well as inform the intellect; which shall make children love virtue as well as understand what it is, is the great desideratum of our schools." This manual presents the elements of the subject in a simple, concise, and intelligent manner, and illustrates them by familiar examples. Its teachings are scriptural; and we earnestly commend it to the attention of parents and teachers.

15. *History of Mary, Queen of Scots.* By Jacob Abbott. With Engravings. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1848.

THIS history was prepared expressly for the younger class of minds. The thrilling narrative of the beautiful, though unfortunate Queen, is related in that pleasing and attractive manner for which the author is justly distinguished. He evidently inclines to the darker side of the question, respecting her participation in the murder of her husband, Lord Darnley, as well as her criminality respecting her intercourse and marriage with the Earl of Bothwell—the two worst features in her history. No one can read the story of her downfall, long captivity, and final cruel death, and not pity her sorrows, and deplore her unhappy fate.



- 14.—*History of King Charles the First, of England. With Engravings.* By JACOB ABBOTT. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1848.

THIS is another of Abbott's Histories, similar in design and execution with his *Mary, Queen of Scots*. It portrays the chief events of his personal history and of his eventful reign, as well as the long and fierce struggle with his Parliament, which ended in his overthrow and the establishment of the Commonwealth under Cromwell, in a lively and graphic manner, so as to interest the reader deeply in the subject, and fix the prominent points of the history in his memory. It is illustrated with a number of very striking engravings, and is beautifully bound, uniform with the other volumes of the series. This series of short and popular histories, from such a polished and practised pen, will no doubt be received with favor, and awaken a deeper interest in the study of history in the minds of the young.

- 15.—*Gowrie; or the King's Plot.* By G. P. R. JAMES Esq. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1848.

Another of James' novels. The moral of this is unexceptionable, and yet the impression it makes on one's mind is very unpleasant. The Plot is so dark and hellish, and the end of the hero so tragical, that the mind, especially of a sensitive person, is unfavorably affected by the reading of it. We cannot, as a matter of taste or principle, commend such works to the reading community.

- 16.—*The Great Hoggarth's Diamond.* By W. M. THACKERY. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1848.

This work is from the pen of the author of "Vanity Fair." It is inferior to that in point of interest and power, and still it has its merits. It is conceived in the same vein of keen satire, and hits off some prevailing weaknesses and sins of modern society, with no little justice and effect.

- 17.—*The Rev. Leigh Richmond's Letters and Counsels to his Children. Selected from his Memoir and "Domestic Portraiture," with an account of the closing scene of his life. Written by his Daughter.* Published by the American Tract Society.

Such a book as this is a treasure. The piety that pervades it; the wisdom of its counsels; and the sweet affection, and parental anxiety and tenderness which characterize it, impart to it a peculiar charm and power to instruct and improve. We know of no better book to put into hands of those for whom it is specially intended.

- 18.—*The Sufferings of Christ.* By a Layman. Third Edition. Revised and enlarged. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1848.

This book has attracted no little attention in the theological world, both for its doctrine and its logical ability. A third edition in so short a time, shows that it is extensively read; and we have reason to know that a goodly number of intelligent divines and laymen, hold the views of the "Sufferings of Christ" herein advocated.

The character of this work is too well known to need an extended notice. We are not prepared to adopt the main doctrine of the book, "that Christ suffered in his entire personality, or in the totality of his character as human and divine—that there was that about his death which could not have been predicated only of his humanity; something superhuman and awfully mysterious, in consequence of the presence and participation of the divine." Still, to affirm the contrary, and with so much confidence, and without any qualification,

as many do, we conceive to be unwarranted. The whole subject of the Incarnation and Atonement, is a "mystery," too profound for man to explain: the precise nature and extent of that union of the Divine and human natures in the person of Christ, which underlies the whole superstructure, can never be known by us, and hence we cannot know how far, if at all, the Divine participated in the sufferings of the human. Modesty and humility specially become us, in speaking on a theme, so peculiar in its character, and so awfully mysterious. This book deserves to be read and studied.

19.—*Youth's Cabinet*. Edited by REV. FRANCIS WOODWORTH. Bound Volume. New York, 1848.

Mr. Woodworth is really one of the most pleasing and entertaining writers for the young that we know of. This volume, of nearly 400 octavo pp., abounds with matter that children and youth cannot fail to relish highly, and be made happier and wiser thereby. There is nothing to offend a refined taste, or correct morals; and everything to please the eye, instruct the mind, and improve the heart.

20.—*Theophany; or the Manifestation of God in the Life, Character, and Mission of Jesus Christ*. By REV. ROBERT TURNBULL, author of "*The Genius of Scotland*," "*Pulpit Orators of France and Switzerland*," etc. Hartford: Brockett, Fuller, & Co, 1849.

This work was received at a very late day, and we can do little more than announce it. The subject of the Book; the popularity of the Author as a writer; and its appearance just at this time, for well known reasons, will direct attention to it, and secure for it, as well as for Dr. Bushnell's forthcoming work, a careful and extensive reading. The object of the work is not polemical but practical. It is written in a kind spirit, and in a most beautiful style. "The first part of the work contains a rapid sketch of the principal incidents in our Saviour's life, in order to exhibit the great truth of 'God manifest in the flesh,' in its historical aspects." The Second Part discusses the Moral Perfection of Christ: the Divinity of Christ: His Incarnation: His Atonement: and the Relations of the Godhead to the Sufferings of Christ. The Author's views differ from what are understood to be the views of Dr. Bushnell, as recently put forth at Cambridge, and at New Haven, on certain cardinal points; and are, in the main, those usually held by orthodox divines. He recognizes one fact of immense importance, viz., the folly of any and every attempt to explain the mystery of the Incarnation or of the Trinity; "that we are incompetent to speculate upon this subject; and that no theory, professing its elucidation, however plausible and splendid, can possess the slightest claim to our respect." We fully agree with him here. It is folly and presumption in the extreme, for any mortal to attempt to tear aside the veil behind which God has seen fit to hide the *philosophy* of His own infinite existence, and of the Plan of Salvation. It is enough for us to know the stupendous facts. We shall probably refer to this work again, when Dr. Bushnell's work, now in press, shall have made its appearance. The book is most elegantly printed.

unconnected rules, unworthy of regard from the philosopher and from the man of elevated moral principle: no longer, either, as a mere negative, critical art, having no developing, invigorating, nourishing power or aim in itself, looking only to manner, and, by its soulless rules and cautions fitted to produce, at the best, but mannerism, smooth, fair, precise perhaps, but cold, stiff, and expressionless, and, therefore, to be shunned and despised by every free, generous, feeling spirit: nor yet as an art which only a peculiar age and peculiar circumstances can originate or allow; possible, perhaps necessary, in the condition of the ancient States of Greece and Rome, but wholly unsuited to our age of the world. It is now extensively received as an important art, worthy of the study of the philosopher in its scientific relations, and necessary in the training of every one who would gain the name of a true orator. If there have appeared as yet no complete, philosophically constructed textbooks of rhetoric, or of homiletics even, which can commend itself to universal favor; if no satisfactory theory of the art has as yet been worked out; if we must alike reject the theory of Schott, as too narrowly limiting the design of eloquence in confining it to the production of a harmony of will between the speaker and hearer; and that of Hoffmann, who determines its laws from a too exclusive regard to the form of the thought; and that of Palmer, who pushes this theory of Hoffmann so far as to deny the applicability of rhetorical principles to pulpit discourse, which, he insists, must derive its form from its Scriptural theme—the text; and, in fine, that of Theremin, who seems to embrace in eloquence all discourse designed to produce a moral effect on others, whether in public or in private, in the relations of friendship, of the family, or of the state, while yet, like Schott, he limits its aim to an effect on the will alone; if we are satisfied with none of these views of the art, we must yet admit in all these discussions an earnestness of endeavor, a care and labor of investigation, a precision and force of reasoning worthy of a true philosophical spirit, and rich in promise as to ultimate philosophical results.

We should esteem it a most hopeful sign, if, in the whole range of English literature of modern times, a solitary work could be found characterized by the spirit which appears in these and other recent German productions. While both in Great Britain and in the United States, the broad field of secular eloquence, in both its departments, deliberative and judicial, is thrown open by our free political constitutions, inviting every generous, patriotic spirit to the most assiduous culture of oratory—a field almost entirely closed to the German, and even the field of pulpit eloquence is in these two countries more open, more extended, and more inviting than in Germany, yet it now seems probable that from German divines will proceed the first philosophical conception of rhetoric and just theory of eloquence. We say *German divines*; for it is

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ARTICLE I.

By PROF. H. N. DAY, of Western Reserve College, Ohio.

ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE.

*Die Beredsamkeit eine Tugend, oder Grundlinien einer systematischen Rhetorik; von Dr. Franz Theremin. Ziveite, verbesserte auflage. Berlin, 1837.*

THE first edition of this work appeared in 1814. The author, who is Court-preacher at Berlin, has published a number of volumes of Sermons, Poetry, &c., besides an elaborate work on Eloquence, entitled "Demosthenes and Massillon; a contribution to the history of eloquence," which appeared in 1845.

He is a writer of considerable power and originality. His mind is clear, philosophical and vigorous. His style is remarkably simple, terse, and expressive.

The occasion of the production of this work was a conviction in the author's mind of the radical imperfection of existing theories of eloquence, and a corresponding imperfection in the existing treatises on rhetoric. The author has the happiness of witnessing a remarkable change in the views which prevail in Germany, in respect to this art, since the first publication of his treatise.

As well from the character as from the number of works which have recently appeared in Germany, the inference is a lawful one that the art is no longer regarded there as incapable of being reduced to strictly philosophical principles. It is no longer regarded as a mere contrivance—a jugglery, whose highest aim is to subvert the judgment, supplant the reason, and set aside the moral feeling by insidious play with blind passions, or by the glare of sophistry and the dissimulations of false logic, and therefore, from its very nature, unable to rise above a mere collection of arbitrary

tical demands. Eloquence had become corrupt. It had degenerated into a mere play of words. It had lost its very soul and life—the rational end and intent essentially implied in all true oratory. In the hands of the Sophists, rhetoric was a mere juggling artifice. It was show, pretense; it had no heart. Socrates, perhaps, should receive the credit for restoring to eloquence, now a dead form, its heart and life. It is a part of the fruit of his labors and teachings, that eloquence at Athens, having caught again its breath, grew up to such an admirable stature and beauty in the succeeding age. It was from the school of Isocrates, the admirer, pupil, and constant friend of Socrates, that the flood of Athenian orators, all of the first rank, of whom Cicero speaks,<sup>1</sup> issued. In that school, Grecian oratory had its birth. But this question lay at the foundation of the Socratic teachings. It was involved essentially in all his discussions of the subject. The grand conclusion at which he arrives, in the admirable dialogue of the *Gorgias*, and to which the whole discussion presses, is, that rhetoric must be practised “for the right,” *ἐν τῷ δίκαιον δεῖ*, so far, at least, as the rhetorical argument is used in the dialogue as exemplifying and illustrating more generic principles. Thus, too, in the Socratic view, the true orator must be a good man, who is no other, in his view, than one who practices the right. It is evident, that if the question did not come up in this identical form in the discussions of Socrates, it was fully involved in them; and it is as evident that the arguments of Socrates went to show that in all true oratory there was a moral procedure. The whole tribe of the Sophists resisted strenuously this opinion. The real point at issue between them was this. After undergoing this warm discussion, by the Sophists and their antagonists, the question gradually settled down upon the Socratic side; and his opinion became the prevalent, almost the uncontroverted sentiment.

But what it is pertinent here to remark is, that the discussion of this question originated on exclusively practical grounds; and was taken up and carried on by the most practical of men. The presumption is, then, that there is a possible philosophical ground on which this question can rest, even if we can find it no where in the field of our speculations. No great ethical question of interest to the race ever arose out of actual life which had not a true philosophical basis to rest upon. We may discard the philosophy in the light of which this question was discussed among the Greeks; we may reject the philosophical grounds on which the ancients were content to rest their decision of it. We may not, however, rationally deny to a question of this character, thus originating, a claim upon our interest; certainly not for the reason

<sup>1</sup> De Orat. II. 22. Isocrates, magister istorum omnium, cujus e ludo, tanquam ex equo Trojano, meri principes exierunt.

that we do not at once discern the point of view from which the Greeks contemplated it.

But we have not only the fact, that the discussion of this question actually arose from practical life among the most practical of men, to create a strong presumption in favor of the propriety, not to say importance of discussing this question; we have, in addition, the fact, already intimated, that the affirmative decision of the question, after earnest controversy, met with almost universal acquiescence. That eloquence was a virtue, became as settled and unquestioned as any principle in philosophy or ethics.

With Aristotle, it was the germ and essential characteristic of his whole conception of rhetoric. With him rhetoric was but a subdivision of ethical science, and the entire development of the art or science was from a purely moral ground. His first grand division of the art, founded on the different kinds of discourse, rests on a moral foundation; and can be vindicated, as Theremin well observes, only as resting on this basis.

The Stoics, it would seem from a remark of Quintilian,<sup>1</sup> discussed the point at length and in full, without, however, manifesting any doubt in regard to the correctness of the prevalent sentiment.<sup>2</sup> They did not hesitate to maintain that eloquence was a virtue, even while they allowed the advocate to urge mere verisimilitudes against known truth.<sup>3</sup>

Among the Romans, the reception of this sentiment was unhesitating and universal. It settled into a practical principle, carrying everywhere, as Cicero tells us,<sup>4</sup> an authority never questioned more than that of civil laws themselves. And he himself in his *Dialogue de Oratore*, rising higher perhaps than the popular sentiment, pronounces eloquence, in so many words, to be one of the chiefest virtues; *est enim eloquentia una quædam de summis virtutibus*.

Such harmony of sentiment in regard to a point at first controverted, cannot be accounted for on the supposition of any erroneous ethical theory then prevailing, nor on that of any erroneous conception of the intrinsic nature of eloquence. If the predominance of the æsthetic sentiment among the Greeks might be supposed to incline them to regard everything as morally right which was perfect in form, and thus lead them to attribute to a perfect oratory a moral excellence, we have yet to account for the prevalence of the opinion against the stoical exaltation of the substance over the form which was the predominant theory in Rome.

<sup>1</sup> De Orat. Ins. 11, 20, 5. Quod philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus colligunt.

<sup>2</sup> Cic. de Orat. III. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Cic. de Off. II. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Acad. Qu. I. 2. Nos autem præceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam (quoniam utramque vim, virtutem esse nostri putant) sic parentes, ut legibus et cæt.

Besides, we are to remember that in Greece, where the opinion under consideration was received with less exclusive favor, eloquence, at least after the times of Socrates, partook far more of an ethical than of an æsthetic character, while in Rome, where the opinion gained universal acceptance, the form of eloquence was more regarded, in the Ciceronian and subsequent ages, than the substance. On the theory supposed, the case should be reversed. The imagined excess of regard to the form in the Greek which led him to exalt the æsthetic into the rank of the moral, and so to make a perfect eloquence a virtue, should have developed unduly the form of oratory at the expense of the matter; while the un-æsthetic Roman, who depressed the form unduly in his excessive regard to the substance, should have sacrificed the style to the thought in eloquence. These, however, are results at war with facts; for the type of Grecian eloquence is Demosthenes, while that of Roman, is Cicero.

This hypothesis, moreover, is at war with the known facts of the origin of the opinion. The opinion originated, as we have seen, in the Socratic school, in opposition to the Sophists.

We are driven to the necessity of supposing some ground in the demands of practical life,—demands common to the race, for the earnest discussion of this subject among the most practical of the practical Greeks; and moreover, of supposing some ground in truth for the decision they pronounced upon it, however strange and irrational all this may appear to us.

It may be thought, however, that the opinion is a perfectly harmless one, true or false; if true, it will not disturb any received doctrine in metaphysics, or ethics, any admitted canon of criticism or any adopted principle of oratorical training. It may be deemed a frivolous if not a senseless question, and deserving of no serious thought. Perhaps we are in error here;—in as serious error in regard to the importance of the question, as we may be in regard to the answer to be given to it. The practical eye of the Greek saw a high importance in the discussion. It may appear after all, and even upon our own ground, that his true instinct is more trust-worthy than our speculation. It may be shown, perhaps, that practical wants of the present age demand the serious discussion of the question as much as they did in the age of the Sophists; and, also, that its theoretical bearings are no less imperative in their demands of a thorough investigation of the matter.

Is not the oratory of the present day essentially sophistical, Gorgias-like? How much of our congressional oratory is for "Buncombe," whether intentionally so or not? How much of our political "stump" speaking is mere declamation? How much of our judicial pleadings is swell and noise? How much of our anniversary eloquence is emptiness and vanity;—a mere bubble ef-

fort at display and effect, having no aim to fasten a moral conviction deep in the heart, satisfied if a smile, a titter, or an uproarious applause bespeak admiration of the speaker to the exclusion of a moral effect? And even our pulpit oratory, how much of it must be allowed to be formal, if it be not rant, just fit to fill out the hour prescribed in worship, but animated with no earnest intent or purpose fastening on the hearer's heart, and powerless in lasting impression? How often with the permanent pastor, is the preparation of his weekly discourses but a drudgery—a mere outside, mechanical work? Might not a Socrates find enough in the eloquence of the present day to call out his powers to their utmost for the purpose of reforming it;—of emancipating it from its sophistical bondage to form?

The theoretical bearings of the question are no less imperious in their demands of a thorough discussion. If the sentiment of the best of the ancients be not correct, if there be no moral procedure essentially involved in true eloquence, then all our theoretical conceptions of an art of oratory distinguishable from all other arts and sciences by strictly scientific boundaries,—of a complete and distinct art of rhetoric by itself, are necessarily loose, indefinite. We cannot, indeed, distinguish rhetoric from logic or grammar and other arts, by any tenable distinctions. There is no art of rhetoric; and what is so called is but a pretence and a shadow. It has no philosophical reality. Not only this, all oratorical training is but empirical in the lowest sense, hap-hazard, conjectural, uncertain, in short, idle and irrational. All rhetorical criticism is groundless, unmeaning, silly. Anything is right, and anything is wrong, according to the accidental stand-point of the critic. False assertion, sophistical reasoning, violations of grammar, disgusting delivery, can be vindicated on as good grounds as their opposites. To preach, to plead, to harangue, these are unworthy pursuits; for eloquence is but a Socratic "cook-art," and all who practice it are of the Gorgias herd. But on the other hand, if this ancient theory be correct, then rhetoric has a distinct field to itself. Separated by palpable boundaries from all other departments of science, it is capable of a complete, philosophical development. The training of the orator may proceed by well-ascertained laws, on a path direct and sure. Criticism has a meaning and a validity, and oratory is a noble pursuit, the most noble of all human callings.

For two reasons we shall discuss the question, whether eloquence is a virtue, indirectly, by examining whether these statements are true; whether the supposition of an ethical element in eloquence involves these consequences: one is, that as we think, the prevalent opinions can best be met in this way. The direct discussion of the question would be in danger of being put upon a level with the idle discussions of the Schools. The other reason



is, that while these positions, if sustained, would involve an affirmative answer to the question, the discussion in this form will also bring out the main arguments of a direct discussion.

The first position, then, that we assume, is, that only upon the ground that eloquence is essentially and characteristically an ethical or moral procedure *can rhetoric be philosophically distinguished from either of several kindred arts and sciences*. It has been practically conceded that rhetoric exists as a distinct art, and can therefore be philosophically distinguished from every other art and science. This concession, as we shall now attempt to show, involves the truth of the theory proposed, and, likewise, shows its importance.

Rhetoric borders on each of the sciences of logic, grammar and aesthetics, and also on each of the arts of poetry and philosophical discourse. In theory, it has been in fact merged by different writers, in one or another of these sciences and arts. We shall see that the line which separates it from each of these is the line that bounds the moral sphere.

Rhetoric is closely allied to logic. It derives its matter in part at least from that science. If logic be regarded in the broader and more philosophically just import of the term, as the science which enumerates and classifies the intellectual states of the rational spirit, as those states are determined by the spirit's contact with the world around it, indicating these natural conditions of their appearance, and embracing in its purview all thoughts, whether conceptions or judgments, then rhetoric, so far as it regards the representation of mere thoughts, is, as Dr. Whately observes, "an offshoot from logic." Accepting, for the moment, this narrow view of rhetoric, we ask now, where lies the boundary between the two sciences? Dr. Whately answers, logic "judges of" arguments, rhetoric "invents and arranges" them. Expressing the distinction in other language, and expanding Dr. Whately's view of logic so as to embrace conceptions, and all judgments whether intuitive or deduced, logic furnishes the forms of thought, rhetoric fills these forms with a real content, and disposes them in a proper order. But what principle directs how to fill these logical forms, where find this content and how to arrange when found? Whence does rhetoric obtain this directive principle which this view makes distinctive of the art? If logic furnishes it, then rhetoric is distinguished from it, only as an art is distinguished from a science of the same subject-matter, which is no distinction at all, in the sense now intended. Every complete system of logic should be a complete science of rhetoric. If the particular character of the thought furnishes it, if the specific character of the political events with which the statesman is conversant, or that of the body of jurisprudence which the advocate employs, or the scriptural truth which

the divine uses as his matter, furnishes it, then, clearly, there is no distinct art of rhetoric. We may have a forensic rhetoric and a sacred rhetoric; but one will be a system of politics or of law, and the other will be a system of theology. No such directive principle, as is implied in rhetoric as distinguished from logic, is given by logic or by the matter of discourse. It must be sought elsewhere, or rhetoric cannot be philosophically distinguished from logic. As we shall see, it can come only from a moral source.

Rhetoric, however, is not confined to the mere representation of logical states. Oratory is not mere logic,—cold, dead, although well-disposed thought. It is essentially “action.” It is a representation of feeling, sentiment, principle, in short, of character. We only assume this now. We assume it lawfully, for it is practically conceded that eloquence is not mere logic, habited in language or incorporated into vocal sound. This universal practical concession recognizes in eloquence what, on close examination, will be found to be a moral element. But, what it is pertinent to remark here, just so far as this moral element is left out of view in theory, all philosophical distinction between logic and rhetoric vanishes. The moment a distinction arises between the two, the moral element comes into view.

Rhetoric is closely allied, likewise, to grammar. Grammar is the science which treats of the embodiment of logical states in words. Thoughts, whether conceptions or judgments, and their relations, as appearing in words, it is the peculiar and sole prerogative of grammar to superintend and control. In other words, grammar is the science of the verbal forms of logical states. Now, just as Aristotle, at some times, for he seems inconsistent with himself, would absorb rhetoric into logic, so there are others who would absorb everything in discourse into grammar. We have, accordingly, Arts of composition constructed which are little else than applications of the principles of grammar; and what little else there is, is merely loose appendage without vital connection with the rest.

But what more in rhetoric than in grammar can there be besides the moral element? Oratory, like poetry, expresses, indeed, passion, emotion; and grammar has nothing to do with this, except so far as regards the susceptibility of logical states, and, consequently, of grammatical forms to be modified by passion, what can grammar do with it? Parse the expression of a passion! Parse an interjection even! To what law of grammar is it subject? What logical relation does it express that determines to it a definite form which grammar shall subject to rule? Poetry,

<sup>1</sup> Since writing this paragraph in the text, the following happy illustration of its truth has fallen under our eyes from a popular school-book. “To parse the following fragment,” says the author, “would puzzle, if I mistake not, even a maturer grammarian :

as well as rhetoric, have, thus, it must be allowed, a palpable line of separation from grammar; inasmuch as they both express passion with which grammar has nothing to do. Oratory, however, as will be shown directly, expresses passion only with a moral intent, which is not the case with poetry, at least, necessarily. Oratory ever implies a moral life expressed with a moral reference to another moral life. All this is entirely foreign to grammar, which confines itself to the mere representation of logical states.

Rhetoric is, also, closely allied to æsthetics. Eloquence implies form—æsthetic form. It might seem as if it were but one of various æsthetic forms. So in fact it has been regarded. Many of our treatises on rhetoric are but parts of æsthetical systems. They only apply principles of taste to the expression of thought. Eloquence must, indeed, conform to æsthetic laws; not, however, because it is essentially an æsthetic product. Nor are æsthetic laws its highest laws. It is this false conception of rhetoric—ranking it as a department of æsthetics, which has, more than anything else, corrupted eloquence in modern times, and made the study of it so distasteful to thinking minds. Æsthetics has to do with the form alone. On this, says Hoffmann, all are agreed; that we can talk of beauty only in respect to an object of sensible intuition.<sup>1</sup> Hence, as the verbal expression or the vocal delivery is in discourse, the chief, not to say with Hoffmann, the only object of such intention, this false conception of rhetoric has confined attention mainly to this verbal form. Just so far, however, as the attention of the speaker is confined to the form—the manner, eloquence disappears. It is no longer oratory, it is but theatrical display.

Eloquence is æsthetic only because, only so far as all right expression of a moral state and all right endeavor to accomplish a moral aim must be in beautiful forms. Æsthetics, as the science of beautiful forms, all which are expressions of moral states, does indeed regard or imply ethics. There is, however, nothing necessarily moral in a merely æsthetic production. There may be the form, which is all that æsthetics regards, without the substance. Æsthetics implies no extrinsic aim, no intent, out of itself. It implies conceptions of moral states, it is true. But man

To die—to sleep!

To sleep! perchance, to dream.

Is to die to be treated as an infinitive or a noun? What governs to sleep in each of the two instances of its occurrence? What governs to dream? To these questions, it is difficult, without a knowledge of sentential structure, to return an answer; with it we readily supply the suppressed portions of the sentence, and the parsing necessarily follows thus: To die is to sleep; but if to die is to sleep, then, perchance, it is [also] to dream!"

Surely our ideas of the province of grammar need reform.

<sup>1</sup> Auschanung. Phil. der Rede. p. 11.

has these as a rational being; and may have them in a certain degree of perfection without a right moral exercise. The sculptor, the painter, need not be himself the hero whom he represents in art, in the slightest degree. The poet may be anything but a man of virtue. His product may be perfect, so far as æsthetical principles go, while himself remains a brute or a fiend. Satan recognized the loveliness of the form of virtue. He had a conception of it, distinct and clear; and if he might be permitted to handle the pallet and pencil, could, with some practice, certainly if an apt scholar in the arts of design, have represented it on canvas. He could not, however, be truly eloquent, any further than show can pass for substance. He might play the orator, he could not be one. He could not, in other words, express a moral state with an aim and intent to produce the same in another mind. This only is eloquence. He might appear to conform to rhetorical rules in some things; his discourse might be outwardly in conformity with those rules; but from the necessities of the case, if what we have assumed and shall attempt to prove, be true of the nature of eloquence, his discourse must be in violation of some or all essential principles. The representation of a moral state with an intent to awaken it in another mind—this essential property of true oratory it could not possess.

If the poet, after producing a true poem, and hence a poem of virtuous tendencies, should proceed to publish it for the sake of the virtuous effect, then his procedure would be a moral one;—not because, however, of the mere poetical production, but because of the good intent in publication. This part of the procedure, wherein lies all the morality of it, is, however, certainly not that of a poet, as such oratory, on the contrary, involves in itself this moral part, as we shall see. For all oratory is not only a production, but, at the same time, a publication, and for a moral end.

Here, then, as before, we find the boundary which divides rhetoric from æsthetics to be that which bounds the moral field. Let this moral characteristic that belongs essentially to rhetoric, be dropped from view, and it merges in æsthetics. So theory, so experience abundantly proves.

While rhetoric has thus been regarded by different minds as a subordinate department respectively of logic, grammar, and æsthetics, it has, also, by others, been ranked as a co-ordinate department with the art of poetry of the generic art of æsthetic discourse.<sup>1</sup> By those writers who have firmly apprehended the moral element in rhetoric, the distinction between these two arts has been steadily maintained; while those who have excluded

<sup>1</sup> Of the works that proceed on this view, that of Pinder's *Eschenburg's Theorie und Litteratur der Schönen Rede-Künste*, Berlin, 1836, may serve as a representative.

this element from view, have, with difficulty, if at all, avoided confounding them. This is strikingly the case with Aristotle on the one hand and Cicero on the other. With Aristotle, the moral in rhetoric was characteristic and fundamental. He accordingly keeps the two arts—rhetoric and poetry, entirely distinct; and as he regarded language only as a mere medium of expression, and, therefore, accounted style as having little if anything more to do with an art of rhetoric, than the natural history of marble and granite with the arts of sculpture and architecture, poetry and rhetoric in his views have little in common.

Cicero, on the other hand, dropping the moral element from rhetoric, seems at a loss how to distinguish the two from each other.<sup>1</sup> The fact is the more remarkable, as Cicero adopted generally the Aristotelian system of rhetoric. It shows most clearly how necessary is the apprehension of the moral element in rhetoric, in order to a distinction between these arts. Our more popular modern treatises on rhetoric, which, like Cicero, fix the attention rather on the form than on the substance of the discourse, in the same way confound these arts. Dr. Campbell regards poetry as “properly no other than a particular mode or form of certain branches of oratory.”<sup>2</sup> Dr. Blair professedly regards them as essentially distinct; yet thinks there is no “occasion for being very precise about the boundaries.” And his formal definition, which is exceedingly loose, and certainly incorrect, makes them differ only in this respect, that poetry addresses the imagination and the passions, while oratory addresses itself, for the most part, primarily to the understanding.<sup>3</sup> His treatise generally seems to recognize no essential distinction.

The distinction between oratory and poetry is, however, palpable and fundamental. The entire development of the one art must proceed on principles radically different from those on which that of the other rests. Oratory seeks an end out of itself; poetry, as a pure æsthetic art, finds its aim in itself. If it teaches, convinces, excites, persuades, it does it not of intention but by incidental consequence. “Poetry,” says Theremin,<sup>4</sup> “seeks nothing farther than that the idea correspond perfectly to the form, and the form to the idea. Its design can never be to implant the ideas, which it expresses with such satisfaction to itself, in another’s mind. The one effort would hinder the other. In the double endeavor to represent his own spirit and to work upon another, the poet would fail in both. Eloquence, which ever seeks an external effect, can never, therefore, be regarded as a part of poetry.” And, in another place,<sup>5</sup> he says to the same effect: “Poetic and philosophical production is a kind of activity which may be called isolated, returning into itself. For it expresses an idea, and has in

<sup>1</sup> De Orat. I. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Rhetoric, Lect. xxxviii.

<sup>3</sup> Philosophy of Rhetoric. Introduction.

<sup>4</sup> Book I., chap. 3. <sup>5</sup> Ibid. chap. 4.

the expression no other aim than this idea, and the expression itself. What is so produced, can indeed work, like everything that exists, outwardly; yet it has not the design so to work to thank for its origin."

Oratory is thus essentially distinguished from poetry by this, that its aim lies even out of itself, while in poetry it lies within. This outward aim, which thus distinguishes oratory from poetry, lies in the moral nature, as has been already assumed, and will, in the proper place, be proved; and the distinction between these arts is consequently given by ethical principles. At all events, without the admission of this, all philosophical distinction vanishes.

Similar observations are applicable to the relationship between proper oratory and philosophical discourse. The latter, as Theremin, in the quotation last made, remarks, has no other aim than the idea it expresses, and the expression of it. It accordingly can recognize no other law for its representations than that which lies in the idea itself, which must appear in its greatest clearness and greatest extent,<sup>1</sup> except, perhaps, what is prescribed by the medium of representation. While thus oratory and philosophical discourse are clearly distinguishable, they are so only from the fact of the presence of a moral element in one which is foreign to the other. In all oratory, necessarily, then, is seen the living moral man animated by a moral intent; in philosophy, the appearance of all personality is foreign and therefore offensive.

But the existence of this moral element in oratory,—that it is there and how it is there, will appear more clearly in the consideration of the second position which we assume: *that only on this ground is a distinct art of oratory philosophically possible or conceivable.* We come now to view directly what has hitherto been considered only indirectly, and formally to prove what has been assumed from commonly entertained impressions.

An essential element in the conception of an art existing by its own right, distinct and independent, is that it respects a distinct activity or faculty for the exercise of which distinct and peculiar laws can be prescribed. Music is an art by itself, and independent, inasmuch as it respects the guidance and development of the faculty of song, which is a distinct faculty. *Æsthetic* art generally is the art of representing the ideal in outward perfect forms, a power obviously distinct and complete in itself. Poetry is the art of representing an ideal in forms of language. Every true art supposes thus a distinct, peculiar power, inherent in the race of man; not accidental, not the creature of time and circumstance, but seated in man as man. Hence it becomes necessary to show, that oratory is the development of such a power, or it cannot claim to be an art. As Theremin forcibly observes,<sup>2</sup> "If it cannot

<sup>1</sup> Book III. chap. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Book I., chap. 1.

be shown that eloquence is one of the elemental powers in man, then that opinion, (that eloquence is a creature of circumstances, and that ancient eloquence was the product only of the peculiar condition of ancient states,) stands uncontested; and whoever in modern times deems himself an orator, has only to give up his claims. But if this can be shown, and a distinct original power is in fact indicated, the development of which, in a certain direction, necessarily produces eloquence, then is it no more the ephemeral blossom of a single age; and although it may conceal itself, and sometimes appear under other names, it yet lives just as real and energetic a life in modern as in ancient times.

If oratory then, be an art distinct by itself, of what faculty or activity is it the development? Not the faculty of representing mental states in outward forms generally. This idea merges it in art generally, and confounds it with sculpture, music, all other particular arts. Not, more specifically, the faculty of representing in forms of language. For then oratory comes under the same laws as poetry; and the orator should speak in rhyme and measure, or the poet sing in unbound prose. Not, still more specifically, the faculty of representing a real, as poetry is the faculty of representing an ideal in forms of language.<sup>1</sup> For then all scientific composition would be oratory; and the geometrician must construct his demonstrations, the philosopher draw out his conclusions by the same laws by which the orator pleads. Persuasion then becomes synonymous with scientific representation. Then Euclid is eloquent, and Demosthenes is no more so; unless, indeed, we say the geometrician is not eloquent because he strictly conforms to the laws of such representation, and the orator is eloquent because he violates them. The orator never makes the laws derivable from the representation of a real in forms of language his highest controlling laws; while the philosopher must. What then, precisely, is the peculiar faculty in man which, put in exercise in the right direction, creates oratory? We shall give our own answer to this question, after having presented that given by Theremin.

After having remarked, as already quoted, that the activity conceived in the production of poetical and philosophical discourse is an isolated activity, returning into itself, he proceeds:

"There is another kind of activity, which ever aims at an external change, whether in the sentiments or the actions of men, whether in the relations of friendship or kindred, or those of the state and church. To this kind of activity, the collective sum of which constitutes social life, belongs now eloquence; and it is so closely intertwined with the circumstances of the time that it can-

<sup>1</sup> This is Hoffmann's definition of rhetoric and poetry, as given in his *Philosophie der Rede*, Stuttgart ed., 1841, p. 20. It is the direct opposite of Dr. Whately's; who distinguishes poetry from prose only by its external form; its rhyme and meter.

not, even for reflection, be separated from them. For if, in a tragedy of Sophocles, it is very possible to regard it as something that subsists for itself, and to conceive of it as separated from all civil relations of the poet, such a separation in a speech of Demosthenes cannot be effected. No one is an isolated product of art; no one can be rent out of the woof of circumstances in which it was spoken: only as connected with these does it form a unity; which again was only an act, a point in the political career of the orator. \* \* \*

Since, however, all action of man in his relations, stands, or should stand, under the control of the moral law, the practice of eloquence, since it is no other than such action, can be subject to no other than ethical laws. It strives to produce a change in the sentiments and actions of other men; the inquiry after its principles naturally changes itself accordingly into this: What are the laws by which a free being should work on other free beings? This question can be answered only out of ethics. \* \* \* And should it be possible to derive all the rules of eloquence, recognized as true and just, but hitherto put together without systematic connection, from the laws by which one free being should work upon another, then there would exist no doubt that rhetoric, as theory of eloquence, is a part of ethics; and eloquence itself is a capacity to work by ethical laws, that is, is a virtue.<sup>1</sup>

He concludes the chapter with the observation: "eloquence in all its different forms is nothing else than the development of the ethical instinct itself."

He goes on, in the next chapter, to show that the laws which govern the orator come thus from ethics. We give the substance of his reasoning; the orator has ends and designs to set in execution; but, in effecting his end, he can usurp no authority over his hearers. He stands ever on a level with them. He must respect their freedom, and never rob them of this prerogative either by arousing their passions or misleading their understandings. While they are ravished by his eloquence, they must, at the same time, act independently; and while they follow his will, must not only believe they follow their own, but actually follow it. This is shown to be possible by the consideration, that there is something universal and necessary which all men will, which from their moral nature they must will;—that the true freedom of man ever strives after the realization of certain ideas which may be enumerated and distinctly indicated. The orator has accordingly satisfied every demand of morality so soon as he refers back his aim to one of the ideas which each one of his hearers desires to put in action. The highest law of eloquence accordingly is: The idea, which the orator wishes to put into action, must be referred back to the necessary ideas of the hearer.

Ideas, generally, are productive thoughts which impel to production and action, and are themselves the germ of the product as well as the rules of the form which is to contain it. There are, thus, plastic, musical, poetical ideas, out of which arise the creations in each of these departments of art; there are, too, ethical

<sup>1</sup> Book I. ch. 4.



ideas, which represent themselves in the life, which lie in the reason, which must be presupposed in every man as a being endowed with reason, and, also, actually dwell in every one, although not in equal clearness and vigor. For the acting spirit, these ideas flow together and form one whole, which shines before it as the highest object of his endeavors, and which can be realized by his action. But for reflection and expression, this highest object divides itself into three separate ideas, according as it is referred to the circumstances of the action, or to the condition of the acting spirit, or the necessary consequences of action, whether interior or exterior. These are the ideas of duty, virtue, happiness. These are the necessary practical ideas which are to be found in every man; and freedom consists merely in following these ideas uncontrolled and unimpeded.

Hence appears the first duty of the orator. The hearers, while they are carried along by the eloquence, should yet remain free, and to this end the orator should refer back his own particular idea to their necessary ideas. He accordingly shows them, how, in order to fulfil their duty, to devote themselves to virtue, to promote their happiness, they must necessarily put what he proposes into execution. Thus, the orator not only respects the freedom of the hearer, but, while he seems entirely to overwhelm him, has actually elevated him to the highest degree of conscious independence.<sup>1</sup>

Some difficulty might be experienced in endeavoring to ascertain the bearing of these general positions on actual forms of eloquence. The author goes on to indicate in what specific forms these general ideas, to which true oratory must ever refer, actually appear in specific departments of eloquence.

"There are," he observes, "among men two relations which have the common aim to facilitate the realization of ethical ideas; and both are ordained of God, the one supernaturally, the other by a necessity of nature. The first is the church, the second, the state.

"Since in the state the universal ethical law, in its application to particular cases, is more closely determined by positive laws and ordinances, *right*, (*jus*) here steps into the place of duty. Since, farther, the happiness of each individual consists in his being free of hindrance in his action as a citizen, and since this cannot be, except in a flourishing condition of the commonwealth, the ethical idea of happiness changes itself into the endeavor after the *well-being of the state*. Virtue, finally, comes here into consideration only so far as the supreme good, to the production of which it is disposed and fitted, also furthers the well-being of the commonwealth: and in this relation it is called *merit*. Right, civil weal, and merit, are accordingly the necessary ideas by which each member of the state as such is guided in his action; and the first duty of the orator, if he treats his hearers as citizens of the state, consists in showing them how, by the carrying out of what he proposes, right is practiced, state-weal furthered, and civil merit attained.

"In the Church, a divine institution and standing under divine rule, human reason cannot be regarded as supreme lawgiver. This is God alone, who by

<sup>1</sup> Chap. V.

His natural word in the conscience, and by his revealed word in the gospel, speaks to us, and gives us a rule of conduct. What, accordingly, this prescribes in a different case, is not barely duty, an idea which only refers man back to himself, but *the will of God*. Farther, the term, virtue, indicates that degree of moral perfection to which man can elevate himself, which he can attain by persevering struggle with sin. The Christian, however, knows something higher. He looks upon moral perfection, as it reigns, without struggle, and without conflict, in the Divine being; and that perfect condition of the soul can, hence, for him, only consist in likeness to God; or, since the invisible Godhead has become man, and lived and acted in human relations, in *likeness to Christ*. Happiness he cannot by any possibility seek in a succession of conditions, each of which facilitates the production of the supreme good in that which follows. On the other hand, his eye, which presses into eternity, discerns the final end to which this succession of conditions leads, to wit, inner union with God, or *blessedness*. For his guiding idea, he accordingly chooses barely that which is the end, and not happiness, which, conceived in the highest ethical purity, can be only the way to this end. If, therefore, an orator regards himself and his hearers as members of the church, his duty consists in bringing the idea which he wishes to communicate to them into union with the ideas which he must necessarily pre-suppose in them. These, according to the foregoing, are the will of God, likeness to God, blessedness. If, in a sermon, no one of these points of view is predominant, this much, at least, is certain; it does not belong to the province of eloquence.

"It appears from this, that as to their ideas, that is, their essential nature, religious and secular eloquence are throughout one and the same."<sup>1</sup>

This is the argument of Theremin to sustain the position that eloquence is a virtue. If exception may be taken to some views incidentally connected with the argument;—if, in presenting the argument he seem to take too broad ground at some points and too narrow at others, still, we think, there is real force in the reasoning, and sufficient to sustain the conclusion. We will now present our own view.

We have seen that oratory is essentially distinguished from poetry and philosophical discourse. The poet and the philosopher find the end of their representations in the matter represented and the representation itself. The orator finds his end, ever, eternal, to both. It is this exterior aim in oratory which distinguishes it from every other art; and is that which constitutes the only possible ground on which a distinct art can be constructed. But this exterior aim which characterizes all oratory necessarily involves in the pursuit of it a moral procedure. This will appear from several distinct points of view.

*Abstractly and subjectively*, the orator's apprehension of his aim involves an exercise essentially moral. As his end lies exterior to the representation itself, it must lie in the mind addressed. The orator must apprehend his aim as thus fixed in another mind;—he must contemplate an effect to be produced there, or he cannot be an orator. Oratory cannot be without this. He cannot, now, by the laws of his being, move thus to produce an effect on another

<sup>1</sup> Chap. vi.

mind, consciously, intentionally, without drawing with him his moral nature. A man may as well administer relief to the distressed without a moral exercise. If he does it with the insensibility of a stone, he yet acts in his moral nature; he acts as a moral being in violation of the laws of his nature as such. There are many, not to say, most of the actions of life, which do not necessarily bear in themselves this moral character. All those proceedings in every day life, which do not contemplate a change directly in another rational spirit, are not necessarily moral proceedings in themselves. They are so only in this respect; that into them all, a moral character perhaps, should be introduced. In this respect, "the ploughing of the wicked is sin." But mere mechanical acts bear no moral character in themselves. Every conscious, intentional procedure towards an effect on another rational spirit, is however, necessarily and essentially a moral procedure. Even the endeavor, consciously put forth, to produce a mere intellectual conviction in another mind, involves an intent to bring one rational nature in contact with another similar nature; it cannot be made without an apprehension of the moral relations existing between such natures, or consequently without the moral character which such apprehension necessarily gives to the procedure. Pure intellect cannot abstract itself from the concrete rational nature and go out alone and work on another intellect similarly abstracted. It cannot conceive of an effect on intellect except as in intimate union with moral traits.

In like manner, abstractly and *objectively*, it may be shown that all oratory involves necessarily a moral procedure. Every oratorical effect is a moral effect. Even an intellectual state transferred from one concrete rational spirit to another, cannot but carry a moral effect. We cannot receive a conviction from another without receiving with it the impress of his rational nature. We may even go further and say with Hoffmann, "a moral effect fails no spoken word." This moral effect must be included in the aim of the orator, and give the pursuit of it, therefore, a moral character. This objective argument may, perhaps, be more forcibly presented from the position taken by Theremin as already given. Philosophical discourse seeks only the true. It fully satisfies its end, when the true appears in its representations. Poetry seeks only the beautiful. It cares nothing for the true for its own sake, only as a means; only as nothing beautiful can belong to anything but the true. Its end is fully satisfied when the beautiful appears in its representations. Not so with oratory. The orator does not seek as his end the true, nor the beautiful in its more general import. These he must regard as his means. They are neither of them his ultimate end. His end is ever a moral one. It is ever to win to the right, the good, the lovely in character—the three phases of the moral. He must, indeed, conform himself

strictly to the true in all his representations; he must not violate the laws of the beautiful in any step of his progress; for the right, the good, the perfect in character, are ever in harmony with the true and the beautiful. So far the orator must be philosopher and poet; and so far, his end is not a moral one. But he is more than this, and so far as he is so, his proceeding is in the moral sphere.

The same will appear from a *concrete* view. Seeking his end in a rational nature, addressing a rational nature directly, he must appear in the fullness of his personality to a full personality. This, precisely, is oratory,—the representation of the full person in forms of language to a full person. In all true oratory, there appears a personality in all the concrete fullness of personal relations, communicating itself to a personality in all the concrete fullness of its personal relations;—a living moral man acting in the present with acting moral men. Here, accordingly, we find an activity, distinct, peculiar, which an art may respect; on which an art may be constituted. It is an activity distinguishable widely from that exerted in the poetical and the philosophical representation. In that is no personality properly concerned. On the contrary, the appearance of the person with its individual relations in all poetry and philosophical discourse is justly an offence. The I can never properly represent itself there. In oratory, on the other hand, the I appears every where; can never be dropped from view. The matter represented ever appears in oratory, in the individual forms of the representing subject; in poetry and philosophy, never.

We have, *historically*, another distinct, independent argument in favor of the position. Oratory, as a distinct art, has found itself under the necessity of recognizing the moral element as the essential principle of its development. That it has done this unconsciously, only the more conclusively demonstrates its essential relationship to ethics. Not only this, but the actual forms of oratory which have appeared,\* as is implied in the view already presented from Theremin, are distinguishable into classes only on the ethical principle.

Aristotle founds his grand division of the art of rhetoric on the kinds of discourse; and these he distributes in reference to their ethical relations. It is true he did not recognize at all this ethical foundation. Perhaps, as Theremin intimates, this was hardly possible till the existence of the Christian church gave full development to one of the leading branches of eloquence. Indeed, the Aristotelian principle of classification seems to us absurd, not to say ridiculous. He says, 'Discourse consists of three things, the speaker, the subject and the hearer. But *the end* is in the hearer; τὸ τέλος ἔστι τοῦ τῶν ἀκούοντων. Therefore, he seems to argue, we are to determine the kinds of discourse exclusively from the hearer. Now

\* Rhet. I. 3. It will be remarked how distinctly Aristotle grasped the external aim of all oratory.

the hearer is either a spectator or a judge. The judge is either a judge of things past or things future. The judge of things future is the senator; the judge of things past is the determiner of causes. The judge of power or capability is the spectator. So that of necessity, he concludes, there must be three kinds of rhetorical discourses; the deliberative, the judicial and the epideictic or eulogistic. Arbitrary as all this appears to us to be, as a philosophical foundation for the classification of discourse, yet the results to which he arrives, or we should rather say, the position which this fanciful reasoning is brought in to sustain, will be found to rest on a truly philosophical basis. How much did the keen, practical insight of the Greek descry beyond the farthest reach of their philosophical speculations? Let us not reject their conclusions because we must their reasonings. These three forms of oratory are the very ones given us by the three phases of the moral;—the right, the good, the lovely in character. Deliberative discourse ever fastens on the good; judicial discourse on the right; epideictic or eulogistic on the lovely in character. The distinction can be vindicated only on this ethical relationship.

Now this distinction of discourses has ever prevailed in systems of rhetoric; while the grounds adduced for it by Aristotle have been rejected. It is a fact of conclusive force as showing that the development of the art must respect an ethical element.

Corresponding with this we have but three kinds of oratory in actual existence. All eloquence may be distributed under this classification. It can be on no other principle. The laws, too, which govern in each, derive their peculiar character and force from this fundamental principle.

The moral element is thus proved conclusively to lie at the root of all development of the oratorical activity in man; for no arbitrary principle can give a complete classification. Only on this ethical ground, consequently, can an art of oratory be philosophically constructed.

It may be supposed, however, that this view is hardly compatible with the well-received import of the term, eloquence. The term generally implies degree. We attach the name to certain parts of the same discourse. There seems to be much address in which the speaker endeavors to convince or persuade, to which, however, it would be a violent use of the term to give the name of eloquence. It may be observed in reply to this objection, that the term poetry, has a similar use. We may single out portions of the same poem, and say of them, in perfect harmony with the received use of the term, "they are poetry;"—making the term significant of degree. That the term eloquence, has been more exclusively used in this way is sufficiently accounted for from the fact that what eloquence,—oratory, is in its essential nature, has not been accurately determined and understood.

It may be thought, moreover, that this view of oratory makes all discourse addressed to another, even familiar conversation, oratory. So indeed, the language of Theremin seems to imply, where, as already quoted,<sup>1</sup> he speaks of the exercise of the oratorical activity distinguished from the poetic and philosophical, as occurring in the relations of kindred and family, as well as in those of the state and the church. But, it should be remarked, he only indicates the oratorical activity as a specific form of this social life. Yet just so far as a moral effect in another mind is aimed at in discourse, even in conversational discourse, there is oratory. All conversation does not contemplate such moral effect. That, by the definition, is not oratory. But we may find true oratory, true eloquence in the retired circle as well as before the vast assembly; by the hearth as well as in the pulpit. The intercession of Effie Deans has thus been justly characterized as eloquent.

The third position which we take in the discussion of this question is, that *every received canon of peculiarly oratorical criticism owes its validity to the assumption of the moral element in oratory.*

Advancing negatively to the proof of this position, we may confidently ask, from what other source can such validity be derived? Not from any science of logic, grammar or æsthetics. The principles given in these sciences, oratory must, indeed, observe. It must take the intellectual states given in logic,—conceptions and judgments, in their logical relations. It must observe the laws which control the incorporation of these states into verbal forms. It must not either violate the principles which our æsthetic nature prescribes. So the orator must not contravene the laws of his physical structure. But neither logic, grammar, æsthetics or physiology gives purely or peculiarly oratorical rules. Nor, farther, does the art of philosophical discourse give such rules. This art seeks as its end, the representation of the true for its own sake. The orator, on the other hand, uses the true for a higher moral end. If oratory were conformed to the same laws that control philosophical discourse then, as already observed, oratory would be identical with scientific essay; and a system of scholastic logic would be as eloquent as Patrick Henry's speech on the war of the revolution. Nor does the art of poetry give them. This art seeks as its end the representation of the beautiful for its own sake. It is only a degenerate, unworthy oratory that seeks admiration only. To subject oratory to the laws of poetry, leaving out only the outward form of poetry—the rhyme and metre, would give us instead of sound oratory, poetry run mad, as it is well called,—poetry demented or vapid declamation. And if not these arts, which have a common form or medium for their representation with oratory, certainly no other arts. Indeed, all rules, all canons of criticism, derived from other sources, exclusive of

the moral are arbitrary, capricious, have no systematic connection, and consequently possess no philosophical validity. This will appear more conclusively from an examination of some specific canons of oratorical criticism which are generally received as of most importance and of highest validity.

It is a law of oratory consecrated by the assent of successive centuries, of rhetoricians and orators, not to say by the coinciding assent of common sense for that period, that the speaker must, in the judgment of the hearer, possess the several qualities of good-sense, good-will, and good principle. But why so? Is this a law applicable to any discourse not involving a moral element? Must the philosopher prove himself to be possessed of these qualities before we will regard with any favor his scientific treatises, assent to his reasonings, or accept his conclusions? Do we judge the poet by this law? Is a poem any less a poem, because the poet is not what he should be in mental furniture, in good feeling or right principle? Above all, must we know these facts of his personal character before we read or admire his poetry? We require this of the orator. It is stolidity or a crime to hear one whom we know to be a fool, a misanthrope or a knave in any proper oratory. Why is this? On what ground rests the validity of this rhetorical rule? Only on this; that the person in its concreteness, and therefore in its moral relations, must enter into all oratory.

It is another equally well-received rule in oratory, that the speaker respect the relations which he personally sustains to his hearers. The apostle Paul, in his instructions to Timothy as to the mode of his preaching, recognizes the authority of the rule when he says, "Rebuke not an elder, but entreat him as a father, and the younger men as brethren, &c." Why now, must the preacher, why must every public speaker recognize thus his relations to his hearers? What principle gives us this canon? Why will not the oration be just as good, just as perfect, if these personal relations be disregarded:—if the youth speak as a father, with the gravity, the cautiousness, the authority of age, or the hoary head with the vivacity and warmth and freshness of a stripling? These personal relations do not affect the quality of a poem or a philosophical essay. We never inquire for them when we discuss their merits, as we must when we criticise an oration. Why are they necessary in oratory, except on the ground that has been indicated?

Farther, it is an indispensable law of oratory that it respect the occasion. On what rests the validity of this canon? Not, certainly on any ground common to philosophy or poetry. We do not condemn the poems of Macpherson or Chatterton because their structure belies the age in which they were written. But let an orator address us in the language of former ages, and what

reception should we feel ourselves compelled to give to his declamation?

Another law of oratory equally imperative is, that the orator must ever conceive of himself as addressing in his own personality, his hearers who are likewise conceived in their distinct personality. He must appear as the person speaking, and they be addressed as persons spoken to. When he speaks of himself, he must use the first person singular; when he speaks of them he must use the second person. He cannot say, "*we* have said"—"*we* must urge," meaning himself; for he then drops the orator, and becomes the mere essayist. How ridiculous would it appear in Demosthenes, Cicero or Chatham to substitute for the "*ego*" the "*we*" of our modern preachers? So if he talk of himself or his hearers as third persons;—if he should say "*the speaker* has presented," or "*the hearers* will judge," instead of "*I* have presented," "*you* will judge," as an essayist represents himself and his readers, he ceases so far to be an orator. Now on what ground rests this requisition unless on that indicated? Certainly not on any thing common to poetry and philosophical discourse. It is egotism in the poet, if it be not a mere figure; it is egotism in the essayist to represent himself, unless the self be the matter of the representation. Neither can appear as the personal organ of the representation. But oratory requires this; and thus to represent himself is no egotism in him. He is not to shun the use of the first person singular, therefore, to avoid the imputation of egotism, if it be necessary to express the organ of the representation. He might as well seek to evade the charge by concealing his outward person behind a screen while speaking. He is only egotistic when the self is unnecessarily made the matter of the representation; not when other matter is represented through the self.<sup>1</sup>

The orator must, moreover, appear ever in the present. It is a just rule that he never speak, as does the essayist, of what he has said, or is saying, or is to say, in any but the relations of time, past, present, and future. For, oratory is a transpiring event, a procedure in time, a progressive action, involving, consequently, a full concrete personality. Its parts must, hence, be measured in time, not in space. The orator must not, in denoting any of these parts, represent them as "above," as if they were higher up on a written page, or as "farther on," as if they were at a distance ahead in space on an extended surface. They are to him the "already" spoken, the "hereafter" to be considered."

<sup>1</sup> A popular anecdote, whether true or not, well sets forth the absurdity of the use of the plural when only the speaker is intended, so common in the modern pulpit. A celebrated preacher, famous for the use of the "*we*," one summer afternoon, after worrying himself sometime with pulling and stretching his cravat, suddenly broke off his discourse, and proceeding to relieve his neck of the incumbrance, exclaimed, "*our* wife has tied our neck-kerchief too tight to-day." It would be pertinent to ask, how large a partnership there was in the preacher's conjugal interest?



All these canons of oratorical criticism rest on this ground, that oratory is a representation by a present, moral person to present moral persons, all appearing in the concrete fullness of their personal relations. They have no validity except on this ground. Poetry recognizes no such canons. The *Iliad* remains just as perfect a product of art, if judged separately from the person of the poet. The oration on the crown is nothing, except as the living Demosthenes, the Athenian citizen, statesman, leader, just as he was determined, in his personal character and relations, by the condition of Athens at that day, appears everywhere in it. This is why poetry of a remote age or clime commands admiration; while oratory, of perhaps a vastly superior order, is neglected or despised. The poem is complete in itself; since poetry has no exterior aim. Its whole beauty is contained in the product. We do not care for the producer, who or what he was. In oratory, on the other hand, the present living speaker being abstracted, and its very life is gone. Only, as this is supplied by an active, well-informed imagination, can the best oratory of another age receive anything of its merited admiration. Hence, to be truly ravished by written oratory imports a vastly higher culture than to be thus affected by poetry or the product of any other æsthetic art.

It is precisely on the same ground that we are enabled to answer the question which perplexed the mind of Cicero so much;—why there have been so many good poets and so few good orators? It is, indeed, as he says, because of a peculiar difficulty in oratory. But that difficulty lies in this, that a perfect oratory imports a perfect man; for the living person that embodies in itself all oratorical representations, is ever a commanding, rather the commanding element; and only as that is perfect can the representation be perfect. Hence, even the recorded discourses of Christ, if animated by a vivid imagination, with a full and complete conception of the person of Christ in its moral perfectness, and with a correct apprehension of the moral state of His hearers, will be ranked among the most perfect forms of oratory, and easily gain assent to the testimony respecting Him; “that never man spoke like that man.”

But it should be remarked that the whole of virtue does not necessarily appear in every specific instance of oratorical discourse. The orator represents generally but a single virtue or grace as the prominent one, as that of patriotism, or a specific form of it, when he addresses the senate, or the love of what is just and equal when he addresses the judge, or the particular trait of character which predominates in the subject of panegyric, or constitutes the end of hortatory discourse. These specific forms of virtue may be in exercise in a high degree, while in the other elements of a virtuous character there may be defect; just as a

man may be brave, or generous, or just, while in other traits, or even in his general character, he may be deficient. This fact, however, does not prove bravery, generosity, or justice to be out of the moral sphere, or the exercise of these qualities to be subject to other than ethical principles. If the particular virtue shine out full and bright, then the oration by every principle of oratorical criticism, rises highest in merit as a product of art. It is because the moral sentiment of love of country shines out in such purity and strength in Demosthenes, in Chatham, in Henry, that their eloquence rises so near perfection. It is this which, more than anything else, constitutes the superiority of Demosthenes to Cicero as an orator. In the Grecian, patriotism was the master spirit; and his earnestness in winning his countrymen to measures or decisions which should advance the glory of Athens, carries him along with an almost superhuman, certainly a resistless power onward to his end. He has, indeed, furnished himself with matter; he is a thoroughly trained, a thoroughly informed statesman. He has disciplined his mind to thorough method. He has mastered by long training all the means of expression, so that they run in of themselves as they are needed for his firmly apprehended purpose. But it is his earnestness, arising from a noble sentiment and fastening on a corresponding noble end, that animates and wields these instrumentalities, which at the same time furnish the necessary body of the spirit's expression and are ennobled by its dignity and enlivened with its life. Cicero was inferior to his great rival in the strength of this sentiment; and his oratory is less vehement, less earnest, less commanding. It suffers him to run out more after form; to think more of his manner. It is hence less effective.

The stand-point in all oratorical criticism is, thus, the strength and elevation of the moral sentiment ruling in the speaker, and the force with which it bears him on towards the moral end which is the object of all oratory. Voice, words, images, are but the matter in which this sentiment must, in expression, embody itself. They are necessary, indeed, but necessary only as instruments. Whether to be used at all and how—this is to be determined from the sentiment and the end of the discourse. No true criticism of style, thus, can proceed without regard to this essential element in all oratory. "True eloquence does not consist in speech. It must exist in the man; in the subject; and in the occasion. The clear conception, outrunning the deductions of logic; the high purpose; the firm resolve; the dauntless spirit, speaking from the tongue, beaming from the eye, informing every feature, urging the whole man onward, right onward to his object;—this, this is eloquence."

The fourth position, which we assume in this discussion, is, that *only upon the ground adduced, can a pursuit, the noblest and most*

*beneficent in its results of all that invite the endeavors of men, be properly recommended or justified to a generous, upright spirit.*

If oratory be but the miserable art of imposing on the judgment by tricks of sophistry and deceitful words, or what amounts to the same thing, allow in itself of such imposition; if it be within its proper province, "to make the worse appear the better cause;" if it be but a jugglery of words, an art of show, and pretence, and illusion, as, it is admitted, seems to be a lawful inference from prevalent conceptions of the art even as revealed in professed systems of rhetoric; if, in short, it have no moral heart, no moral life of its own, which can take up the pure and active spirit, and bear it along in its own high course; it is full worthy of all the ridicule and contempt which the wit of Plato could heap upon it; and Gorgias, and the whole tribe of his descendants, should be banished from every well-regulated state. It has nothing to save it, as has the art of philosophical discourse, as has poetry, and each æsthetic art. These arts all necessarily work healthfully on morals, and the best interests of men; although this be not the direct and immediate end of the artist in his work. The revelation of the true and of the beautiful, although for their own sake, and not for a moral end, is ever in harmony with morality, and promotive of it. But oratory, unless it have a moral end in view, unless it aim to link the specific end in each discourse to a moral idea necessarily residing in every human breast, and hence, from its essential nature, subject itself, throughout to ethical control, is all a vague, aimless, characterless thing. It has no philosophical foundation, and cannot, therefore, be developed into an art or science. It has no laws, no principles, no rules. Everything is afloat; nothing stable. No reason can be given why an orator, as such, should ever observe the laws of truth, other than that which binds thieves to the law of thievish honor. Such laws cease to be valid, consequently, at the caprice of the orator, as of the robber, and are but spider-webs before a stronger reason; on the tenable legal ground, *ratione cessante, cessat etiam lex*. Philosophical discourse has a law given for its conduct in its very nature. As the representation of the true for its own sake, it must necessarily observe the true everywhere. Poetry has, likewise, a law prescribed by its essential nature, and, therefore, for it, of universal validity and absolute. It must represent nothing but what is beautiful; and the beautiful is always in harmony with the true and the right. But oratory, which has no end in itself, which essentially seeks an end out of itself, unless that end be found in the moral nature, in the concrete person, has no law; can have none till that exterior end is ascertained. It need not be said that whatever is necessarily lawless is unworthy of the pursuit of any rational nature.—But, happily, this is not so. The exterior end which all true oratory implies, lies in the moral nature. It breathes, therefore, a pure,

moral element. Its very life is a moral life. So Plato himself felt; and therefore was he so severe in his denunciations of the Gorgias corruption of it into a miserable "cook-art." Plato insisted that the true orator must be a just man. He could do this only on the ground that oratory is itself a moral procedure. How absurd to make this requisition of a poet!

Abstract from oratory this ethical element, and it becomes at once a heartless, lifeless form, from the embrace of which every warm and pure spirit must revolt. But conceived, as in reality it is, as a development of a moral germ, regarded as springing ever from a moral sentiment, the exercise of which is a virtue, and in its whole development as but the movement of that sentiment onward towards its moral end, and there is everything in it to love, to admire. It becomes the noblest, most inviting pursuit open to man. It is of all pursuits the most beneficent in its results, for the awakening of moral sentiments in man is the highest, best effect of human endeavors, yea, of Divine workings. It works, too, most healthfully and fosteringly on the spirit itself that exerts the powers of oratory. Every exertion is a direct exertion of a moral power; and, therefore, is ever fostering to the moral principle.

Theremin has a remark, interesting and important in itself, but of peculiar pertinence here, as indicating the probable influence on the orator himself of frequent addresses to large assemblies. "Taken singly," he says,<sup>1</sup> "men may be full of little passions; but so soon as they are assembled in large masses, each one seems to give up the bad part of his individuality, in order to retain only the purely human in it, which is ever good. So far as he loses himself in the crowd, he is no more the narrow-spirited creature that is ruled by lust and selfishness; but his interest blends with that of all the others, and hence can be only pure and noble. The larger, therefore, the assembly, the more magnanimous and noble must the orator be, or he is lost." Even with the modification which some might feel themselves obliged in truth to make of this general remark, it yet expresses a great truth; and its bearing on the formation of character in the orator is most obvious. It proves that the habitual appearance before large auditories to lay hold of their common impulses and common convictions, must tend to expand and elevate the spirit.

This is true of all true oratory. There is much that is spurious. The false, the merely seeming, as the cloaking of immoral ends under the disguise of the truly moral, the veiling of falsehood under the covering of truth, this, of itself, can work, indeed, only all on the dissembling spirit. But no such effect results from the practice of oratory as founded on its proper ethical basis, and developed throughout in strict conformity to ethical principles.

It is, indeed, true that not all good orators are good men. So

<sup>1</sup> Book I., chap., 8.

fortitude and bravery are virtues, although not all soldiers, whose very profession leads them to the habitual exercise of these virtues are good men. The exercise of a pure, moral oratory does not necessarily involve in it the whole character. It still remains true, that the truer and more perfect the oratory, the better will be the man; and, conversely, the better the man, other things being equal, the more perfect will be the oratory. This is true in a different and higher sense than a similar remark in regard to poetry. Poetry, as ever the representation of the beautiful, which is ever the form of a moral state, bears an indirect relation to ethics; and such as to warrant the proposition, the better the man, the better the poet. But oratory, as the direct expression of a moral conviction with reference to a moral end, directly involves an ethical character, in the orator, inasmuch as the firmer and deeper the seat of this moral conviction, and the stronger the grasp of this moral end, the higher the oratory.

The fifth and last position, that we assume, is that *only upon the ground we have proposed, can any just course of oratorical training be prescribed or conceived.*

The systems of training, if systems they can be called, most current among us which are not founded on the ethical element in oratory, proceed mainly from one of two somewhat opposite points of view. The one merges oratory in common art with poetry and gives almost exclusive attention to the form. This is the characteristic of our most popular rhetorical treatises, as well as of our most common methods of conducting exercises in literary composition. The natural effect is that the mind of the learner is turned chiefly on the outward for its own sake; on the style and manner, and hence unavoidably the almost irresistible tendency to mannerism. Wanting the essential life and soul of oratory, rhetorical exercises, proceeding on this view, are necessarily esteemed, the merest drudgeries. If the student put himself, slave-like, under the strict control of the system, he turns out a vapid declaimer, or a dry, heartless, mannerist. With good reason have men of original minds and generous spirits spurned all such training; and, if this were true rhetoric, their denunciations of the art altogether are merited. This view of oratory gives no course of training which is likely to be of any essential service, while it may be of incalculable detriment. It is philosophically unsound, since it leaves out of view the main elements of oratory,—the object and the content of discourse; and passes off the less important element for the whole.

The other view merges oratory in a common art with that of philosophical discourse, which, as we have seen, is the representation of the true for its own sake, and drops the exterior aim which we have indicated to be essential in all true oratory. Dr. Whately is a good representation of this conception of oratorical training,

although he confines rhetoric to the representation of judgments only, and excludes that of conceptions; in other words, limits it to argumentative discourse, and excludes explanatory.<sup>1</sup> This view confines attention exclusively to the matter of discourse, leaving out both the object and the manner. Hence, Dr. Whately, on principle, rejects style from rhetoric as well as elocution. Some lurking doubt as to the philosophical correctness of his view, seems, however, to have induced him to introduce both into his treatise. It would have been a meagre art of rhetoric, indeed, if it had been confined, as he formally insists it properly should be, to the mere invention and arrangement of arguments. What kind of oratorical training could such a limited view of rhetoric give? We need not dwell on this point, in showing that any other view of the art than what we have presented furnishes no worthy system of training for the orator. Reason, *a priori*, and experience alike reject the best system thus given as imperfect or directly hurtful.

But a view of oratory, on the other hand, which recognizes it as having essentially an exterior aim, as a personal procedure with another person, and hence as involving a determining ethical element, furnishes, naturally, and at once, a course of training, complete, consistent in itself, attractive and full of promise to every aspiring student of eloquence, and withal, having the full sanction of long and uniform experience.

It prescribes, in the first place, as the most essential thing, the practical adoption of the moral ideas which lie at the foundation of all true eloquence, with the culture and nourishment of them into pervading, controlling principles of life. It is in vain to think of eloquence without having the soul of eloquence. The statesman must have a true love of country; the legal counsellor and advocate must be animated with a true love of right and equal justice; the preacher must burn with a true love of holiness and all its correlate ideas, or he cannot be eloquent. The comprehensive moral idea, including its three generic phases, of the right in itself, the beautiful, and the good, must rule, in some of their specific applications or forms, in each several department of eloquence. So far, the ancients were right in requiring, as the first thing of the orator, that he be a good man. This specific form of the moral idea, he must nourish in all the various ways in which practical principles are nourished and developed in the human mind, by feeding it with truth, and invigorating and disciplining it in appropriate exercise. The statesman must foster his love of his country's prosperity, and his country's approbation by the diligent and thorough study of his country's history, condition, and capacities. He must strengthen it by the actual exercise of the patri-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Whately, in his development of the art of rhetoric, proceeds inconsistently with his own principles, in including persuasion, or address to the will, in the art. His justification of this procedure is of no philosophical value.

otic spirit. Demosthenes was Demosthenes because he was a patriot, and from his patriotic zeal studied out so accurately and fully the bearings of all events, inward and outward, on his country's welfare. Therefore, was he able, when all other orators failed, to step forth, and with a voice of eloquence which no Athenian heart could resist, bid on to high, patriotic endeavors and sacrifices. The deliberative orations of Cicero, testify to the same point. He was the thoroughly-informed, the bold and decided statesman, because he was a patriot, nourished and strengthened on the studies and by the efforts of a patriot. It was the ardent love of the just and equal, the deep-cherished reverence for law, which first prompted the severe investigation into its nature and developments, and then grew on its thus furnished food, which carried the Roman almost to any equality in the department of judicial eloquence, with his Grecian rival. So, in the other great province of oratory, it is the love, deep-seated love, nourished and cultured into a controlling passion, of holiness and its kindred or subordinate ideas, which ever makes the Christian preacher eloquent. Any system of oratorical training which keeps this element out of view, must necessarily, be radically deficient.

This view of oratory, again, prescribes a philosophically just and complete course of training for the orator in regard to the content of discourse. Most of our modern treatises on rhetoric have excluded from their view, the department of invention, or that which treats of the provision and arrangement of the thought in discourse. Yet this, with the ancients, who more firmly apprehended the ethical element in oratory, was the main department, and style with them was ever subordinate. This department is the more essential in a proper art of oratory, as upon this alone can a systematic and progressive course of exercises in oratory be constructed; a course which, from its furnishing to the student an object and thereby determining the matter in composition, converts his rhetorical exercise from what would otherwise be, and usually is, a repulsive drudgery into a pleasant, exciting, and, therefore, in every way profitable exercise. Founded, as this department is, mainly on the logical states of the mind and their relations, oratory so far coincides in its development with a proper art of philosophical discourse. It yet occupies a field which is foreign to this latter art,—that of address to the feelings and to the will; while it modifies in reference to its moral aim the peculiar laws of mere scientific essay. The philosophical necessity of this department in a true oratory lies in this; that a moral procedure in reference to a moral end in another mind necessarily involves the use, as means, of truth presented according to the laws of its apprehension in the human mind. No other view of oratory can give this necessity; and hence, it has been so often excluded.

In the same way, this view of oratory in the third place, shows the philosophical necessity, in a complete art of oratory, of the department of style; and prescribes the course of learning in reference to it. Thoughts can be addressed to other minds only through language. Were rhetoric justly confined, as Dr. Whately confines it to the mere invention and arrangement of arguments, or more generally to the mere invention and arrangement of thought simply for the thought's sake, then, as does in fact that author, we might drop style from its place in this art. It is the exterior aim in oratory, of which Dr. Whately takes no recognition in his fundamental conception of it, that prescribes the necessity of style in a complete development of rhetoric. At the same time, this view defines the line between proper rhetorical and poetical style; which no other view can furnish. It gives at once, also, the principle of classification for the various properties of style, which yet remain, for the most part, unclassified. While it indicates the necessity of attention to style in all oratorical training, it yet prevents, by its keeping prominent its exterior aim, giving law to all culture in oratory, the lifeless, disgusting mannerism of an æsthetic development of the art.

Finally, this view determines the relation of elocution to rhetoric, and the attention which the orator should give to it in his training. Whether elocution is or is not a part of rhetoric, is a question that has much puzzled rhetoricians. The æsthetic class who have looked more to the form of oratory, have inclined to recognize it as an essential department, but yet have hardly known what to do with it. Dr. Whately, on the other hand, both rejects it as a proper part of rhetoric, and condemns all systematic training in it. If oratory, however, be, essentially, a personal procedure, implying an address to another mind, it necessarily includes elocution as much as style, or invention; the vocal, as much as the verbal or the logical embodiment of the moral aim. Elocution is, then, originally, an essential part of spoken oratory. But mind may be addressed through the written character as well as through the sound, and the actual accomplishment of the moral end, which we have held to be involved in all oratory is, so far, independent of the vocal expression. There is a propriety, as there is, also, great convenience, in constituting a distinct art of elocution. In training here, however, the end of discourse should never be lost from view, otherwise, the result will be as Dr. Whately intimates, "an affected style of *spouting*." For the orator, in the original and proper sense of the term, a distinct and thorough training in elocution is necessary; unless, indeed, the tones of oratory are all arbitrary, capricious, and subject to no law. This, happily, is not the case. Vocal expression has been successfully subjected to a strict philosophical analysis; and, in a work of remarkable

We refer, of course, to Dr. Rush's *Philosophy of the Voice*; a work that places the author in the first rank of original investigators in this country.



philosophical thoroughness, precision, and accuracy, the various movements of the voice in expressing the relations of thought, as also the kinds and degrees of passion, are fully and clearly enumerated, described, and classified with the exactness and fullness of arts of music. It is, now, as absurd to object in oratorical training to systematic training in elocution, as, in musical training, to condemn the systematic and methodical procedures prescribed by proper musical arts. No function in man attains its full development, or measure of capacity, without exercise; and it would be silly to question whether such exercise should in him proceed rationally or not, that is, according to the known laws of that function, and by systematic progressive stages. The liability, here as in style, to mannerism, is counteracted by the same principle which prescribes the necessity of distinct and thorough training in it;—the presence of the moral element which controls in all oratory.

All those processes of oratorical training which systems of rhetoric properly set forth and direct, are at once determined; and regulated with philosophical precision, by this element in oratory. There is another part of oratorical training, of which the ancients made much, that lies out of such systems. We mean what the ancients called *imitation*;—the study of models in oratory. How much this has to do with oratorical culture is proved by the fact, that great orators ever appear in clusters. Demosthenes was but the brighter star of a glorious constellation of Athenian orators, as Cicero was but one of many brilliant Roman statesmen and advocates. In this part of his training, the orator needs more than elsewhere, perhaps, the guidance of the moral element. The study of models of eloquence in reference to the specific character of this moral element, its strength, its development and mode of working, gives unity to the whole study, furnishes the proper stand-point of criticism indicating both excellences and faults, and counteracts the liability to habits of servile imitation.

The importance of this part of training in oratory, it is to be feared, is not properly appreciated in modern times. The study of written oratory, even, is of far higher benefit than is generally supposed. "Men who have a quick, penetrating genius," says Augustine, as quoted by Fenelon, "profit more in eloquence from reading the discourses of eloquent men, than from studying the precepts even of the art." The speaking orator, the better model, is not always at hand. Written oratory lies ever within our reach. There is, indeed, an oratory of the most perfect kind, ever open to our study; the oratory of nature. There the all-perfect is ever speaking. His Divine person, ever holding forth the high moral end of His teachings, appears everywhere. Nature is not poetry. It is a sad piece of work, if it be only or essentially that. It is not to be studied for its forms. It is oratory everywhere—a

God speaking—communicating His own perfect nature to those whom, in this respect, as moral, He has created in His own image. This is its commanding element. For this moral end, and for the mode by which it is accomplished, nature should be studied. So regarded, nature is perfect. Thus studied, good sermons will be found not only “in stones,” as the poet has it, but everywhere.

Thus, here as elsewhere, it is only by the apprehension of the ethical element in oratory that we gain any satisfactory view of the art. From whatever point regarded, it presents itself ever under the same aspect; and forces us to the admission, that *true oratory is ever essentially a moral procedure.*

## ARTICLE II.

### DANTE.

By REV. ROBERT TURNBULL, Hartford, Connecticut.

THE old Florentine Republic had attained, even in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a high degree of wealth and refinement. Her civilization, crude and stormy in some of its aspects, was passing into a state of serene beauty and strength. Had it not been checked by hostile powers, by the despotism of the Papacy and the tyranny of the Empire, and especially by the universal prevalence of bigotry and violence, it might have risen to the highest elevation, and long blessed the world with its benignant influence. That, however, was a period of social and political transition, in which freedom and tyranny, religion and superstition, charity and hate, contended for the mastery, and in which it is difficult to say which gained the victory.

It was an era, however, favorable to the development of some of the higher and more vigorous qualities of the human mind, and especially to the cultivation of poetry and romance. The stars shone bright and clear amid the gathering or the vanishing gloom. The violence of the storm, which often swept the heavens, only gave deeper beauty to the calm and sunshine by which it was succeeded. It was an age, at once, of stormy passions and lofty imaginings, of great vices and great virtues.

The earliest and greatest of the Florentine, and indeed of the Italian Poets, is Dante Alighieri, author of the *Divina Commedia*, or the Vision of Hell, Purgatory and Paradise; one of the noblest poems in any language, and yet one of the most singular compounds of truth and error, of beauty and deformity. It, however,

we make allowance for its narrow views, its superstitious fancies, and atrocious bigotries, as due rather to the age than to the man, we shall be compelled to acknowledge it one of the sublimest Epics that was ever written. Severe, gloomy, and cumbrous, it is yet radiant with the light of genius, and contains pictures of truth and virtue the most vivid and entrancing. In parts, the author seems absolutely inspired. He writes like one of the old Hebrew prophets. Brief, rapid, condensed, burning with heat and beauty, his language rushes and rejoices, like a strong man to run a race, while the rapt reader is compelled to hold his breath in astonishment and delight.

It is true, that every now and then, one is shocked with some strange barbaric notion, some superstitious figment, or some outrageous fanaticism. Not unfrequently we are bewildered with extravagant theology, and still more extravagant metaphysics; yet, all the while cannot help being awed by the spirit of grandeur and beauty which pervades the whole, and which ever and anon gleams out upon our vision, like beacon-fires upon the mountains, or the faces of angels amid the clouds of heaven. Then, again, after a long and fatiguing journey through the shuddering night, or lurid glare of the *Inferno*, we come, with the wandering poet himself, to some terrestrial paradise, some scene of ineffable loveliness in the wide waste of horror, from which, refreshed and cheered, we gradually rise to mingle with "the spirits of the just made perfect," and lose ourselves in the splendors of "the beatific vision."

As Mont Blanc not only rises far above his fellows, but is often crowned with light, while the rest of the world is reposing in shadow, so Dante not only soars above all his contemporaries, and indeed above all the poets of Italy, ancient or modern, but seems invested with a supernal radiance, as if he held communion with a higher sphere. Yet, like Mont Blanc, he is "of the earth, earthy." His "foundation is in the dust." He belongs, obviously, to an imperfect, nay more, apostate race, even when soaring above the clouds, and catching the rays of the eternal sun. In him the fiercest fanaticism is mingled with the widest sympathy; the most intolerant passion with the gentlest love. On acquaintance, however, you forgive everything, forget everything, just as in gazing upon the Alps at sunrise, or at sunset, you forget that their rosy summits form a part of the dull earth, and imagine, in your half-dreamy and poetic mood, that they must be the portals of eternal day, so near to heaven they seem, and so radiant with the beauty which comes from afar.

All the darkness of Dante's inferior nature is thus forgotten, or, if you please, absorbed with the ravishing splendor which he caught from a better world. His Beatrice, once human, becomes divine—the incarnation of truth and beauty, the very sum and essence of all goodness, purity and joy.

So also his fierce judgments, both of the living and the dead, so repulsive in many respects; his intolerant scorn of his enemies, and the burning sarcasm that he heaps upon "the lost," assume the character of heavenly justice, stern and awful as that of God. This, doubtless, is owing to the intense vividness of his imagination, and the overpowering force of his language, exceeding in this respect, all the uninspired poets of ancient, or of modern times. Indeed, from his profound sincerity and tragic earnestness, Dante becomes to those familiar with his genius, a sort of spiritual being, having a greater affinity both with angels and devils than with living men and women. It is scarcely the man Dante, that penetrates the shadowy circles of the *Inferno*, and then ascends with a serene, airy motion towards the light of Paradise. It is rather the spirit of Dante, or a spirit in the form of Dante, a sort of half-human, half-divine Mephistopheles, that glides with such unresisting might, first amid the horrors of the bottomless pit, and then amid the glories of heaven.

Hence, also, everything which he describes, even the most grotesque and horrible, appears as if it must be true and real, so clear, so palpable, does he make it. "Verily, this man," said the old women of Verona, who, in his dark complexion, stern countenance and frizzled locks, imagined they saw the tokens of his exposure to the smoke and heat of the infernal regions,—“Verily, this man has seen and touched the horrors he describes.”

But Dante reached first the terrestrial, and then the heavenly Paradise, and, as if he had never seen the despair of hell, lingered long amid the unutterable glories of the Divine presence; so that the last impression which he leaves upon our minds, is that of a purified spirit, a large-hearted, ethereal, contemplative angel, who has seen the face not only of the glorified Beatrice, but of the uncreated God.

In this way the author of the *Divina Commedia* has become idealized in our minds, as the poet of Paradise, not of Paradise lost, but of Paradise regained. That stern and melancholy face of his at last glows with unearthly joy, and smiles upon us from the highest heaven.

“Forth from the last corporeal did he come  
Into the heaven that is unbodied light,  
Light intellectual, replete with love;  
Love of true happiness, replete with joy,  
Joy that transcends all sweetness of delight.”

PARADISO. Canto XXX

This great poet was born on the 14th May, 1265, sixty-three years before the birth of Chaucer, the morning-star of English poetry, and about three centuries before that of Shakespeare. He was thus the child of the Middle Ages, and in none did that strange and stirring period more gloriously mirror itself. Indeed, the char-

acter and poetry of Dante may be regarded as the richest flowering of the mediæval spirit. It mingles the visions and subtleties of seraphic doctors with the dreams and harmonies of fablicists and troubadours; the revelations of Christianity with monkish superstitions and heathen fancies. This was the age of Thomas Aquinas and Father Bonaventura, of Arabian poetry and Provençal song. Dante loved and studied both. He belonged to the church of St. Dominic and Francis de Assisi; and while adoring the Son of God, bowed down to the image of the Virgin, and rejoiced in the persecution of heretics. He hated the Pope, and spoke of the Court of Rome as "Babylon," but more on political than on religious grounds; for, although he did not hesitate to put several of the holy fathers in the deepest hell, he yet believed that "the keys of the kingdom" had been given by St. Peter to the Bishops of Rome. Doubtless, he had a creed of his own, beautiful and pure in its essential elements, but overlaid and overborne by the superstitions and errors of his age. His mind was eminently metaphysical as well as poetical, and it found abundant food, not only in the speculations of the Anglic doctors, but in the dreams of the monks and the traditions of the Church.

The youth of Dante was spent in Florence, amid the storm and splendor of that ambitious Republic. Losing his father in early life, he was placed under the care of guardians, who secured for him the most ample means of instruction and discipline. His progress in literary and philosophical studies was surprising. They were the natural food of his earnest, vigorous spirit. At the age of eighteen, he had shown such a genius for poetry as to attract the friendship of many distinguished men, and among others, of Guido Cavalcante, a young nobleman of high accomplishments and poetical temperament, and of Giotto, who painted his portrait. This long-lost portrait was discovered in the Bargello, at Florence, in 1841, and presents him in his youthful vigor. Judging from this, he must have been eminently handsome, with noble and expressive features, full of sensibility and sweetness. A shade of thoughtfulness, and even of melancholy, lingers in the lustrous eyes and chiselled mouth, but the prevailing expression is that of dignity and gentleness. Tall and swarthy, with dark eyes and dark hair, lofty forehead and serene mouth, he seems the *beau idéal* of manly strength and beauty. But care and sorrow, in subsequent life, greatly changed his appearance. His features, yet noble and striking, became sharp and angular, his eyes sunken, his hair matted, his brow wrinkled, and his mouth severe and mournful, though mingled with a wonderful expression of dignity, purity and power. It is at once attractive and disdainful, like the face of a fallen, but repentant and regenerated angel.

Even in his youth, though buoyant as others, the nature of Dante was strong, brooding and sensitive. At the early age of nine, he

became enamoured of Beatrice Portanari, "the gentle Bice," as he loved to call her, whom he had met at her father's house. With azure eyes, "soft as a dove's," and penetrating "as an eagle's," "amber tresses," "where love doth lie," "a spacious forehead,"

"Radiant with truth,  
While fingers, even nose and eyebrow smooth  
And brown, as though it had been pencilled there :"—

Above all, the "blended gentleness and majesty of her entire mien,"

"Divinely tintured with a pearl-like hue;  
Gentle and sweet to view,  
With looks of scorn, where scornfulness were meet,  
Meek, unpretending, self-controll'd and still  
With sense instructive, shrinking from all ill :"—

it is no marvel if Dante beheld in her all attributes of excellence and beauty.

Her very gait, if we may believe the young enthusiast, was that of an angel!

"Onward she moves, clothed with humility,  
Hearing, with look benign, her praises sung—  
A being seeming sent from heaven among  
Mankind to show what heavenly wonders be."

Whether she reciprocated his passion is not known; indeed it is altogether uncertain whether he ever ventured to declare it. At all events, she was married to another, and died in early life.

Dante never forgot her. Her image haunted him like a vision of Paradise. It awoke in him a new life. Mingling even with his devotions, as the type of innocence and eternal purity, it formed the guiding-star of his destiny. Like Burns' "Mary in Heaven," the glorified Beatrice drew his affections "beyond the visible diurnal sphere." Her relations to earth were forgotten. All in her that was human vanished from his sight. He saw her only as the favorite of Heaven, the beau-ideal of uncreated and eternal beauty.

It is true, that in after life he wedded another; but there is no good evidence to believe that he ever cherished for Beatrice aught but the purest feelings. Evermore he heard her gentle voice chiding his follies and wooing him to virtue. Evermore he beheld her glorified form, in the dim future, beckoning him to immortality. Often falling into temptation, sorely buffeted by the storms of adversity, tortured by contempt and shame, and yielding too frequently to the tempestuous passions of his heart, he never turned his eye from Beatrice, and the high goal of perfection and repose which she had reached before him. Indeed, this perfect form in the mind of Dante, became the mere symbol of the beautiful and divine. The *real* was transformed into the *ideal*, the natural into the supernatural; hope sprang from disappointment, and desire itself became an idolatry and worship. Brighter and brighter grew

the vision, stronger and stronger the attraction, from the first dream of his earthly love to its last triumph amid the agonies of death. So far from alienating his heart from God and duty, as human lovers are wont to do, his passion for Beatrice, sublimated by fancy, and purified by faith, dissolved the ties that bound him to earth, and impelled him towards heaven. Indeed, after her death, Beatrice never appeared to Dante except as "a blessed spirit,"

"Where angels dwell, and are at peace."

In the beautiful dirge which he wrote on the occasion of her death, he says :

"Forth from the lovely habitation where  
Supreme in grace it dwelt, her soul is gone,  
And in a worthy place shines starry bright."

Of all this he had some presentiment in a singular waking dream or trance, so he tells us, which just preceded this sad event. In his *Vita Nuova*, or New Life, in which he gives an account of his affection for Beatrice, and its influence upon his character and destiny, he says :—"At last I came to this point, that I knew not where I was, and it seemed to me as though I beheld women passing before me, weeping and with dishevelled hair, marvellously sad ; and methought I saw the sun darkened, so that the stars were visible, and of a color which made me think they wept ; and methought the birds, as they flew along, fell dead, and that the earth quaked fearfully. And as I lay wonder-stricken at these fantasies, and grievously alarmed, I imagined that a friend came to me and said, 'Dost thou know that thy admirable lady has departed from this world ?' Thereupon, I fell to weeping most piteously, and wept not only in imagination, but with my eyes, bathing them with veritable tears. Then methought I looked towards heaven, and it seemed as though I beheld a multitude of angels who were ascending upwards, and before them they carried a little cloud of exceeding whiteness. To me it appeared that these angels were singing gloriously, and the words of their song methought were these : '*Osana in excelsis* ;' and other than that I did not hear. Then it seemed to me, that my heart, wherein is so much love, said to me, 'It is true, that our lady lieth dead !' And upon this methought I went to behold the body, in which that most noble and blessed spirit had been. And such force had my erring fancy, that it showed me this lady dead ; and it seemed to me that women were covering her head with a white veil ; and her features wore such an aspect of humility, that they seemed to say, 'Now do I behold the beginning of peace !' While in this trance, a humility so profound seized me, on beholding her, that I called upon Death, and said, 'Come to me like a churl ; forasmuch as it behooves thee to be gentle, seated where thou art. Then come to me that do de-

sire thee so much. Thou seest that I already wear thy colors.' And when I had seen all the mournful mysteries completed which are wont to be performed to the bodies of the dead, methought I turned into my chamber, and there methought I looked up to heaven; and so patient was my imagination, that I began to cry aloud and weep with my veritable voice, 'Oh most lovely soul, how blest is he that beholds thee!' And uttering these words with heavy sobs of woe, and calling on Death to come to me, a young and noble lady, who was at the side of my couch, thinking that my words were lamentations caused by the pain of my disorder, was seized with great alarm and began to weep; whereupon certain other ladies, who were in the chamber perceived that I was weeping, by the tears which they saw her shed, and having made this lady, who was the most nearly allied to me by blood, to leave my side, they drew near to wake me, thinking that I dreamt, and told me to sleep no more, and not to disquiet myself. Hearing them accost me thus, the potent fancy ended just as I was on the point of saying, 'Oh Beatrice, may'st thou be blest! And already had I said, 'O Beatrice,' when, recovering myself, I opened my eyes, and saw that I had been deceived."

In this singular waking vision, as it may be termed, we discover the germ of the *Divina Commedia*, a view corroborated by the closing paragraph of the *Vita Nuova*: "But I determined," says he, "to write no more of this divine saint, until I should be able to write of her more worthily; and of a surety she knows that I study to attain to this with all my powers. So, if it shall please Him, by whom all things live, to spare my life for some years longer, I hope to say that of her, which never yet hath been said of any lady. And then may it please Him, who is the Father of all good, to suffer my soul to see the glory of its mistress, that is, of the sainted Beatrice, who now, abiding in glory, looketh upon the face of Him, *qui est per omnia secula benedictus*."

Dante, notwithstanding his poetry and dreams, mingled freely with his fellow-citizens, and acquired high distinction in the Republic. Near the church of San Giovanni, a stone seat used to be pointed out, where, in his prosperous days, he was wont to sit, of a summer afternoon, conversing gaily with his friends and associates.

•  
"On an ancient seat,  
The seat of stone that runs along the wall,  
South of the church, east of the belfry tower,  
(Thou canst not miss it,) in the sultry time,  
Would Dante sit conversing, and with those  
Who little thought that in his hand he held  
The balance, and assigned at his good pleasure  
To each his place in the invisible world."

ROGERS.

He loved to wander, sometimes alone, and sometimes in com-



pany, in and about the Baptistery, with its marvellously wrought gates, fit, as Michael Angelo said, to be the gates of Paradise. It was here that he broke the marble of the Baptismal font, into which a child had accidentally fallen, a mishap ascribed by his enemies to evil motives, and from which he so strikingly clears himself, in the last line of the following singular comparison. Describing the wells or pits in which simoniacal offenders, and among others no less a personage than Pope Nicholas III., head downwards, were tormented with flames, that flashed from heel to toe, along the upturned soles of their feet, he says:

"The sides and bottom of that livid rock  
Were scooped into round holes, of equal size,  
Which seemed not less, nor larger than the fonts  
For baptism, in my beautiful St. John's;  
And one of which, not many years ago,  
I broke to save a drowning child from death:  
Be this my pledge to undeceive the world."

INFERNO. Canto XIX.

While mingling freely in society, and taking an active part in public affairs, Dante, like all thinkers, loved solitude, and was sometimes accused of unsocial habits. His mind was intense and meditative, eager for knowledge and panting for glory. Boccaccio states, that on one occasion, being in Siena, and unexpectedly finding at a shop window a book which he had not seen, but which he had long desired, Dante placed himself on a bench before the door, at nine o'clock in the morning, and never removed his eyes from the volume until vespers, when he had run through the whole contents with such absorbing interest as to have entirely disregarded the festal processions and music which had been passing through the streets the greater part of the day, and on being questioned as to what had happened in his presence, he denied having knowledge of anything except what he had been reading. In company he sometimes scarcely uttered a word; but when he did speak, it was with a force and splendor which astonished his hearers. His mind indeed was so intense and imaginative that at times he appeared to have believed the creations of his own genius. How natural, for example, and how striking the following, especially the lines at the close, where he ascribes, like the old women at Verona, the duskiness of his visage to the "infernal air" of the lower regions:

"High morn had triumphed o'er the glimmering dawn,  
Which fled before her, so that I discerned  
The tremble of the ocean from afar:  
We walked along the solitary plain,  
Like men retracing their erratic steps,  
Who think all lost till they regain the path.  
Arriving where the dew drops with the sun  
Contended, and lay thick beneath the shade,

Both hands my Mentor delicately spread  
 Upon the grass : aware of his intent  
 I turned to him my tearful countenance,  
 And thence he wiped away *the dusky hue*  
 With which the infernal air had sullied it."

PURGATORIO. Canto I.

But the passionate and disdainful nature of Dante demanded action as well as thought. Hence we find him acquiring high distinction in political life, and fighting, with heroic energy, at the battle of Campaldino. He was made Prior of the City of Florence, one of the highest offices in its gift. To this, however, he ascribed all the calamities of his subsequent life. Of a proud and impulsive temper, he made many enemies; and being embroiled in the factions which distracted all Italy, and especially Florence, he was exposed to the vengeance of the dominant party, to which he originally belonged, but which, with apparent inconsistency, he violently opposed.

The immediate occasion of his banishment was a deadly feud between the two opposing factions into which the Guelphs were divided, who held undisputed sway in Florence, and one of whom was expelled from the city by the authority of Dante. Availing himself of this state of things, the Pope succeeded in sending into Florence, Charles of Valois, who, under the pretence of friendship, made himself dictator, recalled the faction of the Neri, and banished the Bianchi, with whom Dante was identified.

Then commenced his bitter exile, and long wanderings, during which he proved, in his own expressive words,

"How salt another's bread is, and the toil  
 Of going up and down another's stairs."

This occurred in his thirty-seventh year. The calamity was immense and overwhelming. For he was not only banished, but his property was confiscated, and his house burnt to the ground. He made one or two attempts, in connection with others, upon Florence, but without success. Subsequently he was condemned to be burnt alive, if he should return to his native place, or fall into the hands of his enemies.

The age of Dante, though brilliant and spirit-stirring, as a transition from chaos and darkness to order and light, was one of violence and blood. Popes and bishops mingled in the strife of ambition; and even the best men of the age, Dante among the rest, were not free from the spirit of lust and revenge. Murders and assassinations were of common occurrence. The rancors of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, the one the party of the Pope and the other of the Emperor, were deep-rooted and violent. Family feuds were fierce and sanguinary. Everywhere steel performed the work of revenge.—Woe then to the man upon whom rested the ban of a

dominant faction. No prayers, no tears, no threatenings or adjurations, avail him. He can never return to his home. In sorrow and anguish must he wander among strangers, with no rest but the grave.

Behold then the noble citizen, the warrior and poet, "stricken, smitten and afflicted," clad in his gray cassock, his stern brow hidden under an unseemly cowl, his visage careworn and stern, moving about from place to place, for the space of nineteen years, longing all the while to see his beloved Florence, but never permitted to approach its gates.

We enter into no detail of this melancholy period of Dante's history, as the facts in reference to it are extremely meagre and uncertain. He found a temporary home for brief seasons, in the houses of his friends and admirers. Occasionally he met with kind treatment and high distinction, but most of the time he had no "certain abiding place." It is even thought that on one emergency he suffered for the want of food; and there is a terrible intimation in one part of the *Commedia*, that he was compelled, "wrapped in his cloak, with face averted," to hold out his hand in the marketplace for bread!

But all the while he was meditating his great poem, and dreaming of Beatrice and heaven. This was his solace in the "waste howling wilderness," through which he was passing, like one of Bunyan's pilgrims, to his own immortal Paradise. Softened and subdued, he looked for rest only in the bosom of "eternal peace."

A letter exists, said to be nearly coeval with the time of Dante, and in the handwriting of Boccaccio, his great critic and admirer, from the prior of a monastery, to a celebrated Ghibelline leader, a friend of Dante, regarded as genuine by Leigh Hunt and others, which throws an interesting light upon the history of the *Commedia*. "Hither he came," says frate Ilario, the monk referred to, "passing through the diocese of Luni, moved either by the religion of the place, or by some other feeling. And seeing him, as yet unknown to me and all my brethren, I questioned him of his wishings and his seekings here. He moved not; but stood silently contemplating the columns and arches of the cloisters. And again I asked him what he wished, and whom he sought. Then slowly turning his head, and looking at the friars and at me, he answered, *Peace!* Thence kindling more and more the wish to know him, and who he might be, I led him aside somewhat, and having spoken a few words with him, I knew him; for although I had never seen him till that hour, his fame had long since reached me. And when he saw that I hung upon his countenance, and listened to him with strange affection, he drew from his bosom a book, did gently open it, and offered it to me, saying: 'Sir Friar, here is a portion of my work, which peradventure thou hast not seen. This remembrance I leave with thee. Forget me not.' And when he had given me

the book, I pressed it gratefully to my bosom, and in his presence fixed my eyes upon it with great love. But I beholding there the vulgar tongue, and showing by the fashion of my countenance, my wonderment thereat, he asked the reason of the same. I answered that I marvelled he should sing in that language; for it seemed a difficult thing, nay incredible, that those most high conceptions, could be expressed in common language; nor did it seem to me right, that such, and so worthy a science should be clothed in such plebian garb. 'You think aright,' he said, 'and I myself have thought so. And when at first the seeds of these matters, perhaps inspired by Heaven, began to bud, I chose that language which was most worthy of them; and not alone chose it, but began forthwith to poetize therein after this wise,

"Ultima regna canam fluido contermina mundo  
Spiritus quæ lata fratent; quæ præmia solvant  
Pro meritis circumque suis."

But when I recalled the condition of the present age, and saw the songs of the illustrious poets, esteemed almost as naught, and knew that the generous men, for whom in better days these things were written, had abandoned (*ahi dolore!*) the liberal arts unto vulgar hands, I threw aside the delicate lyre which had armed my flank, and attuned another more befitting the ear of moderns;—for the food that is hard, we hold in vain to the mouths of sucklings." After making this explanation, more in accommodation perhaps to the Prior's prejudices than his own decided views; for the truth is, Dante perceived the necessity of addressing all classes in their own mother tongue, to secure the immortality of his works, he requested the Prior to add some notes, with the spirit of which he furnished him, and then forward it (transcribed as it is supposed by the monks) to their common friend the Ghibelline chief, a commission, which, knowing the Prior's intimacy with that personage, appears to have been the principal object of his visit to the monastery.

Dante made several efforts to obtain a restoration to his native city, but with no success. It was indeed proposed to grant him this boon, on condition of his submitting to humiliating conditions. Of course, he rejected the proposal with disdain. But he never ceased to think of Florence with the yearning love of early years. In his *Convito*, he remarks, on one occasion, with reference to some harshness and obscurity in his style, that it ought to be excused in consideration of the unfavorable circumstances in which he wrote, and adds, with an affecting eloquence: "For it pleased the citizens of the fairest and most renowned daughter of Rome, Florence, to cast me out of her most sweet bosom, where I was born and bred, and passed half of the life of man, and in which, with her good leave, I still desire, with all my heart, to repose my

weary spirit, and finish the days allotted me ; and so I have wandered in almost every place to which our language extends, a stranger, almost a beggar, exposing, against my will, the wounds given me by fortune, too often unjustly imputed to the sufferer's fault. Truly, I have been a vessel without sail or rudder, driven about upon different ports and shores by the dry wind that springs out of dolorous poverty ; and hence I have appeared vile in the eyes of many, who perhaps by some better report had conceived of me a different impression, and in whose sight not only has my person become thus debased, but an unworthy opinion created of everything which I did, or which I had to do."

If Dante did not always express himself in this touching and lofty strain ; if he sometimes gave way to the harshest recriminations, and the most violent invectives, it is to be ascribed to the cruelty of his enemies, and the sharpness of his grief. "A wounded spirit who can bear?" It is a wonder, indeed, that he did not go mad altogether, and end his days by dagger or poison, as many did in that tempestuous age. But he had a great work to perform, and this it was which really sustained him in his exile. Calmly and constantly, in the house and by the way, he labored on, building up his immortal Epic, in the certain conviction that it would live in all coming time.

His last home was at the Court of Ravenna, where, in the service of Guido Novella Polenta, himself a poet, and a munificent benefactor of men of letters, the father, too, of Francesca di Rimini, whose passionate love and melancholy fate are embalmed in the *Commedia*, Dante spent some peaceful years. But the iron had entered his soul, and being unsuccessful in an embassy to Venice, undertaken on behalf of his patron, he died broken-hearted, 14th September, 1321. It was the day of the Holy Cross. "And perhaps," says Longfellow, "a solemn anthem was the last sound that reached the ears of the dying man, when, between life and death, he beheld 'eyes of light that wandered like stars.'" He was buried at Ravenna, with the highest honors, his noble patron himself pronouncing his funeral eulogy.

Too late Florence repented of her cruelty to her noblest citizen. Embassy upon embassy was sent to Ravenna, to claim the remains of Dante, but the inhabitants of that city were too proud of the treasure to give it up. Guido Polenta intended to erect a gorgeous monument over his grave, but he did not live to execute his design, being driven from his dominions and dying in exile at Bologna. A hundred and fifty years after, Bernardo Bembo, father of the celebrated cardinal of that name, completed Polenta's design ; and three centuries after that, Gonzaga raised a second and more magnificent monument in the same place ; while in Florence a very beautiful and imposing monument by Ricci has recently been erected in the old Church of Santa Croce, near the tombs of

Machiavelli, Angelo, Galileo and Alfieri. The greatest honors formerly conferred on his memory by his native city, were the restoration, to his family, of his confiscated property, after a lapse of forty years; the erection of a bust, crowned with laurel, at the public expense, and the appointment of a lecturer to expound the mysteries and beauties of the *Divina Commedia*. This office was first held by the celebrated Boccaccio. Similar institutions were founded in Bologna, Pisa, Venice, and other Italian cities; so that in two centuries, the highest renown was heaped upon the man, "who lived by sufferance, and died in exile."

After all, it is only within a few generations, that the genius of Dante has been thoroughly appreciated by his own countrymen; and now they are in danger of cherishing for him an excess of veneration, copying his faults as well as his virtues. Foscolo has defended him with enthusiasm and ability. Gingueni and Mariotti have written eloquently in his praise. Some foreign critics have done justice to his extraordinary genius, while others, among whom is Leigh Hunt, have mingled with their criticisms much vituperation and contemptuous remark. Sir Walter Scott, who was more distinguished for his genial fancy, practical good sense, and power of depicting manners than for profound thought or refined sensibility, after reading a few pages of Cary's Dante, threw it from him in disgust. Robert Hall, who possessed a higher range of thought and a keener taste, it is said, made himself acquainted with Italian for the sole purpose of reading the *Divine Comedy* in the original. Macauley says that it is the only poem worthy of being compared with Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Tieck, the celebrated German poet and critic, calls it "a mystic, unfathomable song." "I know of nothing," says Carlyle, "so intense as Dante. His painting," he adds, "is not graphic only, brief, true, and of a vividness as of fire in a dark night; taken on the wider scale, it is every-way noble, and the outcome of a great soul. \* \* \* On the whole, is it not an utterance, this mystic song, at once of one of the greatest of human souls, and of the highest thing that Europe had hitherto realized for herself?"

It may be allowed that Dante is somewhat unfortunate in his supernatural machinery. His representations of the invisible world are far from corresponding with those of the "Sacred Oracles;" he sanctions, of course, the theology of the middle ages, and praises, as saints of the first water, such men as Folco and Dominic, the keenest persecutors of the age. He puts unbaptized infants as well as infidels in hell, and describes with a relish the roasting of heretics; he mingles also with his visions many absurd and fantastic shapes, never seen in heaven, earth, or hell, and not unfrequently indulges in expressions of fierce passion and revenge. After all, his poem is penetrated with the deepest energy of genius, and glows with a purity and splendor, less of earth than

of heaven. With some harsh dissonance here and there, it is "most musical, most melancholy," like the song of seraphs or of glorified spirits. Marred by conceits, false notions, and bad passions, its general import and aim are worthy of the highest intellect, and the purest heart. Every one must rise from its perusal with profound regret for the frailties of human nature, but with a deep and abiding sense of the "beauty of holiness, and "the blessedness of the man whose God is the Lord."

Then, again, Dante ought to have the benefit of the obvious allegorical character of the *Commedia*, a circumstance generally overlooked, and not sufficiently taken into account even by his admirers. His visions are not meant for veritable or literal realities, even if they appear to be such; but rather as forms of thought, symbols or figures, such as he could command for enshrining the great and thrilling ideas and emotions of his poetical soul. Upon this point Dante's own words are express:

"O voi ch' avete gli, intelliti sani  
Mirate la dottrina ch' asconde  
Sotto l' velame degli versi strani."

"All ye whose minds are healthfully attuned,  
Admire and prize the noble truths that lie  
Wrapt in the mystic veil of poetry."

¶ In a letter to one of his friends, accompanied by his poem, he says, "It is to be remarked that the sense of this work is not *simple*, but on the contrary, one may say, manifold. For the very sense is that which it derives from the things signified by the language;—the one literal—the other *allegorical*. The subject of the whole work, taken literally, is the condition of the soul after death. But if you will observe the express words, you will easily perceive that in an allegorical sense the poet is treating of *this hell*, in which, journeying on like travellers, we may deserve reward or punishment."

Rosetti, author of the "anti-Papal Spirit," and the beautiful poem of "Iddio e l' Homo," *Behold the Man*, affirms that it was Dante's intention to read mankind a great moral lesson, by setting forth, in his description of the guilty Babylon, the vices of the Court of Rome of his time, to represent in the horrors of hell, the punishment awaiting these crimes, and in the bliss of Paradise the return to more virtuous days. He finally regards Beatrice as the personification of morality or theology. But this view is too narrow and jejune. In no respect can it be made to correspond with the character and history of Dante's mind. He reveals, it is true, the horrors of Papal usurpation, and scourges, with no gentle hand, the occupants of St. Peter's chair, as wolves in sheep's clothing; but this occupies but a small portion of his poem, which

sweeps the whole field of human action, and passes on into the retributions of eternity.

It is, in fact, Dante's own life and destiny, in connection with that of mankind generally, and particularly that of his own age, which he would describe; the progress, so to speak, of a sinful soul through all forms of discipline and wretchedness, to the final glory of the celestial state. Into this dark and rugged channel, issuing however in sunlight and beauty forever, he pours his own stern and melancholy spirit, panting for perfection and heaven. Hence he begins his progress under the guidance of Virgil, the appropriate symbol of human wisdom, passes through the regions of the Inferno, where he meets his own countrymen and contemporaries suffering for their crimes, and from which he gradually ascends to a purer region, under the care of Beatrice, the symbol of heavenly wisdom, and lands, after various stages of ascent and glory, in the highest heaven, where he enjoys the beatific vision of Christ and God.

In this view, we are sustained by Foscolo, who conceives that "the great drama of human life," and not "the abuses of the Papacy alone, forms the real subject of the *Divina Commedia*. On this account Dante has been styled "the historian of his age,"—the "voice of ten centuries,"—the "prophet of his country,"—the "painter of mankind in general," who calls all our faculties into exercise "to reflect on all the vicissitudes of the world." The forms or figures in which all this is expressed, or embodied, are creations of the poet's mind; and however grotesque some of them may be, they veil, in most cases, an import of the highest significance, while indicating the vivid and all-embracing genius of their author. In this too, consists the most striking proof of Dante's inventive power. His pictures are marvellously natural and original. They strike the mind with the force of new revelations or discoveries. All of them are clear and significant, and many at once grand and beautiful.

Connected with this, we cannot help referring to the manifestation of his creative genius in the use of language. At the time he wrote, the Italian had scarce an existence except as a rude and imperfect speech. He was the first great author that impressed upon it beauty and power. Passing through the crucible of his vast and fiery spirit, it came forth like precious gold seven times purified. It was subsequently further purified and polished by Boccaccio, Petrarch, and others; but it acquired its principal beauty and strength from the fires of Dante's genius. In him thought and speech are one. They issue, at one jet, clear and sparkling from the same furnace, the latter is as much a creation of his mind as the former. Hence the surprising freshness and originality of his diction. It is not simply the dress, but the very body of the truth, all alive and instinct with soul. Possessing the



vigor and elegance of sculptured forms, it is all a glow with life and passion.

His style, we admit, is often rude in its general outline, and harsh in its occasional expression, as are the statues of Michael Angelo and the scenery of the visible creation, but it is penetrated with the fire of genius, and every now and then breaks into untold shapes of beauty and splendor. Its rudeness is that of nature, which often appears harsh and unfinished in some of its features, but never fails as a whole to reveal the beauty and perfection of the in-dwelling spirit.

Dante is a painter in words, and quite equal in strength and majesty to his great admirer, Michael Angelo, who has been styled the Dante of painting and architecture. Indeed, Dante himself possessed a taste not only for poetry and music, but also for drawing. To this, we find an interesting allusion in the *Vita Nuova*. "On the day," says he, "that completed the year after this lady (Beatrice) had been received among the denizens of eternal life, while I was sitting alone, and recalling her form to my remembrance, I drew an angel on a certain tablet, etc." Thus also Michael Angelo was not only a great painter, architect and sculptor, but a poet of no mean pretensions. His favorite author was Dante, and in many of his works, both of the chisel and of the pencil, he has introduced figures suggested by the *Commedia*, or taken directly from its pages. Among these were the statues of Leah and Rachel from the twenty-seventh Canto of the *Purgatorio*, on the monument of Pope Julius. His own copy of the *Commedia*, we are informed, by the Italian writers, had the margins embellished with sketches from the subjects in the text, a precious treasure, but unfortunately lost at sea. Dante's power over language was as despotic as that of Angelo over lines and colors, and hence both created eras in the history of literature and art. Appropriately and beautifully, therefore, Byron in his "Prophecy of Dante," puts into his lips the following words. Speaking of Italy, he says,—

"Thou'rt mine—my bones shall be within thy breast,  
 My *soul within thy language*, which once set  
 With our old Roman sway in the wide west;  
 But I will make *another tongue arise*,  
 As lofty and more sweet, in which express  
 The hero's ardor and the lover's sighs  
 Shall find alike such sounds for every theme,  
 That every word as brilliant as thy skies  
 Shall realize a poet's proudest dream,  
 And make thee Europe's nightingale of song."

It is owing to the same vividness and freshness of mind that almost everything in the *Commedia* assumes an original and graceful form. In this respect how striking and beautiful his angels.

Unlike all other angels that were ever imagined or depicted, they are not only most natural and becoming, but instinct with grandeur and loveliness. The variety of their forms, as well as the energy and gracefulness of their motions, cannot escape the dullest observer. The angels of Titian and Guido, and even of Raffaele and Milton, are but glorified human beings; but Dante's angels are altogether supernatural, not only in their temper, but in their form and aspect. They come from afar, as it were from the musty depths of ether, glide across the "blue profound," guiding the barge that is to convey the chosen spirits to Paradise, poise themselves on wide-spread wings of every form and hue, sometimes using them as sails, and anon rising with them into the highest heavens. Majestic and powerful, they disdain all earthly aid, and pass through space as their natural element. Colorless at first, as if they were a mere presence or mystery, then revealing themselves at a distance, with a dull red, like the planet Mars, struggling through the mist of evening, but growing brighter and brighter like the deepening flashes of lightning. Some are clad in vestures of the freshest green, floating on the ambient air, and fanned by ethereal wings; others again, are all aglow with unearthly lustre, their bright armor flashing like the sunlight, and producing a sudden dizziness in the eyes of the beholder; others have faces like "the morning star," casting forth quivering beams; while others are clothed in ash or coal-colored garments, with swords in their hands, too sparkling to be gazed at by mortal eye. One is announced by a tempest, and has the face of a person "occupied by other thoughts." He touches the portals of the sky with his wand, and they fly open; and then without uttering a word to his companions, he returns the way he came. The agitation of another's wings makes the shores tremble, and resembles a crashing whirlwind which sweeps through the mountains and levels the forests; while the presence of another affects the senses like the fragrance of a soft summer morning.

What a picture, for example, is the following. How simple in its general outline, but how striking and graceful.

"That being came all beautiful to meet us,  
Clad in white raiment, and the morning star  
Appeared to tremble in his countenance;  
His arms he spread, and then he spread his wings,  
And cried, 'Come on, the steps are near at hand,  
And here the ascent is easy.'"

PURGATORIO. Canto XII.

He sometimes presents a complicated picture, and indeed an entire history, with one or two brief and rapid strokes upon which we dwell for hours, without exhausting the import. One smiting word—as Carlyle would say, and all is silence! The following for example, has been much admired.

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"Ah when thou hast returned to yonder world,  
And art reposing from thy long, long journey,  
Remember me, for *I am Pia*.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Siena gave me birth, the Marshes death,*  
And this he knows who, with his ring and jewel,  
But newly had espoused me."

The original is yet more condensed and expressive. But how much is contained in this brief history—a whole life—a long and lingering death—deep affection—jealousy cruel as the grave—and the fearful, unutterable consequences. At once we have the image before our eyes of the young and beautiful Pia, first wedded, —then confined in the marshes whither her husband had conveyed her, fading away, and lastly, dying; all unconscious, perhaps, of the fatal wrong inflicted by her husband. But who was Pia? None can tell. Pages of conjecture have been expended upon the question, but without much satisfactory result. They say she was the wife of a grandee, Nello Della Pietro, who, becoming jealous of his young bride, removed her to the putrid marshes of the Maremma, where she soon drooped and died, without suspicion on her part, or intimation on his, of the terrible purpose for which she was hurried thither; her gloomy keeper, with a steady eye, watching her life go out, "like a dying lamp in a sepulchre," and after her death abandoning himself to utter despair.

It will be seen from this, that Dante's pictures of horror and grief are equally striking with those of beauty and gladness. The caverned Inferno, with its gloomy circles, claspings of hands, shiverings that make the air tremble, looks averted, tears trickling slowly and reluctantly adown dark and dusty cheeks, or congealed upon stony eyelids, beings silent and sad, others, whose enforced words cause the flesh to creep and the spirit to quake, and others, vanishing with a sigh or a stifled groan in dismal shades or lurid flames; doleful creatures with streaming hair and burning eyes, shut up in caverns lurid with lightning, or swept, like flocks of birds before gusts of tempestuous winds; others lying prone upon the "burning pave," or crushed into holes of scorching lava; some encased in ice, and others devoured by hellish monsters; while over and through the whole is a strange movement and mystery of woe, which can be felt but not described.—One indeed is shocked and appalled, but held spell-bound by the strange fascination. Occasionally one is even disgusted; for the pictures, wonderfully truthful, are so grotesque and horrible that they could originate only in a semi-barbarous age, and in a mind, as it were, half-demoniac and half-divine.

It is an infinite relief, however, to meet amid the waste of gloom and sorrow, so many pictures of beauty and gladness, all the more fascinating from contrast, like flowers in rifted rocks, or fountains

in the desert. His descriptions, especially of external nature, are as fresh and lovely as the dews of early morn contending with the sunlight. "You long," says Leigh Hunt, "to bathe your eyes, smarting with the fumes of hell, in his dews. You gaze enchanted on his green fields, and the celestial blue skies, the more so from the pain and sorrow in the midst of which the visions are created."

Dante's delineations of calm and homely scenes, of inanimate nature, of picturesque objects and pastoral images; his allusions to the higher and more tender feelings of the human heart, the love of home, of kindred, and of heaven; his pictures of undying affection and devotion, and above all his visions of glory, give indications of a mind, which, while it knew and revealed the horrible and bad, knew also and discovered the beautiful and good. If some then have felt themselves authorized, from the former, to say he has the spirit of a demon; are we not authorized also from the latter, to say he has the spirit of an angel? Moreover, if he rose from the first, and rested only in the second, may we not hope that his errors were forgiven, and his nature finally purified and blest?

But let us look at some of his exquisite pictures, and gather from them some solace and cheer amid the gloom and waste of the *Inferno*. Among other things, the miser, tormented by the thirst of Tantalus, is made perpetually to behold, without tasting, not water merely, but

"Rivulets that from the verdant hills  
Of Casentine into the Arno flow,  
Freshening its current with the cooler rills."

In the same way, the livid flames which illuminate the eighth circle of the infernal regions, are

"Lights numberless, as by some fountain-side  
The silly swain reposing, at the hour  
When beams the day-star with diminished pride,  
When the sunned bee deserts each rifled flower,  
And leaves to humming gnats the populous void—  
Beholds in grassy lawns or leafy bower  
Or orchard plot, of glow-worms emerald bright."

What can be finer than his description of the evening hour, with its soothing melancholy and dreams of home!

"Twas now the hour when fond desire renews  
To him who wanders o'er the pathless main,  
Raising unbidden tears, the last adieus  
Of tender friends, whom Fancy shapes again;  
While the late-parted pilgrim thrills with thought  
Of his loved home, if o'er the distant plain  
Perchance his ears the village chimes have caught  
Seeming to mourn the close of dying day."

The last line, even in the translation, as all will allow, is melody itself, and might have suggested to Gray the opening stanza of his exquisite elegy.

But none of these are equal to the portrait of the glorified Beatrice, as she appears to Dante in a cloud of flowers :

“Even as the blessed in the new covenant  
Shall rise up quickened, each one from his grave,  
Wearing again the garments of the flesh,—  
So upon that celestial chariot  
A hundred rose *ad vocem tanti senis*,  
Ministers and messengers of life eternal,  
They were all saying, *Benedictus qui venis !*<sup>1</sup>  
And scattering flowers above and round about,  
*Manibus i dato lilia plenis !*  
I once beheld at the approach of day  
The orient sky all stained with roseate hues,  
And the other heaven with light serene adorned,  
And the sun's face uprising overshadowed,  
So that by temperate influence of vapors,  
The eye sustained his aspect for long while :  
Thus, in the bosom of a cloud of flowers,  
Which from those hands angelic were thrown up  
And down, descended inside and without,  
With crown of olive o'er a snow-white veil  
Appeared a lady under a green mantle,  
Vested in colors of the living flame.”

PURGATORIO. Canto XXX.

Another briefer, and if possible, yet more exquisite description of Beatrice, is given in his vision of the spirits in the planet Mercury :

“I see full well how in the light divine  
Thou dwellest, and that thine eyes a joy display,  
Which, when thou smilest, more serenely shine ;  
But who thou art I know not, neither why,  
O worthy soul, a sphere is given to thee,  
Hid by another's ray from mortal eye.  
These words I spoke unto the joyous light  
That had been first to address me—whereat she  
Arrayed herself in splendor still more bright :  
*And as the sun conceals himself from view  
In the pure splendor of the new-born day,  
Bursting his mantle of the early dew ;  
Even so that holy form herself concealed  
Within the lustre of her own pure ray.”*

Dante ascends to a yet higher strain in the following, where Beatrice, the symbol of religion, which in light and love, reveals a beauty and glory the most intense and overpowering :

“Like as the bird who on her nest all night  
Had rested, darkling with her tender brood

<sup>1</sup> These Latin quotations are scraps of old choral chants, and have, from association of ideas, a fine effect.

Mid the loved foliage, longing now for light,  
 To gaze on their dear looks and bring them food—  
 Sweet task, whose pleasures all its toils repay,  
 Anticipates the dawn, and through the wood  
 Ascending perches on the topmost spray,  
 There all impatience, watching to descry  
 The first faint glimmer of approaching day.  
 Thus did my lady toward the southern sky,  
 Erect and motionless her visage turn;  
 The mute suspense that filled her wishful eye  
 Made me like one who waits a friend's return,  
 Lives on this hope and will no other own.  
 Soon did my eye a rising light discern;  
 High up the heavens its kindling splendours shone,  
 And Beatrice exclaimed, 'See, they appear,  
 The Lord's triumphal hosts! For this alone  
 These spheres have rolled, and reap their harvest here.'  
 Her face seemed all on fire, and in her eye  
 Danced joy unspeakable to mortal ear.  
 As when full-orbed Diana smiles, on high,  
 While the eternal nymphs her form surround,  
 And scattering beauty through the cloudless sky,  
 Float on the bosom of the blue profound:  
 O'er thousands of bright flowers was seen to blaze  
 One sun transcendent! 'from whom all around,  
 As from our sun the planets drew their rays,  
 He, through these living lights, found such a tide  
 Of glory as o'erpowered my feeble rays."

Thus Beatrice, or Religion, guides the soul of Dante to the primal and essential Light, the Sun of suns, the Eternal Fountain of being and blessedness, "God manifest in the flesh."

The goal, then, to which all the aspirings of the sin-stricken wanderer reached, was God himself; and hence he at last obtains a mystic vision of the Holy Trinity, wherein he beholds "our image painted." The mystery, however, is too profound and dazzling, and "vigor fails the towering fantasy."

"But yet the will rolled onward, like a wheel  
 In even motion, by the love impell'd,  
 That moves the sun in heaven and all the stars."

Much discussion has arisen respecting the origin of the *Commedia*, a name, by the way, given to this singular poem, as equivalent to that of Drama, and not intended to convey any ideas of a comic or ludicrous nature, as some have absurdly imagined, but as possessing something not merely of an epic but of a dramatic form, and exhibiting the great drama of human life, in the fearful and joyous changes through which it is destined to pass. The origin of the poem, so far as its subjective character is concerned, we have already discovered in the experience of Dante. Many things indeed may have suggested and aided its formal development, but

<sup>1</sup> The "Sun of Righteousness," the Lord Jesus Christ.

like all other immortal poems, it is a pure creation of genius. It sprang from the deep fountains of Dante's own heart, and is hence the best history not only of his genius, but of his life. We see more of Dante in the *Commedia* than in all that has ever been written respecting him. It is truly the development of his *Vita Nuova*, or New Life. Through all the gloom of the *Inferno*, as well as the glory of the *Paradiso*, we behold that sinful, suffering spirit passing on to the full perfection of its being and blessedness. To this we find an affecting allusion in the thirtieth canto of the *Purgatorio*, where Beatrice, now to be regarded not as an earth-born beauty, but as the glorified symbol of truth and purity, is represented as saying:—

“ In his new life this man was such that he  
 Might in himself have wondrously displayed  
 All noble virtues in supreme degree.  
 But all the kindlier strength is in the soil,  
 So do ill seed and lack of culture breed  
 More noxious growth and ranker wilderness.  
 I for some term sustained him with my looks;  
 To him unveiling my young eyes, I led  
 His steps with mine along the path of right;  
 Yet soon as I the threshold gained of this,  
 My second age, and laid life's vesture down,  
 He turned from me and gave himself to others.  
 When I from carnal had to spirit risen,  
 And beauty and virtue in me grew divine,  
 I was less dear to him and less esteemed;  
 And into devious paths he turned his steps,  
 Pursuing still *false images of good*,  
 That make no promise perfect to the hope.  
 Nor aught availed it, I for him besought  
 High inspirations, with the which in dreams,  
 And otherwise, I strove to lead him back;  
 So little warmed his bosom to my call,  
 To such vile depths he fell, that all device  
 Had failed for his salvation, save to show  
 The children of perdition to his eyes.”

In embodying this great fact or idea, Dante chose such forms and imagery as were familiar to him; derived partly from men and books, from the spirit and opinions of the age, and partly from the natural workings of his own mind, fusing its materials and bringing them into new and unheard-of shapes. Thus his theology and metaphysics are those of the times in which he lived, or which immediately preceded him. Much of his hell, something also of his heaven, and certainly all of his purgatory, are the figments of superstition, and monkery; but the great indwelling spirit, the genius of the whole, which gleams through these fantastic shapes, or rather informs them with living energy and splendor, is the unborrowed inspiration of his own mighty intellect, touched with the finger of the Almighty.

On this ground there may be something in the idea of Sismondi (*Literature du Midi*, vol 1, p. 356), who refers to the monkish pageants and plays sometimes enacted in the age of Dante, to represent the punishments of hell, as having suggested the form of the *Inferno*. He says that on more than one occasion such an exhibition, in dramatic form was made at Florence, in the dry bed of the Arno, with all the varied torments which the imagination of the monks had called up, rivers of boiling pitch, gulfs of fire, mountains of ice and horned serpents—all which were brought to act upon real persons (heretics of course) who by their horrible shrieks, groans and howlings, made the illusion complete. It has been remarked, however, whether this suggested the *Inferno*, or the *Inferno*, this; for the one is just as probable as the other. At all events the minds of men, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, were familiar enough with such ideas. The monkish preachers of that day tasked their imagination for the production of all sorts of horrors to frighten the people into obedience. Religion, enshrining a few grand elements preserved from antiquity, was gross in its character, and often brutal, if not demoniac in its manifestations.—“In the age of Dante,” says Mariotti (*Italy Past and Present*,) “praying and fighting went side by side. The Ark of the Covenant rose in the midst of martial encampments. The priesthood of Christ gloried in the name of church militant. The bishop said mass in his coat of arms, and rival fraternities knocked each other down with their crucifixes. The whole system of faith and worship was made to fit an age of violence. Christianity ruled by terror. Religion was then indeed the *fear* of God. Fear of the devil had been a more appropriate expression. The most egregious follies, and often the most fearful licentiousness and cruelty were mingled with intense bigotry and self-sacrificing penance. Fire and sword were the weapons of the church. The wasting of heretics under the names of Paterini and Cathari, the Puritans and Dissenters of their age had become an almost daily ceremony.”

That the stern genius of Dante was imbued with something of this gross and stern asceticism, cannot be doubted. At all events it must be obvious to every one that he employed its more striking forms and expressions to reveal the daring thoughts of his deep and gloomy genius. But all the while we can discern his better nature struggling through the fire and smoke, and finally breaking away from the whole, and ascending, like a creature of heaven winged with sunbeams, to the fountain of eternal day.

But the acute Villemain, in his “*Cours de Litterature Française*,” gives a better account of what may be called the formal origin of Dante’s *Inferno* than the one suggested by Sismondi. “One day,” says he, “long before the epoch of Dante, in the little city of Arezzo, the Pope Nicholas second, being present, a cardinal ascended the pulpit and preached. This cardinal was then



fifty years of age; he was small of stature; his eyes were sparkling and animated by an ardent and sombre fire, which made sinners tremble; his hair still black, gave to his countenance, already aged, something more manly and harsh. His words were revered by the people. He was deemed a holy man, and all the bishops of Italy trembled before his power. This was Gregory seventh, yet now only Archdeacon Hildebrand."

But why go back so far, enquires Villermain, for the inspiration of Dante. Because a man of genius having preached such a thing as the *Inferno*, it must have entered the popular mind, and repeated, amplified and exaggerated, gone down to posterity a vast legend, which another man of genius afterwards transformed into the highest poetry. Gregory, indeed cared nothing for the poetry, but he wished to subdue incorrigible offenders and fix an indelible stigma upon the Germans, whom he hated. Listen to him.

"A certain German Count," said he, "died about ten years ago. After his death a holy man descended in spirit into the infernal regions, and there saw the abovementioned Count placed upon the highest step of a ladder. He affirmed that this ladder seemed to rise uninjured amid the roaring and eddying flames of the avenging fire, and to have been placed there to receive all the descendants of that race of counts. Beyond, a black chaos, a frightful abyss extended infinitely and plunged into the infernal depths, whence issued this immense ladder. This was the order established there among those who succeeded each other: the last comer took the highest step of the ladder, and all the others descended each one step towards the abyss. The men of this family coming after him were successively arranged upon the ladder, and by an inevitable law, went one after another to the bottom of the abyss.

The holy man who witnessed these things inquired the cause of this damnation, and why the Count, his contemporary, reputed to be an upright and worthy man, a rare circumstance among persons of that class, was thus severely punished. 'On account of a domain of the church at Metz, which one of his ancestors, of whom he is the tenth heir, had wrested from the blessed Stephen, all these have been devoted to the same punishment; and as the same sin of avarice had united them in the same crime, so the same punishment has united them in the fires of hell.'"

Here we have the idea of the ten degrees or circles of the *Inferno*, which issuing from "that terrible mouth," which made kings tremble, might have floated about in the terrified visions of the multitude, until arrested by the glowing mind of Dante, was finally set in the framework of his immortal verse.

But speculations of this sort are more curious than profitable, except as illustrating the spirit of the age, and the possible methods of genius; for while Dante derived his materials from all sources, he alone possessed the power to construct them into that temple of

adamant, which is yet invested with all the gloom and glory of the middle ages ; or to quote his own words,—

“ the sacred song which heaven and earth  
Have lent a hand to frame—which  
Many a year hath kept me lean with thought.”

In a word, the *Divina Commedia*, is one of those old Gothic edifices of the dark ages, with its many chambered cells, and even dungeons, its dim aisles and massive towers, fretted ornaments, old tombs and blazing altars, illumined by the rays of the setting sun, and echoing the soft tones of the vesper bells, a thing at once of dread and beauty, of stern asceticism and celestial devotion. In that old temple, “ that great supernatural world cathedral,” a modern, and a Protestant even, may linger in hallowed worship. There his spirit, subdued by solemn thought, may rise to the home of glory beyond the spheres, where the good of all creeds finally mingle ; and if, by the grace of God, he should himself finally reach “ the highest heaven of uncreated light,” he will not be much surprised if, notwithstanding all the errors and imperfections of Dante, he should meet there the glorified Florentine. Would to heaven that in these days of skepticism and pride, of hollow religion and lofty pretension, when we scarce believe in heaven, to say nothing of hell, we had one half the clear vision, the steady faith, and the all-conquering love of the immortal poet. With our better views and softer piety, we might then set our foot upon the world, mount into the clear empyrean, and bathe our spirits in the very light of the eternal Sun.

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### ARTICLE III.

## OLD AND NEW SCHOOL PRESBYTERIANISM.

By REV. SAMUEL T. SPEAR, Brooklyn, N. Y.

*Differences between Old and New School Presbyterians.* By Rev. Lewis Cheeseman: Rochester: Published by Erastus Darrow.

(Continued from page 41.)

THE Eighth Chapter of the “ *Differences*,” contains the following table of contents : “ Tendencies of the new divinity—The new divinity rests upon one, or, at most, two assumptions, both of which are false—Tends to infidelity.” This does not present a very

lucid idea of what the author intends to accomplish. The main purpose, however, of this chapter, is to trace the "New School" heresies back to their "*fountain*," or source. In the estimation of the author, these "errors" sprang from the "Dissertation on the Nature of true Virtue," written by the Elder Edwards, *clarum et venerabile nomen*. He tells us that he has "MET with a treatise on the nature of virtue"—meaning the above "Dissertation." President Edwards did the mischief; he presented "a theory on this subject," which, by a process of philosophical and theological incubation, has proved the source of all this evil. The seminal error of the great metaphysician passed into the hands of Drs. Hopkins, Emmons, Edwards the Younger, Taylor, Mr. Finney, &c., infecting the theology of New England, and spreading its baneful influence over the Presbyterian Church. "After this manner, an error apparently harmless at first, and scarcely one hundred years old, and originating with a sound divine, and one of the greatest and best of men, has been gradually, and in various directions, evolving different and cardinal errors, which have ultimately mingled and spread into vast systems, and which now float, with their dark, pestilential vapors, upon Mount Zion, distributing everywhere the elements of decline and death." p. 187. These are terrible effects of one mistake.

What then is the "theory," the "error" of President Edwards? "True virtue most essentially consists in BENEVOLENCE TO BEING IN GENERAL. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent of the heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will." "When I say true virtue consists in *love to being in general*, I shall not be likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind, or exercise of love, is of the nature of true virtue, but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its *direct and immediate* object: so that no exercise of love, or kind affection to any one particular being, that is but a small part of the whole, has anything of the nature of true virtue. But that the nature of true virtue consists in a *disposition* to benevolence towards being in general, though from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to *particular* beings, as objects are presented and occasions arise." Edwards takes special pains to discriminate between natural sentiments, affections, self-love, conscience, &c., and that love of which he is speaking in the definition of true virtue. The latter is not an *instinct*, but subsists in connection with *reason*, and the *grace* of God producing it. It comprehends "being in general," as it is capable of application to all beings; in respect to whom it seeks whatever is their *summum bonum*, a question which not it, but reason and revelation determine. In eight consecutive chapters, Edwards elaborates, qualifies, and establishes this view—showing

<sup>1</sup> Edward's Works, New York edition, vol. iii., pp. 94, 95.

himself to mean what Paul and John mean by "*ἁμαρτία*" This is the cardinal "error," unattended with the arguments and explanations of its illustrious author.

What Edwards intended to say, and did say, will not be clearly understood by a mind that fails to appreciate the wide distinction between two different departments of spiritual ethics. We doubt whether Mr. C. apprehended this distinction. All ethical inquiries belong to one or the other of two great provinces of thought. The first is the province of *objective principles* or truths: the second is that of *subjective facts*, existing in the bosom of a moral agent. In the first, we ask, what is right objectively? in the second, what is that in a moral agent which conforms to the law of right. In his "Dissertation," Edwards has the latter question in view. He applies his discriminating analysis to this single point: *What is that subjective condition of a moral agent, whose presence constitutes that agent truly virtuous, and whose absence determines it to be vicious?* The ultimate objective grounds of moral distinctions formed no part of his inquiry; his research was limited to the *phenomenal* fact of true virtue as a state, condition, or exercise, of a moral being. What is that state? Edwards answered—Love—defining its qualities and its objects.

Our author, not pleased with the doctrine of Edwards, had before him a very fine field for argument, embracing two demonstrations; namely, that the "theory" was an "error; and that this "error," in the downward tendency of error, has generated the "New School" heresies. He does not, however, seem to have thoroughly comprehended the logical wants of his subject.

In regard to the first question, whether Edwards was wrong in his analysis of subjective virtue? he offers no argument, not one solitary proof. He does not condescend to tell us what is the true light on this vital point. Had he given us *his* definition, we might then have compared notes with him. He has left us to see an error, without the benefit, either expulsive or attractive, of the opposite truth. The only relief from this uncertainty is to gather his theory by inference. If the theory of Edwards is totally wrong, then is the exact opposite of his affirmation right? If so, then Mr. C.'s theory of true virtue is, that it consists in *not* loving being in general. This is the only clue by which we can imagine what is the view of the author. Would it not have been respectful to the "sound divine" to have paid to his error the compliment of a "sound" refutation? The name of President Edwards is a "tower of strength" among those who appreciate talent and piety. Most men would think a little proof not out of place, when attacking the opinions of such a divine.

The author informs us that this theory is "scarcely one hundred years old." On this point we think he is not a little in "error," as to a matter of fact. Those acts or exercises, or

states of mind, which God requires must contain the *essence* of all true virtue; in them it consists. What are the fundamental principles of the Divine requirement? We give the judgment of the great Expounder: "Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt *love* thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."<sup>1</sup> We subjoin the authority of an inspired apostle as to the nature of true virtue: "Love is the fulfilling of the law."<sup>2</sup> We recommend the brother to read his Bible once more, especially I. Cor., chap. 13, and the I. Epistle of John entire. We need not fortify the views of Edwards with any reasonings of our own: the above authorities with Christian men will be sufficient. We cannot, however, withhold the expression of our astonishment, that a Christian writer should describe such a doctrine, as containing consequentially "the elements of decline and death." The picture he means to give is truly hideous. Strange coloring for such a hallowed groundwork! Where were his recollections of the Bible! His thoughts of the well-established tendencies of true love in the universe of God! We feel offended, for truth's sake, that he should so caricature this grand *sum* of human virtues. If it be a great "error" to place virtue in true love, so great that the idea leads to all forms of heresy, then there must be something very bad in true love.

Let us, however, attend to the other point, i. e. the question of fact, whether these "heresies" sprang from the treatise of Edwards? Our first remark is, that Dr. Lord, the endorser, and Mr. C., the author, are not agreed as to their source. The Dr. informs us in the "Introductory Chapter," that they are "the *ancient heresies*"—revived—extending back as far as the days of Luther, Augustine, and even Paul himself. Not at all; says Mr. C. He has "met with a treatise on the nature of virtue," containing an error "*scarcely one hundred years old*," which has done all this work! Who is right? Where did these "heresies" come from? We hope these brethren will try to be a little more harmonious—remarking that when men draw on their fancy for facts and relations, they ought to be exceedingly cautious in the exercise of it.

Our second observation is, that the author's principal difficulty with the "Dissertation" of Edwards is, not that virtue consists in benevolence or love, but that this love is an *exercise*, a preference, an *active* state of a moral agent. In his conception, it carries along with it the theory which "commences all moral distinctions with the commencement of moral preferences;" the admission of which idea in respect to holiness or virtue, would

<sup>1</sup> Mat. 22: 37-46.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. 13: 10.

imply the same admission in respect to unholiness or sin, and thus leave no opportunity for his peculiar views in respect to the *nature* of sin. He observes that if this theory be granted, "then no moral distinctions can exist back of intelligent mental preferences, and neither holiness, nor sin, can belong to the nature of a moral being, but must always belong to his acts." Hence it must not be granted; it must be called an "error," the root of all error. Mr. C. we suppose, is one of those who hold to the doctrine, that it is a sin for a man to *be born as he is*, with those constitutional and created endowments which are derived directly from the Creator's hand; that sinfulness, with all its moral qualities and legal liabilities, is as true here, as of the actions of men. So we understand him. And, because the "theory" of Edwards in his view inferentially repudiates this doctrine, he repudiates the theory. But why does the Edwardean view repudiate the favorite doctrine of Mr. C.? Simply because the assumption is made, that benevolence is an *active* state of the soul, an *exercise* of its powers, and that consequently "moral distinctions" are to be predicated, not of faculties as such, but of mental phenomena. This is the fatal sin of the theory. Now, we suggest, that by a little ingenuity the author might have spared himself the trouble, as well as peril, of this attack upon Edwards, and equally upon the Word of God. He might have done so in either of two ways; namely, by not assuming that love is an active state of the soul; or by facing the naked question, whether sin and holiness as moral predicates, go back of the operations and active states of the mind. He had no occasion to call Edwards into this issue, more than any other man whose position implies, that "moral distinctions" relate only to *active* conditions of the soul. He might, for example, have taken John's definition of sin, and referred the "New School" heresies to this source, contending that the definition is not accurate, or at least not sufficiently adequate to be an orthodox description: "Whosoever committeth sin transgresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law." The virus of not going back of active mental states for the matter of "moral distinctions," as really inheres in this definition as in the "theory" of Edwards.

For our third remark we submit a specimen or two of the manner, in which he traces the "New School" errors back to the fundamental mistake of Edwards. Here he evinces the most extraordinary insight into remote relations. We felt while reading him as we remember once to have felt, when endeavoring to fathom the mysteries of Kant's Critick on Pure Reason. As an example, he traces the "New School" error, that Christ did not suffer the literal penalty of the law, but did suffer its legal equivalent, to the theory of Edwards. The mode of derivation or *nexus* between two errors, if we are able to understand him, is this: that God as

<sup>1</sup> Page 189.

.. <sup>1</sup> I John 3: 4.

a benevolent being, and in the sovereign exercise of that benevolence, did, according to the "New School" exposition, choose to substitute the sufferings of Christ for the punishment of the sinner, realizing in the former all the purposes of the latter, while providing in specified cases for the remission of the threatened penalty. God did this in *love*; therefore, (mark the logic) since Edward's theory is that virtue consists in *love*, this "New School" view of the atonement having the idea of *love* in it, grew out of that theory! This of course is the reviewer's statement of the author's argument: if it be not correct, then we confess a total inability to understand what he means to say. It is difficult, as it is needless, to reply to an argument so ærial; that finding the word or idea of love in two sentences, proceeds to infer that the *matter* in the one sentence is a philosophical derivative from the matter in the other. Give us this license of thought, and we pledge ourselves to find *anything in anything*. We should have felt obliged to the author, had he referred us to some "New School" divine who had reasoned from the nature of virtue in man to the nature of the atonement by Jesus Christ. We might add other specimens of the manner in which he traces "New School" errors back to a "single fountain;" but we forbear. It is sufficient to say, that he not only mis-states their sentiments in almost every instance in which he undertakes to describe them, but also fails to give the shadow of a proof showing their consequential connection with the theory of Edwards. It is altogether a *fancy* sketch. Surely he cannot complain that we have no faith in his words, when he gives us no proof, historical or metaphysical, that verity lies in his language. It must be amazing to candid and thinking men, that he could have found any respectable endorers to commend such a mass of puerility, under the appellation of "able discrimination and sound reasoning."

What the author says on the subject of "man's ability," as another error affiliated to the one in regard to virtue, we pass in silence; since this point will be considered in another connection. We leave this chapter by quoting and commenting upon a single passage in its address to the *unregenerate*. "We call upon you, therefore, by the truth of your total depravity, and by your righteous and hopeless condemnation in your present state; by the blood of atonement so long neglected, and by the expostulations of the Spirit so long resisted; in view of the resurrection morn, the judgment seat of Christ, and the retributions of eternity, to AWAKEN AT ONCE TO RIGHTEOUSNESS and TO CAST YOURSELF TO-DAY upon the bosom of your blessed and only Redeemer." We do not object to this exhortation, though we confess not a little surprise in view of its source. Does he *really* mean to tell wicked men "to

<sup>1</sup> Christian Intelligencer.

\* Page 202. The under-scoring is by the reviewer.

awaken at once to righteousness," and cast themselves "to-day" upon Christ? Suppose one of them, having read his philippic against the "New School" error of "man's ability," should reply thus: "Sir, we have no ability to do this. If we take your advice, we must *act*, we must act at once, we must act rightly too. True, you say, our inability to love God belongs to our moral constitution; but this does not mend the matter; for, according to your own explanation, it is not only real, but in every sense *total* and *absolute*, and always has been so. We have no *capacities* "to awaken;" we never had; there is no sense in which we can do anything in obedience to your advice. You are orthodox, and so are we." Now if the author met this reply in conformity with the views expressed in this and other chapters, he would have to answer: "All right: but remember that ability in relation to *ethics* is in no sense indispensable to obligation. Your duties and capacities as moral agents, have no relation to each other; the absoluteness of your inability to love God is a crime; you sinned before you did anything. Moral distinctions, character and desert of hell, apply to the very faculties God gave you; infants are responsible subjects of God's government as soon as they are born, and deserve the woes of the second death for *being born as they are*; all humanity is *summed* up in Adam. Though you have no ability of any kind except to do evil, yet you must awake to righteousness, you must do it at once. If you object to this, recollect that your inability is not "*chemical* or *agricultural*," but one that belongs to your "*moral constitution*," that is to say, you have not the capacity of mental sight, preference, affection or faith in the direction of holiness, and yet you must exert a capacity which you have not, and never had. By the truth of the *absoluteness of the inability of your moral constitution*, I call upon you to awake." To prate about heresy, and then make an exhortation which, if sincere, implies that very heresy, or is sheer nonsense, is a specimen of inconsistency those may explain who can. If the sinner really has no ability of "*moral constitution*," as the author teaches, to love God, or believe in Christ, why exhort him to either act? If his inability be that of "*moral constitution*," it is not "*a crime*," but a misfortune; and we can no more awake under the pressure of such an inability than we can "*create a world*." To urge it as a duty is to belie all common sense. Orthodoxy of this kind is not in the Confession of Faith, or in the Bible.

Chapter vii. p. 150-184, is devoted to the consideration of "*Revivals of Religion*." Almost the whole chapter is occupied with a running sketch of revivals from the earliest periods down to the present time; upon which we make no comments. If the author judged such a sketch desirable, we shall not quarrel with his preference, though we are not able to see to what argumentative use he applies the history.



He is very careful to disabuse the public of the "impression" which he thinks somewhat prevalent, "that Presbyterians of the Old School" are opposed to true and genuine revivals. He has no objection even to "meetings which last several days," and does not, with any particular emphasis, criticise what are called *measures*. In the course of his reflections we learn what are the *characteristics* of true revivals. "True revivals, then, result from a divine and supernatural agency." "True revivals occur in connection with means divinely appointed." "When true revivals occur, believers, some of them at least, are greatly quickened and divinely led to seek after them as blessings inexpressibly great and desirable." "True revivals are attended with alarming apprehensions of sin and misery." "The *miraculous* changes which a true revival of religion supposes, must be common to the Church in all ages." It had been well to have added with greater distinctness, that in "true revivals," *sinners* are generally converted to God. We can assure the author that we do not deny, and we know of no "New School" man that does, any of the above conceptions of a true revival, if we except the last; and in respect to this we charge him with using the term "*miraculous*" in a manner contrary to the *usus loquendi* of the word. If this description is meant to imply, as we fear it is, that "New School" Presbyterians do not hold to "true revivals," according to the above model of ideas, we can only say that it is a gross misrepresentation. It would be a testimony than which nothing can be more foreign to the truth.

Passing by these incidental matters, we present the author's *main* idea in regard to "revivals" in "New School" churches. It is, that these so-called revivals are *spurious*, the "work of man and not of God." This he infers from the assumed fact, that the "New School" are *heretics*. Hence revivals among them are nothing but "a revival of old heresies:" "they are not the result of divine influences." His position is, not that there are some *false* conversions, but that the *revivals* themselves bear this character. He more than intimates their affinity with "Mormonism," "Christianism," and "Popery." If, among them, there happen to be a few "genuine conversions to Christ," this fact is not to be considered as having any connection with "New School" men or doctrine. They do not hold gospel doctrine enough to have a revival of true religion, that is to say, in plain words, *they are not Christians*. When the martyrs shall be re-produced in the persons of the millennial witnesses, "Finney, and Barnes, and Beman, and Beecher, will surely make but a sorry appearance in the hands of these sons of Abraham." This, in the compass of a *nut shell*, is what he tells the world about revivals among "New School" Presbyterians.

<sup>1</sup> p. 156-159.

<sup>2</sup> p. 167.

His chapter on "Revivals" is not a narrative of *facts* showing the alleged spuriousness, but purely a process of a *priori* reasoning from the pseudo-orthodoxy of his own mind, against the clear evidences of God's grace. It is a repudiation of the Holy Spirit in the *fruits* of that Spirit. Confident in the assumption of his own exclusive orthodoxy, he gravely concludes, that the rumored works of God's grace are not what they appear to be. We are not mistaken in imputing to him this style of reasoning. "The new divinity, being a most glaring and wide departure from the ancient faith, is undoubtedly an *apostasy*, not a progress—is a revival of false religion, and not of the true."<sup>1</sup> "The new divinity then is another gospel, an apostasy from the faith, and the revivals connected with its progress, are revivals of a spurious Christianity."<sup>2</sup> At the close of the chapter he sums up his views by declaring, that these revivals "are a revival of old heresies," "not the result of divine influences." The converts, if they think they love Christ, and trust him for salvation, are certainly mistaken: for Mr. C. has an orthodox way of telling *a priori*, whether, they are Christians or not. First, to assume that all orthodoxy is with himself; next, that there is not enough of truth among "New School" Presbyterians to have a revival according to the truth; and finally, to declare that the appearances of such a revival, are all deceptive; this we deem a very singular mode of settling a plain question of fact. Its injustice must be palpable to every eye.

The author's sole argument is the *doctrinal* one, and that too as it exists in his *own* mind. He seeks to disprove the *possibility* of a true revival among "New School" Presbyterians, by the doctrinal test. To show then, his total want of truth, his gross misrepresentation of others, we take a single point—a point very intimately connected with the subject of revivals. One of his assertions is, that "New School" Presbyterians teach "*that a supernatural agency is not necessary to produce them:*" and since this is an error, and God does not promote works of grace by error, therefore the revivals "are not the result of divine influences."<sup>3</sup> The proof of the aforesaid teaching is, that "God," according to Mr. Barnes, "requires a service strictly according to our ability, and to be measured by that;" that Dr. Duffield does not hold that a total and absolute natural inability to obey God (for this is the point and the only point of the Dr.'s allegation) is the ground for the necessity of divine influences; and that, Mr. Finney, who is not a *Presbyterian*, and is no authority one way or the other, has said, "if the sinner wants a new heart, he must go and make it himself." The author fails to make the distinction, which he ought to know is made by Mr. Barnes and Dr. Duffield, between natural and moral ability and inability: and because of this failure, he imputes to them a

<sup>1</sup>p. 167. <sup>2</sup>p. 172. <sup>3</sup>p. 183

sentiment they do not hold. This is the amount of his proof. He does not quote their language denying "a supernatural agency:" but *infers* the denial, and makes them hold all the inferences he chooses to make. This is a violation not less of the laws of reasoning than of candor and justice, in stating the sentiments of others. The very least he could have done, was to furnish the denial in their very words.

The assertion as to what the "New School" teach on this point, is a great departure from the truth. We might show this by an indefinite array of authorities. Even Dr. Taylor of New Haven, that *heresiarch* in the true line of heresiarchs from President Edwards, holds no such sentiment as the one imputed. We quote his own words: "I believe—That this moral change, (regeneration) is never produced in the human heart by *moral suasion*, i. e. by the mere influence of truth and motives as the Pelagians affirm, but is produced by the Holy Spirit, operating on the mind through the truth, and in perfect consistency with the nature of moral action, and the laws of moral agency."<sup>1</sup> See the heresy vitiating all the revivals in which Dr. Taylor preaches; namely, that God converts men by His Spirit, using His own truth as the instrument of the same, in the language of the Confession of Faith, "enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God;" that men in being "born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," are "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God which liveth and abideth forever."<sup>2</sup> If regeneration occurs in revivals, then Dr. Taylor does not hold or teach that so far revivals do not proceed from divine influences, but exactly the contrary sentiment: neither does he hold that they are "effected" simply "by moral suasion," as Mr. C. represents "New School" men to believe.

Dr. Beecher has shared quite largely in the castigations of the author's pen. Let us see what he believes in regard to "supernatural agency." "The author, or efficient cause of regeneration is God." "The power of God concerned in regeneration is *supernatural*; as compared with the power of any created agent; as above the power of any law of nature, or natural efficacy of truth and motive, in the ordinary operation of cause and effect, natural or moral; as distinguished from the stated operations of divine power; as being an interposition to accomplish unfailingly a change in the will and affections of men, which never takes place without it; as it is an act of God's *almighty power*."<sup>3</sup> Is this venerable patriarch in Israel at fault on the question of "supernatural agency?"

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Taylor's Letter to Dr. Hawes, in the *Christian Spectator* for March, 1839. p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. ix. Sect. 1.   <sup>3</sup> John 1: 13. I. Pet. 1: 23.

<sup>4</sup> Beecher's Views in Theology, p. 200-202.

and are all the revivals with which God has honored his former days, to be set down as "a revival of old heresies?" We feel that our common Christianity is insulted by the author's impeachment. And if this be his "able discrimination and sound reasoning," we hope the day is far distant when we shall see the like again.

Mr. Barnes is also in the list of those who deny the "supernatural agency." Let him speak for himself. "This doctrine, that God by his Spirit prevents or goes before a sinner in his efforts, or *commences and carries forward the work of his own power*, I deem of cardinal value in the work of religion. If it be true, then it is of the utmost importance that it should be *seen and felt* to be true, and that the Holy Ghost should have the glory. I have no sympathy with any scheme that divides the honor with man." If this be denying the "supernatural agency" of God in the production of revivals and the regeneration of men, then it is difficult to see what it would be to affirm it. But, it may be said, Mr. Barnes holds, that "God requires a service strictly according to our ability, and to be measured by that." This is very true; and God Himself holds the same doctrine in the most explicit manner: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with *all thy heart*, and with *all thy soul*, and with *all thy mind*." Does it hence follow that Mr. Barnes does not believe "a supernatural agency" necessary to conquer the *aversions* of depravity, and bring sinners to love God with *all* their heart, soul, strength and mind? Just as if a man, in order to believe and preach the great fact and necessity of Divine influence in revivals, must take every iota of Mr. C.'s strange metaphysics!

Again, Dr. Skinner, an eminent "New School" divine, who has labored much in revivals, and is now one of the Professors in the Union Theological Seminary, in a volume entitled "Preaching and Hearing," devotes two chapters to "Preaching on Ability." Although he holds most distinctly to the doctrine of man's *natural* ability to obey the requirements of God, and vindicates the same with a strength of argument not easily answered; yet he as distinctly holds the doctrine of man's *moral* inability or *total aversion* to true holiness, so great that nothing but the Divine influence and operation of the Holy Ghost can ever subdue his heart and make him willing to serve his Maker. "When the call to repentance is obeyed, it is obeyed indeed under the renewing influence of the Spirit of God, whose work herein is doubtless one of the most glorious of all the instances of divine power and goodness; but still, it is obeyed by the human mind itself, in the exercise of its own faculties." "The work of divine power and grace, which has human obedience as its result, is one of surpassing glory and

<sup>1</sup> Barnes' Defence, p. 30. It is worthy of notice, that these statements, *cum multis aliis*, of the same type, were preached in a revival, and not drawn out by the exigencies of a doctrinal controversy.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. 22 : 37.

excellence, which excites angelic admiration, and will be celebrated for ever in the praises of eternity. All that God does in performing this work, no one beside himself can know." Here, also, without further quotation, we ask, Is Dr. Skinner to be denied the benefit of his own solemn and explicit language? to be judged by what he says, or by what Mr. C. chooses to infer?

We refer the reader to an article by Erskine Mason, D. D., entitled "The Promise of the Spirit," in the *Bib. Repository* for Jan. 1848. From it we select two or three passages, as specimens of a large number. "The best method, perhaps, of arriving at the meaning of the promise, and the nature of the agency it respects, is to turn our attention to some scenes which the Bible represents as proving the fulfillment of the promise, and to some facts which are admitted to be the results of the agency in question." "The point which seems established from this analysis of Pentecostal scenes, is, that the office-work of the promised Comforter consists in giving new and spiritual views of truths already revealed, and in bringing the heart and life under their controlling influence; and what was needed *then* to secure these views and their results, is no less needed now." "Of the reality of this agency, and its absolute necessity in order to anything like spiritual apprehension, we can never have too distinct or firmly-settled ideas." "Upon this influence, as promised by Jesus Christ to his disciples, is dependent the success of the gospel in the world." "No mere exhibition of truth, no outward means or appliances, no system of external instrumentality, however wisely constructed and faithfully used, can, independently of this direct and special agency of the Holy Ghost, avail to build up the kingdom of Christ, or change a human being from a carnal into a spiritual state." And yet, Dr. Mason is a "New School" Presbyterian, holding, contrary to the representations given by Mr. C., to the doctrine of the "direct and special agency of the Holy Ghost."

We might in the same way take up every item of his *a priori* argument against the soundness of "New School" revivals, and convict him of mis-stating the opinions of "New School" men; or, what amounts to the same thing, of making inferences which neither they nor their published sentiments authorize. We cannot, however, devote more space to this chapter. The reader has before him its main point, namely, that Mr. C. is orthodox; that the "New School" are heretics and apostates; and therefore that the revivals among them are nothing but "a revival of false religion," like the revivals of "Mormonism." The thousands and tens of thousands who have professed their faith in Christ, some of whom are now preaching the gospel in our own country, and others in pagan lands; some of whom have already rested from their labors, giving good evidence of piety in their last moments: these

<sup>1</sup>pp. 196, 203.

<sup>2</sup>*Bib. Rep.* for Jan. 1848, pp. 67, 70, 75.

were the dupes of a *spurious* Christianity. If the revivals are spurious, then the converts are spurious. They have no consciousness of the love of Christ, no evidence of piety! What an attack upon their experience! What a shameless effrontery! We wonder whether his endorsers mean to commend the sentiments of this chapter to "the friends of truth?"<sup>1</sup> If so, we can only express our deep sense of the injustice and injury.

We proceed to give some exposition of the author's *general method* of conducting the doctrinal comparison between "Old and New School Presbyterians," with a view to exalt the one and disparage the other. Some knowledge of the *way* in which he does this work, will aid our judgment, and especially serve to regulate the degree of our confidence in his labors.

*What is the subject-matter of this comparison?* DOCTRINE. What, then, is doctrine in the Christian and Biblical sense? The author does not answer this question, and this is one of the features of his method. He undertakes to compare the views of different men upon doctrine, with not the slightest explanation of the *term* itself. This we regard as a serious defect. It is, however, no uncommon practice with those who append their philosophy to doctrine, and then claim for the compound the credit of inspired authority. They palm off *their* ideas for inspiration, by associating them with inspiration; and insist that not only the doctrine must be received, but also their auxiliary and explanatory modes of thought. It is a heresy not to adopt *seriatim* the Shibboleths of their philosophy. A vast proportion of the controversies among Christians has arisen in this way, and been related to matters in regard to which the Bible is silent. Such controversies will exist, and there will always be some croakers about "Differences," unless men learn to distinguish between the essential parts of a doctrine and the mere *appendices* of human philosophy. Its essential parts are those which God gives in His Word, since the doctrine is simply some truth which He teaches for the belief of men. This is a *real* and an important distinction. "There are, with regard to every doctrine, certain constituent, formal ideas, which enter into its very nature, and the rejection of which is the rejection of the doctrine; and there are certain others which are merely *accessory* or *explanatory*." These "constituent, formal ideas" are given by God upon his own authority, and are to be implicitly received and faithfully expressed in the symbols of the church. If it be difficult for men always to agree as to what these "ideas" are, let it be remembered that the elevation of human philosophy to their high rank of authority will not relieve that difficulty, but increase it ten fold.

The *effect* which this important distinction should have upon

<sup>1</sup> Christian Intelligencer.

<sup>2</sup> Biblical Repository, for Oct. 1831.

theologians, has been well stated by another. "At the same time, the undeniable fact, that systems of philosophy have been as changeable as the wind; that each, in its turn, has been presented, urged and adopted with the utmost confidence; and each in its measure perverted the simple truths of the Bible, should teach us to be modest; it should teach us to separate the human from the divine element in our theology, and to be careful not to clothe the figments of our own minds with the awful authority of God, and denounce our brethren for not believing Him when they do not agree with us. It should teach us, too, not to ascribe to men opinions, which, according to our notions, may be inferred from the principles which they avow." These very sensible observations belong to a strain of remarks, in which we find that the *isms* of the church have been the *isms* of this or that "particular system of religious philosophy;" that "the questions which now alienate and divide Christians in this country" are nothing "but questions in mental and moral science." These remarks were made in a review of Dr. Cox's Sermon on "Regeneration and the Manner of its Occurrence;" and were, perhaps, *primarily* intended for "New School" philosophy. If so, we most cordially welcome the application; and would ask whether they be not as good for "Old School" philosophy, indeed for all philosophy?

It ought to be remembered, that a man may hold the essential, "constituent, formal ideas" of a doctrine, and at the same time hold a *bad* philosophy; or that he may connect those "ideas" with a *good* philosophy; or that he may hold them without *any* philosophy but that of the *plainest common sense*, which is the real condition of the great proportion of Christians. If he fasten his faith upon the doctrine, embracing its constituent idea or ideas, as set forth in the Word of God, he does not *doctrinally* differ with another who does the same thing, though they may not be altogether similar in their philosophy. If this is not a true position, then it is absolutely impossible that any considerable number of Christians should ever be united in adopting any formula of faith. The *practical* rejection of this position "would split the church into innumerable fragments." Diversities of mental capacity and educational influence always have, and always will involve some "differences" among good men as to those ideas, which are merely *human* theories of revealed truth. We do not say that these theories are unimportant, or that a good is not better than a bad philosophy; or that a man may not substantially destroy the vital nature of a doctrine by his mode of explaining it; but, we do say, that the doctrine as given in the Word of God, is one thing, and its philos-

<sup>1</sup>Biblical Repertory, Vol. II. New Series, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup>The author alludes to the controversies then existing in the Presbyterian Church. It is a very important concession, and from the "Old School" side.

<sup>3</sup>Biblical Repertory.

ophy as originated by the thoughts of men, is another. He who fails to recognize this distinction, is in danger of confounding a divine doctrine with its human philosophy; and not this merely, but also of assuming God's authority for *his* philosophy.

The pertinence of these general observations we might illustrate very fully by the *manner* in which Mr. C. treats the whole subject of "doctrinal differences." Though he professes a great abhorrence of all philosophy, yet he is a great admirer of *his own*. Were he to treat his "Old School" brethren as he has the "New," he would find not a few heretics, and perhaps apostates, even among them.

As one example, we refer to his philosophy of the atonement; for, say what he will, he still has a philosophy on this subject. One of the grounds of heresy among the "New School" is, that they do not hold that Christ, "in the strict and literal sense,"<sup>1</sup> suffered the penalty of the law. The opposite of this heresy is, that Christ did suffer this penalty, which is the doctrine of Mr. C. For not agreeing with him in this mere speculation of his own mind, he denounces the "New School" as heretics. Now, as a matter of fact, neither the Bible, nor the Confession of Faith, affirms the truth of the author's theory; and what is worthy of special attention, the highest "Old School" authorities, though *nominally* adopting the theory, upon a full explanation of their meaning, repudiate its essential parts, and reduce the controversy very much to a mere question about the proper use of a term. And yet the "New School" are heretics for not believing what neither the Bible nor the Confession declares, but what is simply Mr. C.'s philosophy of the doctrine.

Again, the author is very plainly an advocate of the theory of *physical* regeneration, physical in the sense of a change in the constitutional properties, *pura naturalia* of the human mind. He calls it "a change of nature," in contrast with what the "New School" affirm, and therefore, if he mean anything, he means a *physical* change. Here, then, he is without the authority of the Bible, or the Confession, or human consciousness. It is nothing more than the author's theory of a truth, held in common by himself and his "New School" brethren; namely, that sinners are regenerated and converted to God by the Holy Spirit, and never without this Divine Agent; not disagreeing, so far as we know, as to the phenomenal facts of human consciousness when a soul is born into the kingdom of Christ. He must put in his not altogether harmonious metaphysics with the doctrine; and the "New School" must take it *all* as he makes it, or reject it all, and therefore be subject to the charge of heresy.

It would be easy to fill a long paper with specimens of the above

<sup>1</sup> This is the very sense in which they make the denial. The qualification often occurs in Beman on the Atonement.



character. A greater theorizer, without unity or the acumen of metaphysics, we have seldom seen. He goes beyond the Bible; beyond the Confession of Faith in some things; and arrogates infallible interpretation in others; and then says: "See! how '*we*' and the '*New School*' *doctrinally* differ! How orthodox '*we*' are! How heretical they are!" He omitted to mention the little circumstance, that his philosophy was not *inspired*; and that Bible doctrine had an existence long before he was born. Had he turned his philosophical battering-ram upon his "Old School" brethren, as for example, upon the theory of the nature of sin set forth in the "Dissertation on Native Depravity" by Gardiner Spring, D. D., it is quite probable that he would have made not a little scattering in that direction; it is not certain, that even his principal endorser might not have received some severe contusions. No orthodoxy is safe, when put on trial before a man who does not discriminate between the mere figments of his own mind, and doctrine, as given in God's Word. He can make heresy when he chooses: and where he shall locate the *virus*, may be dependent on his ecclesiastical position; and the *degree* of its poison, upon the intensity of his own bigotry.

We have another question, which will help us to some farther perception of the author's method: *What are the personal terms involved in the proposed comparison, and the criteria of a correct conception of those terms?* They are "Old School" Presbyterians, and "New School" Presbyterians. What are they? Well known religious denominations, of about equal size, exchanging fraternal courtesies, once united as a single denomination, but now in the providence of God separated. What are they in the *theological* and *doctrinal* sense? Are they Arminians, Arians, Pelagians, or Calvinists? What are they? This is a very material question, to be correctly settled, as preliminary to the possibility of a just comparison.

In looking at this question, the first and natural inquiry is:—Have they any published creed, any confession of faith, "containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" No one disputes, that they have the *same* confession; and that, notwithstanding their alleged "differences," neither has evinced the slightest disposition to modify that confession in a single particular. Both subscribe to the same standards, as embodying a human and systematic statement of scriptural doctrines. They license and ordain ministers, and try heretics by this system. They use it for all the purposes for which any creed can ever be used. It is known as the Calvinistic system, in distinction from Arian, Armenian, Pelagian, and other systems of belief. It derives its authority, not from the learned men who compiled it, but from its conformity to the Word of God. It is a rule of faith, because it contains "the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures."

We inquire what disposition does Mr. C. make of the fact, that both "Old and New School" adopt the same standards? He treats it as of no moment, so far as the latter are concerned, only to prove their dishonesty; for he fraternally exhorts them to make "an *honest* subscription to our standards." He is a very zealous advocate for the standards. But, alas! they are worth nothing to settle the faith of "New School" men; they only show what "Old School" men believe. If the former adopt the confession as a "system of doctrine," this makes no difference; for they do not believe it. "New School" men, are not entitled to the benefit of their creed; they may use it if they choose, but this hardly creates a *presumption* as to the nature of their faith. Creeds and catechisms must indeed be very useful things, or "New School Presbyterians very *dishonest* men, according to the abounding charity of Mr. Cheeseman! The truth is, Mr. C., *cum aliis sui generis*, assumes in the very outset that *his* interpretation of the creed is the creed; and that those who may not choose to use his mind as a prism to dissolve its light, are, therefore, rejecters of the creed itself. Hence he but seldom refers to the Confession. When he quotes its language, he does not argue the question of its meaning, thus dodging his logical duty in the very moment of its professed performance. It is enough to tell what "we" hold, since what "we" hold is what the Confession teaches, and that, too, exactly as "we" hold it. As a specimen of downright insolence, we have never seen anything that went beyond Mr. C.'s treatment of "New School" Presbyterians in the matter of their subscription to the standards. As a specimen of argument, we have seldom witnessed a more shabby and perfectly rickety structure, than that of the author in relation to the meaning of the Confession. The celebrated John Foster, in his journal, observes, "There is a great deficiency of what may be called *conclusive* writing and speaking. How seldom do we feel, at the end of the paragraph or discourse, that something is *settled and done!*" "We are not compelled to say with ourselves—Yes, it is so! it must be so! that is decided to all eternity!" We think if Foster had been favored with a sight of Mr. C.'s book, he might have had a new illustration of these ideas.

If the author desired to settle points by a manly and candid mode of argument, his course was a very plain and simple one. First, upon the statement of a doctrinal point he should have quoted the Confession of Faith, chapter and section, showing, by a thorough exegesis of its language, and the history of its interpretation, what the confession taught in regard to that point. Secondly, he should have cited in their *very words*, "Old School" authorities and "New School," touching the same point, not distorting or partially representing their sentiments. Thirdly, upon compar-

<sup>1</sup> Life and Correspondence of John Foster, pp. 117, 118.

ing them with the Confession, the common standard of both schools, he should have candidly considered the *character* of their differences, if any existed; whether they were or were not such as existed when the Confession was formed,—and were fraternally compromised that it might be formed,—when it was adopted by Presbyterians in this country as the basis of union; such as have existed during the whole history of the Presbyterian Church in these United States; such as have been acknowledged from time immemorial in admitting the orthodox Congregationalists of New England into the Presbyterian Church; such as were not deemed grounds of suspicion, alienation, and separation among brethren while a good spirit prevailed: in short, whether these differences are fundamental—differences as to the essential and constituent parts of doctrine, or the mode of explaining that doctrine. The author ought to have performed a work of this kind, if his purpose was to make a fair case for the consideration of men. As a substitute, however, for all this, he assumes that “we” understand the Confession; and that because the “New School” do not in every particular understand it as “we” do, therefore they are heretics, though they subscribe to the Standards, and swear a solemn oath of honesty before God. They are dishonest men; and you need make no account of their creed, as any proof of their doctrinal faith! This, then, is another feature of the author’s method; namely, the unrighteous manner in which he treats the solemn profession of “New School” Presbyterians.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Christian Intelligencer of New York City, in an editorial notice of Mr. C.’s book, and in obvious allusion to “New School” Presbyterians, speaks of “those who, under the specious appearance of an orthodox creed, are seeking to introduce another gospel.” With the same allusion, the editor adverts to their “hidden evasions, and indirections, and concealed and guarded opposition to truth;” for bringing which “to light” he commends the work to “the friends of truth,” and assigns to it “able discrimination and sound reasoning.” He also implies, that “whatever may be the established creed” of these Presbyterians, still “the theology, *current* in the New School body,” is not in accordance with that creed. We confess we read these passages with a deep and painful sense of their injustice. Did the editor mean to say, that “New School” Presbyterians “do not heartily receive” their standards? that “under the specious appearance of an orthodox creed,” they “are seeking to introduce another gospel?”—that they are practising “hidden evasions and indirections, and concealed and guarded opposition to truth?” that “the pulpit and the press,” “the fountains of real sentiment,” as to “the theology *current* in the New School body,” prove that body dishonest in the retention of its “established creed?” All this fairly lies in the language. Is this the sentiment of the Protestant Reformed Dutch Church of this country? Then we are not a little astonished that they should hold any fraternal intercourse with the members of the “New School body;” that they should pay any respect to their certificates of dismission; that, in efforts to evangelize the world, they should mingle “with those who, under the specious appearance of an orthodox creed, are seeking to introduce another gospel;” that they should ever enter their pulpits, or receive them into their own. The implications are of the gravest character; they strike down the common Christianity of “the New School body”

But, it may be asked—Is it never lawful to undertake the proof that a denomination has abandoned its standards, though professing to retain them? We answer: It is never lawful to set out with this assumption. A man is to be presumed innocent, until he is proved guilty. So a Christian denomination has a right to refer to its Standards as an exposition of its faith. Those standards are good and conclusive evidence, until overruled by stronger evidence. In the present instance, if “the current theology of the New School body” is hostile to the standards, why does not that body *formally* abandon them, and at once make a new Confession? The very terms of the supposition assume, that there are no difficulties in the body, in the way of taking this course. Where, then, are the difficulties? In the state of public opinion; which solution is the same thing as to say, that “New School” Presbyterians are *dishonest* men, holding one set of sentiments and professing another. But *who* says this? Dr. Lord, Mr. Cheeseman, and other champions of a certain kind of orthodoxy, who, begging nearly every question in dispute, perverting the sentiments of those they attack, substituting assertion for argument, and their philosophy for the Word of God and the Confession of Faith, violate all the just laws of reasoning; first, in making themselves orthodox; and secondly, in assailing others, who must silently and patiently bear their sundry impeachments, or be subjected to the necessity of a reply. They do this under color of zeal for the faith, in circumstances and ways that do not reflect much glory upon the character of that zeal. They make themselves *religious partizans*; and then ask the public to presume their orthodoxy, and equally the heresy of “New School” Presbyterians, until the latter is disproved by the sternest demonstration. We are well aware that the great mass of “Old School” brethren—ministers and laymen—take no such ground. We do not apply these remarks to them. But, where they fit, we are frank in saying, we mean that they shall apply; for they are nothing but the simple truth—truth, too, that has cost our Zion the loss of much peace and prosperity. These are the men who throw the “New School” subscription to the Standards out of the account, when weighing this class of Presbyterians in their strange balances. This is what Mr. C. does, to all intents and purposes: it is the very thing of which we complain, as an act of injustice, both logical and moral. We claim as good a right to be heard through our Standards as he has; and will not consent to have them torn away, without lifting a note of remonstrance against the violent deed. The mere circumstance that he is the accuser, not in an ecclesiastical to its very foundation. It is on account of such—we know not what term to use, more than for any other reason, that we have undertaken to review this book, and expose it to the observation of men. In itself considered, we do not regard it as worthy of notice.

court, but in the court of the world's judgment; creates no presumption, that the Standards do not as faithfully represent the accused, as they do the accuser. We have dwelt upon this point, because we have felt the deep injustice of the course to which we have alluded.

But we will not stop here. We fully accept the author's challenge to seek, "in the widely circulated writings of their leading and influential divines," for a "criterion" of "their denominational theology." He need not suppose that we will "shrink from this most reasonable test," or "attempt to evade it," and thus give "evidence of conscious weakness and guilt." If it is legitimate to seek "in the widely circulated writings" of "New School" men, for "their denominational theology," it is equally legitimate to take the same course in respect to the "Old School." We propose, therefore, to look at the facts; to see, if we can, what the author has really done in the way of the "ultimate criterion" of "denominational theology." We will take a rapid glance at the witnesses, from whose testimony we are to ascertain the "denominational theology" of the two Schools. And here the reader may get a third idea of the author's method.

First: what are the authorities referred to by Mr. C., giving us the theological sentiments of "Old School" Presbyterians? We have searched his book carefully to collect these authorities, and present the result, as a specimen of his theological erudition. In all, he has taken a single extract from Owen's Death of Death; another from Symington on the Atonement; another from Junkin on Justification; and still another from Dr. Spring's Dissertation on Native Depravity. We have passed through the book, page by page; and these, so far as we have been able to discover, are all the "Old School" authorities with which he has favored the public. We have two questions: Who are the witnesses? What is the substance of their testimony?

As to the first witness, Dr. Owen, we take the liberty to inform the author, that he was neither an "Old," nor a "New School" Presbyterian, but attached to the Independents in England. His researches led him to think that the Presbyterian system of church Government, was not conformable to the Scriptures; he lived about two centuries since. He is of course no authority to prove what is the "denominational theology" of "Old School" Presbyterians in these United States. He belongs to that class of witnesses whom our discipline characterizes as *incompetent*. The work of Owen, from which the author quotes, is not in the "Catalogue of the books published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication." The second witness, though cotemporaneous with these times, is *trans-atlantic*; and furnishes no authoritative proof of "denominational theology" in this country. The third and fourth, namely,

Drs. Junkin and Spring, we acknowledge to be "Old School" authority, so far as ecclesiastical position is concerned; though judging from the "Vindication" of the former in the trial of Mr. Barnes, and the "Dissertation on Native Depravity," by the latter, we have the most serious doubts about their harmony in all respects. So much for the witnesses.

What is their testimony? The first three are cited to prove, that "Old School" Presbyterians believe in the *all-sufficiency* of Christ's atonement. This is the only point to which they testify. Do the "New School" disagree with them on this point? We believe not. The testimony of the last witness is, that "they" (alluding, obviously, to the New Haven divines,) "*could not tell*," touching certain abstruse questions, more or less related to "the native character" of man. This, then, is the whole of it, namely; *four witnesses, two of whom are incompetent to testify; three of whom prove that "Old School" Presbyterians believe in the all-sufficiency of Christ's atonement; and one of whom, that the New Haven divines "could not tell!"* We ask the reader, if this is not an exceedingly brilliant illustration of the author's doctrine of seeking "in the widely circulated writings of their leading and influential divines," for an "ultimate criterion" of the "denominational theology" of "Old School" Presbyterians? Such light as to points of faith is seldom seen! The author does indeed occasionally quote the Confession of Faith, and generally without comment; but this is not to the purpose, since the question to be settled is, Which of the Schools is in best conformity to the Confession, equally adopted by both? The Confession, by the very terms of the trial, is not a witness, but a judge—and a judge too, not of *all* questions, but such only, as lie within the province of its doctrinal teaching.

True, the author, on a great variety of points, says, that "*we*" believe thus and so. But who are *we*? Mr. Cheeseman, speaking for the "Old School" without appointment, and at the time when he spake, without the least authority; and since he has spoken, the Biblical Repertory does not wish to commit itself to the work of "*endorsing every sentiment*," without informing us how much may be excluded by this cautious precaution. Has it come to this, that a Christian minister will compare "Old and New School Presbyterians," for the professed purpose of showing their "*doctrinal differences*," with such meagre authority, as to the real character of the *first* term? Does he suppose that reasoning has no laws? He was as much bound to quote "Old" as "New School" authorities, on all the points at issue. He might have done it; their standard writers, the Christian Advocate, the Biblical Repertory, the books of the Presbyterian Board of Publication, would have supplied him with ample materials, and perhaps a few qualifications as well as arguments, that did not occur to him. This was

especially appropriate, since his Old Schoolism is of but *recent* date, and liable, therefore, not to have all the finish which more time would give. His "Old School" brethren have just cause of complaint against him. He had no right to speak for them, without showing his authority. He was bound to say to the world: *This is merely my opinion*; I give you no proof: you may take it for what it is worth: this is what I think orthodoxy *ought* to be, and therefore what Old Schoolism *is*. His failure to give us, by authority, the "denominational theology" of "Old School Presbyterians," is a death-blow to the whole work, and needs only to be stated to make it look logically contemptible. How can two terms be compared in respect to their differences, until the question is first settled, what are the terms? We wonder, that his endorsers did not see this weak spot. We are quite willing to hope that, in the multiplicity of editorial engagements, they might have penned their notices, without that mature reading which they commend to others. By no sophistry is it possible to remedy this defect; it is absolutely fatal to his argument, and turns it out of a court of candor as an intellectual humbug. Should it be said, that the quotation of "Old School" authorities was not necessary; we ask, Why not? Is it, that the Confession of Faith is sufficient authority? Ah! this is to enter a judgment before you have tried the cause! Why was it necessary, then, to quote "New School" authorities? Any effort to relieve the author from the logical blameworthiness of his position, goes so far to turn his whole performance into a mere newspaper *slang*.

We turn to the author's "New School" authorities, to show the "denominational theology" of this branch of the Presbyterian Church. The *leading* authority, the one most frequently used, and on which he mainly relies, is Mr. Barnes in his Notes on Romans, II. Corinthians, Galatians and Ephesians. His principal citations are from the Notes on Romans. He also refers to Beman on the Atonement, Beecher's Sermon on the Native Character of Man, Duffield on Regeneration, Finney's Lectures, and Dr. Dewey. The reader will see that we have a greater array of authority on this side of the question, than upon the other. We propose to take a view of these several witnesses, in order to estimate the real character of the case the author has made out.

We begin with Mr. Barnes. He is arraigned by the author, charged with heresy, and through him all "New School" men likewise. Let us see how the case stands. In 1836 the question of Mr. Barnes' orthodoxy in his Notes on the Romans came up by appeal before the General Assembly, the ultimate and highest tribunal to settle such a question in the Presbyterian Church. He was then pronounced orthodox, and restored from his suspension by the Synod of Philadelphia, Dr. Lord, Mr. C.'s endorser, voting to sustain the appeal, with others then and now occupying high

places as "Old School" Presbyterians. What used to be familiarly known as "the Princeton party" in the "Old School" ranks, had not as yet been constrained to go to the full lengths of the "Philadelphia party," another cognomen for another subdivision of these ranks. Upon this trial before his peers, Mr. Barnes was not pronounced to be the heretic and apostate from the faith, which Mr. C. represents him to have been, and still to be. He made a full and explicit statement and vindication of his sentiments in reply to the charges of Dr. Junkin, which were subsequently published, entitled "Barnes' Defence," and of which Mr. C. has taken no notice, which is strange, if simple truth were his object. Mr. Barnes had his attention called to the doctrinal points by the charges and plea of his prosecutor; and was therefore placed in circumstances to bring out his views with great distinctness. He did so bring them out; the General Assembly heard them, and told him to keep on preaching the gospel. It had been well, and but an act of candor, if Mr. C. had used this "Defence" in connection with his use of the Notes.

The plain fact, then, is, that the leading authority to show the heresy of "New School" Presbyterians, turns out to be just *no heretic at all*, in the judgment of the General Assembly. The collected wisdom and piety of the Presbyterian Church, as then represented, are at variance with the author on a question of fact. It may be said that the General Assembly also was heretical in 1836. Ah! why so? Because it did not condemn Mr. Barnes. Would it have been orthodox if it had condemned him? What! the General Assembly, the supreme judge of the Standards, orthodox when it votes one way, and heretical when it votes the other! The General Assembly heretical, when Dr. Lord himself and other men of unquestionable orthodoxy, voted with and helped to make the majority! What kind of Presbyterianism is this! But, who says this? Mr. Cheeseman, if he says anything. Well, is Mr. C. an appellate court, authoritatively to review the decisions of the General Assembly? Aside from the question of authority, whose judgment is probably the best? The brother must be remarkably modest, and withal actuated by a profound respect for the Standards, a *thorough going* Presbyterian, if he wishes the privilege of reversing the decrees of the highest tribunal in the Presbyterian Church. This would place him in that strange genus of ecclesiastical humanity that virtually says: All *right*, if we have the majority; but if not, then all *wrong*. Dr. Junkin, in bringing his charges, professed a wish to obtain a decision of the "proper tribunals" upon the doctrinal points, and was gratified; and had before him either of two alternatives; namely, quietly to respect that decision as a good citizen of the Presbyterian commonwealth, or, if he could not conscientiously do this, then peacefully to withdraw. On the whole, we think Mr. Barnes' orthodoxy will outlive



the severe castigations of Mr. C. The fact that he sat unharmed beneath the orthodox ægis of the General Assembly, Dr. Lord himself holding up the shield with both hands, will be taken, we apprehend, by the generality of mankind as a tolerably fair answer to Mr. Cheeseman's charge of heresy. He is a very good witness to prove, not the heresy, but the orthodoxy of "New School" Presbyterians.

But lest the author may think this a kind of special pleading that forces him into an unhappy position, we will place his witness before the "Old School" Synod of Philadelphia, at whose bar he was condemned by a decided majority, and whose decision was reversed by the next General Assembly. We have read the history of his trial before this Synod, "with all the pleadings and debates as reported for the New-York Observer." There were some very severe things said by many of the members well known to be "Old School" men. But not all "Old School" men thought and spake as did the majority, by any means. And as a specimen of several speeches somewhat similar, we give that of Dr. M'Dowell: "I can vote with a good conscience that Mr. Barnes is guilty of holding great and dangerous errors, but not that he holds fundamental errors. I believe that he holds to the doctrine of total depravity as firmly as any man in this house, and that he believes this depravity to be derived from our connection with Adam. I believe he holds that there is no salvation for a sinner, but through Jesus Christ, and that he is saved only on the ground of the merits of Christ, and that he becomes interested in these merits exclusively by faith. And I believe further, that he holds to the absolute necessity of the influences of the Holy Ghost to convert and sanctify the soul. I have long known that he differed from me in his mode of explaining some of these points, but I am satisfied that on the great fundamental doctrines of our religion he preaches in this way. I stand before the public in the expression of this opinion, and I shall act accordingly." We leave this witness, endorsed by his own Presbytery—as to the fundamentals of religion endorsed by as good an "Old School" man as Dr. M'Dowell in the heat of a warm controversy—then endorsed by the General Assembly. We are not at all dissatisfied with his introduction, especially since we cannot learn from Mr. C. either what is the "denominational theology" of "Old School" Presbyterians, or what the Confession of Faith teaches. All we learn from him is what "we" hold. For aught that appears in Mr. C.'s book, Mr. Barnes is as sound an "Old School" divine as there is in the land. This is not lightly said; for, be it remembered, that what an "Old School" divine is, Mr. C. has no where shown us. We see very distinctly what *he* is; but more we do not see.

Dr. Lyman Beecher is another of these "New School" witnesses.

Trial of Rev. A. Barnes, for Heresy, p. 255.

He also is one of the "leading and influential divines;" venerable in years—honored by God, with a long and very useful ministry—and having some evidences of the high esteem and confidence of the churches. It will be remembered, that he was called to pass through the fiery ordeal of an ecclesiastical prosecution for heresy, upon charges presented by Dr. Wilson, of Cincinnati, and that he came out orthodox in the judgment of those whom the Constitution made judges in the case. His cause was first tried by his own Presbytery; and afterwards by an appeal of his prosecutor, it went up to the Synod of Cincinnati; in both of which courts, he was declared sound in the faith. At the request of the Synod, he soon after published his "Views in Theology," embodying the substance of his defence when on trial. Of this book, Mr. C. has taken no notice. We commend it to his special attention. We recommend him to read the *authorities* therein cited, that he may see how many good and great men must stand or fall with Dr. Beecher. He will find the Dr. to be a very orthodox divine, if the Word of God, the Confession of Faith, and an almost endless series of authorities on doctrinal points, can prove such a claim. Perhaps the testimony of this witness, if thoroughly studied, will give him a better opinion of "New School" Presbyterians.

Dr. Beman is also in the list. The author makes a somewhat free use of his little work on the Atonement. The alleged "New School" heresy of this book, is narrowed down to a single point; namely, that Christ did not suffer the *literal* penalty of the law threatened against the sinner. We answer, the Confession of Faith does not affirm what Dr. Beman denies. The author has made no attempt to prove that it does: and he would have failed, had he tried the experiment. Dr. Beman's heresy consists in believing that the sacrifice of Christ was a substitute for the penalty, and not the identical penalty due to the sinner. It may, perhaps, be well to relieve the author's horror of this heresy, by giving him the language of Dr. Lightfoot, who was a member of the Westminster Assembly, and contributed his learning and piety to the compilation of the Confession of Faith. "Was Christ so much as punished by God? Much less, then, was he overwhelmed by the wrath of God, damned by God. Was a lamb punished, that was sacrificed? He was afflicted, but not punished: for punishment argues a crime or fault preceding. Were the sad sufferings of Christ laid on him as punishment? Certainly not for his own sins: no, nor for ours neither. He suffered for our sins, bore our sins; but his sufferings were not punishments for our sins."<sup>1</sup> Thus, we see that even the Westminster Assembly was not orthodox. The author might write another book to show the existence of heresy in that august body.

The next witness is Dr. Duffield, in his work on Regeneration.

<sup>1</sup> Lightfoot's Works. London Edition, 1822, vol. vi. pp. 23, 24.

The first extract is from Chap. xx. entitled, "The moral certainty of Human Depravity." The quotation reads thus: "It is a question alike pertinent and important, whether in the incipient period of infancy and childhood, there can be any moral character whatever possessed, \* \* \* properly speaking, we can predicate of it neither sin nor holiness."<sup>1</sup> Our first remark upon this quotation is, that the author has taken fragments of two distinct sentences, and united them so as to make one. Our next remark is, that he has mutilated the last of these sentences by a defective quotation. Compare the two readings: Mr. C.'s—"properly speaking we can predicate of it neither sin nor holiness." Dr. Duffield's—"properly speaking, THEREFORE, we can predicate of it neither sin nor holiness, PERSONALLY CONSIDERED." He has equally mutilated the *first* sentence, as will appear from the following comparison:—Mr. C.'s reading: "It is a question alike pertinent and important," &c.: Dr. Duffield's: "WE SAY FUTURE, for it is a question alike pertinent and important," &c.<sup>2</sup> We charge Mr. C. with unfairness in quoting his author. In the chapter from which these *garbled* extracts are made, Dr. Duffield maintains, as he does also in others, the FACT of the consequential derivation of human depravity from the sin of our first parents. He discards certain human theories, philosophies of men, which have been offered in explanation of this fact. He observes—"Our object is simply an observation of facts, so far as they tend to shape or affect the *future* moral character of the child. We say *future*, for it is a question alike pertinent and important, whether in the incipient period of infancy and childhood, there can be any *moral character* whatever possessed." Upon this "question," the Dr. proceeds to remark, explaining the *sense* in which he uses the phrase, "*moral character*." "Moral character, is character acquired by *acts* of a moral nature. Moral acts are those acts which are contemplated by the law, prescribing the rule of human conduct." Taking this view of the phrase, the Dr. then holds that we cannot predicate "personal sin" of an infant before it has *acted*, when it "has not committed *acts*, which can be considered *violations of the law of God*. It has no *personal* sin; for it has not *morally* acted." "Properly speaking, therefore, we can predicate of it neither sin nor holiness, (a moral character,) *personally* considered." The *substance*, then, of the heresy, is simply this: That an *infant* that does not know its right from its left hand, "neither having done any good or evil," is not a sinner, "*personally* considered." This conflicts with the author's theory of *physical* sinfulness; and therefore Dr. Duffield, and by imputation "New School" Presbyterians also, are heretics. We purposely avoid a discussion of this subject in the present connection; and will hand Mr. C. over to the tender mercies of one of his "Old School" witnesses; namely, Gardiner Spring, D. D., in

<sup>1</sup> p. 110.<sup>2</sup> Duffield on Regeneration, pp. 377, 379.

his "Dissertation on Native Depravity." Dr. Spring holds that there is "no other sin in the empire of Jehovah, except this," (p. 9,) namely, the sin of *actual* transgression. It is fair to cross question his own witness to learn the "denominational theology" of "Old School" Presbyterians; and quite sure are we, that if Dr. Duffield is a heretic for rejecting Mr. Cheeseman's theory of *physical* sinfulness, so is Dr. Spring. The latter holds, that whatever constitutes "the human soul a sinner at the age of three-score years-and-ten, essentially constitutes it a sinner from its birth." What is this, according to Dr. Spring? The violation of God's law—moral action—this, and this only. Very true, the Dr. maintains, that this commences at birth; and as true that he avows the offensive heresy of Dr. Duffield: even more than this, for what the latter says is not inconsistent with the doctrine of original sin, understanding by this, something different from what we mean when we speak of sin in application to moral *actions*. Is the same opinion orthodoxy in one man, and a glaring heresy in another?

We refer to another quotation. "Shall we suppose that God cannot do with sinners, in reference to himself, what one man has done with another; that a physical efficiency is necessary to make the sinner willing to confide in him. \* \* \* It would be, in effect, to say that man can subdue his foe, and, by an appropriate moral influence, convert him into a friend, but that God cannot convert his enemy, and bring him to believe, except he puts forth his physical power, and literally creates him over again." The amount of this testimony is, that Dr. Duffield does not believe in the theory of *physical* regeneration, such as would imply that God "*literally creates*" the sinner "over again." If this is heresy, then orthodoxy is to believe that God does "*literally create him over again!*" Dr. Duffield holds, that the Spirit, by a "special and immediate, or supernatural influence," secures the conversion of sinners, maintaining at the same time, that this "efficient agency of the Spirit, is in perfect unison with the moral influence of the truth;"—that the Holy Spirit overcomes the sinner's aversion to holiness, and makes him willing in the day of His power; "that the power which God exerts, is *through the truth*, as a means, and not directly on the naked soul;" and that this view is distinguishable from the absurd theory of *physical*, coercive, and literally creative regeneration.<sup>1</sup> In the passage cited by Mr. C., the Dr. simply inquires, whether God cannot convert sinners by the use of His own truth, whether "of his own will," He can not beget "us *with the Word of truth*," whether we must adopt the theory of a "creative force, acting directly, immediately on the naked soul of man, without the intervention of truth, or any medium or means of influence whatever,"<sup>2</sup> in order to account for the fact of regene-

<sup>1</sup> p. 137.<sup>2</sup> Duffield on Regeneration, pp. 482. 483.<sup>3</sup> Two Discourses on Regeneration, by George Duffield, p. 4.

ration. This is the Dr.'s whole crime, so far as set forth by the author;—the crime of asking the question, whether God cannot convert a sinner without *literally* creating him over again! A very great heresy! a painful evidence, that the "New School," and not a few of the "Old," have departed from the faith! a luminous proof, that "they, in effect, make truth an agent!" As a correction of his *crude* notions on this whole subject, we recommend to his special notice, "Charnock on Regeneration;" also, a Review in the Biblical Repertory, for April, 1830, of Dr. Cox's sermon on "Regeneration and the Manner of its Occurrence." He gives abundant evidence that he is not familiar with the writings of the "leading and influential divines," to be cited in proof of the "denominational theology" of "Old School" Presbyterians.

We present a third quotation by the author: "Not much less deluding are the systems and tactics of those who, fearing to invade the province of the Spirit, are careful to remind the sinner that he is utterly unable by his own unassisted powers, either to believe or repent, to the saving of his soul. It might as truly be said that he cannot rise and walk by his own unassisted powers."<sup>2</sup> This is cited as proof that "New School" Presbyterians reject the agency of the Holy Spirit in revivals. The extract is taken from Chap. 29, entitled "The means of Grace." The author has mutilated the first sentence. In the original it reads: "Not much less deluding are the systems and tactics of those who, fearing to invade the province of the Spirit, are careful to remind the sinner, AT EVERY TURN, that he is utterly unable by his own unassisted powers, either to believe, or to repent to the saving of his soul."<sup>2</sup> The phrase, "*at every turn*," is a part of the sentence which gives complexion to the meaning of the whole. And we inquire, what was the author's *instinct*, that led him to cut a passage out of the middle of the Dr.'s sentence? He must have seen the passage, as proved by the fact that he saw the words on both sides of it. Why did he not quote it, when professing literally to give the language of Dr. Duffield? The simple truth is, it changes the complexion of the Dr.'s words. His object was to administer a rebuke to those who, in urging the sinner to believe and repent, are careful "*at every turn*," to tell him that he has no power to believe and repent, lest they invade the province of the Spirit. If there be no such persons, then the rebuke is harmless; but if there be, then we commend to every reader of the Bible the question, whether they preach repentance and faith to sinners after the example of the apostles. But, does the Dr. repudiate and dishonor the agency of the Spirit in the matter of the sinner's conversion, as Mr. C. would fain make his reader believe? Ah! there are passages in this very chapter, and one in the paragraph but one sentence removed from the sentence quoted, which must have met

<sup>1</sup> p. 172<sup>2</sup> Duffield on Regeneration, p. 542.

his eye, and fully taught him, that Dr. Duffield, as really as himself, believed in the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and conversion by His power. That the reader may see Mr. C.'s *manner* of representing to the public the sentiments of others, we give one or two of these passages. "The sinner that truly repents, will learn more effectually from his *own* EXPERIENCE than from all human teaching, to whom the efficacious grace, which made him willing to turn to God, is to be ascribed." A sentence of just *seven* words separates this from the one quoted by the author, as proof of Dr. Duffield's heresy. "It is only as the use of the means of grace secures the *divine agency*, that they become *effective* means of salvation." "In the conversion of a sinner, the agency of God is the result of special DESIGN, and not according to any fixed law, to which, as in the operations of nature, successful appeals may be infallibly made." We might cite such passages indefinitely, showing the *faith* of Dr. Duffield. And yet, Mr. C. not making the distinction between *natural and moral inability*, as does the Dr., would leave the impression upon the reader's mind, that he discards the agency of God in the conversion of sinners, and holds "another gospel." The Dr., as the whole connection shows, was simply replying to those, who, when they urge sinners to repent and believe, "at every turn," deny that they have the repenting *faculty*, lest they "invade the province of the Spirit." If Mr. C.'s use of the passage is orthodox, we ask whether it is *candid*?

It will be remembered that this same Dr. Duffield was once tried by the "Old School" Presbytery of Carlisle upon charges based on the sentiments of this book. There were ten charges of error; on eight of which the Presbytery, by a divided vote, rendered a verdict of *guilty*; on two of which, *not guilty*. In reference to the censure, the Presbytery, after receiving notice from the accused of his intention to appeal and complain to the next General Assembly, adopted the following preamble and resolution: "As to the counts in which Mr. Duffield has been found guilty, Presbytery judge that Mr. Duffield's book and sermons on Regeneration do contain the specified errors; yet, as Mr. Duffield alleges that Presbytery have misinterpreted some of his expressions, and says he does in fact hold all the doctrines of our Standards, and that he wishes to live in amity with his brethren, and labor without interference for the glory of God, and the salvation of souls; Therefore, Resolved, That Presbytery at present do not censure him any further than to warn him to guard against such speculations as may impugn the doctrines of our Church, and that he study to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." "Messrs. James and M.K. Williamson (the active agents of the prosecution,) gave notice of their intention to protest and complain of this decision to

<sup>1</sup> pp. 537, 538.

the next General Assembly."<sup>1</sup> The Presbytery then appointed their commissioners "a committee to defend the Presbytery against all appeals and complaints, which may come before the Assembly against the doings of Presbytery." The protestants did not prosecute their complaint before the Assembly; and in view of the final action of the Presbytery, Mr. Duffield had no occasion to prosecute him; and thus the matter ended.

It will be seen, "that the final sentence" of the Presbytery was a "virtual acquittal." It did not touch the ministerial standing of Mr. D., but simply warned him "to guard against such speculations as may impugn the doctrines of our church;" it did not decide that his "speculations" had done this, or that "the specified errors," set forth in the charges, were incompatible with a faithful adherence to the Standards. This "Old School" Presbytery, therefore, did not see in Mr. Duffield "another gospel;" and thus they differed very materially from Mr. C. in their judgment.

Mr. Finney is the author's next witness. He quotes quite freely and on sundry points, the testimony of this writer. We have no occasion to follow the track of these quotations; but would remark that Mr. Finney is not, and has not been for many years a Presbyterian, "Old School" or "New." We suppose that Mr. C. is acquainted with this fact; and we cannot withhold the expression of our surprise, that he should refer to this writer, as an authority for the "denominational theology" of "New School" Presbyterians, without even intimating the well-known truth in regard to Mr. Finney's position. It is disingenuous. It is a very easy thing to say that "New School" men are all *Finneyites*, as it is easy for a man to say more things in five minutes, than he can prove in forty years. Without traveling out of our way to present the points and grounds of our dissent from Mr. Finney's views, we emphatically object to the testimony.

The name of Dr. Dewey also figures on the author's pages. He has contrived to insert a number of passages, in some of which Dr. Dewey, so far as the *words* are concerned, has written in a manner *orthodox enough* for any Presbyterian, "Old School" or "New." From this he infers a doctrinal affinity between Unitarians and "New School" Presbyterians. We make no reply, for we have no words to waste upon such reasoning.

The reader has now an insight of Mr. Cheeseman's manner of going back of the Confession to what he calls "an ultimate criterion" of "denominational theology." His "Old School" authorities, all told, are just four in number, two of whom are not competent witnesses. The *all-sufficiency* of the atonement, and that "*they could not tell*;" these are the matters proved. This paucity of evidence is compensated for, by a very expanded amplification

<sup>1</sup>Principles of Presbyterian Discipline, &c.; Carlisle: printed by George Fleming, 1835—p. 113.

and frequent use of the word "we." We have never seen an instance, in which "we" was so large and pompous a term. Of his "New School" authorities, as revelations of their own heresy, and, by imputation, the heresy of others, after the previous remarks, we shall leave a candid world to its own judgment. The truth is, he has made no case for trial; he is logically *non-suited*. He must have calculated very largely on the credulity and stupidity of his readers. Such a method would be exceedingly questionable in a political campaign, where "*stump speeches*" are made merely for effect; in a grave theological discussion it is perfectly unbearable. It violates the very first laws of good reasoning. If the "New School" were the greatest heretics that ever lived, the author has not given one particle of evidence, that the "Old School" are not quite as bad. To his virtual proposition, that we should take him as an exponent of the latter, we can only say, *we wish to be excused*. We much prefer to see his authorities, and that too in their own words.

If from the author's *general* method, we now turn to what may be denominated his *particular* method, we shall find another very large and varied subject for critical remarks. In reading his book for the purposes of a review, we had divided this method into several branches in the following manner: Instances in which the author quotes the Scriptures to prove a point, when the passage has no relation to the point to be proved: instances of *false* interpretation of the Bible, and many more of no interpretation: instances in which he contrives to mingle his own philosophy with, as if a part of, the Word of God; instances of gross injustice in quoting "New School" authorities: instances of unauthorized inference and false statement in respect to "New School" Presbyterians: instances of passages, either containing no ideas, or ideas in some cases ridiculous and in others perfectly abhorrent. To do justice to this schedule of subjects would be to write another article. We offer one or two examples.

He accuses Mr. Barnes of "indirection" and evasion in his comment upon Rom. 8 : 7 : "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The evidence is in these words of Mr. Barnes : "The apostle does not express any opinion about the metaphysical ability of man, or discuss that question at all." "But the affirmation does not mean that the *heart* of the sinner might not be subject to God; or that the *soul* is so physically depraved that he cannot obey, or that *he* might not obey the law. On that the apostle here expresses no opinion. That is not the subject of the discussion." The author's comment is in the following words : "Here we are told substantially, that the very thing which the apostle did say, he did not say, or at least that he did not mean to say it; yea, that he expressed no opinion on that point, selecting the only point on



which the apostle expressed himself in the most decided terms, and contriving to contradict him without seeming to do so, and that by an adroit introduction of the words metaphysical and physical." We have two remarks. First, the author has committed himself to the doctrine of *physical* depravity, sin in the very *substance* of the soul; for this is what Mr. Barnes says Paul did *not* say, and what Mr. C. says he did say. Secondly, as a hermeneutical question, Mr. Barnes is right, and M. C. is wrong, in the interpretation of the passage. "*Διδόναι τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς, ἐχθρὰ εἰς θεόν· τὸ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ὁσώτασται, οὐδὲ γὰρ δοῦναι.*" Rom. 8:7. Of what does the apostle predicate "enmity against God," etc.? "*τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς,*" What is this? Literally, and truly, as Mr. Barnes says, "*the minding of the flesh.*" This "*minding of the flesh*" is not the mind itself considered as a simple *essence*, nor is it a *faculty* of the mind, but an operation, a yielding to the flesh, a *state*, and not a faculty. Immaterial what is true about metaphysical ability or physical depravity, that truth is not the subject of affirmation or denial by the apostle. The *minding of the flesh* is put in contrast with the *minding of the spirit* in the 6th verse; and neither *minding* applies to the faculties of the soul, simply as such. If Mr. C., therefore, had referred to his Greek Testament, forgetting his "Old School" mania while he studied the very words of the apostle, he would not have accused Mr. Barnes of "indirection," and cited his "singular evasiveness" as a specimen of "New School" theology. The "indirection" is solely with the author. The very thing he undertakes to condemn, that he does.

We present an instance in which the author does great injustice to Mr. Barnes' Exposition of Rom. iv. 3: "For what saith the scripture? Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness." What are Mr. B.'s views of justification by faith, according to the picture drawn by Mr. C.? "But Mr. Barnes, in opposition to this, (the Larg. Cat. Ans. 73, and Short. Cat. Ans. 33,) affirms, that the act itself (faith,) is imputed to us for righteousness. On Rom. iv. 3; "It was counted unto him for righteousness," he remarks, "*It* here evidently refers to the act of believing. It does not refer to the righteousness of another, of God, or of the Messiah. Faith is always an act of the mind, it is not a created essence which it placed within the soul. It is not a substance created independently of the soul, and placed within it by Almighty power. It is not a principle. For the expression, a principle of faith, is as unmeaning as a principle of joy, or a principle of sorrow, or a principle of remorse. God promises, man believes, and this is the whole of it." After farther quoting Mr. B., the author observes: "Hence Mr. Barnes obviously teaches that faith is an act demonstrable of love to God, and to which God is graciously pleased to promise pardon, *though it receives not, as indeed it cannot, the "righteousness of God, or of the Messiah."*

<sup>1</sup> pp. 32, 33.

Again, remarking upon Mr. B.'s coincidence with Dr. Dewey, he observes: "Faith, (says Mr. Barnes,) is an act demonstrable of love to God. It is a state of mind to which God is graciously pleased to promise pardon. *It has no reference to the righteousness of another, of God, or of the Messiah.* God promises, man believes: and this is the whole of it." What, then, is the offensive matter in Mr. Barnes' views, according to the account given by Mr. C.? We suppose, not that faith is "an act demonstrable of love to God," nor that it is "a state of mind to which God is graciously pleased to promise pardon;" this is orthodox enough for aught we can see; but that "*it has no reference to the righteousness of another, of God, or of the Messiah;*" and here surely the creed is bad enough. This is a rejection of the work of Christ in the matter of justification, faith without its object. If Mr. Barnes, or even John Calvin, holds this view, let him be condemned. But if Mr. B. does not hold this view, then let Mr. C. be set down as a *false accuser* of his Christian brother.

What then does Mr. Barnes teach? On the passage, "And it was counted unto him for righteousness," he observes, "The word 'it,' here evidently refers to the *act* of believing," namely, Abraham's act of believing. "It does not refer to the righteousness of another, of God, or of the Messiah," that is to say, by this word "it," is not meant the "righteousness of another," but the faith of Abraham, "which in *some sense* is counted to him for righteousness. In what sense this was, is explained directly after." Now, if Mr. Barnes be in fault here, then is the apostle also, both here and in the fifth verse; "But to him that worketh, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his *faith* is counted for righteousness." What is counted? His faith. To whom? To him "that believeth." For what? "For righteousness." But does the apostle or Mr. Barnes teach, that faith is so counted, though it receives not Christ, though it "*has no reference*" to the work of Christ, as Mr. C. would make us believe in respect to the latter? No such thing; and here we accuse him of a great want of truth and candor. When Mr. Barnes said, "God promises, the man believes; and this is the whole of it," he was *defining* faith as the believing act; for he immediately adds, "Beyond the mental operation there is nothing in the case; and the word is strictly limited to such an act of the mind throughout the Bible." He was not saying, as Mr. C., by changing the relation of his sentences, and putting his words into a false position, makes him say, "this is the whole of it," in reference to the *relations* of faith, or God's gracious reckoning in regard to it. This is not Mr. B. speaking for himself, but Mr. C.'s very ungracious caricature of Mr. Barnes. There is no apology for this untruthful exhibition of another's sentiments. Mr. C. had the means of knowing better, in Mr. Barnes' notes upon the verse

<sup>1</sup> pp. 56, 57, 58.

in question. In commenting on the phrase, "*For righteousness*," Mr. Barnes said, "In order to justification ; or to regard and treat him in connection with this (his faith) *as a righteous man*." In expanding this generic statement, he said, "It is in no sense a matter of merit on our part, and thus stands distinguished entirely from justification by works, or by conformity to the law. From beginning to end, it is, so far as *we* are concerned, a matter of grace. The *merit* by which all this is obtained, is the work of the Lord Jesus Christ, through whom this plan is proposed, and by whose atonement alone God can consistently pardon and treat as righteous those who are in themselves ungodly." In his comments on the fifth verse, he says, "But he (God) regards them (believers) *as united by faith to the Lord Jesus ; and in this relation he judges that they should be treated as his friends, though they have been, are, and always will be personally undeserving*." Mr. Barnes, if we understand him, holds that faith is the the *instrumental* cause of justification, and that it is reckoned to the believer for righteousness, not as a work of merit, but because it receives the merits of Christ ; that God for Christ's sake freely pardons and graciously saves those who are united to Christ by faith. If the author meant to say, that Mr. B. did not believe that the moral character of the Saviour was set over to believers so as to be really and truly their character, that he did not believe in the transfer of Christ's character to His people ; then he should have used very different language. As it is, he has grievously misrepresented his Christian brother.

Passing by a long list of passages we had noted for comment, we conclude by giving a specimen of the author's ideas of our common Christianity.

"The differences which separate believers into denominations are various, and though each communion may receive a sufficient amount of evangelical truth to preserve their church state, yet, when each one shall have relinquished all their differences with every other, the denomination which would be the result would have but little to distinguish it from an association of free-thinkers." "And thus we might proceed to include other denominations, and to show, that if we should agree to relinquish our respective differences for the sake of a common union with each other, we should, in that event, agree to relinquish every evangelical truth, everything held dear and sacred by any." Our present concern is not with the design of the author in making the above statements, but with the statements themselves. We think they will fall as a new and strange sound upon Protestant ears ; and were they true, we should be compelled to adopt the mournful lamentation of Dr. Junkin, in reference to the alledged heresies of

<sup>1</sup> pp. 206, 207.

Mr. Barnes, and say, *ex animo*, that such doctrines shake the foundation of our personal hopes for eternity.

The question is not whether an organic and formal union of all "believers" is either practicable or desirable; but, what would be the consequence of such a union? The author assures us, that it would turn the whole family of Christ into little else than "*an association of free-thinkers*;" that it would be "*to relinquish every evangelical truth, everything held dear and sacred by any!*" He contradicts himself in the very act of making the statement. He concedes to "each communion" of believers "a sufficient amount of evangelical truth to preserve the integrity of their church state." If they have this amount, being separate, would they have any less when united? He fully grants the infidel scandal against the church of Christ; makes Christianity, as embodied in that church, a mere matter of *moonshine*; substantially affirms that there is no ground of "evangelical truth" common to, and held equally by all Christians—that there is no unity of faith—that Christians doctrinally cease to be Christians the moment you deduct their differences, and take only their agreements. If they would relinquish "every evangelical truth" by union, will the author tell us how many such truths they hold in a state of disunion? He will please also to show the beautiful symmetry of thought between this new doctrine and another idea of the same chapter, namely, "The church is in all ages the same, and her testimony is the same." The same! What! when her differences are so great, that if these were given up for the sake of union, all would be gone! One general wreck would ensue! No wonder, the author with such a creed in his heart and in his head, and the other kindred *custodes ecclesiarum omnium*, should want to magnify "Differences." There is nothing else to magnify; the very life of Christianity is in them; the moment you lose sight of these, there is nothing to be seen but the ruins of a supposed faith. This certainly is a very sensible and comprehensive view of our glorious Christianity. Peradventure, it may be one of those rhetorical exuberances, sudden inspirations of fancy, that led the "Presbyterian" to think "that a little pruning would not injure the style." We suggest this as a very good passage to begin with.

It is really painful to witness such an exhibition of theological *disease*, or of the most radical, High-Church sectarian monomania. Under the influence of either, the mind acquires a cast of thought, which makes it almost *insane*. Amid all the actual harmonies of the Christian world, the subject of the strange passion is incessantly sounding his favorite note of "Differences." It is his key-note; and by a vitiated moral taste he learns to relish the music. That he should write a book on this subject, if he writes anything, is no marvel. If he is a preacher, he will doubtless often edify his people with the theme. Go where he will, do what he will, his pre-

vailing passion will steal the march on him. Put him in the World's Convention, laboring to form an Evangelical Alliance upon a doctrinal basis common to Protestant Christians; and there he is in a spasm of agony on account of his favorite theme. The idea of such an Alliance—why, it is a perfect *humbug*! The moment Christians undertake to agree by a relinquishment of "differences," all their supposed unity of faith evaporates! They agree! Never, except at the expense of "every evangelical truth!"

In taking leave of Mr. C. we remark, that he has presented no cause for trial, touching the "Doctrinal Differences between Old and New School Presbyterians." So far as his book is concerned, we know not what they are, and could make no reply, were we ever so much disposed to try it. The witnesses on one side only have been heard. It is not certain that even the brother himself is an "Old School" Presbyterian. How he would appear when brought to the standard of high authorities, no mortal can guess from his work. Hence we totally decline all comparison of the "Differences," with his statement for a basis.

#### ARTICLE IV.

### THEOPHANIES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

By REV. E. NORRIS, A. M., Pastor of the Freewill Baptist Church, Boston.

THE Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, are exceedingly explicit in maintaining the invisibility of the DIVINE BEING. Let the following texts be considered, viz: Ex. 33: 20, "There shall no man see me and live." Job 9: 11, "So he goeth by me, and I see him not; he passeth on also, but I perceive him not." John 1: 18, "No man hath seen God at any time." John 5: 37, "Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape." Rom. 1: 20, "For the invisible things of him (are) his eternal power and Godhead." Col. 1: 15, "Image of the invisible God." Heb. 11: 27, "He (Moses) endured, as seeing him who is invisible." 1 Tim. 6: 16, "Whom no man hath seen, nor can see."

Now with these positive declarations of God's invisibility before us, what are we to do with that numerous class of texts found in the Old Testament, in which God seems to place himself within the scope of human senses, causing both his *voice* to be heard and his *shape* to be seen? We might indeed suppose that such language was made use of to express a spiritual appearance of God, did not the circumstances connected with such manifestations

utterly forbid the supposition, and make it apparent that there was indeed a visible form or an audible voice.

Of the numerous epithets applied to such manifestations, we select for present examination, the expression מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה *Angel of Jehovah*, which in our English version is rendered *Angel of the Lord*, and is evidently used with reference to some manifestation of God, which suggests itself to the natural senses of man. In the examination of this appellation, we shall consider its import as used in the PENTATEUCH, and then trace it through the other Historical and Prophetical books.

The first time this form of speech occurs is in Gen. 16: 7, where the מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה found Hagar by a fountain of water in the wilderness. This Angel is represented as conversing with her in such language as she could understand, and which elicited an answer from her; commanded her to return to her mistress, promises to multiply her seed, tells her that Jehovah had heard her affliction, and foretells the character and habits of her progeny. But the *name* Hagar gave to the God that talked with her, is just what we might expect from one who had been taught to believe in the invisibility of the Divine Being: "And she called the name of the JEHOVAH that spake unto her, אֱלֹהֵי מַרְאִי *thou God of visibility*," v. 13. This rendering, according to Boothroyd, is given by Le Clerk, Houbigant, and Michaelis, and it certainly accords with the *usus loquendi*. See I. Sam. 16: 12, וְשׁוֹב רָאִי *And fair of appearance*. Job, 33: 21, מִרְאִי *from being seen*, i. e., it cannot be seen. Nahum, 3: 21, כְּרָאִי *as a sight*. The reason why Hagar gave the Jehovah that talked with her this name is thus given: "For she said, and have I also here רָאִי אַחֲרַי *looked upon the back parts of the visible?*" It is worthy of notice, that we have here the same form of expression which occurs in Ex. 33: 23, where God said to Moses, "Thou shalt אַחֲרַי אֶהְיֶה *see my back parts*."

The name Hagar gives to the well, בְּנַיִר לַחַי רָאִי (verse 14,) Boothroyd thinks has been corrupted, and should read אֶלְחַי or אֶלַי for לַחַי, *the well of the invisible God*. Without such a rendering, the paronomasia is destroyed.

The ancient versions go to substantiate the idea that Hagar was deeply impressed with the fact that God had appeared to her in a visible form. The *Greek* reads (v. 13), "For I have *openly* seen him that appeared unto me." The *Chaldee*, "Lo, I begin to see after that he *appeared* unto me." *Syriac*, "Lo, I have *beheld* a vision, after he beheld me." *Arabic*, "Even here I have *seen*, after his seeing me." *Targ. of Jon.*, "Behold here is revealed the divine majesty after the vision." We think from a candid examination of this subject, two things must be quite evident: 1st,

Hagar saw a visible appearance of God; 2d, Having previously believed the Divine Being to be *invisible*, she is struck with astonishment, and calls him a *visible God*.

The appellation, *יהוה מלך* next occurs in Gen. 22: 11, "And the *Angel of Jehovah* called unto him out of heaven, and said, Abraham, Abraham." That this *Angel* was identical with God himself, is clear from the considerations following: 1st, He was the one who commanded the sacrifice, and hence he says, (v. 12,) *Thou hast not withheld thine only son from me*; and the 1st, 2d, and 3d verses say, that *God* tempted Abraham, and commanded him to sacrifice his son.

Of this same *Angel* it is said in verses 15, 16, and 17, "And the angel of Jehovah called unto Abraham, out of heaven, the second time, and said, By myself have I sworn, saith the *Lord*; for because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven," &c. Now it is evident that no ordinary angel could have sworn to bestow such blessings as are here promised; and the fact that Abraham calls the one who swore to him, the *Lord God of heaven*, in Gen. 24: 7, fully identifies this *Angel* with the Supreme God.

The name Abraham gives to the place, and the *remark* he makes on the occasion, seems to be designed to commemorate the fact, that he had, at this time, enjoyed a visible interview with God. (v. 14.) "And Abraham called the name of the place *יהוה ירא* *Jehovah shall see*, or differently pointed, it might have a passive signification, *Jehovah shall be seen*, by which reading the paronomasia is preserved with the latter clause, as given by the Septuagint, which reads, "As it is said to this day, In the *mount the Lord will appear*." It appears that this saying had become a proverb in the days of Moses, and hence would, of course, continue a long time after him, and some have regarded them as prophetic, pointing to the erection of the temple on this spot; which idea is favored by the Chaldee. In that temple God was pleased to manifest Himself to men, not unfrequently to the natural senses; and the texts which represent Him as dwelling in "his holy mountain," "in his holy temple," are numerous. See Ps. 11: 4, and 87: 1. Isa. 11: 9 and 5—6: 7. Joel, 3: 18. Jonah, 2: 7. Mic. 1: 2. Heb. 2: 20.

True, some distinguished names dissent from the reading of the Septuagint, but it appears to us that that reading accords best with the whole tenor of the discourse, and it is supported by Pagnine, Houbigant, and others.

The same Being appeared to Isaac, as *יהוה* in Gen. 26: 2, and commanded him to go down into Egypt on account of the famine. In the second verse he says to Isaac, "I will give thee these coun-

tries, and I will perform *the oath* which *I swear* unto Abraham, thy father." The Jehovah who swore to Abraham we have just seen was identical with the Angel of Jehovah which commanded the sacrifice of Isaac, Gen. 22 : 15, 16, 17, compared with Gen. 24 : 7.

The same Being appeared to Jacob as a *man* (Gen. 32 : 24) ; but Hosea, in chap. 12 : 4, calls this man the *Angel* : "Yea, he had power over מַלְאָךְ the *Angel* and prevailed, and he made supplication to him: he found him in *Beth-el* and there he spake (עָמַד) with him (v. 5) ; even the Lord God of hosts, יְהוָה in his *memorial*." Now the prophet, in the last clause of the passage, refers to the second appearance when Jacob had come out of Pandan-aram, as recorded in Gen. 35 : 9-15, to which being, called a *man* when he wrestled with Jacob at Penuel, the *Angel*, the *Jehovah God*, and the *Jehovah*, by Hosea, is applied the names *God* and *God Almighty*, and He is represented as confirming the promise He made to Abraham and Isaac, who is called Jehovah in Gen. 12 : 7 ; 13 : 14 ; 28 : 13.

This was the *Angel* that redeemed Jacob from all evil, whom he represents as identical with the *God before whom his fathers had walked, and who had fed him his life-long*. See Gen. 48 : 15, 16. This is the Angel of God that spoke to him in a dream at Padan-aram, and who declared himself to be the *God of Bethel*, to whom Jacob made his vow. See Gen. 31 : 11-13.

Jacob, it appears, inquired for the name of the man with whom he wrestled at *Penuel*, but his curiosity is not gratified, and in allusion to this, Hosea says, "*Jehovah is his memorial*," i. e., *his name*. Jacob called the name of the place פְּנֵי־יְהוָה "the *face of God*," "for," said he "I have seen God *face to face*, and my life is preserved." Such visible appearances of God seem to have been so rare that they always excited great astonishment, and there appears to have been an impression that no one could see him and live. See Judges, 13 : 22.

The next account of the appearance of the Angel Jehovah, was to Moses, in Ex. 3 : 2, "And the Angel of Jehovah appeared unto him in a flame of fire," &c. This appearance (verses 6-10) calls himself the God of his father, and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob ; says he had seen the affliction of *his* people in Egypt, that he had come down to deliver them and to bring them to a good land, appoints Moses their conductor, &c. Moses gives to this being the appellation *God*, and hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon him, and when Moses inquired what name he should give to the children of Israel, this same Angel said (v. 14), *I AM THAT I AM*, and commanded him to say to the children of Israel, that one, bearing the appellation of *I AM*, had sent him unto them.

This, therefore, was the *Angel of Jehovah*, who pledged himself to conduct the Israelites to the promised land ; and that he was no



ordinary angel is apparent not only from the names applied to him, but from the fact that God declares that his *name is in him*. See Ex. 23 : 21 ; and when the Israelites had sinned by making the golden calf, God said he would send *an angel* to conduct them, but He himself would not go up with them. See Ex. 33 : 23. Now the fact that the people regarded such intelligence as "*evil tidings*," and "mourned," and "stripped themselves of their ornaments," shows that they could not have supposed the Angel of Jehovah, who had previously pledged himself to be their leader, an ordinary angel ; but when God said (v. 14), "My (פָּנַי face) presence shall go with thee," Moses seemed satisfied.

This *Angel of Jehovah* also appeared to Balaam in Num. 22 : 22 ; but it will be seen by the connection, that he who is repeatedly called "the Angel," is recognized by the prophets as God Himself.

In Judges 2 : 1-5, we have an account of the Angel of Jehovah speaking to all the children of Israel, reproving them for their sins ; and this Being represents himself as the one who covenanted with their fathers and brought them out of Egypt. Also in Judges 6 : 11-40, we have an account of an *Angel of Jehovah* appearing to Gideon, under the oak which was in Ophrah ; but Gideon calls him "*my Jehovah*," and said that he had seen an angel of the Lord *face to face*, and was greatly afraid, till Jehovah comforted him with the promise that he should not die.

It would be needless to refer to more of the numerous instances given in the historical parts of the Old Testament, where God appears to man as the אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. See Judges, 13 : 3 ; II. Sam. 24 : 16 ; II. Kings, 19 : 35 ; I. Chron. 21 : 12 ; but in all instances, it is apparent that there is a *representation of God* which comes within the reach of the human senses, and that the Being called Angel, is identical with the *Infinite Jehovah* himself.

There are numerous other instances in which God, under *other names*, appears to man. Consult the following texts : Ex. 24 : 9-11, "And they saw the אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל God of Israel." Ex. 19 : 11, יְהוָה "will come down in the sight of all the people upon Mount Sinai." Ex. 33 : 11, "And Jehovah spake to Moses *face to face*, as a man speaketh unto his friend." Isaiah 6 : 1, "I saw Jehovah sitting upon a throne," &c. (v. 5.) "Woe is me ! for I am undone—for mine eyes have seen the king, Jehovah of hosts." The Old Testament abounds with such declarations ; but our chief object is to trace the word *Angel* through the prophets into the New Testament. It is a question of much importance as to whether this word מַלְאָךְ is ever manifestly applied to the *Messiah* of the New Testament.

We conceive that the *Angel of Jehovah* when he appeared to Manoaah (Judges 13 : 3), assumes a title which is peculiar to the Messiah. (v. 18.) "And the Angel of Jehovah said, why askest

thou after my name, seeing it is *וְאֵלֹהִים wonderful*?" The same appellation is unquestionably given to the Messiah in Isa. 9 : 6, "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders, and his name shall be called *וְאֵלֹהִים Wonderful*, Counsellor, the mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace." That this text refers to the *Messiah* of the New Testament no one can doubt.

Again the term is evidently applied to Christ, in Isaiah, 42 : 19, "Who is blind as my servant? or deaf as my *מַלְאָךְ Angel* that I sent?" This angel or servant is the same as the servant mentioned in the first verse, "Behold my servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my soul delighteth," &c. ; which, with the 2d, 3d, and 4th verses, are quoted in Matt. 12 : 18-21, and applied to Christ. Malachi also refers to the *Messiah* under this appellation, Mal. 3 : 1, "Behold I will send my messenger (John the Baptist), and he shall prepare the way before me, and *Jehovah*, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come into his temple, even the *מַלְאָךְ Angel* of the covenant, whom ye delight in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts."

That the New Testament writers understood this prophecy as referring to John the Baptist, and to the Messiah, is apparent from Mark, 1 : 2, "As it is written in the prophets, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee." See also Matt. 11 : 10 ; Luke 7 : 27 ; Mark 1 : 3, "The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight." Now the 3d verse is quoted with but little alteration from the Heb. of Isa. 40 : 3, "The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of *Jehovah*, make straight in the desert a highway for our God." Mark, after the blending together of these two predictions, goes on to speak of John and Christ, showing clearly that he understood the *מַלְאָךְ Angel* of *Jehovah* of Malachi to be identical with the *קְדוֹשׁ*, and the *אֱלֹהֵינוּ our God* of Isaiah, and with the Messiah, whose history he is about to record. In the same connection Isaiah calls him the *קְדוֹשׁ*, "glory of Jehovah," (v. 6,) which expression often refers to a visible appearance of *God*. See Ex. 16 : 7-10 ; 24 : 16 ; 40 : 34 ; Lev. 9 : 6 ; 1. Kings, 8 : 11 ; Isa. 35 : 2, and others too numerous to note. The expression refers to the Messiah of the New Testament, in numerous texts, amongst which are the following : Isa. 60 : 1 ; Hab. 2 : 14, and others.

In I. Cor. 10 : 9, Paul says, "Neither let us tempt *Christ*, as some of them also tempted, and were destroyed of serpents." Now who was this *Christ* who was tempted in the wilderness? We learn, by referring to Num. 21 : 5-9, where we have an account of the people speaking against a being denominated *God* and *Jeho-*

vah, who is represented as the leader of the Israelites, and to whom we have already seen, that the appellation, Angel, is constantly applied. For tempting this Being they were bitten by serpents.

We call the attention of the reader to but one other passage, John, 1 : 1, &c., where Jesus Christ is called the *Λόγος*; *Word*, and is identified with the God who was in the beginning, and the Maker of all things. Now as Jesus Christ represented God, as a *word* represents the mind of him who utters it, there is reason for giving him this appellation. But was this a Jewish form of expression? Have we any reason to suppose that the readers of John's Gospel would have been able to comprehend the import of such an epithet when applied to the Messiah? He is evidently arguing to prove the Divinity of our Lord; but if he bases an argument upon a term which the Jews have not been accustomed to apply to their God, nor to the Messiah, he proves nothing to their minds at all. Now it is a fact worthy of attention, that in the Chal. Paraphrase of Onkelos and Jonathan, we have the expression מִקְוֶה דְּיִהוָה *Word of Jehovah*, where reference is made to a visible form of the Almighty. See the following texts: Gen. 3 : 8, "*The Word of Jehovah walking in the garden*;" 26 : 3, "*My Word shall judge thee and bless thee*;" 28 : 20, "*And Jacob vowed a vow to the Word*," &c.; 35 : 9, "*And the Word of Jehovah appeared to Jacob*," &c.; Ex. 16 : 8, "*Your murmurings against the Word of Jehovah*;" 19 : 17, "*To meet with the Word of Jehovah*;" 30 : 5, "*I will appoint for thee my Word*;" Lev. 26 : 11, "*My Word shall not reject you*;" Num. 11 : 20, "*Rejected the Word of the Jehovah*;" 14 : 9, "*But rebel not ye against the Word of the Lord*;" 23 : 4, "*And the Word from before the Jehovah met Balaam*;" Deut. 1 : 30, "*The Word of Jehovah, thy God*;" 32 : 33, "*And in this ye did not believe in the Word of Jehovah thy God*;" 13 : 18, "*If thou shalt be obedient to the Word of Jehovah thy God*;" Ps. 2 : 2, "*Against the Word of Jehovah*;" 4, "*Word of Jehovah shall have them in derision*;" 11, "*Word of Jehovah*;" &c.; Ps. 3 : 4, "*I cried unto the Word of Jehovah*;" Ps. 9 : 2, "*I will rejoice in thy Word*."

The above quotations, taken at random out of the Scriptures, are certainly sufficient to show that the Jews, in the time of John, the Evangelist, must have been familiar with the application of the epithet, *Word*, to the *God* of the Old Testament; and it is more than probable, had been accustomed to apply it to their expected Messiah.

We are brought by this discussion to the following conclusions :

1. That Jehovah, although in His essence *invisible*, was accustomed to reveal Himself to the senses of men under the old dispensation. This appearance is often called the *shekinah*, the *habitation* or *dwelling* in the Chaldee.

2. That this revelation of God was identical with the Messiah of the New Testament. John, 1: 18, "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him."

3. The God of the Old Testament is the God of the New, and there is an identity of thought running throughout the sacred volume.

4. The grand *idea* of the Bible is the revelation of CHRIST to the world. He is the great Hero, both of the Old and the New Testaments.

5. What a bright evidence this unity of thought, kept up through the Pentateuch, Prophets, Gospels and Epistles, affords of the Inspiration of the Bible! God must have guided the minds of all, or their thoughts would not always have been running in the same channel.

6. What a glorious proof of our Lord's Divinity! He was the *Angel of Jehovah*, the *Jehovah*, the *God* who created the world, who presided over, and was worshipped by the Jewish nation.

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#### ARTICLE V.

### ASTRONOMICAL VIEWS OF THE ANCIENTS.

By PROFESSOR TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., University of New-York.

SWEDENBORG tells us that in the course of his visits to the spiritual world, he several times met with the ghost of Aristotle, and held certain very interesting conversations with him respecting the opinions he had entertained while upon the earth. Among other things, he tells us that he found it exceedingly difficult to drive the old Stagyrite out of his absurd notions in regard to the figure of the earth. It would appear from this account that a two-thousand years' residence in the ghostly world had produced no change in his philosophical views, or given him any more light in respect to either spiritual or physical matters, than he had enjoyed during the dark days of his sojourn in this earthly and animal existence. After a most faithful effort, however, Swedenborg at last succeeds in convincing him of his errors. He learns with astonishment that the earth is actually round, and finally yields to the improbable idea of there being *antipodes* inhabiting the other side, with their feet and heads in vertical and opposite directions to our own. The ghost of the old Greek remembering, doubtless, with a stubborn pride the absolute sway he had so long exercised in the learned and

scientific world, is very reluctant to be taught such new and startling doctrines. He is exceedingly puzzled to understand how *up* and down can both have reference to the same point, or how persons and things on the under side of the earth can possibly maintain their position without falling off into the *ἀπειρον*, or infinite abyss of space below. But he is at last convinced, and becomes, as we are told, very much ashamed of his former notions.

This may be taken as a pretty good sample of Swedenborg's dreams, or of the manner in which he was wont to transfer to the spiritual world the subjective states of his own mind, with all its errors, ignorance, and prejudices. In others of his numerous visions, his theological partialities and dislikes are equally apparent; furnishing conclusive evidence, that the spirituality in which he lived, transcended but little, if any, the sphere of his own brain, or the cherished thoughts and impressions of his waking hours.

No reputation that Swedenborg may have among his own followers can shield him here from the charge of having made, to say the least, a shameful and egregious blunder. He admits the possibility of lying appearances sent by evil spirits, and the most charitable supposition might be, that in this case the seer himself was thus imposed on by an emissary of darkness. The Aristotle whom he saw could not have been the renowned philosopher of that name, whose numerous works have come down to us. The truth, however, is that the Swedish mystic has imposed upon himself, by giving in his dreams, an objective presentation to one of the most vulgar errors of his day. Without taking any pains to test its truth, he simply assumes the common notion, that, until quite modern times, all mankind, the learned as well as the unlearned, had believed the earth to be a flat, extended, immovable plain. It is only as representing such a common notion, that we adduce his statement, or attach any importance to it; although we cannot but regard it as most strange, that one who has among his disciples such a reputation for learning, and especially for a knowledge of the ancient world and church, should have suffered himself to be imposed on, or should have imposed on himself, by such a falsity engendered of his own ignorance and prejudice.

That such an opinion in respect to the ancient ignorance should prevail among the comparatively uninformed masses, need excite no wonder. That it should be so often met with, however, among those who not only have the means of knowing, but the actual knowledge to the contrary, if they would but advert to it, can only be accounted for by remembering the strange tenacity of early errors imbibed in childhood, and the power with which they often override the clearest subsequent information. One of the first lessons the child learns in this boasting age, is the immense superiority of modern science, and modern philosophy, to anything which might bear those names in the ancient world. As though the for-

mer had not sufficient ground, in the excellence of its own unchallenged claim, and in its acknowledged supremacy in many respects, the greatest pains are taken to present a false, and unnecessary, and foolish disparagement of the latter. Hence so many grow up with this idea, that in respect to all true views of the earth and the universe, almost all who lived before Copernicus and Galileo were the veriest infants in natural knowledge—the merest children of sense, who regarded the earth as a flat extended surface, the heavens as a solid vaulted arch on which the celestial beings had their residence, the sun and moon, the stars and planets, as fixed in this solid firmament, or in similar concentric and transparent spheres, with no other design but to give light to the earth, or serve as minute sparkling ornaments in the fancied *kosmos* of which our own world was the foundation as well as the most important part—in other words, that for which all the rest existed.

Among other causes that have contributed to this, we may reckon certain familiar stories that are to be found in our most elementary reading-books, and which, in consequence, make an impression that is with difficulty erased, or even much affected by the best information afterwards acquired. There are, for example, the common histories of Columbus and of Galileo. The authors of the popular accounts of the discoverer of America have been disposed to set in the strongest light their hero's favorite idea of the spherical figure of the earth, as something at that time most striking and new. They have been too fond of representing him as a martyr to science—as the victim of that persecution which awaits all new discoveries. All this, too, feeds the scientific vanity of the relator or reader, as one who himself views things from an elevated scientific stand-point, and can therefore well appreciate the martyr's lofty position. Hence the tendency to contrast the meek science of the discoverer with the intolerant bigotry and ignorance of his opponents—especially those of the ecclesiastical order. In the case to which we now refer, these have been unduly magnified. Accounts that may be proved to be spurious and inconsistent with known facts, have been handed down as authentic history. There is also given a false view of the nature of the opposition he encountered. It is represented as having reference to his scientific theory of the earth's sphericity; whereas it was in fact mainly grounded on the practical objections to the execution of his scheme, which arose from the then state of navigation and geographical knowledge.

Be this, however, as it may, there is no denying that, from the common histories of Columbus (and they are among the first books that come into the hands of children) there is, in a great degree, derived this prevailing notion which afterwards adheres even to the better educated—namely, that previous to his time there had hardly been known, or even thought of, the doctrine of the earth's

sphericity, much less of its motion on its axis, and still less any idea, even the most remote, of its not being the center of the universe.

Another thing which tends greatly to aid the strange misconception thus existing even among intelligent men, is the trite story of Galileo, so common in almost all our school-books, and such a special favorite with a certain class of sciolists and lecturers who seem never to become weary in repeating this stale account for the thousandth and ten-thousandth time. He, too, was a martyr to science. He, too, was a victim of that persecution that awaits all who make discoveries, and which the *bold* lecturer would have us believe may even yet be encountered by himself for his fearless avowal of such original views as generally accompany the recital of this thread-bare history. And then, too, to add to the eclat of their favorite saint, there has ever been a disposition among scientific men (a disposition ever the strongest with such as were the most skeptical, and, therefore, in their own way, the most bigoted themselves) to magnify the ignorance and bigotry of his clerical opponents, to ascribe to them a strange, motiveless hatred to knowledge in the abstract, and to repudiate any charitable suggestion that they, on their part, might possibly have been influenced by a pure zeal for truths of a higher order than any relating to the figure or motion of the earth,—truths, too, which seemed menaced, not so much by the *facts* as by the proud and boasting spirit of irreligious science, aiming, as it often does, to pervert such facts to an irreligious and unscientific purpose.

To return, however, to Swedenborg and Aristotle. In order to prove that the seer was in this case imposed on by some counterfeit ghost, we need only, in the first place, turn to the treatise entitled, *De Cælo*. We believe that there is but very little, if any, dispute among the learned of this being one of the most genuine works of Aristotle. At all events, (if such a proof of authenticity might have weight with the decriers of the Stagyrite,) it does undoubtedly contain many very strange and extravagant opinions,—enough to furnish an abundant stock for all who are most fond of declaiming on the absurdities of ancient science. On these questions, however, of the globular form of the earth, and of the antipodes, and in respect to a philosophical view of *up* and *down*, instead of being the fool that he is represented to be, he was undoubtedly as orthodox as any in the newest scientific church,—as sound, in short, as Galileo, or Bacon, or even Swedenborg himself. He not only held the earth to be round, and maintained the existence of antipodes, but put forth some of the best demonstrations that have ever been advanced in proof of those positions, except the actual fact of the circumnavigation of the globe.

A leading one among these arguments of Aristotle, yet maintains its place in our school-books on astronomy, and is, doubtless, often

appealed to by many, who are not aware of its antiquity, as a striking result of the progress of modern science, since its revival by Copernicus and Galileo. It may be found in the second book of the treatise *De Cælo*, chap. xiv. 8. He is reasoning against Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and others of that ancient school, who, in spirit, at least, bore the nearest resemblance to some of most modern date. They claimed to be *par eminence*, the *physici*, the *naturalists*, the scientific men of their day. They were the Baconians of their time, the men of induction, of observation, of experiment,—who, avoiding all visionary *a priori* speculations about το βέλτιστον, and το κυριώτατον, about the *well and fit*, and *highest and best*, and ideas, and final causes, prided themselves upon having adopted the cautious, scientific, *a posteriori* method of reasoning from facts or phenomena, as made known to us by the senses. In contending with this school, he refutes them on their own ground of philosophising from appearances, and shows that their doctrine of the earth's being flat, and floating on the compressed air or water, οὐ κέκρυπται ἀλλ' ἐκτενερματίζουσα τὸν αἰθέρα τὸν κάτωθεν, like a cover to a vessel, is utterly at war with the *phenomena* that are exhibited in an eclipse of the moon. He had before proved the doctrine from other and more *a priori* reasons, in other words, reasons drawn from the known or conceived relations and fitness of things. Here he appeals to the senses regarded as making their observations under the guidance of reason. “*Εἰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ κατὰ τὴν Αἴσθησιν*. οὐδε γὰρ αἱ τῆς σελήνης ἐκλείψεις τοιαύτας ἂν εἶχον τὰς ἀποτομὰς. νῦν μὲν γάρ. χ. ε. λ. . . . . περὶ δὲ τὰς ἐκλείψεις ἀεὶ κυρτὴν ἔχει τὴν διορίζουσαν γραμμὴν.” “*Ὡςτ' ἐπειταρ ἀλείπει διὰ τὴν τῆς γῆς ἐκπύρόσθησιν, ἢ τῆς γῆς ἂν εἴη περιφέρεια τοῦ σχήματος αἰτία σφαιροειδὲς οὖσα*.” And, moreover, it follows also from the appearances, or phenomena, that are presented to the sense. Otherwise the eclipse of the moon would not exhibit such sections as we see it does. For although in its monthly phases it has all diversities of outline, so as to be at one time straight, again gibbous or convex, and again, concave, yet in its eclipses it has the defining or intersecting line, (made by the shadow of the earth,) *invariably* curved. So that, since the moon suffers eclipse by the interposition of the earth, it must be the periphery (of the earth's shadow,) that is the cause, because the earth itself is spherical.” Another phenomenal argument which still maintains its place in all popular astronomical treatises, is drawn from the appearances (*φαντασίαις*) and varying heights of the stars. From these, it is inferred, not only that the earth is round, but also that it hath no very great magnitude.—“Since even in a small change of distance, either to the north or to the south, there is a manifest change in respect to the horizon (ὁ ὁρίζων κύκλος), so that the stars which were over our heads undergo a change (of position or direction,) and do not appear the same (that is, vertical,) as we travel either to the north or to the south. In this way, some stars are seen in Egypt



and in the neighborhood of Cyprus, which are not visible in the more northerly regions; and again, some stars are continually above the horizon in the north, which do seem to set (or go under the horizon,) in the regions before-mentioned. So that from these reasons also, is it manifest, not only that the earth has the form of a sphere, but likewise that that sphere cannot be very large; for otherwise there would not be so perceptible a change to those who make such a comparatively small variation in their position upon the earth's surface." All the rules of Bacon's Organon could not have produced an argument more directly grounded on rational induction and observation. It addresses itself to every man's eye, and to every man's common sense, when employed in the contemplation of natural things. We certainly must live on a ball—and that too, a ball of no great comparative magnitude—because, as we travel over its surface in one direction, bodies which before appeared in or near the horizon, disappear in consequence of the straight line from them to the eye being interrupted; and this can only take place because the curvature of the body on which we dwell has come between. For the same reason, other parts of the visible horizon come into sight, because we have ascended or passed over the convexity that before hid them from our view. And so also, stars before in or near the vertex make a less and less angle with that part of the horizon from which we are departing, and which therefore seem to rise just in proportion as we descend, or seem to descend, the opposite convexity; all which, as Pliny says—*accidere non possit, nisi in figura pilae*—could never happen except on something that has the figure of a ball.

Now Aristotle affects no profundity of reasoning here. It was an obvious common-sense view, that must have presented itself to thousands of observing minds. It must have been familiar to men who lived long before his day—even to the old star-gazers in Egypt, Chaldea, Idumea, Syria, and those other oriental regions where, as we are assured on the best authority,<sup>1</sup> phenomenal astronomy received an early and assiduous cultivation.

No one can attentively read Pliny's argument on the same subject, without a conviction that he is presenting it, not as any profound view peculiar to himself, or to a few theorists, but as the common science of his day, or the prevalent doctrine of all thinking and well-informed men. It is true, he enters into a formal argument to prove the sphericity of the earth, or *orbis terrarum*,<sup>\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Epinomis*, 987, a.

<sup>\*</sup> This most common Latin phrase, *orbis terrarum*, is generally regarded as denoting a flat circle of the earth, such as is presented by the phenomenal aspect of the visible horizon. But this is on the assumption that the notion of a sphere could not have been entertained in those early periods at which the expression took its rise. No doubt, whatever may be the most primary idea, it was suggested like almost everything else in language, from sensible appearances; but it may still be regarded as having some grounds of probability, that this sensible appearance, instead of being the limited and varying visible horizon, was

but in doing this, merely proceeds on the same principle with the authors of our most approved and most scientific text-books, who, notwithstanding the universality of certain truths, still deem it necessary to present them as matters of analytic investigation and synthetic demonstration. In other words, he simply presents acknowledged facts in a scientific form and order.

"There is no doubt," says Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* ii. 71—*Sic enim fit haud dubie*—"that this spherical figure of the earth is the cause that certain stars of the northern clime never set, whilst, on the other hand, others in the contrary quarter never rise to us. Thus they are respectively invisible to those dwelling in the opposite parts, because the rising ball of the earth interrupts the sight—*attollente se contra medios visus terrarum globa*. So that—*Septentriones non cernit Troglodytice et confinis Egyptus, nec Canopus Italia et quem vocant Berenicis Comam*"—the Troglodyte, and his neighbor, the Egyptian, never see the Great Bear, nor Italy the star Canopus and the constellations they call the Hair of Berenice." It would appear from Manilius, (*Astronomicon*, lib. i., 215,) that these constellations furnished the common or standing illustrations in almost all similar attempts to prove the earth's sphericity.

Nusquam invenies fulgere Canopum,  
Donec Niliacas per pontum veneris oras :  
Sed quærent Helicen, quibus ille supervenit ignis,  
Quod laterum tractus obstant, medioque tumore  
*Eripiunt terra cælum, visuque coercent.*

"Neither," proceeds Pliny, "does the world, as the common language would seem to say, raise itself at the higher pole (*pole excelsiore*), but the same parts are regarded as elevated to those who are near them, and depressed to those at a distance. So that as we travel over the convexity of the earth, some parts *appear* to rise, whilst those which before seemed elevated, appear to settle

rather the rolling sphere of the heavens, every way surrounding the earth, or central body, and therefore corresponding to it in shape. *Orbis*, we know, is thus applied to the great mundus, or universal globe, as in that noble passage of Horace, Ode III. 3,—

*Si fractus illabatur orbis,—*

and there certainly would seem to be something incongruous, or out of harmony, in applying it in so different a sense to the earth. The same idea of *roundness* seems to be in the earliest etymological sense of the Saxon *world*, *weorlde*, *world*; allied to which is the word *whirl*—*hwirle*.

<sup>1</sup> *Berenicis Comam*. Pliny has certainly made a mistake, or the constellation intended by him must be a very different one, and in a very different quarter of the heavens, from that which bears this name in modern catalogues, and which, moreover, appears to be the same with that described by Aratus and Callimachus. The constellation generally known as the Coma Berenices is in the northern hemisphere, and must, therefore, be visible to all parts of the earth north of the equator.

down,—which phenomena could not take place, except on something which has the figure of a ball.”

Since we have interrupted our remarks on Aristotle by citing the Roman naturalist, it may be well to exhibit here his beautiful manner of presenting that common argument from appearances, which may be found in almost all our astronomical and geographical text-books—*Eadem est causa propter quam e navibus terra non cernatur, e navium malis conspicua : ac procul recedente navigio, si quid quod fulgeat religetur in mali cacumine, paulatim descendere videatur, et postremo occultetur*—“From the same cause is it that the land is not seen from the ships themselves, when it is plainly visible from the peaks of their masts ; and so, as the vessel recedes in the distance, should something brilliant be fastened to the mast-head, it would present the appearance of descending by little and little, until finally it would be wholly eclipsed and disappear.” Plin., *Nat. Hist.*, lib. ii. 65.

But to return to Aristotle. He reasons against Anaxagoras and his school, not only from the appearances of the heavenly bodies, but also from the next best species of inductive proof, namely, facts, as far as known, in the natural history of the earth. He maintains the very hypothesis which is so generally claimed as being peculiar to Columbus. He infers the contiguity of India and the Pillars of Hercules, or Straits of Gibraltar, on the alleged ground that elephants were to be found in both these parts of the world.<sup>1</sup> Though the seeming extremes, they were to be supposed actually near to each other, because represented as abounding in the same natural productions. The fact may not have been, as stated by these early naturalists, or it may have been the case, as there are some grounds for believing, that such animals once existed there, although they do not now. On either view, however, the reasoning remains sound. It proves, too, that the opinion was quite common which had led to the formation of such a theory, and that it had not been derived so much from any speculations of philosophy, as from the observations and estimates of practical men, who had visited the most remote parts of the then known earth. It must also have been the common scientific opinion of his day ; for he tells us that on the strength of such a theory, “the mathematicians who attempt to calculate the extent of the earth’s circumference, make it out to be as much as 400,000 stadia,” or, according to the most common estimate of this very uncertain ancient measure, about 50,000 miles. This we know to be twice as much as it really is ; but the pains taken in this and the subsequent similar attempts of Eratosthenes and others to determine the periphery of the earth from the accurate measurement of a few degrees on one of its meridians, show that they must have proceeded on no

<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, *De Cælo*, Lib. II., ch. xiv. 15.

mere casual theory, but on what was then taken as the settled science of the age.

All this evinces the cool and cautious reasoner from observation, or from what is commonly received as established fact, and a mind prompt at availing itself of every rational ground of experimental induction. It certainly manifests a consistency of argument widely different from that extravagance which some ever associate, in their minds, with the physical disquisitions of this philosopher. At all events, it proves that nothing can be farther from the truth than that driveling nonsense about the antipodes, and the impossibility of people's hanging with their heads down, which Swedenborg attributes to his ghost.

It is quite common to institute disparaging comparisons between Bacon and Aristotle. It would, however, be no difficult matter to prove that the former was really inferior to the latter in respect to accurate physical knowledge. Let any one contrast some of the absurd notions of the Father of the inductive philosophy, with the enlarged information exhibited by Aristotle in his natural history, and which was almost wholly the result of his own examinations. How remarkable, too, the faculty for careful, well-conducted observations, which he ever manifests, even when his scientific conclusions are most certainly erroneous; as in his book *De Meteoribus* and other physical treatises. The truth is, that while Bacon merely talked and wrote about induction and experiment, no man, according to his means, either in ancient or modern times, ever pursued these methods more practically or scientifically than the much abused Stagyrite.

In these views of the figure of the earth, as has been seen, he attacks with their own weapons the school of Anaxagoras, and others, who were so fond of appealing to sense and observation. His favorite argument, however, the one of which he makes the most account, and in which the true philosopher most appears, is derived from what may be called *a priori* views, or, in other words, the consideration of that figure which is most in accordance with what are conceived to be the primary laws, or as the Greeks styled them, necessities (*ἀναγκαιά*) of matter. The following may be regarded as a summary of the reasoning which he gives us under this head, in his book *De Cælo*, ii. 14, 8. The gravity of each and all the parts, he maintains, must be viewed in reference to some point, towards which, in the natural tendency of all action to equilibrium, there must be, therefore, an equal, or nearly equal, effect on all sides.<sup>1</sup> Each portion, therefore, is alike pressed, and presses,

<sup>1</sup> Pliny employs a similar argument (*Nat. Hist.* ii. 65), and brings in proof the spherical figure assumed by water drops, which, although not involving in all respects, the same principle, do nevertheless furnish most beautiful and apposite illustrations of it. *Atqui non aliud in rerum natura aspectu manifestius; namque et dependentes ubique guttæ parvis globantur orbibus; et pulveri illatæ frondiumque lanugini impositæ, absoluta rotunditate cernuntur.*

in this common direction, and so must, in time, take its permanent place, according to its degree of gravity, that is, its tendency to this central point of equilibrium. Such a tendency being from all points in reference to the *one most common*, or which, in consequence of such tendency, is *continually becoming the most common*, there must arrive, at length, an equality on all sides, and such an equal pressure towards the centre as to maintain this fixed equilibrium; so that one part cannot "bulge or swell out" beyond or above the general surface or bound of the mass, without so disturbing the whole, and therefore so arraying the whole in opposition to it, as to be again, in time, brought down to a condition of rest in relation to this common sovereign point. "Εκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων βάρος ἔχει μέχρι πρὸς τὸ μέσον· καὶ τὸ ἑλαττον ἐπὶ τοῦ μείζονος ὁδοῦμενον οὐκ οὐδὲν εἰς κυμαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ συμπίπτουσιν μᾶλλον καὶ συγχωρεῖν ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ ὥς ἂν ἔλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. κ. τ. λ. "Because then," he proceeds to say, "there is a like tendency in every direction from extremes to a centre, it is manifestly necessary that the mass should be in like manner every way similar, and the extremes in every part equally distant from the common central point. *But the figure that must result from this is that of a sphere*"—τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σχῆμα σφαίρας ἐστίν.

It may be observed that we have, in this argument of Aristotle, that principle of *the sufficient or insufficient reason*,<sup>1</sup> which is supposed to have been peculiar to the school of Leibnitz. There is no reason why the tendency should be more to one side than to another, or—to state it in a more positive way, every conceivable reason for tendency in one direction applies here equally to tendency in every other; since all up and down, as he shows in lib. iv, ch. 1, of this same treatise, must have reference to motion to or from a central point, and therefore there can be no cause

<sup>1</sup> This axiom of Leibnitz affirms generally, that for every physical action there must exist a sufficient *reason* in distinction from *cause*. It may be viewed, however, under either a negative or a positive aspect. It would maintain that there can be no change, when every assignable reason for change in one *direction*, or in one *relation*, can be equally assigned of any other. On the other hand, it would assume positively to determine the *direction*, or *relation*, or *result*, of any dynamical agency, when there can be no reason on *one side* of such direction, or in *one view* of such relation, that is not equally capable of being affirmed of the other side of such direction, or the opposing parallel view of such relation. It is the fundamental principle of all equilibrium, and is thus employed by Archimides in his theorem of the balance. In fact, Leibnitz would make it the foundation of all statical and dynamical science; thus connecting the latter with the very laws of mind, or *necessities of thought*. In other words, he would regard this axiom as the uniting point of the logical or mathematical, and physical—ut rem omnem mechanicam reducam ad puram geometriam. We may gather his idea of its value and importance from the following statement which he makes in a letter to a friend—Tota autem res, quod mireris, pendet ex axiomatica metaphysico pulcherrimo, quod non minoris momenti est, circa motum, quam hoc, totum majus esse parte, circa magnitudinem. See Stewart's Elem. Phil. Vol. II. page 131.

for any irregularity in one quarter, that would not produce the same effect (and thereby actually destroy the irregularity) in every other direction.

Aristotle follows the preceding demonstration from the nature of things, with one view which strikes us as being not a little remarkable. He would seem to infer the sphericity of the earth from the fact that gravity causes bodies to fall, not in lines parallel to each other, but by similar angles—*πρὸς ὁμοίας γωνίας ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶς διέγεια*—as the mathematical expression is. This is intelligible if it can be taken as a mathematical inference from the proved or assumed sphericity of the earth. But we cannot regard it as an argument for such sphericity, unless there is supposed a nicety of observation in respect to the descent of falling bodies that has never been reached by any accuracy of science, or perfection of instruments in modern times.

We have intimated the opinion, that this doctrine of the roundness of the earth, was far more of a common, and even popular, view, than is generally supposed; and that it came as much from the practical observations of practical men, as from any speculations of philosophers. It would seem to be naturally suggested by some of the simplest and most obvious aspects of the visible universe; and that, too, independent of the phenomena to which we have alluded, and which must have forced it upon the thoughts of all who had ever travelled, by land or sea, over any considerable extent of the earth's surface. Even to those who had never wandered far from the spot on which they were born, the spherical appearance of the old rolling heavens, or the great *kosmos* all around us, would suggest the idea that the earth must have a *corresponding* sphericity; and more especially, would such a conception naturally present itself in connection with the belief that our own abode constituted the central body of the whole. This idea of its being suspended self-balanced, itself a sphere, in the middle of a spherical universe extending above, around, and beneath it, in every direction, would present nothing difficult for the imagination, and nothing abstruse for the reason, although in itself, most full of wonder and sublimity. It would indeed, from its very simplicity, seem to be, in fact, the most easy and natural view, and most in accordance with the purity of the primitive theism,—or that simple piety which referred the creation, and management, and maintaining of the universe, to the direct act and providence of God.

There is certainly no great difficulty in conceiving of the earth coming from His hand, having that figure which is at the same time the most perfect as well as the most simple,—the most delightful to the eye, and the most satisfactory to the reason. Neither is it hard to bring our minds to the thought of its remaining just where He put it, or of its moving, if it does move, on such a centre, or around such a centre, as He may have assigned.) It may reasona-

bly be supposed, on the other hand, that it was rather the pride of what would sometimes call itself science, that led the minds of men in the opposite direction. In its efforts to get away from the simplest ideas of figure, state, and causation, its first tendency would be to continuous series of hypotheses, or theories of agency and support, ever demanding other theories as the foundation of all preceding ones, and so presenting the appearance of profundity of argument and conception. Hence such speculations as those of Anaximenes and Anaxagoras respecting the earth resting on the water, the water on the air, the air on something else, and so on, *etc. &c.* Hence the atoms of Democritus, the attractions and repulsions and fluids of Empedocles. Hence the convex and concave particles, the hooks and eyes, the perpendiculars, and infinitesimal declinations of Epicurus and Lucretius. To this same fondness for theorising about causation, or—to use the language of the modern phrenologist who himself furnishes one of the best examples of the same tendency—to this excessive action of the scientific organ of causality, must be ascribed that theory against which Aristotle arrays his strong common sense. According to this hypothesis, the earth is sustained by is extreme platitude pressing on the air, which not being able to escape with facility becomes so condensed as at length to support the broad mass above. There is then demanded, to be sure, another hypothesis in respect to the air itself, and the means by which it is sustained, and then another to account for that, and so on ; but all this only the more and more gratifies the feeling to which we have alluded, and which finds its pleasure in thus ever departing farther and farther from that simplicity of view which has the least to do with any philosophical apparatus of machinery and causation.

This is the very charge that Socrates makes against Anaxagoras, who is one of the best specimens of this kind of sciolists, (or more scientific theists,) furnished by the ancient world. In one of the treatises of this philosopher, he had made a great parade of his doctrine of the *Noûs*, or Universal Intelligence, which led Socrates, as he himself tells us, to read his book with the eager hope of having his mind satisfied respecting the form of the earth,—whether round or flat, and whether occupying the middle or any other position in the universe.' The argument he expected was one that would exhibit this true form and true position with some reference to the *Noûs* of which so much was said ; in other words, would show what figure was simplest and best, or most in accordance with the idea of *well and fair*—*τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*—or as he more generally styles it—*τὸ βέλτιστον*. He was, in fact, looking for something very much like what Leibnitz has named, *the sufficient reason*. To his grievous disappointment, however, he finds that his author, and others of the same school, after they have once

<sup>1</sup> See the *Phædon* 97. d.

made an introductory flourish about their *Noûs*, or universal intelligence, never afterwards make any use of it in the study of the arrangements of the universe, but instead thereof are evermore bringing in, *αἶρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα*, *atmospheres, or gases, and æthers and fluids*, or in other words, attempting to rest the earth, and the universe, and all physical phenomena on an ever unfinished chain of causation. Wherefore he blames them, because—*φύσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πεποισμένην ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰτίας ἐπιμένοντες ἢ διὰ βέλτερον*—*τ. τ. λ.*—"professing that all these things are arranged by mind or reason, they are ever assigning some other cause than that thus it was *best*,"—or that such a form, or such an arrangement, was the most fitting.

On these grounds we have the best warrant, we think, for believing, that the opinion of those philosophers who made more account of moral and *a priori* truth—such as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and even Aristotle, all of whom held the spherical figure of the earth as the *fittest* and *best*—was more in accordance with the common mind, than those dogmas of the materializing schools which made more show of theory and causation, and which, although now known to present the most gross absurdities, were doubtless, in their day, and by their authors and admirers, regarded as the more scientific and profound.

Lecturers, and authors of popular scientific school-books, frequently amuse us with the old stories of the earth resting on the back of the elephant, the elephant on the tortoise, the tortoise on the head of the serpent, and so on ad infinitum. This is generally presented in derision of what are commonly styled the more vulgar errors; but it certainly has a more fitting application to much that in all ages has been broached under the name of science, with its apparatus of agents and fluids, and its endless machinery of cause and effect. Ever, too, as such science has been forced, from time to time, to return to greater simplicity of view, has it manifested again and again the same tendency under some varied form. The elephant, and the tortoise, and the serpent, which were the best symbols of the platitudes, and atmospheres, and æthers, and fluids, of Anaximenes and Anaxagoras, appeared again in the cycles and epicycles of that most strictly inductive of all astronomical schools which is now so stigmatised under the name of the Ptolemaic. They came again upon the stage in the vortices of Des Cartes; and perhaps, the same *idola specus*, instead of being buried among extinct genera, may yet be traced in the invisible fluids, and galvanic agencies, and nebular systems, and vestiges, and developments, and rarefactions, and condensations, of our most modern science.

With all its boast of progress, this method has never gone beyond, if it has ever of itself really reached that truth which was presented in the simple, primitive, religious, yet most sublime con-



ceptions of a *Kosmos*, *universe* (*in uno vertens*), or catholic harmony, which was such a favorite with the most reflecting souls in the earliest ages of the world. The Latin *mundus* contains the same thought; and surely it could have been no atheistic or naturalistic spirit that first developed these terms, and brought out their true idea so far back in the earliest periods of language. There is more of value, even of scientific value, in this idea, however imperfect and inaccurate may be the details of the knowledge with which it is connected, than in any extent of mere fact-discovery or even cause-tracing without it. A true kosmos, although conceived of as comparatively limited in space,—as bounded by a firmament or empyrean, or even as having the earth for its centre, is a far higher thought, a more sublime conception than is presented by any science, however extensive and accurate in its details, that finds no such resting place in its endlessly progressive, and therefore endlessly unsatisfactory, theories of agency and causation.

In truth, whatever we may say of induction and observation, and building carefully on facts, it would not be difficult to show, that no great movement has been ever made in true science, except by men whose minds were filled with the religious conception of a kosmos, or thoroughly imbued with that *a priori* spirit which assumes law, and order, and unity, and harmony, and universal interdependence, and final causes, and in short, a *sufficient reason* pervading the whole and every part of the universe of God. Astronomy had gone on for centuries, with its inductions, its observations of phenomena, its cycles and epicycles, until the old Pythagorean music of the spheres awoke again, like Memnon's harp, in the soul of Kepler. His harmonies of numbers, fanciful as they may seem to our men of exact science, contained a truth to which mere induction, unaided by a higher faculty of the soul, would never lead. The ancient conception of the kosmos revived again in Newton's idea of universal gravitation. This was not the result, but the guide of his induction. The falling apple, which figures so largely in the oft-told anecdote, may have suggested a method of inductive *proof*, but it did not furnish the *idea*. He knew from his own soul that the law existed. He was as certain of it as that "*the Lord liveth*." It was under the stimulus of this *a priori* conviction, that he set about that lower *a posteriori* verification which was to bring up experience and hypothesis to this higher station for observing nature, and connect them by scientific formulas with this advance position. Here there was a real step in science. Afterwards, as in former parallel periods, come again the men of observation, of experiment—the cautious explorers of nature. Their mission is to confirm, to verify, to calculate the exact agreements of experience with that previous idea which prompts the experiment, and without which observation is but a

chaos governed by no rules and leading to no substantial results—a groping in the dark, a blind seeking without any idea of what is sought, or of where it is to be found, and without any rational conviction that there is really anything to be sought for. Since the days of Newton, we have had mathematicians and observers of the highest order. But what have they done in the way of substantial progress? Much, it might be justly replied—much, every way. They have greatly improved those mighty agents, the telescope and the differential calculus. They have most accurately estimated the distances of the planets in inches and barleycorns. They have weighed their masses. They have determined the velocity of light. They have calculated eclipses—they have reckoned the longitude—they have carried the lunar tables to seconds and fractions of seconds. They have adjusted to the utmost nicety the clock-work of the solar system; and regulated even the cometary gearing which might almost seem to connect its machinery with other parts of the universe. They have discovered double stars, and triple stars, and nebulae of every form and extent. They have “gauged the heavens.” They have attempted to fix our own position among the indentations and islands of the milky way. They have settled the precession of the equinoxes, and the nutation of the poles. They have determined the exact equatorial excess. They have, in fact, so accurately ascertained the size and figure of the earth, that it no longer possesses either a poetical or a scientific interest. But with all this, there has been, in some respects, a retrogradation from the great idea of Kepler, Pythagoras, and Newton. The tendency of the *most* modern science seems to be, rather to break up the conception of the universe as a harmonic whole, and to throw it again into chaos—to produce the dreary impression of infinite space filled with stellar and nebular phenomena presenting every form of irregularity. Every step of its progress seems to recede farther and farther from the ideas of unity, of harmony, of one eternal and immoveable centre, without which, of all conceptions, that of the universe, (if it can be called a *universe*), is the most painful.

Whatever, then, we may think of these reasonings of Aristotle, —*εστὶ τὸ μέσον, respecting the middle*,—still a *kosmos*, with even the earth for its centre, is a far higher conception, we repeat it, than that of infinite space filled with stars, and nebulae, and comets, and floating star-dust, without any centre at all.

In truth, the argument we have presented from the Greek philosopher, would apply with still more force to the universe as a whole, than to the earth, the sun, or any single part of it. There the reasoning would be perfect, because there would be nothing *ab extra* to be taken into the account. The earth is not an exact sphere, because the operation of this law of equal central tendency is disturbed by its connection with other parts of the system, and

allowance must be made for the friction, so to speak, of the machinery by which this connection is effected. The revolution on its axis, and other causes coming out of the earth's relation to the sun, produce such a depression at the poles that it cannot be said to be exactly spherical. But to the great *mundus* there can be nothing extra-mundane, except it be the Supramundane Deity, who, although *in* the world, as "filling all things," is yet not *of* the world, nor *a part* of the world. As applied to the universe, then, Aristotle's argument in proof of the sphericity of the earth would be absolutely perfect. The great whole has a centre immoveable, and consequently an *up* and *down* absolute and unchangeable. Of this we may have the most certain conviction, whether we regard the universe as the direct work of God, or of a plastic nature created for that purpose and working under His superintendence. From this centre, too, must the glorious structure spread out in all directions, possessing a sphericity demanded by the reason,<sup>1</sup> and falling nothing short of the absolute perfection of the mathematical idea itself. As we gaze upon the nightly heavens, we may be absolutely certain that there is some precise point in our visible hemisphere, between which and our own eye lies the exact line of direction that leads to the far-distant centre of the universe. Although unknown to us, its position is none the less certain and fixed. There is some star twinkling on the retina of the gazer's vision, that, for us, and as reckoned from our geocentric view, either occupies, or approaches the nearest in celestial longitude to this unknown point in the visible firmament. It is in some inter-

<sup>1</sup> This is said with all confidence on the ground that every other conceivable figure is more or less imperfect. They have all, in some parts, a defect or excess in respect to other parts. They all have abruptnesses, and suddenly terminated planes and edges, or else an inequality which presents in some directions what does not exist in others. None of them have a centre to which every part bears a perfect analogy. There are none of them but what would affect us with a feeling of incongruity, if presented to the mind as the ultimate form of the universe, regarded as a whole, and as a perfect work of God. There are none of them but what would present anomalies, or unevennesses, for which no *sufficient reason* could possibly be assigned, or would appear arbitrary as the form of a totality having no *ab extra* relations. Why should it be a cube, or a parallelopipedon, or a pyramid, or a cylinder, or any like figure more or less regular? The soul asks no such question in relation to a sphere, because this figure perfectly delights the eye, and its ideal perfectly satisfies the reason. The round forms and circular orbits of our own system (as far as they approach to circularity) seem to be demanded by an *a priori* conviction independent of the confirmations of sense; and we are reconciled to their falling short of absolute perfection, in this respect, only by ascribing it to their necessary *ab extra* relations. True, these orbits are the result of the laws of central forces, but there is an ideal necessity back of the physical; or, we may say, there is a war of ideas in the very attempt to conceive of God's having created laws of nature, that would have brought out squares, or oblongs, or irregular curves departing far from the circular or elliptical as the established paths of the planetary bodies.

section of some meridian with some great circle of the sphere. It has a latitude and a right ascension as precise and true as was ever determined by any astronomical observation.

This idea of the universal centre is a conclusion of the moral reason. The devout soul goes directly forth to it without the aid of science. It waits not for those inductions which would be an eternity in reaching it. In obedience to the law of spiritual gravitation, it overleaps all science, and goes at once to the ultimatum. There is some point, it affirms, from which all distortion, disproportion, or obliquity of view must vanish—some point from whence everything, as contemplated by the mind, or as seen by the eye, must appear in its true place,—whence every part of the universe assumes its true kosmocentric longitude, and from whence, instead of the horrid shapes—

The Hydras, Gorgons, and Chimæras dire,

that figure in some scientific maps of the nebulæ and stellar clusters, all will be seen to be beauty, harmony,—geometrical ratios more exact, and combinations of numbers more perfect, than ever came into the calculations of the mathematician or the dreams of the poet;—some centre, in short, from whence, in the sublime language of Scripture, “there is neither parallax nor shadow of turning.”

In truth, this idea of a kosmos, and of a kosmos *having the most perfect of all figures*, is stronger than any conclusions drawn from experience and induction. The soul that truly thinks, is driven by it to ascribe that perfection to the greater and the greatest, which it finds everywhere in the least. It will not allow the belief that the *whole* may be destitute of that which appears, even in the minutest of the parts. Shall there be such a perfect geometrical regularity in the smallest snow-drop, with its equidistant points, and exact angles, and diverging radii, and concentric circles? And shall this great universe be regarded as a chaos in *respect to its ultimate form*, an irregular congeries of whirling worlds, and wild wandering comets, and nebulæ floating everywhere and in all directions, and presenting all the deformed apparitions of our milky way, rather than that perfect harmony, that perfect *ratio* in all its parts, that perfect and *sufficient reason* for every size and distance, and finally that most *perfect form*, which it would be almost like blasphemy to deny to the most *perfect work*.

Towards this ultimatum of the moral reason, science would be ever creeping by the cautious path of induction and observation. Estimated from its point of departure, or what it is leaving behind, its progress may indeed seem most rapid. Computed from the opposite direction, the merest infinitesimal would give the measure of its advance beyond that which it so contemptuously derides for its narrowness and absurdity. In one respect Herschell and Le-

verrier are immensely beyond Thales and Aristotle,—in another, the difference between them dwindles into insignificance. The  $\tau\omicron\ \mu\iota\sigma\omicron\upsilon$  has been removed from the earth to the sun. Science, it is said, is now about taking another step. It is carefully surveying the heavens for those data that shall direct to the more remote centre, about which our sun, with all its attendant planets, is making the revolution of that “*great year*,” at whose termination,

Magnus ab integro sæclorum nascitur ordo.

But still we are yet in the outskirts of the universe, in the mere “*ends of his ways*.”<sup>1</sup> The astronomer is no nearer the great  $\tau\omicron\ \mu\iota\sigma\omicron\upsilon$  than the geologist is to the centre of our own globe. Our enormous numbers whether employed in the calculus of time or space, really do nothing to aid the conception of the vast extent of the universe. Solomon’s sublime language—*The Heavens, and Heaven of Heavens*—gives as much assistance to the devout imagination, and carries it as far into immensity, as the billions and trillions by which we labor to express the distances of the stars. In respect to the true grandeur of the *kosmical* idea, our own accurate science places us on no higher ground for adoring contemplation than might have been occupied by David, or Pythagoras, or any other devout soul that aimed to see in the visible universe a type of the infinity and omnipotence of God.

To return, however, to the point from which we made the digression,—it may be said, that, aside from the considerations on which we have just been dwelling, the globular figure of the earth was almost a direct matter of sense. Those who were in the habit of observing the heavens—especially in long voyages and travels, could hardly help taking notice of this sphericity, as an obvious visual phenomenon. This is strikingly exemplified by the writer of that most graphic and popular work, entitled “*Two Years before the Mast*.” “So great,” says he, “was our change of latitude, that each succeeding night we sunk some constellation in the south, and raised another in the northern horizon. The Magellan clouds disappeared, whilst the Great Bear, and the familiar signs of northern latitudes, were nightly rising in the heavens.” Now we know that in quite early times the navigators of Tyre visited Britain, and even Scandinavia, on the north, whilst to the south, they coasted far down the western shores of Africa towards the equator. Can it be supposed that the same phenomena did not arrest their attention,—especially when it is borne in mind that they looked more to the stars for guidance than modern navigators are in the habit of doing. As they sailed from the tropical parts of Africa to these northern regions, great changes must have taken place in the appearance of these polar constellations. From being sunk almost to a level with the horizon, they ascended to an

<sup>1</sup> As it should be rendered. Job. 26 : 14.

elevation higher than 45 degrees, or to a latitude approaching the zenith. Could such observers have been at any loss about the real cause of the appearance, or have failed to attribute it to the swell or convexity of the surface on which they were sailing? When the northward or southward progress was very rapid, it must have seemed to them as though this convexity visually rose up between them and the heavenly bodies of which they lost sight,—as each successive evening one and another of them disappeared below their visible horizon. The same striking appearances must have forced themselves upon the notice of the sailors of Solomon, in their long three years voyages to the remote southern land of Ophir. They were observed and recorded, if we may believe the account of Herodotus, by the circumnavigators of Africa in the reign of the Egyptian Necho. Could such a phenomenon have escaped the eye of the Argonauts? In fact the Grecian ships could not have sailed even from Crete to Troy, without a very distinct change in the position of the heavenly bodies. Still more striking must it have been in any voyage made to Egypt,—and such voyages, we know, must have been earlier than the days of Homer. The change must have presented itself in the extensive land migrations of the earliest patriarchal tribes. Abraham could not have traveled from Ur of the Chaldees to Egypt without witnessing it.<sup>1</sup> The wanderings, too, of the tribes in the desert had sufficient differences of latitude to bring it into distinct visibility. To the Nomadic Scythians the appearance must have been almost as familiar as the northern and southern declination of the sun.

Now had such change been observed only of the stars in the zenith, or high above the horizon, it might have been regarded as the common parallax of bodies supposed to be at no great distance above us, and as perfectly consistent, therefore, with the idea of the earth's being a plane. But this could never be held of those heavenly bodies which appeared in or very near the horizon. Let them be near or remote, there would be no change to an eye proceeding in the same line of elevation with them, and toward the same point of compass. They would still remain in the horizon, however much the observer, moving on a plane surface, might approach, or recede from, them. But these are the very stars in respect to which this apparent change of position would be the most striking and distinct. They rose as the traveler or voyager advanced in a line with them; they sunk and disappeared as he receded in the opposite quarter.

These appearances, then, must have been so common, so often

<sup>1</sup> It is remarkable that the oriental accounts of Abraham ascribe to him a high degree of astronomical science. So says Josephus on the authority of Berosus; and with this agree the traditions of the Arabian tribes. The Scriptures may have preserved a dignified silence in respect to this, because occupied with a much higher department of his character.

observed by travelers upon the earth's surface,—the explanation, too, the only possible explanation, we may say, must have been so obvious, that we cannot doubt of the antiquity and commonness of this opinion of the earth's sphericity; or of its being, in fact, the prevailing belief of all observing and practical men, until certain early forms of physical science rejected it as too simple, too little philosophical, too little capable of being connected with any such machinery of intervening agency and causation as would be required for the hypothetical support of a flat extended mass.

The phenomenal expressions so often found in the Greek and Latin poets, and especially in Homer, are not at all at war with the view we have just taken. It is true, they describe the sun as sinking in the ocean, or as plunging beneath its surface,—as in that most beautiful verse,<sup>1</sup>

Ἐν δ' ἵππο' Ὀκεανῷ λαμπρὸν φάος ἡέλωιο,

or in Virgil's still more beautiful imitation,

Quid tantum Oceano properent se tingere soles.

From this however, we cannot draw the conclusion that Homer was any more ignorant than Virgil of the phenomena which have been described as arising from the convexity of the earth. The latter poet, as we know from his account of the zones (Georg. I. 232), held this as firmly and as intelligently as Columbus, or any modern schoolmaster. The objection, however, is met at once, by remembering that such expressions, like others of a similar kind from the Holy Scriptures, are strictly phenomenal. They are addressed solely to the eye; and Homer may be said to have been pre-eminently the poet of that organ. They would have lost all their poetical beauty in a more philosophical or scientific dress. There was hardly any part of southern Greece, or of the Grecian isles, from which the sun did not *seem* to rise out of, or sink into, the ocean waves. The language of Homer and Hesiod, therefore, is no more inconsistent with a true view of the figure of the earth, than the similar lines from Byron's poem of Childe Harold's Pilgrimage—

The sun that sets upon the sea  
We follow in his flight.

Indeed the daily appearance and disappearance of this luminary could hardly have failed to suggest, to the earliest observers, the idea of a central body, around and under which he passed, or seemed to pass, in his journey to the opposite east. Such would appear to be the conception presented in the striking imagery of the nineteenth psalm (v. 4,) "*Therein*, (that is, *in illis calis*, or in the lower hemisphere of the heavens, as may be most easily

<sup>1</sup> Iliad VIII. 485. Compare Works and Days 527. Argonautica, 515.

inferred from the always dual form of the Hebrew (שָׁמַיִם) *hath He set a tabernacle for the sun.*" In other words, there is his subterranean tent in which he seems to pass the night—*nocturnum solis domicilium* (as Rosenmuller says) *in quo quietem quasi capere videatur*, and from whence "he comes forth like a bridegroom out of his secret or covered chamber (מִדְּפָתוֹ) and rejoices as a strong man who sets out on his daily journey." Most naturally following this, and suggested by it, would be the thought, that this central body must have a shape corresponding to the circularity of the surrounding orbit of revolution, and presenting, *on all sides*, a parallel convexity. This is precisely the idea of Hesiod in the Theogonia (127), where he strangely represents Gaia, or earth, as generating Uranus, but still in exact figurative conformity to herself.

Γαῖα δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις μὲν γέλυτο ἸΣΟΝ ἑαυτῇ  
Ὀὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ' ἵνα μιν ΠΕΡΙ πάντα ΚΑΛΥΠΤΟΙ.

Indeed the harmony of conception, demanded by the very laws of the mind, must have been sadly disturbed by the thought of a flat, thin, mass, boundless in extent, or limited by sharp irregular edges,<sup>1</sup> and yet forming the centre around which rolled a *kosmos* of *orbs*, and *orbits*, and *periods*, and motions in which circularity, and curvature, and sphericity seemed the first and all pervading ideas.

Hence we find that Aristotle, and Pliny, and Manilius<sup>1</sup> and others of the ancients who have treated on these subjects in a formal and scientific manner, do all so naturally follow this analogy, and proceed from the consideration of the sphericity, or spherical appearance, of the great *mundus*, to that of the earth as so intimately associated with it. To depart from this analogy would have seemed like introducing jargon into an otherwise perfect system,—a discord amidst the music of the spheres. It is true, this appearance is in a great measure optical, and only partly real. Yet, still, even as a result of the laws of vision, it may well be taken as a type of that mathematically perfect sphericity which the mind demands as truly and *really* belonging to the whole *kosmos*. And so, too, this very law of vision itself may have been created as a type of that higher law of central relation, which so forms and arranges the great whole, that in respect to it the real and the apparent become one and indivisible.

The phenomena we have been considering arise from change of the observer's position. But aside from this we may say that the globular swelling of the earth is a matter of sense, even to the unmoving spectator. To one who looks out from a level beach upon

<sup>1</sup> The same law of conception that would demand a circle for the periphery, on the supposition of its patular or *plate* form, would never be satisfied with anything short of perfect sphericity.



the broad expanse of the ocean, it actually seems to rise, in its convexity, to the tangent drawn from its surface to the observer's eye. This, too, has not escaped the poetical observation; and hence, we think, that singular expression which meets us so often in the *Odyssey*, ἢ π' εὐρεία νῶτα θαλάσσης, "*the broad curving backs of the sea.*" This would seem to derive some confirmation, from the manner in which the same term is phenomenally applied by Euripides to the curving vault of heaven,—as in the *Fragment of the Andromeda*.

Ἄστρουσι δὲ νῶτα διαφύσσονα<sup>1</sup>  
Αἰθέρος ἰσθαῖς,

quoted by Aristophanes, *Thesmoph.* 1065, as a specimen of bombast, simply because this malignant comedian did not understand the philosophical poet he was ever satirising. Compare also Euripides *Electra*, 735.<sup>1</sup>

It may be concluded, therefore, that poetical expressions which phenomenally would seem to represent the earth as a plane, are not at war with the position we maintain, that there was a quite common and extensive belief in its sphericity. But whilst this may hold true of such language addressed solely to the eye, there is abundant proof that the higher poetical or ideal conception ascended above the mere phenomenal aspect of the earth's surface, to the contemplation of its position and relations in the universe. Hence that sublime passage of Ovid,

Circumfuso pendebat in aere Tellus,  
Ponderibus librata suis.

And earth, self-balanced, on her centre hung.

So also Manilius in his *Antronomicon* Lib. I. 194 :

Nec vero tibi natura admiranda videri  
Pendentis terræ debet. Cum pendeat ipse  
Mundus, et in nullo ponat vestigia fundo.

Both seem to have imitated the old astronomical poet, Aratus, from whom Paul quotes in the 17th chap. of *Acts*—

ἔχει δὲ ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη  
Μεσσηγὺς γαῖαν· περὶ δὲ οὐρανὸς αὐτὸν ἀγίνει—<sup>2</sup>

or as Cicero renders it in his Latin version,

<sup>1</sup> Along with this may be reckoned the Latin phrase *conscendere aquor*, as in the *Æneid*, i. 381, and also the corresponding Greek expressions. These, it is true, may mean no more than to go *up* from the land, or out to sea, as the opposite ones would signify to come *down* to land. Still there must have been something in nature to suggest the metaphor, and we have, therefore, good reason for concluding, that it came from the appearance to which we have alluded as resulting from the real curvature of the sea.

<sup>2</sup> Aratus, *Phænomena* 22.

Sed tenet equali libratam pondere terram,  
Quam circum magno se volvit turbine cælum.

We have a similar thought, and similar language, in the Phædon of Plato, 109, a. where Socrates says, that "since the earth is round, and is suspended in the middle, it has no need of any other necessity or power for its support but its exact correspondence to the heaven that is all around it, and its self-balancing equilibrium, *ισόφροντα*; for a self-balanced thing (*ισόφρονον πρᾶγμα*) being placed in the centre of that which is *exactly like itself*, hath no sufficient reason why it should fall in any one direction rather than in any other." It is also the same conception that is presented Job, 26 : 7 : "Who stretchest out the north over emptiness, and *hapest the earth upon nothing*." Some Jewish interpreters here would render the Hebrew *מִלְּבָרָה* a *bridle*. The derivation, however, from the negative *לֹא*, not only suits best the context, and makes the truest parallel to *ἄνιν*, or *emptiness*, but has, moreover, the sanction of the Chaldaic, Syriac, Vulgate, and Septuagint versions. The rendering of the latter corresponds exactly to our own—*ἄνευ οὐδενός*. It is difficult to keep from the association of ideas that would connect such an expression with the conception of a globular form to the body thus suspended and self-balanced. In fact, this suspension is one of the very views from which Manilius deduces the spherical figure.

Pendens terra . . . . . cum mundus pendeat ipse.

From which, among other reasons, he concludes,—

Est igitur mediam tellus sortita cavernam  
Ætheris, e toto pariter sublata profundo;  
Nec patulas distenta plagas, sed *condita in orbem*  
Undique surgentem pariter, pariterque cadentem.

The first part of the verse in Job greatly favors the same conception : "Thou stretchest out the north, *מִלְּבָרָה*, high over emptiness." The most simple and natural interpretation would refer this to the phenomenal aspect of the heavens; in looking upon which we almost seem to see the terrestrial convexity, as though bending down beneath the elevated pole of the mundus, in such a way that the northern constellations would appear to extend beyond it, and actually to hang over empty space. We can hardly keep thinking, that the ancient writer of the book of Job had in mind the same phenomena, and the same mode of conceiving them, that Virgil has given in his description of the zones, *Georg.* l. 239 :

Mundus ut ad Scythiam Riphæasque arduus arces  
Consurgit, premitur Libyæ devexus in Austros.  
Hic vertex nobis semper *sublimis*; at illum  
Sub pedibus Styx atra videt, Manesque profundi.

*Mundus* here includes *Tellus*,<sup>1</sup> as corresponding in form and analogy. Otherwise there would be no harmony nor consistency in the representation. The *manes profundi* of this passage, when divested of the mythological, correspond to the  $\alpha\eta\epsilon\rho$ , the vacuum, the emptiness, or *empty place*, of the writer of the book of Job. High over this hangs the northern world, whilst the opposite regions are presented to the imagination as sinking down into the profound shadow which ever fills the space that is opposite to the sun,—although, as we know, all parts of the earth, by reason of the revolution on its axis, enjoy the alternations of light and darkness. In the same manner, Manilius represents the earth as so suspended that the northern part appears elevated whilst the southern is depressed—

Pars ejus ad Arctos,  
*Eminet*, austrinis pars est habitabilis oris,  
Sub pedibusque jacet nostris.

It is evidently the same thought, in substance, that runs through all these representations we have given from Virgil, Ovid, Manilius, Plato, and Job. To the same effect speaks Aratus of the elevation of the northern hemisphere and the depression of the southern—the one pole raised high over the void space, the other sunk in darkness—

'Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐπίοπτος, ὁ δ' ἀντίος ἐκ βορέας  
Ἐποθεν ὠσεσάτο·

In tracing the history of the Grecian astronomy, no fact seems more remarkable than the accurate views entertained at a very early period respecting the five zones. The division made by the equator, or by a line drawn half way from the visible vertex around which the mundus seemed to revolve, would be quite natural and easy. The limits of the sun's annual declination, north and south, would also present a matter of ready and distinct observation. But to transfer these divisions to the surface of the earth, to assign

<sup>1</sup> Hebraists, of the Hutchinsonian school, would connect the Latin *Tellus* with the Hebrew  $\text{עֲלֵמָה}$  (*suspendit*), as employed, Job 26 : 7. This will not appear so very extravagant, if we advert to the Greek  $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\mu\alpha$ ,  $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambdaαντον$ , and the Sanscrit *tul*, in all of which there is the same primary idea of *suspension*, weight, or rather *equilibrium*; and hence the sense of *sustaining*, *supporting*, as in the Latin *tollo* and *tuli*. It receives, too, some countenance from the manner in which the Latins employ *tellus* as distinguished from *terra*. The former denotes the earth as a whole, as the centre of the world, as when Cicero says of it—*Tellus neque movetur*. *Terra*, on the other hand, denotes the earth as an element distinguished from the other elements, *air*, *water*, &c. *Tellus*, also, is the proper name of the earth-goddess, in distinction from other deities; as in the *Æneid*, viii. 136 :

Geniumque loci, *primamque Deorum*  
*Tellurem*, Nymphasque et adhuc ignota precatur  
Flumina; tum Noctem, Noctisque orientia signa.

them to corresponding parts of a southern hemisphere that had never been visited by actual observation, and above all, to deduce theoretically the phenomena of the arctic and antarctic zones, would seem to require an exactness of astronomical science, and a clearness of conception apparently inconsistent with other views the men of those ages are supposed to hold. For these reasons we are disposed to believe, that the early theory of the zones which is ascribed to Thales, was rather a fragment of a former more accurate and extensive system of astronomy that had been carried to a high degree of perfection in Egypt, or some parts of the east; from whence he had received it without being familiar either with the science or the observation required for the construction of such a theory. Still, there can be no doubt of the fact, that Thales maintained this doctrine of the zones very nearly as it would be now set forth by our modern astronomy, and used it as a means for marking the same geographical divisions of the earth, although the ancients regarded some of these as uninhabitable and inaccessible.

These zonal divisions, as we have seen, are distinctly alluded to by Aratus. But the most scientific as well as most poetical representation to be found in any of the writings of antiquity, is given us by Virgil in that passage of the *Georgics*, which we have already partially quoted for another purpose.

Quinque tenent cælum zonæ; quarum una corusco  
Semper sole rubens, et torrida semper ab igne;  
Quam circum extremæ dextra lævæque trahuntur  
Cerulea glaciæ concretæ atque imbribus atris.  
Hæc inter mediamque, duæ mortalibus ægris  
Munere concessæ Divum, et via secta per ambas,  
Obliquus qua se signorum vertitur ordo.  
Mundus ut ad Scythiam Riphæasque arduus arces  
Consurgit—premitur Lybiæ devexus in Austros.  
Hic vertex nobis semper sublimis; at illum  
Sub pedibus Styx atra videt, Manesque profundi.  
Illic, ut perhibent, aut intempesta silet nox  
Semper, et obtenta densantur nocte tenebræ,  
Aut redit a nobis Aurora, diemque reducit;  
Nosque ubi primus equis oriens afflavit anhelis,  
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina vespæ.

To the same effect Ovid, although with less both of science and poetry:

Utque duæ dextra cælum, totidemque sinistra  
Parte secant zonæ, quinta est ardentior illis;  
Sic onus inclusum numero distinxit eodem  
Cura Dei;—totidem plagæ tellure premuntur.  
Quarum quæ media est, non est habitabilis æstu;  
Nix tegit alta duas: totidem inter utramque locavit;  
Temperiemque dedit, mista cum frigore flamma.

From the time of Aristotle down to Ptolemy, almost all whose views are recorded, and who have any name in philosophy, seem

to have held to the sphericity of the earth, not as a mere individual conjecture, but as an established scientific doctrine. We need only mention the geographer, Pytheas of Marseilles, who maintained the practicability of the earth's circumnavigation. There was also Hicetas of Syracuse, who according to Theophrastus, as Cicero tells us (*Acad. Prior.* 11, 123), not only held the earth to be globular, but also that it turned upon its axis;—thus producing the apparent diurnal revolutions of the heavenly bodies—*Cælum, solem, stellas, supra denique omnia, stare censet, neque præter terram rem ullum in mundo moveri; quæ quum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia quasi stante terra cælum moveretur.* Soon after this we may date the commencement of the Alexandrian school of astronomers, of whom it may be justly said, that there is no other period, either before or after them, in which the science made such rapid progress,—especially if we take into the account their means of accurate observation, and the immense difficulties they had to overcome. Aristarchus seems to have anticipated some of the most solid views of modern times. Besides firmly believing in the old Pythagorean, or Egyptian, doctrine which was afterwards revived by Copernicus, he made estimates respecting the comparative distances of the sun, planets, and even the fixed stars, that showed an astonishing reach of thought and accuracy of reasoning. He held that the distance of the sun from the earth was almost nothing in comparison with that of the stars, and that so inconceivably remote from us were these, that viewed from *their* position, the widest range of our annual orbit would occasion hardly any perceptible parallax, or, in other words, subtend any perceptible angle.

Eratosthenes, also, was certainly a most remarkable man for his time, or for any time. Besides inventing an armillary sphere, he estimated the obliquity of the ecliptic at 23 deg. 51 min. 20 sec. which was certainly a most astonishing degree of accuracy for his means of observation. He is also mentioned by Strabo as having measured a degree of the meridian, and from thence having determined the extent of the earth by a method which, although by reason of the imperfection of instruments erroneous in its details, was nevertheless, in principle, in accordance with the strictest processes of modern science. Of Hipparchus we may safely say, that as an observer he was never surpassed. Should we style him the ancient Herschel, it would be no disparagement to the well known astronomer who now bears that illustrious name. In his catalogue of the stars, and his observation of the precession of the equinoxes, he performed in one life-time the work of generations, and laid down land marks (if we may use the expression) by which the science has ever since been enabled to determine its own rate of progress.

• After Hipparchus, the rapid movement which had commenced in astronomical science, seems to have been somewhat arrested. Next to him the most distinguished names of the succeeding period are those of Cleomedes and Posidonius. The latter also, as we are told by Strabo, measured an arc of the meridian. He was also distinguished for an orrery, or machine representing the motions of the heavenly bodies, and of which Cicero makes such a striking and beautiful use in his argument for the Divine Existence from evidences of design in the structure of the universe. He supposes this machine of Posidonius exhibited among the inhabitants of Scythia or Britain, and asks how the rudest barbarian could really doubt whether such a structure was the result of chance, or reason; and if so, he proceeds, how can we hesitate to ascribe to a higher reason the architecture of the world itself—*Quod si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam, sphæeram aliquis tulerit hanc, quam, nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cujus singulæ conversiones idem efficiunt in sole, et in luna, et in quinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in coelo singulis diebus et noctibus, quis in illa barbarie dubitet, quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione? Hi autem dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casumne ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua, an ratione ac mente divina?* The passage is so beautiful, and the reasoning at the same time so convincing, that the reader will certainly pardon us for having given it in full.

Ptolemy may be regarded as closing this brilliant school. That astronomer is so well known, that we will not dwell upon him here, except to state, that with all that accurate science by which he was distinguished above his predecessors, he seems nevertheless to have made what may be regarded as a retrograde movement. He was a true Baconian; and in accordance with what he deemed the legitimate laws of philosophizing, he rejected all reasoning except that which came from the inductive observations of the senses. He accordingly repudiated the old Pythagorean or Egyptian theory, which we now know to be the true one, and which Aristarchus and some others had almost placed on the foundation of established or undisputed science. The consequence of this change in Ptolemy from the spirit of former discovery, as exhibited in the noble ideas of Aristarchus and Eratosthenes, was the arrest of astronomical progress for more than one thousand years. Ptolemy became the oracle; and not only was there rejected the doctrine of the sun being the centre of the system, together with the earth's motion on its axis, but also its sphericity began to be called in question, after it had been regarded as established for centuries. Probably there were much less enlightened views in respect to this during the dark ages, than had prevailed four hundred years before Christ; so that Columbus might have some rea-

<sup>1</sup> Cicero De Nat. Deor. Lit. II. 88, 89. . .

son for regarding himself as the discoverer of a new doctrine, or at least a reviver of an old one. And yet the almost absolute sway which the philosophy of Aristotle then maintained over the human mind prevented the idea of the earth's sphericity from being wholly lost. Of this we want no better proof than is furnished by the writings of the voluminous Albertus Magnus. Among his multifarious treatises on all subjects, we find one expressly devoted to astronomy. It was written, he says himself, at the request of his fellow ecclesiastics, and intended as a compendium of what was regarded as the established science of the day. Aristotle's argument on the roundness of the earth is given without alteration, diminution, or addition. However much, therefore, the idea may have faded from the common mind even of the learned—so much so as indeed to furnish some ground for the claim of new discovery, or at least, of revival, on the part of Columbus, as put forth by his modern biographers—still the universally received authority of Aristotle kept the doctrine in its place in formal treatises on science and philosophy. This is clearly shown in the servile imitation of the good Bishop of Ratisbon, as exhibited in his astronomical text-book for the use of his monks. Learned as he was, he never thought of departing, in any matter of physical science, from the acknowledged teachings of the Stagyrte. He would hardly have been more cautious, in a question in theology, of differing in the least from the decrees of councils, or the decisions of the canon law.

Connected with this doctrine of the earth's sphericity, is the belief in the existence of antipodes. The present article, however, has been extended to so great a length, that the consideration of this, and of some other views of the ancient astronomy, must be deferred to another occasion. Among these may be mentioned the early opinions respecting the *motion* and *position* of the earth, (or, in other words, the Pythagorean doctrine of the solar system,) together with the views entertained by some respecting the moon and planets being inhabited, as also the kindred doctrine of the plurality of worlds.

## ARTICLE VI.

## THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS MODIFIED BY MENTAL PECULIARITIES.

By REV. L. CURTIS, Woodbury, Conn.

WHEN we know the temperament and the predominant feelings of a man, we have an index of his philosophical system. Truth is eternal, but the passions of men modify their perceptions of it. What is merely intellectual, as in mathematics, men see alike. All our systems of algebra express the same relations, and may prove the same problems, though by different modes of demonstration. But art, morality, and religion, address not only the intellect, but taste, sensibility, affection; and these are variously modified in different individuals. Hence in those departments of inquiry which come within the range of both sentiment and reason, men give to their productions the stamp of their individuality. True, ideas when brought into a system, assume an intellectual form; they express only the relations of thought to thought. But it must be remembered that before they thus come out into the light, and run in the open channels of creeds and the schools, they have to filter their way through temperament, and passion, and prejudice, like fountain rills which receive their peculiar tinge and properties from the strata through which they pass.

The influence of mental peculiarities in directing and shaping thoughts, may be illustrated by a familiar incident. A man awkwardly stumbles and hurts himself by a fall. One spectator regards him only as an object of compassion. Another *would* feel pity, but cannot for his life suppress laughter at his ludicrous stumble. Here, the same event arrests attention, but directs it to different incidents, and will ever after awaken different trains of association according to the peculiarities of the individual. And this simple case may show us why we have so many theories in morality and religion. Men view the same facts from different positions, and through the medium of different sensibilities.

Take the example of Augustine and Pelagius. The germs of their respective systems were in their peculiar constitutions and individual experience. Augustine, with an ardent temperament, had, in early life, a warfare between his will and his propensities. But so complete over him had been the mastery of passion, that he denied the freedom of the will. Yet his conscience would not allow him to disclaim all responsibility. Hence he crowded the whole race into the Garden, and made them eat together the same



apple. In that *first sin*, all were free, but *then* they lost their freedom by corrupting their nature. This notion of original sin was the basis of his whole system, and all other doctrines were made to harmonize with it.

Pelagius, on the contrary, had a cooler, evenner temperament. Conscious that he was *free*, and having experienced little of the violence of passion, he denied human depravity, and framed his system accordingly. Thus, both, from their peculiar bias, by making one doctrine exclude the other, formed disproportionate and false systems. The same has been true in recent controversies on the same doctrine; and we have learned that one truth so held as to exclude another, is not a truth, as a right in civil society, so exercised as to interfere with another, is not a right; that is, all truths, as well as rights, are consistent with each other.

All false religions take their origin in different elements of the human character. The ideas and passions of men struggle for expression. They obtain it in the forms of art, in social and religious institutions. But the diversified nature of human passions gives shape to these forms. The warrior will have his Mars; the philosopher his Minerva, and the voluptuary his Venus. *Buddhism* sprung from the gloom, the mysticism and contemplative abstraction of a melancholic temperament, united with a weak moral sense. Conscious of bondage to an animal nature, and also of high aspirations, the Buddhist refers the source of evil, not to the moral depravity of man, but to a Demiurge, or evil being, who united the soul with matter. Hence, the remedy is in afflicting the body by all manner of ascetic severities, and in elevating the soul by contemplation, into a union with God.

But Brahminism, which refers the cause of misery to the wickedness of man, springs from a deeper moral sense, and a more ardent temperament. Hence its sanguinary deities, its penitential self-tortures, and propitiatory sacrifices. And these two elements, variously modified and blended, reappear in every age, and attach themselves to every prevailing system. The Fakir of India, the Anchorite of Egypt, the Oriental Gnostic, and the contemplative Pythagorean have their representatives on every soil and under all systems,—in the Catholic monk of the middle ages; in the Protestant mystic of the seventeenth century; in the ascetic Puritan of New England; and more recently in those of Oxford notoriety. The same element in the human character will find its expression as well in theological systems, as on human countenances. It will take a thousand different forms and complexions, but it will pervert and shape to itself both the dogmas of faith and the formularies of practice. Pure Christianity is no more proof against the constitutional bias than against the perverted will of man; and from her early twilight in the first, to her orient flush in the nineteenth century, the mists of human passion have either darkened her lustre or discolored her ray.

But by the side of the gloomy abstracted Buddhist, and the self-macerating penitential Brahmin, let us place the easy, good-natured, plump Epicurean of the phlegmatic temperament. What system does he want? No morbid, gloomy imagination shrouds the world to him. An easy conscience prompts no bloody rites of self-torture. His ethereal spirit feels no uncomfortable alliance with a grosser nature, and he will purify the one by solemn abstractions, and starve the other by fasting, when hearty cheer and a good dinner are out of the question. The world, both of matter and spirit, so long as *united*, is well enough for him, whether made by a Demiurge, a good Being, or by Chance. And the only essential requisite of his ethical and theological system is, that it harmonizes perfectly with the most approved system of Dietetics. He objects not to mysteries, if they are not too deep, and he finds them in perfumes and ragouts. He likes reform in the refectory, and conservatism in the cellar; and he is in favor of the most rigid system of laws, if they prevent cock-crowing in the morning.

Think you, the bilious Cato would have framed Epicureanism? Never! His inflexible severity of character could have no sympathy except with the rigid morality of the Stoic. Cicero would have diluted the bile of the one by the lymph of the other, and mingled also the nerve of Socrates with the sanguine element of his own composition.

The lymphatic and ardent Asiatic may repose for centuries, except at fervid intervals, under the petrified but crumbling columns and venerable domes of old institutions, dreaming composedly of fate. Your sanguine-bilious Anglo-Saxon seldom sleeps, and then with but one eye. To-day he pulls down—to-morrow he rebuilds, and with a better model. He bows to fate, when he has lost from the firmament of his own breast the star of his destiny.

But not only systems, but the manner of constructing them, depends on similar causes. A man like Wolf, of strong reasoning intellect and weak moral sense, forgetting that religion must have its data in the heart, as well as in the intellect, will have a system completely demonstrable or none at all. He takes only an intellectual view of great religious truths which can never be fully comprehended until they are *felt*. Hence he reasons and doubts and demonstrates till he denies his own existence.

But a Jacobi, from the conscious demand of his higher nature, seizes on the great facts of moral obligation, immortality, and the Divine Existence, as first truths. No matter how he come by them. No matter if he cannot give his ideas a systematic development. These truths need no demonstration. They meet the wants of his moral nature, and he is satisfied. And who will prove him unreasonable? The artist does not ascertain the laws of

beauty by the unaided perceptions of reason. He listens humbly to the responses of those inward sensibilities to which beauty appeals. He consults these as his oracles. They are the highest tribunals in the empire of Art. And can it be that the moral and religious sensibilities of men have nothing to do with the perception and belief of moral and religious truths? Can reason pronounce upon these great truths independently of those sensibilities to which they are addressed? By no means. And nothing can be more reasonable than that the perception of a truth should be vague, or even its existence denied, when the sentiment to which it appeals is inactive or dead. Multitudes have doubted their immortality till some event, perhaps the loss of a near friend, has quickened their native longings. The earthly affections of the mind are allied to its nobler sentiments, and the highest truths are often realized through the instrumentality of these affections. This fact has been beautifully expressed by an English dramatist :

"I have asked that dreadful question of the hills  
That look eternal—of the flowing streams  
That lucid flow forever—of the stars  
Amid whose azure fields my raised spirit  
Hath trod in glory—all were dumb! but now,  
While thus I gaze upon thy living face,  
I feel thy love that kindles through thy beauty  
Can never wholly perish! we shall meet  
Again, Clemanthe!"

But there are others, blessed of Heaven, who need for their faith neither the force of logic, nor the quickening power of a remarkable event. The universe is to them but a natural language, speaking, hymning forth the highest truths. With their deep moral sensibility, and a natural love of the beautiful, the good, and the infinite, they seem allied to the spiritual world by high instincts. As the swan, while pent up, and treading the dusty ground, far from her native sea, bends her prow-like breast and arches her graceful neck, as if already floating on its buoyant waters,—so these men, while on earth, seem to live and move among the highest realities of another life. In them is their true element. There are human souls over whom their "immortality broods like the day, a presence which is not to be put by." The great primal truths shine out upon them like the stars. Sophistry may throw a mist over them, as mere abstract, logical truths addressed to the intellect. But they can look within, and the clear images of heaven's lights come twinkling up from the depths of their moral consciousness. They *know* there are planets, if they cannot ascertain their parallax by mathematical formulæ.

Could these men, with the harmonious blending of all the temperaments and sensibilities, combine the logic of the head with the sentiments of the heart and the vision of the soul, so as to con-

vert longings into thoughts, impressions into ideas, and ideas into logical forms, we should have a system of morals and theology, as true and complete, as are our system of astronomy. It would embody all essential facts, and in their just relations. It would clearly represent truths in the highest department of science.

But now the systems of men are not the truth of God; as a landscape painting is not nature, but only a picture of it. Still, shall we not trust in the perfection of the *real* landscape, because we see it only in the false perspective and rude colors of painting? We *will* believe the dark old forest has a solemn majesty in its depths, which the artist has not revealed; that unseen meadow and lake smile side by side in the radiance of the sun; that the sound of the waterfall is there, and warblers in harmonious concert answer to each other from thicket, and grove, and hill, though music come not out from the canvass. We will believe there is *Truth*, precious, eternal TRUTH; that Nature and Revelation are full of harmonies yet unrepresented and unseen, and that the throne of Jehovah is founded in justice and judgment, though the passions of men have darkened it with clouds.

#### ARTICLE VII.

### THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PAPACY.

By REV. GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D., Pastor of the Church of the Puritans, New York.

*The Rise and Fall of the Papacy.* By the Rev. Robert Fleming, Junr., Minister of the Gospel: London: Edited with a memoir of the Author, by Rev. Thomas Thomson. Edinburgh and London: 1848.

The year 1848 may or may not be one of the years, into which one of the sides of the Apocalyptic Compasses directly falls; but in the modern world there has been no year like it.

Revolutions have taken place, and trains of causes and consequences have been developed, more sudden and vast than heretofore have occupied whole centuries. As God's plans are converging and thickening towards their consummation, it seems as if He were concentrating and hastening the operations of His providential Omnipotence. The nebulae of his dispensations are taking the form of stars; the dim hazes of Providence are condensed into a milky way, where almost with the naked eye we discern suns and planets, and while this process of rapid marshalling of forces and events,

and this reduction of apparently chaotic materials into order, is going forward, there are thunderings and lightnings. It is difficult to say whether it looks just now most like the breaking up and finishing of an old dispensation, or the opening of a new. More probably it is both. As the trumpets, the seals, and vials of the apocalyptic visions run into one another, and are not separated by abrupt silences or deeps, so it is with the connection between old and new providential arrangements. They pass gradually into one another; and the eras of greatest majesty, importance, and pomp, are neither the departure of an old, nor the inauguration of a new order of things alone, but both these simultaneously, the old and the new seen struggling together. The waves are violent where two seas meet, and the spray tosses into the heavens; but by and by the world shall see the whole ocean urged forward in majestic billows under the power of a great steady wind. Such, we have reason to believe, will be at length the course of God's providence in the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom to its full glory.

It is certainly possible that we are now near the very culminating point of one of God's great cycles of events, particularly marked in Divine Revelation. By the help of that revelation, we may do much towards ascertaining our position; and whenever we can do that, we begin to understand much more clearly the prospect around us, and the order and meaning of what is taking place. The generations of men, in their passage across this world, are sometimes in the valleys, and sometimes on the mountain-tops. Sometimes they seem to do nothing but vegetate, sometimes they act with intense excitement. Sometimes they arrive at places, where, in the arrangement of God's times, they are at posts of commanding observation; but generally they see only what is just before and around them; and the most of men see only the walls of their prison. Among the great providences of God, we are as men travelling across a range of primeval mountains. For the most part they are occupied with winding ways through valleys, or with the work of ascending and descending, and are so hemmed in with intersecting ridges, that only the valley along which their course leads, or the mountain with its opposites, whose sides they are ascending, can be seen at once, until they reach the top of some mighty range, or come to the height of some grand pass, where perhaps the eye can sweep across the whole mountain region. At such a point, the different ranges can be seen crossing, dividing, and branching off, in a wide and gigantic connection. Thus, in respect to the view of God's great providences, most generally, in the course of present events, where we are ourselves travelling, our sight is very limited; but now and then God takes us over a vast aspiring summit, where, by the help of His Word, we can see almost everything. Sometimes the generation

in the heart of which you are thrown, marches over one of God's grand planes, over the very summit of some mighty range laid down in prophecy. Generally men are too much occupied with themselves, and with watching one another's movements, to note the steps of God, or the glory of His providences. They are like soldiers dragging cannon over sublime mountains, thinking only of the present labor, and looking only to their own footsteps, with neither heart nor leisure to admire the grandeur of the scenery.

All the events at this day taking place are in the train of fulfilling prophecy. None of them can go against it, though they may seem temporarily so to do. All are appointed or overruled by God for his purposes. Nor are we left with mere *general* prophecies for our guidance, such as the predictions of the universal reign of Christ in their various forms, and of the conversion of all nations to the Saviour. We have also a particular series of prophetic visions or histories of the future, concerning the whole fortunes of the church of God on the earth, and the fate of her enemies. The book of the Apocalypse of John in Patmos is such a succession of disclosures, even to the end of the world. And though it is a book confessedly of exceedingly difficult interpretation, nevertheless we may gather much from the concurring voice of calm and holy commentators in every generation, and may arrive at instructive probabilities, if we cannot come at absolute certainties. Moreover, sometimes men have arisen, and such men will continue to arise, eminent for piety, and of great study and learning, directed by God's providence and grace to the illustration of particular prophetic books, and prepared of God particularly for their appointed work; individuals of a very close walk with God, and great absorbedness in the mysteries of His Word, to whom it is given to see further and clearer than others into their meaning. As it was vouchsafed to Daniel in consequence of his holy, humble earnestness and diligence in looking into the prophecies of old, as well as by reason of the loftiness and sincerity of his motives, not out of a vain curiosity or mere love of learning, but out of love to God and his people, and a pure desire for the coming of His kingdom; as it was vouchsafed to him after studying and praying, after studying and understanding by books, the number of the years whereof the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, that he would accomplish seventy years in the desolations of Jerusalem; as it was granted to him to have a supernatural interpretation and addition to the same, even by the mouth of Gabriel the angel, and to have skill and understanding given him above all others; so we doubt not now, that it is from time to time given to humble holy saints appointed of God's providential discipline to this work, to have unusual and almost supernatural insight into the application and meaning of various portions of God's difficult prophecies. Such persons are highly favored servants, whom God

raises up for the edification of His church in the knowledge of the Scriptures.

Whether Mr. Fleming have been such an one, or not, we do not undertake to say ; but very few works have ever stirred men's minds more powerfully for a season, than this little volume of his concerning the Apocalypse. He was a learned and holy Minister of the Gospel in London, where he closed his ministry with his mortal life in the year 1716. He had studied the prophecies with intense interest and zeal, being pressed thereto by his own forebodings from the aspect of the times ; and it was amidst the despondent feelings and intense anxieties produced by the tortuousness of Protestant politics, and the growing ascendancy of the Romish superstition, about the year 1700, that he published his Discourse on "The Rise and Fall of the Papacy," demonstrated from the prophetic disclosures in the Apocalypse. He applies the 16th Chapter of Revelation wholly to the judgments of God upon the Papal Power, and the destruction of that power, together with that of the False Prophet. At the time when he wrote, the Romish Church seemed to be rapidly growing, and the power of France especially, as the great support of Rome, was at an overshadowing height, so that the cause of Protestantism even in England seemed endangered ; but from the study of the prophecies Mr. Fleming found encouragement for himself and his fellow Christians ; and predicted, from the pouring out of the fourth vial, the destruction of the French monarchy about the year 1794, and a great abasement of the power of Papal Rome from that time onwards. He traced the rise, increase, and establishment of the Papacy, the application and meaning of the seven seals, the seven trumpets, and the seven vials. He showed that they were then about entering upon, the beginning of the fourth vial, which would continue to be poured out till the destruction of the French monarchy and the House of Bourbon. He said that the French monarchy, after it had itself scorched others, would itself consume by doing so, and that the height of this judgment would be about the year 1794.

In the year 1793, when the horrors of the French Revolution were at their uttermost excess, and when Louis 16th was about to perish on the scaffold, these predictions of Mr. Fleming, written almost a hundred years before, were remembered, were brought before the public, and the work itself, from which they were taken, was reprinted, it is said, both in England and America. They produced then a deep, thrilling, universal sensation—the more so, because of the modest, conscientious, holy character of the man, who seemed to have been led, by the study of the prophecies, and by the understanding of numbers from books, like Daniel of old, to such prophetic conclusions. The world were astounded at the literal fulfillment of his predictions.

But Mr. Fleming's predictions went much farther than this. The fifth vial he declared would be poured out upon the seat of the Beast, or the dominions that more immediately belonged to, and depended upon the Roman See. He said that this judgment would probably begin about the year 1794, and expire about the year 1848; so that the duration of it, upon that supposition, would be the space of fifty-four years. "For I do suppose," said he, "that seeing the Pope received the title of Supreme Bishop no sooner than the year 606, he cannot be supposed to have any vial poured out upon his seat immediately, so as to ruin his authority so signally as this judgment must be supposed to do, until the year 1848, which is the date of the 1260 years in prophetic account, when they are reckoned from the year 606. But yet we are not to imagine that this vial will totally destroy the Papacy, though it will exceedingly weaken it, for we find it is still in being and alive, when the next vial is poured out."

Few things in the history of literature, sacred or profane, have occurred, more remarkable, than the coincidence of these predictions so literally with the events, after the lapse of two periods, the one of a hundred, and the other a hundred and fifty years. It is not strange that the explanation of this phenomenon should be sought in the supposition that Mr. Fleming, under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, in his prophetic researches, was led, in part, to the interpretation of the Apocalyptic prophecies. In the light of such coincidences, men will read the 16th chapter of the Apocalypse with new confidence, and find in it the speedy and utter downfall of the Papal power. Mr. Fleming may have been utterly mistaken in the interpretation of much of the prophetic imagery of the Apocalypse, and may never have studied its details by any supposed or ascertained laws of symbolism; but his calculations upon dates, together with the main application of them to the fortunes of the Papacy, are not to be lightly disposed of.

His volume of exposition was brought again into notice in Edinburgh some few years since, by those who then believed that we are standing in the midst of Apocalyptic events, yet to be fulfilled, mightier and more fearful than French Revolutions. It was thought that a serious perusal of Mr. Fleming's views would be timely, and accordingly a short biographical and critical preface by Rev. Mr. Thomson commended them, about the year 1845, to the public. When the year 1848 had opened, there was little need of such commendation; for, again, a most startling coincidence between his conjectures and the reality, filled men's minds with interest and wonder. Speaking of Italy, Mr. Fleming had said, that the judgments of "the fifth vial, which is to be poured out on the seat of the beast, or the dominions that more immediately belong to, and depend upon the Roman See, will probably begin about the year 1794, and expire about the year 1848." And



he thought that that vial would not be poured out upon the seat of the Beast particularly, so as to ruin his authority so signally as that judgment must be supposed to do, *until* the year 1848. The calculation has proved, in every respect, most wonderfully accurate.

As to Italy, a man has but to look into her history for seventy-five years, to find, that from 1794 to 1848, her experience has been that of a vial of wrath almost uninterruptedly. Under the Austrian despotism and Papal tyranny united, what country under heaven has been so crushed and withered? And as to other countries, the vial of the French Revolution took them all by turns, till this predicted period of judgments might have seemed to be completely exhausted. The year 1848 opened in perfect repose, with the promise still of uninterrupted quiet and prosperity. Again the change began with France. In a moment, as if fire had been communicated from a central train to a thousand other trains, branching off in every direction, the whole of Europe was in a blaze. Nevertheless, the vials of wrath in these revolutions have been poured out mainly upon the seat of the Beast, in Mr. Fleming's larger definition of that phrase. The Romish nations were divided against themselves, and in arms against their own governments; and the beginning of the end is hardly yet seen. But it is all the while the Pope's authority that has received the heaviest blow. And as Mr. Fleming pointed out the year 1848 as a period of signal ruin to that authority in the seat of the Beast, more immediately and particularly, precisely such ruin has the result demonstrated. Blow after blow from heaven, up to the very close of the year 1848, fell upon the heart of the Pope's dominions, till the last news reverberating among the nations in that year, the last stream of thunder, and lightning, and earthquake, from that vial, was of the Pope himself flying in the disguise of a servant from his own territories and people, his authority for the time being utterly at an end, and his temporal sovereignty itself not only endangered, but, as some even then predicted, gone forever. A greater central event for the planting of the Apocalyptical compasses of measurement and interpretation could hardly have been assumed than this, into which Mr. Fleming's conjecture falls 150 years beforehand. The manner of the Pope's flight ought not to pass unmarked, and how beneath the very rain and thunder of this vial of God's wrath, the head of this Apostate and Antichristian Church has written out upon his own forehead the mark of impiety and blasphemy; written out himself and his Church in open proclamation, in the character of sheer idolatry and enmity against the gospel. He who called himself the Supreme Pontiff, and pretended to speak in the fulfillment of his duty as Supreme Pontiff, humbly and devoutly invoked—whom? To whom does the Supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church pray, thus setting

the example of prayer to all his subjects? Is it to the one sole object of prayer, to the Omnipotent and Omnipresent God, to God our Saviour? No! to the great Mother of Mercy, and the apostles Peter and Paul! He humbly and devoutly, in this flying proclamation, in this hour of extreme and utter danger, when the spirit and soul of the man, the Church, and the system, came out sincere and undisguised, invoked the great Mother of Mercy, and the Holy apostles, Peter and Paul, for their intercession, that the city and State of Rome, the seat of the Beast, on which God was pouring down His vials, might be saved from the wrath of the Omnipotent God! Truly, one cannot help thinking with what feeling must Peter and Paul, from their high abodes in heaven, regard these impious appeals to them as the mediators between God and man. They rejoice, and all heaven is represented as rejoicing in the fulfillment of God's judgments, in the pouring out of the fifth vial and the other vials to the uttermost. And if there could be laughter in heaven amidst such awfully glorious, solemn, and magnificent openings and shuttings of the successive acts in this great drama of redemption on earth, surely the inhabitants of heaven would laugh at this appeal of the flying, terrified Pontiff, to the apostles Peter and Paul.

The flight of the Pope, and the rebellion of his subjects against his authority, are among the dregs of this fifth vial, which, nevertheless, though, on Mr. Fleming's scheme, it expires about this year 1848, does not, according to his view of the predictions following, utterly destroy the Papacy; because the same Beast is found afterwards alive, and acting in concert with the False Prophet. The sixth vial, Mr. Fleming thinks, is to be poured out upon the Mohammedan Antichrist. The Turkish monarchy is to be totally destroyed between the years 1848 and 1900; an event of which there is the utmost probability, even if it were not predicted in the Scriptures. This sixth vial is to destroy the Turks, and then, says Mr. Fleming, "We hear of three unclean spirits, like frogs or toads sent out by Satan, and the remains of the polity and Church of Rome, called the Beast and the False Prophet, to persuade the eastern nations, upon their deserting Mohammedism, to fall in with their idolatrous and spurious Christianity, rather than with the true reformed doctrine; and these messages shall be so successful as to draw these eastern kings and their subjects, and with them the greatest part of mankind, to take part with them; so that by the assistance of these, their agents and missionaries, they shall engage the whole world, in some manner, to join with them in rooting out the saints." Then comes the seventh vial, and the complete destruction of all the Antichristian nations, especially Rome and the Papal Antichrist. This, Mr. Fleming supposes, will take place between the year 1900 and 2000. And how great and remarkable, says he, this last destruction of the Papal Antichrist

will be, we may guess by that representation of it in Rev. 14: 19, 20, where it is set forth under the emblem and character of the great wine-press of the wrath of God. And among other things spoken of, relating to the battle and victory obtained at Armageddon, you have this account of the General and his victorious army in Rev. 19: 11, &c.: And I saw heaven opened, &c. And as to the representation of this slaughter by the wine-press of blood, it is further said of it, that it flowed to the height of the horse-bridles for the space or extent of sixteen hundred furlongs; so that Armageddon seems to be denoted here as the field of blood. Now the territory of the See of Rome, in Italy, is said to be extended the space of two hundred Italian miles; that is, exactly sixteen hundred Italian furlongs, the Italian miles consisting of eight furlongs. Hence it is supposed, or rather suggested by Mr. Fleming, that the *Stata Della Chiesa*, or the territory and possession of Italy belonging to the See of Rome, may be the field of battle called Armageddon, where the final and eternal destruction of Antichristianism will take place.

Now in regard to this last conjecture, we can form no opinion. It is a thing which may be and may not be; but of the conflict there is no doubt. Nor is there any reasonable doubt that it is near, and that God is now preparing the world for it. And in reference to Mr. Fleming's interpretation of the contents of the sixth vial, as destined for the empire of the False Prophet, and also the after-results of the pouring out of that vial, in the combination of the inimical forces of Infidelity, Mohammedism, and Romanism against the church of God, there is a concurrence of things already marvellously looking towards such a result. The power of the completest despotism on earth, in the Empire of Russia, is already overshadowing the face of Turkey, and with sure advances the Emperor of the North is preparing to swallow up in his dominions the Sultan of the South. The likelihood is, that within fifty years from this time, the Empire of Turkey will be part and parcel of the Empire of Russia. Now the religion of the Empire of Russia is that of the Greek Church, a corruption of Christianity in some respects, almost as bitterly opposed to the Reformed Religion as the Papacy itself. It may very possibly be one of the three unclean spirits mentioned in Rev. 16: 13, with which Mohammedism itself will be conjoined. And after the formation and consolidation of this new anti-Christian, amalgamated church of the unclean spirits like frogs, then all these forces of Atheism, Superstition, Infidelity, Mohammedism, and Romanism will be gathered together into Armageddon to the battle of that great day of God Almighty. Then will follow, rapidly and with great awfulness, the seventh angel, with the seventh vial, completely destroying the Papal Power and religion from the earth; immediately after which, and as Mr. Fleming argues, about the commencement of the year

2,000, the grand period of the millenium on earth will begin. Such seems to be, in the main, Mr. Fleming's scheme of interpretation.

Now of that millenium the seeds are already planting, the roots growing, the foundation laying deep. All the missionary movements and successes of the modern age are destined for it. They are gathering and preparing that church of God, with which, and before which, and by which, the Lord, strong and mighty, will fight the great battle of final judgment and victory. The efforts and successes of our missionaries in the East look to that. The raising up of a new and pure church in the heart of the Turkish Empire among the Armenians, may be a preparation for that critical, and dangerous time, when the Turkish Empire will be the Russian Empire, and Mohammedans will perhaps be tempted and compelled into an alliance with the corrupt Greek Church, rather than by true conversion into the Church of God. God will have, here and there, his fortresses, and his armies in reserve. And moreover it is to be remembered that all the present outpourings of the fifth vial, towards the close of which Mr. Fleming thinks we now stand in the year 1848, look to and prepare for the work of the sixth and seventh. Under the pouring out of this vial upon the seat and dominions of the Beast, there cannot but be included the wresting of so vast an area of territory from the Romish power as that of all California, and the sudden peopling of it with a Protestant instead of Romish population. We find it stated before this change, by the author of "Two Years Before the Mast," that no Protestant in California had any civil rights, nor could hold any property, nor indeed could remain more than a few weeks on shore, unless he belonged to some vessel. Consequently the Americans and English who intended to reside there must become Roman Catholics to a man, the current phrase among them being—a man must leave his conscience at Cape Horn. Now, all is changed. Relieved from the despotism of Romish intolerance, a man may take his conscience along with him, and obey its dictates without fear. So that the acquisition of California is really a great inroad into the Kingdom of the Beast, a great result of the fifth vial, being indeed, the first great territorial conquest of Christendom from the Papacy since the reformation. The scarlet color that has so long tinged our missionary-world maps with the fiery hue of Rome must now give place to the white; superstition in the adoration of the host shall give place to freedom in the preaching of the gospel; and all this, wherever it comes to pass, is making way for the outpouring of the seventh and last vial in the next century.

For, as we have remarked, and as is necessary to be remembered in studying these epochs of the vials, God's great eras do not open without preparation, neither is one entirely finished before another is permitted to begin; but they lap over one another like

tiles. The roots of the next are concealed under the body of the last. So it is with the prophetic eras. As if, concerning a great forest of oaks or pines, it should be said that in such or such a year the trees of it should all be overthrown, and a forest of cedars should be found in its stead. Meantime a process of decay is going on in the hearts of those trees, and a growth of young cedars is springing up under their branches. By and by, when the decay has gone far enough, comes a great wind, and in one night the whole forest is prostrated. Then the fresh young cedars are disclosed, and begin of themselves to rise into a forest. Both these processes were begun long ago, although the one of them is the end of one vegetating dispensation, and the other the beginning of another.

So it is with the great eras and cycles of events on earth. They are not created at once, abruptly, but are the consummation of long-continued trains, of causes long and uninterruptedly working, though perhaps unseen, perhaps long unsuspected, or the connections not at all known. So when the final development comes, almost the whole world is taken by surprise, astounded. It is in this way that most of the prophecies in God's Word are fulfilled. Men, perhaps, are gazing at the great forest of oaks, and remarking with wonder its extent and magnificence. They cannot see the worms that God has prepared day and night doing their work, and the consequent rottenness in the heart of every tree. They may read the prophecies, but deny their application, till the night of the great predicted storm comes, and in the morning, lo the oaks are gone, and the fresh young cedars rise up in glory. The very Nebuchadnezzar, against whom the decree of madness and utter overthrow has gone forth, walketh in the pride of his heart in the palace of the kingdom of Babylon, and sayeth:—"Is not this great Babylon that I have built by the might of my power, and for the honor of my majesty?" While the word is in the king's mouth, there falleth a voice from heaven saying:—"The kingdom is departed from thee." Belshazzar, the king, maketh a great feast, and they drink wine from the golden vessels of the temple, and they praise their gods of gold, silver, brass, iron, wood, and stone. In the same hour cometh forth the finger of a man's hand, and writeth on the wall, God hath numbered thy kingdom and finished it. And though it be not believed, or the consummation not dreamed of at present, yet in that very night is Belshazzar, the king of the Chaldeans, slain.

And in modern Babylon, the man of sin and son of perdition sitteth over against the great hand-writing on the wall, which marks his image and his utter destruction, sitteth from age to age mitred, tiara'd, clothed in fine linen, and purple, and scarlet, and decked with gold and precious stones, and pearls, with cardinals and hierarchies revolving dependent, and all nations drinking of

the wine of their fornication. And lo, in the midst of all this, a mighty angel taketh up a stone like a great millstone, and casteth it into the sea, saying:—Thus with violence shall that great city Babylon be thrown down, and shall be found no more at all. Yet the prediction is disregarded or denied in its application, and still will be, even while the causes are gathering that shall hurry it into an overwhelming consummation like an avalanche, till not only the fifth and sixth vials are finished, but till the seventh also is poured out, and all the astonished nations see the prophecy in its fulfillment.

The view taken by Mr. Fleming is exceedingly encouraging to all who are praying and laboring for the coming of the kingdom of God. According to this view, it is manifest that all the labors of Christians now, will tell wonderfully upon the world, if not in immediate results, yet in the accomplishment of God's designs as they open before us. It is manifest that our period is eminently that of preparation for great coming events, and for the final and complete destruction of the Papal anti-Christian powers under the seventh seal, immediately ushering in the Millenium. While the sixth seal is pouring out upon the Eastern world, and Mohammedism and the Turkish Empire are receiving those blows from God's omnipotence which shall shatter them in pieces, the effects of the fifth vial will be still working and completing—that is, the weakness of the Papal power will be increasing, and the affiliations of all ecclesiastical institutions especially connected in any way with the seat of the Beast, or copied after his pattern, will suffer proportionably. The hierarchies that have taken their impress and polity from the kingdom of the Beast, in lording it over men's consciences, we may expect to see one after another toppling down. The various forms of union between Church and State extant in the world, of which the seat of the Beast is the most perfect example, will be visited with scattering big drops of ruin from this fifth vial. We believe that all politico-ecclesiastical establishments will come to an end, and that the spirit of Popery and of intolerance will either be purged out of the English Church, or else will utterly destroy it. Good men in it, like Baptist Noel, are already hearing God's voice, and obeying it, Come out of her my people! Meanwhile we have reason to hope that revivals of religion will be multiplying, and that in every land where efforts are now making to preach the gospel of Christ in its purity, greater numbers will be added to the church of God. Yet still the disparity as to numbers between the church and the world must be exceeding great, until the pouring out of the seventh vial, and the great battle and victory of God Almighty. Then commences the grandest cycle of years ever passed on earth, a scene of glory for which all preceding scenes have been only preparatory, a scene of Divine grace which the pencil of inspiration labors adequately to describe.

According to Mr. Fleming's scheme, this is to begin immediately after the final and total destruction of Rome Papal, in or about the year 2000; an era to which indeed a very general expectation on the part of Christendom looks forward. But as we have intimated, much of the light and glory of that millennial period will be disclosed beforehand and gradually; and saints even now on earth may perhaps have a more honorable and blessed part in preparing for it, and ushering it in, than those upon whom its glory opens. And there is certainly a very remarkable warning on the part of God to those living in the neighborhood of the sixth and seventh seals, Rev. 16: 15. It is evident that a crisis is coming for which a man will need the solidity of a deep piety. All his wood, hay, and stubble are to be burned up. Superficial things will be tried and exposed to shame and injury. But he who is laboring sincerely for God is in a glorious train, which is sweeping him onward to eternal glory and blessedness.

Now whatever may be thought of Mr. Fleming's fancies, or private interpretations on particular points, the main current of his views runs unquestionably in the right channel. It is Papal Rome in league with civil rulers, the Papal Apostasy and hierarchical despotism, supported by the civil powers, that occupies a large portion of the prophetic history in the Book of Revelations. Mr. Fleming may, in some cases, have disregarded the laws of symbolic representation, and put an arbitrary signification upon particular prophetic emblems; but his conjectural predictions could not have grown out of any calculation or interpretation which in the main was wrong. And he remarks, "Whatever differences have been among the most eminent interpreters of this book, as to particular calculations and accommodations of things, yet they have all of them agreed in the main foundations of the interpretation thereof, as Dr. Cressner has irrefragably proved in his book, entitled a *Demonstration of the First Principles of the Protestant Application of the Apocalypse*. So that there are two things almost equally strange to me: That the Jews should own the verity of the Old Testament, and particularly of Daniel's prophecy, and not see that the Messiah is come; and that the Papists should believe the Divinity of the New Testament, and particularly of the Revelation, and not see that their Church is Antichristian. But while I admire the wilful stupidity of both these parties, I cannot but admire also the wisdom of God in making use of both these in His providence to confirm to us the verity of Christianity, in prophesying both of the one and the other so long before, and in continuing them to this day as standing monuments of the divinity both of the Old and New Testaments. What is wanting in history is made up in prophecy, which is an account of things to come. As Daniel makes up the hiatus or defect of the history of the Old Testament, so the Revelation of John supplies that of the

New, by leading us down from Christ's first, to His second coming."

It is proper, after this general sketch of Mr. Fleming's exposition, to present some of the particular calculations and assumptions on which the details of it are based. There is a mixture of reasoning from undeniable data, of sagacious supposition, and of mere conjecture; but the conjectures are never presented as anything *but* conjectures.

Mr. Fleming sets out with four *postulata*, in which he says that, generally, all are agreed, and which Mede, More, Durham, and Cressner have proved irrefragably.

The first of these is, simply, that the Revelation contains the series of all the remarkable events and changes of the state of the Christian church to the end of the world.

The second is the proposition, as given at the close of his volume, that Babylon the great, or the apocalyptic Beast, taken in a general sense, as it is represented with its seven heads and ten horns, is no other than an emblem of the Roman Empire.

The third is the proposition that the seven-headed beast, more especially considered as it is rid upon by the whore, doth represent Rome to us as it is under the ecclesiastical government of the Papacy, or apostate Church of Rome.

The fourth is the proposition that the seven kings represented by the seven heads of the Beast, are no other than the seven forms of supreme government that did successively obtain among the Romans; that, according to the declaration of the angel, five of these forms of the Roman government were already fallen when John was writing, namely, the forms of kings, consuls, dictators, decemvirs, and military tribunes, as reckoned by Tacitus, the sixth form being the imperial, then in existence, and the seventh and eighth being the Papal government, the Beast or Antichrist rising out of the others, and receiving afterwards from the ten horns or kings their power and authority.

These *postulata* Mr. Fleming holds as certain. He then proceeds to show that the three grand apocalyptic numbers of 1260 days, 42 months, and time, times, and a half, are synchronical, all signifying the same duration, and also prophetic in their interpretation of years as signified by days. That they cannot be taken literally for days will appear from hence, in Mr. Fleming's view, that it is impossible to conceive how so many great and wonderful actions which are prophesied to fall out in the time of 1260 of them, or three solar years and a half, if taken literally, could happen; such as the obtaining power over all kindreds, tongues, and nations, the world wondering at and submitting unto the Beast's reign. Moreover the 1260 days are represented as the duration of the Beast, which nevertheless is not to be destroyed utterly until the great coming of Christ, so that it is entirely impossible to render the days otherwise than for years.



Mr. Fleming then proceeds with a peculiar demonstration of his own in regard to the prophetic years, as being different from the Julian years, or our ordinary years of 365 days, and as determined by thirty days in the month, and twelve of such months in the year, or 360 days. He proves this by the assumed synchronism between the 1260 days, the 42 months of days, that is, years, and the time, times, and a half, or year, double year, and half year, that is, of days, that is, of years. The 1260 days, taken prophetically for years, of which there can be no doubt, are a fixed number of 1260 years. If the 42 months are synchronical, meaning months of days, which stand for years, they must be months of 30 days, making, when multiplied by 42, exactly the first number of 1260. Now if the time, times, and half time, are also synchronical, they must mean in the same manner a year, two years, and a half year of just such months of 30 days each, making up again the same number of 1260 years.

But if the first ascertained number of 1260 years be ordinary years of 365 days, then the other two numbers are *not* synchronical, and cannot be, and so the three designations are entirely out of joint. For it is plain that 42 months, divided by 12, produce 3 years and six months, which, taking the year at 365 days, is 1278, a conflict and confusion of 18 years. It is equally plain that the time, (365 days of an ordinary year) added to their double of times, and then a half time, (or 183 days) make the same dissimilar number of 1278. Therefore to make these numbers synchronical either the first designation must be reduced to these two last, or these two last must be reduced to the first. But these two last cannot, on any known principle, be reduced to the first, that is, if we fix the standard as the ordinary Julian year, but an utter confusion remains; to prevent which, they must be taken as synchronical by the computation of a year by 12 months of 30 days each. Then the difference between this prophetic computation and the ordinary one being 18 years in each of the numbers, those 18 must be cut off; so that, if you compute the date of the beginning of the Papal Power or apocalyptic Beast as at 606, when the Emperor Phocas gave him the title of Universal Bishop, and add to that the designation of apocalyptic continuance, 1260, it makes the period of 1866 less 18, which is 1848. But Mr. Fleming does not reckon the full rise of the Pope to the headship of the Empire till a much later date; because, although the Pope received the title of Universal Bishop as early as 606, yet he was for a long time afterwards subject in temporal concerns to the Emperors; and therefore cannot be reckoned to have been in a proper and full sense head of Rome, till he was so in a secular sense as well as ecclesiastical. But this was not until the time of Pepin, say 758, by whose consent the Pope was made a secular prince, a great part of Italy being given him as St. Peter's patrimony. The time of this

donation and enthronement being fixed by Mr. Fleming in the year 758, the duration of the Papal Kingdom in prophetic computation will be up to the year 2,000.

Nevertheless, Mr. Fleming thinks that if, in a complete respect, both spiritual and temporal, the era of the beginning of the kingdom of the Beast must be fixed at 758, and so the period of complete duration be computed from thence; the period of 608 being that of his investiture with the title of Universal Bishop, must be also a main starting point, from which the 1260 years carry us in 1848 to a period in which the vials are poured out upon the seat and kingdom of the Beast, and the beginning takes place of his decisive overthrow, or of his consumption, previous to his last despairing efforts and utter destruction. If the bare title of Universal Bishop be not an event of sufficient import to constitute the Pope head of the Beast, Mr. Fleming thinks we may reckon this headship two years later, from the year 608, when Boniface IV. first publicly authorized idolatry, by dedicating the Pantheon to the worship of the Virgin Mary, and all the saints. This would bring us to 1850.

For this calculation Mr. Fleming is not confined to the argument from the assumed and evident synchronism between the apocalyptic numbers. He adduces, as a remarkable confirmation of his views, the famous prophecy of Daniel's seventy weeks, or four hundred and ninety days, (Daniel 9 : 24), reaching down from the edict of Artaxerxes Longimanus in his twentieth year, (see Neh. 2 : 1-10), to our Saviour's sufferings at Jerusalem, which he says made up exactly the period of 490 years prophetically calculated, that is, 490 years of 360 days each, or years of 12 months of 30 days each. Mr. F. asserts that all interpreters have been confounded by not distinguishing between this prophetic calculation, and the ordinary one. Thus far his reasonings are not mere guess-work, but valid conclusions from well-established data, and in his own view demonstrations.

As to the other calculations in regard to the future, particularly the fortunes of the French Monarchy, he himself declares them to be mere conjectures or guesses; and it must be confessed that the reasoning by which he was led to them is out of the line of any logical connection with the main apocalyptic argument, and is not supported by any ascertained principle, but by an arbitrary fancy. He has a singular idea of a repeated application of the period of 1260 at different epochs, beginning it with different events; as, for example, the reasons for his conjecture that the fourth vial will be at the height of its outpouring about the year 1717, and at its expiration in the humiliation of the French Monarchy, in 1794, are merely, first, his finding that the Papal kingdom got a particular accession to its power in the year 475, from which, if we begin the calculation of the 1260 years, it brings us, prophetically interpreted, to the year 1717; and second, his finding that the Papal kingdom

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got another accession to its power, when Justinian, having conquered Italy, left that country mainly to the Pope's management, which was in 552, from which, if we begin the calculation of the 1260 years, we are brought (prophetically) to the year 1794. Now it is difficult to see any connection of principle or argument between these data and the conclusions of his dates; and yet his fixing upon this period of 1794, together with what he says of the house of Bourbon, and again his fixing upon 1848, by the same process of calculation of the 1260 years, renewed from the year 606, present a very remarkable coincidence of conjecture with reality. In the case of the period of 1848, it would seem more than mere conjecture; it goes to prove the correctness of his last calculation.

It was the opinion of Mr. Fleming that this book does certainly contain the series of all the remarkable events and changes of the state of the Christian church to the end of the world. It is also the Christian church in conflict with her enemies, except in one particular period, designated as a thousand years. Strangely enough, there are those who would restrict the whole of this prophetic series to a minute portion of time, a very few years, and a very few and, to the church at large, comparatively unimportant events. They do this, notwithstanding they are compelled to admit that the close of this book carries us forward even to the end of the world and the last judgment. They admit the beginning of the series, and restrict their interpretation mainly to a few years there, but see nothing, and allow of nothing, afterwards, until the end. The beginning is the church militant on earth, the end is the church triumphant in heaven; and these restrictive, liminary interpreters take these two ends of the series in the vice of their hypothesis, and press them so close, that there is no room for any intermediate developments; or rather, they exclude, by their hypothesis, all intermediate developments, and thus bring the two ends of the series violently together. To do this, is to commit quite an outrage on the tenor of the apocalyptic predictions. It is somewhat as if, in constructing a map of Europe and Africa, a geographer should bring the two continents together, with only the line of a river between them, instead of "that great and wide sea;" when all the world know that not the Mediterranean sea alone divides them, but certain definite well-known islands also, lying in the midst of that sea.

The truth is that the interspace between the beginning of the prophetic series of events in the Apocalypse, and the end of that series, is so filled up, not only with successive facts, but with definite periods, running out of and into one another, that any interpretation which does not make the tide of things run up connectively into the last period, as well as set out from the first, is quite inadmissible. To restrict the main body of the apocalyptic revelations to a very few years at the beginning, and then to overleap, as a vast void untouched by prophecy, the whole history, both of

the Church and her enemies, as it has actually been unfolded, and come down on the other side of the void, is as if one should take the head of Nebuchadnezzar's image in the vision, and striking out all the intermediate developments, attach it to the feet, or striking out body, feet, and all, attach it to the stone out of the mountain. We have before the end, a definite landmark of great importance, an island indisputable in the intermediate sea, and that is the apocalyptic period of a thousand years, upon the verge of which the preceding series of events leaves us. The things unfolded in the nineteen foregoing chapters, bring us up to the beginning of that millennial period in the twentieth, the events of the preceding chapter being an immediately preceding preparation for it, in such a manner that it evidently grows out of those events. Now, unless this millennial period of a thousand years of the binding and imprisonment of Satan, and the reign of the Saints with Christ, be maintained as already past, the series of events in the preceding nineteen chapters is still in fulfillment. This period of a thousand years is still, beyond all question, future; and its position in the Apocalypse affords a grand unassailable vantage ground, from which to beat down the untenable hypotheses of those interpreters, who bestow the whole attention of the apocalyptic revelations upon Nero or Constantine.

Mill, Basnage, Le Clerc, Lowman, Lardner, Doddridge, and others, are among those who maintain the Apocalypse to have been written towards the end of the reign of Domitian, in the year 95 or 96. In regard to the application of the Book by some interpreters to the destruction of Jerusalem, Lardner argues with great force that if the Apocalypse *was* written before that event, it was doing what there was no need should be done, the destruction of Jerusalem having been most explicitly and minutely foretold by our Lord himself, in much plainer terms—indeed, in a manner that could not be mistaken. Three historians and evangelists, at least, had recorded His predictions and prefigurations of the calamities, the overthrow, and utter destruction of the city and the temple. To write the Apocalypse for those events would have been to do in a very obscure, blind, and doubtful way, just upon the eve of those events, what had been done long before, with the greatest clearness and certainty, in direct reference to them, and as a means of preparation for them. There was no call, no necessity, for such a book as the Apocalypse, in regard to an event so well understood by the Christian church, as the destruction of Jerusalem. Christ himself had spoken the predictions concerning it, in the plainest manner, from his own lips. Why should this be done again, in vision, in a manner so difficult and obscure, that it must be long before the true application of the imagery employed would be discovered?

The Neronian hypothesis, besides being attended with insuper-

able critical difficulties, involves the absurdity of that work of inspiration, which was to close up for ever the whole volume of revelation in a series of majestic acts and scenes transcendently sublime and awful, being expended mainly on one or two years of the persecuting freaks of a fiddling tyrant in the city of Rome! Probably few persons will ever succeed in believing that the vast arrangements and sublime imagery of representation employed in the Apocalypse stop with Nero, or mainly concern themselves with him. We very much doubt whether his existence is ever hinted at. The hypothesis is against the whole analogy of prophetic interpretation. God's plan, even where it is apparently restricted to individuals, or takes up inconsequential points, seems always intended and arranged, *through* the particular, *for* the universal. If an Epistle is written to the Romans, Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, or to Timothy, or Titus, it is not for them only that it is designed, but through them, for the church in all ages. No prophecy of the Scriptures is of any private interpretation; but again and again have portions of God's Word been written through an individual, an age, and a generation, for another and future age, and much of the meaning has remained hidden from them, in whose hands the prophecy was first placed, unto whom sometimes it was revealed that not unto themselves but unto others they did minister the things of the Spirit. There was never such a thing known as a book of God written for the exigency of some half a dozen years, for the comfort of a small community of Christians under a particular temporary persecution. The plain promises of God must be their comfort in such a case, and they are so, always, and not the imagery of a book requiring much study and effort of interpretation to bring it to bear. If we saw a man drowning, we would not throw him a life-preserver so intangible or oily that it would elude every effort to grasp it, or so involved and intricate in its fastenings, that it would take a day's ingenuity to attach it to the person. The supposition that the Apocalypse was meant for John's immediate readers particularly, mainly, or exclusively, would restrict it to a very few persons at the uttermost, and to those few the interpretation of it would be almost impossible, without an additional personal revelation. Besides this, the incongruity between the grandeur of the apocalyptic visions, and the scenes on earth, of which Nero's cruelties were the centre, turns the mind at once against any such local temporary application. We feel that if this be a prophetic book concerning the church of Christ, of things important to be known, it must be expected, in analogy with fulfilled prophecy, to be a series of things, either that will constitute, on the whole, the great landmarks of history, as connected with the church, or be found so connected with previous prophecies, as to be essential to their complete understanding and development. To put one's line of

conjecture into the troubled sea of past time, and draw up, almost at hazard, some local, temporary event or name, and thrust that, by ingenuity of hypothesis, into the centre of these predictions, compelling all things to hitch themselves to it, is not the right way of pursuing truth, or discerning the mind of the Spirit. A man may make a mosaic of his own, out of the combined materials of the apocalyptic revelations, and any historical period since the Crucifixion, with whatever limits he may choose—and again and again the thing has been done—but no interpretation can advance beyond the region of utter uncertainty, or almost vague conjecture, which does not cover the whole connected period proved by internal evidence to be passed over, and linked together in the different unfolding periods and representations of the book itself. No interpretation can be the true one, which limits the whole to a part.

Furthermore, the Apocalypse being ostensibly and designedly a prophetic book, the last of inspired prophecies, the closing work, to which were to be affixed the tremendous seals contained in its last verses, chap. 22 : 18, 19, it is fair to expect that its prophetic disclosures will extend farther than the other revelations of the New Testament, which went before. It is fair to expect that John would go farther than Paul, in the main, and that John would go as far in the prophetic history of events, as Paul had gone in the prophetic history of doctrines. Paul had foreshadowed a dread, vast, mighty doctrinal corruption and apostasy, which was at length to assume so terrible a personification, overshadowing the world, that it should be known as that Man of Sin and Son of Perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or is worshipped ; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God. Paul had said that the roots of this Mystery of Iniquity were even then already striking down under ground ; but that some great hindrance, which he does not designate by name, was then preventing, and would continue to prevent and withhold its development, for an indefinite period to come, till the time appointed for that development ; and that then this Wicked One, this vast personification of wickedness, this realization and absolutism of the Mystery of Iniquity, should be revealed : the process of the revelation, the coming of *it* and of *him*, of the Mystery of Iniquity and the Man of Sin, being after the working of Satan, with all power and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish ; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved, being under strong delusion to believe a lie and hate the truth, because of their pleasure in unrighteousness.

Paul had also said that that great coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, of which he had spoken in the preceding Epistle as sudden and near, like a thief in the night, was not at hand in such a sense as to trouble any man's mind with immediate anxiety ; on the

contrary, so far from it, that no man must suffer himself to be deceived in that respect by any means ; for that the Day of Christ, of which he had spoken, was *not* at hand, and should *not* come, until that great falling away and that awful revelation had taken place, until that Mystery of Iniquity should stand revealed as **THAT WICKED**, having gathered around its system the ingredients, elements, and multitudinous supporters of it, as mighty crystallizations and incrustations of lying wonders, and believers in lying wonders, of one form and spirit, from the millions who believed not in the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness. That great Day of Christ, and that great coming of Christ, to which the hearts of all believers were taught to look forward with such intense expectation and desire, was not to take place till after all this development and revelation ; for this Man of Sin and Son of Perdition, this Wicked Mystery, and Despot of Iniquity, was not to be destroyed but by that very coming ; he should be consumed by the Spirit of the Lord's mouth, and destroyed by the brightness of his coming. All this is a description, with which should be at once compared the nineteenth chapter of the Apocalypse, the coming of the Lord with the armies of heaven, and out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword ; and the consumption and destruction of the Man of Sin, and Son of Perdition, and Mystery of Iniquity, with their lying wonders, by the Spirit of his mouth, and the brightness of his coming.

To all these predictions, Paul added yet another delineation of this mighty departure from the faith, under the warning, like the preceding, of the Spirit speaking expressly :—seducing spirits, doctrines of devils, lies in hypocrisy, consciences seared with a hot iron, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meat ;—a blaze of prophecy, a ball of prophetic fire, sudden and startling like the other, and to be compared with it, and with that other circumstantial relation, penned about the same time, in Eph. 2 : 16–23, concerning what were undoubtedly some of the working roots of that overwhelming apostasy and mystery of iniquity to be revealed. So Paul paints, with a hand like the night-visions in the Book of Job, the dread shape which he saw looming up on the horizon of the indistinguishable future, and filling sometimes the whole void. “A spirit passed before my face ; the hair of my flesh stood up. It stood still ; but I could not discern the form thereof : an image was before mine eyes.” There is at once a terrible confusion and clearness, a mixture of distinctness and mysterious indefiniteness in these disclosures, together with an almost infinitude in the outline of form and time, indicating a long perspective of evils successively crowding on and taken up into one dread personification and system, concerning which it might have been, perhaps, expected that some farther disclosure should be vouchsafed to the church, before the book of Revelation was completed. The

sublimity of the passage in Thessalonians was very likely one of the elements seething in Milton's mind, when he drew the outline of Death at Hell's gate, the Goblin born of Satan :

"The other shape,  
If shape it might be called, that shape had none,  
Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb,  
Or substance might be called, that shadow seemed,  
For each seemed either : black it stood as Night,  
Fierce as ten furies, terrible as Hell,  
And shook a dreadful dart : what seemed his head,  
The likeness of a kingly crown had on."

The grisly terror of the Son of Perdition was to grow ten-fold more dreadful and deformed, till his frown would wither souls, and his arm strike death into the heart of nations.

We have said it was fair to expect that John, supposing him employed by the Divine-revealing Spirit to make the last disclosures of Christ to His church on earth, would be led farther than Paul, or would take up and disclose in the shape of things, what Paul had foreshadowed in the shape of a doctrinal apostasy. Accordingly, it will be found that where Paul, in few, brief, terrible words, like pencils of fire thrown against a wall, and leaving a blaze of threatening hieroglyphics, has related the rise and progress of doctrinal error or corruption, John, in vast, expanded, various imagery of symbols, relates the progress of corresponding events and things, relates the tremendous developments, of which the lying wonders, power, signs, and deceivableness of unrighteousness in the Man of Sin and Son of Perdition by the working of Satan, are the core, the seed, the soul. John brings out under the historic form, the fulfillment of the doctrinal predictions of Paul. John takes Paul's undated and indefinable, or rather, inappropriate prophecies, and carries them forward into their appropriate place in time, with their dress in the developments of Satan, and the victories of Christ. Compare the delineations in the thirteenth chapter of the Apocalypse, with the Man of Sin and Son of Perdition in the second chapter of the second Epistle to the Thessalonians, and the conclusion is irresistible, that Paul and John must, in these two passages, be speaking of the same dread, blasphemous, overwhelming power and development. The characteristics are the same—blasphemy, power, signs, lying wonders, and all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish. But whereas there is no date in Paul, but a vast incalculable period of time, of revelation, development, and sway for this monstrous mystery of iniquity, until the brightness of Christ's own coming shall destroy him, and the spirit of his mouth consume him, in John there is a date; and going forward to the nineteenth chapter, you find that date, whatever it be, carrying that same monstrous mystery and beast of iniquity up to the brightness of the coming of the Lord,



with the sharp sword issuing from his mouth, consuming and destroying that revealed, perfected, finished, and accomplished WICKED.

And whereas in Paul there is no historical form, but a doctrinal forthshadowing of terrible error, and an anomalous mystery of lawlessness and impiety, intimating by name and character both a personality and a system, confusedly, and yet with most terrible definiteness combined, in John you have the error, the impiety, the blasphemy, the confusion, the mystery, and the power passing into historical form, the great despotic, papistic, hierarchical adultery of Church and State, the Dragon giving his power, seat, and great authority to the Beast, exalting him, and letting him exalt himself above all that is called God, or is worshiped, and letting him oppose and blaspheme God, his name, his temple, his tabernacle, with power over all kindreds and tongues and nations, so that all that dwell upon the earth worship him, except the followers of the Lamb, except those who have received the love of the truth, that they might be saved. As in Paul it is written, that he opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshiped, so in John he openeth his mouth in blasphemy against God, and is really worshiped of all that dwell upon the earth, save those whose names are in the Book of Life. The power, signs, deceivableness of unrighteousness, and lying wonders in Paul, come out in exercise in the attributes and doings of the terrific, all-powerful, false-miracle-working Beast in John, with image-worship of himself compelled, as an additional counterpart of the Goblin, who sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God. And to crown all, as this goblin of Paul's delineation is the Man of Sin and the Son of Perdition, so the number and name of this Beast of John's. Revelation is the number of a man. And when we advance a step farther in the apocalyptic series, we find another form of the same great development under the name of Mystery, given to it by Paul, a mysterious confusion of iniquity, in which the same lawless power is at once the Man of Sin and the mother of harlots. And whereas in Paul it is said, that inasmuch as the worshippers of that Wicked would not receive the love of the truth that they might be saved, for this cause God would send them strong delusion that they should believe a lie, it is said also in John, that God hath put in their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree and give their kingdom unto the Beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.

Now, the successive visions of Paul and John are two distinct revelations of the same great transactions; the first in very general though distinct outlines; the second in nearer and more minute and appreciable forms. The whole movement of Divine inspiration in them is like the successive revelation of portions of the starry universe, by telescopes of different and increasing power,

the last that are constructed bringing the objects so much nearer, that their forms, spheres, and relations, with the motions in their orbits, can be recognized. Through the first, you perhaps behold clusters of worlds of indefinite extent and incalculable movements, but were unable to determine in regard to most of them what place they hold in the planetary system, and indeed in regard to some of them, whether they were cloud-worlds or stars. Through the second, though your field of vision is not enlarged, ten thousand worlds are seen in it, rising distinct and luminous, and you are enabled by known quantities to calculate their relative nearness, and their paths and powers of influence. So in Paul's telescope, the new-discovered and reported worlds are so distant, that they seem in the same plane; but in John's telescope they are brought so much nearer to us, or we are carried so much nearer to them, that their connection with, and influence upon, one another is clearly seen, while their relative distances from us can be measured, and a thousand signs are read that before were never dreamed of.

Now having shown the counterpart and corresponding work of Paul and John, we think it almost beyond doubt that, as inspired artists and workmen, they were occupied upon one and the same subject. If you could suppose two Michael Angelos, or a Michael and a Raphael, the one commencing a mighty, gigantic sketch like that of the *LAST JUDGMENT*, and the other taking a separate piece of canvas, and filling it up, it would scarcely be known with more certainty that both the sketch, and the vast execution of it, belonged to one and the same theme. We next inquire for the original of the subject itself.

And where in all the world, or the world's history, is the being, thing, system, agent, intelligence, institution, or empire, in which these corresponding characteristics of doctrine and of form, of principle and practice, centre? You could not have Paul's delineated perpetuity of doctrinal corruption, without John's delineated continuity of historical organization. You cannot find the counterpart of Paul's deeply working system of error, without the persecuting freaks of John's bestial organization inspirited by that error, and carrying it into effect. Where now is the first and the second; where or what is that depraved movement of mind and heart, beginning by degrees, and increasing without limit, that enshrining and canonizing of error, that adoption of a lie for the truth, that immeasurable doctrinal perversion and corruption, rising and strengthening, till incorporated in an established, overwhelling, multiform, and yet uniform apostasy? Where is that despotic, all-controlling, all-crushing unity of error and power, which was to grow and spread in its development and revelation for ages, and partly in the course of such revelation while incomplete, and partly by the permission of God after its development was finished, was to remain unconsumed and undestroyed even

until the before-predicted coming of the Lord? Where are these actual features to be recognized, and the actual incarnation, personification, and enthronement of them in supremacy, these features of error and blasphemy, usurping the place of God in the temple of God, and exalted above all that is worshiped? So much is demanded, if you would have the counterpart of Paul's delineation. You must have the mystery of iniquity working at first so gradually, from age to age with such deceivableness of infernal policy, at no time clearly shown, as not to terrify the Christian church from it as the work of Satan; but silently to gather the church into its toils, until it can fill the pretended Christian church in the place of God, until it stands to the pretended Christian church for the body and essence of Christianity. It must be the silent, accumulated deposit and secretion of corrupted and malignant principles, one after another, intertwining, interfolding, interlacing, imperceptibly growing out of, and growing into, and supporting one another, till it rises, a complicated unity and mass of iniquity, with the bones, sinews, arteries, and veins of a perfect system. So shall it tower up, filling the horizon of men's souls, the spiritual vision of the church, a dread, vast form of superstition, shutting out the light of Heaven, and overshadowing the world in the gloom and terror of its awful despotism.

And where, as the habitation and instrument of all this, can be found a body, a form, an organization, of a nature and with features to meet the prophetic delineations of John? Where is the combination and league of antichristian error with civil policy and power? Where is the organization that can sustain by the secular arm the prescribed ecclesiastical corruptions and idolatries, having the secular power and authority given over to it for the purpose? It must be a power maintaining, on infernal principle, the most fierce and unrelenting intolerance against the witnesses of God; a fiery, immutable, unrelenting intolerance against every system and being that does not bow down and worship; an intolerance, in the exercise of which the man of sin and mother of harlots is drunken in the blood of the saints, and becomes the nurse and teacher of the most sanguinary and remorseless bigotry the world ever saw. It must be a hierarchical and civil despotism, the adulterous combination of Church and State, aiding one another, as a dragon and a wild beast, or seating one another in state, as a drunken whorish woman on a scarlet-coloured beast, covered all over with the names of blasphemy, and a system taking into embrace and under protection the speculative and practical errors foreshown of Paul, acting them out and enforcing them.

Where shall we find the counterpart of such an existence and agency? The creature is the same, both in the first and second stage of the prediction. The thing is one—one spirit, one purpose, one direction; all the eyes one, all tendencies, all forces, con-

centrated, increasing, fought against, sometimes defeated, but rising again, sparkling, blazing, blaspheming, infuriate, hating, lying, persecuting, drunken with blood, adulterous, heaven-defying, hell-born, hell-destined. It is not easy to find a false agent, a thing of intrinsic littleness in learned masquerade to sit for this picture. It is not possible to crowd all those characteristics into a few years or a single epoch. Any interpretation that does this falls by internal weakness and absurdity. Any interpretation that separates this sublime and awful integrity of wickedness, this vast consistency and enormity of error and of crime, any interpretation that splits into fragments these huge features of the SON OF PERDITION and strews them here and there upon the earth, is as a garrulous old man's guesses, or as a childish tale. It were easier to draw the faces of a thousand swart Ethiop brats, and make the world believe that the gigantic Sphinx at the bottom of the Pyramids was hewn out of the mountain just to stand as their united representative.

As to the thing itself, you are bound to point out a great world-awing reality of superstition and of tyranny. And as to the duration, you have got to find some vast actuality of time, some mighty continuity of existence and of power in history, extending from its roots in Paul's day, even to the day of Christ's second coming; not a mere disjointed series of historical events, which you may lay hold of, hap-hazard, by help of some spasmodic, temporary features of resemblance to that great WICKED, intruding it into the place of the likeness, but an inexpugnable, undeniable, domineering absolutism of identity, combining the doctrinal errors and apostasies which are the very soul of THAT WICKED, with the conquest, alliance, and crimes of national establishments, interpenetrated with the same spirit, and bound into one organization of those errors, and uniting from age to age to maintain the supremacy of THAT WICKED.

What is there in all history, what in all the world, what in the development of the church through and by its corruptions *with* the world, that answers in continuity, in vastness, in concentration, in Power, in oneness, to this demand? What that presents to the mind such a picture in realization, of an indomitable essence of wickedness, sweeping through storm or calm, as a fathomless ocean current, as a cataract from the steep, as an avalanche from the summit of a mountain? What agent or agency in full being and power over a thousand years, always in opposition to the church of God, always usurping the place of God in his temple, whether that temple be the conscience and reason of the individual man, or the counterfeit presentment and pretence of the only true church collectively and the authority of supremacy and infallibility in it; always giving laws to it in the stead of God, setting aside, or putting in abeyance at pleasure God's own laws,

by pontifical dispensation, taking out of God's hands even the forgiveness of sins, and making even that glaring, heaven-defying usurpation, that enormous impiety and blasphemy, a great and lasting foundation of its dominion?

Now really there is but one answering power, but one continuous existence and incarnation of pride, of lying, of blasphemy, of false-miracle-working, of civil and religious despotism and cruelty, of politico-hierarchical development, and of supreme authority, to which the mind can spontaneously turn, or to which the attention can be directed;—and that is the outstanding Romish Apostasy and Corporation, filling nearly all history since the time of Constantine. There is but one organized Mystery of Iniquity answering to the description of Paul, that can make any pretense to bridge with its body the gulf of time from his writing to the Saviour's coming; and there is but one external series of historical events and developments of form, answering to John's imagery, that can stand to receive the inspiring soul of iniquity prophesied by Paul; so that of both together, in regard to his handwriting on the wall, **MAN OF SIN AND SON OF PERDITION**, the world is compelled to say, *Thou art the man*. There is no other establishment in opposition to the church of Christ, of a continuity of spirit and of power reaching across the chasm of ages, and itself boasting an unbroken succession even from the Apostolic age. There is no other establishment that ever pretended to occupy the place of God, that ever claimed infallibility; that ever demanded or received universal obedience and worship; that ever had all the world wondering after it; that ever, for the space of twelve hundred years, had power given to it over all kingdoms, and tongues, and nations. There is no establishment, or king, or reign, or organization in history, that ever, with the other characteristics presented, could stand for the original, even for the short space of *three* or *four* years, even if you were to interpret the apocalyptic 1260 and the 42 months to stand *only* for days. But when you take the true prophetic designation of years, there is nothing save only the Romish church, and the union of Church and State dependent on that church, and springing from its teachings and worship, that does not, if you attempt to force it into a place in this interpretation, utterly fail. There is no kingdom, or policy, or organization, or local or formal association of human existence, agency, and power, political or ecclesiastical, that can assume to itself that period of 1260 years. There is scarcely anything on earth of vitality, in any shape, that has lasted, continuously, so long; hardly anything, any organization; much less anything, save one, that wears the characteristics of these predictions. The application of them is so plain, that it seems a hallucination, a destitution of common sense, to deny it.

There is no other system and continuance of error and iniquity

answering to Paul ; there is on other system or continuance of form and policy answering to John.

As to the mystery of iniquity in Paul, and mystery and maternity of harlotism and abominations of the earth in John, the Romish apostasy may defy both the ancient and modern world to show any form of evil not springing, more inveterate, from her all-encompassing womb. The Romish Corporation, the Papacy, has the high and unapproachable distinction of taking up into itself all the forms of error and of crime depicted in the New Testament, whatever they may be. There is nothing which you may not find with its head above the wave, and its roots within the earth, in that vast pool of corruption. There is no form of human malignity, dark or open, which has not been avouched and practised within the heart or under the shadow and authority of that system. Its master births of wickedness are of such a gigantic grandeur and terribleness of deformity and cruelty, that the world from Adam to Napoleon can show nothing to compare with them. Of such a character unrivalled, is the tremendous conception, machinery, and remorseless workings of the Inquisition.

A like supremacy and horribleness of evil and of cruelty characterizes, in essence and results, the enforced celibacy of the clergy, together with the principles, instructions, and machinery of the confessional, in the shamelessness and indescribable bestiality of its theology. The author of the History of Fanaticism has painted almost as well as human language could do it, unless John Foster were again on earth, the hideousness of its creative depravity. "It is hard to suppose," says he, "that the Romish Church, in constituting her hierarchy, had wittingly kept in view the purpose of rendering her clergy the fit instruments of whatever atrocity her occasions might demand them to perpetuate, and so had brought to bear upon their hearts every possible power of corruption. Not content with cashiering them of all sanatory domestic influences, she has, by the practice of confession, made the full stream of human crime and corruption to pass, foul and infectious, through their bosom ! Having to construct at discretion the polity of the nation, the church architects have so planned it, as that the sacerdotal order should constitute the CLOACÆ of the social edifice ; and thus have secured for Rome the honor of being, through these channels, the great STERCOARY of the world ! How fitly, in the language of prophetic vision, is the apostate Church designated, sitting as she does at the centre of the common drainage of Europe, as the MOTHER OF ABOMINATIONS, and as holding forth in shameless arrogance the cup of the filthiness of her fornications !" What was it but this system that Paul saw in the dread visions of prophesy, lifting its miscreated front athwart his soul—what execrable shape but this, seated in the very temple of God, as the

Man of Sin and Son of Perdition, this mystery of iniquity and death,

“Where all life dies, death lives, and nature breeds  
Perverse, all-monstrous, all-prodigious things,  
Abominable, unutterable, and worse  
Than fables yet have feigned, or fear conceived.”

And then as to the details of impiety, the marks of correspondence, point after point, with the original, are none of them wanting in this system, though they can be found in nothing else. There is nothing else that makes, or ever made, in the face of the whole world, pretensions to a daily sacrifice of the Son of God for sin. There is nothing else, nor ever will be, that since the old Paganism passed from the world, reinstates its forms, prays to angels and to virgins instead of God, and sets up a daily idolatry. There is nothing else that sets back the church upon its old Judaic forms of a sacrificial priesthood, exalts a Supreme Pontiff on earth in the place of Jesus Christ, and arrogates, in blasphemous impiety, the power of forgiving sins. There is nothing else that ever did, or ever will, claim to itself the authority of dispensing with the obligations of the Divine law, and appropriate to itself the seal of damnation in asserting as a holy principle the doctrine of doing evil that good may come. There is nothing else, and never will be, that arrogates to its head a supremacy above all law human and divine, a sovereignty over law, and an impossibility, inherent and inseparable, of being in subjection to it. In this is the mark of that *ἀνομος*, that WICKED, that LAWLESS, as literally it is to be rendered; a mark of correspondence distinctly arrogated to the present fallen incumbent of the Papacy, by the open avowal of some of his prelates that it is not possible, in the nature of things, for the Pope to be a subject on earth. Thus is that LAWLESS revealed, although the declaration of this principle of his nature would have been more in keeping with the times of Hildebrand and Borgia.

It is singular that it should have come up again in our age, as a vain, impotent echo of past blasphemies, just sufficiently loud and marked to keep up a continuity of evidence. It is a squeaking voice indeed, in comparison with the palmy times of full canonical and papistical thunder, the times when it was declared that the Pope holds the place of the true God, when canon laws and councils denominated him our Lord God on the earth, when it was asserted that being God, he cannot be judged by man, that he has the power of dispensing with all laws, and the same authority as the Lord, that he is the possessor of all power in heaven and in earth, presiding over all the kingdoms of the globe. The canon law declared, that the Pope, in the plenitude of his power, is above right, can change the substantial nature of things, and transform unlawful into lawful. And Cardinal Bellarmine declared that the Pope can substantiate sin into duty, and duty into sin. Thus by

Divine providence was that Lawless and Wicked left to be fully revealed as the original of the prophetic delineation in Paul of a creature who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God or that is worshiped ; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God, and as the original of the corresponding prophetic delineation in John, of a beast covered with the names of blasphemy, and speaking great things in blasphemy, enthroning the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth, the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus. The correspondences between Paul's and John's descriptions on the one hand are remarkable and undeniable ; and the identity between both and the Papal system as revealed and developed, appropriating *both* to itself in the world's actual history, make up a combined internal and external demonstration, which cannot be resisted. Perhaps in these four points the demonstration is most definite and absolute, (that is, if we leave out the veiled and indescribable mass of abominations answering historically from age to age to the "filthiness of her fornication" as described by John,) to wit, (1st,) the idolatry of praying to saints and angels, and of image-worship, and the daily idolatry of the mass ; (2d), the sitting as God in the temple of God, with the mouth speaking great things and blasphemy, and the power claimed and exercised of dispensing with all laws human and divine ; (3d), the hatred and persecution of the witnesses, and of them who keep the commandments of God and the testimony of Jesus Christ, refusing to worship the image of the beast ; and (4th), the vast period of time indicated both in Paul and John, and accomplished in the revelation and existing power and development of the Papacy] through so many ages in the world's history.

Paul says, MYSTERY OF INIQUITY and MAN OF SIN ; John says, *upon her forehead was a name written, MYSTERY, MOTHER OF HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH.* It is said that some centuries ago, the Pope's mitre had ordinarily inscribed upon its frontlet the name of MYSTERY ; but that the correspondence between this title and Rev. 17 : 5, having been noted, the inscription was blotted out and discontinued. We should like to see one of these old tiaras. Yet there is scarcely a conceivable circumstance of development that could add to the overwhelming array of evidence in regard to the original of the prophetic portraits. The system of the Papacy stands complete in history, the indisputable realization of the images, predicted in the Scriptures. "If the *theory* only of this system," says the author of the History of Fanaticism, "should go down to posterity, and its *history* be lost, no credit would be given to the affirmation that a scheme so unnatural had ever found a place in the world ; much less that it had maintained its influence over civilized nations during a longer course of ages



than could be boasted by the fairest and most extensive monarchies. Or if the *history* of the Romish Church were to descend to distant times, and the *theory* of the system be forgotten, then must it certainly be thought that during the thousand years or more of its unbroken power, a license extraordinary had been granted to infernal malignants to usurp human forms, and to invade earth with the practices of hell; or that the world, from the seventh to the seventeenth century had suffered a dark millenium of diabolic possession."

A Diabolic Possession! And what but this, exactly, is the stamp of Divine Revelation in regard to it? A Possession by him, whose grand work on earth, since the Crucifixion, we are distinctly informed in the New Testament is by all possible means to keep the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, from shining into men's minds. And if now we take this tremendous system to look at it apart from the high place of opposition, exaltation, and defiance against God, which it occupies God-ward, and consider it in the place of diabolic influence and injury in regard to human welfare, which it occupies *man-ward*, we find that the climax and supremacy of evil in it is just this, (according to Paul,) that it is the all-deceivableness of unrighteousness *in them that perish*, (compare II. Thess. 2: 9, 10, with II. Cor. 4: 3, 4;) and just this, (according to John,) that the grand article of its merchandise is the *souls of men*, of all classes, small and great, rich and poor, bond and free, its upholders and followers being those, and those only, whose names are not written in the Book of Life. (Compare Rev. 17: 13, with Rev. 13: 8 14, 15.) The perdition-power of the system is just this, (according to Paul,) that they who abide in it are lost, because they received not the love of the truth that they might be saved, but had pleasure in unrighteousness; and (according to John,) that the names of its followers not being written in the Lamb's Book of Life, they are to drink of the wine of the wrath of God without mixture in the cup of his indignation forever, because, as before, the love of the truth, and the testimony of Jesus, is not in them, but they are followers of the beast and worshipers of his image. Rev. 14: 9, 10, 11.

The terrible-ness of the thing is in this tremendous fact, that the truth by which God sanctifies the soul, is *not in that system*, but a soul-destroying corruption of it, so that it is a system of perdition to its followers, making *them* the sons of perdition, as well as its head. It is the fact announced from God, that if any man receive the mark of the beast, it is the mark of sin, and of wrath, and of exclusion from heaven, under strong delusion to believe a lie. And in truth, if the lie of Purgatory were all in this system that men did believe, that alone would be enough to cut off the whole power of the gospel from the soul, since any man under the power of sin, would rather trust to a future promised and assured purgation

and salvation by fire, than purchase salvation now, at the cost of a *present* acceptance of the gospel, in a present renunciation of all sin, through faith in Christ only, and with submission of all things to him. But in every direction, in this organized Mystery of iniquity, the truth is effectually barricaded out, and its place is supplied by strong delusion. The nature of the system is such, in its daily sacrifice of the mass, its confessions and absolutions, its denial of justification by faith, its throwing men upon penances, sacraments, works, and priests for salvation, its veiling and withholding of the Scriptures, its doctrines of purgatory, its worship of images, its prayers to saints, and its many mediators instead of one, as to shut up every avenue by which the truth of the gospel could gain entrance to the soul.

When men were under the persecuting power of the Beast, they looked narrowly at these things, and studied the face of the Sorceress in the Book of Revelation; for if they did not find God's seal of reprobation on the system, why should they resist it unto death? If they could by any means see anything but anti-Christ in Rome, they would not lay down life by an uncalled-for opposition. But since the sword and power of persecution have been in a great measure taken away, and in personal security men's vigilance has been lulled, men have looked at Rome through Tracts for the Times, rather than through the visions of John in Patmos. By the application of semi-Papistical churches, and the rag-fair resurrection of formalism in purple and scarlet array, and the retrocession from Protestantism of some who dwell upon the earth, and wonder after the Beast that was and is not and yet is, the conscientious opposition against the great apostasy of Rome, as the Man of sin and Son of perdition, has been somewhat softened. And meanwhile the Papistical system seemed to be getting a temporary invigoration, like a dying old man, into whose veins an infusion of warmer youthful blood has been made from the frame of a vigorous subject. It is not the first time that the deadly wound of the Beast has seemed to be healed, and almost all the world has taken to wondering after him.

Nevertheless, the evidence of the correspondency which we have dwelt upon between the delineations of the Man of sin in the New Testament, and the Romish Church, as that man, in the world's history, has been growing stronger every century. It is becoming now more convincing than ever when the Papacy is beginning to tumble, and Rev. 17 : 16, is in part fulfilled. As the correspondency has been proved in the development of the system, so will it be in the consumption. And it is remarkable that the correspondency was begun to be discovered and set before the world more than eight hundred years ago. The hand-writing on the wall was even then compared with the glowing image of the mystery of iniquity, and even then men were startled to behold it.

The church of the Waldenses began this defection and proof. They wrote it down in a treatise upon anti-Christ, of as early a date as 1120; a treatise which, in many respects, is by far the most remarkable document of the middle ages. It comes to rise in the midst of complete surrounding darkness. It is a most vigorous and stern delineation of anti-Christ in the Romish Church, as Paul's Man of sin and Son of perdition, and John's Mother of harlots and abominations of the earth.

From the Waldenses, this judgment of anti-Christ as seated in the Romish apostasy passed over into England, and was in some measure re-affirmed by Wickliffe, from whom downward to the British Reformation, the proof and conviction were deepening and becoming more intense and impregnable. The bold, unsparing, unqualified, unhesitating invectives of Luther against Rome, the Pope, and the whole system, poured out with the vehemence of a passionate, great soul, impelled by irresistible conviction, did but set fire to innumerable *stacks* of opinions already prepared in many thinking minds, and gathering by degrees more in the unthinking. At length it grew in men's thoughts to be a truth almost as settled as the messiahship of Christ, that if anything could be proved of unquestionable correspondence with prophecy, it was the sole proprietorship of the Papacy and the Pope in those predictions of Paul and of John, of which we have endeavored to trace the counterpart characteristics. Accordingly, both on the Continent and in Great Britain, these predictions were wielded with effective boldness and great power, by the most learned and holy of the Reformers, against the factions of the Romish Church, and in demonstration of her wickedness. Every where the voice was heard come out of her, my people! and almost every where by some it was obeyed.

But by a great ruse of Satan, one of the most deadly iniquities of the Papacy was retained even in the Reformed Churches, in an adulterous connection between Church and State, and a usurpation of the prerogatives of God over conscience; and the Reformation stopped in mid career. Then those energies of the Reformed churches that might and should have been turned against Rome, were employed on mere forms among themselves, in battling for and against them, for the acquisition of temporal and ecclesiastical power and perpetuity. The Church took the State, and the State the Church in an embrace foreshadowed by the drunken woman on the scarlet-colored beast, and but little less fraught with spiritual evil than that apostate Church itself. The head of the State was made by constitutional organization the head of the Church, and to the Church so organized every subject was forced, by sacramental swearing and sealing, to belong, and then papistical intolerance, arrogance, and persecution were adopted.

The consequence has been inevitable. While the spirit and

opinions of the noble army of Reformers and martyrs have more and more died out of existence, the spirit and opinions, the old abandoned rites and superstitions, of the Papal system have more and more sprung up again and come to life. After a while, the impossibility or inconsistency of preserving and maintaining in a Reformed organization so much of the spirit and semblance of the Papacy, and at the same time branding the Papal church as anti-Christ, has been seen and felt, and the Tracts for the Times, with other movements, have prepared the way for a sort of mongrel re-churching in men's opinion's of the excommunicated and apostate church, as the dear and true Mother, not of Harlots, but of the Reformed Daughters, and a veiling of the form of the great Whore of Revelations as the chaste spouse of the Redeemer.

Nevertheless, nothing can save it from the perdition to which it is hastening. It is the Son of perdition, it is the Mother of harlots. And while in quarters distant from the Seat of the Beast, the knight-errants of Church and State adultery are proclaiming against all comers the spotless reputation of "the great whore that sitteth upon many waters," at home the ten horns begin to hate the whore and make her desolate and naked, and to eat her flesh and burn her with fire. In her own familiar region of allurements and of power, men apply to her the Scriptural descriptions, and fasten upon her by irresistible demonstration the heraldry both of Paul's and of John's painting.

The end is near, and with it comes the freedom and glory of the church. Nation after nation will find the chains of National Church establishments thrown off, and the claims of the gospel, in full religious liberty, adopted. The Hierarchical Despotism in all its forms, and the pampered priest-craft dependent upon it, are almost at the death struggle. "When the State," says Baptist Noel in his late book, "withdraws from its paralytic and trembling limbs the couch on which it has been reclining, with royalty for its nurse, nothing will remain for it but the grave."

## ARTICLE VIII.

## THE CHINESE EMPIRE.

By REV. RUFUS W. CLARK, Portsmouth, N. H.

*The Middle Kingdom: a Survey of the Geography, Government, Education, Social Life, Arts, Religion, &c. of the Chinese Empire and its Inhabitants. With a New Map of the Empire and Illustrations, principally engraved by J. W. Orr.*—By S. WELLS WILLIAMS, author of "Easy Lessons in Chinese," "English and Chinese vocabulary," &c., in two volumes. New York and London. Wiley & Putnam, 1848. pp. 590, and 614.

AMONG the benefits conferred by our foreign missionaries, not only upon the general interests of human learning, but also upon the people to whom they are sent, and the missionary enterprise itself, the accurate and full compilation of information, such as is embodied in this and similar works, is not the least important. In order to quicken the churches, secure the adoption of plans of systematic benevolence, and awaken a general interest in the great missionary work, there needs to be a *knowledge of foreign countries widely disseminated*. The interest felt in the welfare of a distant people, will be, *cæteris paribus*, in proportion to the knowledge we have of their condition, wants, habits, and the facilities afforded for introducing among them the arts and blessings of civilization. And just the kind of knowledge that we need for this purpose, as well as to subserve the general interests of literature, is furnished by Medhurst, Williams, Gutzlaff, and Abeel, in regard to China; by Smith and Dwight in regard to Armenia: by Dibble in his history of the Sandwich Islands, &c. &c. When men visit these countries simply as travelers, diplomatists, merchants or geologists, they furnish us with information only in the particular department in which they feel the deepest interest. The traveler will give us a view of the external features of the country, its scenery, mountains, lakes, rivers; its works of art, with some account of the manners and habits of the people. The diplomatist will describe its government, courts, and jurisprudence. The merchant will inform us respecting the commerce of the country, its resources, amount of traffic, and articles of export; while the naturalist will confine himself to his favorite science. But the intelligent missionary, whose object is a philanthropic one, will give us a comprehensive view of everything of interest relating to the people among whom he dwells. He will especially let us into their inner life, and spread out to view their intellectual

and moral condition. He will show how their social and political institutions grow out of their character as a people, while at the same time he gives a due degree of attention to other departments.

Mr. Williams' work, affords a striking example and confirmation of these remarks. In his first volume he gives a view of the general features and geography of the empire; the extent of the population; the natural history, laws and government of China; the state of education; the structure of the Chinese language, with an account of their classical and polite literature. In the second volume we have a description of the architecture, dress, industrial arts, commerce, science, history, chronology, and religion of this strange people, with a view of their social condition and the missionary efforts which, at different times have been made in the Empire. The information given upon these interesting points, he has obtained from personal observation and experience, as well as from the most authentic sources within his reach. The latter he has evidently consulted with great diligence and candor; and the results of his labors are here presented to the world in an attractive and substantial form. Upon some points he may be rather too diffuse, and some sentences might have been grammatically improved:—but in addition to the literary merit of the work, its great charm lies in the fact, that it bears the marks of a truly Christian author.

With regard to the general scientific and historical writings of our missionaries, it may be safely affirmed, that we have been for the last half century, more indebted to them for a knowledge of foreign countries, than to any other class of writers. Being, for the most part, men of thorough education, sound judgment, industrious and patient habits—ready to any work of toil or sacrifice for the good of others; having the benefit of long residence among and familiar intercourse with the people whom they describe, they enjoy peculiar facilities for such a service. And as the missionary enterprise continues to enlist the talents and acquisitions of the church in its service, we shall look more and more to our missionaries for full and reliable information respecting foreign countries, especially the heathen world. For no motive but the highest form of benevolence—nothing but the spirit of the gospel could induce men of refinement, learning and taste, to exclude themselves from the advantages of civilized society, and dwell for a long series of years, or for life, with rude, ignorant and barbarous tribes.

But the value of the contributions of our missionaries to the cause of learning, is also strikingly seen in what they have done to improve the languages and literature of heathen nations. In some cases they have reduced languages to a written form; in others greatly facilitated their acquisition, and in numerous instances

translated valuable English works. In confirmation of this, we would refer to the literary labors of Dr. Morrison and the Rev. W. Milne in China; to the translation of the Bible in the language of the Indians in 1663, and also of other Christian books, by the celebrated John Elliot: to the valuable translations made by our Sandwich Island missionaries, and to the numerous publications issued from the Smyrna press, in the Armenian and Armeno-Turkish languages.

Dr. Morrison, besides his Chinese Bible, dictionary and grammar, translated into the Chinese language, the Assembly's Catechism, the Liturgy of the Church of England, and published in 1817, under the title of a "View of China for Philological Purposes," a work on the geography, chronology, festivals, &c., of that country. He also published a tract on Redemption, a synopsis of Old Testament history, a small volume of Dialogues in English and Chinese, and several essays upon religious subjects. From the press connected with the mission at Malacca, there have been issued, besides Bibles and tracts, "a periodical called the Indo-Chinese Gleaner, edited by Dr. Milne; a translation of the Faw Books, by Mr. Collie; an edition of Piemare's Notitia Linguae Sinicæ; a Life of Milne, and a volume of Sermons by Dr. Morrison. The number of volumes printed in Chinese was *about half a million.*"

From the Smyrna press there had been issued up to July, 1846, in the Arnenian and Armeno-Turkish languages, *sixty-eight different works*, a list of which may be found in the appendix of the Annual Report of the A. B. C. F. M. for the year 1846. Among them we find the following: Abercrombie or Mental Culture; Worcester's Astronomy; D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation; A translation of the Bible into Armeno-Turkish; Lives of the Patriarchs and Prophets; Natural Theology; Pilgrim's Progress, and the Young Christian. The Psalms have been published in four different dialects. Two editions in ancient Armenian, 3,000 copies in 1841 and 2,000 in 1846. Another in Eastern or Ararat dialect of modern Armenian, 5,000 copies. Another in Western or Constantinople dialect of the modern Armenian and another in Armeno-Turkish.

But our limits will not allow us to take a full survey of what our missionaries have done in this department. Nor is it possible to calculate the benefits which a future generation will reap from the introduction of a Christian literature into so many languages which have heretofore been the vehicles of the worst forms of error and superstition. Millions will rise up to pronounce their blessing upon those noble, philanthropic and devoted men, who, amid so many privations and discouragements—amid such a variety of self-denying duties connected with their missions, and with no hope of earthly reward, and nothing to stimulate them but

their love to God and man, were enabled to master their languages, and infuse into them the elements of spiritual life.

In reading the account which Mr Williams has furnished us of the middle kingdom,<sup>1</sup> the conviction will be deeply impressed upon every mind, that the Chinese people have many strong and peculiar claims upon the attention, sympathy, and benevolence of the Christian community. Notwithstanding their characteristic exclusiveness, vanity, and tenacious adherence to their customs, and institutions, there are features in their present condition which render the prospect of their evangelization peculiarly hopeful.

Among the considerations which entitle them to especial regard, we refer, in the first place, to the vast extent of their population. Upon this subject greatly conflicting opinions have been advanced by different writers. While some have taken the ground that the censuses which from time to time have been taken, were in the main, correct, others have strenuously disputed their accuracy. Malte-Brun says, that "cool and impartial men rate the population of China, properly so called, at 150,000,000." In the *Encyclopedia Americana*, it is stated, without however, any reference to authorities, that China Proper has only 146,280,000; but the tributary States, and those under its protection, swell the total to 240,000,000.

Mr. Williams, however, thinks that the population, as estimated by the Chinese, is not over-stated; and the missionaries now on the ground, in their communications, speak of the population as 400,000,000. Chinese authors refer to between twenty and thirty estimates and censuses of the population made between the years 1393 and 1812, inclusive. Of these, the four deserving of most credit are those of 1711, 1753, 1792, and 1812.

"From 1711 to 1753 the population increased 72,222,602, which was an annual advance of 1,764,824 inhabitants, or a little more than six per cent. per annum for forty-two years. . . . From 1753 to 1792, the increase was 104,686,882, or an

<sup>1</sup> The reason our author assigns for giving his work this title is, that this is the meaning of the most common name for the country among the people themselves. The country, as we have long known, has several names, the most of which indicate the ignorance of the people with reference to their geographical position, and their importance among the nations. "One of the most ancient is *Tien Hia*, meaning 'Beneath the Sky,' and denoting the world; another, almost as ancient is *Si Hai*; i. e., [all within] the four seas; a third, now more common than either, is *Chung Kwoh*, or Middle Kingdom, given to it from an idea that it is situated in the centre of the earth; *Chung Kwoh jin*, or men of the Middle Kingdom, denote the Chinese. The present dynasty Tsing, calls the empire *Ta Tsing Kwoh*, or Great Pure Kingdom. It is sometimes called *Tsing Chaw*, i. e., [land of the] Pure Dynasty. The term so frequently heard in western countries, for China—the Celestial Empire—is derived from *Tiew Chaw*, i. e., Heavenly Dynasty; meaning the kingdom which the dynasty appointed by heaven rules over; but the term *Celestial*, for the people of that kingdom is entirely of foreign manufacture, and their language could with difficulty be made to express such a patronimic." Vol. 1, pp. 3, 4.



annual advance of 2,682,997 inhabitants. During this period the country enjoyed almost uninterrupted peace, under the vigorous sway of Kienlung, and the unsettled regions of the South rapidly filled up. From 1792 to 1812 the increase was 54,126,679, or an annual advance of 2,706,333. At the same rate the present population is over 450,000,000; but no one supposes there has been that increase; nor are there any data from which to make even the least guess of the present population of the empire. The Chinese have overflowed the bounds of their possessions on all sides, under the patronizing policy of their monarchs, especially in Manchuria, Mongolia, Ili, and towards Thibet, while the emigration towards the Indian Archipelago is also large."—Vol. I. p. 214.

Among the reasons given by our author for believing that the country is able to support the highest population ascribed to it, we refer to the following:—

According to the last census, taken in 1812, there were 268 persons to a square mile. But in Great Britain and Ireland, the average, according to McCulloch, was, in 1831, 212 to a square mile. In France it was, in 1846, 223; in Holland, in 1838, 214; in Lombardy, in 1839, 260; and in Belgium, in 1836, 321 to the square mile. In England and Wales, out of the 29,000,000 of acres of land under cultivation, only 10,000,000 are devoted to grain and vegetables, the other two millions being fallow-ground and used for hop beds, &c.

"If the same proportion between the arable and uncultivated land exists in China as in England, namely one fourth, there are about 650 millions of acres under cultivation in China; and we are not left to conjecture in this case, for by a Report made to *Keinlung* in 1745, it appears that the area of land under cultivation was 595,598,221 acres; a subsequent calculation places it at 640,579,381 acres, which is almost the same proportion as in England.

Estimating it at 650 millions, for it has since increased rather than diminished, it gives *one acre and four fifths to every person*, which is by no means a small supply for the Chinese, considering that there are no pastures or meadows for horses, sheep or oxen in the country."—Vol. I. p. 218.

It has been estimated that eight men can be supported from the amount of land required for the sustenance of one horse; and since the number of horses has been reduced in England, by the introduction of railroads, from a million (the number in 1830) to 200,000; if one half of the land now used for pasture, should be cultivated for grain, "and no more dogs and horses raised than a million of acres could support, England and Wales could easily maintain a population of more than four hundred to the square mile, supposing them to be willing to live on what the land can furnish." Now it appears that,

"The greatest part of the cultivated soil in China is employed in raising food for man,—woollen garments and leather are little used, and cotton and mulberry occupy but a small proportion of the soil. There is not, as far as is known, a single acre of land in the empire sown with grass seed, though the sedge in the marshes and grass on the hills are collected for fodder or fuel; and, therefore, almost no human labor is employed in raising food for animals, which will not also serve to sustain man. Horses are seldom used for pomp

or war, for travelling or carrying burdens, but mules, asses and goats are employed for transportation and other purposes in the north west. The natives make almost no use of butter, cheese or milk, and the few cattle they employ in agriculture easily find their living on the waste ground around the fields and villages."

"The common viands are pork, ducks, geese, poultry and fish, all of which are raised cheaply. In the houses and boats of the poor, it is not uncommon to see a pig, or two or three ducks, kept in a pen, or cage, and living upon the refuse of the family. No animal is reared cheaper than the Chinese hog, and the hatching and raising of ducks affords employment to thousands of people, each of whom can easily attend to hundreds. While animal food is thus provided for the people, its preparation takes away the least possible amount of cultivated soil. The space occupied for roads and pleasure grounds is insignificant, but there is perhaps an amount appropriated for burial places quite equal to the area used for these purposes in European countries; it is however, less valuable land, and much of it would be useless for culture, even if thus unoccupied. Graves are usually dug on the sides and tops of hills, in ravines and copses, and wherever they will be retired and dry. Moreover, it is very common to preserve the coffin in temples and cemeteries until it is decayed, partly in order to save the expense of a grave, and partly to worship the remains, or preserve them until they can be gathered to their fathers, in their distant native land."—Vol. I. pp. 218, 219.

Fish is also a prominent article of food with the Chinese. On this point Mr. Williams says :

"In no other country is so much food derived from the water. Not only are the coasts, estuaries, rivers and lakes, covered with fishing boats of various sizes, which are provided with nets, dredges, and tackle of different forms and uses, for the capture of whatever lives in the water, but the spawn of fish is collected from the shallow waters of the rivers, and carried wherever it can be reared. Rice fields are often converted into pools in the winter season and stocked with carp, mullet and other fish; and the tanks dug in the fields for retaining the rain needed in irrigation usually contain fish. By all these means an immense supply of food is obtained at a cheap rate, which is eaten fresh or preserved with or without salt, and sent over the whole empire, at a rate which places it within the reach of all above beggary."—Vol. I. p. 221.

We see from these facts, taken in connection with the vast extent of the Chinese territory,<sup>1</sup> that the country is capable of supporting even the immense population assigned to it; for the highest estimate does not give as great an average population to a mile, as exists in many of the countries of Europe.

But there are other cogent reasons which favor this opinion. The political and social condition of the country tends greatly to multiply the inhabitants. The laws which forbid emigration are so rigid, and the emigrant is subject to so many restrictions and

<sup>1</sup> The eighteen Provinces which constitute China Proper, contains an area of 1,348,870 square miles, while the whole empire under the sway of the present dynasty, covers, according to estimates made by McCulloch, an area of 5,300,000 square miles. The circuit of the whole is 12,550 miles, or about half the circumference of the globe, and comprises about one third of the continent. China Proper is seven times as large as France, and nearly half as large as all Europe.

disabilities, that nothing but the fear of absolute starvation would induce any to leave their native land. Yet thousands are annually pouring forth from the country in every direction, in search of the means of subsistence. They are to be found in "lands like Burmah, Siam, Cambodia, Tibet, Manchirva, and the Indian Archipelago, where comparative ignorance and barbarity prevail, and where the extremes of a tropical or frozen region are to be exchanged for a mild and salubrious climate. Add to these discomforts the fact, that *not a single female is permitted, or ventures to leave the country*, and consequently all the tender attachments that bind heart to heart, must be burst asunder, and, in most cases for ever."

Besides, if the emigrant returns with the property he has acquired, he is subject to constant annoyances from the officers of government, and his own relatives, who are ready to take advantage of his violation of the laws of the land. Not unfrequently he is the subject of excessive cruelties, and in some cases, these cruelties result in the loss of life.<sup>1</sup>

The laws respecting the enrollment of the people are very full, and enforced by various penalties. Each family is required to have a board suspended in the house upon which the names of all the household are recorded for the inspection of the officers of government. For a failure to make the required entry, the head of the family is liable to receive one hundred blows if he is a freeholder, or eighty blows if he is not. Officers are appointed in each district to enforce the laws, and make the necessary returns to the general government; and it was the opinion of Dr. Morrison, whose testimony in the case is entitled to the highest regard, that the censuses given in the general statistics were "more trustworthy than any other documents available."

But our limits will not allow us to pursue farther, the arguments upon this subject. The investigations of Mr. Williams are very full, and to us, very satisfactory. Still, as he admits, the question is an open one, and can only be decided by authorities, which can-

<sup>1</sup> "A case occurred in 1832 at Canton, when the son of a Chinese living in Calcutta, who had been sent home to perform the usual ceremonies to his deceased grand-parents, was seized by his uncle, as he was about to be married, on the pretext that his father had unequally divided the paternal inheritance; and he was obliged to pay a thousand dollars to free himself. Soon after his marriage, a few sharpers seized him and carried him off in a sedan, as he was walking near his house; but his cries attracted the police, who carried them all to the magistrates, where he was liberated. He was, however, obliged to fee his deliverers." Another case occurred in Macao, which resulted in the death of the man. He had been living several years as a merchant in Singapore, and still kept an interest in the trade with that place. Being reputed as very wealthy, a number of thieves, one night, rushed in upon him to search for opium, when he was so terrified that he jumped from the terrace upon the hard ground, and was so injured, that he soon after died.

not be disputed. No one can doubt, however, the vastness of the population, and no philanthropist or Christian can view these hundreds of millions of human beings, without feeling that interests of infinite moment are connected with their present condition and future destiny. Could we read the inner life of one of this vast multitude, and know his thoughts and feelings, his hopes and fears; could we estimate the value of this one spirit, and measure its capacities for happiness or for misery; could we view the darkness of that dreary night which has settled over it, and the tenfold greater darkness that, without the gospel, awaits it in the future world; could we then, embrace within the sphere of our vision, four hundred millions of such beings, all speaking the same language and living under the same government, and being borne by the rapid tide of time to the same eternal world, we should feel, that, as the disciples of Christ, we had the most weighty and imperious duties to discharge towards them. We should feel the most intense anxiety to communicate to them the glad tidings of salvation—an anxiety which could be allayed only by strenuous efforts on the part of the whole church, to pour into those mighty masses the truths of God's Word.

Another interesting feature in the Chinese nation, is the high degree of civilization which they have so long enjoyed. We see among this people, all that internal peace and security, all that social and domestic comfort, all that skill in the arts and progress in science and education, to which a nation without the gospel, ever has, or probably ever can attain. From the *London Repertory of Arts, Sciences and Manufactures*, we learn that the Chinese were acquainted with the art of raising silk-worms, 2700 years before the Christian era, and that 1000 years before Christ, the compass for guiding travelers by sea and land was known. Boats and vessels constructed entirely of iron were used 400 B. C., and the knowledge of ink and paper is dated back 200 B. C. Printing from wooden blocks is said to have been invented between the years 581 and 593 A. D.; engraving on stone, A. D. 604; boring wells, the art of lighting and heating with inflammable gas, suspension bridges, fire engines, &c., A. D. 1120. For a knowledge of medicine, agriculture and horticulture, the Chinese have been long distinguished. They treat successfully many diseases which in Europe have been regarded as incurable. In horticulture, they understand the art of changing the colors of flowers, and of producing by artificial means, from dwarf trees, as fine fruit as is obtained from large ones.

Mr. Williams, in his second volume, devotes a chapter to the industrial arts of the Chinese, in which he describes their modes and implements of agriculture; the cultivation of rice, cotton, hemp, &c.; the progress they have made in the arts of metallurgy, and in the manufacture of glass, porcelain and silk: the growth,

preparation, and various kinds of tea; and their wonderful skill in carving in ivory, metals, &c. It is evident that among the various branches of labor, agriculture holds the highest rank in the estimation of the people. It is for the interest of the government to encourage the tillage of the soil, not only to provide food and labor for the people, but also to obtain in the easiest manner the means for sustaining the government. Besides, it is found less difficult to govern an agricultural, than a mercantile or war-loving community.

The idea has very generally prevailed, that the Chinese were very much averse to changes or improvements of any kind, and that this aversion acted as a strong barrier against the introduction of the gospel, or even of the inventions or discoveries of Christian communities. This, however, is not the case, though they are slow to change. Our author says:—

“Three new manufactures have been introduced during the present century, viz., that of glass, bronze-work, and Prussian-blue. A Chinese sailor introduced the manufacture of the latter, which he had learned thoroughly in London, and from which the people now supply themselves. Ships have been built upon the European model in a few instances, but there is little encouragement for naval architecture, since native merchants can bring a freight by foreign ships at a much cheaper rate than they can build them. Brass cannons were made during the war with England, in imitation of pieces taken from a wreck, and the frames of one or two vessels to be worked with wheels, by men at a crank, in imitation of steamers, were found on stocks at Ningpo, when the English took the place. The Chinese are not willing to adopt foreign improvements, unless they can see their way clear for a remuneration; but they have not the means, the science, or the inclination to risk many doubtful speculations or experiments.”—Vol. II. p. 142.

Many causes have operated, however, to retard the progress of the arts among them. While as a people they are not destitute of the power of invention, they are particularly distinguished for imitation; and being shut out from intercourse with other nations, the only models to which they have access are those left to them by their fathers. Besides, the great body of the people being obliged to depend upon manual labor for a subsistence, and the spirit of competition being very great, few have the leisure to devote to inventions or improvements. There are also suspicions and jealousies awakened when one acquires wealth, and the laws for the protection of property, are not, in such a case, rigidly enforced. Hence the stimulus to produce new inventions with the hope of acquiring a large property, is, in a great measure, taken away. If we add to this the debasing and weakening influence of heathenism upon the intellect, and the consequent absence of mental discipline and scientific knowledge, we very readily account for the want of progress and improvement. It was not until the gospel had aroused the European mind from the slumber of ages, that the mechanical arts began to flourish, and at the present moment the progress of Christianity the world over, indicates the

progress in these arts and in the comforts of life.' Nothing, therefore, but the quickening and ennobling principles of the gospel, can develop the ingenuity and inventive energies of the Chinese. Nothing else can break up the dull routine of monotonous manual labor, which generations after generations have pursued, and infuse life and enterprise into the people. To the idea advocated by Mr. Williams, that "the abundance of labor must be employed, and its cheapness obviates the necessity of finding substitutes in machinery," we cannot wholly subscribe. For, the introduction of machinery, while it may temporarily interfere with the employment of particular classes, is productive of as many (if not more) benefits, to the poor, as the rich. The cheaper the means and comforts of life can be produced, the greater share the laboring classes can obtain of them. Where on this continent is machinery more used than in New England, and where on earth do the middle and lower classes enjoy so many of the comforts, and we may add, the luxuries of life? Mr. Williams adds, that "under the fostering care of a wise government many contrivances for abbreviating it (labor) might be profitably introduced, such as saw-mills, flouring-mills, steamers, &c; but a wise government needs an intelligent people to work with and upon, in order to a harmonious onward progress."

In prosecuting the missionary work, we know of no agency, in addition to those already employed, that promises better prospects of success, than the sending forth of intelligent pious mechanics, to introduce among the heathen the temporal blessings of Christianity. Such an agency is, doubtless, less needed in China, than in some other nations; but could pious carpenters, manufacturers, cabinet-makers, blacksmiths, &c., be induced to introduce among heathen communities the mechanical arts, in connection with the preaching of the gospel, the establishment of schools and the distribution of books, the indirect influence of such a movement would be in the highest degree salutary. A single well-built, comfortable house erected in the midst of a barbarous people, would be a perpetual preacher of the temporal benefits of Christianity. It would give the people new ideas and awaken in their minds the spirit of improvement. It would help to break up their strong prejudices against change, a most important desideratum, as every missionary will testify. It would serve to teach

' It is interesting to observe how Providence bestows temporal blessings upon mankind just as they are prepared by the gospel to receive them. Communities that are destitute of virtuous and religious principles, are forced to expend that physical strength, in hand labor for the means of subsistence, which otherwise would be employed in deeds of flagrant wickedness. By thus drawing off this force, heathen society is able to exist. But as a people are elevated and purified, and able to use blessings without grossly abusing them,—the curse, "in the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat thy bread," is removed, and leisure is given for the enjoyment of intellectual and moral blessings.

them that the poorest inhabitant of a Christian land, can live in a more comfortable habitation, than is occupied by their king and his royal household.

The pious physicians and printers who have gone forth have rendered and continue to render the most valuable services to the missionary : and ere the world is converted to Christ, we believe that new agencies, with a vast augmentation of those already in use, must be put into operation. Mr. Williams himself went out to China as a printer ; and by his self-denying labors, his indefatigable industry, and his eminent usefulness, he has laid the Christian world under a high obligation, and earned for himself an enduring name.

The state of education and literature, is a most interesting and hopeful feature in the condition of the Chinese nation. Although their system of education is extremely defective, being confined to but few branches, and affording but little scope for the exercise of all and particularly the higher faculties of the mind, still, it is a pleasing fact, that education is appreciated by the mass of the people, and no mean efforts are made to secure its benefits. Probably no pagan nation has ever felt the conservative and controlling influence of education and literature to the same extent to which it has been experienced by the Chinese. Even before the time of Confucius, the importance of a general system of instruction was acknowledged by the people, and for centuries before the Christian era, the Chinese were in advance of the other civilized nations, in general education. They had not, it is true, produced philosophers, poets, historians and orators, such as flourished in Greece and Rome, but the masses of the people were more enlightened, than in those nations, and derived from the diffusion of knowledge greater moral benefit. In the Book of Rites, we are told, that "for the purposes of education among the ancients, villages had their schools, districts their academies, departments their colleges, and principalities their universities." Nor is it a little remarkable that the standard works and general literature of such a people should be so pure, and calculated to exert so healthful an influence. Mr. Williams quotes the testimony of a writer upon this point.

"The Chinese student not being secure from error by the light of revealed religion, can only derive his moral precepts from his school learning. He is certainly therefore fortunate in the possession of a body of ancient, national literature, which, while it cultivates his taste and improves his understanding, contains nothing to influence his passions or corrupt his heart. The Chinese are not compelled, as we are, upon the authority of great names, and for the sake of the graces of style and language, to place in the hands of their youth, works containing passages which put modesty to the blush,—works in which the most admirable maxims of morality are mixed and confounded together in the same page with avowals and descriptions of the most disgusting licentious-

ness. The writings which the Chinese put into the hands of their youthful students, are in this respect, wholly unexceptionable."—Vol. I. p. 435.

Many useful injunctions are given to children, of which the following are specimens. "Let children always be taught to speak the simple truth; to stand erect and in their proper places, and listen with respectful attention." "The pupil when he sees virtuous people must follow them, when he hears good maxims, conform to them. He must cherish no wicked designs, but always act uprightly, whether at home or abroad; he must have a fixed residence, and associate with the benevolent, carefully regulating his personal deportment and controlling the feelings of the heart."

The chief motive with the students, to obtain a high rank as scholars, is that they may receive an important office under government, or otherwise secure an honorable position in society. Such, however, is the system of instruction pursued, that the life of a student is one of intense and painful effort. The memory is overtasked, while the other faculties are but little exercised; and the attention being confined to classical and historical studies to the exclusion of other branches of literature, the mind is but little aided by the pleasure attendant upon the acquisition of general knowledge. Besides, the scholars not being symmetrically trained, their minds are not well balanced, and some who have received the highest honors for scholarship, are ignorant of the most common facts in general history, and the first principles of modern science.

The examination for the various degrees, are exceedingly rigid and thorough. The candidates, when they enter the hall to prepare their essays, are carefully searched, to ascertain whether they have pre-composed essays, or other aids concealed about their persons.

"When they are all seated in the hall in their proper places, the wickets, doors, windows, and other entrances are all guarded by men, and pasted over with strips of paper. The room is filled with anxious competitors arranged in long seats, pencil in hand, and ready to begin. The theme is given out, and every one immediately writes off his essay, carefully noting how many characters he erases in composing it, and hands it up to the board of examiners; the whole day is allotted to the task, and a signal gun announces the hour when the doors are thrown open, and the students disperse. The first two trials thin off the crowd amazingly, and the examiners can easily reduce the number of competitors, so that not one tenth of those who appear at the first struggle, are seen at the third. A man is constantly liable to lose his acquired honor of *sintai*, if at a subsequent inspection he is found to have discarded his studies, and he is therefore impelled to pursue them in order to escape disgrace, even if he does not reach the next degree."

Some of the halls are very large, that at Canton, containing 7500 cells, each of which measures four feet by three. The students are so arranged as to be easily inspected by the soldiers, and the furniture of their apartments is very simple. Their position



is exceedingly cramped and painful, and it not unfrequently happens that the old students die from excessive fatigue.

The advantages, however, of the Chinese system of education, with all its imperfections, are very great. It forms the basis and the strength of the institutions of the country, and secures as just and equitable an administration of the laws, as is possible in a heathen community.

"Most of the real benefits of Chinese education and of this system of examinations, are reached before the conferment of the degree of *kujiu*. These consist in diffusing a general respect and taste for letters among the people; in calling out the true talent of the country to the notice of the rulers in an honorable path of effort; in making all persons so thoroughly acquainted with the best moral books in the language, that they cannot fail to exercise some salutary restraint; in elevating the general standard of education so much that every man is almost compelled to give his son a little learning in order that he may get along in life: and finally through all their influences, powerfully contributing to uphold the existing institutions of the empire. Educated men form the only aristocracy in the land; and the attainment of the first degree, by introducing its owner into the class of *gentry*, is considered ample compensation for all the expense and study spent in getting it. On the whole it may safely be asserted, that these examinations do more to maintain the stability of the Chinese government than any other single cause.—Vol I. p. 448.

The science of the Chinese, including their knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, anatomy, surgery, and military tactics; the general characteristics of the people, and the religion of the country, are topics which are fully and ably treated in the work before us. But our limits will not allow us to dwell upon them. The religion of this people in connection with our missionary labors among them, is a subject to which the attention of the religious world should be especially directed. For, when we consider the vastness of the Chinese population; the progress they have made in civilization, the arts and education; and the facilities now afforded for introducing the gospel into the Empire, we cannot but see that they have claims upon us which are surpassed by no other nation. The five Ports which are open, afford to the missionary access to five or six millions of the people, many of whom are favorably disposed towards foreigners. Already congregations have been gathered to listen to the Word of Life, and more might be gathered were there only laborers enough in the field to reap the harvest. "Facilities for learning the language are constantly increasing. Dictionaries, vocabularies, phrase books, grammars, and chrestomathics in all the dialects will soon be prepared, and the list now is not small. They have all, with few exceptions, been made and printed by Protestant missionaries."

To see the gospel traversing, on its great mission of love, the hamlets, villages, towns and cities of that immense empire; to see it moulding the opinions, habits and principles of the people; modifying their government; improving their laws; arousing their

mental energies, and elevating them in morals and religion, would be, indeed, a sublime and glorious spectacle—a spectacle which would quicken the church, and give to the missionary cause an impetus which would not spend itself until the kingdoms of the earth had become the kingdom of our Lord.

With regard to the general character of the Chinese we would remark, that while there are many features of an interesting and encouraging nature, there are others which indicate the existence of gross vices. If we compare them with the most enlightened and Christian nations of the earth, we are impressed with their degradation, their idolatry, and their fearful immoralities. On the other hand, if they are compared with other heathen communities, we find much to excite our admiration. By their love of peace and good order, their habits of industry, and fondness for traffic, they have imparted a stability to society, and created a general respect for the laws of the land. Their reverence for their parents and superiors has also had a conservative influence upon the community; and the effects of education, in disseminating among them the principles of justice and benevolence, and bringing together different classes, have been most happy.

Still, if we look at the other side of the picture, we find evidences of human depravity, and Pagan degradation of the most appalling character. While there is an outward regard for decency, the conversation and conduct of the masses are in the highest degree reprehensible. Licentiousness prevails to an alarming extent, and brothels abound in every street. The great sin, however, of the people is that of lying. This has degraded them in the eyes of foreigners, and destroyed much of the interest that would otherwise have been felt in their welfare. Residents among them acquire the habit of regarding all with suspicion, and dealing with them on the principle that no confidence whatever can be placed in their word. Thieving, also, is common, although it is greatly restrained by the punishments which are inflicted on criminals.

"On the whole," says Mr. Williams, "the Chinese present a singular mixture; if there is something to commend, there is more to blame; if they have some glaring vices, they have more virtues than most Pagan nations. Ostentatious kindness and inbred suspicion, ceremonial civility and real rudeness, partial invention and servile imitation, industry and waste, sycophancy and self-dependence, are, with other dark and bright qualities, strangely blended. In trying to remedy the faults of their character by the restraints of law, and the diffusion of education, they have no doubt hit upon the right mode; and their short-comings show how ineffectual both must be, until the gospel comes to the aid of the ruler and the subject, in elevating the moral sense of the whole nation. This has now commenced, and every day adds fresh proof of the necessity of missionary labors among this remarkable people. Facts of daily occurrence brought to the knowledge of the missionaries, reveal the prevalence of the most fearful immoralities, and furnish a melancholy insight into the desolating horrors of Paganism. Female infanticide, in some parts openly confessed, and divested of all disgrace and penalties everywhere; the dreadful

prevalence of all the vices charged by the apostle Paul upon the ancient heathen world; the alarming extent of the use of opium, (furnished, too, by the British and American merchants,) destroying the productions and natural resources of the people; the universal practice of lying and dishonest dealing; the unblushing lewdness of old and young; harsh cruelty towards prisoners by officers, and tyranny over slaves by masters; all forming a full unchecked torrent of human depravity, proving the existence of a kind and degree of moral degradation, of which an excessive statement can scarcely be made, or an adequate conception hardly be formed."—Vol. II. pp. 98, 99.

The closing chapter of the work is devoted to an impartial consideration of the late war with China, with some of its effects upon the government and people. Although England cannot be justified in waging that war, but must add it to the long catalogue of her national sins, still a higher Power has overruled it, in some instances, for good. It has taught the Chinese many important lessons. It has led to the ratification of commercial and political treaties, which will doubtless be of great benefit to China and to the maritime nations of the earth. It has secured the protection of Christianity, although the hostility felt towards the English is a permanent obstacle to the progress of their religion among that people. The continuance of the opium trade is also attended with many direct and indirect evils. The fact that this trade is so extensively prosecuted by the English and Americans, who in the view of the Chinese are the representatives of the Christian faith, must seriously embarrass the operations of our missionaries, and help to put far off the day when China shall be numbered among Christian nations.

Still, the church has but one course to pursue in reference to this people. Let our missions be enlarged; let the Bible and other religious books be extensively circulated; let Christian schools and churches be organized; and let fervent prayer ascend for the Divine blessing, and there will be hope for China—hope that her teeming millions will be lifted from their moral and intellectual degradation—hope that her chains of political servitude will be broken, her idols overthrown, and Christianity triumphant.

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*The British Quarterly Review. November 1848 and February 1849. London.*

THESE two numbers of this great Quarterly are unusually rich with able, timely, and interesting articles. There is a favorable though discriminating Review of Channing's Memoirs; an admirable sketch of the Life of Keats; a curious and elaborate outline of Spinoza's Life and Writings; a timely and able paper on the Endowment of Romanism; a lengthy historical and philosophical article on the state of Europe in 1848; an able and discriminating, though we think somewhat unjust, critique on Macaulay's History of England; a favorable Review of Baptist Noel's Church and State; a learned and instructive and argumentative paper on Modern Millenarianism, with other articles of no little value.

## ARTICLE IX.

## CRITICAL AND LITERARY NOTICES OF BOOKS.

BY THE EDITOR.

- 1.—*BIBLIA HEBRAICÆ, secundum editiones Jos. Athiæ, Joannis Leusden, Jo. Simonis Ahiorumque, imprimis EVERARDI VAN DER HOOCHT, D. Henrici Opitii, et Wolfii Heidenheim, cum additionibus clavique Masoretica et rabinnica* AUGUSTI HAHN. *Nunc denuo recognita et emendata ab Isaaco Leeser, V. D. M. synagagæ Mikre Israel. Philæ. et Josepho Jaquett, V. D. M. presbyter Prot. Epis. Ecclesiæ, U. S.* Editio stereotypa. Nori Eboraci: Sumtibus Joannis Wiley. 1849.

We have given the whole contents of the title-page of this work, as the best endorsement of its merits, and commendation, that we are capable of giving. HAHN'S HEBREW BIBLE is so well known and highly appreciated in the learned world, that the announcement of a standard American edition of it ought to be hailed with pride and pleasure. Prof. Robinson, in the *Bib. Repository* for April, 1832, congratulated the public on the appearance of the LEIPSI edition of this work, hundreds of copies of which have been imported into this country and sold. It is surprising that we have waited seventeen years for an American edition of this great standard sacred classic, especially considering the state of Hebrew literature in this country.

It is a sufficient recommendation of *this* edition to say, that it is an *exact reprint of the Leipsic edition*. The typographical execution is also well-nigh perfect; the paper is good; the type is new, clear, and handsome, and the points are beautiful and distinct, while the binding is appropriate and substantial. The price is also low, viz., \$4. Certainly no Hebrew scholar need longer deny himself a good Hebrew Bible; and as the means of studying the original Scriptures are thus multiplied or made accessible, we doubt not the number of learners and students will rapidly increase.

- 2.—*Essay on the Union of Church and State.* By BAPTIST WRIOTHESLEY NOEL, M.A. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1849.

THIS and MACAULAY'S HISTORY, are the two great books of the season. The social and ecclesiastical standing of the author; his reputation for piety and ability; the noble stand which he has taken, and the recent developments of Providence bearing on the great question herein discussed, lend much circumstantial interest and importance to this work. But the book itself is worthy of the theme—worthy of the man—worthy of the age. We feel, on reading it, the contact of a master-mind; the force of a great argument; the warmth of a large and catholic heart; the glow and attraction of a sincere, earnest, all-pervading piety; we had almost said the conviction of a new truth, and the impulse of a new life.

Mr. Noel has certainly executed his task, in a strait-forward, thorough, able manner. He is evidently master of his whole subject; his constant reference to authorities, biblical, historical, and statistical, evinces a thorough exploration of the sources of argument, and a wish to meet the question fairly and fully: his language is clear, terse, and intelligible to all; his spirit is emi-

ently kind and Christian, though "no spurious liberality or fear of censure" is allowed to restrain rebuke or dull the edge of truth. His array of facts, especially those bearing on the *condition and influence* of the Establishment, is exceedingly illustrative of his main argument, and indeed truly appalling; and his final conclusions are sound, irresistible, and seal the doom of the iniquitous Union. So little is *self* brought into the discussion, that the book furnishes no evidence that the distinguished author had ever sustained personal relations to the Establishment, or been so harshly and cruelly used by the Bishop of London on announcing his determination quietly to retire from it: there is no invective in the book, it is all *argument*, and argument that must carry conviction to many of those "loved and honored brethren" of the evangelical school whom he leaves behind, and from whom he parts in so kind a spirit, and in so sublime a manner.

The book is not faultless. Some parts exhibit marks of haste in putting his thoughts into form; now and then his reasoning may be fallacious, and his principles pushed to unwarrantable lengths; his present views also of ecclesiastical polity will not receive the sanction of a large part of the great body of Dissenters; still these are minor things, and do not in the least affect the integrity or weaken the force of his main argument.

The following is a general analysis of the Essay. Part I.—Principles of the Union between the Church and the State. Ch. I.—General considerations which condemn the Union. In six sections he here shows that it is condemned by the Constitution of the State; by the Pastoral Relation; by History; by the Mosaic Law; by the Prophecies of the Old Testament, and by the New Testament. Ch. II.—Principles of the Union condemned by the Word of God. This is shown in four sections on the Maintenance of Christian Pastors by the State; the Supremacy of the State; Patronage; Coercion. Part II.—Effects of the Union. Ch. I.—Influence of the Union upon Bishops; upon Pastors; upon Curates; upon Members of the Anglican Churches, and upon Dissenters. Ch. II.—Influence of the Union upon the Number of Ministers: the Distribution of Ministers; the Maintenance of Ministers; the Doctrine taught in the Anglican Churches; the Evangelization of the country; upon the Union of Christians; the Reformation of the Churches; the Progress of Religion; influence upon the Government, and upon other National Establishments. These two chapters reveal some startling statements and facts; take one. "What is the actual state of the Establishment? Myriads of its members have nothing of christianity but the name, received in infancy by baptism, and retained without one spontaneous act of their own; and millions do nothing whatever to promote the cause of Christ. Its 13,000 churches are generally without evangelistic activity, without brotherly fellowship, without discipline, without spirituality, without faith. Of its 16,000 ministers, about 1,568 do nothing; about 6,681 limit their thoughts and labors to small parishes which contain from 150 to 300 souls; while others in cities and towns profess to take charge of 8,000 or 9,000 souls. And of the 12,923 working pastors of churches, I fear, from various concurrent symptoms, that about 10,000 are unconverted men, who neither preach nor know the Gospel!" Part III.—Means of promoting a Revival of Religion in the Churches; its extension throughout the country; Conclusion.

We give a paragraph of his conclusion, in which his argument is summed up and condensed into a burning focus: "The union of the Churches with the State is doomed. Condemned by reason and religion, by Scripture and experience, how can it be allowed to injure the nation much longer? All the main principles upon which it rests are unsound. Its State-salaries, its supremacy, its patronage, its compulsion of payments for the support of religion, are condemned by both the precedents and the precepts of the word of God. We have seen that it sheds a blighting influence upon prelates, incumbents, curates, and other members of Churches. It adds little to the number of pastors, it distributes with a wasteful disregard to the wants of the population, and it pays

least those whom it ought to pay most liberally. It excludes the gospel from thousands of parishes; it perpetuates corruptions in doctrine; it hinders all scriptural discipline; it desecrates the ordinances of Christ, confounds the Church and the world, fomenting schism among Christians, and tempts the ministers of Christ both in and out of the Establishment to be eager politicians. Further, it embarrasses successive governments, maintains one chief element of revolution in the country, renders the reformation of the Anglican Churches hopeless, hinders the progress of the Gospel throughout the kingdom, and strengthens all the corrupt papal Establishments of Europe."

This work has a great and blessed mission to perform. Baptist Noel has evidently been called to undertake "a second Reformation, more spiritual and not less extensive than the first." God has trained him for the service in his own wonder-working way, and qualified him to achieve it: it is the great work of his life. This is not an ebullition of feeling or a hasty change of views; but an expression of convictions deep-seated, long maturing, and now when the fulness of time is come, boldly and manfully expressed in the language of a Luther. Spiritual Hierarchies as well as Political Despotisms, are indeed "doomed." We wonder not at the prodigious sensation which the book is producing on the other side of the water; Dissenters elated; the people meeting in assemblies to read it; and prelates and churchmen full of wrath and alarm.

3.—*God in Christ. Three Discourses delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.*  
By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown & Parsons. 1849.

THE views presented in these Discourses, as they were originally delivered, have already attracted much attention; and our object is merely to announce their appearance in this authentic form. The Discourses on the Trinity and Atonement appear as they were delivered, the former at New Haven, the latter at Cambridge. The Discourse on Dogma and Spirit, has been recast, and so far modified in "its form as even to vary a little the import of the subject." The whole is introduced by an elaborate Preliminary Dissertation, on the "genesis" and powers of language. The views presented in this Dissertation, the author regards as an essential key to the doctrines of the discourses. They must at least have the effect, with those who embrace them, of discouraging *theological criticism*; since the main conclusion of the author is, that through the infirmities of language, natural science and dogmatic theology are impossible. Thought is not conveyed by literal statements and definitions, serving as measures of truth, but is suggested by the resultant force of mutually repugnant symbols, held up in words. "Poets, then, are the true metaphysicians, and if there be any complete science of man to come, they must bring it."

Having arrived at this conclusion in his Introduction, we could not, of course, expect the author to present his views of the Trinity and Atonement in the usual dogmatic method of our theological formulas; and we are not surprised that such havoc as he makes of catechisms, creeds, and systems of divinity, should excite alarm. But whether his doctrine of an "Instrumental Trinity," and an æsthetic Atonement be identical with that of other Calvinistic theologians, and which approaches nearest the doctrine of the Scriptures, we will not attempt to decide in a single paragraph. To many of the author's views, especially on the subject of the Atonement, we can by no means subscribe. Yet we must at least acquit him of the charge of Unitarianism; and we hope that the publication of these Discourses, and the discussion to which they must lead, will help Christians to a better understanding of each other, and of the doctrines themselves.

Of the eloquence and power with which the author exhibits his views, we cannot express too warmly our admiration. The *mysticism* with which his

theology is tinctured, and his style really *saturated*, is an element that does not readily coalesce with Calvinism; and to this in part the "evil notoriety" of the Discourses is to be attributed. We shall doubtless have occasion to refer to this work again.

4.—*Macaulay's History of England, from the Accession of James II.*

By THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. Vols. I. II. 8vo. pp. 619, 617. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

WE cannot so well express our feelings in introducing this greatest of recent books to our readers as in the language of the North British Review: "We have never perused a work of literature or science, or even of fiction, with such an intense interest as that with which we have devoured the two remarkable volumes now before us. We have cheated our mind of its usual food, and our body of its usual rest, in order to grasp, by one mental effort, the great truths which they teach, and imbibe the noble lessons which they convey. Were we among the personal friends of Mr. Macaulay, or did we adopt the latitudinarian views of religious truth which he has presented to us in all the fascination of language and of sentiment, we might have suspected that our judgment was partial, and our admiration extravagant; but, though our Presbyterian feelings has been often offended, and our most venerated martyrs but slightly honored, and our national creed not unfrequently reviled, yet these penumbral spots disappear, while we study in his bright and eloquent pages the vindication of our country's liberties,—the character and the fate of the sages who asserted them,—and the righteous but terrible doom of the Princes from whom they were wrong."

The first volume is divided into five chapters. "In the *first* Mr. Macaulay gives a condensed and elegant sketch of English history from the earliest times to the Revolution in 1660. In the *second* chapter, he details the leading events in the reign of Charles II. In the *third*, he describes the state of England at the accession of James II., treating of its statistics, its literature and science, its arts, its agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, the state of its towns and villages, and the condition of its population; and in the remaining *two* chapters, he gives the history of the last of the Stuarts, which is continued and concluded in the *five* chapters of the second volume."—The space of time which these two volumes cover is therefore small, being little more than the reign of James II., but that space was crowded with momentous and destiny-ruling events and results. We most earnestly wish that the author had gone more fully into the history of England *previous* to the accession of James II., the period from which he dates; especially that he had availed himself of his favorable stand-point and sources of knowledge and preëminently fitting qualities, to bring out in its proper light and importance the glorious Puritan history of that eventful period, which he has scarcely touched upon; and which, as an all-modifying and all-controlling element of the British Constitution and of English history ever since that period, seems to us essential to a fair, just, and complete execution of the great and useful task to which he has addressed himself.

Our narrow space will not allow of our going into the merits or demerits of this History as far as completed; nor need we: the favorable judgment of the world is already passed upon it; no commendation will help it; no criticism will injure it; besides, our readers will be sure to get it, and read and judge for themselves.

Mr. Macaulay's style, modes of thinking, and characteristics as a writer; his extensive and accurate erudition, his power of analysis and classification, his liberality of views and acknowledged ability, were so well known beforehand, that an intelligent, *a priori* judgment might have been passed upon the characteristics of this work. We see Macaulay, the splendid and powerful Essayist in every page. It does not read like history; it is not a dry de-

tail of events or chapter of names and dates : it is one grand continuous Dissertation on the working out of English Liberty, in which names and dates and isolated events and characters, which form the staple of most of our histories, are merely incidental, while *things—principles*—the master-originating and moving *causes* of Revolution and Progress, which constitute alike the true philosophy and the real soul of history, are made chief and paramount. With him, "every fact has but one meaning, every event but one tongue, and every mystery but one interpretation." Hence, there is no darkness, no confusion, no dullness, no unmeaning jargon, no inanimate forms, no useless actors, no crude philosophizing, no stilted diction, no tricks of art, in all his pages. The scene is one; the actors few and admirably chosen, and made to play well their part; the plot thickens; great and still greater events crowd upon the stage and intensify the interest; the grand catastrophe hastens on—signs in heaven and wonders on earth herald its coming; and when at last the climax is reached, and Destiny comes forth to utter the doom of the last of the Stuarts,—we are spell-bound, and yield ourselves up to the power of a master-mind. And this is why all classes of readers, young and old, learned and unlearned, find so much to interest them in these pages.—That it will not only correct many false opinions of the past and induce a juster and higher appreciation of the present, but also awaken a new and more general interest in the reading and study of history, we cannot for a moment doubt; and therefore rejoice in the rapid and extensive circulation which it has already obtained.

But two volumes are published; several more are to come, as it is to be brought "down to a time which is within the memory of men still living." No little impatience and anxiety will be felt to see the result of Mr. Macaulay's future labors. Says the North British Review, "It will no doubt include the chronicle of the Great Revolution, which at the close of the last century, subverted European dynasties, and which, after being itself subverted, has reappeared with redoubled energy, threatening the extinction, or heralding the improvement of every political institution. The path of the historian will, therefore, lie among thorns and quicksands, exposing him to the assaults of vindictive factions—of men rushing headlong to changes, or checking the march of that great civilization which the highest oracles have taught us to anticipate. The manner in which Mr. Macaulay has traced his course through the intricacies of our own revolutionary period, is the best earnest of his future success; and though we sometimes start at what is perhaps only the shadow of secular bearings, when he refers to conflicting creeds, and treats of ecclesiastical strife, yet we look forward with confidence, and even with delight to his future labors. It is difficult for a statesman embroiled in the politics of his own day, and committed often to hasty opinions which he does not himself hold, to descant freely and consistently on the events of other times, and to protect those stern decisions which he pronounces for posterity, from the taint of passing interests and contemporary feeling. Mr. Macaulay has, in our judgment, steered clear of this Scylla and Charybdis of history, and we feel assured that even his political adversaries will not venture to assert that he has chronicled the reign of James II. with the temper of a partisan, or sought to magnify his own political opinions, by distorting the facts or suppressing the truths of history."

We cannot close this imperfect notice without expressing our surprise and sense of shame, that such a tempest should be raised against the Harpers' noble edition of this History, because the orthography of a few words were conformed to our standard. And has it come to this? Are we to be the last to show honor to our own Webster? Are we never to have a literature, a creed, a standard of our own? Are we never to think a thought, or even to spell a word, without deferring to trans-Atlantic authorities? Shame on American independence! We dislike the principle of mutilation as really as do many others, but if that principle is to be constituted into an iron rule, and applied even to the orthography and punctuation and capitals of an author, leaving a



publisher, even of a foreign work, not the least liberty in these mere mechanical parts,—we will for ourselves refuse to come under it, nay we will be for repudiating the foundation principle itself.

5.—*The Life and Thoughts of John Foster.* By W. W. EVERTS. New York : Edward H. Fletcher. 1849.

FOSTER is too well known even on this side of the Atlantic to need any advertisement from us, and too highly appreciated to render criticism or commendation of any avail. His writings have exerted and are exerting a powerful influence over the thinking and leading minds of the world. There is an originality, and a vigor, and a reach of thought in them, which cannot fail to stir up and sway the reader's mind.

The plan of this book is somewhat peculiar. It embraces a compendious view of his life, together with an estimate of his intellectual, literary, and religious character. While the body of the work consists of the most remarkable passages of Foster's writings, collected and classified for convenience of reference and use.

From the examination we have been able to give it, we are of the opinion that these selections have been made with nice discrimination and sound judgment; and the thoughts are arranged under their appropriate topics, and numbered to facilitate reference. The whole presents a rare collection of gems, gathered from all his writings. Those who have not Foster's works, will find here the very cream of them all; and those who have them, will also find its arrangement of topics and classification of choice passages and copious index greatly facilitating a reference to the opinions of this remarkable man.

6.—*Rational Psychology : or the Subjective Idea and the Objective Law of all intelligence.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., *Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary of Auburn.* Auburn : Derby Miller & Co. 1849.

AN octavo volume of 717 pages. Nothing like a definite and complete idea of so elaborate, abstruse, and extensive a work can be given in a brief notice. Prof. Hickok has evidently bestowed patient and laborious thought on the science of mind; he is a close, independent, bold thinker; and has produced a work here which we think will make him favorably known to the thinking world. Its method is peculiar and original; its principles are discussed with subtle discrimination and great logical acumen; and its ends reached by a careful and thorough investigation of the "a priori elements and primitive principles of all science."—Some idea of the drift of the Author's mind may be derived from his explanation of what Rational Psychology is. "In this science, we pass from the facts of experience wholly out beyond it, and seek for the *rationale* of experience itself in the necessary and universal principles which must be conditional for all facts of a possible experience. We seek to determine how it is possible for an experience to be, from those a priori conditions which render all the functions of an intellectual agency themselves intelligible. In the conclusions of this science it becomes competent for us to affirm, not as from mere experience we may, that this *is*—but, from these necessary and universal principles, that this *must be*. The intellect is itself investigated and known through the a priori principles which must necessarily control all its agency, and thereby the being of intelligence is expounded in its constitutional functions and laws of operation."—Introduction.

Having shown what Rational Psychology is, and the Ends to which the conclusions of the science may be rendered subservient, the Author passes to the Groundwork of the subject, which he declares to be "*a universal criterion of science*," and this criterion is shown to be "the determined accordance of the subjective Idea and the objective Law."—His general method appears in the

following: "Our work thus necessarily divides itself into *three parts*—the faculty of the Sense; of the Understanding; and of the Reason. We must attain the *a priori* subjective Idea for each, and also the objective actual Law of each; and in each case determine the correlation of the idea and the law respectively. In this we shall have reduced each faculty of knowledge to an *a priori* philosophical science, according to the universal criterion for all science; and in this Rational Psychology will be completed. Moreover, in these conclusions of Rational Psychology, we shall find the data for demonstrating the valid being of the objects given through these intellectual faculties; and thus in each department we may add also the outlines of an "*Ontological Demonstration*." The carrying out of this idea constitutes the body of the work.

We commend this work to the attention of the few who read and digest works of this purely intellectual and abstruse character. How far the main idea of the book is original, we are unable to say; the discussion is certainly able, and the subject worthy of the profoundest study of the profoundest minds. It strikes us that there is a certain air of Germanism or transcendentalism about the work, especially in the Author's mode of thinking and use of language, which detracts from the interest and value of it.

It is put forth with becoming modesty. "It is not expected that it will be of any interest to the many; sufficient quite, if it reach and occupy the minds of the few, and propagate its reciprocations of free thought through the growing numbers of such as *can* and *do* familiarize themselves in purely rational demonstrations. Nor has it been deemed that there is here a perfected and universally comprehensive philosophy; though it is believed that the true direction is here taken, and it is also hoped that some progress has been gained towards the ultimate attainment of that position from which the complete science of all sciences, if ever to be consummated, must at length be perfected. It is intended only as a contribution to the common current of rational philosophic speculation, and is silently cast into the stream of thought to flow on with it if found to be congenial, or to be thrown ashore if it prove only as a foreign cumbering drift upon its surface."—Preface.

- 7.—*Oregon and California in 1848*. By J. QUINN THORNTON, *late Judge of the Supreme Court of Oregon, and Corresponding Member of the American Institute, with an Appendix, including recent and authentic information on the subject of the Gold Mines of California, with Illustrations and a Map*. In two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

THESE volumes are not a mere catch-penny concern, as are many of the works which the California excitement has produced. They are intensely exciting as a narrative, and of real and permanent value, for their varied and reliable information. They evince, too, no little literary taste and erudition, though the product of a California emigrant. They tell a tale of emigrant hardship, suffering, and toil, that harrows up the reader's feelings to their intensest pitch, and chills his very blood.

Judge Thornton and wife, in company with a large body of emigrants, crossed the continent to Oregon in the year 1846. We have here a detailed narrative of this journey. Their sufferings were unparalleled. Led out of their way by designing men—overtaken by the storms and snows of a terrible winter mid-way the journey—sick, dispirited, and dying from cold and starvation, and the bones of more than half left to bleach in the wilderness,—it is a record of terrible interest. We have read of battle-scenes, shipwrecks, horrible sufferings, and lingering deaths; tales of torture, cannibalism, and tragedy, real and imaginary,—but in the whole course of our reading we have met with nothing to compare with the narrative part of these volumes. Men, women, and child-

ren dying by inches from hunger in a dreary wilderness; the living feeding upon the dead; toasting their hearts on a stick, and cutting off the flesh from the bones and subsisting upon it; killing each other for food; selfishness, revenge, murder, cannibalism in its most horrid features, reigning in the camp,—the annals of human suffering nowhere present a more appalling spectacle. We specify "The Camp of Death," and "The Winter Camp," on the terrible Sierra Nevada, as embodying a tale which nothing but the terrible fidelity of truth could have drawn. Once read it will never fade from the mind. It gives one a new view of the power of human depravity and human endurance. We give an extract or two, though of the most revolting character. The scene is "The Mountain Camp," when visited by the party of relief sent out from California to the famished, snow-bound, cannibalized survivors of that ill-fated party.

"The men had now, for the first time, a little leisure to observe. The mutilated body of a friend, having nearly all the flesh torn away was seen at the door,—the head and face remaining entire. Half-consumed limbs were seen concealed in trunks. Bones were scattered about. Human hair of different colors were seen in tufts about the fire-place. The sight was overwhelming; and outraged nature sought relief by one spontaneous outcry of agony and grief and tears. The air was rent by the wails of sorrow and distress that ascended at once, and as if by previous concert, from the charnel-house of death beneath the snow." Eight miles distant was the camp of Messrs. Donner. "Baptiste had just left the camp of the widow of the late Jacob Donner, with the leg and thigh of Jacob Donner, for which he had been sent by George Donner, the brother of the deceased. That was given, but the boy was informed that no more could be given, Jacob Donner's body being the last they had. They had consumed four bodies, and the children were sitting upon a log, with their faces stained with blood, devouring the half-roasted liver and heart of the father. \* \* \* Around the fire were hair, bones, skulls, and the fragments of half-consumed limbs. \* \* \* They had not gone far when they came to the grave of Jacob Donner. His head was cut off, and was lying with the face up, the snow and cold having preserved all the features unaltered. His limbs and arms had been severed from the body, which was cut open—the heart and liver being taken out. The leg and thigh which the boy Baptiste had obtained, had been thrown back, upon the party coming up with relief. Other graves were seen, but nothing remained in them but a few fragments." And yet the author says: "A multitude of the most shocking and revolting circumstances are designedly suppressed as being unfit for the sober pages of history. Notwithstanding the unspeakable distress which is known by the world to have existed, and the thrilling scenes which the narrative of this lamentable affair presents, the *full* story will never be told, and the half of that which is known by the people of California will never appear in print; and indeed ought not."

8.—*Punishment by Death: its Authority and Expediency.* By GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D.D. New York and London: John Wiley. 1849.

THIS is a second and complete edition of this great work. It is a masterly argument, based on Divine Authority, and on the experience of the world, in favor of Capital Punishment, and all attempts to set it aside or evade its conclusions are vain. It has already done a great work. It has made a deep and salutary impression on the public mind; restrained, as by a mountain barrier, that tide of licentiousness, irreligion, and mock sensibility—for that the springs of this movement lie in the deep-seated wickedness and infidelity of the human heart, no observing mind can doubt—which is beating against the great sanction of law, and threatening the very foundations of society.

The re-issue of this work is highly opportune. The battle is evidently to be resumed; the *great* struggle is yet to come on this fundamental question; and every lover of order, peace, virtue, justice, humanity, religion, ought to

prepare for it, and to awake to meet it. Nothing so able, so convincing, so logically irresistible, has been written as this argument of Dr. Cheever's. It ought to be read and pondered by every legislator, judge, jurymen, minister, layman, and citizen, that its principles and conclusions may be embodied in public sentiment, and made to control the legislation and jurisprudence of this great nation.

9.—*An Introduction to the New Testament, containing an examination of the most important questions relating to the authenticity, interpretation, and integrity of the canonical books, with reference to the latest inquiries.* By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, LL.D. Volume I. The Four Gospels. London: Samuel Bagster & Sons. 1848. 8vo. pp. 430.

We take great pleasure in introducing this elegantly executed and highly valuable work to the notice of American scholars and divines. It is eminently timely, and a valuable acquisition to English Biblical literature.

The work has been prepared with special reference to the researches and speculations of German Biblical scholars. The author's knowledge of German mind and of the entire field of German criticism, including the most recent writings, is extensive and thorough. No available source of information adapted to render it worthy of the name, "Introduction," has been neglected. But while he treats this German literature with fairness, and evinces a perfect mastery of it all, the author is no slave to it; he yields no blind submission to its authority, but retains that freedom of thought and of soul which is so essential to correct investigation and sound criticism. While he has no sympathy for the "stereotype minded" or for those "who creep along in the ruts of hereditary or prevailing opinion," he has none for the rash innovator or specious speculator, and is free from the virus of German neology.

The author says: "It seems to be the wiser course to prepare for all the objections that may be urged against the New Testament. It is better to anticipate the diffusion of certain subtle cavils in the field of Christianity than to decry at a distance, or to be overwhelmed by their novelty when they are fairly imported from other lands. It is the writer's belief that the books of the New Testament are ere long to pass through a severe ordeal. The translations of various Continental works which have recently appeared in England, and the tendency of certain speculations in philosophy, indicate a refined skepticism or a pantheistic spirit which confounds the *objective* and the *subjective*, or *unduly subordinates* the former to the latter. Many are disposed to exalt their *intuitions* too highly to the detriment of the *historical*, as Kant did his *Pure Reason*."

These extracts will give our readers some idea of the design, character, and utility of this "Introduction to the New Testament." It supplies a want which many have felt and expressed, and we doubt not that when its great merit is known on this side the Atlantic, it will be eagerly sought after and highly appreciated. We hope it will be speedily republished in this country, as the English edition is quite expensive. The work will be completed either in two or three volumes, and when completed we shall refer to it again.

10.—*Posthumous Works of the REV. THOMAS CHALMERS, LL. D. Edited by the REV. WILLIAM HANNA, LL. D. Volume V. Sabbath Readings.* New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

THIS volume is uniform in its mechanical appearance and in its general character with the four previous ones. It extends from Genesis to II. Kings. We have already several times expressed our high opinion of the spiritual character and merit of this series, and need not now renew our commendation. We take great delight ourselves in reading them for edification; and although they

are neither critical nor expository, but just the free pious thoughts of that great good man, yet are they highly suggestive and abound with original, striking views of Divine Truth. The Harpers have brought out this series in a very appropriate and beautiful form.

- 11.—*Life of Franklin Illustrated. His Autobiography, and a Narrative of his public life and services.* By the REV. H. HASTINGS WELD. *Splendidly embellished by numerous exquisite designs* by JOHN CHAPMAN. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

FRANKLIN'S Autobiography ought to be read and carefully studied by every man, especially by every young man who wishes to be anything. There is a world of wisdom, sterling sense, and sagacity in it. He certainly possessed peculiar gifts; he was a close and discriminating observer; a bold and original thinker; a real genius in invention, a philosopher in arrangement, and a master-operator in execution. His experience was varied and profound; his opportunity for a thorough knowledge of human nature in all its phases and conditions peculiar, while the part he acted in the great events of our Revolutionary history was conspicuous, and places him in the very first rank of statesmen, diplomatists, and patriots; and here we have the results of his sagacity, shrewdness, extensive observation, and experience, embodied in his own personal history, and told in his own inimitable manner. It is a book for "the people"—a book of "proverbs," if you please, having in it no little of the wisdom of Solomon; proverbs illustrated and worked out in his own history. It is a practical every-day philosophy which has made the fortunes of more men (*for this world only, alas!*) than all the gold of California will ever make. The narrative of his public life and services by Mr. Weld, forms an interesting and valuable addition to the autobiography.

This edition is a splendid affair—nothing like it exists; the old philosopher would hardly know himself in so splendid a dress. The paper, the press-work, the pictorial illustrations are all superior. And yet though got up in this costly manner, it is sold for the low sum of \$2, in eight numbers.

- 12.—*Life and Reign of Pope Pius the Ninth, with a Biographical Sketch of his predecessor, Gregory XVI. Prepared as a Supplement to the 17th edition of the History of Romanism.* By JOHN DOWLING, D. D. New York: Edward Walker. 1849.

A FIT supplement to Dowling's great work, *The History of Romanism*, and bringing it down to the present eventful period. We are glad to learn that this highly valuable book, so full of historic interest, and constantly referred to as good authority in the great controversy with Romanism, is having so extensive a circulation. It is indeed a remarkable book; and if our readers wish to know what Romanism is and was historically, let them get and read Dr. Dowling's History.

- 13.—*History of Alexander the Great.* By JACOB ABBOTT. *With engravings.* New York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS is decidedly the most interesting and life-like sketch of the world's renowned conqueror that we have seen. It has all the interest and charm of the liveliest romance with the fidelity and truthfulness of veritable history. The main features of the character, the conquests, and the life of this wonderful man are here so distinctly brought out and so admirably blended and colored as to leave a very vivid and lasting impression on the reader's mind. The rapidity and grandeur of his conquests; the pomp and magnificence and oriental luxury of his court and regal state while reposing on his laurels at Baby-

lon; and his final debauchery and melancholy end, as herein narrated, possess a power of fascination that rarely falls to the lot of history.

14.—*History of Hannibal, the Carthaginian General.* By JACOB ABBOTT. *With engravings.* New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

CARTHAGE, the rival of Rome, and long her maritime mistress, and finally the victim of her terrible vengeance, will ever possess a melancholy interest to the student of history. This beautifully written life of Hannibal, her great General, who carried the war to the very gates of Rome, performing the prodigious feat of crossing the Alps in the dead of winter with his whole army and implements of war; whose splendid career of victory and conquest for a season covered Carthage with glory and Rome with defeat, but whose sudden reverses rolled back the tide of carnage and death upon the shore of Africa and reduced her proud city to ruin, and overwhelmed the General in hopeless and terrible calamity—this life, so crowded with great and startling events, and chequered with prosperity and adversity, glory and shame, and terminating in so melancholy and tragical a manner, is replete with interest and instruction.

15.—*History of Queen Elizabeth.* By JACOB ABBOTT. *With engravings.* New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

QUEEN ELIZABETH, if we judge rightly, appears here in her true light, and that is no very enviable one. Mr. Abbott's appreciation of her great virtues and great faults, her private character and public life, comes nearer to our ideas of the truth than anything we have before seen in any single history. He narrates her early life as the neglected child of a disgraced and beheaded queen and as the victim of Mary's jealousy, and you become interested in her; he sketches the principal events of her long and glorious reign, and you admire and wonder at her strength of mind, and indomitable energy of will, and political sagacity, and regal splendor, and state crimes; he portrays her utter selfishness and hypocrisy and double-dealing and cool calculating treachery and cruelty as a sovereign, and you lose all respect, and denounce her memory; he shows her womanly weaknesses, her pride and vanity, her partialities and love attachments; the struggles of sovereign pride and love of power against maidenly tenderness and yearnings as in the case of the ill-fated Essex, and you know not whether most to pity or to blame; he paints the *death-scene*—Elizabeth prostrate on the floor, writhing in agony and calling for mercy, straining her ear to catch the sound of prayer, forsaken by nearly all of her lords and other satellites who had fled to Scotland to hail King James as soon as her death was known, and she stung by the consciousness of abandonment,—and you inwardly exclaim, "O the littleness of human greatness! the poverty of a crown! the bitterness of death in a palace with not a true heart to tender its sympathy, or a divine consolation to offer its support!"

This series of brief histories from the polished and graphic pen of Mr. Abbott is not only of a very popular character, but is admirably adapted to interest, particularly, the young in the study of history. He has selected the most remarkable characters in history, and grouped together the leading events in the life of each, so as to give a distinct and complete impression of their historic being. And while these histories wear an air of romance, and are highly fascinating, the author has confined himself to the facts of sober received history. The series will form a gallery of well-executed and striking portraits of these world-renowned personages. The several histories are uniform in size, binding, and general appearance; are illustrated by many striking and beautiful engravings; and together make a useful and most beautiful little library.

16.—*Raphael*. By ALPHONSO DE LAMARTINE. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

LAMARTINE is certainly a writer of great beauty and power, whether his subject be history or romance. This work is a fictitious narrative, full of the poetry of thought, the beauties of style and imagery, and the extravagance of over-wrought and transcendental sentimentalism. The drift of it is to illustrate the power and workings of that mysterious element in man which we call sympathy, in the affairs of love and conjugal life; showing that the love which is based on the beauties and accomplishments of person, on matrimonial bonds, or rank, station, and wealth, cannot secure the bliss for which the lover sighs in his inner soul; that heart must meet heart in the contact, the outgoing and the communion of a pure spiritual sympathy, or man must pine in loneliness and die with secret grief. There is a profound truth at the bottom of all this; and our regret is that the distinguished author has so marred the description by the most extravagant romantic ravings and superlative nonsense, that all sober-minded matter-of-fact persons will only read to laugh, and sentimental ones to run mad.

17.—*The North British Review*. November 1848 and February 1849.

THIS Quarterly represents the Free Church of Scotland party in English literature, politics and religious matters, and is conducted with great ability. It comes nearer to our own standard of thinking and feeling than any one of the other great Quarterlies which give expression and direction to the English mind; indeed no well-informed American ought to be without it.

These last two numbers contain several articles of peculiar interest and great excellence. We have only space to specify those relating to the Authorship of the Letters of Junius; the Final Memoirs of Charles Lamb; the Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh; Baptist Noel's Church and State; Macaulay's History of England; and the Duke of Argyll's Essay on the Ecclesiastical History of Scotland since the Reformation.

The Review of *Baptist Noel's* powerful work, though kind in spirit and favorable in general, takes decided exceptions to some of his principles and reasoning, as unsound, and pushed to extremes; as having a decided tendency to radicalism in ecclesiastical matters. "We had hoped to find in Mr. Noel's book a more moderate scheme of reform projected, which might have reconciled the extremes; but we are compelled to say, that we despair of him as a leader in any great movement of reformation, when we see him thus merging himself in the confused ranks of existing dissent—descending into the arena, single-handed, as the champion not of a Church but of a chapel—and pleading with all the ardor of a neophyte for a system of disunion and disorganization, the utter impotence of which, for any combined action, even its veteran supporters were beginning to deplore." How far the decided Presbyterian feelings of the "North British" have influenced its judgment we know not: it anticipates however, far humbler and less beneficial results from this already renowned Essay than are confidently predicted on this side of the Atlantic.

The article on *Macaulay's History* is one of the ablest and grandest things we have read in many a day; and it is doubtful whether many of the thousand and one reviews which it has called or will call forth, will attain to its high standard of merit. While the reviewer is not blind to the faults of the great historian, to his church partialities, and his injustice to Puritan character and history, he still does him noble justice, and profoundly appreciates the incomparable merits of this great work. We think it vastly more truthful and just and valuable than the critique in the British Quarterly already referred to.

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ARTICLE I.

THOUGHTS ON THE ATONEMENT, WITH REMARKS ON THE VIEWS  
OF S. T. COLERIDGE.

By REV. HENRY NEILL, LENOX, MASS.

MUCH has been written respecting Mr. Coleridge both as a metaphysician and a poet. In these respects men are fast doing him justice. Of his Theological views, however, much remains to be said.

On no one subject was he more anxious to make himself understood, and to give satisfaction to an enquiring mind, than on the subject of Redemption, or the *work that Christ does for a fallen soul*. It is in the "Aids to Reflection," pp. 187—202 of Dr. Marsh's edition that Mr. C. expresses himself most fully on this great theme.

His view was wholly a subjective one. He believed that Christ effected the redemption of men only as He imparted His own spiritual life to their believing souls. The texts which he quotes and dwells upon are such as these; "I am the resurrection and the life." "The Way, the Truth, and the Life." "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." "The last Adam was made a quickening spirit." John 6: 24—26, was also a favorite passage with him; especially that place in which the Redeemer, after having said "I am the bread of life;" "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me and I in him," perceiving that the disciples murmured and thought it "a hard saying," explained himself by adding, "Doth this offend you? It is the spirit that quickeneth: the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are *life*."

If Mr. C. regarded the Atonement as bearing any relation to

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the government of God, he has not expressed it. The views which he had been accustomed to hear and read, of the connections of Christ's sufferings with the Justice of God, were such as he could not receive. Having been taught to regard the scene on Calvary, in the light, either of a literal "propitiation" to vindictive Justice, or as a "ransom" to satisfy the claims of an exacting creditor, when he came to apply these words as *thus explained* to the death of the Redeemer, his moral nature recoiled from the idea thus conveyed of the ground of its necessity. He felt it to be derogatory to God to regard the love and obedience of his creatures as a debt which could be paid by another; or the *personal* feelings of Jehovah such as could be relieved by a propitiatory sacrifice.

Thus indisposed to regard the words "ransom, propitiation, &c.," as definitive of the nature, ground, theory, or mode of the atonement, Mr. C. does not appear to have obtained any view of Christ's work in its outward relations which was satisfactory to his mind. That view, which represents the sufferings of the Redeemer, as an expression of Divine displeasure against sin, answering the ends of government, as well as could the endless misery of the offending human race, he does not appear to have thought or heard of. Capable as this view is of a philosophic and scriptural defence, and although propounded by Grotius more than two hundred years ago, yet the author of the "*Aids to Reflection*" makes no allusion to it in any form. It may be that the revulsion of his mind from the views entertained by many of his day when they spoke of the Atonement, was such as to prevent him from regarding any objective view of Christ's work, with the tranquillity necessary for its reception into the understanding and the heart. It may be that he did not feel the need of any such view. Whatever may have been the occasion of his mental position in regard to the external bearings of this great subject, it must always be a matter of regret that some one did not urge upon his attention Romans, 3: 25—26, "whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation *to declare his righteousness* for the remission of sins," &c. Unsatisfactory as these words and the view contained in them may be to one seeking mainly after a participation in Christ's spiritual nature, nevertheless, it would not have been a difficult matter through them to have convinced a mind as comprehensive and candid as that of Coleridge, that a propitiation "*to declare God's righteousness*" was a very different thing from a propitiation to satisfy God's vindictive Justice.

To say that God, through Christ, who was Jehovah in the flesh, "declared His righteousness for the remission of sins," has long been regarded by eminent divines, both in England and America, as only another mode of saying that God on Calvary so expressed His grief and abhorrence at sin, that he might with safety forgive it.

We must always regret that Mr. Coleridge took no notice of any such view ; not because it is necessary for a sinner to know *how* he is saved, in order to *be* saved : not because it is as important to know, the ground or condition of any good thing, as to feel its power : not because the view that Mr. C. did embrace of Christ's work is not true as far as it goes : nor even because the governmental theory as stated above, can be asserted with confidence by any mind that has lived only in this world as sufficient to cover and account for *all* the outward and distant relations of an event, which *may* have peculiar and untold bearings upon those portions of the universe whose moral condition and circumstances are different from our own : but because this theory does furnish a view of the ground of the necessity of Christ's extreme agony and in an objective light, satisfactory as far as we can see, or at least have seen, sustained also by every appropriate form of analogy, and in keeping with the very words of the Scriptures.

It must not be supposed, however, because Mr. C. could not regard the terms ransom, propitiation, satisfaction, redemption, reconciliation, &c., as expressive of the nature or theory or mode of the atoning work, that he attached to them no meaning. They were to him words of deep significance. They expressed for him as no other words could so well express at the time they were uttered, *the magnitude of the benefits resulting from the sufferings of Christ*. If they did not indicate the *principle* which occasioned the necessity of an Atonement, they did to him most appropriately portray the superlative blessings which those sufferings secured.

On p. 192 of the "Aids to Reflection," the author, says distinctly, the italics being his own and significant : "It is the *consequences* of the act of redemption, that the zealous apostle (Paul) would bring home to the minds and affections both of Jews and Gentiles. Now the Apostle's opponents and gainsayers were principally of the former class. They were Jews : not only Jews unconverted, but such as had partially received the gospel. Add to that Paul himself was a Hebrew of the Hebrews ; intimately versed "in the Jews' religion above many, his equals, in his own nation, and above measure zealous of the traditions of his fathers." It might, therefore, have been anticipated, that his reasoning would receive its outward forms and language, from his own *past* and his opponents present habits of thinking, and that his figures, images, analogies, and references, would be taken preferably from objects, opinions, events, and ritual observances ever uppermost in the imaginations of his own countrymen. And such we find them : yet so judiciously selected, that the prominent forms, the figures of most frequent recurrence, are drawn from points of belief and practice, from laws, rites and customs, that then prevailed

through the whole Roman world, and were common to Jew and Gentile.

Now it would be difficult if not impossible to select points better suited to this purpose, as being equally familiar to all, and yet having a special interest for the Jewish converts, than those are from which the learned apostle has drawn the four principal metaphors by which he illustrates the blessed *consequences* of Christ's redemption of mankind.

These are; 1, Sin-Offerings, sacrificial expiation. 2. Reconciliation, atonement, *καταλλαγή*. 3. Ransom from slavery, redemption, the buying back again, or being bought back, from *re* and *emo*. 4, Satisfaction of a creditor's claims by a payment of the debt.

To one or the other of these four heads all the numerous forms and exponents of Christ's mediation in Paul's writings may be referred. And the very number and variety of the words or periphrases used by him to express one and the same thing, furnish the strongest presumptive proof, that all alike were used *metaphorically*.

There is truly no escape from the conclusion, that if words significant of different things, are used in relation to the Atonement, they cannot all be used as expressive of the nature of its theory, law, or principle. The sacred writers never meant to assign several different theories, laws, or principles for the same thing. For what purpose, then, are different figures used in relation to the Atonement? Mr. C. says for a common end, to which they all with propriety may be applied, viz., to show by its blessed effects the worth of redemption.

On p. 191, we find these words: "Forgiveness of sin, the abolition of guilt, through the redemptive power of Christ's love, and of His perfect obedience, is expressed, *on account of the resemblances of the consequences in both cases*, by the payment of a debt for another, which debt the payer had not himself incurred." And "the transferring of the sameness from the consequent" to the cause or principle, was the mistake against which the author of the "Aids to Reflection," so strenuously and so justly remonstrated. In the following passages, Mr. C. reiterates and vindicates his idea, that the Jewish metaphors which have been made by many theologians to illustrate the principle or mode of redemption, were actually designed by similitude of *effect*, only to describe the superlative excellence of the gift.

"Such being the effects of our redemption, well might the fervent apostle associate it with whatever was eminently dear and precious to erring and afflicted mortals; and where no single title could be other than imperfect, seek from similitude of *effect* to describe the superlative boon, by transferring to it the name of each act and ordinance, habitually connected in the minds of *all*

his hearers with feelings of joy, confidence, and gratitude." Pp. 195—6.

He represents the apostle as saying, "Do you rejoice when the atonement made by the Priest has removed the civil stain from your name? Here is an Atonement which takes away a deeper stain—a sacrifice for the whole world. Would you be grateful to one who had ransomed you from slavery? Here is Redemption from a direr slavery—the slavery of sin unto death. Had you involved yourself in a heavy DEBT for certain gewgaws, and in default of payment had made yourself over as a bondsman to a hard creditor, with what emotions would you not receive the tidings that a friend, whom you had neglected and reviled, had paid the DEBT for you—made a SATISFACTION to your creditor? But you have incurred a debt of death to the *Evil Nature*; you have sold yourself to *sin*; (and) the stranger has appeared—the Son of God: to as many as have faith in his name, the debt is paid—the satisfaction has been made."

Now, to show that the above-mentioned metaphors are not to be understood as literally expressive of the nature or mode of the Atonement, but of the blessedness of its effects, Mr. C. proceeds to say: "Let us suppose for a moment that the varied expressions of St. Paul, are to be *literally* interpreted; that (ex. gr.) sin is, or involves, an infinite debt (in the proper and law-court sense of the word debt)—a debt owing by us to the vindictive justice of God the Father, which can be liquidated only by the everlasting misery of Adam and all his posterity, or by a sum of suffering equal to this. Likewise, that God the Father, by his absolute decree, or (as some divines teach) through the necessity of his unchangeable justice, had determined to exact the full sum; which must, therefore, be paid either by ourselves, or by some other in our name and behalf. But besides the debt which all mankind contracted in and through Adam, as a *homo publicus*, even as a nation is bound by the acts of its head, every man (say these divines) is an insolvent debtor on his own score. In this fearful predicament the Son of God resolved to pay the debt for us, and to satisfy the Divine Justice by a perfect equivalent. Accordingly, by a strange, yet strict consequence, it has been held by more than one of these divines, that the agonies suffered by Christ were equal in amount to the sum total of the torments of all mankind here and hereafter!! P. 196.

The surprise expressed in this last sentence, and, indeed, implied throughout the whole paragraph, by Mr. C., that any could believe that Christ suffered in kind or in degree as do the lost, has been expressed repeatedly since by orthodox divines, in stronger language than Mr. C. has used.

There is, certainly, good sense and sound logic also, in the fol-

lowing remarks on the same point, and they indicate very plainly what the writer meant to reject from his idea of Atonement :

"It is easy to say—'I do not hold this,' (the sentiment last quoted,) or we do not make this an article of our belief! The true question is: Do you take any part of it: and can you reject the rest without being *inconsequent*? Are debt, satisfaction, payment in full, creditors' rights, &c., *nomina propria*, by which the very nature of Redemption and its occasion is expressed? or are they with several other figures of speech for the purpose of illustrating the nature and extent of the consequences and effects of the redemptive act, and to excite in the receivers a due sense of the magnitude and manifold operation of the boon, and of the love and gratitude due to the Redeemer? If still you reply, the former: then, as your whole theory is grounded on a notion of *Justice*, I ask you, is this justice a *moral* attribute? But morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between thing and person; on this distinction, all law, human and divine, is grounded; consequently the law of justice. If you attach any idea to the term justice as applied to God, it must be the same which you refer to when you affirm or deny it of any other personal agent—save only that in its attribution to God, you speak of it as un-mixed and perfect. For if not, what *do* you mean? And why do you call it by the same name? I may, therefore, with all right and reason, put the case as between man and man. For should it be found irreconcilable with the justice, which the light of reason, made *law* in the conscience, dictates to man, how much more must it be incongruous with the all-perfect justice of God?

"Whatever case I should imagine, would be felt by the reader as below the dignity of the subject, and, in some measure, jarring with his feelings; and in other respects the more familiar the case, the better suited to the present purpose.

"A sum of £1,000 is owing from James to Peter, for which James has given a bond in judgment. He is insolvent, and the bond is on the point of being carried into effect, to James' utter ruin. At this moment Matthew steps in, pays Peter the thousand pounds, and discharges the bond. In this case, no man would hesitate to admit, that a complete *satisfaction* had been made to Peter. Matthew's £1,000 is a perfect equivalent of the sum James was bound to have paid, and for the sum which Peter had lent. *It is the same thing*: and this is altogether a question of *things*. Now, instead of James being indebted to Peter for a sum of money, which, (he being insolvent) Matthew pays for him, we will put the case, that James had been guilty of the basest and most hard-hearted ingratitude to a most worthy and affectionate mother, who had not only performed all the duties and tender offices of a mother, but whose whole heart was bound up in this her only child—who had foregone all the pleasures and amusements of life in watching over his sickly childhood, had sacrificed her health and the far greater part of her resources to rescue him from the consequences of his follies and excesses during his youth and early manhood; and to procure for him the means of his present rank and affluence—all which he had repaid by neglect, desertion and open profligacy. Here the mother stands in the relation of the creditor: and here, too, we will suppose the same generous friend to interfere, and to perform with the greatest tenderness and constancy all those duties of a grateful and affectionate son, which James ought to have performed. Will this satisfy the mother's claims on James, or entitle him to her esteem, approbation, and blessing? or what if Matthew, the vicarious son, should at length address her in words to this purpose: 'Now, I trust, you are appeased, and will be henceforward reconciled to James. I have satisfied all your claims on him. I have paid his debt in full, and you are too just to require the same debt to be paid twice over. You will, therefore, regard him with the same complacency, and receive him into your presence with the same

love, as if there had been no difference between him and you. For I have *made it up.*' What other reply could the swelling heart of the mother dictate than this? 'O misery! and is it possible that *you* are in league with my unnatural child to insult me? Must not the very necessity of *your* abandonment of your proper sphere form an additional evidence of *his* guilt? Must not the sense of your goodness teach me more fully to comprehend, more vividly to feel the evil in him? Must not the contrast of your merits magnify his demerit in his mother's eye, and at once recall and embitter the conviction of the cancer-worm in his soul?' If, indeed, by the force of Matthew's example, by persuasion, or by additional and more mysterious influences, or by an inward co-agency, compatible with the idea of a personal will, James should be led to repent; if through admiration and love of this great goodness, gradually assimilating his mind to the mind of his benefactor, he should in his own person become a grateful and dutiful child—*then*, doubtless the mother would be wholly satisfied! But then the case is no longer a question of *things*, or a matter of *debt* payable by another. Nevertheless the effect, (and the reader will remember that it is the *effects* and *consequences* of Christ's mediation on which Paul is dilating,) the effect to *James* is similar in both cases, i. e. in the case of James the debtor, and of James the undutiful son. In both cases, James is liberated from a grievous burthen; and, in both cases, he has to attribute his liberation to the act and free grace of another. The only *difference* is, that, in the former case, (*viz.* the payment of the debt) the beneficial act is, singly, and without requiring any re-action or co-agency on the part of James, the efficient *cause* of his liberation; while in the latter case, (*viz.* that of redemption) the beneficial act is, *first*, the indispensable *condition*, and *then*, the co-efficient."

From these extracts may certainly be obtained a lucid view of what Mr. Coleridge *did not* believe in respect to the theory of the Atonement, or the *ground* of its necessity. If, however, any suppose that these extracts may be so interpreted as not to do him justice on the points for which they are introduced, we refer them to the writings of the distinguished divine who first brought the "Aids to Reflection," to the notice of the American people, and who may be supposed to understand, and to a great extent adopt Mr. Coleridge's views on the subject under consideration. In a Review of Prof. Stuart's Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the Christian Spectator, for March, 1829, Dr. Marsh says, "If we have accomplished our purpose in the views' which we have now presented, it will appear, in the first place, that the mode of reasoning which the apostle adopts, and the various analogies which he employs, both in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and to a less extent, and with less frequency, in his other epistles, are such as were best adapted to the understanding of those whom he addressed, being derived from rites and customs most nearly related to the subject, and for the most part prevalent, not only among the Jews, but throughout the Roman world. It will appear, we think, in the next place, that it being the aim of the apostle to illustrate 'the virtue and efficacy,' or the blessed *consequences* of 'the redemption which is in Christ,' and the whole force of his comparisons and analogies, between this and other

! See p. 139—146, of article referred to in the Christian Spectator.

acts or agents, being derived from the resemblances of their effects, we cannot, by any logical interpretation, infer from the nature of the known *causes* on the one hand, the nature of the unknown *cause* on the other." p. 146.

If any doubt remain as to the light in which Mr. C. viewed the terms which have given rise to the various theories on the Atonement, we think the closing remarks on p. 200 of the "Aids to Reflection," will dissipate it. It explains fully what he meant by the *consequents*, from the redemptive act, on the human soul. "The consequents," says he, "from the effect are—sanctification from sin, and liberation from the inherent and penal consequences of sin in the world to come, with all the means and processes of sanctification by the word and Spirit: these consequent being the same for the sinner relatively to God and his own soul, as the satisfaction of a debt for a debtor relatively to the creditor; as the sacrificial atonement made by the priest for the transgressor of the Mosaic Law; as the reconciliation to an alienated parent for a son who had estranged himself from his father's house and presence; and as a redemptive ransom for a slave or captive.

We have no doubt, therefore, that Mr. Coleridge,

1. Rejected the idea, that the terms "ransom," "propitiation," &c., were used by Paul as expressive of the *principle*, or mode, of the redemptive act.

2. That he still regarded those words as metaphors given to portray the superlative benefits of redemption viewed in relation to the sinner's soul.

Still farther, it may be seen from the extracts already quoted, that Mr. C. regarded the words satisfaction, reconciliation, ransom, &c., as expressive not only of the variety and magnitude of the benefits which fallen souls have received through Christ, but also as significant of the surpassing excellency of the spiritual boon itself, which Christ imparted—the very redemption which He wrought out—as teaching the blessedness of that relief or remedy, whose nature any single expressions or images were not adapted to portray.

What that relief or remedy consisted in, was, to the mind of our author, revealed again and again by John, under the word "Life." Life, as opposed to spiritual death. "Ye will not come unto me that ye may have life." John 5: 40. "For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself." John 5: 26. "As the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will." John 5: 21. He regarded spiritual life as something more than truth rightly apprehended and obeyed by the fallen faculties of a human soul. He regarded "Life" as an emanation of being and power descending from the Divine in Christ, (it may be

through the truth, as a medium, or it may not,) into the sinner's heart; an actual impartation of renewed existence from Him who was made "a quickening spirit."

Mr. Coleridge and Dr. Marsh both believed that the Evangelist John, being led by his constitution and circumstances, and the design of his writings, to look at the work of Christ from a different stand-point from that of the apostle Paul, has given the more simple and intelligible account of the Redeemer's work. They understood Paul, for the most part, to view the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, as antagonistic to the Jewish notions of salvation by rituals and sacrifices, and hence his modes of utterance; whereas, John is understood to view it irrespective of the controversies of the day, and to express it by those analogies of *nature* which bore the strongest resemblance to it.

"Now John, the beloved disciple, who leant on the Lord's bosom, the Evangelist *κατα πνευμα* i. e. according to *the spirit*, the inner and substantial truth of the Christian creed;—John, recording the Redeemer's own words, enunciates the fact itself, (of redemption,) to the full extent in which it is enunciable for the human mind, simply and *without any metaphor*, by identifying it *in kind* with a fact of hourly occurrence—*expressing* it, I say, by a familiar fact, the same *in kind* with that intended, though of a far lower *dignity*; by a fact of every man's experience, *known* to all, yet not better *understood* than the fact described by it.

In the redeemed it is a *re-generation*, a *birth*, a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved, the germinal principle of a higher and enduring life, of a *spiritual* life, that is, a life, the actuality of which is not dependent on the natural body, or limited by the circumstances and processes indispensable to its organization and subsistence. Thus the regeneration to spiritual life is at the same time a redemption from spiritual death."<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Marsh, in his review of Prof. Stuart, already alluded to, evidently entertains the same idea with Mr. C. respecting the necessity which Paul was under, of adopting a different phraseology respecting redemption from that of John and the Evangelists. He regards Paul and John as having different ends in view. The one (Paul) having as an end, "to overcome the force of Jewish customs, Jewish attachments, and Jewish prejudices, by proving the *superiority* of the Christian system over the religion of their fathers." "To accomplish this," says Dr. M., "we should expect him to seize on those points in the Christian system, in the character and work of its author and head, which furnish the most striking analogies to the objects of Jewish love, reverence, and devotion. With this view of the object of the writer, and its attending circumstances before us, we can easily perceive, that it would not have been natural, nor wise, for the

<sup>1</sup> Aids to Reflection, p. 193.



apostle to adopt the style and language of the Evangelists, and exhibit the work and character of Christ in the simple and literal terms employed by the beloved disciple." "It was not for them (the Jews to whom Paul wrote) to be told in language simple and free from metaphor, of those spiritual things by which, even when enunciated by our Lord himself, many of his disciples were offended; of the spiritual efficacy of that quickening, life-giving spirit, John 6: 63. I Cor. 5: 45., by which we are regenerated and born again to a higher, an enduring and spiritual life; and for the nourishment and growth of which, we must by faith feed on "that living bread which came down from heaven."

With these extracts from the writings both of Mr. Coleridge and his friend and interpreter, it is next to impossible not to obtain a lucid and intelligible apprehension of

III. The *positive* views which our author entertained respecting Christ's work for the souls of men. He believed that Jesus out of His own being imparted life to those who were "dead in trespasses and in sins." He regarded Christ after his incarnation as the great Source of spiritual vitality to a fallen world. With his mind intent upon those passages of Scripture in which a connection is said to exist between Christ and his followers, as between a vine and its branches, or a body and its members, with the head, he became convinced that his own renovated being derived its life from the person and spirit of Jesus, in a sense more special and direct than that in which his physical frame received natural life from the Creator. What the law of this transmission definitely is he does not attempt to state. He speaks as one who felt it to be a fact that he was illumined and strengthened to some extent, by Jesus himself. From his own consciousness in connection with the testimony of the Scriptures he was inwardly assured that the true children of God were "one with Christ," in a sense more intimate than that which is comprehended in a mere unity of purpose and feeling. Divines have called it the "mystic union" between Christ and the Redeemer. The reformers bore witness to it, as manifesting itself in a peculiar manner at the communion table when their hearts burned within them over "the broken body and the shed blood." They did not analyze it. They called it "life in Christ." As no life, vegetable, animal or spiritual, has yet been made to yield up its elements, perhaps they could not analyze it. They could tell the conditions of its existence, the mode of its development, and its sublime issues; and this they did. They testified also to the fact as it existed in their own consciousness and made itself known to others who were the subjects of its power. Who can say that more than this was not beyond their reach? Who can say that any laws of spiritual intercommunication can be so apprehended and unfolded by a human mind as to be made intelligible to others, until that mind is

divested of its corporeal investiture and removed to a higher and less obstructed sphere? Yet, in such a communication actual, spiritual, and regenerative between Christ and his followers did Mr. C. place his hope of purification and his assurance of immortality. It was not on himself that he relied. It was not on his outward works. It was not on any "opus operatum" wrought even on Calvary amidst appalling wonders. He relied upon Christ dwelling in and upholding us in the hour of temptation as far as He is received, imparting to us sensibility and resisting power out of his own infinite fullness as "the second Adam" and the quickening spirit," and at last bringing him off conqueror over himself and his many infirmities. His reliance is upon a living Christ, operating all the while and manifesting himself to the penitent and believing as he does not to the world, until "formed within the hope of glory."

That there is an important and sanctifying truth in this view of Christ's agency for the souls of men, no one will deny. That it is the whole truth respecting the work of redemption no one ought to claim. The writings of Paul do certainly recognize in the atonement a relation to God, as well as to the souls of men. Christ's dying agony impressed the universe with the "righteousness of Jehovah" as well as transmitted the life of the Redeemer into the hearts of a regenerated world.

The objective and governmental view is the complement of that subjective one embraced and advocated by our author. Both are essential to the full interpretation of all the New Testament writings. It is easy to see why some minds make one of these relations prominent in their conceptions and teachings, and why some give their whole assent only to the other. Those minds whose circumstances have always demanded a ceaseless outward physical activity; whose constitutional and induced prejudices are for visible results rather than for an abounding inward life, who are men of rigor or dialectics, rather than men of feeling or reflection, cannot be expected to give at once an intelligent and decided assent, to that view of the Redeemer's work advocated by Mr. Coleridge and mainly taught in the writings of John. Their nature leads them in a different direction. They must regard redemption as something *done* from without rather than as something inwardly, *doing all the while*. They will apprehend it only as a satisfaction already *made* to the law, or to the fears of spectators in distant worlds, or to justice, or to the feelings of God, rather than as a gift of life coming from Christ and constantly pouring itself into the hearts of men to renew and purify them, and recognizable only in greatly meditative and divinely anointed hours. So comprehensive however is the gospel in its revelations and adaptations to the manifold and diversified wants of human nature when they are not contradictory, that it speaks equally to the

man of an outward and dialectic culture seeking mainly to remove a governmental obstacle in the way of his pardon, as to him who, thirsting after righteousness and a spirit conformed to that of Christ, knows of no obstacles save such as lie in the earthly affinities of his own soul. Whilst a perception of both the outward and inward relations of Christ's life and death, strictly in keeping with the actual facts that have transpired and that still exist, and duly proportioned to the spiritual want of the individual soul may be essential for the highest development of Christian character; yet it is surely not difficult to see how the biases of constitution and of education will lead one mind to Christ primarily as a propitiation to God, and another as the renovator of his heart, the source of his life, and the hope of his glory.

Without positively rejecting the former of these relations of the redemptive work, Coleridge gave his whole thought and affection to the latter. His nature led him to do so. A feeling and creative soul is not apt to find its peace in the outward relations of anything, and the only objective views of redemption that he speaks of as having ever received, were caricatures and untrue as they impressed his mind. He believed, as has been said, and placed all his hope in the belief that Christ's own life is communicated from Himself by the Spirit with regenerative and sanctifying power into the hearts of all who do cordially receive Him as their deliverer. In this view he is certainly sustained by the testimony of Jesus.—If allusion is made to the raising of the dead by the Father, and to the quickening of their bodies on the morning of the resurrection, Jesus sees in this the symbol of the higher life-giving power lying within Himself, and says, "even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. As the Father hath life in himself so hath he given to the Son, to have life in himself. And ye will "not come unto me that ye may have life." John 5: 21, 26, 40.—If the Jews exultingly speak of their physical sustentation in the wilderness and of the manna they did eat in the desert, Jesus endeavors to engraft upon their idea of life in the body by the bread that perisheth, the more exalted idea of life in the soul coming from Him who was the resurrection and the life. His words are, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness and are dead. I am the living bread which came down from heaven; if any man eat of this bread he shall live forever. I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life. The words that I speak unto you they are spirit, and they are life. John 6: 31—63.

If a robber is spoken of as entering the door of the sheep-fold "to kill and to destroy;" Jesus, contrasting with this his own mission, says, "I am come that they may have life, and have it more abundantly. My sheep hear my voice and they follow me, and I

give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish," John 10: 27, 28.—If Martha, sorrowing because her brother is in the grave, hastens to meet the Redeemer, and when told by Him, "thy brother shall rise again," cannot be comforted, supposing that Jesus referred only to the rising at the last day, she is then assured that life greater than that which would appear on the morning of the resurrection was embodied in Him at that very moment, and could manifest itself upon the spot. His words are: "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth on me, though he were dead yet shall he live. And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." John 11: 25, 26.—And then when Jesus himself is about to die, and he had to say to his disciples, "the hour is come," He seemed to gather great consolation from the thought that by a death unjustly induced and agonizing, life, spiritual and eternal, would go out from Him and reproduce itself as it never could have done without such a death. He calls that trying hour, the hour in which the Son of Man should be glorified, ("δοξασθη,") and immediately adds: "I say unto you except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone, but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." John 12: 23, 24.

In adducing this passage in support of Mr. Coleridge's view of the atonement, we do not mean to say that there were not other and distinctive modes in which Christ was glorified in his death, besides that of giving forth his life to be reproduced in the hearts of men. We do not even affirm that the image of the corn of wheat dying to give its life out, and so beautifully appropriate as introduced by the Redeemer to convey the idea that, by dying, His own life would emerge and diffuse itself over an apostate world to regenerate and save it, was used by Him in this passage for that purpose only; but we do affirm that if it was the intention of Jesus to tell the world that that spiritual Vitality which, as it came out from Him during his life, had sanctified and blessed so many hearts, would at his death, and ever afterwards, manifest itself with a power and result indefinitely increased, it is difficult to see how He could have uttered the thought with more expressive significance than through this very image of the dying grain of wheat. As every seed must die, in order to give forth its life, as indeed nothing is quickened except its previous form dies, as even the animal creation and the spirits of men, must put off their old investitures and organization in order to manifest a more efficient and exalted existence; as empires, when falling, yield up the material for new and better ones; and martyrs speak most powerfully from the flames, if dying words, having bound up in them the struggles, aspirations, and ultimated experience of a whole previous state of being, have always been the words which have lived, and carried "spirit," and conveyed life to others; is it singular that Jesus should say to His disciples, sad and wondering at

his speedily approaching departure, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." Does He not here mean to say, that as a corn of wheat cannot put its life forth except it die, so the laws for the development and reproduction of His own life are such that dissolution under the appointed circumstances would send that life forth with accumulated power, to perform its sublime and sanctifying work: thus confirming the idea that the heart of man might be renewed and fortified by the quickening energy of Christ's life as it emerged from himself, and was inducted into them by the Spirit. What is made thus probable by the words of Jesus, and the analogies of nature and human existence, is confirmed by the facts that soon transpired at the cross, and have continued ever since. The Centurion believed when he saw Christ's agony and heard his prayer, and so did the condemned malefactor. Forty days afterwards, thousands repented that they had killed the "Prince of Life," and were baptized in the name of Jesus. In thirty years Christianity crossed the Mediterranean, and in three hundred was on the throne of the Cæsars converting their armies.

As in the life-time of Jesus a virtue went out from Him to heal the diseased as they touched but his garments, so after He died and ascended on high, virtue and immortal life still issued from Him with a wonderfully exalting and regenerating power, augmenting its triumphs as if the kingdoms of this world were all to become the kingdoms of our Lord. With this testimony before us we are prepared to hear even the apostle Paul direct the Roman Christians to a "law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus," as all-sufficient and necessary to free them from the "law of sin and death." We are prepared also to hear him assure the Corinthians, when speaking of death and the ruin occasioned by the sin of Adam, that "as the first Adam was made only a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit."

With this view of redemption we are not disappointed that many who have felt in sadness, the death-bringing power of sin, should cleave with grateful and adoring joy to the life-giving power in the Saviour's person and atoning work; delighting to believe that if through Adam a law was introduced into our world bringing sin and death, through Christ another and stronger law was introduced bringing life and peace, and yet when in their dying hours asked as to the ground of their hopes, compelled to answer in the solemn and discriminating words of a departed saint, "Just so far forth as the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has made me free from the law of sin and death, just so far forth have I hope and no farther." Neither are we surprised that the learned and revered Neander should utter as his last words in the American Preface to his *Life of Jesus*, "Perhaps the impulse which the

American mind has received from the profound Coleridge, who, (like Schleiermacher among ourselves) has testified that Christianity is not so much a definite system of conceptions as a power of life, may have contributed, and may still further contribute to prepare the way for a new tendency of scientific theology in your beloved country."

Whether the hopes of this distinguished historian and Christian teacher, in relation to the theological tendencies of our country, will ever be realized, it is difficult to say; there is no doubt that as a nation we need an inward and subjective culture; a young and busy people incline to the outward and superficial in everything. In theology as in life they will be attracted by forms and systems, rather than by that which gives the power to any form or system; because the appearance is always easier to see and to apprehend than the reality; they will look at effects rather than at their causes, direct their attention to conduct rather than to the feelings which dictate it, in religion to statements and formalities, rather than to the universal truths that are embodied in the rituals and the beliefs. This tendency in our nation, nowhere manifests itself more distinctly than in the views which are often taken of this very subject of the atonement. One effect of Christ's work has been prominently contemplated by one portion of the church, and another by a different portion, until at length general and diverse theories have been constructed on the basis of each specific image, designed, with others, only to magnify a common and grander end: and thus a figure of speech, drawn from some local custom in a Roman or Jewish community, is permitted to determine the range of an event whose bearings may be as wide as the whole circle of the universe. Hence it is a subject of congratulation, as Neander has intimated, that Coleridge's writings have been introduced among us: he thinks they may prepare the way for a new theological tendency, and calls them "profound." It is certainly true that they direct the mind away from all theories founded only on some local and outward event to a fact which must be admitted to exist as a theme for endless gratitude, viz. to the *life-imparting* power of Jesus in His redemption: which may be illustrated and magnified by many outward events, and confirmed by many moral and scriptural considerations. For example:

The fact that the life of a fallen first-parent has passed over into the human race, and entailed upon it serious moral disabilities, does, of itself, make it probable that if that race should ever be redeemed, it might be by the transmission of the Life of God into the soul of man, through some appropriate channel. And what more appropriate channel than an incarnation of Jehovah, with its accompaniments of sorrow, and toil, and death, brought close to human hearts.

Not only is our race a fallen one, but that fall is perpetuated by

the life of the first Adam still lingering and working death in the chambers of the soul.

By whatever laws the influence and character of one being may infuse itself into the source of another's existence, by those laws have the perponderating affinities of the fallen Adam obtained the control in human hearts. Not only are men sinners, but in a sense they are sinners by their nature. They come into the world with hereditary prepossessions, occasioned by the transmitted and reproductive emanations from their beguiled original. Now, if the evil tendencies of such a fall, from such a source, working in such a way, are to be met and overcome, have we not reason to believe that it will be done by a greater life from a greater source, transmitted by similar laws, working with as wide-spread and even intenser power, until conveyed into the hearts of all the nations to purify and save them?

Such a source of life was Jesus Christ. "In Him was life." Such a restorative power began to go out from Him as he toiled and died in Palestine; and has been transmitted from Him by invisible agencies, as He sits on the throne of His glory, and now waits to enter and sanctify the hearts of men. It was to be expected, that if God redeemed men from the Fall, it would be done by bringing before them, and into them, a being and influence stronger than that which had betrayed and despoiled them; even "force against force, law against law, incessant and inward action of a heavenly kind, against incessant and inward action of an earthly kind, i. e. a law of life against a law of death.

It may be well here to add, that the words of the apostles are just such as they would have been, had they believed that the life of a pure and holy Being, claiming to be God, yet appearing as a man, had penetrated the sources of their own being, and was manifesting itself to their consciousness in irrepressible longings that Christ might be formed in other hearts.

Take, for example, Paul's letter to the Galatians: after a few words of salutation, in which he speaks of Christ giving himself for our sins, that "*He might deliver us from this present evil world,*" he alludes to the time when "it pleased God to reveal His Son *in him*;" and then, with a most animating description of the power which that vision, and those words of Jesus, which he received on his way to Damascus, had on him, closes the 2nd chapter with that memorable passage, "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

Commencing the third chapter with an expression of surprise that the Galatians should have been led away from Christ, he asks them whether they received the Spirit by adhesion to an outward ceremonial, or by faith in an inward and crucified

Jesus? He reminds them in the fourth chapter, that he should travail in pain for them, until Christ again be "formed *within them*;" and closes in the fifth and sixth chapters with earnest exhortations that they would stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ had made them free, assuring them, that "in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availed any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature."

So the Epistle to the Romans: whilst parts of it contain the idea of legal justification, conveyed under the image of propitiation; and whilst the first four chapters are taken up with an elaborate argument to show that an external and sacrificial righteousness can avail nothing in the sight of God; yet the design of the epistle is to magnify the blessing of Christ's redemption, and to show that "as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many shall be made righteous;" that "as sin reigned unto death, so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord." Then, as if the apostle would show to men the *mode* of their redemption, after complaining bitterly, and at length, of the laws of his being that warred against the better laws of his mind, he closes with the exulting assurance, "There is now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit; for the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

The prayer of this same apostle in the Epistle to the Ephesians is, "that Christ may dwell in their hearts by faith;" and among his last exhortations to them is the following, "Awake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead and Christ shall give thee light."—He tells the Colossians that their "life is hid with Christ in God."

The other writings of this apostle, as well as the Epistles of Peter and of John, are just such as would come from men who had so seen and loved the Lord Jesus, that His spirit had infused itself into their very nature. All their words are more or less about *Him*. If for a moment they speak of something else, it is only to honor Him who was formed within their hearts. They cannot write a page without introducing His name whom "having not seen they loved." Christ seemed to be in them in a very peculiar and significant sense. John says in his epistle as he had done throughout his gospel, "That which was from the beginning which we have seen, that eternal Life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us, that declare we unto you, that your joy may be full," or as Paul says, that you may glorify God in us.

If it should be urged as an objection to this view of Christ's work for the souls of men,

"That there is a mysteriousness about it, a want of definiteness



and tangibility ;" we can only reply, that so far forth as the *elements* in which this spiritual life consists, are concerned, they are not more intangible, or difficult of analysis than the elements of vegetable, animal or intellectual life. Who can resolve any form of life into anything more ultimate or intelligible than what is properly comprehended under the conditions, operations and results of its existence ?

All that we know of life in the seed is, that if placed in the ground, where moisture and heat may do their appropriate work, a germ will spring up if "the seed die." These are the *conditions* of life in the fields ; after this we may ascertain the steps and laws of its development, through the blade and the ear up to the "full corn in the ear," when "that which was sown in weakness is raised in power." So with the life of Christ in the soul ; we may know its conditions, the mode and laws of its operation, and its sublime issues. The felt power of it on the sensibilities must be a matter of experience.

The conditions under which Divine Life is imparted to the soul, are easy of apprehension, though it may be with difficulty experienced. They are such as these.—1. That God shall be brought as near the soul as sin has been. Things to operate with their full power on one another must be brought near to each other. Napoleon's soldiers felt no fear when he was near them. His life went out into them. So in storms at sea, if there can be found on board the sinking ship one who is not afraid to die, the frantic passengers will gather around him, and listen to his words, until the tempest in their souls is stilled. Here soul is in contact with soul, and life goes out from the strong-hearted, and the trembling one is himself made strong.

If however, men agitated by shipwreck or worn down by disease, can be made tranquil and hopeful by the near approach of some mind stronger and better than their own, what might not be expected if the Divine mind with all its attributes, should come to a sinful mind in its anxieties, near enough to make it feel His presence and His sympathizing power ! But to come thus near, it must 2. Come in some endearing and attractive human form. The mind that can help us must be touched with "the feeling of our infirmities ;" must drink some cup of human sorrow, and create some vision of better hopes, as well as secure the sanctions of our conscience. We need not say that Jesus Christ did all this ; we see him weeping at Bethany ; we hear him pleading with men in Galilee and sighing in Gethsemane ; and there were other sounds—thanks be unto God, they are hushed, they are finished. But

3. In doing all this, God laid not aside His inherent power. He did not cease to be Himself. He needed omnipotence to subdue our pride, and quench our passions, and omniscience to know all

the wickedness of our hearts. Hence if maniacs raved among the tombs He could cast the demons out; if the multitude were hungry He could feed them; and if mothers wept over sons that were dead, he could bid the dead ones live. Yet as the seed must yield up its old form and die in order to live, so a human soul must

4. Yield itself up to God, as God urges His way into it, and thus cause old things to pass away, in order that all things may become new. The soul must, in fact, die in order to live. We know there is a point here yet unexplained; we know not why a sorrowing soul—sorrowing and dying for its sins, sees things that others do not see, and hears things they do not hear; we know not why dying men have sometimes such exalted visions, and such lofty hopes; we know not why a tree, if it be cut down, will sprout again: but this we know, that there is life in death; that the dissolving hour is the hour when a new structure is reared, even a heavenly tabernacle. Perhaps what seems to die is only withdrawn from that form of development, that it may assume a better form; but still there is all the darkness and silence, and where there is maturity of growth, all the agony of death, as the new life begins. It is written, that we must die, in order to live. Die unto sin, that we may live unto righteousness. As in sleep, the hour of its ending is the hour of a more glorious beginning; so as with self-renunciation, and renunciation of the world, and pangs of torturing guilt, we die unto ourselves, we live unto Christ; we live, yet “not we, but Christ liveth in us.”

Such are the simple conditions on which Christ's life is imparted to fallen souls: revealing what the soul must do, and making it plain that all that is wanted on its part, in order to have life, is, that it shall pay the price—i. e., as a penitent, awake and come to Jesus, that Christ may give it light. Whilst the mode of the quickening is not revealed, and may be among those things we can know but in part, yet all that man is commanded to do is reasonable and plain, strictly in keeping with the analogies of nature, and prompted by the yearnings and constitution of the soul.

Without analyzing the conditions of this impartation any further, inasmuch as any examination on the side of the soul can give only the processes, (the source of life lying out of it,) and any examination by us on the side of God, brings us soon to those “secret things” which lie in the profundities of His own Being; we proceed to say, that the operation and results of this life, when once imparted, are also as simple and beautiful as they are sublimely in accordance with the universal laws of progressive development.

After Christ is once introduced into a fallen heart, there is, of course, a change. Any living thing, when introduced into an

important centre, works changes all around it; but in this case, that which is introduced is the life of a holy, and powerful, and divine mind; and the changes are in keeping with the nature of the cause, and its quickening impulsations. The thoughts, associations, feelings, and purposes, of course are now changed. When the life of Christ is imparted to the soul, by its deep love constantly dwelling on Him, the mind cannot remain as it was; and this change is strictly in keeping with the laws of all living changes, which are growths. It is step by step; from small beginnings, imperceptible, and slowly advancing, but with grand results at last; rapidly consummated, and marked by crises all the way. It is "as if a man should cast seed into the ground; and should sleep and rise, night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how," saith the Saviour. So is the kingdom of God; so is the life of Christ in the soul. "First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." If the beginnings are in darkness and underground, the ultimatum is in the sunlight, and as with the mustard tree, high up in the firmament. Sorrow, and fear, and visions of darkness, are changed into joy, and hope, and high endeavor, and the light and liberty wherewith "Christ doth make his children free." In such a view of redemption, there are no veiled mysteries, and no difficulties in the apprehension of it, which do not necessarily belong to the nature of the subject. It addresses itself to the feelings, as much as to the understanding; and hence, is revealed in its fulness only through the experience of the soul.

It was not strange that a poet and a man of feeling, should have embraced this view of Christ's agency in his redemption, and openly expressed his preference for it, rather than for any view which confined the atonement to a distant mountain in Judea, and to the government of God. The images which spoke to other men only of *modes* of deliverance, spoke to him of the great *deliverance* itself. Yet it must not be forgotten that Coleridge, in combating certain partial and unsatisfactory theories, founded on the *illustrations of the benefits received* from Christ, and in diverting the attention to something more universal and real, does seem to lose sight entirely of those outward relations of the Redeemer's work, which connect it with the universe and with the government of God.

This brings us to the consideration of those outward bearings of the scene of Calvary, without some notice of which any discussion of Christ's mediation would be defective, if not erroneous.

If, by reason of a tendency to view things in the light of their bearing only upon the personal peace or improvement of the mind, we are inclined to forget their bearing on other great interests, it should be announced with emphasis,

IV. That the atonement has a relation to God as well as to man—to other worlds as well as to this—to other minds as well as to our own. It was designed as much to inspire confidence and love towards a just Governor, dispensing pardon for the sins he has declared must be punished, as to renew and purify the hearts of a fallen world. We have an inward well-grounded assurance that in the Great Supreme there is consistency and truth; and that what we see not here, we shall see hereafter. There is a feeling in all minds, that God must execute His promises and threatenings, and that wherever there is an apparent withholding of their fulfilment, it is for some good reason; such as, that He may accomplish the same end in a better way. There is a universal principle of right lying behind all precepts, whether comminatory or encouraging; and it is the felt pressure on the heart, through the words of the commandments, of a mightier truth than can possibly be conveyed by them, which makes men yield an unforced assent to their equity. There is a human consciousness which testifies of right and wrong. Even if God had declared no law, or attached no penalties to it, still the reason which compels man's assent to any threatening against sin, would lead him to expect from God some expression of disapprobation against wrong doing; if not in merited punishment, then in some other form. As the embodiment and personification of holiness, God must hate sin; and to retain the confidence of created intelligences, and impart to them fulness of joy, why should He not manifest to them in all possible and appropriate forms, His delight in righteousness and his disapprobation of wrong? As character in this world manifests itself in appropriate acts, why may it not in all other worlds? If the principles of moral government are everywhere the same, why must not consistency of character always utter itself in some appropriate manifestation? We learn as much from events as from precepts. A father's grey hairs brought down in sorrow to the grave, speak as much as his words or his justly-inflicted stripes; and whenever such an exhibition of parental suffering is the means of reclaiming an offending child, farther punishment is unnecessary either for retaining the confidence of the other members of the household, or for reforming, and, at the same time, securing the respect of the transgressor himself, when restored.

This would be an atonement of the fireside; and thousands of such have been successfully made. So in the government of God. After having shown His intense disapprobation and grief at wrong doing, by the thunder and troubled shaking and judicial penalties of Sinai, as well as in the natural retributions from violated laws, it would not be singular, could the same ends be secured in some other form, if the merciful Father of our spirits should change this manifestation, which, in its place, was the only

appropriate one, into another, which, for the sake of relieving the penitent from suffering, called forth cries of agony from Jehovah himself. Such a possibility might seem an unprecedented wonder, but for analogous occurrences which transpire every day under the parental roof, often in the school-house, and occasionally in the administration of civil laws.<sup>1</sup> Yet such an atonement Jesus made. God subjected His own nature to a fearful pang, that we "through his sufferings might be healed." The form in which He did it, was the form of a man. It was done in a way which deeply affected those who beheld or heard of the transaction. In no other conceivable mode could the desired end be accomplished, and divine life be made to enter believing souls. What was needed was not only a momentary expression of displeasure against sin—this the earthquake and the pestilence could make—but an expression of grief and disapprobation, which should be fresh for all generations, and intense enough to affect them when the story of it was told, and adapted to win man's love, at the same time that it impressed his conscience and his fears.

Could this be accomplished in any other form so well as in the suffering of an innocent being, who is both God and man, on some spot in our world where men and angels could see it? Such a spot was Calvary; such a being was Jesus Christ; such suffering came forth in his ignominious and sorrowful life, and in his agonizing cry of *Eloi, Lama, Sabachthani*, that burst from Him upon the cross.

Unspeakably great was the suffering of that hour. It was not suffering, however, to appease the wrath of God: God so loved the world that He sent His only-begotten Son; and it was God as well as the humanity that suffered in that form of a crucified Saviour.

Neither was it a literal ransom, in the sense in which that word is used in commercial transactions; nor was the righteousness of Christ transferred to men, in any other sense than as it was formed in their hearts. God's favor cannot be bought, and no being however exalted can have any righteousness to spare. All are bound by laws vast as the capabilities of their being, to do and suffer all that they can in the highest lines, and for the highest ends. If any existent intelligence is willing to be as merciful and righteous as his nature and opportunities admit of (and a holy soul cannot do less than this), the wants of a sinning world, loyalty to God and to truth, or to the necessities and demands of his own moral being, would furnish a field for its entire appropriation. Even Jehovah himself does not hesitate to speak of himself as bound by principles of right and wrong, lying at the foundation of

<sup>1</sup> See the case of Zeleucus, and the reason given by God why He could not hear David's prayer in behalf of his child.

all His precepts ; He manifests His righteousness that he may be "just," and calls upon men to declare whether His ways are not "equal," according to the standard which governs both Him and them, and which occasioned the revelations in nature, in the Bible and in human souls. Holy character is not a thing which any holy being can have too much of. And all that one has he is bound to use. How then can there be any character to be imputed ? Besides, another's righteousness obtained only by transfer (if such a thing is conceivable,) would not change the heart : how therefore, could it occasion the remission of the punishment that comes in the line of *necessary* and *universal* laws ? How could it mitigate the anguish of personal remorse for wrongs un-repaired ? The mind is "its own place," and makes a heaven of hell, and hell of heaven." Hence it cannot be by any such process that through Christ's suffering, which was God sorrowing in Jesus, as well as Jesus suffering in his proper humanity, the penalty of sin is remitted, or even the offer of pardon is announced.

If forgiveness, on repentance, is now proclaimed to all men, it can be consistently done because the scene on Calvary in its connections achieved for the interest of the universe and of the penitent all which the inflicted penalties of Sinai could secure. It opened a way for God to manifest His feelings towards wrong doing without clothing his brow with thunder. It thus retained the confidence of all created intelligences in Him as a sin-hating God, as much as if His indignation had burst forth in flames of fire to consume the transgressor. Therefore it must ever be regarded as an occasion of unutterable joy and gratitude, that when the proper time had come, and the world could appreciate an exhibition of sorrow as well as of wrath, God, "sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh," by a cry wrung from his own heart, and not by the endless woes of the penitent offender. There was a peculiar adaptness in the scene on Calvary to give forth this expression. It could do it as nothing else could. To any array of physical wonders, however startling, men born in the midst of them become accustomed. What if the winds should wail on forever, and the stars arrange themselves in letters of fire on the face of the firmament, and shudderings as if of horror be felt throughout all "earth's wide domains," and the very leaves coil up with anguish ? They would soon speak naught to him who from childhood had played and slept on the bosom of a moaning world. Things to affect men throughout all their generations must be out of the course of nature, and in a measure new and absorbing, and they must come close to the heart. Hence it is that the crucifixion with its sad and fearful accompaniments affects the human soul as nothing else can. It was the crowning act of a whole life assiduously spent for other's good. By it men are convinced that God loved them.

From it they also see that Jehovah hated sin. The scene on Calvary carries with it all the awe-inspiring power of omnipotence rending the rocks and shrouding the sun in sackcloth with all the plaintiveness of appeal that comes from a soul overwhelmed with grief at another's transgression. The dignity and compassion portrayed in it, has a fullness always beyond conception, and yet intensely expressive as told by a few of those that saw for themselves what transpired in that awful hour. The story of this can never die. It speaks of a child and of a manger, and of intense agony. If it was not the literal substitution of suffering on the one side in the place of character on the other, if it was not a strict equivalent for remorse and hell in the eye of distributive justice, it was at least the substitution of one bitterly sorrowful mode of expressing the Divine displeasure for another and much severer mode. It was suffering; it was Divine suffering; it was vicarious suffering; it was God speaking from Gethsemane and Calvary in deeper and more significant tones the very same lessons, with some others, which he had uttered on Sinai, and for the same ends. It was a heart-rending exhibition of tenderness, allying itself with principle, to save a lost world. It was a manifestation of character infinitely exalted, self-sacrificing and just, given forth in the moment when human necessities demanded and admitted of it.

As it is no uncommon thing for families and communities to be restrained and fortified by exhibitions of character; as a manifestation of love or sorrow or moral disapprobation has sometimes lead those to repentance whom other modes of appeal have not effected; is it surprising that God should add to the motives once made by the law and its penalties to the susceptibilities of fear, the higher appeals made from the life and sufferings and death of Jesus to the whole moral nature? When considerations of gratitude and justice began to be recognized in a wicked world was it not to be expected that God would appeal to these? and if necessary through a cross and His own sufferings? possibly what "the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, the bringing in of a better hope" might.

This is the ground therefore on which we rest the argument for an objective atonement; viz: the necessity, in the fullness of time, as human nature became prepared for it, of furnishing for man's contemplation some other exhibition of God than had been made from Sinai and the providences of four thousand years; and of furnishing this in such a way that pardon or repentance might be proclaimed broad as the earth and seas, and free as the winds of heaven, and all without hazarding for a moment the confidence of the universe in its Sovereign, who would be expected with such a proclamation to manifest in some form His disapprobation of sin. The Jewish sacrifices appropriately foreshadowed this idea; that God, whilst He forgave men their sins, was grieved that they had

committed them. To an intelligent Hebrew, there could be given in his day no more expressive symbol of God's disapprobation of man's evil doing, that when amidst the solitude of the desert the cry of the victim went up slain before the altar, and the smoke of its sacrifice darkened the skies. In this way the law even had in its ritual "the shadow of things to come." It gave forth to those who could interpret its signs the very same impression which was uttered on Calvary: "It declared God's righteousness." Thus Jesus is said to be "a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." In His death as in his life, he manifested and magnified God's grief and disapprobation at sin, at the same time in which He was pouring forth His spiritual being to regenerate mankind. Hence the apostle says, in another place, "Him hath God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God. To declare, I say, at this time, his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus."

Let no one aver that this theory represents "the prevention of crime as the great and sole end to be answered by punishment in the government of God." To prevent crime is but a small part of the good obtained, by a provision which secures the confidence and homage of an intelligent universe, and makes God consistent with himself. It is right that God should be honored and loved, and the great end of the atonement as of the punishment of sin, is to secure the honor of God in the sight of all whom He has created, as well as to prevent any more sin. The sins of God's creatures have wronged Him, and all who are affected by them, and wronged their own souls. Whilst it is an abstract and unmeaning idea to speak of sin, as deserving punishment for its own sake, in and of itself, as if sin had any self; it is a practical and awfully solemn and often deeply felt fact, that sin deserves punishment because it wrongs God, and wrongs the universe, and wrongs the sinner's soul. This it is which makes God abhor it. This it is which makes the universe demand from God an expression of His abhorrence, that "He may be just, and yet the justifier of" all who repent; an expression to be given forth not of necessity through punishment, but in any form which will answer the ends of government as well; such as a sigh from God's own soul. Because God has a deeper sense of sin's ill-desert than man can ever have, it by no means follows that he must utter this feeling by punishment. Still he must utter it; and He did so on Calvary.

Another objection to the governmental view has been, that it does not seem to grow immediately out of the Scriptural expressions and images. We have already endeavored to show that "propitiation" and "sacrifice," and Rom. 3: 25, do most appropriately and impressively announce the fact that God is greatly



offended at sin, and considers it a grievous wrong. Still it is not to be denied, but should be spoken out more boldly than is common, that the Bible truths were uttered thousands of years ago; were spoken in a form to meet the mental wants of the people to whom they were addressed; whilst that form contained in it a higher truth than the obvious one, and also included it. During the time of the sacrifices, the Jews were a rude and barbarous people. They felt, as did all the heathen nations, that the only way by which punishment could be remitted, was by some satisfaction in the form of blood, shed to appease the indignation of an offended Deity; even their own indignation, and that of all warriors was appeased in this way. It was not singular then, but just what might have been anticipated, that, if Jehovah should endeavor to convince them that they might be forgiven, He would do it through some symbol to which they were accustomed, and could understand. A sacrifice gave them the idea of deliverance, of redemption. And Jehovah seems to have been willing that they should retain the bloody and erroneous idea, which their untutored natures suggested as to the mode by which this was effected, for the sake of giving them the blessed and all-important truth that they might be pardoned. A little at a time, seemed to express the principle on which they were instructed. Who can say that this is not the only way in which a revelation can be made?

Future ages, as they receive greater light, will understand the fuller meaning of the words and images first given to meet the wants of an unenlightened age. Such has ever been pre-eminently the case in relation to those words and symbols, for the literal meaning of which some so pertinaciously and inconsistently with their own action in other cases, contend. For instance, it was once claimed, and still is by a few, that the atonement was designed only to appease the indignation—meaning by this, the instinctive vengeance and fury of the Almighty. With such the favorite and usual mode of speaking of Christ's sufferings is, that he drank the wrath of God.

In the lapse of years, this idea of God's indignation was modified to mean a sense of justice, and the propitiation to appease not so much an instinct of divine indignation, as a sense of vindictive justice; then, as the feelings and views of mankind advanced in purity and truth, vindictive justice was tempered into distributive justice. For this idea a large portion of the church still contend; they make a sense of justice in the breast of God to be satisfied only by punishment—the sole ground for the necessity of an atonement. Strenuously do they still reject the truth, that general justice must now take the place of distributive, in accounting for the great redemption. Why should man be so slow to believe that the sufferings of Christ were endured, as

must be the judicial punishment of sin, for the sake of securing the general happiness and interests of the universe, rather than to appease a personal feeling in the Divine breast?

From the nature of the human soul, and the laws of its advancement, from the hopes which are vouchsafed to us by the promises of God respecting the destiny of man, it must needs be that our views of the atonement must enlarge with our knowledge of God, and with our range of thought and feeling; for the atonement was one revelation of God to his intelligent creatures.

This principle, that the meaning of language advances, and must not be limited to its first literal and inadequate sense, is not new. It is avowed, and acted upon by all theologians, when it suits their purposes. Even the Princeton Review does not hesitate to say, respecting the words ransom, redemption, purchase, &c., "It is readily admitted that all these words are often used in a wide sense, to express the general idea of deliverance, without reference to the *mode* by which that deliverance is effected." This is just what we aver in relation not only to the words ransom, redemption, but also in respect to the phrase propitiation, sacrifice, and any other single term by which this great event was first declared to a fallen world. They are all to be taken in a wide, as well as in a literal sense; the wide sense growing wider throughout eternity, and yet comprehending all the previous senses, as a great circle does the smaller ones within it.

Thus we see how it may be true that the atonement, in a sense, does appease the wrath of God; for there is an anger in which is no sin. It is true, also, that it satisfies God's sense of justice; for according to the constitution of all holy minds, a sense of wrong or ill-desert must arise in view of any fact which brings so great a wrong as sin does upon both God and man. What we object to, and protest against, however, is, that these minor ends should be asserted to be the only ends for which Christ suffered, and even be made to take the place of a greater one, and one indefinitely more in keeping with the whole character of God.

Neither let any one call this a verging towards socinianism. Socinus made the atonement only an expression of God's love, and limited the range of the great event to this half-truth, as do those only to a much smaller fraction, who make it a mere satisfaction of God's justice. Whereas the principle we advocate extends its range to the whole universe of God, and makes it the expression of every feeling which could appropriately come from Jehovah in view of a great wrong committed against himself, and forgiven; especially does it express His disapprobation at the sin, and pity for the sinner.

In confirmation of this view we would add, that it shows as no

other can, how the judicial penalties of sin may be removed; whilst it is liable to none of those objections which prevent the reception of other theories. By judicial penalties, as distinguished from natural, we mean those sufferings which God has annexed to transgression for the sake not of reforming the offender, nor mainly for the sake of preventing crime, but for the purpose of manifesting to the universe God's character, i. e., His hatred of sin, His love of holiness, His wisdom, and even His goodness on the large scale. By natural penalties, we mean the sufferings which come upon the body and the soul as the necessary result of violated laws. These also show in a degree, the character of God and the misery of sinning, but in this life they come upon the righteous as well as upon the wicked, and are used for disciplinary ends, and in the world of the future unless appropriated to judicial ends, cease to exist, except as they make the heaven of a renovated man different from that of an angel that never fell.

It is this judicial penalty which the atonement in its outward bearings was designed to remove; it removes also the natural penalty when it becomes judicial or beyond the reach of remedial agencies. The natural penalties of transgression when suffered only for chastisement and purification are removed as far as they can be, by Christ formed within the heart, exterminating the desire, and possibly at last the memory of sin. What we are disposed to vindicate is the necessity of an expression of Divine displeasure against sin, when forgiven, for the sake of showing to an adoring universe the character of God, and of thus sustaining in Him the confidence of all created intelligencies, including the pardoned transgressor himself.

On this ground an atonement in some form would be necessary if there existed only one man to be forgiven. It might not be made on Calvary, but still an expression of displeasure would have to be made somewhere, in some form, for the sake of retaining the entire confidence in God, of that one penitent mind.

Since natural penalties come to an end from their very nature when not authoritatively perpetuated; judicial penalties announced and enforced by Jehovah constitute with many the great sanction of God's moral government, as distinguished from that which is natural. But inasmuch as all suffering, natural as well as judicial, is for moral ends, we prefer to consider all the government that is conducted in a moral system as moral government; a part of which is enforced by natural, a part by natural and judicial, and a part only by judicial retributions.

Hence when God said to our first parents, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," and reannounced the same penalty again in the edict, "the soul that sinneth it shall die," He meant by "death," all the natural and judicial suffering which

could come and did, from sin as persisted in, according to the time and obstinacy of its continuance. No one supposes that in the very day that Adam eat he suffered all that he could suffer in all time—that he suffered hell-torments. But he did begin to suffer that which if the transgression had been persisted in eternally, would have ended in hell-torments. No one supposes that he suffered all that is meant by spiritual death in its literal and most entire sense. He suffered in that day a great spiritual obscuration with remorse of conscience and alienation from God and the fear of something terrible to come, which was all that he then could suffer. What was meant then by “die,” was, thou shalt be subject to mortality, begin to die a spiritual, and if sin is persisted in or not repented of, an eternal death.

This penalty was in part to reform the offender, in part to deter others, and in part to confirm the confidence of the universe in a pure and holy God. That part of any penalty which is to reform the offender, when removed, is removed by reformation, by the Christ in his heart, and by the Christ on Calvary so far as it brings Him into his heart. That part of any penalty which is strictly judicial, is removed by Christ on Calvary, expressing God's displeasure against sin, as well as any degree of retribution. If it is enquired here, can the atonement remove remorse? We reply, if by remorse is meant only a sense of ill-desert, growing out of the apprehension of judicial punishment, it does; if, by remorse, however, is meant a sense of ill-desert growing out of a consciousness of having done great wrong to the soul, to Christ, to God, and to the universe; such remorse nothing can wholly remove so long as memory brings up the wrong. Heaven and the atonement may mitigate, but may not remove remorse; they may change the character, but may not exterminate the sense of ill-desert. Such sorrow from such a memory, may even increase the love, and deepen the humility, as it multiplies the obligations to gratitude in a redeemed soul; and the heavenly objects, exercises and employments may also place remorse in abeyance for millions of years; but still, the possibility of a sad sense of ill-desert where there is the memory of transgression can never be removed. What if sin is seen to have been overruled for good, as was Judas', it can never seem as lovely as holiness in its place. When remembered it must always seem hideous and repulsive and an occasion of sorrow to a holy mind. What the atonement did then in its objective relations was to make it possible for any mind to be saved from the judicial penalties of the law, and to bring Christ into the heart. It did not overthrow or annihilate existing necessary natural laws. It brought the penitent also under the power of mighty regenerative laws, like that of the law of the spirit of life. But it could not prevent the necessary emotions of the heart except as new affections expelled old sorrows. For

the penitent the crucifixion removed the merited retributions announced by God as a Lawgiver, and to be judicially inflicted. It removed the necessity of that eternal torment which was designed to show God's disapprobation of sin, since in the crucifixion that disapprobation was made apparent to the universe in another and a more impressive form. How different this, from that view which represents the atonement as only a satisfaction to God's sense of sin's ill-desert, which must be obtained through stripes inflicted on some innocent substitute; and which could be satisfied in no other way than by torture. From such a view we wonder not that large bodies of believing men have shrunk back confounded; neither is it strange that many have rejected the fact of the atonement altogether rather than admit the reason given for its necessity. That reason when analyzed comprises two statements, each equally false.

The first is that because sin deserves punishment, therefore God's sense of its ill-desert must be expressed by punishment. The second, that this punishment must come in the form of agony inflicted on the sinner, or on a substitute. We have already shown from the nature of the human mind, and from the constitution of every family, that a sigh from a parent's heart, or the marks of grief upon his brow, may go farther for the accomplishment of any end for which punishment is ever inflicted, than any number of stripes laid upon the offender, or on an innocent substitute. God is a parent; and that agony on Calvary was wrung from his own heart and not only from an innocent child. When the Bible uses language which makes Christ in this transaction as distinct from the Father as if He was another person, it is only an accommodation of language to the imperfect conceptions of fallen men. "By his stripes are we healed," is a metaphorical expression, meaning, in its wide sense, by God's sufferings in Christ are we delivered. There is no feeling in the breast of God which demands the punishment of offenders only for His own private satisfaction. It is easy to see how the word "propitiation," might come to be regarded as a feeling of vindictive justice burning in some breast; but the spirit of Christianity, the laws of enlightened and sound interpretation, and loyalty to Jesus, ought no longer to suffer such a meaning to be attached to this word when speaking of our redemption; as literally expressive of its nature. It is time that in our conceptions of the Deity moral reflections should take the precedence of instinctive emotions. It is plain when the apostle uses the word propitiate, with several images already referred to, that it is used sometimes to portray the blessedness of the results which are as great as if men had been rescued by sacrifice from the wrath of an avenging Deity; such expressions, had deep meaning for the people to whom they were uttered; and when they gave simply the idea of a great deliverance, a true and proper one; it is

also true that a sacrifice in the lone desert might manifest God's disapprobation of evil doing without implying that any private feeling in His own breast was satisfied or appeased by the cry of the dying Lamb. It lessens not the necessity of punishment, it diminishes not the necessity of an atonement, but it assigns to punishment its true end, and to the atonement its true intent to speak of it as an exhibition of disapprobation at sin, coming from the soul of an aggrieved and injured Father. Such a view, instead of making us wonder at God's wrath, overwhelms us with the extent and awe-fullness of His love.

And now in the light of the views which have been advanced, one of which regards Christ as the life-imparting power to the soul, and the other as removing the necessity for judicial punishment, an interesting and important enquiry arises : viz.

V. What is the natural and appropriate effect of these views respectively upon the feelings and the character? Are they adapted to make men more holy? Will they reach and bind the human conscience? Will they mould and sway for good a sinning heart? This is an important enquiry : because if there is no tendency in these views to sanctify the soul, it would be a serious presumption against them ; and if on the other hand it can be shown that they actually contribute to this in an eminent degree and legitimately have no other effect, it will be as decided a presumption in their favor.

Any true view, however limited, of Christ's life and death, must awaken the gratitude of a heart that has sinned, if it believes that Christ died for it. If one hazards his life for his friend, that by his death his friend may live, it is regarded as an instance of heroic self-renunciation, and never fails to stir the fountains of human feeling, and call forth tides of willing admiration. Whether it be the Rochelle pilot whom Louis XVI. rewarded with that laudatory epistle, and with the pension for life, or the Italian soldier pleading with his companion in arms to let him die in his behalf, or a youthful maiden venturing out on stormy seas to save the wrecked, or exposing herself to "the battle of the warrior with confused noise, and with garments rolled in blood," that others might be free ; but one impression is made upon the mind ; it is thrillingly affected ; it admires ; it loves. A living being has hazarded existence for a fellow-being. Let the principle, through which the offering avails be what it may, if life is actually surrendered for another, and if it is done voluntarily, we never fail to yield up our hearts, wondering yet rejoicing in sadness at the deed. Gratitude, ceaseless if not overwhelming, is the immediate, necessary, and universal emotion, in view of such acts of unwonted self-abandonment for the good of others.

Yet, if we attempt to mention the sacrifices of those who counted not their lives dear unto them, in connection with that of

Him, who loved us and gave himself for us, such has been the unspeakably greater expenditure of suffering on the part of Jesus, compared with that which can have been endured in the toils and agonies of all the martyrs of the world, that we feel rebuked in alluding to them, except for the purpose of illustrating the nature of the feelings which must ever be kindled at the thought of Christ's love "unto death." If it is an extraordinary thing for a man to die for his friend, though "peradventure for a good man some will even dare to die," to what an extent has "God" commanded his love towards us "in that whilst we were yet sinners Christ did for us!" So long as we believe that Jesus "died" for us, whatever may be our theory of the atonement, so long as we believe that Christ actually "gave His back to the smiter that we, through his sufferings, might be healed," gratitude, adoring, interminable, inexpressible, must oppress and melt into contrition, a soul that has committed wrongs which it cannot repair. Whether Jesus offered up himself, in order to impart a kind and degree of spiritual life which could not be given forth so as to reach all the world, except by such a death, or whether it was to answer some end of government or law, that "with a great cry he gave up the Ghost," the effect on all hearts who dwell upon the fact, must in one respect be the same; they must be bowed down with an abiding sense of obligation so long as they believe that Christ's death was the means of their everlasting life.

In addition, however, to this universal sense of indebtedness, distinctive views might be expected to induce specific states of mind. Such distinctive feelings do certainly belong to the explanations that have been given of the mode of our redemption, and as their legitimate result.

If the death of Jesus, after his sorrowful life, did remove a governmental obstacle in the way of man's pardon; if the sufferings of Christ did make it consistent for God to do that without which such a manifestation of grief and disapprobation, with safety He could not have done; if by reason of those sad scenes in Gethsemane and on Calvary, so full of God's compassion, and so singularly adapted to inspire confidence in Him, even a mind disposed to view things in their relation to justice or the interests of the universe, can venture to ask for pardon, when without such an exhibition it could never have sought it; surely for such a mind, this governmental view has its place; to it, a necessary and all-important place; it removes despair; it helps the sinner to believe that God can pardon his sin, and yet in so doing neither dishonor Himself nor shake the confidence in Him of any created intelligence.

This, then, seems to be the appropriate province of the objective governmental view of the Atonement, in its operation on the feelings, viz.: to remove despair; despair growing out of an ap-

prehension that God would be dishonored in the eyes of all who are looking towards him from any world, if He should every moment pardon accumulated sins from numberless transgressors, and at the same time make no manifestation of His displeasure at them, either in their sufferings or His own.

There are distinctive emotions elicited also by the apprehension that Christ is constantly imparting His own spiritual life to the soul.

With such a belief, the mind begins to hope, and it is at the same time impressed with a child-like sense of its dependence. A conviction that there is a vital union between Jesus and his followers, tends directly to inspire confidence and expectation. Under the impression that the Redeemer is upholding it, it is easy to see how a distrustful mind may at last actually look forward to the day when it shall reflect the image of the Saviour it has loved; when, through Christ strengthening it, it will have obtained the mastery over itself, and yet feel all the while that its strength is *an imparted strength*. The faith which causes it to hope, at the same time keeps it humble. Its glory is chastened by infirmity. Awe-inspiring and spiritually elevating are such expectations springing from such convictions. They seem like a token of acceptance—a pledge of restoration in the heart given by Jesus himself.

With such convictions, the hope of a happy eternity will never exist irrespective of the character. Whilst the mind recognizes devoutly its dependence on God for the good that is in it, it must ever feel that its love of holiness will be the basis and the measure of its everlasting enjoyment.

Important as we regard these views of the atonement, both as a vindication of its necessity, and as a source of comfort and strength when clearly apprehended, yet we would ever remember that it is not the explanation of a fact, or even the consciousness of it that saves, but the working of it in the heart. The mind that has no knowledge of the relation of Christ either to the universe or to its own regeneration, may still find peace in the belief, that "if the wicked man forsake his way, and the ungodly man his thoughts, God will have mercy upon him, and if he turn unto the Lord, the Lord will abundantly pardon him."

We conclude by saying: There are normal laws in theology, as in all other sciences which are slowly discovered, which explain existing facts, reconcile apparent difficulties, and give great significance to that which has hitherto been without a meaning. To apprehend these, and to feel their power, should be the great aim of the Christian teacher and disciple.

Until this is done, theories will be founded on isolated developments of scriptural events which, though they will not account for



all the varied aspects of the case, may still be regarded as approximations to the truth. Such were Luther's and Calvin's views of the atonement. Whenever good men have made and recorded with care the results of their observations on the great theme of the New Testament, they have noted down some important facts, even when their specific explanation of them was unsatisfactory. Must not the work of this and future ages be, to make use of these facts, in connection with those which are seen by each generation for itself, for the sake of ascertaining the general law which will harmonize all discordant theories, account for all apparent deflections, and reveal to the sight of wondering and adoring man, the mysteries of redemption?

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## ARTICLE II.

### CLASSICAL STUDY.

By PROF. J. J. OWEN, D. D., New York.

The use of the classics in a course of liberal education, is now pretty generally acknowledged and appreciated. The efforts, which were made a few years since to bring them into disrepute, have signally failed, and opposition to their study has well nigh ceased.<sup>1</sup> The cause of classical learning has never been more highly valued than now. Never have its friends labored to better advantage, or with brighter prospects. The most friendly relations exist among the co-workers in this department of education, arising from no specific organization, but from their devotion to the cause in which they are laboring.

<sup>1</sup> It is within the recollection of many, how fierce was the onset made, some twenty years ago, upon the classics, on the alleged ground of their immoral tendencies. "*Formosum pastor Corydon ardebat Alexim*," had all the changes rung upon it which a distempered imagination and fanatical spirit could devise. It was asserted that the academies and colleges, where such vile productions were studied, could not be other than hot-beds of vice, the nurseries of wickedness in its most revolting forms. From these phillipics against the classics, they would proceed to descant upon the admirable substitute furnished by the natural sciences, as if the inspection of a shell, the anatomizing of a fish or a lizard, the analyzation of a plant, chemical experiments, excursions in search of minerals, things useful and desirable in their place, could give the mind that exercise and full play of its powers and consequent strength and enlargement, which would result from the study of Homer, Thucydides, or Demosthenes.

The number of classical students is increasing each year. The time is not far distant, when the more common classical authors, such as Virgil, Cicero, Livy, Horace, Homer, and Xenophon, will be read by many, who have no intention of entering upon a full and extended course of study, or of preparing themselves for any one of the learned professions. Many parents are now found who wish their sons to become acquainted with the elements of the ancient languages, even while their intention is to educate them for the common pursuits of life. They regard a good education not only of intrinsic value, but in reference to the vicissitudes of life, one of the most certain and available bequests, which they can make to their children. Thus is given a cheering promouition of what may be expected, when the utility of classical studies is more generally understood and the facilities for obtaining a classical education, are so multiplied and reduced in expense as to be accessible to all.<sup>1</sup>

Such being the state and prospects of classical learning in our country, it becomes a pertinent inquiry, how the study of the ancient languages may be prosecuted so as best to subserve the object for which it is designed.

This involves a preliminary enquiry as to the end of classical study. It cannot be the acquisition of the languages merely, for this would be a substitution of the means for the end. The great object is to educate the mind, give exercise and strength to its faculties, teach it to reason, weigh evidence, balance probabilities, arrive at just conclusions, make new creations and combinations in the world of thought. This is a result not of mere linguistic attainments, but of the mental discipline through which those attainments are made. Great proficiency in the ancient languages is in itself no evidence of a thoroughly educated intellect. We have known students who, by the aid of a retentive memory and a commendable attention to the general principles of exegesis, have

<sup>1</sup> The principles of exegesis, unfolded in the grammars of Buttmann, Matthiae, Thiersch, Rost, Kühner, Krüger, have greatly modified the system of instruction in this country. In the list of those who were instrumental in introducing these authors to American scholars, the name of Robert B. Patton stands pre-eminent. His enthusiastic devotion to Grecian literature is fresh in the recollection of many now on the stage of action. At the early age of *twenty-two*, having been called to the chair of ancient languages in Middlebury college, he obtained leave to visit Germany for the better qualification of himself for the duties of his office. There he sojourned three years, and such were his attainments in both the ancient and modern languages, that he received from the university of *Göttingen*, the honorary degree of *Doctor of Philology*. In that land of scholars, he enjoyed the society of Hermann, Buttmann, Thiersch, and other eminent men, and from them caught the true spirit of classical criticism. He returned to this country one of the most accomplished scholars of his age, and in possession of a classical library, at that time, probably, the best and most extensive of any private collection in the land.

attained to considerable ease and elegance of translation. But further than this they have never gone. Thus far they have been intellectual dwarfs, and will probably remain so as long as they live.

It is the manner in which the languages are studied, the state of the mind when brought into contact with the lesson, upon which true mental improvement depends. If the student is interested in the subject of his study—if he sympathizes with the spirit of the writer—if he marks well the proprieties of his diction, and its adaptation to the nature of the subject—if he tries the power and appropriateness of the words and their arrangement—if he is on the alert to detect any false assumption, fallacious reasoning, misplaced argument, or unwarrantable inference—in a word, if he puts himself into such connection with his author as to be under the same governing impulse, volition answering to volition, emotion to emotion, judgment to judgment, taste to taste, then there is mental enlargement and strength, giving promise of a ripe and vigorous intellect. Then are brought into action all the faculties of the mind, and there will be secured that equilibrium of the mental powers, which is so essential to eminence and usefulness.

The true end of classical study has been greatly overlooked, and even when correct views have been taken of the subject, they have been rendered useless by the manner in which, with few exceptions, the ancient languages have been studied. The textbooks have often been unsuited to the age and attainments of the student. Had the design been to disgust him with the classics, to baffle his efforts to understand and appreciate his author, to repress interest in his studies, and to bring him to regard his lesson as a task, irksome and useless, we know of no books better adapted to secure such a result, than the far-famed and, for a time, the highly popular *Collectanea Minora and Majora*, of Andreas Dalgren. The notes, if such meagre and ill-digested annotations deserve the name, were written in Latin, and referred mainly to manuscript readings, emendations of the text, and other points of criticism, far above the comprehension of the young student. A word or phrase, the meaning of which no one could well mistake, was sometimes defined in English, while difficult idiomatic clauses, involved and confused constructions, grammatical obscurities, geographical and chronological problems, were either overlooked or referred to some author, of whose work it was quite doubtful whether there was a copy in the United States. Thus the student was stumbling continually upon inexplicable passages, which invested with obscurity other portions of his lesson, and rendered his task embarrassing and unpleasant from the uncertainty with which every step was attended.

The fragmentary form, in which the various authors were presented, served also to diminish the interest with which they ought

to have been studied. Selections were made from so large a number of writers, as to render them of necessity quite short. The student was hurried from author to author, without remaining in any one long enough to become acquainted with his style or peculiarities of thought. If with this we take into consideration, that the selections did not always embrace continuous portions of the writer, but were composed of broken and disconnected extracts, we shall cease to wonder that the youth looked back upon his classical course with feelings of thankfulness that it was ended, and that the only things treasured up in his memory were, that Thucydides was difficult, Plato abstruse, Aristotle dry and concise, Demosthenes vehement,—which characteristics, it is not to be supposed he gathered from his own reading so much as from the stereotyped epithets, which from age to age have been applied to these authors.

In addition to these misjudged and ill-prepared text-books, the only lexicon, generally accessible, until the last few years, was that of Schrevilius. A few who had the means paid their ten dollars for a copy of Hedericus. In these lexicons, a word of obscure signification was defined by an equally obscure Latin word. The more remote significations were seldom given, or, if so, the Latin translation would throw the student back in despair upon the Greek, over which he would sit in a state of dejection, adverse to all mental activity and improvement. His progress was continually arrested by his being under the necessity of turning from the Greek to the Latin dictionary, in this wretched process of a double translation. How could he be interested in a study attended with such difficulties and interruptions? How could he keep abreast with the thoughts of his author, while thus impeded with hindrances thrown in his pathway by those who should have lent him a helping hand and cheered him on in his cause? Instead of being in a frame of mind suited to derive profit from his intellectual toil, he became discontented, nervous, fretful, and soon approached his daily task as reluctantly, as an ox bendeth his neck to receive the unwelcome yoke.

As a well known fact, how small a proportion of the students, in those times of which we are speaking, became proficient in the ancient languages? How few pursued classical studies for the love of them? Sadness comes over our spirit as we think of those days, in which the light of subsequent experience warrants us in saying, that time was wasted, and energies paralyzed, and hopes destroyed, which no future study could fully repair, with whatever zeal and diligence it might have been pursued.

But this sad picture, which the memory of the past calls up, is not without its uses.

*“Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.”*

If we would make the ancient languages a means of mental improvement, we must render the study of them delightful. The eye of the scholar should rest upon fair type, impressed upon good substantial paper. Old books, soiled with the thumbs of preceding classes, and interlined for the benefit of drones, should be banished from the rooms of college. The use of translations should be sternly prohibited, and upon evidence of their existence within the college precincts, should be ferretted out and expelled, as being most baneful to literary progress. The lexicon of each student should be the best in use. Not only should a school grammar be in his possession, but one or more of the larger grammars, to incite him to inquiry, and enable him to push his investigations into the more hidden principles of the language which he is studying. That economy is ill-judged and disastrous, which seeks to save a few dollars by putting into the hand of the student inferior elementary books, or those which are dim and defaced by previous use. An education is often rendered defective thereby, and a comparatively small return for the time and money necessarily expended is realized in after life. The proverb, *penny wise and pound foolish*, is never more applicable, than in a stinted allowance for books, which lie at the very foundation of literary eminence.

We are aware that among the yeomanry of our country, the greatest self-denial has often to be practiced in order to give a son a liberal education. The members of a family not unfrequently subject themselves to great inconvenience, if not to the absolute want of many comforts, in order that he, whom they hope to see occupying an honorable place in some one of the learned professions, may be enabled to pursue his studies without embarrassment. Such persons have a right to expect a reduction of college expenses to their lowest limit, and that, as in board, clothing, and incidental expenses, so in books, everything superfluous shall be dispensed with. But let not this commendable economy embrace the text-books requisite to the successful prosecution of study in any one of the departments. Here there should be an open hand, a generous allowance, or the efforts of the student to derive the highest profit from his course of study, will be greatly crippled.

The youthful student should be aided also by judicious annotations, especially on those authors whose style is obscure. We are no advocates of superabundant and indiscriminate translations of both easy and difficult passages—boards and bladders, upon which indolence may be buoyed up without self-exertion—but we refer to timely and appropriate helps, prepared by practical scholars, who know where to render assistance, and how to lend the sinking student a helping hand, and enable him to strike out again upon the bosom of the element in which he was ready to be en-

gulfed. While he should never be relieved from close and severe application, yet it is very undesirable, that his strength should be wasted in vain struggles to overcome difficulties, which a single remark or grammatical reference might have removed.

The interest in classical study, which is necessary to secure the full measure of its disciplinary influence, depends, in no small degree, upon the manner in which the recitation is conducted. If the exercise consist in mere translation, and the etymological and syntactical parsing of a few words selected at random, it will become dull, formal, and most disastrous to all mental activity. The monotonous and hesitating tones of the student, as he feels his way through a long and difficult sentence, and the tones of still greater dullness, in which he passes through the declension of words, with which he ought to have been and probably was made familiar in the elementary exercises of the language, fall upon the ear of his fellow members of the class, with a drowsy influence, which few have power to withstand. From such an exercise the students repair to their rooms, to dose over their next lesson, or at least to make a mere mechanical preparation for its recitation.

But if the teacher comes to the recitation room, himself, by the freshness of previous study, fully conversant with the lesson—if he throws life into the exercise, by seizing upon the strong points of beauty or difficulty and holding them up clearly to view—if he inspires and stimulates his pupils to research by appropriate and timely remarks—if he leads them up to the glorious classic temple, and points them to its deep-laid foundation, its massy and majestic columns, its towering dome, its admirable proportions and exquisite finish, their is little danger of their gazing upon the structure with listlessness, or, entering reluctantly its portals to feast upon its interior glories and splendor.

In these exercises, the teacher should not be discursive, or fatigue his class by prolixity of remarks. Some point selected beforehand, or suggested by the recitation, should form the topic of his observations. At one time, he may descant upon the quantity of syllables, and from the stores of a disciplined and richly furnished mind, invest this subject with a charm and importance, which it will not soon lose. At another time, he may expound the laws of Greek accents, showing their importance and the feasibility of their being thoroughly understood. At one recitation, some principle of exegesis may be discussed, and, at another, some subtle point of philology taken up and examined. The social usages and customs of the ancients, their religious rites and observances, their systems of jurisprudence, their laws of trade and commerce, their code of morals, the political elements, which developed in the forms of aristocracy and democracy, were continually struggling for the mastery, until both were swallowed up in military despot-

ism, the great features of the mythical, heroic, and historical ages, the reconciliation of chronological discrepancies, and the clearing up of geographical obscurities, should all in their proper place receive due attention. The whole field of classical research should be traversed and retraversed. The class should be led to expect, that some new region with its rich and varied scenery would be explored at each recitation. The philosophy of language should be taught, not to the exclusion of grammatical analysis, but as its principal end. The memory of students should be stored with the great facts of grammar, instead of being overburdened with disconnected and cumbrous forms. The living features of each author should be impressed upon the mind, rather than the texture or fit of the costume in which he is clad.

There are boundless fields in the department of classical instruction, which have scarcely been entered. Rich mines are to be worked, and others still richer are to be opened and explored. The youth who are now entering the halls of literature, may reasonably expect that their instructors will conduct them to those regions, whence they may return laden with the treasures which diligence, attention, and devotedness to classical study may enable them to gather.

We are led to indulge in these remarks from a conviction, that the standard of classical scholarship ought to be greatly elevated in our literary institutions. A good classical scholar should no longer be a *rara avis* in our colleges. In every class there should be, and there may be, if proper efforts are made, a goodly proportion of accurate scholars, and all may be brought to a respectable proficiency in this department of study. What an impulse would thus be given to the cause of general literature, and how speedily would a corresponding improvement be manifested in all that pertains to education.

Before we can hope, however, to see this desirable result, there must be a more thorough and extended course of preparation in our high schools and academies. It is vain to expect from the able and excellent instructors in our colleges and universities, the full measure and strength of their professional influence, if expended on classes composed in part, at least, of those whose previous training has been so limited and imperfect as to render them not only unsuited to the more advanced stages of study and instruction, but weights and clogs to the progress of their more thoroughly prepared classmates. If our voice could be heard, or being heard, could have influence with parents and guardians, we would urge upon them, as a matter most intimately connected with the educational welfare of those committed to their care, to retain in the academic stage of education, candidates for college, until they are able to construe, with facility and accuracy, all the

classic authors embraced in the prescribed course of our best academies. If Virgil is a required book for admission to college, let it be interpreted as meaning the *whole* of Virgil, and not the first four books of the *Æneid*: if the candidate is to be examined in the Greek Reader, let him not be considered as qualified to sustain the examination by a perusal of some twenty pages of the book. Any attempt to fritter away the studies prescribed for admission to college, is the worst injury which can be inflicted upon the young student. It leads him to form a low estimate of the value of a classical education, and to regard it as of secondary importance, whether he is qualified to derive benefit from his collegiate course, the main object being to secure an entrance into college, with the ulterior view of receiving a diploma, which, in such cases, is indeed of some importance as being the only evidence that its possessor has received a liberal education. We repeat then, that unless the standard of preparation for college is greatly elevated, it will be vain to expect, that classical studies will take the place they ought to occupy in our high seats of learning.

We proceed to make a few remarks on the value of a thorough acquaintance with the classics, and the claims which they have to be studied, as furnishing a high means of mental improvement.

It is generally admitted, that no better models of literary excellence are to be found than the classic writers of Greece and Rome. But although held in such estimation, it is a fact not to be denied, that the great majority of students throw them aside, as soon as their collegiate course is terminated, and bid adieu forever to classical study. We know of no step more fatal to literary or professional eminence. This is a natural result of the little interest felt in these studies as a college exercise. When this want of interest is removed by a more judicious course of instruction, and a better supply of suitable text-books, the instances of continued attachment to the classics will be far less rare than they now are. The choice collection of classical books found in many private libraries, will show the high estimation in which these works are held, while the apt and ready quotation, the happy allusion, the refined taste, the acquaintance with the laws of criticism, will betray in the possessors of these libraries, a familiarity with classic lore, resulting only from close and long continued study.

We believe that many neglect the classics from a spirit of false independence, or, perhaps we should say, from a mistaken idea of the true use of them as model productions. A slavish imitation of some favorite author, is indeed incompatible with that strain of mental nerve and muscle, which in the end makes a full-grown and accomplished scholar. But this is the abuse of that, which in its legitimate employment is highly essential to intellectual progress. There is not an art, or trade, or vocation of life, in which the principal of imitation, or a comparison of the subject in hand



with the model performance of others, does not form the chief element of success. The same principle of comparison lies at the foundation of literary improvement. Models must be studied, and their excellencies enstamped upon the mind, or there would soon be a relapse into a state of semi-barbarism. What is the use of the great body of English literature—a treasure more valuable than all the gold or diamonds of the British Empire—if these authors are not to be studied, and their beauties and excellencies incorporated by the laws of mental alchymy with our own thoughts and emotions? With unspeakably greater emphasis may this question be asked in respect to the writings handed down to us from the master minds of antiquity. The annihilation of the whole body of English literature would produce a vacuum not half so disastrous to the cause of letters, as the loss of the classic authors of Greece and Rome. Few though they be, and imperfectly understood even by the ripest scholars, yet they have given shape and comeliness to the creations of the most gifted intellects of modern times. They have moulded the forms of beauty, which adorn the pages of our best poets. They have given keenness to the weapons, which have been wielded most successfully in the cause of truth. Poets, orators, statesmen, divines, have bowed to the superior genius of those men, who for more than two thousand years have sat as princes in the temple of learning. Are the classics then to be banished from every private library, and deemed unsuitable to be studied after the disciplinary stage of education is passed?

But it is said that genius is trammelled by the study of the dead languages. Yes, genius that is empty and inflated, and that seeks to hide its poverty by soaring into the regions of transcendentalism, may be trammelled, when compelled to read and digest the pages of Plato, Aristotle, and Tacitus. Butterfly minds, which spread their gaudy wings in the sunbeam, and having pursued their zigzag flight for a brief season, disappear, nobody knows when or where, they too may be trammelled by falling into the vice-like grasp of Thucydides or Demosthenes. But his classic erudition was no clog to Milton in his wondrous flight. His acquaintance with the writings of antiquity never dulled the philosophical acumen of the author of the *Novum Organum*. The ability, with which Newton was able to discuss some of the most knotty points in ancient chronology, did not disqualify him for the authorship of the immortal *Principia*. Shakspeare was not the less able to stir up the fountains of the soul to their lowest depths, because he could imbue many of his thoughts in the hues of ancient lore. Reference can scarcely be made to one of the great intellects of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that was not well versed in the dead languages; and we hazard but little in saying, that posterity will record the same of those in the nine-

teenth century, whose works have the merit to outlive the age in which they were produced, and pass down to be read and admired by those of coming centuries. There is not a surer index of a small and distorted mind than a depreciation of those great works, which are the fountain-heads of the intellectual streams that have fertilized and beautified the world for so many hundred years. This depreciation will generally be found to result either from a profound ignorance of the ancient languages, or from an affectation of wisdom, which seeks to exalt itself, by decrying everything that has received the suffrage of preceding ages.

There is an opposite extreme into which many fall, quite as hurtful as the error which we have just considered, and that is, a slavish imitation of some favorite Greek or Roman author. This servility is destructive of all originality or individuality of style. Some of these copyists, in imitation of the *κορυδαίολος* *Εκτωρ*, and *πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς*, and *Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων*, have loaded their sentences with epithets, as fantastic and grotesque as the regimentals of Jack Falstaff's soldiers. Others have adopted involved and confused orders of construction, in imitation of the *anacolutha* of Thucydides, as if these blemishes had placed upon the brow of that writer his well-deserved coronet of *Princeps Historicorum*. Others string into interminable sentences, propositions complex and diverse, in order to write with Ciceronean fullness and magnificence. This is a perversion of the classics, which every one should cautiously avoid.

Between these extremes of utter abandonment of the classic authors, on the one hand, and excessive adherence to them, as models, on the other, lies the mean, which we would recommend to be occupied by all who have any acquaintance with the ancient languages. As a preliminary step to the benefit, which all may hope to realize from a proper use of their classical attainments, we would suggest a familiarity with each author, such as is attained only by repeated and careful perusals. This cannot be expected to include the whole circle of the classic writings. It is neither necessary nor desirable to spend the amount of time which would be required to read all the Greek and Roman authors. The number should be quite limited, and the selection varied according to the taste and circumstances of each reader. Nor would we insist upon such a critical familiarity with these authors, as is the result of long continued and patient investigation which busies itself with a comparison of manuscript readings, the elucidation of lexical, etymological, and syntactical difficulties, the harmonizing of conflicting points of chronology, the solution of geographical and archaeological problems.—Such critical scholarship is not essential to the general understanding of an author. What we recommended is at first, so

careful a perusal as to arrive at the sense of a given passage or chapter, and then by repeated reviews, to bring the mind into free and full connection with the sentiment, so that delightful intercourse may be held with the men, whom universal suffrage has placed at the head of the republic of letters.<sup>1</sup>

Having thus become familiar with a select portion of the classics, it will be a pleasant and profitable exercise to read a few pages of some author each day. The selection may be made with some reference to the mental exercise, which the avocation of the day imposes. The poet may give wings to his imagination, by reading some hundred lines of Homer or Horace. The metaphysician may sharpen his power of analysis, by communing with Plato or Aristotle. The orator may prepare himself for the forum, the bar, or the popular assembly, by perusing the speeches of Pericles, Demosthenes, or Cicero. The historian may give polish to his style, and enlarge his powers of generalization, by consulting Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Livy, or Tacitus. The statesman may derive lessons of patriotism from the example of Aristides, Themistocles Epaminondas, or Cincinnatus.<sup>2</sup>

The utility of such an exercise cannot be too highly estimated,

<sup>1</sup> Such was the practice of that profound scholar, Wyttenbach, who found no eloquence in Demosthenes the first three readings. "But at the fourth," says he, "an unusual and super-human emotion pervaded my mind. I could now see the orator at one time all ardor; at another in anguish, at another borne away by an impulse which nothing could resist. As I proceed, the same ardor is kindled in my own mind, and I am carried away by the same impulse. I fancy that I am Demosthenes himself, standing before the assembly, delivering this oration, and exhorting the Athenians to emulate the bravery and glory of their ancestors. I can no longer read the oration silently, but aloud." A similar testimony to the happy result of repeated readings, is furnished by other eminent scholars.

<sup>2</sup> An objection may here be raised, that amidst the multifarious and distracting pursuits of life, no time can be found for the study of the classics. But system and industry will enable one to accomplish much, which would otherwise be deemed impossible. How many would regard it impracticable to make a daily sketch of the events and occurrences, which came under their own observation. Yet John Quincy Adams, than whom no one had greater or more constant demands made upon his time, could keep a full and uninterrupted diary for more than fifty years. Some ministers of the gospel can hardly find time to write one sermon each week. But a clergyman in one of our great cities, by rising at four o'clock in the morning, can find time, in addition to his weighty parochial duties, to write commentaries on all the books of the New Testament, and on some of the most difficult ones of the Old. That time can be found for the prosecution of classical studies may be learnt in the case of Robert Hall. "He thought himself defective," his biographer remarks, "in a tasteful and critical acquaintance with the Greek poets. He read the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* twice over; proceeded with nearly equal care through nearly all the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides, and thence extended his classical reading in all directions. To the Latin and Greek poets, orators, and historians, he devoted a part of every day for a number of years, studying them as a scholar, and also as a moralist and philosopher."

nor can its omission be compensated by the most attentive study of works in our vernacular tongue. The mental effort, required to read the Greek and Latin authors, imparts an interest to the subject, such as cannot be felt in reading works in our own language. Select the most pathetic scene in modern poetry, and compare the effect of its perusal with some tender passage in Euripides, or in the *Iliad*, as the parting of Hector and Andromache, or the lament of Andromache, at sight of her husband's dead body trailed by Achilles around the fields of Troy. Not to speak here of the unrivalled pathos of these selections from the Grecian bard, the process of translation gives an individuality and interest to every circumstance, such as the mind fails to perceive in the most highly-wrought passages of similar description, written in our own language.

In illustration of this point, let us refer to a battle-piece, which has been truly said to approach the nearest of any modern composition to the fire and energy of the Homeric encounters, we allude to the battle of Flodden, in Scott's *Marmion*. No one, however, can justly claim for this effusion the power to send the blood coursing through the veins, which every reader of them in the original must attribute to the battle-scenes of the *Iliad*. Heroes of superhuman strength rush to the encounter. They launch at one another their massy spears, and wound even the celestial beings who mingle in the affray. Stones of vast size are thrown, with a force which breaks down ramparts. Chariots drawn by horses of immortal breed, are driven with frantic fury to the charge. The gods descend to battle. The heavens gather blackness. The thunders roll, the lightnings flash, the earth shakes. The father of the gods extends the everlasting scales, and weighs the destinies of the contending hosts. Discord, Tumult and Fear stalk dreadfully over the field. Achilles clad in celestial panoply rushes forth like the god of battles, at whose sight the Trojans turn pale, and fly for protection within their heaven-built walls. The Scamander in vain raises its waves to arrest his course. Far as a spear's cast the hero leaps at every bound, and defies the rage of the river-god. Hector he seeks, and at Hector he shakes his far-shadowing spear. The armies give place, the gods retire, the arena is clear, and the issue is left to be decided by the two great heroes of Greece and Troy. As he approaches the final scene, the poet kindles up with his subject, until his verse flows along with a fire and grandeur which has never been equalled by any uninspired writer, and probably never will be as long as our world shall stand.

The British parliament and the American senate have furnished to the world splendid examples of eloquence. But who will affirm that the study of the orations of Pitt, Burke, Fox, or those of our own Adams, Clay, and Webster, can be substituted as a mental

exercise for that of Demosthenes, Isocrates, Lysias, and Cicero? We are inclined to hazard the remark, that it would require a higher exertion of intellect, to read and understand the oration of Demosthenes on the Crown, or the funeral oration of Pericles, than all the speeches combined of the great statesmen to whom we have alluded. In reading the latter, it is true, that the mind would have to be in an active, reflective state, far above what is required in reading history or treatises on common and practical subjects, but would be spared those intense efforts, which are demanded to read understandingly the great masters of Grecian eloquence. In this exercise, every mental power is to be exerted to the utmost, and even then the reader often feels his inability fully to grasp those ideas which were thundered over the heads of the fierce democracy of Athens, and by which it was swayed to and fro, as the trees of the forest by a mighty tempest.

We make not this comparison with a spirit to undervalue the productions of modern times, but from a conviction, that the ancient writings not only have in themselves surpassing merit, but being reached by the process of translation, which brings the mind into a state of unwonted activity, make deeper and more abiding impressions upon the reader, and are, therefore, more subservient to intellectual improvement. The influence of such a familiarity with the classics, as we are recommending, would be happily felt in the range and command of language, precision in the use of terms, and skill in the construction of compact, nervous, and well-balanced sentences. The mental effort required to select words and idiomatic expressions corresponding exactly to the original, has ever been regarded as one of the best kinds of discipline, to which the youthful mind can be subjected. How much greater value then should be attached to this exercise, in the riper years of manhood, when the intellect, disciplined and strengthened, can the better possess itself of all the good results?

The study of the ancient languages is necessary to the acquisition of the laws of general grammar, the great principles of language, which are marked with wondrous similarity in all tongues, even in those of nations widely-sundered and flourishing in different periods of the world's history. Comparative philology is of quite recent date, and therefore in its infancy. We know of no richer field in which to gather literary laurels. When thoroughly explored, there will be such an advance in all that pertains to language, that it will constitute an era in general philology, from which scholars will look back upon us as upon men groping in the dark.

The Anglo-Saxon belongs to the Teutonic branch of the great Indo-Germanic family of languages, and is destined to be the most widely-spread of all modern tongues. But it has by no means reached its full measure of grammatical flexibility, copiousness and

strength. New modal forms are to be introduced. The laws of concord and grammatical dependence are to be extended. Harmonious combinations of words are to be multiplied. Changes are to be rung on various modes of expression, and that which is full-toned and melodious retained, and that which is dissonant rejected. In a word, our language is to be rendered more nervous, copious, and flexible, to meet the overwhelming mass of ideas, to which the spirit and improvements of the age are giving birth.

In this great work to what pattern-language can we look, if not to the Greek, a language, which in the words of H. Coleridge, is "the shrine of the genius of the old world, as universal as our race, as individual as ourselves; of infinite flexibility, of indefatigable strength; with the complication and distinctness of nature herself; to which nothing was vulgar, from which nothing was excluded; speaking to the ear like Italian, speaking to the mind like English; with words like pictures, with words like the gossamer film of the summer; at once the variety and picturesqueness of Homer, the gloom and intensity of Æschylus; not compressed to the closest by Thucydides, not fathomed to the bottom by Plato, not sounding with all its thunders, nor lit up with all its ardors even under the Promethean touch of Demosthenes."

In a political aspect, the ancient languages have much to commend their study, especially to citizens of this Republic. We know of no better text-books of freedom, than the writings of those men, who lived in the golden age of Grecian literature. Republicanism is the controlling sentiment of all their works. It could not well have been otherwise. Socrates bore arms in the Peloponnesian war, in behalf of democracy against aristocracy. Thucydides was one of the leaders in that fierce and protracted struggle of principles. Sophocles was a military colleague of Pericles, the great champion of the rights of the people. Euripides was warmly attached to a government administered by the people. Xenophon and Plato were inspired with the most ardent love of liberty, and although circumstances drove the former into the Lacedaemonian service, yet he ever remained true to his principles. Lysias, Isocrates, and above all Demosthenes, were uncompromising foes to every form of tyranny. These writers were no parasites, fed at the table of a bloated aristocracy, and dependent on the smiles of kings and princes, but free and independent thinkers, sturdy and consistent republicans, who not only declaimed in favor of freedom, but when necessary put on their armor and battled in her sacred cause. There are rich lessons of political wisdom, genuine republicanism in their writings, such as are not to be found in the whole circle of modern literature, if we except that of our own free country.

In this age, when the civilized world is awaking from the lethargy of centuries, when the shackles of political slavery are burst-

ing asunder, and men are beginning to tread with the step of freemen, where can the educated mind of this country, or of Europe, better resort for instruction than to those great lights of the past? How deplorable to the cause of liberty, if the miserable abortions of Socialism are adopted as the moulds in which the institutions of freedom are to be cast. Let us never give credence to the assertion, that happiness and competence can be enjoyed without individual industry. Let us spurn the mummery and nonsense which we hear about the majesty and dignity of human nature, the spirit's freedom, the ethereal essence that cannot be bound by laws, restrictions, usages, and customs, but is so unrestrainable and diffusive, that it spreads and amalgamates with other spiritual existences, and helps to form a universal whole, so that the labor of each component existence rightfully belongs to the whole social compound. Let us never feel, that wise and wholesome laws and usages for the protection of individual rights as well as of the body politic, are a burdensome restraint to any but the idle and the vicious; and let us learn to discriminate between constitutional and well-regulated liberty, and a licentious freedom which allows the profligate and indolent to feed, like vampires, upon all the life-giving elements of society. In a word, let us reject these new-fangled theories of pseudo-philosophers, which the agitation of mind has thrown, like froth and scum, upon the surface, and let us draw up from the cool and unagitated depths, the pure waters of ancient wisdom. It was from these fountains, that the fathers of this republic drank, and wo to us as a people when we forsake these waters, and seek to slake our thirst from the shallow, muddy, slimy pools of Fourierism, Socialism, or Communism.

It may be feared, that the course of study which is here recommended, will beget habits of literary servility, and thus destroy originality. But there is little danger that the daily practice of reading a dead language, in which the ideas take the shape and complexion of usages, customs, and habits, which existed more than two thousand years ago, will so control the mind of the reader, as to destroy its independent action, and cause it to draw to an unwarrantable extent upon the labors of others. There have been very few plagiarists, who have indulged their thievish propensities in purloining from the Greek and Roman classics. The structure and habits of a mind, having the energy and industry to master the ancient languages, is *prima facie* evidence, that it cannot rightly be charged with the crime of literary theft. The acquisitions of the scholar have resulted from too much labor, to countenance in himself or in others an undue appropriation of that which does not belong to him. Stolen articles of this description are usually found in the tents of literary idlers, who desire fame without mental toil, and who hold it to be incompatible with their genius, to shut themselves up in their study, and there

to hammer out, and temper, and polish the creations of their own mind—literary Camanches, who scour the plains, and steal everything and from everybody that chance may cast in their way.

We know that there is an abundance of copyists and imitators, but they are the growth, not of the soil of ancient lore, which has to be dug and made mellow by years of toil, but of the hot-bed of the current literature of these times. Every arrival from Europe brings in a fresh importation of books and pamphlets, which find their way to our great publishing houses, and then are multiplied ten thousand fold, to feed the craving desire of the public mind for everything foreign. This is the reason why so many books, claiming to be American, are redolent with ideas and modes of expression brought across the Atlantic. An increased attention to the classics, would counteract the servility with which everything foreign is greeted. There would be found other standards of criticism than those erected across the waters, other tribunals to which the learned might resort for the adjustment of literary controversies, than those in her Britannic Majesty's dominion. Homer and Horace would be deemed as good authority in matters of poetry, Plato and Xenophon in polished and well-pointed prose, Thucydides and Demosthenes in strength and energy of diction, as the penny-a-liners of a foreign magazine.

We need to be more Americanized in all that pertains to the fine arts and liberal sciences. We need a revolution, a declaration of independence in the republic of letters; for the political enthralment of 1776 was not more galling and oppressive, than that which enslaves to foreign dictation no small portion of the educated mind of our land. This revolution will never be effected, until our higher institutions of learning, both collegiate and professional, elevate the banner of freedom, and teach their sons a manly disregard of the flippant and uncourteous remarks upon American authorship, so frequently found in foreign newspapers and reviews—until those, whose education and position in society give weight to their example, patronize books that are truly American—until our scholars, poets, painters, and historians look upon the clear skies, and the verdant fields, and lofty mountains, and pellucid streams of their native land, and draw their inspiration thence, rather than from descriptions of foreign scenery, or long and expensive sojourns in foreign lands—in a word, until a high literary tariff, more effective than one imposed in dollars and cents, shall protect us from the worthless books, which are brought over in every packet and steamer.

It must be evident to every man, who looks upon this subject attentively, that there is a growing disrelish in the community for sober, substantial, instructive reading. The love of excitement has taken possession of the public mind. Every book is cast aside which does not administer, by its overwrought pictures of human



life, to this passion for the strange and marvellous. Hence it is not wonderful that the *Spectator* and the *Rambler* are regarded as dull and insipid, when compared with the writings of Dickens and Maryatt. Still less wonderful is it, that the Greek and Latin classics should be displaced by works belonging to this new school of fiction.

We are grieved at the reflection, that few professional men, even those who have received a liberal education, have any classical books in their library; that such works are the first to be disposed of, as being the least useful, while reviews, pamphlets, and periodicals, are carefully preserved, bound up, and placed in the most conspicuous part of the library. We tremble for the young men now coming upon the stage of action, unless they can be induced to forsake these dainties, this pound-cake of literature, and adopt the substantial, nutritious, invigorating food, which gave such mental strength to the Edwardses, the Dwights, the Adamases, and the Marshalls of other days.

We would say then to every young man, in a course of liberal education: If you would rise to eminence in the pursuits of literature and science—if you would become ornaments in the learned professions, or prepare yourselves for distinction and usefulness in the halls of legislation, beware how you indulge in the light reading which, under the specious title of cheap publications, is flooding our country. Waste not your time in the perusal of books, which are as little suited to the wants and susceptibilities of your immortal natures, as husks are for the purposes of food. Resolve to be scholars, not book-worms, whose whole time is to be spent in the library, but practical scholars, with minds richly stored with all that is valuable in ancient as well as modern literature, and thoroughly prepared for whatever sphere of action you may be called to occupy.

In conclusion, we repeat again our belief, that the cause of classical learning is becoming more appreciated in our country; and although counteracted by many influences, to some of which we have just referred, yet these will gradually disappear, or become so modified as to do no essential injury to the cause of sound education. Let those who are engaged in the important and honorable vocation of classical instructors, take encouragement from the past, and go forward with enlightened zeal in the prosecution of their duties. Let their standard of scholarship be more and more elevated. Let them firmly oppose every attempt to abridge the amount of classical reading, or the time given to this department in their respective institutions. Above all, let the harmony and singleness of purpose with which their labors are now conducted, ever continue; and let their only rivalry be in devising the most efficient means for the advancement of the cause entrusted to their keeping.

## ARTICLE III.

## THE SANDWICH OR HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: THEIR HISTORY AND RELATIONS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD.

By REV. HENRY T. CHEEVER, Pastor of the Chrystie-st. Congregational Church, N. Y.

THE name of the Sandwich Islands has become endeared to the church like Jerusalem or Antioch, where the disciples were first called Christians. It evokes a train of grateful, we might almost say sacred associations, and the bare mention of it is enough to allure the interest of the Protestant world. The fact too that a number of American citizens are now resident at these Islands; and that it is a transplanted off-shoot from the old Puritan vine, in the form of New England missionaries, that, under God, has wrought so marvellous a change there; together with the natural desire to be definitely informed about a people and a country where the outlay of benevolence by the American churches has been so wonderfully rewarded,—these considerations have been naturally enough suggested as grounds of favor for an independent, semi-religious, historical, and statistic article upon those remote islands of the Pacific.

“Placed far amid the melancholy main.”

the Ararat of the North Pacific, these lone Islands were first made known to the rest of the world through their discovery by Captain Cook in 1778. They lie between the meridians of 160½ west longitude, and the parallels of 19 and 22½ north latitude: 2800 miles from California, northeast; 5000 from China west; 5000 from South America east; 2700 from the Society Islands on the south. The names of those inhabited are Hawaii, Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai, Molokai, Oahu, Kauai, Niihau, embracing an area of about 6100 square miles.

The origin of all the islands is volcanic. They were evidently formed by repeated eruptions from the bed of the sea, depositing layer upon layer of volcanic matter, until by this process and the gradual subsidence of the sea, they have attained their present elevation. That process may be still seen going on in the largest of these islands, (Hawaii) the interior of which would seem to be a vast reservoir or chamber of pent-up mineral fire, that lets off now and then some of its redundant elements by violent emission, as the lancet does from the arm of a man threatened with apoplexy. Kauai, the northwestern-most of the groupe, is the oldest made, as proved by the lava there being entirely disintegrated, or frequently formed into basalt, like that of the Giant's Causeway in Ireland. Hawaii, which Captain Cook naturally enough mis-called Owyhee, is the southeastern-most and latest formed, being

the only one where there is an active volcano, and that in the southern portion of this large island. Volcanic fire seems to be working to the south and east, towards the great furnaces in the range of the Andes on the continent of South America.

When these islands first came to be inhabited cannot be conjectured: whence is probable. Tradition reaches not to their origin, although curious fables of Hawaiian cosmogony do. But the natives preserve the genealogy of seventy-three kings, have the names of some of the south Pacific islands, knew the direction of the Society Islands, the nearest inhabited groupe, and have tales of their ancestors coming thence; and their language is a dialect of the one great family of Polynesian tongues. When but a few years ago a Japanese Junk came ashore at Waialua on the island of Oahu, and the natives saw the few survivors, men looking much like themselves, who had been drifted for nearly a year, and were five thousand miles from their homes, the missionary there told us, that the first inference and talk of the natives was, now we know whence our fathers came from. A number of facts like this point to the way in which all the islands of the Pacific may have been populated, and indicate, too, how the highly civilized aborigines of South America may have had their beginning directly in a pair of Japanese blown off by a Typhoon from the shores of eastern Asia, instead of our having to trace them down from Behring's Straits through the length of North America.

The temperature of these islands is equable, and the climate in every way salubrious. The northeast trades fan them perpetually on the windward side, and there is a regularly alternating gentle land and sea breeze on the leeward side. The heat experienced is at no place in the groupe so great as at New Orleans in the summer time, or often at New York. For the year round there is always the purest air, and a variety of climate can be commanded by change of situation, that is not to be had elsewhere in the world within the same area. American constitutions debilitated by the uniform heat of a leeward residence, find repair and health by moving to a station where they can be fanned by the trades; and persons constitutionally inclined to pulmonary disease when living at the sea side, are benefitted by recourse to the mountain air. The highest elevation of the mercury observed in ten years at Lahaina (the port on the leeward side of Maui where most of the whale ships recruit,) was 86 degrees of Fahrenheit: the lowest 54°. Greatest difference in any one day 19°, a diurnal range which is of very rare occurrence, the difference between noon and morning, or noon and night being seldom more than ten degrees. The highest range observed is in June, the lowest in January. The greatest heat noted at Honolulu for twelve years was 90°, greatest cold 53°; mean 75°. Sudden weather changes are unknown, nor are there storms of long continuance, and in every

view the Sandwich Islands may be deemed one of the most healthful countries in the world. Families are reared in great safety, as the remarkable increase of the missionaries shows. Children there do not have to run the gauntlet of those formidable diseases that invade families in climes less favored with genial skies and perpetual summer.

The human constitution, it is evident, had attained to great perfection at the Sandwich Islands, and, their barbarism and sensuality to the contrary notwithstanding, there was high physical health and beauty before it was poisoned and marred by the mixture of abandoned foreigners and the fresh provocatives to profligacy thereby given. The reverse is now painfully true, for disease is rife, and there is evidence of fatal, we fear irremediable detriment having been done to the native constitution. Still the physical aspect of Hawaiians, as a race, is pleasing. Their complexion is a clear olive brown, as near in color to the kernel of an English walnut as anything we know. They call themselves *Ka ulu* the red-skin in contrast with the *Keokeo*, white skin. Their features would make them to be classed by physiologists with the Malay division of the human family, from which doubtless they have sprung. They have generally thick lips and large nostrils, but the nose is not flat, nor the hair woolly, but uniformly strait and black. They have rather high cheek bones like the North American Indian, and the erect European forehead, certainly not depressed or retreating as one of the late histories mistakenly characterizes it.

The national Hawaiian head is of a good size, and phrenologically well-shaped, though it has rather unduly large a base, and is flattened and straight at the back. This unnatural flatness of the occiput is thought to be owing to the way the mother holds her babe, which is by the left hand supporting the back of its head. Frequently, too, they lay its little head in a hard gourd-shell on purpose to flatten it; and the way of all Hawaiians when sleeping, is to lie upon the back, which tends to keep the skull of the form given it in childhood. It is deemed becoming to a man to have his hair very short behind; and manly beauty, in their view, depends more upon the *plane figure* and breadth of the occiput, than upon the height and fullness of the forehead. We have often heard them wonder at what they deem the fondness of foreigners for round heads.

In person, the Hawaiians are well-formed, large-limbed, and somewhat taller than the average of Americans. The race of the high chiefs especially, was large, athletic, and finely-proportioned. We have seen among the few that survive, specimens of muscular power, and manly beauty, that might be the archetypes of Jupiter Tonans or Apollo Belvidere. The chief women

are enormously big and unwieldy ; but the impression of their greatness, as of the size of unclad savages generally, and of all people that dress loosely like the Moors and Turks, is apt to be exaggerated and deceptive, in view of those that are not used to the sight of the human form in flowing robes, or the state of nature. This consideration alone, may account in great part for the tales of early voyagers, as to the giant size of Patagonians and certain tribes of South Sea Islanders ; and it has had much to do in originating the idea so generally prevalent, of the peculiar handsomeness of Persians, Greeks, and Turks. Let them be seen in the close coat, or strait jacket, or fashionable corset-boards of the occidental dress, and the illusion will straitly vanish.

Ethnologically considered, the Hawaiian race must rank high, both in its *physique* and *morale*. The forehead, as we have intimated, rises after the European model ; and the common facial angle is nearer to the Caucasian than the Malayan type. The writer has had in possession a skull with all the teeth, which he picked up from among many others near an old battle-ground at Wailuku, on the Island of Maui ; and it is judged superior both for size and conformation to the average of Anglo-Saxon heads. The native mind is docile, quick to learn, and more than ordinarily retentive. To arithmetic, and the arts of writing and drawing, the youth have a special aptitude. Our American school-book, called Colburn's First Lessons, may be said to be a national study. Their own language they acquire with more facility from books, than boys with us do the English ; and the volubility of almost all natives is immense. It is now a statute of the land, that no young persons are to be married unless they can read. The want of this accomplishment is therefore very rare. Their language affords a fair field for ethnological inquiry, in the new department which the Germans have opened under the appellation of "Sprachenkunde," or "Glottology."

Now that it is reduced to writing, the language bids fair to last longer than the race. The stock of High Chiefs has already nearly run out, their rapid decay being the more noticeable than that of ordinary natives, because they formed a large body by themselves—more distinct from the vulgar by peculiar and time-honored privilege and custom, than the nobility of any other land of which we have historic record. Captain Cook estimated the entire population of the islands, at the time of their discovery, as 400,000. But this was probably exaggerated, since the wonder-stricken natives flocked from every quarter whithersoever he landed, in order to see the *haole moku*—the foreign island, as they called the ship, and to lay eyes upon their returned God Lono, as they uniformly designated Captain Cook. In this way the

same persons were often likely to be reckoned twice in his rough computation of numbers. But from other sources we have reason to believe that the population was at least three times what it is at present—a little rising of one hundred thousand. Wide-wasting disease, as in the case of every Pacific island yet visited by unrestrained foreigners, followed upon the first contact of the European with the native race. So far as can be gathered from the dim recollections of surviving old men, it was much like the “wonderful plague” that so providentially depopulated New England of its savage warriors just before the settlement of the pilgrims.

It is a singular fact, which the sagacious Mr. Williams, the martyr missionary of Eromanga takes notice of, that ravaging pestilence, in some form or other, has always ensued upon the first intercourse of foreigners with the different islanders of the South Seas. That the depopulation of the Sandwich Islands, in particular, has been considerable, is manifest, aside from the testimony of aged natives, by the traces to be often seen of extensive cultivation, where now there are few or no inhabitants. This is especially true in the north part of the great Island of Hawaii, in the district occupied as a missionary by Rev. Elias Bond. There is a vast *heiau*, or idol temple there, which we surveyed and measured; and in all the region about, there are lines of low stone fences and enclosures for hogs, and the dividing marks of potato and *kalo* patches, where now there is scarcely an inhabitant.

It is a common saying on Hawaii, that Captain Cook's mark was deep and deadly. In the providence of God, he met his death by his own rashness and self-confidence, at the very hands of the incensed barbarians whom he had wrongly allowed to worship him, and who were restrained from injuring him when they felt themselves wronged, by the belief that he was a god, until a chief whom he struck with his sword, instinctively grasped and held him in his powerful arms, at which Captain Cook uttered a cry of distress. The dread charm of his divinity was at once broken by that cry; and chiefs and people fell upon him in anger, and instantly slew him, exclaiming, “He groans; he is not a god.” The Hawaiian authors of a little text-book of history called *Moololo Hawaii*, collated by Rev Mr. Dibble, quote in their simplicity, and apply to this event, that passage of God's word wherein it is said of Herod, when he received acclamation as a god, that he gave not God the glory, and was eaten of worms. Their inference is, that God's hand was in his death; in thinking of which, at this late day, our most painful reflection is, that the great navigator did not direct the rude natives to the God who made heaven and earth, instead of receiving divine homage him-

self. But we are willing to believe that he was not aware to what extent they honored and served him as a god.

The influence of Vancouver's visit fourteen years after this melancholy event, was more benign. He endeavored to turn the thoughts of Kamehameha the Great to the true God, left him a pair of cattle under a promise that none should be killed for fifteen years, and several useful seeds. The intercourse of his men, however, and that of the whale ships which now began to anchor in their waters, was sadly disastrous to the native constitution and morals, poisoning the fountains of health, and inducing premature decay and barrenness. Details, too, might be given, which have come to our knowledge, of treacherous cruelty and wickedness, and that on the part of some of our own countrymen, so shocking to humanity and decency, that they can hardly be named. The vicious teaching of wicked sailors that now and then stopped among them, and of escaped Botany-bay convicts that strayed there, and of almost all transient foreign visitors that were glad to be able to revel uncurbed in the sensual style of heathenism, were all the while digging the grave of the nation, and burying in it their victims, hideous and loathsome with disease. The first missionaries have things to tell a visitor of early heathenism, and of the habits of foreigners in those days, "to make both the ears of those who hear thereof to tingle." In the providence of God, however, the looseness, the utter abandonment and practical infidelity of those who stopped among them, had one good effect. It was, to undermine the power of the idol-priesthood, and to loosen the oppression of the *tabus*. They, the foreigners, were seen to eat forbidden food on tabu-days, to pay no sacrifices to the gods, and habitually to break the tabus with impunity. The natives naturally reasoned upon this, "It cannot be so fatal as the priests tell us to violate the tabus, the foreigners do not die when they break them; why should we?" Those tabus were many of them horribly oppressive and harassing; and it is matter of astonishment as well as of careful philosophic inquiry, how their despotism could have possibly obtained such a desperate death-hold, like a permanent night mare, upon the imagination of the people. But the history of the world elsewhere than in those embosomed isles of the Pacific, shows that nothing is impossible in the way of plebeian enslavement and degradation, when king, priest, and nobility combine. The tabus at the Sandwich Islands would have been but a bugbear, had not the powerful idol-priesthood and the chiefs that played into their hands, united to enforce them. They made it death to be found in a canoe on a tabu day (*La Tabu*). If any one made a noise on a tabu day, or while prayers were saying, he must die; if he were found with his wife on a tabu day it was

death ; if a woman on the tabu day ate pork, cocoa-nuts, bananas even, and certain kinds of fish, she must die.

It is the statement of David Malo, one of the most sensible and pious Hawaiians living, counselor to the king, as was his father before him, and now a minister of the gospel, it is his written declaration in the Hawaiian Spectator, that "when two persons entered the marriage state the man must build an eating house for himself, another for his wife to eat in, another for his god, another for sleeping, and another for his wife to beat kapa in, that is to manufacture the native cloth from bark, which was formerly almost the sole employment of the women. In addition to this burden of building many houses, there was also another in providing food. He first heated the oven and baked for his wife ; then he heated another and baked for himself ; then he opened the oven containing his wife's kalo and pounded it, then he performed the same operation on his own. The husband ate in his house, and the wife in hers. They did not eat together lest they should be slain for violating the tabu."

In accordance with the genius of the Hawaiian system of idolatry, birds, beasts and trees were the adopted gods of different individuals. If one then made his idol of the native apple-tree (*ohia*) it was ever after tabu to him, so that he could not eat of it but on pain of death. If his god were *kalo*, the chief staple for food, then he could not eat *kalo*. If a hen, then such fowls were interdicted food. If a hog, then the hog was sacred. Stones even were objects of worship and became tabu, so that one might not sit on them. Fish in like manner were idolized, and could not then be eaten, and so of specific things too numerous to be mentioned. Mr. Dibble justly remarks, that in this instance at least a state of heathenism was a state of bondage, not only moral and mental, but that also which toucheth the skin and bones of men, which wears out their sinews and cuts short their lives,—a state of deep degradation and ruin, from which, even to the present day they are but slowly recovering.

Now an incidental good effect of the very profligacy, so depraving, of abandoned foreigners at the Hawaiian islands, undoubtedly was to induce the nation to abandon the system of idolatry and tabus, and it is now a notable and world-known fact, as it was then so strangely providential, that while the first American missionaries were upon the high seas on their way to the islands in 1819, to try what scoffers called a novel experiment of knight-errant humanity, the idol gods were disowned, their temples burned, the great wall of tabus broken down, and the way prepared, so far as that went, for the reception of the true God.

A merchant of Boston, at that time an opposer of what is called the orthodox view of religion, upon hearing that the missionaries were about to embark, offered to send out gratuitously for them



the frame of a dwelling, being the house in which the family of one of those very missionaries now resides at Kailua, whose cordial hospitality the writer has shared. When the merchant was asked his motives for this, he replied that it shocked him to think of civilized men leading so miserable a life as that of the missionaries must be, if no such provision were made for them. And he added that he had given orders to all his captains to offer the missionaries a gratuitous passage back to this country when they got ready to return, as they would all be glad to do before six months. In this he was happily disappointed, for although the first missionaries when they landed at Kailua in 1820, were without furniture other than they made out of their own boxes, without flour or food, except what they could procure from the natives, and without a tithe of the comforts missionaries now have, yet being received with friendliness they heroically held on by faith and prayer. It seemed to be thought then in this country, such was the novelty of the missionary enterprise, the poverty of its resources, and the ignorance of what was needed by a missionary family, that they were to live much like the natives, and consequently the stores provided for them were exceedingly scanty and inadequate. Tender women in those primitive days of the mission, and delicate young mothers had to endure trials and hardships, that would have either overborne, or quite vitiated persons less sanguine and hopeful in God than they. It was that they were chosen of God like their ancestral pilgrims of New England, to be "a restorer of paths to dwell in, to raise up the foundations of many generations," and doubtless that which excited and supported them was the same holy fire that burned in the breasts of their Puritan forefathers, whose experience, it is well said, was a prophecy of the missionary spirit that should come—"an inward zeal and great hope," in the language of Governor Bradford, "of laying some good foundation, or at least to make way thereunto, for the propagating and advancing the gospel of the kingdom of Christ in these remote parts of the world; yea, though they should be as stepping stones unto others for the performing of so great a work."

We have heard Mrs. Thurston detail with deep interest their early trials in a native floorless grass house, when ignorant of the language, and subject to the constant visits of curious unclad natives. Their cooking utensils were a kettle and something else given them by their captain wherein she must prepare food by a fire out-of-doors, surrounded by brawny savages who evinced the same undisciplined eagerness as Robinson Crusoe's man Friday did when he thrust his arm into the boiling pot to catch the animal that was making the bubbling below. Yet were they happy then, and missionary families at the Sandwich Islands now, in the absence of some things elsewhere deemed necessary to content-

ment, but not wanting any of the solid comforts of life, are some of the happiest in the world.

They were received at first by sufferance on good behavior, the chiefs replying to the insinuation of certain malicious foreigners, that the missionaries had come to dispossess them of their lands and make war upon them; "If they had come to make war would they have brought with them their delicate wives?" They were allowed to settle at Kailua and Lahaina among a people who had just snapped the yoke of the tabus and the blood-stained system of idolatry. The king Liholiho, and his chiefs, together with the common people, were just getting up from the universal debauch in which they indulged at the death of Kamehameha, the accession of his son, and the demolition of idol temples. It was a favorable time for the gospel to enter, like that in the life of a profligate, when the edge of appetite for riotous indulgence has been somewhat blunted by satiety and exhaustion, and he feels the utter unsatisfyingness of sensual pleasure, which the poet Burns, alas, too well experienced, so aptly compared

To snow-flakes on a falling river.  
One moment white, then gone forever.

But the surfeit they had taken did not operate like surfeits of some articles of food as honey, to give a distaste for the repetition of those intoxicating draughts and licentious saturnalia. Depraved nature stronger in the human animal than in all others, soon recovered; vicious propensities said give, give, louder than ever, and their deliverance from the restraint of tabus, the example of a profligate king, and intercourse with abandoned foreigners, all conspired to make the Hawaiian nation more besotted, beastly, and miserable in the early years of the reign of Kamehameha II. than probably it had ever been before. "Those were dark days indeed," (say the Hawaiian authors of the *Mooolelo Hawaii*), and calling for commiseration, when even the death of rulers most venerated and beloved, instead of producing any salutary impression, was regarded as an urgent call to the indulgence of gross sensuality and debasement. The conduct of chiefs and people was like mad men and beasts, such as to forbid description. When they put an end to the ancient tabus and foolish rites, they did so with a view merely to their own interest, that they might be relieved of a burden, and that the path of pleasure and sensual indulgence might be less obstructed."

Intemperance and lust in those days may be said to have run riot. Almost every ship that anchored in their waters, was made a floating brothel; and it was a fashion set by the highest chief women to hire themselves out for iniquity, and everywhere they *practiced all uncleanness with greediness*. We have heard it related by a resident missionary how at Kailua on moonlight nights

they used to form rings in the open air, and shamelessly prosecuted their abominable orgies with shouts and dancing. Modesty was a feeling quite unknown, or if it ever had existed, the sex at that time seemed utterly devoid of it. Soon after the settlement together of the families of Messrs. Thurston and Bishop at Kailua, two of the highest chief women in the nation, in order to show their friendliness, called one day at the missionary home by the sea-side, after bathing, utterly unclad.

Where there was no female modesty, and licentiousness was quite unbridled, it is no wonder there was infanticide. This dreadful crime was as common as it is unnatural. Perhaps it had a parallel in no other country. Mothers destroyed their own offspring, both before and after they were born: they regarded the care of children as a burden that contracted their pleasures and impaired their personal beauty. In some cases an additional motive to infanticide was found in the illegitimacy of those children, and the consequent jealousy of their husbands. Hence with a strange hardness of heart as if destitute of all natural affection, their babes were born only to die at the hands of the mother. There is a woman now living at Kailua (or was when the writer left the islands,) a reputable member of the church, who, when a child, was rescued by another, after being buried alive by her own mother.

Their slight care of infants also almost amounted to infanticide, when that crime was not intended. We met with an elderly woman in Kohala, who was said to have borne twenty-five children, not one of whom was living. "It is not uncommon (says Dr. Andrews) to find females who have lost families of ten or twenty children in infancy. I know one woman who says she has borne twenty-one children, but one of whom is living, the others having all perished in infancy. The younger class of women could always tell me how many children they had borne; but from the aged, those who became mothers in the days of darkness, I could seldom obtain any correct account. If they had any living they could tell their number. If they had none they could tell that. But ask them how many have died, and the reply was, *ua nalowali, ua uni loa*,—a great many, I have forgotten. So feeble was the impression made by the death of a child in those dark days."

There were other evil customs prevalent in those bad times, saying nothing of their wars, which rendered life uncertain and dreadful. There were various games of chance at which they gambled deeply, and wherein they frequently lost their lives. There were others which had impure associations, and were practiced only in the night; and, not to enter into painful detail of particulars which might easily be done to show the horrid state of Hawaiian society, there were unnatural crimes, as well as polygamy, polyandria, robbery, murder, burying the aged alive, killing

offenders without trial, and various other savage usages, that rendered the state of society, maugre all the sickly stuff ever told of island innocence and bliss unbosomed in the Pacific, more like a community of devils let loose on a vacation from hell, and eager for all the pleasure of sense they could get before being cast out again into the deep, than a society of immortal men. "That time was very different from the present. Now the aged men and women walk safely and sleep in the path. Reader, you know the customs of this country in days past. The land was full of darkness, folly, iniquity, oppression, pain and death. A pit of destruction, dark, polluted, deadly and ever-burning, was the dwelling of Hawaiians in ancient times."<sup>1</sup>

There is a Welshman living at Hilo, Hawaii, who stopped at the islands in the days of Kamehameha the Great, and has been there ever since. He told us that nothing was more common in those days than for a whole village to get drunk at once, and go to fighting; and for any spite they would set fire to each others' houses, burn their canoes, and pull up their growing food, and steal from each other as they could. Killing men, (*pepehi Kanaka*, was an art into which they were schooled; and there were those among them who taught how to strangle, and break men's bones, and how to dispatch a man at one blow of the fist without bruising him.<sup>2</sup> This Welchman was himself once passing through a ravine, where he met a company of men who spoke to him peaceably. But he had no sooner passed them by a few feet, when a rolled *kapa* fell over his breast and enveloped his head; two of the men at once pulled him down and were about to kill him, when a friendly chief appeared in sight on the opposite *pali*, or ridge of the ravine, and forbade his death.

Those robbers by trade were usually men of great physical prowess, and their way was to lie in wait at a pass near the trodden path, and have a child stationed on some eminence near by, instructed to call out carelessly, as if in sport, *kaikoo*, (heavy surf,) if there were several in company, so that it would be unsafe to venture an attack; or *kai make*, (low tide,) if there were but one or two so that he could venture. A robber in Puna, the southern county of Hawaii, had in this way killed the brother of a man living in Kohala, the northern section of the same island, who was determined to have revenge. He therefore came all the way

<sup>1</sup> Moolelo, Hawaii in Hawaiian Spectator.

<sup>2</sup> "In former times among this people, no man knew when he was safe. At any and every moment he was liable to be murdered, and that, too, by his supposed friends. Often, in standing together in familiar conversation, the first warning a man would have of any evil, would be to see his own bowels falling to the earth. As they wore no clothing, or only the *kihei*, the operation was instantly performed by an instrument made of a hog's tush, which the murderer concealed under his *kapa*."—Rev. L. Andrews, *Hawaiian Spectator*, vol. ii. p. 125.

round through Kona and Kau, and when he had arrived near the spot in Puna where the robber was supposed to lurk, he shaved his head close, and smeared his arms and whole body with some oil of old *Kukui* nuts, so as to make his person slippery as an eel. Then taking a staff, and slinging something upon it after the fashion of Hawaiians, he arranged his *kapa* so that it could be slipped off in a moment, and went limping along like a sick and lame man. As he reached the place of ambush, the robber suddenly appeared and hailed him, "Sick, eh?" "Ay," with a cough, and one hand placed, as if in pain, on his stomach. So he passed on until he had got a little beyond the robber, with an eye over his shoulder on the look out; and when the robber stepped up from behind to grasp him and break his bones, he suddenly dropped his *kapa*, turned and grappled with his foe. The slipperiness of his arms and whole body made it impossible for this notable villian so to keep hold of him as to break his bones in the professional way. They struggled and rolled, neither successful, until, both weary, they left off, and couched upon their haunches opposite each other. The robber pointed to his wife on the hill, and said, "You may have her, and we'll be quit." But not so thought the brother of the dead, and again began the mortal strife, till the avenger at length forced the head of the robber into a fissure of the rock, which the natives, who tell the story, point out, and there trampled upon him until he was dead. At the present time the perpetrators of deeds like these, and even the memory of them are fast dying away; but here and there is a man to tell you a tale of the times of *Naaupo*. There is a member of Mr. Coan's church who confesses to have killed two men with his own hands; and the grandfather of one of the school girls at that station of Hilo, was the murderer of nine.

Now we say, without the possibility of contradiction, that the agency which could so soon transform such a race of savages into the inoffensive, quiet people they are now, must be no less than divine. And the benevolence of the American church is richly paid back in the improvement effected in society and the amelioration of man's temporal condition there, to say nothing of the precious souls saved, and the revenue of glory to God and the Lamb from thousands of ransomed Hawaiians. History, in all its annals, shows nothing like this. Compared with all other progressive improvements it is *a nation born in a day*.

It is a remark of Tholuck, in his masterly essay on Ancient Heathenism, that "whoever stands on a mountain should look not merely upon the gold which the morning sun pours upon the grass and flowers at his feet; but he should also look behind him into the deep valley where the shadows still rest, that he may the more sensibly feel that the sun is indeed the sun. Thus it is also salutary for the disciples of Christ, from the kingdom of light to

cast a glance over the dark stage where men play their part in lonely gloom, without a Saviour, without a God." It is for this reason that we have dwelt awhile upon the miserable state of the Hawaiians when they were first approached by American missionaries in 1820.

It may be of advantage now to take a bird's eye glance at facts showing what has been done and is now doing for their improvement, and to consider what remains to be done in order to complete the work of Christianizing and civilizing the Hawaiian race. We have spent some time at all of the nineteen missionary stations but one where there are resident missionaries, except on the island of Kauai. We have surveyed missionary life under various aspects, and have become somewhat acquainted with the modes and means of operation upon the native mind, and their results, and with the trials and difficulties the missionary has to contend with. We have mingled with the people in the house and by the way, in the field and the school, at their work and their play, in the meeting for religious inquiry and at the public sanctuary, and we have seen by observation what they now are, and have heard from others what they once were. And in instituting the comparison between them now and times that were when the first missionaries landed at Kailua, we will take the state of progress found at the lapse of just one quarter of a century, as indicated by a careful survey and comparison of statistics never before made public in this country.

In the first place, there labored at the Sandwich Islands from 1820 to 1844 at different times sixty-one male and sixty-seven female missionaries, who performed in all 1088 years of missionary service. By these there were expended \$608,865, in their outfit, support, and missionary work. There were seen erected forty permanent dwelling houses, two printing offices and binderies, with which are connected four printing presses; four commodious seminary and school buildings, all which, together with large and valuable lands attached to them, are the property of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Beside these results of Christian industry and perseverance, permanent stone meeting houses were found erected at almost every station, by the united skill and resources of missionary and people, giving and laboring voluntarily; and about three hundred and seventy-five school houses. The Hawaiian tongue had been mastered, we might almost say created, and reduced to writing, and one-half the adult population taught to read. There had been established 403 public schools, in which 17,440 children and youth were being instructed. The entire Bible has been translated from the original tongues, and there had been printed 52,000 copies of the New Testament, and 20,000 of the Old, besides several editions of one to ten thousand copies of fragmentary portions of the Scriptures, be-

fore the entire translation was completed ; upwards of seventy other different works, large and small, had been compiled and issued from the press, and the total number of pages printed at the missionary presses up to 1844, were 22,061,750.

There had been organized twenty-five independent native churches, and there had been received to them on examination 31,409 persons, of whom there were then living in regular standing 22,652, being more than one-fifth of the entire population of the Islands. Besides these results that can be condensed into statistics, the institution of the Sabbath and of Christian marriage has been firmly established ; government had been rendered comparatively just and stable ; a good written constitution and laws have been enacted ; life and property were rendered secure ; the country's industry and resources were beginning to be developed. The Hawaiian nation's independence had been acknowledged by other nations, and it was admitted into the fraternity of Christian states. The commerce of the islands, that is the value of its commercial exchanges, or bills negotiated there for the supply of ships, had grown from little or nothing to \$200,000, while the yearly net revenue of the kingdom had reached to \$70,000, and the annual consumption of foreign goods was \$175,000.

Not to repeat here various valuable statistics and facts that have been given elsewhere, there were found employed at the lapse of the first quarter of a century, as religious teachers of the Hawaiian nation, or in other missionary service among them, six unmarried and forty married missionaries having families to the number of 120 children. There were 548 native school teachers, themselves first taught by missionaries. There were four boarding schools or seminaries, having 276 pupils. There were two families formerly in the service of the mission changed to that of the government, but devoted to the improvement of the Hawaiian race. What then remained to be done before the Sandwich Islands could cease to be missionary ground, and what still remains is, more thoroughly to instruct and Christianize the common people ; to train up an educated native ministry which the people shall support ; to reform the national habits of living ; to inculcate upon the sexes modesty and chastity ; to efface the dreadful characters of pollution and death which heathenism has been burning in for ages upon the Hawaiian constitution ; to introduce more extensively the improvements and arts of civilization ; to develop the country's agricultural resources, and to foster habits and institute new ways of industry.

In order to accomplish this there are needed immediately twelve new missionaries and three physicians ; to supply vacant churches, to lighten the load and do the undone work of worn and weary pastors ; to man the institutions of learning, and to afford suitable medical aid to the people, and to the missionary stations remote

from each other, saying nothing of the great desirableness of pious mechanics, artisans, and farmers, to teach the natives their arts. If any man think that where so much has been done little remains to do, and when he reads that within the last two years the different Hawaiian churches contributed in cash \$9,300 for building and repairing their churches, supporting preaching and schools, and for other benevolent purposes, if he infer that therefore the American church can soon drop the Hawaiian churches, we have only to say that a greater mistake could hardly be entertained. That we may ere long leave the pastors to be supported, after they get there, in great part by the people, is undoubtedly true of some of the Hawaiian churches. But America must continue to supply the men and their outfits, and lend also a helping hand to gospel institutions there for at least twenty years longer. We do not say that if we should now withdraw our aid and send out there no more missionaries, that the light of the gospel would go out along with the lamps of life in the present ministers, and the people all go back to heathenism or over to the Beast. That would be impossible, for truth has made too deep an impression, and taken too strong a hold, to be soon effaced or uprooted. Spiritual life would still linger here and there; and though the leaven of the gospel might in many cases turn sour and become rank Romanism, yet the salt of divine truth would have been too widely diffused, to let society change in the mass either into the rottenness of Rome or the Dead Sea of Paganism. Had missionaries there done nothing, (like Swartz in India) but *preach the gospel* this might be. But they have wisely translated and printed the Scriptures, and founded seminaries and schools; and the people would know too much to be befooled into baptized Romish heathenism, or led back blindfold into that sottish form of it which they forsook. They would probably soon fall into practical lying infidelity, saying to them what they like, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. There would be just enough Christians among them to keep up the form of godliness without its power, and they would retain enough of outward religion to keep them from being feared like barbarians by foreigners, while they would practice all uncleanness with greediness, and foreigners would join with them in digging the nation's grave with their lusts.

We know not whether it argues the greater folly or unfairness, after having done *so much* for a people, having led them on so far, and having our benevolence so signally crowned with the divine blessing, as if to give a notable example to all the world of the reforming and civilizing power of the gospel,—we cannot say whether it argues the greater folly or unfairness, to think of forsaking or pinching them at such a juncture, and leaving the work of the nation's regeneration incomplete, just as benevolence is reaping a harvest from the seed she has liberally sown, and grievous wolves, in the form of



Jesuit priests, are coming in to destroy it, and the enemy to mix with it tares. Yet such is the mistaken thought of some very good men, who are for driving more nails elsewhere, rather than stop to clinch those already drove. They are for pushing onward and making onsets upon the powers of darkness in other places, rather than for securing battles already won, or keeping the necessary garrisons in subjugated towns. Or rather their policy in reference to the whole world may be better compared to that of the general of a besieging army, who should insist upon beating down with his battering ram the city's entire walls, rather than let his soldiers enter and take possession of what they can get by the first good breach, and set themselves to win over or vanquish the inhabitants. Thus these men are for knocking down the enemy's walls by preaching the gospel the world over, but they think the time ill-spent in securing conquests by teaching the arts of peace. They seem to grudge the money and men appropriated to conquered provinces like the S. Islands, because they either want them at home, or to make other inroads with upon the realms of pagan night. But it is not necessary to repeat again that this is miserable generalship, and the poorest policy for converting the world. While actively *aggressive*, the church must be also patiently *conservative*, or her work is but half done. And both money and men must be granted far more liberally than they have been, if she will even hold her own.

The fact that the gospel has been fairly offered to a nation of more than 100,000 souls within much less than the period of one generation; that multitudes have embraced it with eagerness; that many have died in the faith of Jesus; that many live the exemplary disciples of Christ, to praise Him for having ever put it into the hearts of American Christians, to send them the gospel; and that the Lord now adds unto them daily such as we doubt not shall be saved—all this, so far from allowing us in the least to relax our efforts, is, as it were, for nothing else in the arrangements of Divine Providence, but to give the church a standing proof, a visible demonstration, of what would follow from a proportionate outlay of means, the world over, in the great missionary enterprize. For the social and religious progress of those Heaven-blest isles of the Pacific, is every day becoming more apparent and decided; and soon will shine out clearly the part they are to bear in the Christianization of the great realms that border on the Pacific upon either shore, in the track of whose golden commerce they directly lie. Beyond all doubt, it is for some *great* end in Providence, that they have been so remarkably Christianized; and time will duly develop all the links in the providential chain of events that shall yoke this best American missionary experiment with the triumphant chariot of Emmanuel, as it traverses our globe in that dear, and not distant period, when the great voice from

heaven is heard saying, Lo, the tabernacle of God is among men. The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ; and he shall reign forever and ever. What "thou knowest not now, thou shalt know hereafter."

It is natural to remark here, upon Sandwich Island life and religion, how the teachings and example of missionaries descended from the Puritans, and colonizing like them with their families, for a religious purpose, in the howling wilderness of heathenism, are bringing to pass, and (if the California gold fever do but carry off all the vicious foreigners, in the way of the experiment) will be likely to result in a state of society that is but a reprint of Puritanism. True missionary religion, we think, as it appears in the family, as it is developed in the children, of whom a remarkable proportion have become Christians at the Sandwich Islands, as it is engrafted upon the natives, as it pervades their laws, as it bears upon their morals and upon the observance of the Sabbath, is more like strict old Puritanism, than any other exemplification of religion the world at present knows. We have often seen the practical irreligion of people far more civilized and privileged than the Hawaiians, signally rebuked there, as in the instance of the native Governor of Oahu, Kekuanaoa; who, when waited upon on the Sabbath day, by a lieutenant of one of our own ships of war, to make arrangement for a salute to the fort, promptly answered that he was just going to the house of God (*a ka hale pule*), and would attend to that business on Monday.

The general observance of the Sabbath throughout the islands is strict; much more so than with us. It is the *la tabu*, or the prohibited sacred day. No food is cooked on that day, it being all prepared on the one previous—no fires are kindled—no canoes are paddled. They neither fish nor till the land; and if they are on a journey, they uniformly stop over the Sabbath. We remember being at a missionary station, when the church in full assembly, and not moved to it immediately by their pastor, adopted this resolution, "That where the Sabbath finds us on a journey, there we will stop, and keep the holy day." Commander Wilkes, of the United States Exploring Squadron, found considerable inconvenience in his ascent of the great mountain of Mauna Loa, the highest volcanic dome in the Pacific, from the natives' unwillingness to travel or work upon the Sabbath. This is owing in part to the fact, that when the chiefs, under the influence of the gospel, began to feel the necessity of having some written laws, and asked the missionaries very naturally what they should be, they gave them a copy of the decalogue, then recently translated. This, the chiefs said, was *maikai*, i. e. good; and thus the Ten Commandments became the law of the land; and they are in force, we believe, to this day, along with other written laws;

so that a man is fined for unnecessary travel or work on the Sabbath.

Throughout the Sandwich Islands, such is now the force of law and moral sentiment, beginning with this copy of the decalogue, that where robbery and murder a few years ago were practised as trades, and were events of every day occurrence, life and property are now safer than under any long-established government that can be named. It is almost too great a tax on the traveler's credulity to ask him to believe that a people now so remarkably peaceable and gentle, among whom the safety of human life and property is unparalleled any where on the face of the earth, that less than one generation back, this very people were the savage, infanticide, idolatrous race, sacrificing each other to their gods, and owned body and soul by tyrannical kings and priests. Never hitherto in the progress of humanity has so great a change been effected in so short a time. Great as begins to be the Hawaiian love of *waiwai* (property), and degraded and bad as the people still are in many ways, yet such is now the force of law and the effect of the gospel, that we verily believe a man might travel afoot and by canoe, through the entire cluster of islands, from Hawaii to Niihau, and with a net-bag of shining dollars, without danger of molestation, except it be from some desperate runaway foreigner, or a straggling Hawaiian sailor, hardened and made reckless by his cruises abroad. If the same be true of any other land under the sun, we have yet to know it. To the gospel that has wrought the change, be all the glory.

The present rulers of the land, as well as the common people, know and acknowledge, that it is to missionaries, under God, that they owe everything; and in their missionary teachers they place unbounded confidence; and they sometimes evince toward them a gratitude and love that are truly affecting, in which the missionary's friend, too, as we have reason to know, will have a share—and for the sole reason that he is the missionary's friend. From the outset, the chiefs watched the missionaries with a scrutinizing eye, and agreed to let them stay only for a stipulated time, having their fears awakened, as we have already said, by the insinuations and libels of malicious foreigners. The result of the trial was perfectly satisfactory. They became thoroughly convinced that the missionaries were their true friends, having no end but their good. The confidence they reposed in them has never been shaken. Not a few men are there at the Sandwich Islands, who would any day put their own lives in jeopardy to defend their religious teachers. This has been put to the proof in several instances, when the lives of missionaries have been endangered by the brutality and malice of licentious foreigners, balked in their hopes of being able to give full swing to passion, as they once could, before the moral influence of missionaries had become so great upon chiefs and people.

There is not, probably, in all the world, at the present time, nor in the whole range of its history, such another instance of a purely moral ascendancy gained over a people by religious teachers, as at those lone islands. It is seen, and proved in a thousand ways, that can only be known by the observation of a traveler, and there are many pleasing anecdotes that confirm it—one of which, that we have heard, is too good to remain unwritten. The present king, Kamehameha III., who is not himself a Christian, unless he has become so recently, and only a few years ago was greatly addicted to dissipation, once had a call from rather a lawless whaling captain. He made no concealment of his dislike to the missionaries; and well knowing the king's fondness for wine and libertinism, he urged him to cut loose from the restraints of the missionaries, and allow himself and people the same indulgences as formerly. "Stop (said the king); didn't your shadow fall on me as you came in there at my open door?" "Perhaps it did; and what of that?" "What! but if it had not been for the missionaries, you, or anybody else, whose shadow should fall on me, would very likely be a dead man the next hour." An answer thus significant and unexpected, put so tight a stopper to the foreign captain's anti-missionary venom, that he had no more fault to find in that presence with the king's religious teachers.

We cannot help saying, in this connection, that it will be worth while for some one at the Sandwich Islands, to note the fate of those men who have infamously distinguished themselves, by the injury they have done there through licentiousness and rum, and by their opposition to the gospel—from early navigators and the English whaling captains, whose crews at different times threatened the missionaries, and fired the missionary establishment at Lahaina, and the American lieutenant who disgraced himself and his nation's flag, by a licentious defiance of the law and insults to God's ministers at Honolulu, down to loose men and slanderers of the present day, whose mouths indeed have been stopped, but who have not yet passed off the stage. The record might afford an instructive comment on three passages of Scripture: "Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not be unpunished; his mischief shall return upon his own head, and his violent dealing shall come down upon his own pate." "Whoso diggeth a pit shall fall therein; and he that rolleth a stone, it will return upon him." "A false witness shall not be unpunished; and he that speaketh lies shall not escape."

We are of opinion that the missionaries have been somewhat too sparing in the exposure of infamous deeds and infamous living at the Sandwich Islands; while, at the same time, they have had to bear the brunt of all the blows struck in men's blind fury for the gradual leaking out, and disclosure at home, of their evil lives beyond the seas. It was not strange that there should be wrath

and revenge, to find that *there is no darkness, neither shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity can hide themselves*. Men once thought to play the libertine in those seas as they liked, to wallow awhile in the sensual sty, and then, after amassing property, to return to England or America, and be accounted as faithful husbands, and reputable livers, as if they had been pure as Joseph all their days. Some have been mad to find themselves mistaken; and others equally angry to find that the moral influence of the missionaries has at length become so great, that they cannot now try the experiment, and give play to passion, as they once could. This is the well-known, though under-ground cause of all the opposition and slander missionaries have met with. The stale charges of persecuting the Catholics, and meddling with government, were the mere raised letters in the stereotyped plate, *to take the ink and be printed*, while vexation and wrath at the restraints put upon the license they call liberty, were the metal-bed in which the types were fixed, and without which they could never be steady enough to make an impression.

As to the charge of meddling with government, we think it would have been much better for the Hawaiian nation, had it been truer, and had missionaries much earlier been concerned in the councils and laws of the kingdom. Nor do we see any good reason why they should wish to avoid the imputation of being connected with government measures that are good, any more than Christians anywhere of being concerned in politics, (in the proper sense,) to be interested in which is one of the duties of a good citizen. For ministers anywhere to avoid giving good advice to rulers, or proposing salutary laws, especially in an infant state, like the Hawaiian, merely because some graceless Jacobins, for whose countenance or discountenance a man of conscious rectitude (*mens sibi conscia recti*) does not care a straw—because they bawl out “Priestcraft! Persecution! Church and State!” would be no less a cowardly dereliction of duty than unwise. As if a censor of Rome should forego the privileges of his censorship, lest he should be thought *meddling* with the duties, or aiming to unite with his, the office of consul! Or, as if a free Roman tribune should waive the rights of his tribuneship, lest, forsooth, he should seem to be grasping at the consulate.

We hold it to be as much the duty of ministers now-a-days to instruct kings and governors in the law of God, to inform and rebuke them when wrong, and to advise them to what is right, as it was the duty of Jewish prophets of old. If this be meddling, the more faithfully such meddling is practised the better; and in this sense, we take it, the missionaries at the Sandwich Islands have meddled, though not, perhaps, as early, or as much as they should have done, for fear of consequences. If this be all the priestcraft among Protestants, the more of it the better: the

sooner will the laws of men be moulded by the law of God, and human governments be brought to a likeness with the divine. It was meddling in this sense for the missionaries at their late general meeting at Honolulu, in an interview with the king Kamehameha III., to remind him, as they did faithfully, of the wretched estate of himself and his grandfather, and his whole kingdom, in 1820, and of the marvellous and happy change which had been since effected through the blessing of God upon their labors as missionaries. Perhaps, in the view of the late United States Commissioner, who has so gratuitously placed himself in an attitude of hostility to the Sandwich Island mission and government, it was meddling for the missionaries to draw up, and give to the world, so complete an answer to all fault-finders and traducers, and so noble and triumphant a vindication of themselves and their work, as that which is contained in their last general letter, published in the January number of the *Missionary Herald*. We thank the missionaries for that admirable document; and we can hardly say we are sorry for the occasion that has evoked, and, in God's providence, put on file in the archives of the world's history, such a convincing demonstration of the feasibility and success of the missionary enterprise.

A great mission, we are persuaded, is yet to be fulfilled by the Sandwich Islands, in the grand evolutions of providence, along the line of human redemption. The unprecedentedly rapid and thorough evangelization of those islands, is not an event which is to stand alone in the history of human progress and the gospel of Christ. It has relations to Japan, to China, to north-eastern Asia, to California, to Mexico, and South America, that are yet to be unfolded, perhaps to the astonishment of the world. Through them may the prophecy yet be fulfilled in reference to Asia—*God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem*. This, at least, we may rationally conjecture, that it is for some great and wise end, which may soon appear, that those Islands of the North Pacific have been so wonderfully prepared in Divine providence. Who knows but they are yet to be the great missionary printing dépôt for eastern Asia and its archipelago of islands whence the Word of God, and the living missionary teacher, shall make their grand entry into those wide realms of Paganism, by a line of trans-Pacific American steamers! Who knows but they will yet become such a centre of light and civilization, and moral power to the vast regions bordering upon the Pacific, as the British Isles have been to the countries bordering upon the Atlantic. If good men in the ministry there do but labor and pray on contentedly, with all their might, without hankering for California or any other part of Anglo-Saxondom, we believe it will be found, ere long, that they and their native churches have a mission to fulfill in the work of bringing the

Pagan world to Christ, second to that of no other church on earth. The time is coming when it will be a greater honor and privilege to have preached the gospel faithfully at the Sandwich Islands, and that too, in the despised vernacular *Kanaka maole*, than to have filled the best Anglo-Saxon pulpit in America. We say then, with a slight accommodation to the noble island-band of devoted missionaries who have been laying the foundations there for many generations, as it was said by Milton, of the Puritan hero—

Great things, O Islands we expect of you !  
 Firm, faithful men of God, who through a cloud  
 Not of war only, but *detraction rude*,  
 Guided by faith and matchless fortitude,  
 To peace and truth your glorious way have plough'd,  
 And on the ground of pagan temples proud,  
 Have reared God's trophies, and his work pursued !

Yet much remains  
 To conquer still, peace hath her victories  
 No less renowned than war : new foes arise,  
 Threatening to bind our souls with secular chains :  
 Help us to save free conscience from the paw  
 Of hireling wolves, whose gospel is their maw.

We cannot express the just sense of indignation a fervent Christian should feel at the despicable meanness of men who will belie the labors of our excellent missionaries on the very field of their operations, a field which mercantile men and officers of government are able to dwell in with safety only because the patient missionary has been there before them, and, through God's blessing, changed in great part the character and manners of so recently depraved savages. Every effort then to traduce their characters or work, or the native churches they have been instrumental of gathering, ought to meet at once as with a very *ponderie* of opposing evidence and conviction. It were right for the face of Christendom to gather blackness at such malicious attempts to weaken the faith of the church in the conduct or results of the glorious missionary enterprise, an enterprise which is yet to attract to itself more true nobility and enthusiasm than has ever been carried into any enterprise undertaken under the sun. Already does it begin to be true,

The very spirit of the world is tired  
 Of its own taunting question asked so long,  
 "Where is the promise of your Lord's approach ?"  
 The Infidel has shot his bolts away,  
 Till, his exhausted quiver, yielding none,  
 He gleans the blunted shafts that have recoiled,  
 And aims *them* at the shield of Truth again.

Thanks be to God, it is too late, in the serious drama of the world's evangelization for the blunted shafts of anti-missionary

slander to do any harm, though tipped with the venom of political gall. The testimony of unprejudiced men, like the English Rear-Admiral Thomas, Commander Wilks, and other officers of the United States Exploring Squadron, saying nothing of the concurrent testimony of a host of Christian travelers, is all on file before the world; and in the chancery of public opinion it will outweigh as many anonymous sheets of calumny as would bridge the Pacific from Panama to Oahu.

If any reader be in quest of authentic Hawaiian annals, he will find his curiosity well gratified in the perusal of the late very full history by Rev. Hiram Bingham, Hartford; or that by Mr. Jarvis, issued in Boston, 1842; or a history by Rev. Sheldon Dibble, printed at the Lahainaluna mission press, Sandwich Islands. While they are each replete with information of substantial interest to the general reader, the last work, never reprinted in this country, is to the Christian, perhaps, the most valuable of the three. We regard them all as well-sown seed-beds, from which the yet formless garden of Hawaiian history will largely draw. If we can contribute one worthy plant to be set out by the future historian in that fair garden, we are well content, and on it we inscribe

Χριστῷ καὶ Ἑκκλησίᾳ.

#### ARTICLE IV.

#### EXPOSITION OF ROMANS 8 : 19-23.

By REV. S. COMFORT, Sanquett, N. Y.

THERE is a peculiar depth and scope in the writings of Paul. This was seen in his own time by Peter, and it led to the remark contained in II Peter, 3 : 15, 16. From this entire passage it is clear not only that the writings of the former were known to the latter, but that Peter endorsed the plenary inspiration of Paul in the declaration that "according to the wisdom given unto him he had written unto them;" and that "in all his epistles he had spoken" more or less "of these things" of which Peter himself had then been speaking, namely, the destruction of the world by fire at the last day; in which epistles, on this and kindred topics, there "were some things hard to be understood," because he sunk to a depth which "the unlearned and unstable" are not able to fathom, and which "they wrested as they did also the other scriptures, unto their own destruction."

That the writings of Paul contain some things *hard to be understood*, is as true now as when Peter thus wrote. And that there are still those who are *unstable and unlearned*, is equally true. Nor is it less certain that persons of this character *wrest*



the Scriptures now as formerly, to their own destruction. The passage at the head of this article, is one which to many minds is invested with much difficulty, and about the true import of which there has been considerable controversy and still remains some doubt. It has been so interpreted as to favor the doctrine of the future existence of the brute creation, and the restoration of this world to its primeval state of order and beauty. But is either of these doctrines taught by the apostle in this passage?

Mr. Wesley it is well known, took the affirmative of this question, and urged his views in a sermon on this text, in a very ingenious and able manner. But his premises it seems to us are unsound, and his views incorrect. It is clear that in this discourse his entire superstructure is built upon the naked hypothesis that "creature," in this passage, means *irrational animal*. It is therefore certain that as far as the true doctrine of this passage is concerned, whether the restoration of irrational animals to another life be a doctrine of the Bible or not, Mr. Wesley was betrayed into the fallacy called, "begging the question." He takes for granted the very thing which should first be proved. The whole meaning of the passage turns upon the sense given the word "creature," *κτίσις*, which occurs four times in this passage. In its unrestricted meaning it comprehends all created objects. In a more restricted sense this word doubtless applies to irrational animals. In a sense still more limited it is applied to *mankind*. Hence, like other similar terms, its meaning must be determined by the context; and by this criterion its import must be decided in this passage.

But before the restoration of irrational animals from death to a future state is admitted as a Scriptural doctrine, whether taught in this passage or not, the ground on which it is predicated should be well understood. It is this—That inasmuch as brutes and irrational animals were involved in great sufferings by the sin of man, it is the dictate of both justice and benevolence that they should be restored to that state in which they stood at their creation. And as the material world has also been impaired through the same cause, it must undergo a certain renovation before the blight it has received can be discharged. Hence it is claimed that the indemnification to which animals are entitled, not being received in this world, reaches forward to the future. This, as we understand it, is the position assumed. As a mere hypothesis, adopted seriously and in good faith, it deserves a candid examination.

To assume that animals have suffered in their own natures on account of man's sin, is to say they were created with constitutional appetites, propensities, and features of character different from those which at present distinguish them. Now this proposition is either true, or it is not. But where is the proof of the

affirmative? Is it in the Bible? Where in the Scriptures is it declared that they fell with man and on his account? What change have they undergone? Were they once less disposed to prey upon each other than they now are? Had not the vulture and the eagle when created, the beak and the talons which so well adapt them to their present modes of subsistence; and had they not then their present propensities? Or had they the former without the latter? And so of the lion and other carnivorous animals. For all that we can see to the contrary, one of three things must have been true at their creation: either all those creatures among beasts, birds, fishes, and insects which prey upon other animated objects, no matter of what species, had at their creation the natural instruments adapted to such a mode of subsistence *without* the corresponding *propensity*, or they were created with *neither*, or they were created just as they *now are*. Were this question decided in the Scriptures there would be at once an end of the controversy. But this is not the case. The Bible is silent on the subject. It is a question which belongs to Natural Theology; nor is it without its difficulties in connection with that science.

To suppose that the animal kingdom was not made as we now see it, but that other and different attributes have been received since the Fall, especially by those species which are cruel and hostile, seems incompatible with the declaration that the work of creation was finished in six days. To our apprehension it is less difficult to reconcile the present character of such creatures with the declaration that all was "very good." But how much of what we call derangement in the natural world, resulted from the first transgression, it is impossible to say. But not so with the moral world. Sin was a moral act. As such it opened the gate to a flood of moral desolation. Man is the only moral inhabitant of this world. As he alone unites in himself the intellectual and the animal, so he possesses in his compound nature the attributes of both. The natural and the moral world meet in him; or, better expressed, he belongs to both worlds.

That there are difficulties to our reason if not to our faith in the animal kingdom, will not be disputed. How can the sufferings of animals, together with the instruments of attack and destruction natural to those species which feed upon other animals, be more satisfactorily resolved than by adopting the conclusion that all animals, birds, fishes, reptiles, and insects were originally made as they now are, in *anticipation* of man's *then* future defection from God? And if the poison of serpents, as well as the claws and talons of carnivorous birds and animals can be thus resolved, why may not the poison of noxious plants be resolved on the same principle? There is no reason. Nor do we see any valid objection to this mode of meeting the whole difficulty.

We cannot fathom the depths of Divine wisdom. All was present to the Divine Mind from eternity. And if the Divine procedure can be justified, viewing as He did foreseen results, in making the world at all, it can be as easily justified in making it as it is. If the atonement was not an *after-thought*, but a provision previously conceived, adopted, and brought in at the time to meet a foreseen exigency, so that Christ can be called "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;" why may we not suppose that the natural world, animate and inanimate, was, with the exception of those changes on the surface of the earth occasioned by the deluge, made as we now behold it? being thus adapted to man in anticipation of his future sin and consequent fall as a state of discipline or probation for a glorious after-life.

But should an objection be raised on the ground that many animals are unknown to a majority of mankind, and consequently neither minister to man's wants nor serve in any way as instruments of moral discipline to his mind, and therefore seem to have been made in vain or only to be devoured by other animals; we are sure, that to say that the Supreme Being in creating this world had no other end in view but to serve *man*, is not only unduly to magnify him, but to exclude all reference to His own glory in what He has seen fit to bring into existence. We must not make our knowledge the measure of the Divine wisdom. A worthy end, present to the Divine Mind may have been accomplished in the creation of the ephemeral which commences its being in the morning and perishes in the evening, though that end be hid from us. The animal which toils under the hand of man, whose flesh supplies him with food, whose wool with clothing, or whose skin with leather for his use, may thus answer the end of its being. Man in the mean time is accountable for the use he makes of the creatures of God.

But against the immortality of brutes, several objections may be urged. How can creatures which are not under *law* be subjects of reward? Animals are governed by instinct, not by laws proposed to their reason. And instinct never looks at consequences. It never ponders, deliberates, or judges in view of motives. It is blind, and acts without forethought or remorse. Besides, on the admission that a future existence will be allotted to animals with a view to reward them for service done to man or for sufferings endured on his account; why will not the hostile and injurious among them be as justly deserving of *punishment*, as the docile and useful are of *reward*? And what must be the nature of either to creatures by nature incapable of intellectual and moral happiness or misery?

Admitting that the animal creation was cursed on account of man's first offence, have we not reason to look for some proof, or at least some intimation of it, in the Scriptures? That the ground

was cursed with sterility for man's sake is specifically stated in Gen. 3 : 17. This stands in connection with the curse pronounced upon the man, woman, and serpent. But there is no allusion to animated nature. The conclusion therefore seems to us inevitable, that the notion of a direct curse upon animals for man's sake, is both gratuitous and mistaken. That they share with man in exposure to hunger and thirst, sickness and death, is not denied. And that those which have been domesticated suffer by the imposition of unequal burdens and cruelty at the hand of their tyrant-masters, is also undeniable. But do they suffer more from man than many species do from each other? And the two cases of suffering bear to each other this relation—the former is by Divine permission; the latter by Divine appointment.—The conclusion to which we are brought is this, that the use of animals is permitted to man; for their abuse he must give an account. And their hostile propensities, to which their natural instruments for taking life in some species so exactly correspond, must be resolved into the constitution of things as ordered by Divine wisdom. The ways of God are not the less wise, good, and just, because they are to us inscrutable.

But a conclusive evidence that this passage has no reference to brute creatures is seen in the fact that the original word *κτίσις*, *creature*, is the word used by Mark 16 : 15, in the great commission to preach the gospel; also in Col. 1 : 23. In both these places *πασὴν τὴν κτίσιν* in all the world, refers to the preaching of the gospel in all nations. In Matt. the term is different though the commission is the same as in Mark. Here *πάντα τὰ ἔθνη* all nations, explains the words used in Mark and Col. And *πασὴν τὴν κτίσιν* in Mark and Col. show the force of the same words, *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις* in Rom. 8 : 22, and the other three instances in which *κτίσις* occurs in the passage under consideration. The connection and scope of the entire passage confine this application of "creature" to all mankind. But before these are considered, it will be important to determine the true import of several other terms used by the apostle.

*Made subject to vanity*, verse 20, is generally understood to mean, "was subjected to a frail and dying state." But whether this sense should be given to *ματαιότης*, *vanity*, in this place, is very questionable; at least it may be regarded as subordinate to a higher and more important one. This word occurs only three times in the New Testament. By comparing these passages we shall be able to determine its import in the present instance. "This I say therefore, and testify in the Lord, that ye henceforth walk not as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their minds:" Eph. 4 : 17. That it is used here in a moral and not in a physical sense is indisputable. The Gentiles addicted themselves to every species of idolatry. They thus both evinced and indulged the emptiness, foolishness, vanity of their minds. Not only did they

walk in the vanity of their minds in this respect, but in cherishing depraved appetites and passions, including a "darkened understanding—alienation from the life of God through ignorance—because of the blindness of their hearts: who being past feeling gave themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness:" verses 18, 19. From this it appears that "vanity" in v. 17 is *generic* including the particulars in the two following verses. The other instance is 2 Peter 2: 18. "For when they speak great swelling words of vanity, they allure through the lusts of the flesh." The allusion is to false teachers. Emptiness and folly, perverseness and falsehood, by which *ματαιότης*, is defined, distinguished this teaching. And that this moral application of *ματαιότης*, "vanity," is not unwarranted, will further appear from the "corruption," *φθορά*, from which deliverance is promised in the next verse.

The word *φθορά*, *corruption*, occurs in the New Testament in eight other places. In its literal meaning from *φθείρω*, to injure, spoil, destroy; to corrupt, deprave, vitiate, it denotes decay, corruption, mortality. By metonymy it denotes *moral* corruptness, depravity, perverseness, wickedness. It is employed in both these senses by Paul, and in the latter by Peter, as the following examples will show. "It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption," 1 Cor. 15: 42. "Neither doth corruption inherit incorruption;" verse 50. It is used here in the sense of mortality. "He that soweth to his flesh shall of his flesh reap corruption," Gal. 6: 8. Contrasted with a life of piety and its results under the imagery of "sowing" and "reaping," sowing to the flesh stands for the indulgence of carnal and depraved propensities and appetites, and "reaping corruption" for guilt, condemnation, and eternal misery. In import Col. 2: 22 is not essentially different. "Having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust," 2 Peter, 1: 4. "But these as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things which they understand not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption," chap. 2: 12. Again verse 19, "while they promise them liberty, they themselves are servants of corruption." In these examples *φθορά* *corruption*, can be taken only in a metaphorical or *moral* sense. We hence conclude that whenever the term should be taken in a literal or physical sense, it must be determined to that sense by the connection and obvious scope of the passage. And that this is required in the passage under consideration is more than questionable; or if the physical is included it is *subordinate* to the moral application. For why may not deliverance "from the bondage of corruption" in verse 21, be regarded as parallel to deliverance "from the body of this death" in chap. 7: 24? And why is not the "glorious liberty of the children of God," chap. 8: 21, parallel to "the spirit of life in Christ Jesus both made me free

from the law of sin and death," in verse 2? That the parallel holds in both cases will more fully appear when we come to consider the connection and scope of the passage in question.

"The whole creation," as we have shown above, means *all mankind*. The next question is, does "groaning and travailing in pain together until now," refer to mere *physical* suffering, or to *mental and moral*? To us the reasons are preponderant for believing the apostle's eye was fixed upon the latter. For how much greater has been the amount of mental anguish resulting from *moral* causes in the world, than bodily suffering resulting from physical disease? The question of the soul's immortality; the inward conflict with unholy propensities felt by those who desire to improve their higher natures; the tyranny of satan; distraction, uncertainty, and doubt with regard to the invisible world and future happiness, have ever been the fruitful source of mental suffering throughout the Gentile world: a spiritual evil which nothing but Revelation, accompanied by the renewing energies of the Holy Spirit, can relieve. And the apostle adds in the next verse, "And not only they (the Gentiles,) but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit (of adoption,) even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the [further] adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body." He manifestly uses the term "adoption" here in another and higher sense than that in which it is used in verse 15, where he speaks of receiving the "spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father." Here he alludes to the work of the Spirit in sealing our sonship in the family of God on earth; in verse 23, of the admission of the Christian in his glorified body at the resurrection into the family of God in heaven. Of such it is said, "neither can they die any more: for they are equal to the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." Luke 20 : 36. Never till this consummation, for which the Christian devoutly aspires, will he see the end of his spiritual conflicts. In this sense it is that "we are saved by hope," as he declares in the next verse. And "with patience we wait" for this object of our hope, "the Spirit helpeth our [mental] infirmities:" for such are our blindness, ignorance, weakness, and other mental infirmities, "that we know not what we should pray for as we ought."

Having shown that *κτίσις, creature*, in this passage is applied to animals on a mistaken and groundless assumption; and having examined several other terms and phrases, with a view to show their harmony with our hypothesis, that the allusion of the apostle is entirely spiritual and evangelical, and not physical at all, or only in a sense quite subordinate; let us now, to confirm the correctness of this exposition, glance at the scope and connection of this passage.

The apostle, in the *seventh* chapter, represents a Jew with all

his tenacity to the *Law*, looking to it alone for salvation. In vain, as his conscience becomes more enlightened, and the sense of guilt becomes deeper, does he look to the Law for relief from the sense of guilt which its spiritual nature and the strictness of its precepts inspired. The more light he has the greater appears the contrast between his imperfect obedience and the absolute perfection and purity which the Divine Law requires. He finds an ever-present, mighty and controlling energy in himself—his corrupt propensities—maintaining a constant warfare with his will, and thwarting his best purposes and efforts. And the stronger and the more vigorous these are, the stronger he finds the antagonist influence, the “law,” or reigning power “in his members,” bringing him into perpetual “captivity” to this “law of sin.” The conflict rises at length to the highest pitch of desperate grief, that he shall never obtain the desired deliverance, when at length he is evoked by faith to embrace salvation by Jesus Christ. He can now shout victory over his vanquished foe.—The *eighth* chapter opens with the celebration of this conquest. The first fourteen verses contain a contrast between the bondage suffered by one under the dominion of the “flesh,” or a corrupt heart, and one who is in “Christ Jesus,” or renewed by the Spirit. The fifteenth and sixteenth verses describe the Spirit’s testimony to this deliverance and adoption into the family of God and heirship with Christ. Verses seventeen and eighteen declare the comparative insignificance of the sufferings of the present time, from persecuting Jews or Gentiles, in maintaining this faith, compared with future glory to be revealed, especially to those who shall suffer martyrdom for Christ.

So far the apostle may be supposed to refer primarily to Jews who should believe in Christ. But at this point his thoughts seem to have taken a sudden transition to the whole Gentile world, in the passage under consideration. Thus :

Verse 19. *For the earnest expectation of the creature.* Christ was the *desire of all nations*, although they had never heard of Him. They felt the evil and misery of sin, and the need of a deliverer. Thus the Gentile world were, in earnest expectation of this deliverance, called “the manifestation of the sons of God.” In a certain sense they might be said to be in *waiting* for it as the chief good, as alone giving true and complete happiness to the soul.

Verse 20. *The creature was made subject to vanity.* All mankind, Gentiles and Jews, became fallen and depraved, *not willingly*, or by their own act or choice, *but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope* ; through the one trial-offence of Adam, who plunged all his race into the depths of *wickedness and weakness* ; but not without “hope,” since Christ the great restorer was immediately promised.

Verse 21: *The creature itself shall be delivered.* The gospel shall be preached to the Gentiles, offering complete manumission from *the bondage of corruption*, the tyranny of unholy propensities and a depraved nature, and thus be brought *into the glorious liberty of the children of God*, of which he had just spoken. See verses 1—16.

Verse 22: *For we know the whole creation groaneth.* That all mankind, in every age and generation, have labored under a cloud of darkness, error, guilt, and uncertainty, is known to all men. Hence the human race stands in perishing need of this deliverance from the guilt and power of sin by Christ; which the Jew could never obtain by any efforts to keep the moral law, since it could only discover to him his *need* of this deliverance; nor the Gentile, by any pains or penalties which he can endure in the hope of pardon, nor by any offerings however costly, nor by any ablutions however oft repeated, could he obtain the desired purity. All must be sought in Christ.

Verse 23: *And not they only, but we ourselves, groan.* Even we, notwithstanding our glorious deliverance from the guilt of past sin, inwardly feel the *effects* and *tendencies* of our corrupt natures, from which we can never be delivered, till, at the resurrection, the virtue of Christ's death is displayed in the *redemption of our bodies*, delivering them from all their infirmities, they being made like unto Christ's glorious body. This *second* "adoption" is before us, and we are hoping for it. *By this hope we are saved.* But until that period shall arrive, we have the consolation to know that, under all inward conflicts and outward sufferings from toil, temptation, or persecution, *the Spirit helpeth our infirmities.* And however deep our inward groaning after the full image of Christ, against the powers of darkness, or under the toils, trials, or persecutions of our pilgrimage, "the Spirit maketh intercession for us with [still deeper] groanings which cannot be uttered." And so far is anything which can befall us in the providence of God, from being able to destroy this hope, that "all things shall work together for good to them who love God."

From the 28th verse to the close of the chapter, the apostle enlarges upon the permanence and stability of this hope, which from first to last he contemplates in connection with the character which he had before described in the former part of the chapter as "adopted," to which characteristic he adds others in this verse—a character of which nothing has the power to divest the child of God, nor by consequence to destroy the ground of his hope, which can be scripturally cherished only in connection with the Christian character



## ARTICLE V.

THE SPIRIT OF LITERATURE AND ART.<sup>1</sup>

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WHEN we speak of literature, we comprehend the whole action of the human mind in the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge and virtue. Literature is written language; and the gift of language is co-ordinate with the gift of reason, of thought, sensibility and imagination. Without these high faculties and functions, man would be incapable of receiving, comprehending, or using language; and with these he cannot but have language. As he now uses it, what a scope it affords to his faculties! How it enables him to multiply and diffuse his being! Has he a noble thought, he can now make it reappear in myriads of minds: he utters a few sounds, and the secret thought which was known only to himself, takes wings and flies abroad, and becomes a universal possession: he makes a few marks on paper, and it belongs to posterity. Has he a feeling boiling up from the depths of his spirit, and thrilling all his faculties, he has but to frame sounds with his lips, and multitudes are moved as the sea when the tempest passes over it; or he marks down again a few lines, and his passion kindles up all hearts to the end of time.

Does some beautiful vision, or some heroic theme, take possession of his soul, and frame itself into connected incidents and changing scenes, presenting a glorious array of men and things and great deeds;—at once it runs out into sweet and melodious sounds, and a stirring and lofty epic wakes the imagination of nations and of ages. Does a people distinguish itself by its legislators, warriors, artists, poets, orators and philosophers;—the historian holds up the great example, and gives it in charge to immortality. All passions, purposes, thoughts, discoveries, inventions, and imaginations—oratory, history, poetry, philosophy, science, find their expression in language, their vehicle of communication, and the instrument of their power.

<sup>1</sup> The above article I have taken from the body of an oration recently delivered before a Literary Society. It was printed in a pamphlet together with the proceedings and festival speeches on the occasion of a semi-centennial celebration, and distributed among the members of the Society. I have also distributed a few among literary friends. It has not, therefore, been published. I presume few of the readers of the Repository have seen it. As the *sentiments* are such as I wish to disseminate, I have concluded, upon invitation of the Editor of the Repository, to give this portion to the public by means of the pages of this Review. In doing this I am acting not without precedent, and would only refer to the Westminster Review, where a discourse of Macaulay's is published. If the article is new to the readers of the Repository, and if it is worthy of their perusal, I suppose they will not quarrel with the author simply because it was not originally written for them.

H. P. T.

Man knows, thinks, feels, and wills. The activities of his mind have their definite laws and relations; and hence when he seeks to give an external expression of his internal consciousness, the external expression must have definite laws and relations likewise. What his mind is in its inherent capacities, and in the degree and mode of its development, such will his language be.

There are two impulses which lead him to language. The first respects the individual himself:—it is an impulse of his intellectual nature. In attempting to know and comprehend the objects everywhere presented to him, he is directed by a law of his mind to classify them; but having classified them, he requires some common signs by which to represent the different classes. While he is attending to individual objects merely, he may carry in his mind the clear and full conception of each one: but inasmuch as a general classification is founded upon the abstraction of some particular quality or qualities common to all the individuals, and yet adequately descriptive of no particular one, or at most descriptive of the lowest order only—it is plain he can make no representation in his thought which shall strictly embody the abstraction. For the purposes of his own thought, therefore, he must have some sign, some form of language, by which to express his classifications.

The second impulse lies in his social nature. The individual man cannot isolate himself;—he is one of many, and the bonds are strong which bind him to his fellows. Indeed all sensitive creatures are impelled in some way to commune with their kind, and they all have signs well understood among themselves. But man has a community of reason, beautiful emotions, glorious imaginings, and sacred sympathies; and therefore he, least of all, is able to separate himself from his kind, and become an isolated being. Man's nature commands him to form families, neighborhoods, and nations. But in order to this he must have language. Language, therefore, is a spontaneous outflow of his social nature.

*Spoken* language grows out of the necessities of an intellectual and social creature, in all the conditions of his being:—man everywhere and always requires *spoken* language. *Written* language grows out of the necessities of civilization and refinement. The *useful* arts, legislation, and commerce, require it for recording principles, laws, and rules, and for facilitating the exchange of commodities.

But these alone cannot give birth to literature. A nation must have sciences and scientific men, the arts of the *beautiful* and artists, philosophy and philosophers; and that it may have poetry and history, it must have heroic and glorious recollections—a strong and glowing consciousness of national greatness. A mere mechanical, commercial and bargaining people, can have no literature; for the mere calculating and utilitarian functions of the soul

do not contain the elements of truth, religion and beauty ; and hence they cannot supply matter worthy of enduring record—they can only give the story of the homely and ordinary life, which is ever the same. But where a people has education and refinement and great men—there will be both matter for literature, and literary productiveness. And the history of such a people must be perpetuated. The merchant, with his stately counting-houses and proud ships may pass away ; the lofty domes of exchanges, banks, and custom-houses, be crumbled to the ground ; canals and railroads choked with ruins : the palaces of the rich and gay may vanish like a morning vapor ; forms of government may become an exploded experiment, and mighty states lose their existence and name in some mightier empire : but the achievements of literature will stand as proud and enduring monuments when everything else is forgotten.

In one point of view Greece is perished and forgotten. For centuries trampled down as a poor slave, she lost the consciousness of national existence : and the feeble life of her modern resurrection, under the toy-like sceptre of a Bavarian boy, gives no promise that the age of Pericles or of Miltiades will ever return. But we turn from a miserable bigoted people, to the remains of her ancient art and literature. Here we say Greece is not forgotten. The ruined Parthenon is worth more than the living kingdom. The Greece that we think of with enthusiasm, is the Greece which has handed down to us the remains of the chisel of Praxitiles and Phidias ; the poems of Homer, Hesiod, Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripedes, and Pindar ; the histories of Thucydides, Heroditus, and Xenophon ; the logic of Aristotle ; the philosophy of Plato—yes, the dialogues of the old man Socrates, whom the world reveres as the holiest and sublimest of philosophers, but to whom his countrymen gave the cup of hemlock : and yet *they* have perished while *he* lives—he lives, one of the imperishable monuments on which the name of his country is inscribed, and by which his country is remembered.

Nature, too, is exalted and immortalized by the touch of genius. Olympus, Parnassus, Hymettus, and Helicon, are, in themselves, of the ordinary type ; the Ilissus is a lazy, insignificant stream ; the vale of Tempe like many a beautiful valley which nature hath made ; but song and philosophy have given them undying voices of majesty, beauty, and truth.

" Though here no more Apollo haunts the grot,  
And thou, the Muses' seat, art now their grave,  
Some gentle spirit still pervades the spot,  
Sighs in the gale, keeps silence in the cave,  
And glides with glassy foot o'er yon melodious wave."

Literature and art alone give immortality to nations ; for, were

it possible for a nation to attain to greatness without them, still, without them, there would be no records for posterity. Surpassingly momentous, therefore, is the vocation of the men of art and literature—strong and holy the bonds by which they are united in one fraternity. To them are committed the paramount interests of humanity—the life of society is beating in their hearts.

Alas! alas! their fate has been but too uniform! While living, prone to be regarded as drones in the body politic :—they manufacture no fabrics of utility, their labors do not sustain war, nor extend commerce, nor make increase of public wealth. Often no account is taken of them while toiling in sadness and poverty, and they wither by neglect,—or sink into the grave by the relentless hand of persecution—or they are compelled by inexorable necessity to waste energies which were designed for the world of beauty and truth, in the vulgar world of politics and trade.—And when they are gone, their countrymen awake as from a dream! Then they exclaim, the great and good were among us, and we knew it not! We saw not the angel of light until he threw off the mortal robes in which he was disguised! And yet, when they turn to the works which he has left behind, there are the marks of the master hand—there is that by which they ought to have known him. Then, in vain regrets, they build monuments on the top of sacred mountains, or in old abbeys. Then they boast to other nations of their great man ;—proudly they say,—Have you a Socrates, a Milton, a Shakspeare? The murdered philosopher, the poor old blind and persecuted poet, the obscure player, now become the sapphire foundations of national greatness and glory. Now it seems that a nation could spare any of the monuments of its pride and grandeur, rather than the works and the memory of its great men.

Could Socrates, Milton, and Shakspeare return to our world in their identical forms and characters, how the multitude would rush to see those kings of thought! what a universal homage! what expressions of love and admiration would be heaped upon them! And yet, by a sort of metempsychosis, which sometimes takes place, let them reappear in other forms and under other names, and the same fate, which smote them in their ancient forms, might await them again. But are there not exceptions to this sad picture? Have not letters and art sometimes met with noble rewards? And as society advances, does there not appear an auspicious change?

That there have been exceptions—that noble rewards have been bestowed, and that these rewards are becoming more promising, may be granted, without affecting a general truth which we wish here to expound, namely, that literature, under those forms which reach the highest and holiest ends, cannot look for its rewards in the vulgar gain of the world, but must be led on by

motives of a widely different character. We would expound this truth not in the spirit of merely finding fault with the world, and pathetically and indignantly descanting upon the martyrdom of genius, but that we may ascertain the true mission of literature and art, and see how sacred and magnanimous are their duties.

In the first place, it cannot be denied that, as a matter of history, the picture we have drawn does apply to the highest order of genius, and to those most masterly works which have constituted and elevated a nation's literature. Great men *have* labored without reward, and without the hope of reward, unless it were the anticipated judgment of posterity.

The two highest forms of *Æsthetical* literature are, the Epic and the Drama; and the loftiest names which figure in these are, Homer, Dante, Tasso, Milton, and Shakspeare. We may take these as our illustrations.

The Epic and the Drama are the complements of history. History gives only bare facts, and those chiefly which take place in public life. But the human mind does not rest satisfied with the bare facts. The grand events of history—those events which involve the rise and fall of nations, by a strong moral and spiritual instinct, it connects with a superintending Providence, and dignifies with supernatural interpositions. All nations of all ages exhibit this instinct, whether in the forms of a pure and rational religion, or of a wild and terrible superstition. Now Epic poetry aims to supply, by its imaginary creations, this deficiency in history. History, we have said, gives us the actions of men only as facts. Epic poetry takes up the same actions, and after embellishing them with an imaginary grandeur and heroism, and interweaving them with fictitious incidents, brings into the scene supernatural actors. The actions must in themselves be made to appear so lofty and heroic as, in a manner, to be worthy of divine direction and co-operation; and then the appearance of the divine actors both gives an unspeakable dignity and sublimity to the events, and explains their mystery by placing them in the light of the counsels of heaven. Hence the supernatural agency of the Epic is called *The Machinery*, since all the developments of the poem turn upon this agency.

Lord Kames has remarked with what appears to me a strange infatuation of criticism, that "the aim or end of an epic poem can never be obtained in any perfection, where machinery is introduced." Without attempting to refute the particular reason he assigns for this judgment, which indeed might easily be done, it is sufficient to reply, that the epic admits of no just philosophical explication except on the ground of the machinery; and that, in fact, to remove the machinery would be to destroy every epic poem in existence. Remove the supernatural from the *Iliad* and the *Paradise Lost*, and what would be left? No! the super-

natural is the very soul of the epic ; and answers in respect to history, an irrepressible demand of the human intelligence.

There can be no question that the epic is the noblest form of poetry ; and therefore it is called *THE EPIC—THE WORD*—the highest form of human thought and language—the song of songs—the poem of poems. It embraces some great action in the history of man ; it introduces the most heroic characters ; it narrates the most lofty and thrilling events ; it employs a verse of the noblest melody ; it collects around its language all the splendor of imagery ; and behind this magnificent array, it places the counsels and agencies of divinities.

Nor is there anything improbable or unnatural in the machinery, if it only conform to the popular or generally received religion of the nation from whose history the epic springs. If the epic poet supplies the divine agencies to the events of history according to the mythological or religious system of the people to whom he belongs and for whom he writes, he does, in truth, reach the moral effect of reality, just like the dramatist who constructs his fictions on the basis of facts and the known principles of human nature. The epic poet cannot, indeed, give the actual and precise facts of divine agency, but he imagines and represents the actions of divinities so like what the national religion affirms must have happened, that by the national mind and heart they must seem to be the higher and more momentous part of the history itself. The stories of the heroes of Homer were a most precious part of the national tradition, and devoutly believed by the people. The mythological deities of Homer were the deities of the people ; and what the poet sung of their deeds in the heavens, in the sea, and on the earth, in the Grecian and Trojan camps, and amid the conflicts of the armies, appeared to them so probable—such a natural and fit exhibition of their dispositions and might, that the religious belief, without experiencing any shock, enlarged itself to these creations of a sublime imagination.

In referring to the *Divina Comedia*, I do not mean to affirm that it is an epic poem. It is an unique poem. There never was—there never can be another like it. If it be taken as an epic, then we must call it an epic of individuals, rather than of nations—not a historical, but a biographical epic ; and an epic in which the lives and characters of men, who figured on earth, are read in the presence of their eternal destinies. It is altogether a creation of the supernatural. To Dante's own mind it was a reality. He writes with the seriousness, the dignity, the sincerity and earnestness of a man who sees and believes. To the men of his times, and of the times subsequent, his book was like the leaves of the judgment. Here was the theology—the strong belief of the men of the middle ages.

Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered*, is an epic of the crusades, and represents the Christian Mythology of the middle ages, as truly as the *Iliad* represents the Greek Mythology of the age of Homer. These poems are alike the supernatural complements of grand heroic histories.

Indeed, we have only to appeal to our own experience, in order to verify this representation. We, too, have a great epic, whose machinery is drawn from the strongholds of our faith. Judged by the facts and doctrines of the Bible, the *Paradise Lost* is based upon the strongest probabilities. The Bible history is indeed an epic history, for it contains the supernatural complement as a part of its veritable facts. This elevates it above all other histories. But the Bible history is brief, particularly that part which relates to the creation and fall of man. But this brief history is powerfully suggestive, and taken in connection with numerous allusions made to it throughout the Scriptures, and with the doctrines of moral good and evil, becomes the basis of supernatural conceptions, which give Milton's poem the first place in point of sublimity and moral interest. Now would it do any violence to our religious belief, to receive this poem as containing a statement of facts? Nay, when reading it, do we not seem to be engaged with a veritable narrative, as well as with the sublimest and sweetest poetry? And still more, is not our religious faith, with respect to the sinning angels and their malignant agencies, with respect to the first man, the particulars of his fall, and the heavenly grace vouchsafed to him, influenced and substantially shaped by the terrible, the sublime, the lovely creations of Milton? The angelic life in heaven seem to us like a real life. The rebellious angels, and their dwelling within the fiery cope and those burning walls of adamant, seem to us like the fiends and the hell of our belief. That delicious paradise, with its stately trees, its chrystal streams, its bowers of love, its genial clime, its golden fruits, its ever-blooming flowers, its innocent creatures of strength, beauty and melody, and its forms of manhood, and of ideal feminine loveliness and grace, its circling hours of joy, its life of perfect love and peace, and its heavenly visitations, seems to us like the true form of that blissful dawn of pure and untainted life, of which the sacred writings give us only a brief sketch. And even the counsels of the Father and the Son seem not unworthy of the most majestic doctrines of our theology.

Milton himself, with a noble enthusiasm—which we may pardon in him, as well as in Dante—and with something like the consciousness of one of the ancient prophets, invoked that

“ Spirit that dost prefer  
Before all temples, the upright heart and pure :”

and while we read, we insensibly yield to the claim of inspiration, and feel awe-struck, as if listening to a divine word.

The miserable attempt of Voltaire to construct an epic out of modern history, by means of the ancient Greek mythology, was consistent with a genius which could artificially combine, but which, having no sense of the divine, was not equal to the truth and dignity of a genuine epic.

Homer, Dante, Tasso, Milton, wrote from knowledge and from faith. Theirs was a true word, and a true work of art. Art may be fiction, but it has no falsehood and incongruity. Art is truth under the splendid forms of the imagination. Art is nature idealized by the imagination striving after the perfect. Every epic poem; therefore, constructed upon just principles, sustains and gives effect to the facts of history.

We have said that the epic and the drama are the complements of history. The epic is the supernatural complement. The drama is the complement of private individual life. History gives us the actions of men on the theatre of public life. We do not see its great actors in the relations of domestic, familiar, and ordinary life. We cannot be present when their meditations are expressed in soliloquies, nor witness those secret intrigues which contain the springs of public events. History gives us only the public man. The epic supplies the divine agencies which lead on and govern the great actions of the hero. Now we are most curious to learn the familiar every-day life of the individual who has dazzled our imagination in the public events of history. We wish to learn whether he possesses the ordinary sympathies of the race; whether he can descend to common affairs: we desire to read his secret motives, and to hear him counsel confidentially with his intimates. Nay, we would press into his religious beliefs and his superstitions; we would know even the dreams which unveil his character; and if he converse with demons, or good angels, or read the stars of destiny, we would be present at these awful ministries and prophecies. It is natural for us to look upon the hero as the child of destiny, and he is ever prone so to regard himself.

What history cannot do with its bare facts, the drama accomplishes. As the epic reveals a probable supernatural agency relatively to public life, so the drama reveals the probable agencies, both natural and supernatural relatively to private life. The epic gives us the *hero* in alliance with divinities; the drama gives us the *man*, with all the influences and circumstances of humanity collected around him.

In order to reach its end, the drama must conform to the true constitution of man—it must be psychologically true. This is the first requisite. After this, it must conform to the facts of history, and to the manners and customs of the nation and age in which



the action is laid. Those details of the private and secret life which are wanting in history, the great masters of the drama supply by fictions, which we believe must be very like what really happened, because, constructed on right principles, they are intrinsically probable. Take, as examples, the historical plays of Shakespeare. Is any violence done here to nature or to history? Is not the familiar life of the old English kings, lords, peasantry and soldiers brought to view as a reality? Do we not feel that the genius of Shakspeare has raised from the dead what history had buried? The Richard III., whom history offers to our view in public life, must have been the man whom Shakspeare describes in his secret and familiar life. That portion of English history contained in the plays of Shakspeare, is better understood, and produces a more general moral effect than any other portion, where his genius has not illumined the page, and supplied the dramatic complement. If all history were illustrated by dramas like Shakspeare's, would not history be more real, more true, and infinitely more instructive?

Now these two forms of literature have given us the greatest works of human genius; and the five names we have mentioned are the greatest the world has produced in these relations.

Homer, in the *Iliad*, became the father of Grecian life Grecian literature and art, Grecian civilization—and thus the father of all art, literature, and civilization, save that which belongs peculiarly to Christianity. For centuries his song was sung by the rhapsodists throughout the Grecian states; and thus was there diffused and ripened, the two great elements of Grecian character—the *heroic* and the *beautiful*. The Greek drama, the Greek plastic arts, the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis, were all inspired by that one great work. It was a great gift to his country, and to all future ages.

Dante and Tasso spoke a word, plastic and powerful in their times, like the *Iliad* to the ancient world. It was the birth of a glorious language—the opening of a new fountain of literature and art.

Milton takes the loftiest stand of all in this form of literature. Homer was of the Grecian life. Dante and Tasso, of the life of the middle ages. Milton's is the epic of universal humanity, enlightened, redeemed, purified and adorned by the sun of Christianity. He has sung the life of man from the creation to the judgment day. He has sung the counsels of Heaven, the mysteries of providence and of grace. The highest reason, the highest faith, the most awful truth, and the most ravishing beauty, are all combined in his wonderful poem. He has started thoughts which are like sunbeams upon the earth, and then, reflected upwards, wander through eternity.

In the other form of literature, Shakspeare has surpassed, and

must forever surpass all others. He is the great expounder of human nature : he has traced human life to its fountains ; he has analyzed human character into its constitutive elements. In him the severest truths are presented under the most perfect forms of art ; and poetry and action, no longer the amusement of vacant hours, become the august teachers of that most elevated science, whose title only was inscribed on the temple at Delphi. Homer was the founder of the epic. Shakspeare may almost be called the founder of the drama, for he first developed its true idea.

Now these five master-spirits of humanity, producing in the two loftiest spheres of literature those master-works, the destruction of which would be a greater calamity to the race, than the destruction of as many kingdoms—works which are destined to survive all the changes of time, and to remain the everlasting landmarks of thought—for what did they labor ? And what was their portion in the lot of man ?

Of the first, the history is doubtful : but this very doubtfulness proves that neither riches nor honors were his. A wandering bard he surely was ; and perhaps, as his name may indicate, blind. A blind poet constructing his lofty verse, and singing of the sublime, the heroic, and the beautiful, under the piercing experience of human suffering. His mind dwelt on Ida and Olympus amid the haunts and the thrones of the gods ; but he was a poor blind wanderer upon the earth. Poets, artists, learned men, nations, *booksellers*, have lived upon his thoughts. The world has given boundless homage to the form of greatness dimly seen in the remote antiquity ; but while that form moved among men, we hear of no munificent patrons, of no places of power and splendor awarded him : he drove no profitable trade with enterprising publishers : he threw his bread upon the waters, and his memory alone hath found it after many days.

Dante was an exile—a persecuted, sorrow-stricken man. “ It came to be evident to him,” says Carlyle, “ that he had no longer any resting-place or hope of benefit in this earth. The earthly world had cast him forth to wander : no living heart to love him now ; for his sore miseries there was no solace here. The deeper naturally would the eternal world impress itself on him ; that awful reality over which, after all, this time-world, with its Florences and banishments, only flutters as an unreal shadow. Florence thou shalt never see ; but hell, purgatory, and heaven, thou shalt surely see. What is Florence, Can della Scala, and the world and life altogether ? Eternity : thither of a truth, not else-whither, art thou and all things bound ! The great soul of Dante, homeless on earth, made its home more and more in that awful other world. Naturally his thoughts brooded on that, as the one fact important for him. \* \* \* Dante’s heart long filled with

this—brooding over it in speechless thought and awe, bursts forth at length into ‘mystic, unfathomable song,’ and his divine comedy, the most remarkable of all modern books, is the result.” Never did human genius produce a more unearthly book. It was written under the inspiration of no earthly motive whatever. It was written, you may say, from a bursting heart—it was a wail of despair: no, it was written by a man who, in his inward greatness and strength, had triumphed over the agony and despair of earth; and then, anticipating eternity, walked through the circles of hell, toiled up the mount of purgatory, and at length reposed in the beatific visions of paradise. It was wrought out of the depths of his soul as an experience and a hope. Like every true work of genius, it was an irrepressible thought that would be spoken.

The reward of Tasso was neglect and poverty, and seven years imprisonment under a charge of madness, because he honored with noble, faithful love, a woman of higher rank than his own. Now, her only immortality is that *he* loved her: the only immortality of his enemies, that they were *his* enemies.

“Long years! it tries the thrilling frame to bear,  
And eagle spirit of a child of song—  
Long years of outrage, calumny and wrong;  
Imputed madness, prisoned solitude,  
And the mind’s canker in its savage mood.  
Where the impatient thirst of light and air  
Parches the heart.”

There is no sadder history in the history of genius.

John Milton was not a victim of petty Guelph and Ghibbeline factions, nor of narrow, aristocratic jealousy. He was a martyr of great principles for which he had battled from prime manhood to old age. Old, poor, and blind, he was suffered to emerge from concealment, and to occupy an obscure corner of London. But his mind and character were unchanged. His whole being was of the most beautiful and perfect proportions. Like a Grecian temple, nothing unequal, nothing out of place, nothing to mar the grand effect. His character might be drawn as a general scholar, a metaphysician, a divine, a politician, a poet, or simply as a Christian man, and it would appear resplendent in all. And were we to draw his character in all these respects, in the hour of his highest prosperity; and then again, when he was old and blind, poor and neglected; instead of finding aught in the second portrait that would throw shame upon the beauty and majesty of the first, we should find it beaming with the same intellect, poetry and purity, only heightened by expressions of resignation and fortitude, and of a mind more heavenly, as engaged now in meditating that immortal song which crowned his labors.

It was amid this wreck of his fortunes, without patrons, with-

out any hope on earth but the hope of leaving a blessing behind him, that he dictated the *Paradise Lost*—the *Paradise Lost*—a legacy to his country and to mankind—a legacy whose value cannot be expressed by the wealth of kingdoms; and yet it brought him few readers, and only fifteen pounds! But John Milton was not disappointed nor cast down. He wrote not as the hireling of booksellers; he wrote not as the flatterer of patrons; he wrote not as the pander to a perverted public taste. He wrote from an “inward prompting which,” says he, “grew daily upon me, that by labor and intense study, (which I take to be my portion in this life,) joined with the strong propensity of nature, I might perhaps leave something so written, to after times, as they should not willingly let die. These thoughts at once possessed me; and these other, that if I were certain to write as men buy leases, for three lives and downwards, there ought no regard to be sooner had, than to God’s glory by the honor and instruction of my country.”

The strong propensity of the poetical nature contemplating ideal greatness, beauty, and perfection—the spirit of the artist, and the great call of duty to employ the powers which God had given him in a work which, however dealt with in his own day, should run parallel with the race of time, and as a word of truth, beauty, and power, make its way, and work in the heart of all coming generations: these led him to form the great conception years before the hour of execution arrived. And as the work was great, so the preparation was great likewise:—“A work not to be raised from the heat of youth, or the vapors of wine, like that which flows at waste from the pen of some vulgar amorist, or the trencher fury of a rhyming parasite; nor to be obtained by the invocation of dame memory and her syren daughters; but by devout prayer to that Eternal Spirit, who can enrich with all utterance and knowledge, and sends out his seraphim, with the hallowed fire of his altar, to touch and purify the lips of whom he pleases: to this must be added industrious and select reading, steady observation, insight into all seemly and generous arts and affairs.” He had looked for “a calm and pleasing solitariness, fed with cheerful and confident thoughts,” for the working out of his lofty plan. But the only solitariness which he found was that of old age, blindness, and the alienation of the world. And yet his majestic, unsubdued spirit, accomplished the task with the ease, freshness, and soaring imagination of halcyon days. The misfortunes of life could not cheat him out of the work of life. At a time, and under circumstances when others would have lain down to die, he rose with the “lark that, singing, up to heaven’s gate ascends,” and girded him to his labor. The past, to him, was a dream of glorious hopes, and manly exertions: the present a

weary load of sorrow ; but in the future lay his immortal epic as a crown of glory.

Shakspeare's life was not one of deep, consuming sorrow, like Dante's ; nor one of high, stern conflicts for great principles in public places, like Milton's. And yet, it was the life of one combatting with fortune, unquestionably, under many private sorrows and cares, until he had gained for himself a competency, and he went back to the banks of the Avon to rest himself and to die. He lived an obscure life—we know but little about him—and this alone tells of obscurity. His highest elevation was to be manager of a theatre. It is true he had some favor from the great. Southampton was his friend, and gave him a thousand pounds, it is said. Queen Elizabeth conversed with him, expressed her pleasure at his performances, and being delighted with the character of Falstaff, made a suggestion which led to the composition of the *Merry Wives of Windsor*. King James issued his patent to the company of the Globe theatre. And this was all. The queen was repaid a thousand fold by "the most enchanting compliment ever paid by genius to royal vanity," in his *Midsummer's Night Dream*.

But it comes to this—the greatest intellect, the greatest poet of England and of humanity, was approved as a play writer, and a play manager, and received such patronage as enabled him to retire on two hundred pounds a year !

What led to these stupendous dramas ? Was it his necessities—this passing notice of the great—the prospect of this competency ? Here was the *occasion*—you must seek for the *cause* elsewhere. There is a heaven-wide difference between an occasion and a cause. Many men have had like occasions with Shakspeare—nay, more stirring occasions, and have done nothing. The cause was in the mighty genius of the man. He had occasion to write plays—he had to earn his bread. But genius does not live upon bread : it has its own mighty inspiration in itself.

As the development of the reason from its profoundest depths, has its primary conditional or occasional starting point, in relation to time, in some movement of the sense—a sensation of touch, or color, or sound, or perhaps, the mere inspiration of a breath of air ; so with genius, it may be some trivial circumstance—a word—a jest—a look—some shock of pride—some touch of human suffering—an indignity and petty persecution from some Sir Thomas Lucy, which leads to the first determination, which occasions the first movement of the mighty thought : but thenceforward, it moves by its own inward strength, and with the sphere of its own clear and glorious perceptions. The occasion which awakens it, is of small account ; if it did not find one occasion, it would find some other :—sooner or later it must awaken, and know itself, and do its work.

In a world where the allotments of fortune are so unequal, it is not surprising that a sense of want should so often form the occasion for the development of genius. Want knocks at the storehouse where great thoughts and energies are yet slumbering: the master within awakes, and strives to relieve the humble, urgent petitioner;—the doors fly open, and troops of angels issuing forth, scatter the earth with flowers, open chrystal fountains in the deserts, and fill the cope of heaven with melody. Want may be relieved, or may be forgotten, in this world of beauty where genius is now at work.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of Shakspeare is his indifference to everything but the exertion of his genius. He met the demands of want indeed—but he met them moderately and even humbly. Nor does he manifest any ambition of fame—he seems almost unconscious of his own greatness. He moved amid his own matchless creations, satisfied with his own silent delight, and not caring what the world would say of him, nor dreaming that he was to fill all future ages with his name. He came into the world, “the free gift of nature; given altogether silently—received altogether silently as if a thing of little account;” and silently he went out of the world. The generation in which he lived did not collect the materials of his biography, and he left nothing behind him written of himself. He lived in his dramas while he lived, of no more account than the world pleased to make of them. But now he will live in his dramas while the world lives.

We have now considered the two highest forms of literature, and the five great names which figure here. Homer of the world of ancient classic beauty. Dante and Tasso<sup>2</sup> of the middle ages. Milton and Shakspeare of the modern world. We have nothing greater or more perfect in literature to speak of. And here these men with their works are before us. We have only been stating facts. Their lot was not the lot of power, wealth, or pleasure. The motives which led to the stupendous creations which form the glory of mankind, and which, if they were taken away, would leave the world irreparably poor—were not drawn from the ordinary sources which inspire human activity. It were easy to add to these names from the history of the great and good among mankind. And the conclusion at which we should inevitably arrive, would be, that those noble and efficient labors which have led on all improvements, and made the world what it is in science, literature, art, and religion, have had their origin in lofty views of truth, beauty, benevolence, and duty.

<sup>1</sup> Carlyle.

<sup>2</sup> Tasso, himself, indeed, did not live in the middle ages, but his mind was there; his great epic is the echo of the middle ages.

If we now proceed from the facts, to consider the true principle of activity and productiveness in literature and the arts, we shall find that nothing less than motives drawn from these sources, can afford a sufficient inspiration for any truly great work. The noblest natures have drawn their motives from all these sources combined ; others, from only a part ; but, altogether, or in part, they must enter into the production of every great work.

In the first place, he who undertakes any great work, whether in philosophy, science, art, or religion, does often, by that very undertaking, make an advance beyond the spirit of his age, and leave its sympathies behind him.

It is common in our day, with those who make wide generalizations in philosophical history, to represent the great man as the exponent of the spirit of his age. The truth of this representation will depend, so far as it can be true, upon what we mean by the spirit of the age, and the character we assign to it. If we mean by the spirit of the age, the opinions and proclivities of the masses of the people, then, if these be the result of high principles of truth and liberty permeating the masses, he, of those who have gone before us, was the great man, who, rising above the prejudices, ignorance, and bigotry of a previous age, disseminated these principles, and enthroned them in the popular mind. And he is now the great man, who, collecting the prevalent opinions and tendencies, springing from so high a source, into one focus of action, works out, by their means, some grand reform in civil, social, and religious life. But if the movement of the popular mind be in the direction of error and fanaticism, then the leader and exponent of the popular will is but a rampant demagogue, or a furious bigot. He may be an orator in the use of the sacred *names* of patriotism and religion : he may be an inflammatory and acute writer in newspapers and periodicals : he may be deeply read in human nature under its worst, weakest, and darkest attributes, so that, as a pander to the appetites and perverted judgments of men, he may exercise a mighty influence over multitudes, and ride into power upon a storm of evil : in fine, he may gain his ends, and attain to what the world calls *success* ; but great he can never be, if truth be great, if virtue be great, if God be great.

But do we mean by the spirit of the age, those doctrines and opinions which have obtained among the thinking few, who, after all, give enduring character to an age,—then, the great man is he who, reviewing these by a clear and powerful philosophical criticism, eliminates error from truth, and collects results after which the thinking minds have in different ways, and, it may be, through successive ages been struggling, and to which they have all contributed something :—have contributed even by their mistakes and errors : for no one that truly thinks, thinks altogether in vain. Cicero remarks that he would rather err with Plato, than find

truth with his opponents; and I think with good reason, for the errors of some minds are more suggestive than the truths of others. And so he who, reviewing the beliefs of his age in the master minds, tracing their origin and their progress, and describing their present development, comes at last to a logical projection of weighty and commanding truths, is entitled to be considered great, as the faithful exponent of the spirit of his age. He is an exponent of light, power, and beneficence; for, he has reduced chaos to order, and distinguished between wandering comets and the worlds of productiveness and beauty, which move in harmonious orbits around the all-binding centre.

But it must be in the grand progress of thought, that the great teachers of truth, beauty, and goodness, shall come into conflict with error, perversion, and malignity; and that ere the battle be won, many of the noblest perish as victims. Socrates must drink the hemlock ere Plato can write his dialogues, and receive universal homage at the Olympic games. Galileo must be imprisoned ere Newton can proclaim the true system of the universe. Jerome of Prague and John Huss must die at the stake, ere Luther can lead on the Reformation. Hampden and Sydney must fall ere Washington can triumph in the battles of liberty. Nay, Christianity herself could be introduced only by the crucifixion of its Divine Author, and the martyrdom of His apostles. Mankind at large, in many ages, have been like the captives whom Plato has described, in the cave with their backs turned to the light and beholding only shadows. The great man is the solitary one who turns from the shadows, escapes from captivity, and walks out to behold the sun in the heavens; but who, when he returns to proclaim his glorious discovery to the captives below, is accounted worthy of death, for the very reason that he contradicts their science, exposes their shadowy perceptions, and directs them to the world of light and reality above.

The man who *aims* only to be the exponent of the spirit of his age, can never be great, for he is destitute of independent and original thought. He is the mere echo of the voice of the predominant multitude, whether in philosophy, politics, or religion. Even if the spirit of the age be enlightened and benign, he is not great if he becomes its exponent merely for conspicuity and influence: for now he is what he is, not from conviction and principle, but only from expediency. He is only a weathercock of a higher order, self-consciously trimming his plumage to the favoring gales. The great man critically examines the spirit of the age, and accepts it only as it accords with the principles which govern him. Where it is wrong, he is ready to oppose it. He will take up his cross and follow truth through evil report. He will stand unmoved, like a rock in the ocean, when the angry voices of the multitude are swelling around him. He will bear calmly the persecution of



powerful sects and parties. He will consent to lie down in infamy, and bequeath to future generations the work of vindicating his name, when the truths for which he has battled shall have triumphed. There is in him a majestic composure and confidence. He lives not for a particular time, but for all times. He makes his secure home in immortality.

But in order to prove, the elevated motives which inspire the pursuits of literature and art, we may reason not only from the necessary position which he assumes relatively to the multitude who aims to effect any great work;—we may reason, also, from the peculiar nature and ends of these pursuits. The philosopher, the poet, the artist, not only have the lot of greatness upon them, in emerging from the cavern and seeking a purer light;—such also is the work which they have to do, that they cannot do it, unless they turn away from vain time-shows to contemplate an absolute beauty, goodness, and truth. The inspiring forms of art and literature lie in an ideal world, a world of absolute and permanent reality. This, to many, may appear a contradiction, since, in the popular conception, the ideal is ever the shadowy, dreamy, and unreal. Shall we be called a dreamer—a man in pursuit of shadows, if we affirm that the ideal represents the highest form of reality? Let us explain. We begin by accepting the Platonic definition of ideas psychologically considered, that they are the primordial seminal potencies in the reason of all knowledge. We will next take up ideas, logically considered, as primordial and general conceptions, or accepting here the Aristotelian notion—the categories under which all our particular knowledges are capable of being reduced. Some of the most important and productive of these ideas are the ideas of the Perfect, the True, the Just, the Useful, and the Beautiful. Now, by the idea-potencies producing the idea-conceptions, we not only know and comprehend, upon the proper sensuous conditions, that which actually exists, but also that which is possible. But, under the possible, we embrace higher forms of perfection, truth, justice, utility, and beauty, than what the actual world affords. That is, we conceive that the principles existing and at work in nature might have riper and more glorious developments: nay, that in other worlds, they may now have such developments. It is here that the imagination comes in as a mediatory, representative, and creative power, and projects into its own sphere the ideals of more perfect forms. Now, it is the effort to realize in the outer world these ideals which give birth to the highest productions of art. Sculpture, architecture, the epic, and the drama, are embodiments of the ideal. In ideal creations, the supernatural is only a higher form of the natural. What then is the ideal but the more perfect real, not indeed the *actual*, but the *real*—truth, justice, goodness, and beauty, ripened to their highest measures? The actual is change-

able and passing away by a steady progression. The ideal is that to which everything is tending. Literature and the arts, in their finest productions, anticipate, prophecy, represent the end. It would be easy to show, also, how this idealizing process leads on the noblest inventions, under the conception of a more perfect utility:—how industry thus patentiated and directed, has changed the face of the world—how, reaching forward to higher purposes, it will change it still more, until every wilderness and solitary place shall rejoice, and every desert bud and blossom as the rose. The world is yet in its infancy, and the ideals of more perfect social organization, of wide-spread improvements, of universal order and harmony, peace and brotherhood, are even now inspiring multitudes under the dim light of crude philosophers, or under the clear radiance of Divine philosophy, basking in the sunlight of Christianity.

What now is the mission of the man of literature and art? Is it not to study the permanent and absolute real in the ideal; and by immortal works to inspire mankind with the sense of a higher nature, and a higher destiny—to show how wise and good we may become—that we are not mere dust and earth, but partakers of the Divine nature? With such a mission, the low ends of temporary popularity, of worldly gain, of fading hours of pleasure, do not comport. The true philosopher, the true artist, the true poet, produce their works by contemplating the absolute and the perfect. They could not produce them in any other way. He who sets out to compass gain or political influence, fixes his mind upon these objects, and takes his measures accordingly. It is in living for these objects, that he becomes what he aims to be. By the same necessity of thought, he who would compass great works of truth and beauty must become absorbed in the true and beautiful—he must live in a higher and purer world. And this higher and purer world, viewed in relation to poetry and the arts generally, is that world of ideal forms which the imagination creates from the idea-conceptions where men become more heroic and perfect, and nature more richly developed and beautiful—nay, where even evil is idealized into a ranker and more awful growth, and all this without violating the principles of humanity or of nature: and, viewed in relation to philosophy, is that world where truth reigns absolute, and the great problems of being are solved in the light of those eternal ideas which constitute the Intelligence of God!

Let the world deride thee, call thee a dreamer, account thee a fool in sacrificing the toys of wealth, power, and pleasure, O child of genius add of truth! but hold thou on thy heavenward way—live in thy purer and more beautiful world—be inspired by the objects which surround thee, by the truths which beam upon thee, and do thy work faithfully and manfully, and happy in thine own

thoughts and aims, thou wilt strike out sparks of immortal light for the good of men and the honor of God.

But have not men of letters and artists labored for bread like other men? Nay, have not some of their greatest works been produced under the pressure of the common wants of humanity? It cannot be denied. They are subject to all the conditions of an earthly existence. But it was not this which made them men of letters and artists. Had this been their end it would have been better to have been mechanics or merchants—to have taken up any form of labor or business. And yet, the necessities of our earthly lot have had one important bearing upon the works of genius: they have compelled to the completion of tasks which otherwise might have remained in restless and unsatisfied thought, and in endless preparation. For he who has the brightest ideals, is most prone to be dissatisfied with the materials in which he strives to give them an outward expression, as well as with his own skill. The chisel and the marble, the colors and the pencil, the words of human language already appropriated to ordinary uses, often seem impracticable; while intense meditation upon a great subject reveals such richness and beauty, that the hand trembles to attempt it: and thus a mind of the highest powers may be led, if not actually to distrust itself, at least to distrust its present fitness and preparation; and, instead of proceeding to the execution, may only involve itself in a deeper study; or, if making a beginning, may ever be remodelling, reproducing, retouching, in an endless struggle after perfection.

It is here that want has sometimes made its appearance as the best friend of the man of genius, and as a benefactor of mankind; and in the voice of his children, it may be, crying for bread, has called him away from the ideal contemplation—the everlasting dream of beauty, to finish his work. The immortal Allston, under no such rude compulsion to finish, grew old before his great picture; and while he was still erasing and reproducing, and striving to perfect the expression of his ideal, death called him away to higher visions, from a disappointed world.

Shall we then leave the man of genius to the discipline and stern guardianship of want? It would be an unjust and cruel inference. If want has sometimes determined him to action, it has also often frozen up the sources of thought. If it has sometimes called him from his meditations to finish some glorious work; it has also often stood beside him a stern spectre accompanied by despair and death. Perhaps the truth on this subject was never more forcibly and affectingly expressed than by Coleridge in one of his letters:—"Composition," says he, "is no voluntary business. The very necessity of doing it robs me of the power of doing it. Had I been possessed of a tolerable competency, I

should have been a voluminous writer. But I cannot, as is feigned of the nightingale, sing with my breast against a thorn."

The same thought he re-echoes in those touching lines composed in February, 1827:

"All nature is at work. Stags leave their lair—  
The bees are stirring—birds are on the wing—  
And winter, slumbering in the open air,  
Wears on his smiling face a dream of spring!  
And I the while, the sole unbusy thing,  
Nor honey make, nor pair, nor build, nor sing.  
Yet well I ken the banks where amaranths blow,  
Have traced the fount whence streams of nectar flow.  
Bloom, O ye amaranths! bloom for whom ye may,  
For me ye bloom not! Glide rich streams away!  
With lips unbrightened, wreathless brow I stroll:  
And would ye learn the spells that drowse my soul?  
*Work without hope* draws nectar in a sieve,  
And hope without an object cannot live."

It was not for wealth, or political station, that Coleridge sighed—it was merely for a "tolerable competency," that he might possess his cottage at Clevedon on the Severn, "o'ergrown with jasmine, and the broad-leaved myrtle," undisturbed by the daily anxiety, what shall I eat, what shall I drink, wherewithal shall I be clothed; and that he might be permitted to yield himself quietly to the legitimate ideal inspirations of genius, and labor in poetry and philosophy for England and mankind. His intimate friends, Wordsworth and Southey, realized that "tolerable competency," which is the best condition for a man of letters, and nobly did they use it. Like two streams from the same mountain springs, have they made their quiet, majestic, fructifying way; and on their banks are verdant meadows, smiling hamlets, and palaces of beauty.

It is well, where the man of letters can at the same time yield to the proper inspirations of his high pursuits, and gain a competency by his literary efforts; and this, in some departments of literature, such as history and fiction, is sometimes realized. Where this is not the case, he ought to be in employments genial to the great end of his life, by which he may be enabled to secure quietly a competent subsistence, and to follow out his vein.

It is ruinous to high and independent authorship to wait upon publishers. The publisher is a tradesman, and books are his commodities. He must, therefore, suit the public taste—he must meet the demand in the market. But the man of letters cannot write for accidental tastes, and a fluctuating market. He is in a region far above this—he is engaged with other objects. He is writing for truth's sake—he is writing for the determined judgment of taste which belongs to the great and ripened minds of all generations—he is writing for immortality. Great works cannot

ordinarily be produced to meet the demands of the trade. The staple commodities of the book-trade are not works of original and permanent literature. The most profitable books are school-books and novels. The former are, generally, the works of industrious compilers. Some of them are works of great utility. Many are mere forms of speculation. There are some novels which are works of genius of the highest order—there are many more which are clever and agreeable—there are a multitude which are the mere froth of literature; but, like all frothy potations, are eagerly swallowed. The children who need school-books, and the young, inexperienced, and crudely-cultivated, who are attracted by ephemeral novels, form a vast proportion of readers. Here, then, are the staple commodities of the trade!

We have already mentioned as exceptions, history, and the higher order of fiction. Prescott's histories do honor to English literature; and both on account of the strangely romantic interest of their subjects, and their relation to our hemisphere, independently of the grace of their composition, must ever attach themselves to the popular mind. The Waverly novels form a well-known illustration in the other department. We may also mention those great works which, scarcely noticed in their own day, or enjoying only a limited appreciation, have at length triumphed, and become the ornaments and dignified possessions of libraries and bookshelves, if not books of ordinary and general perusal. No one, now-a-days, will so dishonor himself as not to own a Shakspeare and a Milton.

Where a great author has become a favorite with the people, and of course with the trade, the stimulus of genius is liable to be supplanted by the stimulus of gain and popularity. Works are now produced with astonishing rapidity—the supply must meet the demand; but, alas! there is a corresponding depreciation in their character. The child of genius and of truth is now no longer dwelling in his ideal world, adoring the divine and matchless forms before him, and speaking to the common world a word, which, whether men will hear or forbear, is nevertheless a word of import and authority—"a winged word," like the voice of a divine messenger: he has condescended to enter the market, pen, ink and paper in hand, and to cry out, a genius offers his services to the public and the trade; he will write poetry, politics, philosophy, divinity, novels, or reviews, where there is money to be had and influence to be gained.

Walter Scott did not, indeed, pander his fine powers in this gross way; but the Ballantynes and the Constables, the Barons-etcy and Abbottsford, are associated with the decay of his genius, as well as with the overthrow of his fortunes. His Waverly was written spontaneously—from a pure love of the subject—a creation of his mind that could not be avoided; and yet it was long

ere he made up his mind to publish it. What a difference between this work of unsoiled genius, and works which were afterwards thrown off with such rapidity, to meet mere pecuniary demands! Can we believe that Homer could have written the passion of Achilles, and the wanderings of Ulysses; Dante, his Hill of Purgatory and entrance into Paradise; Tasso, the chivalry of Godfrey and Tancred; Milton, his delicious Paradise; Shakspeare, his Juliet, Portia, and Ophelia, at the bidding of a publisher, and, forsooth, because this publisher judged that the public made a demand for such creations of genius? What does the public know of the work of genius until it is done? Nay, must not generations sometimes pass away before it is known—a space of time that men may be able to get into the heart of the work, or may ascend into the clear heavenly light where its perfection and brightness alone can be seen and estimated?

We judge, therefore, that the true man of letters, and the true artist, have a spontaneous, uncalculating affection for the works they take in hand: that they are aiming to bring to light some great idea or conception which is laboring within them; and that this they will strive to do irrespective of any present rewards, and irrespective of the immediate judgment of mankind: that with them it is more necessary to satisfy themselves immediately than to satisfy others, while they feel assured that satisfying right reason now, they will finally satisfy the ripened judgment of ages.

And in this persuasion they are abundantly justified; for, although men may have many vain imaginations, and false tastes and judgments which lead them astray, yet he whose imagination is permeated by the ideas of the pure reason, and who hath right tastes and judgments, hath an intuitive persuasion thereof which nothing can cause to falter, and which is a widely different thing from the vain confidence of error. Like a true, compared with a false prophet, he may not be able to prove to a blinded world his paramount title, and therefore he quietly rests until his day come, when the things spoken shall be tested by infallible criteria.

But are there not other motives which may consistently govern these men of letters and artists? There are two other motives. That which we have named is the spontaneous love of truth and beauty. Of the other two, one relates to the individual himself personally; the other to mankind. The personal motive, is that of developing the personal self into those forms of goodness and greatness for which God created man. Of all things which God hath created, the thinking and immortal spirit imbreathed into man is the noblest and divinest, and most like God himself. A great gift, a great capability, a great responsibility, a germ of immortal thought and delight, is each man given to himself. The true man of letters and of art, who conceives of the beauty of

the world through the ideals which reveal its principles, who conceives of absolute truth and goodness, and who has such a sense of the divine that he cannot frame his epic of human events without laying the machinery of thought and action in the invisible world, must, when he turns to himself, view this soul within him which thus conceives—is thus inspired by ideals, and projects such philosophies, sciences, and arts—as something wonderful and holy, something to be revered and cherished, and led out, if possible, to its full measures. The soul by which we know and feel so much, who can tell how much it may know and feel? We are at the beginning, but where is the end of its development? Can we conceive of a nobler experiment than that of trying its utmost capacity—of trying how wise and good it is possible to become? and this to be forecasted not for the fleeting term of this present life, but for immortality. And in forecasting this for immortality, we are at once reminded that the seeds of the future are sown in the present; and that the growth of the soul forever will be in the direction that we give it now. But to whom can this growth of the soul be an object of such interest as to the man of letters and of art, who from this soul is announcing truth, and projecting forms of majesty and beauty. Has he not in what he is doing, a foretaste of immortal life? He, of all others, ought to find his highest personal good in the cultivation of these high spiritual faculties; he, of all others, might be expected to live for himself in the way of making himself a man such as God has fitted him to become—a man after the divine ideal of humanity. And as the great and good Milton has said, “The end of all learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as we may the nearest by possessing our souls of true virtue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith, makes up the highest perfection:” so we may add, the man of letters and art might be expected to be the most pure-minded and faithful Christian. He who lives amid the ideals of truth, beauty, and perfection, must perceive the moral to be the highest form of these, and the divine Son of God their highest embodiment: and it would seem most natural and fitting that such an one should sit at the feet of this great Teacher of truth and duty, learning his doctrines, receiving his salvation, copying his example and following him devoutly in the only sure heavenward way. Therefore would we say to thee, O thou servant of divine philosophy, thou man of beautiful arts, and of chaste and glorious letters! whatever thou mayest fail of in earthly rewards, thou canst attain to this great end—thou canst save thyself—thou canst perfect thy being, thou canst be a child of light now, and feel thy wings growing that thou mayest be an angel of light in heaven, when thy work is done on earth!

And the other motive, which relates to mankind at large, is akin to this one, and inseparable from it. "I am long since persuaded," says Milton, "that to say or do aught worth memory and imitation, no purpose or respect should sooner move us than simply the love of God, and of mankind." The same sentiment Shakspeare has nobly expressed in his famous lines :

—————"Be just and fear not ;  
Let all the ends thou aim'st at, be thy country's,  
Thy God's, and truth's."

That very process by which the soul is perfected involves these ends. It is by serving truth and justice that the soul attains to a divine nature ; and serving truth and justice, it serves God and mankind. He who undertakes to live only for himself, violates the highest law of his being, and the social constitution of the universe. As he cannot diffuse happiness, so he cannot be happy himself. The sun shining from age to age loses none of his brightness : he is the sun because he always shines : and the great God whom he symbolizes is ever giving and blessing : and God is God because he ever gives and blesses. And man, the noblest creature of God in this lower world, is truly man only as he is godlike.

All the great and good of our race have acted upon this principle. The hero dying for his country ; the martyr dying for his religion ; the philosopher dying for the truth ; the poet and the artist wearing out life in the accomplishment of great tasks for enlightening and elevating mankind ; and the philanthropist, measuring some form of human suffering and devoting his energies to its alleviation or removal—have all acted upon this principle. And that Divine Form which appeared among men eighteen centuries ago, and who presented in his humanity the realized idea of all human perfection, inculcated in his teaching, and illustrated by his life and death, the sublime sentiment, "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

Now we conceive, that as this is the highest motive for all great and worthy deeds ; so there are none to whom it more fitly belongs than to those who make it their vocation to speak to men in the noblest forms of human speech, or by the symbols of the beautiful arts. To feel intensely the charms and the inspiration of the objects of art and literature is both noble and indispensable : to seek the highest elevation of one's own spiritual being is an angelic aspiration : but to let this inspiration and aspiration flow out in streams of blessings upon the world, is to become a co-worker with God.

Here then, O men of literature and art ! is the sublime spirit of your calling—to be inspired by the beautiful and true—to aspire after the perfection of your being—and to seek to make the world wiser, better, and happier—to live a true, manly life, while ye live ; and when ye die, to leave behind you angel foot-prints on the sands of time.



## ARTICLE VI.

## CHRISTIANITY SET FORTH ACCORDING TO ITS PECULIAR ESSENCE.

From the German of Schleiermacher, by REV. WILLIAM HALL.

WE proceed to give several doctrinal statements of this distinguished author, with their respective explanations and comments, in which will be found a more decided development of the characteristic features of the gospel system, considered both objectively and subjectively as understood and taught by Schleiermacher. They come under the head of,

*"Christianity set forth according to its peculiar essence."*

*"Propositions belonging to the apologetic."*

Prop. 1. "Christianity is a monotheistic form of faith connected with the teleological direction of piety, and is distinguished from others of the same sort thus wise ; that everything in it is referred to the redemption effected by Jesus of Nazareth.

1. "The task of investigating the peculiarity of a system of belief, and if possible bringing it to one formula, cannot be accomplished except by showing a something that is the same even in the most different pious states of mind within the same communion, while it is wanting in the analogous conditions within other communions. Now the less reason there is to expect, that precisely this peculiarity has been expressed with equal strength in all mental excitations so very different among themselves, the more easy to fail in this attempt, and in the end to come to the conclusion, that there is no certain inward distinction, but only the outward, determined by time and space. In the mean time it follows with tolerable certainty, from what has been said before, that we shall be least likely to miss the peculiarity, if we keep chiefly to that which is most closely connected with the principal fact, and this is the mode of proceeding which has given form to our proposition. But Christianity, however, offers special difficulties, first of all, by the circumstance that more than other modes of faith it is variously moulded, and divided into a diversity of church-communions, so that we have to propose to ourselves the two-fold problem ; first to find the peculiar essence of Christianity in general, common to these, but then also, that of the particular church-communion, whose claim is to be proved, or whose doctrinal creed is to be set forth. But still more difficulty lies in this, that even yet in every single church-communion almost every doctrine in different places and times, occurs under the most diversified variations, whereby certainly, although not as great a diversity in the pious states of mind themselves, at least a great

variousness in the manner of apprehending and estimating them, always lies at the bottom. Indeed, the worst of it is, that through these variations the circumference of the Christian sphere is controverted among Christians themselves, since one of this, another of that form of doctrine, affirms, that it has to be sure been generated within Christianity, but is yet, according to its contents, properly unchristian. Does he now, who sets out to solve the problem himself, stand with one of these parties, and lay down beforehand, that only what occurs in the sphere of one view, needs to be taken into calculation, in order to ascertain the distinguishing feature of Christianity : then he pre-supposes questions as already decided, to whose decision he is yet just for the first time about to find the conditions. For only when the peculiar essence of Christianity is ascertained, can it be decided, how far this or that thing is compatible therewith or not. But can he divest himself even of all preference, and does he for this very reason, take everything into account, even that which is most opposed, so far as it only gives itself out for Christian : then on the other hand is he in danger of arriving at a result far smaller in contents and more colorless, consequently, also, less suitable for the objects of the problem. This is the present not to be concealed state of this matter. Since now every man, the more pious he is, is wont so much the more to bring his individual piety with him to this investigation ; so the number of those is by far the greater who form for themselves their representation of the peculiar essence of Christianity according to the interest of their party. On the contrary for the interest of the apologetic as well as for that of the doctrinal of faith it seems more advisable, to be content rather with a smaller result for the beginning, and to await its completion from a wider experience, than to begin with a narrow and exclusive formula, which necessarily has one or more antagonistic to it, with which, earlier or later, a struggle is to take place. And in this sense is the formula of the proposition set up.

2. "As now without question, all Christians refer back to Christ, the communion to which they belong : so is it here presupposed, that the expression, *redemption*, is such an one as they also confess to, and indeed not only thus, that they all to be sure use it, although perhaps each in another sense, but so that there is also something common, which all intend by it, although every one has a different way of more nearly defining it. The expression itself is in this sphere only figurative, and implies universally, a transition from a bad condition, which is conceived of as a state of bondage, into a better, and this is its passive side ; but then also, help rendered thereto by another, and this is its active side. It also lies in the manner of using the word, not essentially, that something better must have already preceded something worse, so that the following better, is properly speaking, only a restoration ;

but this can remain preliminarily quite undecided. Is now the expression to be applied to the sphere of piety; then, the teleological direction of the same being presupposed, the bad condition can consist only in this, that the vitality of the higher self-consciousness is hindered or taken away, so that its union with the various determinations of the sensual self-consciousness, and therefore that pious moments of life are little, or not at all brought about. Suppose now we designate this condition in its highest degree by the expressions *godlessness*, or better, *godforgetfulness*; we are still at liberty to think of this not as an utter impossibility of the animation of the godconsciousness. For in that case, on the one hand a need of something lying outside of nature could not be felt as an evil condition: on the other, a new creation in the proper sense, would be demanded, and this representation is not contained in the notion of redemption. As, then, this possibility is retained even there, where the ill condition of the godconsciousness is depicted in the strongest colors, it only remains therefore to designate it as nonexistent facility of introducing the godconsciousness into the connection of the real life-moments, and of keeping it there. According to this, it certainly seems as if both conditions, viz: that before redemption and that to be caused by redemption, are distinguished only as a more and less, therefore indefinitely; and the problem arises, if the idea of redemption is to be finally grounded, to carry back this indefinite distinction to be a comparative opposition. But such an opposition is embraced in the following formulas. Assumed an activity of the *sensuous* self-consciousness so as to fill up one moment and connect with another, its exponent will be greater than that of the *higher* self-consciousness, with respect to its union with the former, and assumed an activity of the higher self-consciousness so [as to fill a moment through union, with a determination of the sensuous, the exponent of the same will be smaller than that of the activity of the sensuous, as it respects completing the moment for itself alone. Under these conditions a satisfaction of the tendency towards the God-consciousness, will not be possible, and therefore if such is to take place, a redemption is necessary, since this condition is nothing else than a bondage of the absolute feeling of dependence. But it is not contained in these formulas, that in all moments determined according to the same, the God-consciousness or the absolute feeling of dependence is null, but only that it does not rule the moment in any one relation, and in proportion as this is the case, the above designations of godlessness and godforgetfulness are applicable to it.

3. "The recognition of such a condition is undeniably found in all pious communions; because all expiations and purifications aim at this, viz, to take away the consciousness of this condition or immediately this itself. But as that very thing by which

Christianity in this point of view is distinguished from all other pious communions, it is exhibited in our proposition as consisting of two parts. First, that in Christianity both these in their connection, viz: the incapacity and the redemption, are not only as it were, one single religious element like many others, but that all other pious emotions are referred thither, and this therefore is the co-supposed element in all others, so that pre-eminently thereby, they are peculiarly Christian. But secondly, that redemption is accounted as something universal and perfectly effected by Jesus of Nazareth. But these two again are not to be separated from one another, but are essentially connected. By no means so as if we could say, that to every one who, in all his pious moments, is conscious of himself as embraced in the redemption, must be ascribed a Christian piety, although he should not at all refer himself to the person of Jesus or even know nothing of him, which also will certainly never be the case; and just as little as to enable us to say, that the piety of a man is a Christian one, even though he refer it back to Jesus, could we suppose also, that he were thereby not at all conscious of being a subject of the redemption, which, to be sure also does not occur. But the reference to redemption is in every Christian consciousness only on this account, because the beginner of the Christian community is the Redeemer; and Jesus is founder of a pious communion only as its members are conscious of redemption through him. The foregoing exposition guarantees also, on the contrary, that this is not so to be understood, as if every Christian pious consciousness can have no other contents than merely Jesus and redemption, but only that all pious moments, so far as the absolute feeling of dependence freely comes out in them, are supposed as having arisen through that redemption, and so far as it seems to be still bound in them, are considered as needing that redemption. It is also just as much a matter of course that this universal component can, and will also, in different pious moments, enter in a different degree more strongly or weakly, without the Christian character being lost thereby. Only this will certainly follow, from what has been said, that if we could suppose religious moments, in which all reference to redemption were taken away, and the image of the Redeemer not at all represented, we should be obliged to say of them that they do not belong more nearly to Christianity than to any other monotheistic form of faith.

4. "The closer development of this proposition, namely, how redemption is effected through Jesus, and comes to consciousness in the Christian communion, falls within the province of the doctrinal of faith; but still with reference to what has been before said in a general manner, the relation of Christianity to other religious communions eminently monotheistic, is here to be explained. These, it is true, are also referred back each to its own

founder; and as if the difference of the founder were the only distinction, this would be a merely external one; just so also if those other communions likewise considered their founder as redeemer, and equally referred everything to redemption. For then there would be in all, merely religious moments of like contents, only that the personality of the Redeemer would be different in each case. But thus it is not; rather are we obliged to say, that only through Jesus, and therefore only in Christianity has redemption become the middle-point of piety. Because since the rest have instituted expiations and lustrations distributively and singly, and these are only individual portions of their doctrine and ritual, the production of redemption does not appear as their principal business. Rather does this seem as something merely derived and secondary. *Their* chief concern is the founding of the communion upon a definite doctrine and under a definite form. But does there arise in their communion an important difference in the free development of the god-consciousness; then as there are some in whom it is most enslaved and redemption-needy, and others in whom it is more free and susceptible of redemption, there follows through the influence of the latter, an approximation to redemption among the former—only indeed no further than as the difference between both is pretty much equalized, merely through the fact that a communion exists. In Christianity, however, the redeeming influence of the founder is the original idea and fact, and the communion exists only under this pre-supposition, and as impartation and diffusion of that redeeming activity. Now, therefore, also, within Christianity both these things are always proportionates, viz: on the one hand, to exalt the redeeming activity of Christ, and to put a great value upon the peculiar element of Christian piety; so on the other, to look upon Christianity only as a means of improvement, and of propagating piety in general, whereby the peculiarity is more incidental, and a collateral thing, and to look upon Christ particularly as a Teacher and Ruler of a communion, but to place the redeeming activity in the background.

“Hence, in Christianity, too, is the relation of the Founder to the members of the communion an entirely other thing than in those other communities; because their founders are represented as taken out of the crowd of like, or very little differing men, in an equally arbitrary manner, and as receiving what they received as divine doctrine and order, not less for themselves than for others. For, as a professor of these systems of belief will not easily deny, God could just as well have given the law through another as through Moses, and the revelation could have been made just as well through another as through Mohammed. But Christ is set up antagonistically to all others as alone Redeemer and for all, and is in no wise contemplated at any time as himself needing

redemption; therefore, also, as the universal voice expresses, originally different from all other men, and clothed with redeeming power from His birth onwards.

"Not as if we would here at the outset exclude all those from the Christian communion, who depart so far from this representation—itsself, no doubt, capable of manifold degrees—that they make Christ for the first time, at a later period, to have been endowed with redeeming power, so long only as this is something different from the mere communication of doctrine, and of an order of life. But do we think of Christ wholly according to the analogy of the other religious founders? The peculiarity of Christianity then admits of being held on to only in the contents of the doctrine and order of life; and the three monotheistic modes of faith remain separated, only so far as each holds fast inviolably to that which it has received. But were they now at the same time still capable of improvement, and should they perhaps also be able to discover for themselves the better doctrines and rules of Christianity; then were the internal distinction wholly removed. Finally, is the Christian church to go beyond what has been received from Christ? Then nothing else remains for Christ, than that he was a distinguished point of development: such an one, however, only, that there is just as well a redemption *from* him as *through* him. And since the perfecting principle can only be reason, then, so far as this is everywhere the same, every distinction between progressive Christianity, and the other progressive monotheistic modes of faith, would gradually disappear, and there would belong to them, altogether in their peculiarity, only a validity limited to a definite period.

"In this manner the difference between two widely divergent conceptions of Christianity admits of being determined, but at the same time passages from the one to the other are evident. If the latter ever appears as a doctrine held in common, such a communion would, perhaps, of itself, separate from the other Christian communions; but if not, it could nevertheless be recognized as a Christian one, if it should not pretend to be already actually redeemed from the necessity of an adhesion to Christ. Much less are those individuals who approximate to this view to be dogmatically deprived of their part in the Christian communion, so long as they themselves desire to keep with the same and in the same, in the vitality of the god-consciousness.

5. "The development of the present series of propositions will, we hope, serve to confirm what has been here offered for determining the distinguishing element of Christianity, while at the same time, as if done by set attempt, we have sought from all which is common in Christian piety, to pick out that by which Christianity is at the same time, in the most definite manner externally set by itself; whereby we have been of necessity led to see

the inward peculiarity, and the outward limitation in connection. Perhaps there admits of being set forth in a universal religious philosophy,—to which then, were it suitably recognized, the apologetic might be able to appeal,—the inward character of Christianity in and for itself in such a manner, that thereby its special sphere in the religious world, would be secured to Christianity. Meanwhile it would be its function to systematise all the chief moments of the pious consciousness, and to show from their mutual relation, which are such as the other moments can be referred to and as can be co-supposed even in all others. Then were it shown, that that which we designate by the expression redemption, becomes such as soon as, into a region where the god-consciousness is bound, there enters a matter-of-fact which sets it free. Christianity would be securely placed as a peculiar form of faith and would be construed in a fixed sense. In the meantime, this of itself could be called no proof of Christianity, since even religious philosophy could exhibit no state of need, neither recognise a definite fact as redeeming, nor, even for one moment, which can be a central one, really concede this situation of things to be in the proper consciousness. Still less can what has here been set forth, make claim to be such proof, since here conformably to the path we have entered, and since we could proceed only from historical observation, we must desist from doing anything towards it, except so much as can find place in a thorough religious philosophy. It is also evident in and for itself, that a person of another religion, can perhaps be perfectly convinced by the above representation, that what has here been set forth therefor, is the peculiar essence of Christianity, without this religion's being thereby received by him as truth, so that he finds himself forced to receive it. Rather as everything here is related to the dogmatic, and this is only for Christians, the present representation also is only for those who live in Christianity, and it is to give guidance only in behalf of the dogmatic, in order to distinguish utterances as it respects any one pious consciousness, whether they are Christian or not, and whether the Christian element is strongly and clearly or more doubtfully expressed in them. We rather entirely desist from all proof for the truth or necessity of Christianity, and presuppose on the contrary, that every Christian, before he gives himself to any investigation of this kind has already in himself the certainty that his piety could assume no other shape than this.

Prop. II. Christianity doubtless has a special historical connection with Judaism; but so far as its historical existence, (in general,) and its aim are concerned, it is equally related to Judaism and heathenism.

1. "Under Judaism are here to be understood first the Mosaic institutions, but as preparation thereto, likewise everything that

had already come earlier into use, which favored the separation of the people (of Israel.) With it now, Christianity hangs together historically by this means, that Jesus was born among the Jewish people, as to be sure a universal Redeemer could not well elsewhere spring up than out of a monotheistic people, as soon as such had arisen. But we are not at liberty to put forward the historical connection too exclusively. For the religious way of thinking of the people at the time of the appearance of Christ was no more exclusively based upon Moses and the prophets, but was variously modified by non-Jewish elements, which they had taken up during and after the Babylonian dispersion. And so also on the other side the Hellenic and Romish heathenism was in various ways monotheistically prepared, and there the expectation of a new formation was stretched to the utmost; as on the contrary among the Jews the Messianic promises were partly given up, partly misunderstood. So that when we put together all the historical proportions, the difference falls out for less than appears at the first glance. And the derivation of Christianity from Judaism is very much counterbalanced by this, that on the one hand so many more heathens than Jews passed over to Christianity, on the other that Christianity would not have found so much as this reception among the Jews, if they had not been penetrated by those foreign elements.

2. "Much more is Christianity equally related to Judaism and Heathenism, so far as it is necessary to pass over from both to it, as to a something different. The spring certainly seems to be greater from heathenism, so far as this must first have become monotheistic in order to become Christian; the two however were not separated, but monotheism was now equally given to the heathen under the form of Christianity, as earlier under that of Judaism. On the contrary, the step forward among the Jews, not to rely upon the law, and to understand the Abrahamitic promises differently, was also not less. If then we must assume, that Christian piety, although it formed itself in the beginning, is not to be comprehended out of the Jewish either of that or of a still earlier time, we can, therefore, in no manner view Christianity as a transformative or renewing progression of Judaism. It is true that if Paul regards the faith of Abraham as the original model of Christian faith, and represents the Mosaic law, only as something inserted between,<sup>1</sup> then we could certainly conclude therefrom, that he wished to represent Christianity as a renewal of that original and pure Abrahamitic Judaism. But his meaning is however only, that Abraham's faith was just as much related to the promise as ours is to the fulfilment, but by no means that the promise was precisely the same thing to Abraham, as the fulfilment to us. But where he speaks expressly of the relation of Jews and Gentiles

<sup>1</sup> Gal. 3 : 9, 14, 23—25.



to Christ, there he represents it as precisely the same, Christ as the same for both, and both as equally far removed from God, and therefore equally needing Christ.<sup>1</sup> Is it now equally related to Judaism as to Heathenism: then it can be no more a continuation of Judaism than it is of Heathenism; but let a person come hither from the one or the other, as to what pertains to his piety, he will be a new man. But the promise to Abraham, so far as it has been fulfilled in Christ, is only so represented, as if it had its relation to Christ solely in the divine decree, not in the pious self-consciousness of Abraham and his family. And since we can recognize the self-sameness of a pious communion only there, where this consciousness is formed in equal proportions: therefore we can just as little recognize an identity between Christianity and the Abrahamic Judaism as the latter or Heathenism. And neither can we say that that purer original Judaism so carried the germs of Christianity in itself, that they would have developed themselves out of the same by natural progress, without the intervention of anything new, nor also that Christ himself so lay in this progression, that a new common life and existence could not begin with Him.

3. "The wide spread assumption of one single church of God from the very commencement of the human race up to the end thereof, contradicts our proposition more in appearance than in fact. For if, too, the Mosaic law belongs to this one connection of a divine economy of salvation: then we must, according to established Christian doctrines, likewise reckon to that account the Hellenic philosophy, especially that striving towards monotheism; and yet we cannot without entirely taking away the peculiarity of Christianity assert, that its doctrine forms one whole with the heathen philosophy.<sup>2</sup> If, on the other side, this doctrine of the one church aims particularly at this, to express the unlimited relation of Christ to everything human, operative even upon past time, this is an objectivity upon which here as yet a judgment cannot be formed, but with our position stands very well together. And thus is there already in prophecy, ascribed to the new covenant a character different from the old,<sup>3</sup> as to be sure exactly this opposition expresses the internal separation in the most decided manner. Therefore the rule is to be laid down, that for Christian use almost everything else in the Old Testament is only a hull of this prediction, and that has the least worth, which is most distinctly Jewish. So that we can find given to us again in passages of the Old Testament, with any exactness only those of our pious emotions, which are of a more universal nature and are not culti-

<sup>1</sup> Rom. 2: 11, 12. 3: 21—24. <sup>2</sup> 2 Cor. 4: 16, 17. <sup>3</sup> Eph. 2: 14, 18.

<sup>2</sup> Εἰκότως οὖν Ἰουδαίους μὲν νόμος Ἕλλησι δὲ φιλοσοφία μέχρι τῆς παρουσίας: ἑνὶ ὅτε καὶ ἄλλοις ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰς περιόριστον ἀκαταστάσεως λαόν.—Clem. Strom. vi. 823 P.

<sup>3</sup> Jer. 31: 31—34.

vated in a very peculiarly Christian manner; but for those which are, Old Testament passages will be no appropriate expression, if we do not think away something, from them, and put something else in; and this being taken into account, we shall without doubt meet with just as near and harmonious accords even in the expressions of the noble and purer heathenism. (!) It is certain, too, that the older apologists appealed not less willingly to Messianic predictions, which were called heathen, and therefore also recognized there a striving of human nature after Christianity.

Prop. 3. "The appearance of the Redeemer in history, as a Divine Manifestation, is neither anything absolutely supernatural nor anything absolutely superrational.

1. "As it respects manifestation, it has already above been agreed, that no starting-point of a peculiarly formed existence, and still more of a community, especially of a pious one, is to be explained from the nature of the circle, in which it arises and works outwards, since otherwise it were no point of commencement, but a mere product of a spiritual revolution. But although now its existence transcends the nature of that sphere, still nothing hinders us from assuming, that the rise of such a life is a working of a power of development dwelling in our nature as a species which reveals itself according to laws, although concealed from us, yet Divinely ordained, in individual men at individual points, in order through them, to advance the rest. Certainly without such an assumption no progression of the human race, either partial or general, were to be thought of. Every distinguished endowment of an individual, through whom in a definite circle, any one spiritual work has been reformed, is such a starting-point; and only the more limited by time and space in their operations, developments of this kind are, so much the more also do they seem, although not explainable from the pre-existing yet, conditioned by it. If we therefore designate all these, each in his sphere, as heroes and ascribe to them a higher inspiration, then by this only thus much is meant, that for the highest good of the circle in which they appear, they are impregnated out of the universal source of life; and that such persons appear from time to time, we must regard as something conformable to law, if we would at all hold fast to the higher significance of human nature.

"All such individuals are therefore in analogy with the idea of revelation, which is meanwhile specially applied only to the sphere of the higher self-consciousness. No one, it is likely, will refuse to admit such an endowing, in all founders of religion, even of subordinate degrees, provided the doctrine and community proceeding from them is to have something peculiar and original in them. But shall this be applied in the same sense to Christ, then, in the next place, we should be obliged to say, that in comparison with him, all which in other respects can be deemed revelation, (mani-

festation,) again loses this character, because all the rest is limited to definite times and spaces, and everything proceeding from such points is nevertheless already from the start, destined again to be annihilated in them, in reference to Him, therefore is no being, but a non-being, and only He is supposed gradually to impart to the whole human race a higher degree of life. For he who does not receive Christ in this universality as a Divine Manifestation, cannot desire Christianity as a permanent appearance. But nevertheless it must still be asserted, that even the strongest view of the distinction between Him and all other men, does not forbid it being said, that his appearance even as man-becoming (incarnation,) of the Son of God was something natural. For in the first place, as certainly as Christ was a man, the possibility, at least, must be in human nature, to receive into itself the Divine just as it has been in Christ. So that the position, that the Divine Manifestation in Christ must even in this respect be something absolutely supernatural, does not at all bear trial; much more does the Prot-evangelium, by in fact connecting the promise of Christ immediately with the Fall, declare entirely against the idea, viz: as if human nature was in any respect incapable of receiving the Divine restoring element into itself, and that the ability thereto must first be creatively introduced. But although in human nature, there lies only the possibility thereto, consequently the actual implanting of this Divine element in it, must be solely a Divine, therefore, an eternal act: still, in the second place, the temporal forthcoming of this act in a definite person is also to be regarded as a fact of human nature, founded in its original arrangement, and prepared through everything earlier, consequently as the highest development of its spiritual power, even be it so that we could never penetrate so deeply into these inmost secrets of the universal spiritual life, as to be able to develop this general conviction into a definite view. For otherwise it would have to be explained always, only as a Divine arbitrariness, that precisely in Jesus and no other, the restoring Divine element made its appearance; but to assume Divine arbitrariness in a single thing is always an anthropopathic view, for which also the Scripture does not vouch, seeming much more to intimate precisely the conditionality here asserted.

2. "But now as to what appertains to the super-rational. Christ could in no wise be confronted with our total humanity as Redeemer, if those very life-moments, by which he accomplishes redemption, were to be explained from the reason dwelling equally in all others, because then these states must occur too in the others, and therefore they also be able to effectuate redemption. If now just so in the redeemed, also conditions of spirit are supposed as obtained only through His communication or influence, and if without this it could not be said that a redemption was accom-

plished in them ; then these feelings are not to be accounted for solely from the reason dwelling in them from their birth, although this is indispensably necessary, since such states of being can never exist in a reasonless soul. Therefore, something super-rational is certainly supposed in the Redeemer and the redeemed ; and whoever would in no way recognize this, could also not understand redemption in a proper sense, and must estimate Christianity only as an institution to stand until something better arises for the transmission of the influences of a human reason eminently awakened in the form of the self-consciousness. This super-rationality is also, almost without exception, recognized in the utterances of those who profess Christ, and expressed under different forms, as an original or later-entered persistent or moment-limited indwelling of God or of the *Λόγος* in Christ, and as a movement of the redeemed by the Holy Ghost. But though we suppose even the highest difference between this super-rational and the common human reason, still this super-rational element can never be set forth as absolutely such, without falling into contradiction with itself. Because the highest aim which is brought about by these workings of redemption is ever still such a condition of man, as could not only receive the most perfect recognition of the common human reason, but in which also what the Divine Spirit, and what the human reason itself in the same individual effects, cannot in general be distinguished. As then reason is entirely at one with the Divine Spirit, therefore the Divine Spirit itself can be viewed as the highest degree of human reason, and the difference between both taken away. But just so also even in the first beginning, everything which contradicts the motions of the Divine Spirit, is also that which strives against human reason, since otherwise a consciousness of the need of redemption could not be in man, before those operations enter, certainly such a consciousness as is satisfied by them. Is there therefore in human reason itself, already in a certain manner that supposed, which is produced by the Divine Spirit ?—then in this relation he does not transcend the same. What now is valid of the redeemed, is just as much also predicable of the Redeemer, inasmuch as even they, who admit no kind of Divine indwelling in him, still with regard to those activities, ideas and rules of life which others explain from that indwelling, on their side, eulogize them as highest reason, and therefore approvingly apprehend with their human reason, which apprehension again, the former do not blame or reject, but likewise recognize with approbation.

*“ Miscellaneous Remarks.*—According to the view of piety here presented, the peculiar being of the Redeemer and of the redeemed in their connection with him, is the original seat of the former question of the supernatural and super-rational in Christianity ; so

that there is quite no reason for admitting anything supernatural or super-rational which were not connected with the appearance of the Redeemer, but were another original thing for itself. Customarily it is treated partly with reference to the individual matters of fact, for which the supernatural is specially claimed, of which here our discourse cannot yet be, partly with reference to the Christian doctrines, which for us are nothing else than enunciations with respect to that self-consciousness and its connection. But if the super-rational in the Christian self-consciousness consists in this, that as it is, it cannot be produced through the activity of reason: still it does not all follow from this, that the expressions with respect to this self-consciousness must also be super-rational. For in the same sense as the Christian self-consciousness, all nature also is super-rational, and still we call our expressions with respect to it, by no means equally so but purely rational. The entire act of receiving expressions with respect to our pious self-consciousness, is but just as rational a thing as the former, and the difference is only this, that this objective consciousness is given originally to him who is affected by nature, but that self-consciousness only to him who is affected by the Redeemer in the manner peculiar to his confessors. From this now it follows of itself, what is not tenable of the ruling view, as if the Christian doctrine consists in part of rational, and in part of super-rational propositions. It is to be sure quite clear, that this can be only a *juxta-position*, but by no means that propositions of two sorts form one whole; because no connection can have place between a rational and a super-rational thing. We also see this tolerably clearly in all treatises of Christian doctrine, which are divided into a natural theology current as purely rational, not only within, but also outside of Christianity, and into a positive validly super-rational only within it, for both then are and remain sundered from one another. But the appearance, as if such a union were practicable, arises hence, that there are undoubtedly Christian propositions, in which the peculiarly Christian element steps considerably in the background, so that they can also be deemed purely rational in the respect in which others are accounted super-rational. Were that peculiar element, however, not all in them, then of course they would not be Christian propositions. The truth of the case is therefore this, that all Christian propositions are in one respect super-rational, but in another also all rational; but super-rational are they in the same respect, in which also everything experienced by us is super-rational, as it is certainly an inward experience, to which they all go back, viz: that they rest upon a given something, and without this could not have arisen by derivation or collocation from universally recognized and communicated propositions. Else were we certainly able to instruct and argue every man into a Christian, without anything else occurring to him.

Therefore it also belongs to this super-rationality, that a true appropriation of Christian propositions cannot take place in a scientific manner, hence likewise lies outside of reason; but it takes place only so far as each man has himself desired to have the experience, as indeed *everything individual and peculiar can be embraced only through the love that desires the perception*. In this sense, therefore, the whole Christian doctrine is super-rational. But is the question asked, whether the propositions which express the Christian states of mind and their connection, are not subject to the same laws of mental formation and combination, as everything uttered, so that in such a representation the more perfectly we satisfy these laws, so much the more will every one be obliged rightly to apprehend what is thought and meant, although he cannot convince himself of the truth of the matter, because wanting the fundamental inward experience: then in this sense everything in Christian doctrine must be thoroughly conformable to reason. Accordingly, the super-rationality of all the single Christian doctrinal propositions is the measure by which we can judge whether they indeed express the peculiarly Christian element, and again their conformity to reason is the proof, how far the attempt to transfer the inward movements of the Spirit into the thoughts, has been successful or not; but the assertion that it cannot be demanded to set forth in a manner agreeable to reason, what rises above reason, seems only as an evasion, by which the incidental imperfection of the treatment is to be covered over, *just as the opposite one, that everything in the Christian doctrine must in every sense be built upon reason, seems but a shift by which to hide the deficiency in the fundamental experience*.

"The common prescriptive remark, that the super-rational in Christianity is not admitted to be contra-rational, appears to be intended to affirm the same thing as our proposition. Because it implies on the one side the clear perception of the super-rational, upon the other the problem to point out the non-contra-rational element therein, which can be attained only through the pure rationality of the exposition.

Prop. IV. "There is no other way to obtain a part in the Christian communion than through faith in Jesus as the Redeemer.

1. "To have a part in the Christian communion is to seek in the institution of Christ approximation to the previously described state of an absolute ease and stability of pious emotions. Because from another than this cause can no one wish to be in the Christian church. But now since each person can enter it only by means of his own free decision, the assured conviction must precede this, that through the influence of Christ, the state of needing redemption may be taken away, and the other introduced, and this assurance is exactly faith in Christ. That is to say, this ex-

pression designates in general, in our sphere, only the confident conviction accompanying a condition of the higher self-consciousness, which conviction is consequently something different from, but precisely on this account also, not less than that which accompanies the objective consciousness. In the same sense was our discourse before this, of faith in God, which was stated to be nothing else, than the confidence with respect to the absolute feeling of dependence as such, i. e. as produced by a Being (Wesen.) external to us, and as expressing our relation to the same. But the faith mentioned in our discourse is a matter-of-fact confidence, only however that of a perfectly internal fact. That is, it cannot be in an individual until through an impression which he receives from Christ, there has been formed in him a beginning, although only an infinitely small one, yet a real anticipation, of the annulment of the state of needing redemption. But the expression, faith in Christ, is here, as faith in God there, the reference of the condition as effect to Christ as original cause. Thus also John describes Him. Thus from the beginning onward, only they have united themselves to Christ in his new community, whose pious self-consciousness was distinctly stamped as a neediness of redemption, and who now had become assured of the redeeming power of Christ in them.<sup>1</sup> So that the more strongly both these things appeared in any one, the more also could he himself through statement of the fact, to which also belong the description of Christ and of his efficiency, call forth the same inward experience in others. They in whom this took place, became believing, the others not.<sup>2</sup> Herein, always since then, has consisted the essence of all direct Christian annunciation and preaching which can take the shape always only of testimony; a *testimony of one's own experience*, which might awaken the desire in others also, to have the same experience. But the impression, which all persons later upon this way receive from what was effected through Christ, viz: from the common Spirit communicated through him and from the whole community of Christians, supported by the historical statement of his life and being, was precisely the same impression which his contemporaries received immediately from Him. Hence also they who remained unbelieving, were blamed not on this account, because they had not perhaps suffered themselves to be moved by arguments, *but only on account of the want of self-knowledge, which must be at the bottom where there is an incapacity to recognize the Redeemer as such, when He is truly and rightly set forth.* But this want of self-knowledge, i. e. of a consciousness of the need of redemption, Christ himself had already declared as the limit of His operativeness. And thus is the ground of unbelief as also the ground of faith, the same at all times."

<sup>1</sup>John 1: 45, 46. 6: 68, 69. Matt. 16: 15, 18. <sup>2</sup>Acts 2: 37, 41.

We conclude these specimens of Schleiermacher's doctrinal views, which however alone, seen out of their scientific connection, and in such comparatively scanty proportions, afford but imperfect data, for an intelligent judgment upon his theological system and Christian stand-point, with the following all-interesting and at least very thought-awakening propositions, the 96th, 98th 100th, 101st of his "*Christliche Glaube*," viz :

1. "In Jesus Christ the Divine Nature and the human nature were united in one person.
2. "Christ was distinguished from all other men by his essential sinlessness and his absolute perfection.
3. "The Redeemer admits believers into the efficacy of his god-consciousness, and this is his redeeming activity.
4. "The Redeemer takes believers into the communion of his untroubled happiness, and this is his reconciling activity."

#### ARTICLE VII.

### ARGUMENT FOR THE BEING OF GOD FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

By REV. JAMES M. MACDONALD, Jamaica, L. I.

It would be presuming too far to undertake to offer much that is new on the evidence of the Divine Existence. The ancient philosophers, and such writers as Clarke, Locke, Ray, Derham and Paley, and the authors of the various Systems of Theology, may be supposed to have exhausted the subject. And this, to a certain extent, is true. But it has appeared that something essential is lacking, in the argument for the existence of God, as it is commonly presented;—which it will be our object to exhibit as succinctly as possible. Several valuable contributions, on this subject have, within a few years, been given to the public, which, as well as works that have been longer known, afford most important aid to the student in Natural Theology.

To enter, in a formal manner, on the proof of the being of God may be thought by some as superfluous, if not irreverent. But even admitting that men generally are not open to doubt on this subject, and that it has been most amply discussed, there are, it is to be feared, very many, who, if they were called upon by an ingenious skeptic, to give a reason for their faith, would find the task a difficult one, from having never given the subject, in its argumentative form, a special examination. Moreover, it is worthy of consideration that the subject possesses an intrinsic importance and dignity, and is so fitted to produce a deep and ever-present impression, as completely to repel the idea of the discussion being



either irreverent or useless. But the argument we regard as peculiarly important, because it is adapted effectually to expose the fallacy of those pantheistic and materialistic notions which have prevailed elsewhere, and which there is some danger, may become fashionable in America and Europe. This latter is the principal reason which leads us, at the present time, to invite attention to this subject.

We think it is Chalmers, who somewhere remarks, that it is impossible for any man to assert positively, that there is nowhere any evidence of the existence of an infinite, eternal, and incorporeal Spirit who is the Maker and Upholder of all things. All that any man can do is to declare that he has failed to discover the evidence of the existence of such a being. And this is saying very little—indeed amounts to nothing—when we consider how very limited is man's knowledge of the universe. The survey which he is able to make, in respect to the whole of the Divine works, is comparatively, hardly greater than that made by the "little ant." of the general landscape, from the top of his tiny hill. A thousand stars glitter in the evening sky, not one of which has he ever visited, and where, for all that he knows to the contrary, the being of God, may be luminously inscribed to the eye. So that it is a "fool" indeed, according to the expression of Scripture, one who shows how little he knows, by his very ignorance of his ignorance, who declares positively that there is no evidence of the existence of a God, who is infinite, spiritual, and eternal. Let him wait till he has quarried through every strata of the earth to its core, till he has sounded the depths of the skies, visited and explored the other planets, the great central orb, and every star and planet of other systems, and ransacked every corner of the wide creation; nay, till he has read every line, and knows every item that belongs to the history of our world, written or unwritten, for the whole period of its existence, and has even searched the records of a past eternity, before he dares to assert that space and duration have, nowhere and never, borne up the clear and undeniable inscription that there is a God.

*The argument à priori, and its value.*

To Dr. Cudworth, unquestionably, rather than to Dr. Clarke, belongs the honor of being the author of the argument, from *necessity*, as it has been termed. In his "Intellectual System," he labors to prove that we can have no proper or distinguishing idea of God, which does not include necessity of existence in it. And John Howe, whom Macaulay so justly styles "that great man," in his Living Temple, while he waives the argument, because some had objected to it as a sophism, expresses the opinion that it admits of being managed with demonstrative evidence. Bishop Stillingfleet, in his *Origines Sacræ*, also argues that necessary ex-

istence doth immutably belong to the idea and nature of God; and that therefore we may with as much truth affirm that He exists as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. Archbishop Tillotson labors to prove that the possibility that there should be a God, is a foundation for proving the existence of one. By *possible*, he means not contradictory to reason. And if not contradictory to reason that there should be a Being existing from eternity, there necessarily must be one. And Dr. Emmons reasons that if the world might have had a cause, then it must have had a cause. The bare possibility of its beginning to exist by a cause amounts to a demonstration that there was some cause of its beginning to exist. But Dr. Clarke is justly regarded as the chief advocate and expounder of the argument *à priori*, for the existence of God. He reasons in this manner, that there must be in nature a permanent ground or reason of the existence of the first cause; otherwise its existence would be owing to or dependent on mere chance. "The existence, therefore, of the first cause is necessary; necessary absolutely and in itself. And therefore, that necessity is *à priori*, and in the order of nature, the ground or reason of its existence." That is, he begins with the cause and infers its effects. And he has displayed, it is admitted on all hands, the greatest metaphysical ingenuity, and learning, in managing this argument. But almost the utmost that can be said of it is, that it is so obscure that it is extremely difficult, even for those who are familiar with metaphysical disquisitions, to follow him through the intricate mazes of his reasoning; so difficult that it must certainly fail to convince the skeptic, and may greatly tend to perplex and unsettle the believer. If there is any force in Dr. Clarke's celebrated argument, it is because, instead of being *à priori*, it is strictly speaking inductive. What leads us to search for a First Cause? Is it not the existence of other beings who could not have made themselves, nor have existed from eternity? In his correspondence, Dr. C. endeavors to prove that something must have existed from eternity, independent and self-existent; or that the existence of space and duration, which are not themselves substances, proves that there must be an infinite, incorporeal, eternal Deity. In this he followed Dr. Cudworth, who argued from the consideration of space and immensity, that there must be an infinite, incorporeal First Cause. But what is this but the argument *à posteriori*? The existence of space and time is assumed as real, and independent of our conceptions of them; and the process therefore becomes an inductive one.

Very few have ever felt satisfied with the argument from necessity; in fact, few have ever professed themselves able to comprehend its nature. Mr. Locke says, "that it is an ill way of establishing the existence of God, to lay the whole stress of so important a point upon that sole foundation, and take some men's having the

idea of God in their minds, for the only proof of a Deity." He regards the proofs which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer as so clear and cogent that it is impossible for a considering man to withstand them. Mr. Stewart, after citing the opinion of "the coryphæus of Scotch metaphysics," Dr. Reid, that he was unable to determine whether these speculations were as solid, as they are sublime, or whether they were the wanderings of the imagination, in a region beyond the limits of human understanding, remarks: "After this candid acknowledgment from Dr. Reid, I need not be ashamed to confess my own doubts and difficulties on the same subject." And Lord Brougham remarks that there is a "great inaccuracy in denominating the argument in question, were it ever so sound, an argument *à priori*, for it is a reasoning founded on experience, and it is to be classed with the arguments derived from the observation of external objects, the ground of our reasoning *à posteriori* as to matter, or at the utmost, with the information given by consciousness, the whole ground of our reasoning *à posteriori* as to mind." Mr. Stewart has well expressed the merits of the argument *à priori* (and we refer to his opinion with greater satisfaction on account of its bearing on a part of the argument which we propose to present) by observing that the fact of our ideas of immensity and eternity forcing themselves upon our belief seems to furnish an additional argument for the existence of an immense and eternal Being; that after we have by the inductive process of reasoning, become satisfied of the existence of an intelligent cause, we naturally connect with this cause, the impressions derived from the contemplation of infinite space and endless duration, and hence "clothe with the attributes of immensity and eternity, the awful Being whose existence has been proved by a more rigorous process of reasoning."

### *The Cartesian Theory.*

Descartes, to whom Mr. Stewart assigns the honor of standing at the head of the modern movement in metaphysical philosophy, was the author of a famous psychological argument for the existence of God, to which we deem it important in these preliminary remarks, briefly to refer. This philosopher showed the application of the principles of the inductive philosophy to the science of the human mind, as Bacon had shown the application of these same principles to the investigation of natural science. He assumed human consciousness as the starting-point, and established the principle that all true science of the mind must rest upon inductions drawn from the world within. Having shown that our own existence is implied in our consciousness, he maintains that we have no idea which consciousness renders more distinct and clear than that of the existence of an all-perfect, and infinite God; and he further maintains that this idea must have been im-

pressed on our minds by the Deity himself, because it would be supposing the effect to transcend the cause, to refer it to any finite origin. Descartes did not mean that men are born with an actual idea of this kind, but simply that the mind is so constituted that as soon as its faculties are developed this truth is perceived intuitively; and hence that the being of God is to be classed among primary truths, which neither reasoning, nor revelation can make plainer. The Cartesian doctrine, we are constrained to regard as much clearer than that of Dr. Cudworth, or Dr. Clarke; and were it no more than this, that the idea of God is so congenial to the mind that, when once received, it can never be lost, we believe it would be wholly tenable; although in that form it would not be conclusive as an argument for the Divine Existence. Descartes's theory is that it is a truth which does not need to be first proposed, but is primary and intuitive. And some very judicious writers, among them Morell, author of the history of Modern Philosophy, appear to think that a powerful argument may be derived from our fundamental conceptions. "This method of proof," he remarks, "certainly appears to those unaccustomed to abstract thinking, somewhat obscure and inconclusive; but it has the merit of becoming more forcible the more it is inwardly realized; and we much doubt whether the tone of metaphysical thinking in our country will not, ere long, render an appeal to these conceptions the most powerful, as also the most popular proofs of the foundation principles of natural theology. As we can imagine an angel in heaven to believe in God from its own deep intuition of His existence, so will men attain a similar intuitive persuasion, in proportion as they raise themselves above the material, into the region of the spiritual and the divine."

And Pres. Hopkins in an admirable essay, "On the argument from nature for the divine existence," originally published in the *American Quarterly Observer*, says: "If we consider the great importance to the race of a belief in God, and the analogy of nature in regard to the mode in which essential ideas are furnished, we may perhaps think it probable that this great idea was not intended to be entirely dependent on the varying process of induction from premises without. It may appear probable that religion, to which the idea of God is fundamental, which is afterwards to shoot higher and spread wider its influence than any other power, should have its roots in the very foundations and elements of the soul of man." But however this may be, we do most cordially believe that man is correctly defined as a religious animal; and that there must be something in his moral constitution, something elementary to his soul, on which religion may rest as a foundation.—With these preliminary observations, we proceed to sketch our proposed argument for the being of God.

The existence of our own minds, independent of matter, is es-

sential to the argument by which we prove the existence of a superior, and infinite Intelligence. And of their independent existence we have a clearer, a stronger evidence, than of the existence of matter. No skeptic can deny the reality of thought ; for even to doubt is to think. Now that to which the phenomenon of thought belongs is the mind, which is conscious of the power, and of every act, of thinking. The mind, in other words, by its own consciousness, becomes cognizant of its own existence ; it affirms itself. This is the true and profound meaning of the celebrated aphorism of Descartes, *cogito ergo sum*. Our knowledge that we possess minds does not depend at all upon matter ; not a single step in the demonstration is dependent on the existence, or our knowledge of the existence, of an external or material world. But what is the nature of the argument by which we prove that matter exists ? It is from sensation that we conclude that something exists beyond ourselves ; and our sensations are but acts, or thoughts of the mind. That is, it is by the feelings or acts of our minds that we discover that there are objects external to ourselves. While therefore, the proof of the existence of mind is wholly independent of matter, and is wholly within ourselves ; the proof of the existence of matter rests upon our sensations, or mental feelings, so that whenever, in any case, we have proof of the existence of matter, the very process of proof, involves proof of the existence of mind. Thus it appears that we have more conclusive evidence of the existence of mind than we have of matter ; or at all events, one is more readily proved, requires fewer steps in the demonstration, than the other.

In the argument which is now to be offered for the Divine Existence, it will be shown,—a step which is of fundamental importance—how the idea of God is obtained, and what this idea is. The evidences of design, although an important part in the argument, are not of themselves sufficient, as will be made to appear ; our course of reasoning must be such as to give us some just idea of the nature of the great Designer or God, and show that this is not another name for what some philosophers mean by Fate, Necessity, Destiny, Nature, or an Energy of nature. God is light ; and the argument that proves His existence is light ; it is a demonstration. It is composed of parts, it is true, each of which is essential to the completeness of the whole, that is, it is cumulative ; but it amounts to a demonstration so perfect, that we may be as fully assured of God's existence, as we are of our own, or of the reality of the external world. Man, as has been truly said, by the author of the History of Modern Philosophy, in a most instructive note on the subject of this Article : "Man is, in fact, a microcosm—a universe in himself ; and whatever proof the whole universe affords, is involved, in principle, in man himself."

*The rational and moral nature of man, as an effect, affords un-*

*answerable proof of the existence of an intelligent and infinite Cause.*

The soul of man needs no one to prove, or teach it, the lesson of its own existence. It knows that it possesses faculties which must forever distinguish it from the inanimate objects of nature, and that, essentially, it possesses nothing in common with those objects. It knows farther, that there is no connecting link between it and those animals which exhibit the highest degree of intelligence; and that they are lacking in something which, even though that degree were increased as high as is possible to their nature, would not close up the impassable gulf, that lies between them. Can any one conceive that brutes could possibly possess characteristics by which human beings might have intellectual communion with them, or social sympathy? The question answers itself. But what is it that distinguishes man from mere matter or animals? Not his erect form, and a finer physical organization, so much as that part of him which thinks and reasons, and renders him a subject of moral government. His intellectual and moral nature constitutes his individuality. His reason, conscience, and freedom of will, as the elements of personality, are effects from which we must infer a cause: and effects from the nature of which we just as certainly infer the nature of that cause.

There is, first, that great principle of the mind which we term reason, that is, the intelligent principle in man. Now this faculty can not be more sure of its own existence than it is that it did not create itself, and that it can not create another like itself. It knows that it would be just as impossible for the stones to cry out of themselves, or for the body to render itself invisible at pleasure, as for the reason to create another like itself. And it rejects instantly the idea, that matter, or nature, or a mere energy of nature, produced it; at the same time it knows that it did not always exist, and therefore must have had a cause of its beginning to exist. The inference is unavoidable, that this cause—the Father of the spirit—must possess reason, and a higher reason, associated with other higher attributes, than are possessed by men. The foundation of this argument is, that we must look not only for an adequate, but an appropriate cause for every effect; in other words, that only can be a sufficient cause, which is suited to the nature of the effect produced. A thinking mind which knows that it did not always exist, nor create itself is the effect; and whither does the question respecting the origin of this mind lead us? A created mind is unanswerable evidence of an uncreated and creative one.

Again, there is that faculty of the soul by which it chooses or refuses any thing offered to it; which, from its nature, is indisputably free, denominated, the will. Every man is conscious that, in choosing or refusing, his will is in no way determined or forced by any absolute necessity. The exercise of the powers of the will is confined only by its capacities, which limits it can not possibly

overpass. It is this, that constitutes man a free moral agent. Here then we have another faculty of the inner man, which, like the reason, we are irresistably forced to regard as an effect, because we are just as sure in this case as in the former, that it did not create itself—that it cannot create another like itself, in a statue, or a brute—and that it was not the product of mere nature, or some secret energy of nature. If then we look for its cause—its Author—we must look above matter, above ourselves, above nature, to a Being, yes, a Being, among the elements of whose character, we may discover one resembling this faculty of the human soul. For the cause, we repeat it, can not be adequate, unless it is also appropriate, by being invested with characteristics and functions, corresponding to those which are produced. As created reason led us to the great uncreated Reason, so here again the human will, which the mind intuitively regards as an effect, leads us to that perfect sovereign Will, which dictates all law, and presides over the universe.

Conscience, also, by which we mean a sense of duty, or that faculty which approves or disapproves conduct and feelings, as right or wrong, is an inherent and distinguishing part of our spiritual nature. This principle, we affirm, is inherent to our mental constitution; for we everywhere find, among all ages and conditions of men, a sense of responsibility, even among the most ignorant and debased, who have the least conception of a Superior Power. And wherever society has made any progress we find this sense of obligation, proportionably predominant, thus proving that a state in which men have a sense of right, and disapprobation of that which is accounted wrong, accords with the nature of man; in other words, that this sense of right and wrong is an essential principle of his nature. But the conscience did not create itself, nor can it create its like. This, also, carries its own proof. Still it is an effect which must have had a cause. And it is equally certain, that it was not the product of some “unconscious, adaptive energy,” or of “plastic nature;” for this would be equivalent to supposing that a cause may produce an effect superior to itself, which is absurd. An effect ceases to be an effect, when it is superior to its alledged cause, and exists of itself. Here, then, is another effect—the law written on man’s inner nature, the sense of right and wrong—which proclaims for its Author the great Lawgiver of the universe. It is engraven on our moral constitution that there is such a Lawgiver. God has left His impress on the soul of man, a likeness of His own nature, an announcement of His approbation of goodness, and a monition of His wrath against sin. There is a witness or representative left in every bosom, which proclaims a Principal—a moral Governor—whose existence although He is invisible, is as real as that of the invisible spirit of man itself. Hence, the fear must be

wholly groundless that atheism will ever obtain any very general prevalence, or continue long. The monstrous error is at war with the moral feelings which belong to man's nature.

Thus compelled to regard intuitively the human soul as an effect, we are led up to Deity, as its only proper and adequate cause. We cannot conceive of the great First Cause otherwise than that those qualities of which He is the author in us, are parts of His own nature, and in him exist in the highest perfection. It is thus that we discover not Necessity, Destiny, Chance, or an Energy of Nature, as the cause of all things, but a personal God. The soul we find to be an image, a copy—sadly marred and broken, it is true, in its present state—but an image still, in which we may trace some striking marks of resemblance to the great Original. Thus the reality of a supreme, intelligent power is made evident; and, at the same time the distinct personality of the Being to whom this power belongs is established: for the Being from whom we derive those attributes which make up our distinguishing characteristics, as rational and moral beings, we are compelled to regard as possessed of these attributes in their highest possible perfection, and therefore, as a personality, in distinction from those, who, ashamed of the name of atheism, acknowledge no other deity but the universal and invariable laws of nature. This, probably, is the only type of atheism to be met with at the present day. Some would fain rest in these laws themselves, independent of the existence and agency of their Author, as sufficient to account for the events which take place in obedience to them. But the course of reasoning which has been pursued, shows that the God in whom we are to believe is possessed, in their fullness and perfection, of all those attributes which we discover in the mind of man, which is the product of His supreme power and sovereign will. This is incontrovertible evidence of the existence of a personal God; in other words, that He is an intelligent being; not a part of all things, “the soul of the world;” but perfectly distinct from, and independent of, all His creatures and works.

It is at this point perhaps, that an application may be made of some of the reasonings of Cudworth and Clarke, in attempting to construct an *à priori* argument. Having become satisfied of the existence of an intelligent cause, those impressions which are derived from boundless space and endless duration, are naturally connected with this cause; and thus God is felt to be invested with the awful attributes of infinity and eternity. Dr. Cudworth, from infinite incorporeal space, infers an infinite, incorporeal Deity. He concludes that as space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows “that there must be some incorporeal substance whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity.” Dr. Clarke pursues the same reasoning but includes infinite duration as well as



space. As they are not themselves substances, he contends that they prove the existence of a being, of whom immensity and eternity are necessary attributes. Sir Isaac Newton considers infinite space as the sensorium of the Godhead; it gives room to infinite knowledge, and is as it were "an organ to omniscience." Thus having proved by other methods, as has been done, the existence of an intelligent cause, the impressions made on us by the contemplation of space and duration may be employed in illustrating and confirming the possibility if not the necessity, of an infinite Being who is above and independent of all visible things, and incorporeal entities. Reflection further convinces us that the cause of all things, which are in themselves finite, and subject to change must be independent, uncaused, and therefore eternal. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose the Being who is the cause of all existence, to act in His own creation, before He existed. It is not in our power to fix any limit to the chain of infinite being; but it would be most palpably absurd to say that this chain needs no other support than its own connected links. We rise from one state of dependent and finite existence to another, till we at last rest in the absolute and infinite, and there find the sure support of the

"Vast chain of being."—

Is Jehovah one? The answer to this is implied in the proof that He is infinite; for it would involve a contradiction to suppose the existence of two infinite beings; or at least, the sense of the human mind has everywhere been against the admission of more than one infinite being. Descartes contended that men, from the very constitution of their nature, as soon as they conceive of a Deity, attribute to Him all possible perfection. The polytheism and creature worship of the heathen do not prove that they consider the things which they worship as the Supreme God. Influenced by custom and superstition, and in direct opposition to reason and common sense, they adopt the rites and idols of their forefathers. Their intellectual and moral perverseness, as displayed in their ideas and customs, respecting the character and worship of God, is to be viewed as a Divine infliction, in punishment of inexcusable unbelief. (Rom. 1: 18, 28.) There is much ground therefore, for the opinion that the very idea of the true God is accompanied with the belief that He is infinitely perfect.—Thus does it appear, from a process of reflection, that that God whose existence we infer from the image which He has engraved on the soul of man, is infinite, eternal, underived one, and possessed of all possible perfection. He is not a mere intelligence, residing in the different species of being. He is not a "plastic power." He is not the universe itself; but He is an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary being, possessed of power, life, wisdom, good-

ness, and every supposable perfection, in the highest possible degree.

The way is now prepared to proceed to another stage in the argument, and one that has been more commonly, and independently, relied upon to prove the existence of God. That portion of the proof which has been presented, viz, that an effect presupposes an adequate cause—a created mind and an uncreated one, renders the argument from design perfectly conclusive. The argument from design is founded on this plain principle that everything in which may be observed marks of contrivance, necessarily implies creative skill, and of course the existence of a being to whom this skill belongs.

*The being of God from evidences of design.*

1. Evidences of design presented in the phenomena of mind. The ancient philosophers drew proofs of design from the constitution of the mind, as well as from the external world. Thus Cicero says, —“*Jam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere. De quo dum disputarem, tuam mihi dari vellem, Cotta, eloquentiam.* \* \* \* \* \* *Jam vero domina rerum, (ut vos soletis dicere) eloquendi vis, quam est praeclare, quamque divina! quae primum efficit, ut ea, quae ignoramus, discere, et ea, quae scimus, alios docere possimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, etc.*” Lord Brougham has handled this part of the subject most ably, and nothing more will be necessary than to refer to what he has given in relation to it, in his admirable “Discourse.” From the nature and operations of mind, he says, we gather proofs of design, by the strict method of induction, as conclusive as we do from the phenomena of matter. The structure of the mind affords evidence of the most skillful contrivance. He considers particularly the power of reasoning—curiosity—the phenomena of memory, its tenacity and readiness—the effect of habit on our intellectual system—and the feelings and passions with which we are moved. “But view the intellectual world as a whole, and surely it is impossible to contemplate, without amazement, the extraordinary spectacle which the mind of man displays, and the immense progress which it has been able to make in consequence of its structure, its capacity, and its propensities, such as we have just been describing them. If the brightness of the heavenly bodies, the prodigious velocity of their motions, their vast distance and mighty bulk, fill the imagination with awe, there is the same wonder excited by the brilliancy of the intellectual powers—the inconceivable swiftness of thought—the boundless range which our fancy can take—the vast objects which our reason can em-

<sup>1</sup> De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. 59.

brace. That we should have been able to resolve the elements into their more simple constituents—to analyze the subtle light which fills all space—to penetrate from that remote particle in the universe, of which we occupy a speck, into regions infinitely remote—ascertain the weight of bodies at the surface of the most distant worlds—investigate the laws which govern their motions, or mould their forms—and calculate, to a second of time, the periods of their re-appearance, during the revolutions of centuries,—all this is in the last degree amazing, and affords much more food for admiration than any of the phenomena of the material creation. \* \* \* \* \* The most abstruse investigations of the mathematician are conducted without any regard to sensible objects, and the help he derives in his reasonings from material things at all, are absolutely insignificant, compared with the portion of his work which is altogether of an abstract kind—the aid of figures and letters being only to facilitate and abridge his labor, and not at all essential to his progress. Nay, strictly speaking, there are no truths in the whole range of the pure mathematics which might not, by possibility, have been discovered, and systematized by one deprived of sight and touch, or immured in a dark chamber, without the use of a single material object. The instrument of Newton's most sublime speculations, the *calculus* which he invented, and the astonishing system reared by its means, which have given immortality to the names of Euler, Lagrange, Laplace, all are the creatures of pure abstract thought, etc. These surely are the greatest of all the wonders of nature, when justly considered, although they speak to the understanding, and not to the sense. Shall we, then, deny that the eye could be made without skill in optics, and yet admit that the mind could be fashioned and endowed without the most exquisite of all skill, or could proceed from any but an intellect of infinite power?"

2. Evidences of design in the external world. When we see a machine, with various parts, nicely adjusted, and all in harmonious action, the idea of its having come into existence of itself, or by chance, never once enters the mind; but we immediately connect it with some designing agent. Such a machine is the human body. Few comparatively seem to know the overwhelming force of evidence which we, as organized beings, bear around—within us—evidence which establishes the being, attributes, and providence of a Supreme Being. The human frame-work is one of the best volumes on Natural Theology. "A piece of mechanism," remarks Sir Charles Bell, "as a watch, a barometer, or a dial, will fix attention; a man will make journeys to see an engine stamp a coin, or turn a block; yet the organs through which he has a thousand sources of enjoyment, and which are themselves more exquisite in design, and more curious in contrivance and mechanism, do not enter his thoughts." What admirable instruments are the human

hand and eye! How exquisite in workmanship! Though complicated, how nicely are all their parts adjusted, and adapted to their several ends! If we turn to the centre of the bodily system—the heart—we shall behold, if possible, still greater wonders. If we might suppose that the external covering of the body were made of some transparent substance, through which, as through glass, we could discern the circulation of the blood, and observe how it is admitted on one side, and let out of the other of that wonderful “laboratory,” as John Howe<sup>1</sup> styles it—could we perceive all this, should we not be ready to pronounce that man mad, or an idiot, who could profess to regard so wonderful a piece of mechanism, as having come into existence by accident, or without a Maker? And that the same Being, who, as has been shown, was the Author of the human mind, was also the Maker of the body, is rendered certain by their adaptation the one to the other, and their mutual action on each other. They are entirely distinct, one being purely spiritual, and the other material, but this mutual adaptation is as much a part of their original design, as any other property that belongs to either, and hence it is evident that they proceeded from the same Designer. And that all other creatures and works were made by the same Being is evident inasmuch as the same wisdom and power are displayed in them, and it is absurd to suppose that there can be more than one absolute and infinite Creator. The more minute and extensive the examination, the more impressive and overwhelming will be the proofs of design, which are furnished in the works of creation. If we carry our inquiries into the microscopic world, they will be as obvious as in those broader fields surveyed by the telescopes of astronomers. “So full is nature of design and purpose,” remarks Pres. Hopkins, “from the blade of grass to the sun in the heavens, that she now seems to stand as one great transparency, through which the workings of a designing agent may be seen.” Proofs multiply as we extend our observation. If we look at a single plant growing at the wayside, we shall perceive the signatures of divine wisdom on every leaf and flower. If we look higher, at the motion of this earth, and other plants, we shall perceive the grand miracle of the universe—the sublime argument for the existence of God—motion in a circle. The song of the spheres is—“There is a God; and that God, how great, how wise, how good!”

“Should fate command me to the farthest verge  
Of the green earth, to distant barbarous climes,  
Rivers unknown to song, where first the sun  
Gilds Indian mountains, or his setting beam  
Flames on th’ Atlantic isles,  
Still God is ever present, ever felt,  
In the void waste as in the city full.

<sup>1</sup> Living Temple, i 3.

I can not go  
Where universal love not smiles around,  
Sustaining all yon orbs, and all their suns."

—"Deum namque ire per omnes  
Terrasque, tractusque mavis, cœlumque profundum."

If now, at this point in the argument we open the Bible—a book which like the human mind is an effect without any adequate cause, except on the admission that there is an omniscient and holy God, who is its Author—we shall discern, written as with sunbeams, what we had read more faintly traced on the tablets of the soul, and the external world, that God is incomparably wise, great, good and holy. We see in Jesus, God incarnate—God with us—God manifest in the flesh. He who was the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person, has dwelt on earth, and men behold his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father full of grace and truth. God has stamped His image on the soul of man, and stamped His image on the Bible, and left traces of His power and wisdom on the broad earth and broader heavens, so that if we believe not we are without excuse. "Revelation itself," remarks Dr. Dwight, "may for aught that appears, be so formed, as to become an indubitable proof of His existence and of any, or all, of His attributes. The Revelation itself is an effect; and from its nature, the nature of the cause, which gave it existence, may be as satisfactorily argued, as from any other effect. In other words, it may be such an effect as to prove the cause divine. Still more obviously may this be the case, when the Revelation, in question, is such a comment on the works of creation and providence, as to explain such mysteries in them, and remove such difficulties, as before prevented us from a correct judgment concerning their nature and tendency."

#### ARTICLE VIII.

#### PETERS AND SMITH ON BAPTISM.<sup>1</sup>

By REV. J. JAY DANA, South Adams, Mass.

THERE has ever been a disposition in men to run to extremes in matters of religion. Some deem outward forms of no avail, and discard them altogether, while others neglect the spirit of religion, in their extreme devotion to its forms. The truly religious have

"1 Sprinkling, the only Mode of Baptism made known in the Scriptures; and the Scripture warrant for infant baptism. By Absalom Peters, D. D. Albany: E. H. Pease & Co., 1848."

"Examination of sprinkling the only Mode of Baptism made known in the Scriptures, &c.; by Absalom Peters, D. D., by Rev. J. Torrey Smith, A. M., Boston: John Putnam, 1849.

been trying long to solve the problem of observing the forms of religion without losing the spirit of piety, and of seeking after the spirit of religion without neglecting the form. The little success which has attended their efforts hitherto, shows clearly that this problem is not of easy solution.

Modal religion has always found favor with mankind, who are prone to substitute outward forms for inward piety. The ancient Pharisees, were not at all lacking in forms. They were strict in performing the external duties of religion. They prayed long, fasted often, and paid tithes scrupulously, and yet had not the love of God in them.

The Romish and Greek churches have lost almost wholly the spirit of religion, and have given themselves up to outward rites and ceremonies, many of which would be well enough were they the manifestations of true piety, but are of no worth when designed as a substitute for it.

It is evident that the church can never arrive at a state in which there will be no need of forms in religion; because the spirit of piety must ever have *some* mode of manifestation, and the church of Christ will always need some ceremonies by which its visibility shall be made apparent; but we believe and firmly hope that the day will come when there will be less controversy respecting the modes of manifesting the spirit of Christ. We believe that Christians will yet see eye to eye, and feel heart to heart. We believe that such an amount of light and love is to be shed abroad that Christians will be willing to sacrifice individual preferences for the sake of greater unity in the Spirit. We believe that the day is to come even on earth, when it will appear as incongruous for two disciples of Jesus Christ to have any controversy respecting "the mode of baptism," as it would now be, were a couple of angels before God's throne to enter into a dispute respecting the mode of holding their golden harps when they sing their song of praise to Him whom they delight to worship.

Before this can take place, however, there must be discussion; and if this can be had without the indulgence of a wrong spirit, it will tend to hasten the period when views perfectly harmonious shall prevail throughout the Christian world. The less of acrimony there is mingled with the writings of Christians in their controversies on this subject, the sooner will conclusions be reached in which all can agree; and the less there will be to turn off the minds of writers and readers from the real questions at issue.

We have chosen to offer some remarks on the books at the head of this article, in connection, rather than separately, because the one was designed as an answer to the other.

We confess that we were not a little surprised on examining the work of Mr. S. to find that he has often turned aside from the examination of Dr. P's *arguments* and descended to personalities,

which, though they may amuse the reader, do nothing towards producing conviction in a mind in search after truth. No reader can study the two works without being struck with this vast difference between them. Dr. "Peters" has written "on Baptism," but Mr. "Smith on Peters." It were easy to transcribe page after page of undignified remarks respecting Dr. P., but we have no disposition to descend to this personal warfare.

When one author professedly examines and attempts to refute the arguments of another, it is but common justice that he should give a fair synopsis of the mode of the argument which he controverts. But in Mr. Smith's book we find no such synopsis. No one can get from it a correct view of the argument of Dr. Peters. Without stating the mode of proof adopted by Dr. P., or even intimating that there has been any argument offered, he charges him with a disreputable begging of the whole question, because he says (p. 128.) that the Baptists "MAKE THE MODE THE ESSENTIAL THING." (Smith, p. 9.) We shall refer to this remark again, and mention it here only to show that Mr. S. in the first part of his book, previous to any statement respecting the argument of Dr. P. charges him with begging the whole question, when in fact, he had devoted 128 pages to its consideration.

We will state at this point of the discussion as briefly as possible, the line of argument pursued by Dr. Peters, and then we shall be prepared to inquire whether Mr. Smith has said anything to invalidate this argument.

After some brief introductory remarks, and explaining that by "sprinkling," he means "any application of water to the subject of baptism," Dr. P. states that "the true question is: What was, and is, the meaning of the word *Baptizo*, as used in the new Testament, to designate the religious ordinance of baptism?" He takes the position that if it could be shown beyond a doubt that in "heathen Greek," the word *Baptizo* meant to *immerse*, this would prove nothing positively respecting the meaning of the word as used in the New Testament, because it was "used by Christ and his apostles to designate an action which was utterly unknown to the Greeks of all preceding ages."—p. 23.

"Let it be remembered that the Greek language had never been used to express any of the ideas of revealed religion, until the Jews were conquered by the Greeks some three hundred years before Christ. Until after that time the idea of a religious ordinance, or ceremony, called Baptism had never entered the mind of the Greek. The Greek language was as destitute of any such idea, as was the language of the Sandwich Islanders before they were instructed by our missionaries. All the ideas of the language, relating to religion, were *heathen* ideas. Hence the whole system of the gospel was 'to the Greeks foolishness.' (I. Cor. i. 23) But the Jews, who had before this spoken the Hebrew language, and had the Old Testament Scriptures in the Hebrew—which was understood by no other nation—being now in subjection to the Greeks, found it necessary to learn the Greek language. And before the birth of our Saviour,

they translated their own Scriptures into Greek. But in expressing the truths of revealed religion in their new language, they were obliged to give to many of its words a new meaning."

Of this new meaning, Dr. P. gives several apposite examples. He instances *pneuma*, which in ancient Greek meant *wind*, but is used in the New Testament to signify the *Spirit*. He mentions also *angelos*, which originally meant a *messenger*, but is used in the Scriptures to express "*the idea of a spiritual messenger from God.*" This idea which is expressed by the word *angelos* was not known to the ancient Greeks. Dr. P. does not take the broad ground that in *every case* the writers of the New Testament have used the words of the Greek language in a sense foreign to the mind of a Greek, but that this is frequently done.

Farther to illustrate his views, he cites the word *arotron*, which "in ancient Greek signifies a *plow*." Were this country to be invaded and conquered by Greeks—and were they to give names to our implements of agriculture, they would doubtless call our "yan-kee plow" by the name of *arotron*, and yet it is very evident that when used in this sense it would mean something entirely different from the ancient *arotron*. So when Christ and his apostles used *Baptizo*, they used it in a very different sense from what any ancient Greek had ever used it. They attached to it a *religious* meaning, which previous to the use of the Greek tongue by the Jews it had never been used in this sense."

Having shown that *Baptizo* had lost its primary meaning, he proceeds in the third section to show what meaning was actually attached to *Baptizo* when used in a sacred sense.

"The true meaning, therefore, of the "*divers baptism*" under the law, and of Christian baptism—the main idea, the thing commanded—is *purification or consecration*. This is the thing signified by the external symbol; and the mode of applying the symbol is comparatively unimportant. This is especially the case with Christian baptism. Hence no particular mode is prescribed in our Saviour's command to his disciples to *baptize*; and the only thing upon which the mind can fasten, in this command as of divine obligation, is the thing signified by the word *baptize*, which is to *purify* or to *consecrate* by the application of water in some mode. And not only is no precise mode of applying the symbol prescribed in the command, but no mode is spoken of afterwards, as binding, or as commanded. The thing called *Baptism*, or *Purification* is commanded, but nothing said of the mode, and I maintain that the mode is not indicated by the names *Baptism* and *Purification*. These names are used to designate the *thing itself*, which is *symbolical cleansing*, or *consecration*. And these names, in this respect, are synonymous. They mean the same thing. Both in the New Testament, and in the writings of the Christian fathers, they are used interchangeably, the one for the other."—p. 38.

For the correctness of this statement he refers his readers to Dr. Beecher's able articles in the American Biblical Repository for 1840–1, who has furnished the most ample proof. He cites Luke 11. 38–41 as an example, where *ebaptishe katharizete*, purify, are



so used that the "obvious and natural force of the passage goes to show that *Baptizo* is here used in the sense of *katharizo* to purify." What is "recorded in John 3, 25, 26, shows conclusively, that the simple idea, at this time attached to baptism was that of purifying or cleansing." The disciples "appeal to John on the subject of baptism, showing plainly that they considered baptism as performed by John and by Christ's disciples, the same thing as the Jewish rite of purification, and that they used the words *baptizo* and *katharizo*, to purify indifferently, the one for the other, when they spoke of these ordinances."

He then proceeds to show that the purifications of the Jews—i. e. their "divers baptisms," were performed not by immersion but by sprinkling. When sprinkling was performed by using a bunch of hyssop it "was a baptism in the Scripture sense of *Baptizo*. It is here called a baptism by the apostles."—p. 46.

A reference to the religious rites of the Jews is most conclusive evidence that they regarded purification as synonymous with baptism, and that these purifications were performed by sprinkling and not by immersions in those cases where purification of persons was enjoined. To confirm his views on this point, he quotes from Dr. Beecher's article in the Biblical Repository.

After a brief section in which he shows that "John's Baptism" was not "Christian Baptism,"—and another, shewing that in the "Scripture idea of baptism the water was applied to the subject, and not the subject to the water,"—he proceeds to speak of the "mode of baptism as practised by John," and concerning the "prophecies which intimate the mode of Christian baptism by the baptism of the spirit." He devotes two sections to a consideration of the instances of baptism recorded in the Scriptures, and comes to the conclusion that "The teachings of the Bible preponderate overwhelmingly on the side of baptism by sprinkling, and force upon us the belief that this was the mode in which baptism was administered by the apostles, in obedience to the Saviour's command."—p. 113.

In his examination of this work, Mr. S. has devoted 18 pages out of 180, or one tenth of the whole, to a chapter which is headed "unfortunate representations and statements." Probably he meant to convey the idea that these "representations and statements" are "unfortunate" for Dr. Peters, but we think Mr. Smith has been "unfortunate" in some things he has uttered. From page 25 to 37 he considers the meaning of *Baptizo* according to the classics, reiterating the same positions which have ever been taken by Baptists. Pages 37 to 43 are devoted to a consideration of the changes

"To the above it might be added, that Dr. P. has defended with his usual acuteness and ability, the doctrine of Infant baptism; but on that point we forbear to say anything, as our present object is to discuss merely the "mode of baptism."

which took place in the meaning of *Baptizo* when used in New Testament Greek. The concluding remark on this topic, we cannot forbear quoting. Mr. S. says:—"The Doctor's proof that there is such a change in the meaning of *Baptizo* is about as follows :

"The classical and sacred use of some Greek words are different. *Baptizo* is a Greek word. Therefore the classical and sacred use are different. That is like the following :

"Some men died in Sept. 1848. Zachary Taylor is a man. Therefore Zachary Taylor died in Sept. 1848!"

To the subject of the "Jewish and sacred use of *Baptizo*," and to the question, "Is Baptism purification?" he devotes p. 43-57. On Page 57 he proceeds to discuss the "New Testament meaning of *Baptizo*," and says at the outset, that he "shall show that the New Testament proves the meaning of *baptizo* to be *immerse*, or *overwhelm*." Pages 91 to 99 are occupied with a consideration of the "construction of *baptizo*"—"Greek preposition *en*." This and the following chapters are mostly a repetition of the usual arguments on his side of the question. It would not throw any light on the general subject to repeat them.

Having stated the line of argument pursued in these two works, it may not be amiss to make the inquiry : Are Dr. Peters positions correct? Our limits will only allow us to consider a few of the leading points embraced in this discussion.

One of Dr. Peters' positions is that the sacred writers used words in senses very different from what they had in the Greek classics. We have already quoted Mr. Smith's idea of the force of this argument where he compares it with the death of Zachary Taylor; but unless we are very wide of the mark there is something in this argument not so easily disposed of as he would have us imagine.

Dr. P. quotes several words, such as *pneuma*; *angelos*, &c. We propose to adduce some other examples which cannot be called "windy," as Mr. S. terms Dr. P.'s argument.

Take for example, *Logos*, which in "heathen Greek" meant "reason," or "discourse." So all are agreed. Does John use it in this sense when he says, "In the beginning was the *Logos* and the *Logos* was God?" No orthodox writer will admit that he does. Suppose one who denies the supreme divinity of our Saviour should say that this passage does not prove anything, because in "heathen Greek" *Logos* meant *discourse*? Would Mr. Smith give up the passage as a proof-text? We trow not.

Take another example, the word *Theos*, which we translate God." The same word was used by the Greeks as a name for their deities; but does *Theos* in the New Testament mean the same thing as they understood it to mean? The writers of the New Testament were Jews, and the ideas which they intended to

convey were Hebrew ideas, and hence when they wrote the Greek language they used it to express their own ideas. They used *Theos* to denote the great and glorious God, and used it not because it expressed precisely the shade of meaning which they intended, but because they had no better word. John never meant to teach that the *Logos* was a *heathen deity*.

The New Testament fully proclaims the doctrine of the resurrection; but *Anastasis* in heathen Greek, does not convey this meaning. It means, simply, a "rising up." It was not used in classic Greek to denote what we mean by resurrection, because that *idea* had never entered the mind of a heathen Greek.

So of the word translated humility. *Tapeinophrosune*, in "heathen Greek," meant a *mean-spirited man*, and had nothing in its sense which conveyed the idea of humility, as the term is used in the Scriptures.

It may not be amiss to add, that this same difficulty of conveying ideas correctly into a foreign tongue, is realized every day by modern missionaries. In China, the missionaries have had months of consultation whether they should use the word which the Chinese use for God, to express the name of God made known in the Scriptures. To a Chinese, this word suggests his *own* deity, which he has been accustomed to worship.

In the foregoing examples, we have cited only those words, the meaning of which, in classical Greek, continued *unchanged* down to the time of Christ; and yet we have shown that when used by the sacred writers, they mean something very different. Mr. S., (p. 42,) says, "If he, (Dr. P.), or any body else, will prove that the word baptize expressed to those who used the Greek language, whether in the synagogue, or the heathen temple, any different physical act, or any less definite physical act, when the commission to baptize was given by our Lord, than it did when used by Homer, Herodotus, or Sophocles, we yield the point at once. The physical act implied in the ordinance of Christian baptism, must be that which the word expressed when the command was given. It has been shown that the meaning of words, as used by Christ, is different from what it was in sacred writers. Suppose it should be admitted that the "physical act" was the "same in the time of Christ," that it was in the "days of Sophocles," we ask if this proves that when Christ used baptizo, he meant just what a *heathen* would have meant by the same word? Mr. S. assumes, as most, if not all writers do, on that side of the controversy, that the sacred meaning of words must be conformed to the heathen sense. We shall have occasion to refer to this topic again.

Dr. P. uses the word *Arotron* to illustrate the change of *meaning*, while the name is retained. He describes an ancient Greek plow, and says it was "a straight stick," &c.; but were

the Greeks to give a name to our plow, they would call it *arotron*. Dr. Peters *describes* the *arotron*, but does not *define* it. Mr. Smith asserts, (p. 42,) "The simple truth is that the word *arotron* will apply to the old Roman plow and to the modern Yankee plow, *without the least modification of its meaning*. We are aware that it answers the *definition* of plow, which, according to Webster, is "an instrument for turning up, breaking and preparing the ground for receiving the seed;" but it does not mean the same *thing* when used for the ancient, that it does for the modern plow. So, were a command made to plow the ground, it would mean an act very different from what was performed in ancient Greece, in obedience to the same command; and yet both would be plowing. To *define* plow by a description of a particular *kind* of plow, would be to exclude every other kind; and hence, to define baptism, as enjoined in the Bible, by *immerse* or *sprinkle*, would be to exclude every other form of administration.

As Mr. Smith seems quite fond of Dr. Webster's definitions, we will quote one or two more: "Baptism, the application of water to a person, as a sacrament or religious ceremony, by which he is initiated into the Christian church" He adds; "This is usually performed by sprinkling or immersion." Here we have both the definition and the description.

In his definition of immersion, he says nothing of its being synonymous with Christian baptism, but defines it as follows: 1. "To put under water or other fluid; to plunge; to dip. 2. To sink or cover deep; to cover wholly; as to be *immersed* in a wood. 3. To plunge; to overwhelm; to involve; to engage deeply; as to immerse in business or cares."

But enough of this. Though it could be clearly proved that baptizo means to immerse, in heathen Greek, this does not make it at all certain that it is used in this sense in the Scriptures. It certainly does not prove that it was invariably used in this sense as we shall show before we close. It is just as probable that the sacred writers attached a new idea to this word, as to the word *Theos* or *Logos*.

It has already been remarked, that Dr. Peters takes the position that at the time of Christ, the word baptizo had a generic sense, and that it had the same meaning as *katharizo*, to purify. Mr. Smith controverts this position. He says, (p. 46.) "Dr. P. lays the foundation of his Scriptural argument on an *assumption* for which not a particle of proof is offered." We say Dr. P. has offered proof. The "plain reader" of Mr. S's book would suppose from this statement that Dr. P. had not even attempted to furnish proof, while he has occupied 14 pages in the discussion of this identical point. Dr. P. says: "There were various ritual or prescribed observances under the law of Moses in which both water and blood were used as symbols of purification or cleansing; which

the apostle denominates 'divers washings.' Heb. 9: 10. In the original it is *diaphorais baptismois* (divers baptisms.) " \* \* " They were not literal or actual washings of the body which were prescribed in these rites but only *symbolical cleansings*. They were external ceremonies or observances in which water or blood was applied to persons and things as a *symbol, emblem* or *sign* of their purification as consecrated to God and accepted by Him."

These "divers baptisms" were not performed, by immersion when *persons* were cleansed, but by "sprinklings." of ashes and water and blood."

Dr. Beecher asserts, "No washing of persons is even enjoined by the word *tâbal* to *immerse*, even in a single instance, nor by any word which denotes immersion—but as I think without exception by the word *râhats* which denotes to *wash* or *purify* with out any reference to mode."

To this Mr. S. replies: "Now I would just observe to the 'plain reader,' since we have the law-book in our hands, it might be best to examine the point for ourselves." He quotes a number of passages, which he says "may throw some light on the subject." We have examined several of these passages, and as far as we have gone we find the word in the original to be *râhats*, and not *tâbal*; and are fully confirmed in the truth of Dr. B's assertion.

Let the "plain reader" look at the first passage quoted which is from Ex. 29: 4, and observe "the light which it throws on the subject." "And Aaron and his sons thou shalt bring unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, and shall *wash* them with water."

There is not the slightest proof either from the meaning of *râhats*, or from the connection in which it stands, for supposing that it means immerse. There is no proof that there was a "bath" in the "door of the tabernacle of the congregation."

Mr. S. says, (p. 24.) "a man cannot be immersed in water, without being *put under the water*;" and can it be supposed that Aaron and his sons were "put under the water in the door of the tabernacle of the congregation!" What was the object of this washing? We answer. Aaron and his sons were to be consecrated to the priest's office, and must therefore become ceremonially clean, and it was a ceremonial cleansing, or washing, which God enjoins. To call that immersion where the body is washed part after part, and not 'put under water' is absurd, according to the showing of Mr. S.

"The true meaning," says Dr. Peters, "of divers baptisms under the law, and of Christian baptism—the main idea, the thing commanded—is purification or consecration. This is the thing signified by the external symbol; and the mode of applying the symbol is comparatively unimportant. This is especially

<sup>1</sup>Biblical Repository for 1840, p. 353.

the case in Christian baptism. Hence no particular mode is prescribed in our Saviour's command to baptize; and the only thing upon which the mind can fasten in this command as of divine obligation, is the thing signified by the word *baptizo*, which is to *purify* or *consecrate* by the application of water in some mode." (p. 38.)

After quoting the last remark of Dr. P.'s Mr. S. says:

"George Fox himself could not have desired or produced any better Quakerism than that passage. Baptism consists, as the reader must see, of two parts; the *external symbol*, and the *thing signified*." He quotes from Dr. P., or *pretends* so to do, and says now "the only thing upon which the mind can fasten in the command to baptize, is the thing signified. Why should Mr. Smith misrepresent Dr. P. by a garbled quotation? When Mr. S. will quote Dr. P.'s sentence *entire* he will find that he cannot torture it so as to make it teach what he charges upon him. There is not in the whole of Dr. P.'s book, a sentence more plainly in harmony with the views even of Baptists themselves, than the one which Mr. S. misquotes and then calls "Quakerism full blown." That the reader may have this fully before him, we quote again Dr. P.'s sentence. "The only thing upon which the mind can fasten, in this command, as of divine obligation, is the thing signified by the word *baptize*, which is to *purify* or to *consecrate*, by the application of water in some mode." If to interpret Baptism as meaning "to purify or to consecrate by the application of water in some mode," is "Quakerism full blown," then to say that baptism is "immersion and nothing else," must be Quakerism gone to seed.

In proof of his position, that when the New Testament was written *baptizo* had become synonymous with *katharizo*, Dr. P. quotes (p. 39.) the passage in Luke 11: 38—41.

On this Mr. S. remarks, "It is evident from this verse that the superstitious Pharisees immersed themselves whenever they came from any public place, for the purpose of purifying themselves from any defilement which they might have contracted."—p. 50. And can it be that Mr. S. admits that the "thing signified by their baptism" was purification? He says, The Pharisees immersed themselves. Why? "for the purpose of purifying themselves from any defilement which they might have contracted." It need scarcely be said that with the exception that Mr. S. says "immersed," and Dr. P. says, "by the application of water in some mode," the position of the two writers is the same. The main idea is *purification*. No man can prove that "superstitious Pharisees," or any other kind of Pharisees, "immersed themselves" whenever they came from any public place. That this was done at times, no one will dispute, but that this was an habitual practise no one can show.

Mr. S. adds: "The Pharisee evidently observed this custom for the sake of ceremonial purification *as an effect* of baptism,

(i. e. immersion.") p. 15. "Agreed, we say, except in denominating baptism immersion; and we ask, if this Pharisee "observed this custom for the sake of ceremonial purification as an effect of baptism," as Mr. S. admits, then did not his mind, to use the language of Dr. P., "fasten on the thing signified by the word baptize, which is to purify by the application of water?" Upon which does the mind of any thinking man fasten with most force, the ceremony or the rite, or upon the thing signified by it?

Mr. S. makes another admission on the same page. He says, "But suppose that Dr. P. has established all that he asserts in this paragraph, what has he proved? Why, that in the *mind of that Pharisee* these two words were synonymous" Very well. "*In the mind of that Pharisee*" *catharizo* and *baptizo* were synonymous. Here is an admission of the point which Dr. P. endeavors to establish, and yet, though Mr. S. admits the truth of Dr. P.'s position, he elsewhere says that it all rests on an "*assumption* for which not a particle of proof is afforded." But in order to set aside the force of this admission, Mr. S. asks: "Are we then to take Pharisaical superstitions as our guide in the Christian ordinance of baptism?" We reply, that this "superstitious Pharisee" was doubtless familiar with the meaning of language as used in his own day, and Mr. S. has admitted that to his mind *katharizo* and *Baptizo* were synonymous. He also quotes what he calls the practise of this Pharisee to prove that immersion is baptism and nothing else," and if we are to take this superstitious Pharisee as our guide in the *mode* of performing Christian baptism, there can be no good reason for discarding him as our guide respecting the "thing" on which his mind fastened—"purification by the application of water in some mode."

Did our limits permit, we should be glad to proceed in this examination of Mr. Smith's answer to Dr. Peters. It would however, be but a repetition of the ground commonly taken in this controversy. Dr. Peters shows that baptism was administered by sprinkling and not by immersion, and Mr. Smith brings the common arguments in reply.

Before we close we must however be permitted to notice two serious charges made by Mr. S. against Dr. P. He is charged with *misrepresenting* the Baptists because he says they make "the mode the essential thing in baptism." "Now," (says Mr. S.) "I pronounce this at once a most disreputable begging of the whole question, and a gross calumny upon us." (p. 9.) Here are two charges. In saying that the "Baptists make the mode the essential thing in baptism, he is guilty of a disreputable begging of the question." This is quoted from p. 128 of Dr. Peters' work. After having proved satisfactorily that baptizo does not necessarily mean immerse, he is charged with "begging the question," because he says; "the Baptists make the mode the essential thing." And what

the question? For what has Mr. S. written his book? Why "Smith on Peters," evidently means to prove that baptizo means immerse. And yet Dr. P. is guilty of a "*disreputable begging of the question*," because he says the "Baptists make the mode the essential thing in baptism." If those who dispute with Baptists must admit all they claim or else beg the question, then what can there be to dispute about?

But (2.) This is accompanied by a charge still more serious. Mr. S. calls Dr. P. a calumniator, because he asserts that they "*make the mode the essential thing*." (p. 9.) It is a serious charge to bring against a Christian brother, that he is a calumniator, and it may be well to see if this charge can be sustained.

Mr. Smith says: "Our position is that immersion is not a mode but the thing itself." (p. 10.) What does this mean? Leave out the negative part of the proposition and it reads: "Our position is that immersion \* \* \* is the thing itself. By this he doubtless means to be understood to hold that baptism which is not performed by immersion, is not baptism. And what is this but affirming that a particular mode of performing a certain act is essential to the act? And is it *calumny* for Dr. Peters to assert that the "mode" is regarded by the Baptists as the "essential thing?" On Mr. Smith's own showing, Dr. P. is no more a calumniator than himself. Yet he asks: "can Dr. P. have read a single book on baptism by a Baptist writer and make this statement? (p. 10.) Again I say, we have no dispute about the *MODE*, all we ask is the *THING*. Our position is, that immersion is not a *MODE*, but *THE THING ITSELF*."

If the command to baptize necessarily *defines the mode* in which it must be performed, why have the "Baptist writers" taken so much pains to make it apparent that there was "much water" wherever baptism was performed? If baptizo means nothing but immerse, and the thing defines the mode, why take so much pains to dwell upon the Greek particles? One might as well say that the command given to Abraham to circumcise himself and his household defined the *mode* in which it should be performed. Whether the foreskin was cut with a knife or with a sharp stone, does not matter at all in our view. God commanded Joshua to make ("knives of stones," in the original, but in our translation,) "sharp knives, and circumcise again the children of Israel the second time." Josh. 5: 2. Suppose now some hundreds of years after this, a sect had arisen who maintained that it was not proper to use a knife made of steel in the practice of this rite, and who cited this divine command to Joshua as the proof, that circumcision is not circumcision which is not performed with a sharp stone. Would it be "calumny" to say that such made the mode the essential thing? They urge that they have no controversy about the *mode*, they want the "thing itself," which is, to be circumcised



with a sharp stone." In this view the mode is *everything*, and yet it is calumny in another to assert it.

If the *mode* is the *thing*, then any one who is physically able to put another man under water is capable of baptizing him. Mr. S. somewhere disclaims the Campbellites as Baptists; but how can he do so consistently if baptism is immersion, and if Campbellites have been immersed, then certainly they have been baptized.

The word baptizo does *not* define the mode in which the rite shall be performed. Paul says, (1 Cor. 10: 2,) "Our fathers were baptized unto Moses;" but how? They passed under a cloud, and through the sea. Suppose it be admitted that they were immersed in the cloud and the sea, yet it is evident that Paul used baptizo in the generic sense, and then specifies the *mode*; but if the *mode* is included in the *thing*, then why specify the manner in which it was done? There is not the shadow of proof that the Israelites were immersed in the sea. Mr. Smith says: "Webster defines the English word *immerse*, to *put under water or other fluid, to plunge, to dip*. According to these authorities, a man cannot be immersed in water, without being *put under the water*." p. 24. If the water is put on him, then he is not immersed according to Webster and Smith; for he cannot be immersed in water without being *put under* it. According to our own view of immersion, it implies, furthermore, that the fluid must come in *contact* with him. Could an individual be in an isolated condition, as in a diving-bell, where the fluid could not reach him, he would not be *immersed* even if he were in the bottom of the sea. Taking Mr. S.'s definition of immersion, we say without fear of contradiction, that neither he nor any other "Baptist writer," can shew that when the Israelites were baptized unto Moses, they were immersed. It *cannot be shown* that the water of the Red Sea came in *contact* either with their persons or their garments; and hence, they were not immersed, according to the definition of the term which the "Baptist writer," whose book we are examining, has given.

We cannot take leave of Mr. Smith's book, without first referring to one or two of his closing remarks, which were probably intended for the "application," as they are addressed "to any of [his] pedo-baptist friends who may have thought it worth their while to follow [him] through these pages."

He says, (p. 179): "Baptism is declared by the Holy Ghost to be '*the answer of a good conscience towards God*.' Now, a good conscience, in relation to any religious duty, implies a correct understanding of that duty; and a correct understanding implies a fair examination. \* \* \* Reading the word of God even, is not an examination of it, if you read with a determination not to sacrifice your preconceived opinions and prejudices." The plain meaning of this, when addressed to pedo-bap-

tists, is, that in order to be conscientious in the performance of this duty, they must be immersed. They must so read the Bible as to understand Christ as teaching that immersion, and nothing else, is baptism.

Has Mr. Smith a "good conscience" on this subject? Does he "read the Scriptures with a determination to sacrifice his preconceived opinions and prejudices?" Let him answer for himself.

Again, he says, (p. 68,) "New Testament baptism cannot be anything but the immersion of believers. Though it could be demonstrated that *baptizo* has fifty meanings, of which only one represents a burial, the forty-nine ought to be rejected and the one chosen; for Paul declares that a BURIAL IS EXPRESSED IN BAPTISM, *for the reason* that nothing else is an adequate sign of our separation from sin. THEREFORE WE ARE BURIED WITH HIM IN BAPTISM." Here is a "preconceived opinion," which will not be altered or amended by forty-nine passages, because they do not coincide with his interpretation of the fiftieth.

And what shall we say of the conscience of another "Baptist writer," Mr. Carson. He says, as quoted in Hall's "Law of Baptism," 2nd edition, "It is a fixed point that baptism means immersion, and in the examination of the reference in the baptism of the Spirit, NOTHING CAN BE ADMITTED inconsistent with this;" and then adds, (p. 164,) "The baptism of the Spirit MUST HAVE reference to *immersion*, BECAUSE *baptism is immersion*."

So with respect to the "baptism of couches." Mr. Carson (vide Hall, p. 46,) maintains that "the couches might have been so constructed that they might be conveniently taken to pieces." Mr. Carson had convinced himself that in "heathen Greek," *baptizo* meant to immerse, and he brings this preconceived opinion with him when he comes to the Bible; and he carries it with him in all his investigations.

Mr. S. further remarks: "It is only by coming to the word of God with a prayerful spirit, and a firm purpose to *do* the duty you may find taught there, that you may hope to learn what duty is. Have you ever done this? If not, can *your* baptism be in any sense the answer of a good conscience towards God? Can you have any *conscience at all in relation to it*?"

We do not claim that all pedo-baptists lay aside all preconceived opinions and prejudices; nor will we admit that Baptists do so. We will go as far for conscience-sake as any Baptist; yet we deem it unfair to be denounced as devoid of conscience, because our conscience does not direct us into the water, so long as the Holy Ghost does not so direct.

Mr. S. further teaches, by implication at least, that pedo-baptists do not "keep the commandments," because they are not immersed. The proposition amounts to this: Baptists are im-

mersed, and pedo-baptists are not ; therefore, there is no conscience in relation to the command, nor obedience to it except among the Baptists. These things are said, adds Mr. S. "in a spirit of brotherly kindness." Should a second edition of his book be demanded by the public, we sincerely hope that he will add to his brotherly kindness, CHARITY!

## ARTICLE IX.

## ASTRONOMICAL VIEWS OF THE ANCIENTS.

By Professor TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., University of New York.

## No. II.

[Concluded from 'page 316.]

THE doctrine of the earth's sphericity was, of course, accompanied by the belief in the existence of antipodes, or, at least, of antipodal regions, whether regarded as inhabited by men, or wild beasts, or monsters of the deep ; for the determination of these latter points belonged more properly to practical geography, than to any astronomical theory of the earth's figure. The word *antipodes*, ἀντιπόδες, does not occur in Aristotle's Treatise De Coelo, although he uses other terms evidently implying the same thing. It may be found, however, in Plutarch, and in Strabo's description of India, lib. xv. c. 1. ; where he also speaks of the Brachmans holding the same opinions about the world's sphericity, &c., as are maintained by the Greeks. Περὶ πολλῶν δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοδοξεῖν,—ὅτι γὰρ γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαγτὸς λέγεται καὶ κεντρικὸς καὶ σφαιροειδής. "For they say that the world is generated, (or produced in time,) and perishable, as likewise that it is spherical ; in the middle of which is situated the earth"—γῆ δ' ἐν μέσῳ ἴδεται τοῦ παντός—and, of course, corresponding to it in form, according to that conception of Hesiod to which we have previously adverted, page 309.

One of the most striking uses of the word ἀντίπους, may be found in the Timæus of Plato, 63 a. Lips. vii. 63, where the philosopher had been reasoning about the true nature and meaning of *up* and *down*. "When anything," he says, "is of a similar nature on all sides, or in every direction, how could one rightly apply to a perfectly similar relation, contrary names?" And then he makes the following supposition : "Should there be a solid body, such that every part of the whole tended equally towards the centre, (ἰσοπαλές) there would be no relation to or from any extreme part in one direction that did not equally exist in another ; but should any one travel round it in a circle, (πορεύοιτό τις ἐν κύκλῳ) although often standing antipodal (in regard to previous positions)

(πολλάκις ἂν στὰς ἀντίπους) he would, nevertheless, everywhere speak of *up* and *down* in the same relation to himself."

Thus it will be seen that the common or vulgar objection has always been the same, and that it has always been met by the same common-sense answer of the sufficient or insufficient reason. If it were said, that bodies would fall from the earth's lower surface, the reply would be at once made by the query—Towards what would they fall?—Πῶς ποῦ' οἰσθήσεται? If not to the centre, why in one direction rather than in another? When once there is clearly held in the mind the idea of such a centre, it is directly seen that *up* and *down* are terms that have no meaning, except in relation to it. This is the answer given by Aristotle, showing that he perfectly understood the whole philosophy of antipodes, and rendering idle and hopeless any attempts to excuse the absurd and blundering ignorance of Swedenborg respecting his opinions. The best possible explanation of the common difficulty would be found in his own language. "Towards the centre," says he, "we call *down*, and from the centre towards the extremities or superficies is *up*."—De Coelo, iv. 1. 4. And from this he proceeds to explain our conceptions of *gravity*; "since by the term *heavy*, or *weight*, we mean only the tendency to the centre, and by *light* the contrary"—τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου φερόμενον ἄνω λέγω φέρεσθαι, κάτω δε, τὸ πρὸς τὸ μέσον—wherefore he says again: ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν κούφον λέγομεν τὸ ἄνω φερόμενον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον—βαρὺ δὲ, τὸ ἀπλῶς κάτω, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον.

Pliny's reasoning is of the same kind—that is, he meets the common objection, not by any scientific interpositions of airs and fluids, as the school of Anaxagoras would have done had they held a similar theory, nor by any doctrine of attractions, such as with hardly any more meaning would be presented in some books of modern science, but by going directly to the sufficient reason, as exhibited in our ideas of the necessary relations involved in the terms *up* and *down*—these being regarded as ever having reference to a centre, and as having, in fact, no meaning, and implying no direction, without it. Ingens hic pugna literarum, contraque vulgi: circumfundi terrae undique homines, conversique inter se pedibus stare, et cunctis similem esse coeli verticem, ac simili modo ex quacumque parte mediam calcari: illo quaerente, cur non decidant contra siti: tanquam non ratio præsto sit, ut nos non decidere mirentur illi. Sed quid hoc refert alio miraculo exoriente? pendere ipsam, ac non cadere nobiscum, ceu spiritus vis mundo præsertim inclusi dubia sit: aut possit cadere, natura repugnante, et quo cadat, negante. "Here is the great controversy between the learned and the vulgar mind; the one maintaining that men are spread over all sides of the earth—that they stand with their feet turned towards each other—that to all there is a vertex of heaven above, presenting the same appearance,

and that, in a similar manner, from every part of the earth, the centre is directly under foot ; whilst the other is ever asking, why then do not they fall off who are situated on the opposite side ? as though the reasonable reply were not ever at hand, that *our* not falling off may be, perhaps, just as much a wonder to them. Yet what is the use of any explanation which only gives rise to another and another miracle (or inexplicable phenomenon), such as that it is suspended, and does not fall down with us, because there may be, as it were, some doubtful or obscure power of air or spirit enclosed within the mundus ;<sup>1</sup> since it is enough for us to say, that nature herself is opposed to any notion of its falling, by denying that there is any one direction in which it should fall rather than in any other."

Pliny's expression here, *natura repugnante*, may appear to some not only very unphilosophical and very unscientific, but also very absurd. It would seem to have a resemblance to that old maxim, *nature abhors a vacuum*, which has so long been a theme of jest to the modern lecturer, and which furnishes so apposite an illustration of the mistakes that are often made in respect to the spirit of ancient science, that we cannot resist the temptation of briefly dwelling upon it as being somewhat kindred to our main subject. The maxim, and the anecdote by which it is set forth, are generally given with embellishments and variations. A pupil, it is commonly said, once inquired of one of the old philosophers, why water rose in the pump. Nature abhors a vacuum was the sage and scientific reply. But why then does it rise to the height of thirty-three and a half feet only ? Because nature abhors a vacuum to this extent of thirty-three and a half feet, but from that point her abhorrence proceeds no farther. Now this may all do very well for the purpose of pleasantly impressing on the minds of classes the scientific fact ; yet, certainly, an injury is done to the intelligence of the student of far more consequence than any that is inflicted on the reputation of ancient science, if the impression is really conveyed, that Aristotle, and others who used language similar to this, are justly chargeable with the nonsense thus imputed to them. They were, it is true, ignorant of some of the scientific steps, a few more of which, and a very few indeed, have been so revealed as to enable us to proceed an inch or two further in the process of explanation. They saw indeed a few less links in the vast chain of which we yet, with all our science, see so very little. But this did not stand in the way of that *à priori* tendency of the ancient mind, which has been so much contemned because it has been so little understood. They reached forth at once to

<sup>1</sup> The idea of the theory to which Pliny alludes, would seem to be, that some universal fluid, enclosed within the mundus, keeps the earth in its place, by pressing upon it equally on all sides ; which would be in fact a theory of impulsion instead of attraction

that ultimatum of science which presented itself as legitimately to their limited, as to our more extended knowledge of facts. Overleaping all intermediate stages, which may be ever so numerous, they recognised directly the presence and pressure of that great physical power which binds and holds together the universe, and which is felt in the smallest as well as in the largest movements of nature. This, they maintained, allows of no *νεκρον*, or vacuum, which its energy did not reach, and penetrate, and pervade, however destitute that portion of space might be of other material powers or substances. We have taken a step here in advance of Aristotle, (although even this, if we may judge from some parts of his works, is rather doubtful,) in regarding the rise of the water as resulting from the weight or pressure of air as the *proximate* cause. But what, it may be asked, makes the weight and consequent pressure of the atmosphere? The attraction of gravitation, which, in plain Anglo-Saxon, is simply *the drawing of weight*, or in other words neither more nor less than what Aristotle defines as the *tendency to the centre*. But what makes the attraction of gravitation? A fluid, it is answered, pervading the system, and pressing inwardly on the sun and subordinate central points. But what produces motion in this fluid, and ever interrupts its tendency to quiescence and equilibrium? Another fluid, or the same fluid as its resistless flow<sup>1</sup> comes pressing in from the immense ab extra spaces of the universe. Now what is this but getting round at last, to the old maxim, *nature abhors a vacuum*—she shudders at emptiness—she allows of no absolute rest. There is, moreover, no part of space in which she is not always energising. All matter is itself an energy, and so also everywhere, between all visible tangible matter, there is ever operating an unceasing energy. Every effect or power in one part of the universe, is producing some effect in every other; and this must be diffused everywhere in just proportion; otherwise disorder, *anomaly* or unevenness, (*ἀνομαλία*) would ensue; or to use Aristotle's strange language, (Physic. Ausc. IV. 9 5.) *πύμανεῖ ὁ οὐρανός*—the heaven, or outward

<sup>1</sup> The natural tendency not only of some of the old philosophical theories, but also of certain aspects of modern science, greatly favors the thought that nature in herself, and aside from all idea of the supernatural as a counteracting power, is a series of immense cyclical periods. If so, what is now a *flow inward*, may at some remote period reach its maximum, and thenceforth become an *ebb*, separating, dissolving, and dispersing into infinity what it now binds into systems and harmonious organizations. Nature, in herself, gives but little countenance to the doctrine of eternal progress. She sheds darkness instead of light over the moral destiny of man, and even in respect to the future physical prospects of the race, she is a veiling, an obvelation, rather than a revelation, as she has been so boastingly styled. Blessed are those who have a better light, and who, in respect to all the higher interests of our world and species, trust implicitly in the Holy Scriptures, as a lamp shining in a dark place.

bound of the great spherical kosmos, would swell out and wave like the rising and falling billows of the ocean.

But, to return from this wide digression, to our more immediate subject of the antipodes, we may express a doubt, whether, in regard to this matter, there is that great difference between the scientific and the untaught, which is generally imagined. With all the standing witticisms in respect to popular notions, and notwithstanding the fondness which some men of small science often manifest for magnifying what they would call the popular ignorance, we can hardly believe that any plain unscientific man of common sense ever found the least difficulty in the explanation, when once clearly presented to his mind. The stale anecdotes of rustic wonder, which form so prominent a topic with lecturing sciolists, and the stupid reasoning respecting the impossibility of hanging with the head downward, from which Swedenborg found it so difficult to drive even Aristotle himself, may be regarded as about on a par with the old tales, to which we have alluded, of the elephant, the serpent, and the tortoise.

We must, however, distinguish the doctrine of antipodal regions from the question, whether, or not, they were actually inhabited. In determining the latter point, other than astronomical reasons had place. According to the most common and popular histories of Columbus, the ecclesiastics who opposed him, are said to have denied the existence of antipodes on the authority of Saint Augustine. We have seen paintings of this kind, in which the bold navigator is represented, standing in the presence of Caiphas-looking men who scowl indignantly on his heretical doctrine, and, for his refutation, point in bigoted and priestly triumph to the open tome of this orthodox father. Now this is merely the way in which some writers and painters ever choose to represent science as persecuted by what they would style narrow-minded religious intolerance. Facts, however, would show, that when this feeling has in some degree existed, and even where it has displayed its darkest aspect, it has generally been called out, not so much by any dislike to discovery per se, according to the usual charge, as by the irreligious attitude which the pride of a little advance in knowledge has almost always generated. We do not think that this was the case with the devout discoverer of America; although the feeling has been most abundantly manifested since, by many among whom he is the standing theme of eulogy. In the case, however, of the famous Italian astronomer, an attentive examination of the facts, we think, will bring the candid mind to the conclusion, that the bigotry was not all on the side of the priests, intolerant as they may have been. Under all the meekness of the supposed martyr, there might be seen to lurk a feeling of satisfaction at the thought of being wiser than the records of our faith, and of the same nature with that which has, in more modern times,

led the geologist far out of his track, to place in the strongest light the supposed discrepancy between himself and Moses. The same feeling may be traced to the still earlier days of Saint Augustine, and doubtless occasioned the expression of the opinion to which reference is made in these paintings, and histories of Columbus. It is beyond all doubt, that this father held the scientific doctrine of his day respecting the earth's sphericity; and held it, too, as being himself a man of science and extensive learning; as one versed in all the then current knowledge, and equal in this respect to Pliny, or any philosopher of his own immediate times. Of course he believed in antipodal regions; but he denied that they were inhabited by human beings, because of the consequences sought to be deduced from it by irreligious and antichristian antagonists.

As far then, as the state of knowledge was concerned, both parties were agreed. The man, too, who plumed himself on his little science, held equally with the father, that the antipodal regions were inaccessible to us from this hemisphere, and he therefore maintained that they were inhabited by men, for no other reason than simply because it furnished him with an argument against the unity of the human race, the common descent from Adam, and all those consequent views of the great doctrine of human redemption that Augustine drew from it. The latter, therefore, on the faith of the Scriptures, regarded in its bearing on the common scientific belief, and taken in connection with such scientific belief, denied the existence of any such extra-Adamic beings. Any one will see that this is just the fair view of the matter, who will take the pains to consult the book *De Civitate Dei*, where the famous opinion of this father respecting the antipodes is given. The soul deeply imbued with a love of the true and the fair, will have no great difficulty in discovering on which side the real narrowness and bigotry existed in their worst forms. In his momentous struggle with the Pelagian heresy, this noble champion of the Christian faith was intent on truths of a far higher order, than are involved in any merely scientific speculations of such men as Galileo and Copernicus—truths of a far higher order than any questions respecting the figure or motion of the earth, whether regarded as round or flat, as moving or at rest. It is a very vulgar mistake respecting Augustine, that he was a theologian merely. Before his conversion, he was distinguished not only for eloquence, and knowledge of rhetoric, but also for his acquaintance with the whole range of ancient philosophy. Beyond all doubt, he was familiar with the astronomical views of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and Pliny. The same error prevails in respect to his works. Instead of these being wholly devoted to theology, there are contained in them extended and systematic treatises on the leading sciences; some of which may yet be cited as furnishing most ad-



mirable models of synthetic instruction. It may be truly said, therefore, that he received all the established science of his day, and even aided its progress by his own discoveries; but never would he defer to its claims, or its pretensions, when he once found it arraying itself, in a spirit of either open or disguised warfare, against truths which he had learned from a higher evidence than the scientific *γνώσις*, and from a deeper department of his soul than that which was concerned with inductions from scientific phenomena.

There are remaining two other views of the ancient astronomy, to which we would briefly call attention in the present sketch. That the earth was spherical, has been shown, we think, to have been a very early, a very common, and at last, the almost universal belief. Besides this, there was the old Pythagorean doctrine, now known to be the true view of the solar system, and which maintained, that the sun was the centre around which the earth and the other planets revolved, whilst the earth, by turning on its axis, produced all the phenomena of day and night. And thirdly, there was a modified or partial view, which contented itself with asserting this diurnal rotation of the earth upon its own axis, whilst in respect to the larger revolutions, it was regarded as immovably fixed in the centre of the universe.

It is well known that Pythagoras, and some of his followers, held a theory substantially the same with that view of the solar system now styled the Copernican. To some minds, however, the grounds in which they maintained it, would seem so insufficient, as to give it the appearance rather of a traditionary wreck of some older and more perfect science, than of having been itself the result of observation, or of any reasoning from phenomena. It is not therefore an irrational supposition, that Pythagoras found it in the course of his eastern travels, and derived it, in fact, from the Egyptians or Phœnecians. If this be so, it would furnish evidence, that a view which we now regard as the great triumph of modern science, actually prevailed in the earliest ages of the world, and perhaps survived the flood in the form of a tradition, whilst the true scientific grounds on which it had once been held had perished.

This system, although generally rejected in the cotemporary and subsequent schools of the Greek philosophy, (not being held at all by Aristotle, and being only accepted in a modified form by Plato,) was afterwards, as we have already mentioned, maintained by Aristarchus. He held it, however, not on the *a priori*, and somewhat mystical, reasonings of the Pythagoreans, but on what would be called more strictly inductive and scientific grounds. In other words, it presented to him the only theory on which the various movements of the celestial bodies could be satisfactorily explained. The solid views entertained by this astronomer, ren-

dered more inexcusable the course of Ptolemy in going back to the other or Aristotelian doctrine of the central position of the earth.

If we can rely upon the statement of Aristotle, the Pythagoreans maintained their opinion solely by *a priori* reasoning—ἐκ τῶν λόγων, rather than ἐκ τῶν φαινόμενων. "In regard to the position of the earth," (as he tells us in his book *De Coelo* II. 13,) "all have not the same opinion. For whilst the greater part say that it is situated in the centre (at least all of them who hold that the universe is finite, πεπερασμένον, bounded or finished), the Italian school, on the other hand, and those called Pythagoreans, maintain just the contrary. They contend that the fire (τὸ πῦρ, or the sun) holds the central place—that the earth is one of the stars or planets, and that by being borne in a circle round the centre, it makes the day and night. In all this they seek not for reasons and causes (λόγους καὶ αἰτίας) corresponding to the phenomena, but they violently draw, or distort the phenomena, to bring them in harmony (πειρώμενοι συγκαθεύειν) with their opinions; thus viewing the credible, (τὸ πιστόν) or the true, not from or through the phenomena, but rather, looking at the phenomena themselves in the light of their own reasons. For they think that to the most precious substance fitly pertains the most precious place; and as fire, they say, is more precious than earth, so is the end, or an end, than the intervening parts; but the outer-extremity (ὁ ἔσχατον) and the centre are each (πέρας,) an end,<sup>1</sup> (bound, termination, or conclusion). From such reasonings as these, they maintain that the earth does not possess the middle of the sphere, but the fire or the sun. These Pythagoreans, moreover, have another similar argument. That place, they hold, to which would naturally pertain the guardianship of the whole system, must be the most lordly, (τὸ κυριώτατον τοῦ παντός) or place of supreme power. Now the centre is such a position, which, therefore, they call Διὸς φυλακήν, Jove's watch-house,<sup>2</sup> or watch-station; and for this rea-

<sup>1</sup> There would appear to be some confusion in Aristotle's language here. The Pythagoreans, as appears from other authorities, and from what Aristotle himself says in other places, held that the phenomena of day and night were caused by the earth's diurnal revolution on its own axis, aside from its annual revolution, by which the seasons were produced. The expression here, φερόμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον, may possibly refer to the motion on the axis, or round the centre of the earth, although in the immediate context it is used in the other sense. Perhaps Aristotle meant to include both parts of the doctrine, but in his attempt at conciseness, has made a careless and defective statement.

<sup>2</sup> This would give the highest and most honorable places to the sun and fixed stars—one occupying τὸ μέσον, and the other τὸ ἔσχατον or the outer sphere; the earth and other planets having τὰ μετὰ, the intervening, or less honorable positions.

<sup>3</sup> It is an exceedingly bold and sublime metaphor, taken from military language, and seems to be admirably suited to the idea of the universal, central,

son, again, they suppose that *fire* (the most powerful substance, as earth is the most inert), occupies this lordly region. But for all this (continues Aristotle) they ought not to declaim in such a way about their *τὸ πᾶν*, neither ought they to bring in with so much parade their figure of the watch-station as belonging to the centre, but seek this simply, as a matter of fact, where the centre really is, and what it is, and what naturally belongs to it; for wherever it is, and whatever it is, it is both beginning, and centre, and most precious place."

Aristotle has evidently but little respect for this reasoning of the Pythagoreans, and yet it is far from being that nonsense which he and others would regard it. It distinctly recognizes a *κόσμος*, an order, a harmony, a unity in the universe—something which must be seen and acknowledged before facts or phenomena can be seen aright, or assigned to their proper rank, or have allotted to them their proper force. Thus, whatever errors there may be in their views or reasonings, taken in detail, or in respect to particular facts, there is, nevertheless, what is of far more value than all mere observation that is blind to it, or proceeds inductively without it. There is, in other words, a recognition of a *fitness of things*, of something which is *βέλτιστον* and *κυριώτατον*, most lordly and best,—of a law and order lying back of appearances, and a belief in which we must, to some extent, carry with us in judging of phenomena, instead of making naked phenomena, viewed in themselves alone, the exclusive medium through which we arrive at the law.

But, whatever we may think of the method, or science of the Pythagoreans, it is certainly a curious fact for our more zealous Baconians, that the advocates, in those ancient days, of what we now know to be the false system, should have so much to say about induction, experiment, and reasoning cautiously from facts or phenomena, whilst the maintainers of what we now know to be the true theory, should be the ones to be charged with a visionary, unscientific, or, in other words, un-Baconian method of reasoning.

It may be well now to give a specimen of Aristotle's arguments on the other side, or in favor of the immobility and centrality of the earth: "Let us, (he proceeds,) first inquire whether it hath motion or remains at rest. For, as we said before, some make it one of the stars or planets; and others, although assigning it its position in the centre, do, nevertheless, maintain that it rolls (*εἰλεῖσθαι*) and moves around the central pole (or axis of the universal sphere.) That this is impossible, will be clear to all who will, in the first place, accept it as a principle, that if it is borne

order-preserving power of gravitation. It is in this sense, the commander's station whence he can best direct his watchful care and energies to the regulation of the whole camp.

at all—whether being out of the middle, or on the middle—it must move by *force*, (or impulse communicated from without.) For no such motion (or property of motion) belongs to earth itself, (αὐτῆς γε γῆς) 'as earth; or otherwise each one of its parts would have the same motion; whereas we see, on the contrary, that they all tend directly (ἐπ' εὐθείας) in a straight line down to the centre. If, then, such motion be by force and praeternatural (βίαιος καὶ πᾶρά φύσιν,) it cannot be eternal; and yet, whatever belongs to the τάξις, or natural order of the kosmos, must be eternal.<sup>2</sup> Again, all the heavenly bodies that have a circular or orbit motion, with the exception of the first or outermost sphere, appear to *fall behind*,<sup>3</sup> or to move on the principle of more than one movement or revolution. The earth, then, whether around the middle, or upon the middle, must also, in that case, have two revolutions. Now, if this were actually so, there would necessarily be *paradoi* (πάφοδοι) and *tropics* (τροπαί), or turnings of the fixed stars, (τῶν ἐνδεδεμένων ἀστέρων.) Nothing of this kind, however, ever appears to happen; but the same bodies seem always both to rise and set in the same places."—De Coelo II. 14.

It is not easy to fix the precise meaning of this last argument, although its general force is obvious. If the earth went round the sun, he seems to say, it would, like the other planets, have two motions—one diurnal revolution every day, and an annual revolution in the contrary direction; unless there is adopted the other point of the Pythagorean doctrine, which makes it turn upon its own axis. The phenomena, however, in either case, would be the same; and the result, according to Aristotle, of these two motions, would be *paradoi*, or *tropics* of the stars.

St James, in a passage which is strikingly suggested by this, has a very similar expression, consisting of the same word τροπή, and joined with it another term, παραλλαγή, almost identical in meaning and etymological construction with Aristotle's word πάφοδος. The rendering, *parallax*, in James, 1: 17., would give a most sublime meaning, if we are not thereby compelled to

<sup>1</sup> There is meant here the element *earth*, as distinguished from water, &c., and not the *earth* as a body.

<sup>2</sup> By αἰετός here, is more properly meant *indefinitely self-sustaining*, without foreign aid; and such as without an extra interruption would be absolutely eternal in duration.

<sup>3</sup> The Greek word here, ὑπολείπμενα, is used in a very peculiar sense. It would seem to have come from the old idea that each one of the planets had its own sphere, in which it was placed, and of whose diurnal motion of twenty-four hours it partook, but not immovably. Every day the inbound planet slipped, or fell back a little, or did not quite keep up (ὑπελείπμενο) with the motion of its swiftly revolving sphere, so as by little and little to produce the orbit revolution of the planet in a contrary direction. The remoter stars were bound firmly in, (ἐνδεδεμένα,) or *fixed* in their empyrean, or outer sphere of fire, so that they had but one constant and unvarying revolution.

attribute to him a higher degree of astronomical science than he could possibly have possessed. It would most admirably represent the immutability of the Divine goodness and truth, or of the *Father of Lights*, as having ever the same eternal central place, from whatever position contemplated, or as being ever without "*parallax or shadow of turning*." We do not well see what else *παρόδος* can mean, in this passage of Aristotle, than what our astronomers would define by the kindred term *παράλλαξις*, parallax; or, in other words, the change which would take place in the position of a fixed heavenly body, on being seen by the same eye from remotely distant points of observation, made by the revolution of the earth upon its axis, or from stations immensely more remote, caused by our planet's annual journey round the sun. If this is his general or specific meaning, or even a fairly-to-be-inferred sense of the passage, the argument, we say, is a good one. As a specimen of inductive reasoning, it is sober, sound, cautious, legitimate, and well-sustained by the then known premises, although further advance in science has shown the conclusion to be false. We see not how it could have been well resisted, if we take into view the knowledge of his day, the phenomena on which he had to ground his argument, and the general premises, which, at that period, could hardly be even conceived of as being otherwise than as he assumes them.

He denies, then, (if we may attach this general meaning to his words,) the motion of the earth in an annual orbit round the sun, on the ground of its being impossible, in that case, that there should not be tropics<sup>1</sup> and parallaxes of the fixed stars. Now, this phenomenon certainly did not take place: no such appearance was ever observed even in the smallest degree; and he therefore concludes that the earth, being immovable, always preserves to these bodies the same relations. The ancients, although they had nothing like our accurate numerical estimates, did, doubtless, regard the planets as being very distant, and the fixed stars as being immensely more remote than the planets. This was a common opinion among philosophers and poets, and all men of enlarged and cultivated minds. The earth, also, was thought to be at a vast distance from the sun; and it was therefore deemed impossible that these bodies should be at such inconceivably greater distances, as to allow of no perceptible parallax, or apparent change of position, from such immense changes in the spectator's place of observation as would arise from the annual sweep of the earth round the sun. Now, when we consider how modern science faltered at this very point, even after she had been fur-

<sup>1</sup> One meaning of the passage may be, that if the earth moves round the sun in an annual as well as a diurnal revolution, the stars would have a northern and southern declination, and would not, therefore, rise and set during the year in the same points of the horizon,

nished with the best means of observation, and how much farther from us the fixed stars are found to be than the boldest minds dared to imagine at the time of the adoption of the Copernican instead of the Ptolemaic system, and the discovery of the telescope; when we call to mind, too, how confidently it was then expected by astronomers, that one of the first triumphs of that instrument would have been the clear detection of such parallax, and that the failure to do so, was, for some time, and even among the most scientific, a pressing, and hard-to-be-answered objection to the new theory we are prepared to appreciate the soundness of Aristotle's argument, viewed simply in respect to its inductive merits. Under the circumstances in which he was placed, and with the means of observation he enjoyed, his rejection of the Pythagorean doctrine of the annual revolution, (although there was no such inconsistency, at least not so great an inconsistency, in retaining the diurnal,) was more scientific than its adoption. If the earth moved round the sun, her whole immense orbit must have appeared, as seen from the nearest fixed star, a mere infinitesimal point too small for measurement. Such a distance even now almost staggers belief. At that day it was past all imagination; and the man who should have assumed it as the necessary ground of an hypothesis, would have had no right to regard it as anything strange or unreasonable that he should be charged with being visionary and unscientific.

Aristarchus, however, who was very far from being a visionary and mystical Pythagorean, did make this very assumption, which is so much in accordance with the strictest deductions of the most accurate modern science. On what grounds he did so, is not very well ascertained. We now know that he was right; but yet, on their own most cherished principles of reasoning and discovery, must our most rigid inductionists admit, that had they lived in the days of Aristotle, they must have adopted his method as the most legitimate, the most inductive, and in *fact* the most strictly Baconian.

The third opinion to which we have alluded, may be regarded as a modification of the Pythagorean theory. It conformed to the more generally received doctrine, by placing the earth in the centre of the universe, whilst, by giving it a motion on its axis, which was, at the same time, *the pole or axis of the great kosmos*, it accounted in an easy manner for the phenomena of day and night. One of the most striking passages in which this view is presented, may be found in the *Timæus* of Plato, 40 B. ΓΗΝ δέ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν *ΙΑΛΟΜΕΝΗΝ* (ἐιλουμένην) δὲ ΠΕΡΙ τὸ ΔΙΑ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΠΟΛΩΝ τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν ΝΥΚΤΟΣ τε καὶ ἡΜΕΡΑΣ ἐμχρήσατο. α: τ. λ. "The earth, also, our nurse or nourisher, he made to roll round the pole or axis that extends through the whole universe, so as to be the guardian and maker

of the day and night—the earth, the first and oldest of all bodies that were generated, or had their origin within the heaven.”

To this passage Aristotle refers *De Coelo* II. 13 : 4, where he says : “Some maintain that although situated in the centre, it rolls (*εἰλεῖσθαι*) round the pole that extends through the whole universe, as it is written in the *Timæus*.” Cicero also gives it the same interpretation. *Acad.* II. 39. Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus, coelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supra denique omnia, stare censet ; neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri ; quae quum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia quasi stante terra coelum moveretur. (*Vide April No. Bib. Rep.* 314.) “Hicetas the Syracusian, as Theophrastus tell us, maintains that the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars, and, in short, all things above us, do stand, and that in all the world nothing moves except the earth, which, by turning and twining around its axis with the utmost celerity, produces the same appearance in all things as if they were moving whilst the earth stood still.” After which he immediately subjoins—*Atqui hoc etiam Platonem in Timæo dicere quidam arbitrantur sed paullo obscurius.* “And the same also, as some think, does Plato say in the *Timæus*, although somewhat obscurely.” To the same effect is Cicero’s own translation of the *Timæus*, in which he thus renders into Latin the passage in question—*Jam vero terram, altricem nostram, quae trajeito axe sustinetur, diei noctisque effectricem, &c.*

It might seem strange that there should have ever been any dispute about the true sense of this place in the *Timæus*. It appears plain enough in itself ; and the clear interpretation of Aristotle—certainly no mean judge of Plato’s views,—would seem to take away all pretence of ambiguity. Cicero, too, gives it the same meaning, although for some reason he is led to regard it as somewhat obscurely expressed. It may be he thought it improbable that such an extravagant opinion should be held by his master Plato, and its very strangeness, therefore, he regards as its obscurity. In his translation of the *Timæus*, he renders *ἀλλοιότηρ, quæ sustinetur*, as though he would avoid the difficulty ; but still the idea of the earth’s rotation on its axis remains in the words that follow, *diei noctisque effectricem* ; for in no other possibly consistent sense can the earth be regarded as the guardian and maker of day and night.

The dispute about this passage is not a little curious ; and we may, therefore, expect to be pardoned for briefly dwelling upon it. The truth would seem to be, that the fair and obvious sense was first opposed by some of the later Platonists, who wished to rescue their ancient master from the opprobrium of holding so heretical a doctrine. Some did not hesitate to charge Aristotle with calumny in respect to his version of it ; and Proclus enters into

a labored exegesis on the word ἰλλομένην, to show that Plato's sense has been altogether mistaken.<sup>1</sup> He reasons also from the passage in the Phædon, to which we have already referred, (April No. p. 311.) where, as he says, Plato maintains the earth to be immovable—a sense which would be inconsistent with the passage in the Timæus, if taken according to the common version of Aristotle and others. It may be truly said, however, of those expressions in the Phædon, 199 A, that they do not at all imply absolute immobility in respect to motion round a central axis, but only deny such a motion to the earth as would in the least carry it out of its place as the central body of the universe. When he calls it “an equal-balanced thing, (ισοῦροπον πῶμα) placed in the centre of that which is every way similar, and having no tendency or bending in one direction more than in another,” οὐδ' ἔχον μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἤτιον οὐδαμῶς κλισθῆναι, he is simply arguing against those who found a difficulty in the earth's being sustained in its place, and kept from falling without an extra support. It is, therefore, motion *from* the centre, and not, at all, motion *around* the centre, that he denies in the Phædon. On the contrary, Plato took great delight in this idea, as furnishing one of those seemingly mystical paradoxes of which he was so fond. Hence he speaks of it elsewhere as the motion ἐν ἐνι, in distinction from φορά, motion ἐν πολλοῖς. He calls it in one place a fountain of all wonders, θαυμασιῶν ἀπάντων πηγή, and regards it as somehow mysteriously combining, at the same time, and in the most intimate union, the two opposite ideas of motion and rest,—a thought similar to that which Aristotle has in his *Physics*, Lib. viii. 9.—διὰ κινήσεως καὶ ἡρεμείας ἡ σφαῖρα.

With respect to this word ἰλλω, or εἰλω, (for they are evidently the same,) we may say that both its use and its etymology direct us to this meaning of *rolling* or *twining round*. It is closely allied to εἰλίσσω, εἰλώ, and remotely to κυλίω, κυλίνδω and the Latin *volvō*. A great variety of passages, moreover, might be cited in favor of this as the established sense, were it not rendered unnecessary by the clear testimony of Aristotle, and the irresistible inferences to be drawn from those other words of the passage, that represent the earth as being, in this way, the guardian of day and night.

Plutarch, in his life of Numa, goes even farther than this, and

<sup>1</sup> See the commentary of Ruhnkenius on the Platonic Lexicon of Timæus, p. 44, where he gives his own opinion in favor of the Aristotelian version of the passage from Plato, and yet goes largely into the reasons advanced by Proclus and Simplicius in support of the other sense of *binding*, &c., as belonging to ἰλλω. At vero pro altera sententia, quæ terram circa axem protensam alligat et constringit, acriter pugnant Proclus et Simplicius, duplices argumento usi, tum quod Plato aliis in libris terram immobilem statuerit, tum quod hic per omnia fere sit Pythagoreorum opinionem secutus. \* \* \*

Sed Aristotelem calumnie reum agit Simplicius, &c.



represents Plato as holding the whole Pythagorean theory. "This king," he says (Plutarch Numa, XI.) "made a *round* temple of Vesta (τῆς Ἑστίας) for the preservation of the *fire* that was never to be quenched. In doing which, he did not merely imitate the figure of the earth, as though the earth were Vesta, but rather the form of the universal kosmos, in whose centre the Pythagoreans hold the *fire* or the sun, to be situated; and this they call the real Vesta, and the *monad*. As for the earth, they regard it, as neither immovable, nor as being in the centre of revolution, but as swinging in a circle round the *fire* or the sun, and as not being, therefore, one of the most precious or first portions of the universe. *These opinions about the earth, they say, Plato held after he had become an old man* (πρεσβύτην γερόμενον) regarding it as having another place, whilst the middle and "most lordly" region pertained to something better."

It would seem from some expressions in this passage from Plutarch, that he had his mind upon what Aristotle says respecting the Pythagoreans; and to which we have already referred. If Plato ever held this opinion about the earth not being the centre, it must have been after he wrote the *Timæus*; as such a view would be greatly at war with some of the principal and fundamental positions of that treatise. Numa, however, who held the doctrine, which afterwards became that of the Italian school, although he himself undoubtedly lived before the time of Pythagoras, might very well have acted on the principle which Plutarch here attributes to him. Vesta, or Hestia, in the Greek mythology, is generally connected with the earth; but the idea of the eternal fire, of which she was the guardian, would very naturally suggest the thought, that this part of her worship was from some old belief that made the *FIRE*, or the sun, the centre, and support, and life-sustaining power of the world. The same conception, too, would easily arise in the mind from the mythical interpretation which Plato gives to Homer's "golden chain." *Theæt.* 153 D. It is true he himself refers it to the sun as *moving round*, and thus becoming the *bond* of the universe, (ξύρδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ *Rep* X. 616. c.) but if there is any mythical sense at all in Homer's remarkable expression, it would seem more naturally to have come from some other, and, perhaps, much older theory which gave the sun a more "*lordly*" and important position than he occupies in the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic. The physical power by which all things are kept in order in the universe, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται, to use Plato's own language, would certainly seem to be most akin to that universal central gravitating tendency which now is supposed to exist towards the sun as the centre of the system.

One of the most peculiar tendencies of the ancient mind was to the belief in cycles and returning periods, not only in respect to the motions of the heavenly bodies, but also in nature generally,

and in all her departments. It undoubtedly, however, had its origin in the early and steady observations of the stars and planets. Here all is circularity, regularity, repetition, or constant recurrence of the same or similar phenomena, with longer or shorter periods, yet so varied as to suggest a great number of corresponding analogies. The very name for *year* in Greek (*ετος*) contains this idea of repetition. It is akin to the conjunction *ετι* (*yet, still, again*;) the pronoun *ετερος*, the Latin *et*, the Saxon *yet*. It is that which comes again, and again, and *still* repeats itself, and *yet* remains the same. The constant recurrence of the moons, the seasons, and the solar periods, draws the mind forth to the observation of the longer and more varied cycles. One of the great uses of the heavenly bodies to us, as the Bible declares, is to serve as measures of times and seasons. It is hard for us now to realize how tedious and monotonous life must have been, had not this aid been afforded, or had men lived without having their attention drawn to it, as in the supposed early savage state described by Æschylus in the *Prometheus Vincetus*, 453.

ἀντρων ἐν μυχοῖς ἀνηλλοῖς—  
 Ἦν δ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς οὔτε χειματος τεκμαρ,  
 Οὔτ' ἀνθεμῶδους ἥρος, οὔτε καρπίμου  
 Θέρους βέβαιον· ἀλλ' ἄτερ γνώμης τὸ πᾶν  
 Ἐπρασσον, ἔστε δὴ σφιν ἀντολὰς ἑγὼ  
 Ἀστρων ἔδειξα, τὰς τε δῦσκειους δύσεις.

The next step would be to the observation of the longer and more complex periods. One of these was derived from the motion of the moon in reference to the sun and earth, by reason of which, after a certain observed time, the principal lunar phenomena occurred again, in the same order, or nearly in the same order as before. Still longer cycles were obtained from the conjunctions of the planets. And thus the mind was carried on by the most easy and natural analogy to the supposition of other cycles transcending all means of observation, or even of computation from any known visible phenomena; until, at last, the imagination found repose in the contemplation of the great year, the *magnus annus*, at the end of which there would commence a repetition of all astronomical phenomena that had ever taken place in the world. Of this Cicero speaks in a beautiful passage in his second book, *De Natura Deorum* 20. *Maxime vero sunt admirabiles motus earum quinque stellarum quae falso vocantur errantes. Nihil enim errat, quod in omni eternitate conservat*

<sup>1</sup> In sunless caves they dwelt—  
 Forerunning sign of winter had they none;  
 No mark of flowery spring, no token sure  
 Of summer with its fruits. But all confus'd  
 And dark they lived, till I the risings taught  
 Of stars, and sittings harder still to learn.

progressus et regressus, reliquosque motus constantes et ratos. Quod eo est admirabilius in his stellis, quia tum occultantur, tum rursus aperiuntur, tum adeunt, tum recedunt, tum celerius moventur, tum tardius, tum omnino ad quoddam tempus insistent. Quarum ex disparibus motionibus MAGNUM ANNUM mathematici nominaverunt, qui tum efficitur, quum solis et lunae et quinque errantium ad eandem inter se comparationem confectis omnis spatii est facta conversio. Quae quam longa sit magna quaestio est; esse vero certam et definitam necesse est.<sup>1</sup>

This is the great Platonic period of which Plato, with a strange mixture of seriousness and sportiveness, gives the numerical computation in a passage that has been much misunderstood, because he is supposed to be aiming to set forth a precise number, whereas he evidently uses his strange combinations of powers, and roots, and pempads, and epitrites, for the very purpose of sportively showing that the number is incalculable and incomprehensible.<sup>2</sup> He, however, would seem to include in this period, not only a recurrence of all astronomical phenomena, but, also, of all physical, and even moral, and political changes.

This transition is, indeed, very natural from the idea of astronomical, to that of physical cycles. Our earth was regarded as so bound up in the universe, as to be affected by all its changes. Hence the early belief in astrology, or the doctrine of stellar and planetary influences, although the name itself was then given to the science we now call astronomy. Nothing in the universe was isolated, or by itself. All was connected; and all parts were sharing, in various ways, in those movements that went to make up the advance, or the retrogression, or the revolution of the whole.

<sup>1</sup> "Very admirable indeed are the motions of those five stars, which are falsely called *planets* or *wanderers*. For nothing *errs* or wanders, which eternally preserves its progress, its regress, and all its other movements constant and determined; which is, in fact, the more worthy of admiration, because, at one time, they are hidden, then again they are disclosed to view; at one time they approach; again they recede: now they move with greater velocity; again move slowly; and then again, for a certain period, become stationary. From which unequal motions, the mathematicians have derived the name of the *great year*, which is accomplished when there has been a complete revolution, in consequence of all the spaces, or distances, of the sun and moon and five planets, in all their mutual relations to each other, having been exactly finished or fulfilled. How long this is, may be a great question; but that there is truly such a period, sure and definite, we are driven by necessity to believe."—De Nat. Deor. II. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Compare, also, the Politicus 269 A., where, from the fable of Atreus and Thyestes, he deduces the tradition of a period during which the sun once rose at that place where he now sets; and then follows it by the strange myth of the *winding up* and *unrolling*, or *rolling back*, of the universe—*ἐπιστροφή πᾶσις ἀναστὰς τῆς γένεως*—during one portion of which, all was *progress* from death to life, and from lower life to higher life; whilst, during the other, *the* order becomes, at length, wholly reversed, and the tendency is everywhere to ruin, decay, and a breaking up of all organization and harmony.

Egypt was the birth-place of these cyclical ideas, whence they seem to have spread over all parts of the ancient world. Hence the long periods of the Stoics, which have more of a physical and cosmological, than of an astronomical aspect—their final conflagrations—their absorptions into the primitive element, and again, the out-birth or development of renewed series of worlds. The ancient mind delighted in reaching forth to these ultimate views; the modern attaches more value to accuracy of knowledge. An ancient philosopher would love to lose himself in a speculation about the lunar cycle, and the effect of its returning period; the modern man of science thinks far more of predicting to a second, the time of a lunar eclipse, or of the occultation of a star.

And yet, as Dugald Stewart most truly observes, these cyclical hypotheses have not been without their partisans among modern theorists. Even the idea of a moral cycle, has had its advocates in our own age of the world. In proof of which, he cites from a periodical of his day, the following remarkable passage: "Similar periods, it has been said, but of an extent that affrights the imagination, probably regulate the modifications of the atmosphere. The aggregate labors of men, indeed, may be supposed, at first sight, to alter the operation of natural causes, by continually transforming the face of our globe; but it must be recollected that, as the agency of animals is itself stimulated and determined solely by the influence of external objects, the reactions of living beings are comprehended in the same necessary system, and, consequently, that all the events within the immeasurable circle of the universe, are the successive evolution of an extended series, which, at the returns of some vast period, repeats its round during the endless flux of time." Elem. Phil. vol. II. ch. II. sec. IV. 1.

Of course we do not believe in the above rhapsody; but it is because we *do* believe the Scriptures, and do not believe in that doctrine of eternal progress of which the cyclical view is but another necessary phase. If, however, we had no other guide but nature, we should be strongly drawn to become a disciple of the theory. Every thing in the *natural* world, as far as we can see, points to such a view, whether regarded as partial or universal. In every organic structure, from the smallest object up to the highest we know, there meets us this same ever-repeated idea of cyclical change—of birth, growth, maximum, decline, decay, transition—*transitus et interitus*. We see it in the vegetable, the animal,<sup>1</sup> the human world. It meets in all social and political

<sup>1</sup> From this natural tendency in the human mind to regard nature, and all the movements of nature, as involving the idea of cyclical revolution, came, in all probability, that remarkable expression *τροχὸν γυρίω*, James 3 : 6., and which has so much puzzled the commentators. It may be rendered *the WHEEL of generation*, or the *course of nature*, according to the more paraphrastic, yet less significant, mode of our common version. It is, probably, used there with

organisms; and even the moral, although deriving their life from a higher world, share in this influence from the physical associations with which they are connected. It presents itself even in the contemplation of the heavens, so far as our infinitesimal position, like that of the mite upon the pyramid, can enable us to make out any law of these greater organic changes.

For some time past, we admit, the apparently contrary doctrine of an eternal rectilinear progress has been a favorite speculation of many minds—that is, of progress in the sheer naturalistic view of the eternal duration of the human race upon the earth. There are, however, clear symptoms that this may be superseded by a return of some of the old cyclical theories. Or there may be an attempt to combine them both in some doctrine of spiral progression, or helical movement of double curvature.<sup>1</sup> But to the firm

a limited reference to the human body, or human existence, as exhibiting one of nature's *lesser cycles*, in which sense it would strongly suggest the expression in Ecclesiastes 12 : 6, *the wheel at the cistern*, and also the strange vision of Ezekiel. The best commentary on the expression used by Saint James, may be derived from a passage in *Aristotle's Physics*, Lib. 4. ch. 14 : 5 :—“Wherefore, time,” says he, “seems to be the motion of a sphere, because, by this, the other motions are measured, and time itself by this motion. From this, too, seems to come the usual mode of expression. For it is an old saying, that *all human things are a wheel*, *κύκλον ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα*; and so also is it said of all things that have physical motion, and birth, and corruption. This is because all things take place *in time*, and have their periods of beginning and ending in it; for time itself is a circle, *κύκλος τις*, or a cyclophery, *κυκλοφορία*.” Compare also Aristotle's Book of Problems.—Sec 17 Prob. 3.

<sup>1</sup> This idea is suggested by a rather amusing episode, which has very lately taken place in our current literature. A very popular discourse has just been published, in which there is very ably maintained this doctrine of the eternal, rectiline, and henceforth, never-to-be-interrupted progress of our race, and of its eternal duration upon the earth. It is, however, attacked by a critic in the New York Tribune, not on the ground of its being antibiblical (a position in reference to the address which might be very easily maintained), but, because it does not recognize, understandingly, what the critic calls “*the cycles and epicycles of Vico*,” and “*the oscillations and transitions of Machiavelli*.” Mr. Sumner, the author of the address, is also charged with “jumbling together with these” the theory of Condorcet, which is said to be “a reaction against the former, and to bear to it the relation of a tangent to a circle.” The critic also refers to “the veritable law as laid down by the great *Auguste Comte*, that Newton of the social system,” “which law corresponds with the motion of the *cycloid*, and combines also the double motion—the *rotatory* and the *revolutionary*.” He thinks, too, that the author of the address did not allude to this law of “the great *Compte*,” through “fear of offending Boston puritanism,” and in reply to the charge that “the great *Compte* is an atheist,” vehemently contends that this is wholly irrelevant matter in a “question of pure science,” such as must be every inquiry respecting the human destiny. This is certainly a strange imputation. We may wonder, on the contrary, that on such a question, not of geology, or astronomy, or physiology, but of human destiny, yea of man's moral and eternal destiny, Mr. Sumner, whose discourse certainly contains some very fine things, should not have made some reference to the written revelation of God, as well as to Vico and Condorcet. Of the “the great *Auguste Comte*,” of course, nothing of the kind was to have been expected.

believer in the written revelation; it matters not how, or on which side, the pendulum swings. The Bible takes ground above and independent of both. It raises us out of the physical into the moral world. It delivers us, on the one hand, from the gloomy prospect of the cyclical disappearance of our whole humanity both moral and physical, and, at the same time, teaches something better for us than progress either organic or intellectual. In short, it reveals a higher idea than that of progress—a final rest—a *perfection* immutable, and from which all movement in any direction is a departure and a retrogradation. "The grass withereth, the flower fadeth, but the Word of our God shall stand forever." "Lift up your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath; for the *heavens* shall vanish away like smoke, and the *earth* shall become old like a garment; but my *SALVATION* shall be *forever*, and my *RIGHTEOUSNESS* shall never be abolished."

One of the great achievements of the modern astronomical science, it is often said, has been its effect in enlarging our conception of the grandeur and vastness of the universe, and, of course, producing a consequent increase of piety and veneration. We would not wish to deny this, or to underrate it; and yet we think that there is, to some degree, a fallacy attending this favorite modern notion. True it is, we have gone far beyond the old astronomy, in reducing the distances of the nearest parts of our visible universe to numerical estimates on whose accuracy we may rely with a good degree of confidence. In respect, too, to other portions more remote, we have computed the minimum, or least limits, within which they cannot be, although, as yet, without any means of ascertaining, or even approximating to, the real measure of remoteness. Notwithstanding all this, we may rationally doubt whether, as far as the effort itself of conception or imagination is concerned, any great advantage comes from this to the contemplator of the universe, or any greater aid to devout and adoring thought than the heavens presented to pious souls before these numerical estimates were made. In some cases the very minuteness and accuracy of the measurement may detract from the emotional effect. Great as the number is, still, when we regard it as expressive of terrestrial distances, and know precisely by how many involutions (for a few of these soon mount up to the highest numbers) it has been raised from miles, and feet, and barleycorns, there is, somehow, a lessening of that sense of grandeur and vastness which accompanies more indefinite computations. We say that the planets are distant just so many rods, expressed in an inch or two of the decimal notation; the nearest fixed star is removed from us, at least, 40,000,000,000,000 miles. The wondering Greek, or the mystical-minded Egyptian priest, or the devout Jew, or the rapt star-gazing Chaldean, believed as well as we do, that these bodies were at a vast distance; but, with

them, thousands of thousands, and myriads of myriads, or ten thousand times ten thousand, may have expressed conceptions in reality as great as our own, and sometimes, (for this depends very much on the state of the emotions,) vastly greater and more powerful.

This thought that the sun and planets are at great distances, so great as to surpass all terrestrial measurements, and that the fixed stars are removed from us by spaces immensely greater still, was quite common in the ancient world. It is expressed by poet and philosopher, and doubtless formed a common idea of all thoughtful and cultivated minds. Of this we could give abundant and satisfactory proof if the limits of our already extended article would allow. In respect also, to the size of these bodies, it was universally maintained (with the exception of some of the Epicureans whom Lucretius follows.) that they were of great magnitude, especially the sun and fixed stars. Some of them, and even many of them, it was thought, might be larger than our earth.

Now with all the aid of the telescope the planets themselves are invested with but inconsiderable disks, adding very little to any former conceptions of their real size, while the fixed stars remain to the gazer's eye as they have ever been since the creation, mere sparkling points in the nightly vault of the heavens. They have always been used, in all the ancient languages, as the symbol of a number too immense for computation, and the invention of Galileo, although it has brought millions more within the field of vision, has not much increased the force of the metaphor, or greatly enlarged the power of the conception, so far as it pertains to the emotional part of our nature. The imagination, we say, has received little or no substantial aid. As we stand and gaze upon the heavens our feelings of their vastness and grandeur will depend full as much upon the moral state of the soul, as upon any arithmetical accuracy of knowledge; yea more, if, as is often the case, these accurate formulas have had the tendency to produce a swelling complacency in the scientific process through which their immense numbers have been obtained, rather than in the contemplation of the real powers and immensities they so feebly represent. It is very possible that the scientific astronomer may make the heavens themselves but the black-board, or diagram, on which he studies the differential calculus, or the mathematical formulas

<sup>1</sup> Lucretius maintains that all celestial bodies are neither greater nor less than they appear to our eyes. The reasoning of the materialist and atheist is on a par with his philosophy. If distance, he says, does not take away from the distinctness of the sun and moon, neither will it detract from their magnitude.

Luna,

Quidquid id est, nihilo fertur majore figura,  
Quam nostris oculis, qua cernimus esse videtur.

Lib. V. 580.

of the laws of forces ; and we would hazard the expression of the belief that Moses, and David, and Pythagoras, even with their inaccurate knowledge, may have drawn from the contemplations of the skies, more devout conceptions of almighty power, of wisdom, of vastness—thoughts more full of religious grandeur and sublimity, than were ever entertained by a Halley or a La Place.

We are too apt, moreover, to think that the idea of the planets and stars being inhabited, is altogether of modern origin. And yet, there is no reason why the ancients should not have entertained the notion as well as ourselves. It is not with us a matter of science strictly, but of exceedingly probable conjecture ; and the probabilities, too, on which the opinion is grounded, are derived as much from moral considerations as from any observable physical phenomena. It came from the application of that common-sense principle of the *sufficient* or *insufficient reason*, to which we have several times alluded. If these bodies were of great magnitude, as was generally believed, and, in this respect, were often spoken of as ranking, to say the least, in the same class with the earth, there was no reason why they should not be regarded as the abodes of life as well as our own little globe—a life which might be lower in the scale of being than the human, and, in some cases, perhaps, immensely higher. Hence it is a conjecture, (and that is all it can even now be called,) which is not unfrequently met with in the writings of antiquity. Plutarch has a treatise, in which he dwells at length upon this opinion in relation to the moon ; and the following Orphic lines, quoted by Proclus in his commentary on the *Timæus*, may be taken as a good representative of what may have been a common poetical conception. They allude to the moon's being inhabited, and are introduced in attestation of the position ascribed to Plato by Plutarch, that *the earth is one of the stars*, ἐν τῶν ἀστέρων, and that, consequently, as it (the earth) is inhabited, so, in all probability, are all, or many, of the others.

Μήσατο δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπειράτων ἦν τε Σελήνην

Ἰθάνατοι πηλζουσιν, ἐπιχθόνιοι δέ τε Μήνην,

ἢ ἢ πύλλ' οὐρε' ἔχει, ΠΟΛΛ' ἈΣΤΕΡΑ, ΠΟΛΛΑ ΜΕΛΛΙΘΡΑ.

He made another earth of size immense,  
Selene called by Gods, by men the moon—  
A world of mountains, cities, palaces.

We might cite in illustration here, some of the ancient speculations about the *infinity of worlds*, but this was properly a metaphysical, rather than either a scientific or poetical view. It was chiefly a favorite with the Epicureans, or ancient infidel materialists ; and they held it mainly because it was connected with their doctrine of the infinity and eternity of the universe. It made matter a necessary existence ; and the infinite development



of worlds, in all parts of space, a necessary process. Hence, Lucretius says :

Quapropter, coelum simili ratione, fatendum est,  
Terramque, et solem, lunam, mare, caetera, quæ sunt,  
Non esse UNICA, sed numero magis innumerali.

Lib. II. 1083.

To be consistent, however, they must have held, that if matter be necessary at all, it must be necessary *forever* and *everywhere*, not only as dispersed *through* or *among* all space, or spaces, but as actually occupying every portion without any vacua, or greater or smaller porosities ; the result of which would have been an eternal, an universal, and an immovable consolidation.

There is another scientific fallacy to which we would very briefly allude. It is that which would always connect this idea of a universe abounding in many orders of being, with the knowledge of local habitations, or fixed bodies, or spaces, to which they may be assigned. Now there is neither any moral nor scientific necessity for this. The Scriptures make no display of astronomical science, or knowledge of other worlds astronomically considered, but it far outgoes all the conceptions of the most scientific naturalist, in its recognition of ranks and ranks of beings above the human race—

Of helmed Cherubim,  
And burning Seraphim—

of Angels and Archangels, *θρόνοι, κυριότητες, ἀρχαί, δυνάμεις*, Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers, *ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις*, in the heavenly places. In this light, too, may we regard that sublime expression of the Old Testament, Jehovah Tzebaoth, the Lord of Hosts. It is indeed capable of being referred to the heavenly bodies, but rather as representative of these "eternal armies," than as being their fixed local habitations ; whilst there are other Scriptural intimations of superior souls and intelligences altogether unconnected with any allusions whatever to any permanent residences in space.

Mere science may be very far from being the mother, or even the friend, of devotion. It may be, and often is, altogether dissociated from any elevated moral conceptions. The astronomer may be undevout. Even in his favorite domain, the contemplation of nature, the scientific man may utterly fail to reach the sublimity of view and feeling to which the religious soul attains with but scanty aid from the stores of science. Isaiah may have known almost nothing of astronomy, as compared with what is revealed in the *Mechanique Celeste*, and yet, in respect to strength and range of devout conception, have gone far beyond any imaginations of the scientific, but unbelieving author. How would the latter have been startled at the strange nature and un-

wonted spirituality of his own thoughts, had he, in some moment of rapt contemplation, been led to utter the words of the prophet: "*Lift up your eyes on high, and behold. Who hath created these? Who bringeth out their host by number? Who calleth them all by name? It is because of the immensity of HIS strength; it is because of HIS great power, that not one of them ever faileth.*"

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## ARTICLE X.

## A SHORT HOMILY ON THE GREATNESS OF THE SCRIPTURES.

By T. H. SKINNER, D. D., Prof. in Union Theo. Sem. New York.

Very remarkable is the declaration of David in Psalm 138: 2. *Thou hast magnified thy WORD, above all thy NAME.* The Name of God, is what he is known by, what individuates him, or distinguishes him from all other beings; as men, by their names, are differenced and distinguished from one another. The Word of God is the revelation of his mind or of himself in human language. Some understand it here, as a promise made to David; but there is no reason why it should be so limited. The *verbal* or oral revelation of God's mind, if we may so speak, has been reduced to writing. In the time of David, this was incomplete, the revelation itself being so; both have since been finished. The revelation is ended, and so is the record. The Bible, including the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the full and perfect embodiment of the written Word of God; of all that God has spoken or has ever intended to speak for the permanent use of mankind. The Bible is God's entire word reduced to writing; and the writing itself is divine: for all Scripture is given by inspiration of God! Holy men of old spake and also *wrote* as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

The Name of God and his Word are here put in comparison, and superiority is given to the latter—the word preferred before the name. Some would set them in apposition, and read thus: "*Thou hast magnified thy word, thy name, above all.*" Taking our version as correct, the meaning is, that God has magnified his revelation of himself in human language, above whatever else he is known by; that is, above all his other works whether of creation or providence. These works are the Name of God, the Bible is his Word; the Bible has the precedence.

2. The Bible is a volume consisting of 66 books, some large, some very small, written by more than 40 persons, who lived in different ages, there being an interval of not less than 1500 years between the first of them, and the last. These inspired scribes were men of nearly all varieties of condition and talents.—*Kings*

shepherds, vine dressers, fishermen; men of high education and of none; men not surpassed in genius by Homer, or Plato, or Solon, and men of ordinary understandings. The books embrace all the different kinds of composition; history, biography, epistles, homilies, tales, parables, apothegms, proverbs, dramas, debates, poetry of every species—pastoral, lyrical, elegiac, epic. Their topics are innumerable, and the discourse on them varies in its strain, from that of the most philosophical penetration and depth, to the simplicity and ease of familiar conversation. There are questions and discussions, in them, profound enough to give perpetual exercise to the strongest minds; and there are simple narratives and songs suited to delight little children. There are specimens of the sublime and the beautiful, the severe and the tender, surpassing all that can be gathered out of other writings. In respect to modes of thought, to style and manner, the penmen retain their respective individualities; they are unlike one another. They have that dissimilitude, that appearance of disagreement and inconsistency among themselves, which is commonly seen when numbers speak or write without collusion or preconcert; yet there is no real discord among them, they can by human pains be harmonized. Their grand aim, their cause, their doctrine, their spirit, their end, is always one and the same, and that as far above the reach of man, as heaven is higher than earth:—Such, in short, that it is evident they were all under the influence of one controlling mind.

3. The Bible is not unworthy of the Divine authorship which it claims, in respect to its composition—the quality and variety of its subjects, and also its manner. The style is not always classical or elegant; but why should, or how could it be? since God in making the Bible, works through its penmen, according to their various individualities, their natural gifts and their measures of understanding and grace; and designed the book for all classes and generations of mankind. There are men to whom no style of speaking is intelligible but that of the most perfect plainness. Some want the utmost strength and pungency of expression; others the utmost tenderness and smoothness; to some it is necessary to prattle, as we do to children; others demand elegance and sublimity. What must be done? Shall the last class alone be accommodated? Shall the Bible be suited only to persons of taste, to critics, scholars, and profound thinkers? Shall it have no care for the poor, the illiterate, the uneducated, the young? The Bible shows itself more than equal to any degree of elegance and profundity to which the human mind, however highly gifted and cultivated can attain. It infinitely surpasses the most highly wrought productions of men. If it is sometimes low, it is so in the way of voluntary condescension to persons of inferior understanding and education. Who will say that such condescension

is not worthy of the Most High? Or who will limit him in his condescending ways of discourse to men, who teaches the birds the various notes they sing, and opens his hand to supply the wants of every living creature that his power hath created?

The Bible in this particular, is like other works of God. God did not think that the creation would be unworthy of him, unless he made every single creature of the highest dignity that his almighty power could give it. Neither did he think that his plan of Providence, would not become him, unless he should so order it that in every act of his power, infinite goodness and wisdom should go to their utmost length. In the scale of being, the orders are many, and there are proceedings of Providence higher and lower. If in the great scheme of God's works the highest perfection demanded variety in the particular parts, why should there not be variety also in the composition of a book from the Divine hand.

4. The Bible is marked by this, that it wants arrangement and scientific method: things are thrown together, seemingly out of order; we find things where none would expect to find them: Exact definitions too there are none: no abstractions; almost no classification; what abruptness, what dislocation! But in this there is nothing against its claim to be the Word of God. Nature is not scientific. There is no botanic garden on the surface of the earth, no cabinet of fossils in its crust. All things are interspersed and thrown together in the creation as they are in the Bible. Arrangement and classification are left to men. God has given the sons of men this work to do; the world, and also the Bible, are so made, that they must needs do it, in order to their own improvement and honor.

5. There are difficult, and apparently useless, yea, even undesirable passages in the Bible; but neither are these against its divinity. They are a strong confirmation of it. Standing, as they do, amidst surrounding forests and fields of wisdom, they are but analagous to the deserts, and rocks, and marshy places of nature; and no more conclude against the divine authorship of the Bible, than do these rocks and deserts against the divine origin of the world. When it can be shewn that no good purpose is attained by the earth's consisting in part of sand and wilderness and bogs and rocks, then, perhaps, the inutility of certain portions of the Bible may be demonstrated. Were men set to the business of world-making, they would introduce no sand, no desert, perhaps no sea—nothing but the richest and most productive soil, into their creations; and had men made the Bible, they would have left out the passages now referred to; which, therefore, are among the presumptive proofs of its Divine authorship. We see in them the impress of the hand that made and garnished the world. The things hard to be understood in the writings of Paul, Peter, Solomon, and Ezekiel; the parts not best to be read in public;

the catalogues of names ; the chronological difficulties ; the apparent discrepancies and dislocations, as component parts of the glorious whole, are, doubtless, indispensable and preferable to any which could be substituted for them ; and the fact is, that time here, as also in nature and providence, is constantly removing obscurity and filling objectors with confusion.

6. The Bible is wonderfully characterized by omissions, or incompleteness in statement and history. It leaves unanswered a thousand questions, which naturally and unavoidably present themselves to the reader : concerning a thousand matters of curiosity it gives not a word of information ; a thousand occasions for comment and remark, it forbears to notice. On the mode in which creative power operated in producing the world and its various population ; on the reasons for placing man in probation, and permitting his fall ; on the grounds of the Divine procedure in a thousand strange and seemingly objectionable cases ; on the infancy and early life of Christ ; on the mysterious fortunes of the church ; on the manner of the last judgment and the resurrection of the dead ; on the modes of existence in heaven and hell, how profound the silence of the Scriptures, or how vague and unsatisfactory its information to the curious ! But, in all this, how unlike man ; how consistent its claims to be the book of God. All the other works of God are, to our view, involved in impenetrable mystery, presenting occasions for innumerable questions, not one of which can be solved by the human mind.

7. Such, then, is that Book of books, of which, by just construction, the Psalmist affirms, that God hath magnified it above all his name. We are to consider some of the evidences of this great declaration ; some things evincive of that paramount greatness and value, which God hath given to the Bible.

And first, let us look into the contents, and the internal structure, of this book. God must have made it great in itself, if He has in other ways magnified it. He would not have distinguished it in his outward arrangements and dispensations concerning it, beyond its own inherent greatness or worthiness to be magnified. There must, then, be greatness in the Bible itself, beyond all other greatness in the works and ways of God. He has put great things into it, beyond any which are to be found elsewhere in nature and time. It is, in itself, greater than all things. As he has magnified the sun, more by the make and structure which he has given to it, than by whatever else shows its superiority to the other orbs, so God has set his Word above all his works, by what He has made it to consist of, or to contain in itself.

We can scarcely touch upon this subject ; but we could do it no justice if we had an angel's powers, and should give it all our time and strength. The Psalmist sought of God

to open his eyes, that he might see the wondrous things contained in his Word. Paul confessed his inability to know the things of Scripture, except as inwardly illuminated by the Holy Spirit. We must have an unction of the Holy One, in order to get even a faint glimpse of these mighty things. These are things into which the angels desire to look. Well does David call them wonders. Wonders they are, of truth and wisdom, of love and goodness, of wrath and justice, of majesty and power : inscrutable wonders, to every mind in the universe, except that One before which hell and destruction are without a covering. They relate to a theme, compared with the greatness of which, the heavens and the earth are without greatness, yea, less than nothing and vanity. Astronomers are overcome with amazement at the amplitude and vastness of the starry heavens ; but let them, with the eye of faith, look upon Him who made the stars, traveling in his strength to redeem mankind, by bearing their sins in his own body on the tree ; let them but believe in their hearts, the Word of God giving the story of human redemption, and even they will confess that God hath made his Word greater than all the worlds by which his power hath peopled immensity.

8. We would delight to pause on this subject—the greatness of the Bible in itself, the whole and every part, as made unspeakably great, by the magnitude of the principal, the central theme ; let us only say what, on behalf of the Bible, we do and must hold, that here are the chief things of time, in the past, the present, and the future, yea, and also the chief things of eternity presented to men, as having their foundation laid with the foundation of the universe itself, in the blood of the Lamb slain in the purpose of God, before nature and time began their courses. This is the reason why such stupendous power is given to the Scriptures. We sometimes give all power to the Spirit ; but let us never mean to take power from the Word of God. The Spirit only applies the Word. In the hands of the Spirit, it is the Word that is like the fire and the hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces.

9. But we must hasten to other observations. God has magnified his Word above all his Name, by what he has done and expended for the sake of it.

Here we are first to note the testimonial signs and wonders by which he has sealed the Bible as his Word. These high, supernatural works of God, are of countless multitude, and as unlike the greatest marvels that creatures can work, as the sun is unlike man's imitation of him. What thousands upon thousands of these mighty works of God have been wrought, all in one way or another, designed to attest and honor and magnify the Word of God ! The sea divided, Jordan driven back, the earth trembling,

the sun arrested, the dead rising, to put greatness on the Bible. Is not this magnifying his Word above all his Name?

10. But more than this, God has shown regard for his Word by the sacrifices it has cost him. Creation cost him nothing: not so his Word. In completing and sealing that, what an expenditure has he met? How precious in the sight of God is the blood of his saints; but the blood of a great cloud of holy martyrs has been shed, in producing and confirming the testimony of God given to the Bible. But all this is as nothing; the Son of God himself is among the martyrs. The Word of God incarnate, shed his blood in supplying the matter, and in bearing witness to the truth of the Bible.

11. Again, God wonderfully magnifies his Word above all his Name in this, that he governs, rules, and disposes of the world, according to, and in fulfilment of it. The Bible contains the plan, the programme of the Divine administration. Here are shown the ends which God intends to accomplish—the things he means to do—the disposition he will make of the kingdoms of men. Here is laid down the great scheme and chart of all things, that are to come to pass even down to the end of the world. Hence, it is the object and business of the providence of God, to fulfil his Word; and so the process of fulfilling, and thus of explaining it, and of multiplying its evidences and its power, is always, and ever will be, going on; and in this way God will be magnifying his Word above his Name, till the heavens and the earth shall have passed away. We need not fear that the Bible will be discredited or disparaged, or become small and unimportant by the lapse of years and ages. God has the times in his power; he has anticipated them in his Word; and that word they must fulfil: they are all ordained only to this end. The Bible will become greater and greater, as the world hastens in its course. Let men of science proceed with their researches and discoveries; let the rulers and judges of the earth proceed with their schemes of government and political economy; let men of business proceed with their high enterprizes of commerce; let infidels and dreamers and every kind of adversaries to God's truth, proceed with their respective systems of opposition; let them all work as they will, they can do nothing but what shall fulfil, and so magnify, the Scriptures; they will be but instruments in the hand of God, by whom he will more and more honor his Word.

12. Again, God has made his Word of surprising greatness in what he has accomplished by means of it. God magnifies whatever he makes great in influence and achievement; but what is there in the compass of knowledge that he has in this respect made equal to his Word? The influences of the sun, the moon, and the stars, the ordinances of heaven, the labors of great and learned men, the powers that be, or have been, in the govern-

ments of men, the mighty commanders and conquerors of ancient and modern days—all powers and agencies in nature or in history, what have they effected, in comparison with what God hath effected through his Word? We would not disparage them, but let them not be compared with the Bible. The human mind, dead in sin, cursed, polluted, doomed to eternal death, visited by the influence of the Bible, is quickened by it, into the life of God. A poor wretch, sinking under the weight of eternal despair is begotten by this Word to a lively hope of eternal joy and glory. A nation crushed by the power of Satan into the lowest depths of political and moral ruin, is born in a day, under the visitations of God's Word, into the blessings of civilization and righteousness. The heathen world was turned upside down, through the preaching of his Word, in the times of the apostles, and the churches of the living God rose in every part of it on the ruins of idols' temples. How amazingly did the power and efficacy of God's Word appear again, as ministered to the mind of Europe by Luther and Calvin, and their confederate reformers; and yet again, what has the Bible done, in Scotland, in England, and America, since the times of the Reformation—and what is it doing now under the ministrations of the missionaries among the heathen and elsewhere. Let these wonders of divine and saving power be considered, as a commentary on the Psalmist's exclamation: "Thou hast magnified thy Word above all thy name." And if we include in our view what is as reality to faith, the achievements of the Word of God yet to be made, the regeneration of the world, the recovery of the entire creation from the bondage of corruption, the production of the new heavens and the new earth in which righteousness is to dwell and which will be filled with the glory of God, as the waters cover the sea, with how much greater emphasis will this exclamation be repeated?

13. God has magnified his Word by requiring it to be magnified in the regards of mankind, by calling upon all men, in such a voice as this, O earth, earth, earth hear the Word of the Lord; by demanding of them that they take it as the rule of faith, life, hope, and destiny; that they try all doctrine and all preaching by it; that they try the spirits by it; that they exclusively and implicitly depend upon and trust in it; that they hold it as more stable and firm than the foundations of the earth and the pillars of heaven; that they wait upon the ministration of it, with constancy and diligence all the days of their life: that they find in it their chief delight, that they prize it above the treasures of the earth and count it more precious than life; that they feed upon it as the bread of immortality; that they be constantly searching into it, and praying that they may better and better understand it; that they keep it pure and perfect as it is, suffering nothing to be joined with nothing taken from it; that they hold it forth to the



world, publish it to all the nations, send it to every creature under heaven, as the only foundation of hope to man ; and that they take it as their high calling on earth, to labor by all appropriate means in order to enforce and establish its authority over all the kingdoms of the world.

14. God hath also magnified his Word, by his dispensations of judgment and mercy—of judgment to the despisers and neglecters of the Bible ; of mercy to those who appreciate and honor it. Let the history of God's ways be studied ; his ways with nations, with churches, with families, with individuals : with wonderful uniformity, they will be found to take their manner and character from the mode in which the Bible is treated. They are honored who honor the Bible ; and they lightly esteemed, yea condemned and cursed, and sooner or later overtaken with everlasting destruction, who neglect and make light of the Word of God.

15. God hath magnified his Word, by causing it to become great in honor among mankind. All do not honor the Bible, but it *has* received honor from man. No other book, no other object in the world is equally honored. All true churches are founded upon it, take it for their constitution, follow its instructions, subsist upon it, draw from it all their hopes and their very life, glory in it as their inheritance, in all their assemblies make it their meditation, their only theme ; teach it to their children, and are devoted to the work of publishing, and spreading it among men. This Book is the glory and the boast of all the great and good among mankind. What a great cloud of worthies from all civilized lands and all times, have paid their best honors to the Bible. The greatest luminaries of genius and learning are among those who bear witness to the divinity of the Scriptures. How immense the labors of literature and science, as well as piety, in doing homage to the Bible. How many thousands of the greatest and most gifted of human minds, are day and night poring over the pages of this book with prayer for illumination from above, that they may be able to comprehend its profound secrets of wisdom. What associations have been formed—what works are going on, to multiply the Scriptures in all the languages of men, and replenish the earth with them, to its utmost bounds. In all this is to be seen God's hand magnifying His Word.

## ARTICLE XI.

## LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS,

BY THE EDITOR.

1. *Theophany, or the Manifestation of God in Jesus Christ, with a Supplement touching the Theories of the Rev. Dr. Bushnell.* By REV. ROBERT TURNBULL. Second Edition. Hartford: Brockett, Fuller & Co. New York: G. P. Putnam. 1849.

In the January number of the Repository, we gave a brief notice of this work, in advance of its actual publication, at which time we expressed a favorable opinion of it, both as it respects its doctrinal soundness and its literary merit. The discussion of the subject of Christ's incarnation and atonement, caused by Dr. Bushnell's "God in Christ," the manner in which that subject is treated of in "Theophany," and the obvious fact that these and other cardinal doctrines of our Faith, are to be subjected, in this country, to a new and most searching re-examination with a view to a re-modification of our Theological Systems, from the infusion of Germanism into our philosophy and theological literature, warrant us in referring again and somewhat at length, to this book.

Some years ago, while a pastor in Boston, Mr. Turnbull published a little volume, entitled "Claims of Jesus," the object of which was to vindicate the incarnation and atonement of Jesus Christ, and bring these great truths home to the hearts of thoughtful inquirers. Theodore Parker had just published his celebrated discourse on "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity," while Ralph Waldo Emerson, Mr. Ripley, and others, were laboring to bring into contempt the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel. That little popular and highly useful treatise was the germ, we believe, of Mr. Turnbull's *Theophany*. Having served well its day, it was suffered to go out of print, using such portions of it only as were deemed of permanent value and general interest in the preparation of a larger work.

The attention of the public having been called afresh to the Divinity and Atonement of Christ by the speculations of Dr. Bushnell and others, Mr. T. rightly judged it a fitting opportunity to issue the work in its present enlarged and re-adjusted form. The speedy appearance of a *second* edition, is proof that it has already found many readers, although it has not the novelty and mysticism, nor the peculiar ability of Dr. B's work to commend it.

The form of the work is rather literary than theological; that is to say, it is not written in the ordinary technical style of the theological and religious works, but in a language somewhat freer and more natural, and possessing, as we think, a fresher and deeper interest. Indeed one aim of Mr. Turnbull seems to have been to avoid the deadening influence of hackneyed ideas and modes of expression—the formal and scientific method of the schools for one more congenial to the heart of Christian piety. It is entirely evangelical in its matter and spirit, but has the cast and appearance rather of a literary than of a theological treatise.

It may be stated, also, that the Author claims for it rather a practical than a polemical character; still it is true that while it sedulously avoids a dogmatical and denunciatory spirit, it fearlessly and ably exposes various popular errors, and enters with some thoroughness into the discussion of those great truths which lie at the foundation of all religious life. It meets, not only the errors of Strauss, Parker, and others, but those of the semi-orthodox and speculative school of Schleiermacher, Neander, and Bushnell. He evinces no little knowledge of German Theology, and while he treats it with fairness and with liberality, he is no slave to it, no servile imitator, but escapes the virus of

German neology, and retains the freedom of thought, and the integrity of the truth. He has gone also somewhat into the literature of the subject of which he treats, and given a comprehensive account of the various opinions and theories of the Incarnation, particularly on what may be termed the metaphysical and imaginative side of theological speculation. Some curious and interesting quotations may be found in the fourth chapter, from Plato, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Bossuet, and others.

Mr. Turnbull says: "Our views of the Incarnation and Atonement of Christ may be found in some features, peculiar, though not differing in any essential particular from those usually styled orthodox. It has been our aim to clear away from the subject some popular misconceptions and misstatements, and to place it, if possible, upon a scriptural and defensible basis."—Preface. We know not that the Author's views upon these high subjects are at all *peculiar*; for they are the views which have been held by the church universal, and defended with consummate ability by such men as Taylor, Hooker and Howe, Robert Hall, and Tholuck. If peculiar, it is only in the form of the argument and mode of expression. Evidently Mr. T. is familiar with the works of the old divines, and sympathizes with the more ancient as well as the simpler and profounder theology of the early church. Though neither Armenian nor a hyper-Calvinist, he has vindicated Irenæus and Calvin from the misrepresentations of Muenscher and Bushnell, and spoken respectfully, at least, of the theology of the "Princeton Divines."

If there is any one peculiarity in the views of the Author which stands out with greater prominence than others, it is, that the whole subject of the Incarnation, lying within the region of mystery, and known therefore only in part, is no subject for philosophical speculation. Upon this point he has endeavored to ascertain the limits of human inquiry, and while he vindicates the mystery by a reference to its natural and moral aspects, its relations both to the finite and the infinite, he insists that it is rather a subject for adoration than discussion. We fully concur in this view and commend his chapter on "The Incarnation as a Mystery," to the special consideration of our readers. We quote a few paragraphs from it:

"As a manifestation of the Godhead, as a Being at once human and Divine, as the connecting link between Heaven and earth, the nature and mission of Jesus would naturally be a subject of difficulty to the reason and philosophy of this world. On this ground, adds the Apostle, 'Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition (teaching) of men, and not after Christ.' For in him *dwell*eth all the fullness of the Godhead *bodily*. And ye are complete in him, who is the head of all principality and power.<sup>1</sup>

"In these expressions is discovered to us the grand peculiarity of the Christian Faith. It proposes to unite the soul to God, the great end of all religion, by uniting it to Christ. For this purpose it presents Christ to us, as the sum and essence of all goodness, the source and fountain of all wisdom and grace, and thence made unto those who believe, wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption; as a Being, therefore, to be loved, revered and adored. This we call a mystery; but not a mystery entirely unknown or unnatural in any way. Nay, it is precisely what we might expect. It is, certainly, what we need. For religion, in its true sense, is not so much a doctrine as a life.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it is a life in the infinite and eternal; in other words, a life in God. Hence we cannot be saved by bare beliefs, traditions, or externalities of any kind. No

<sup>1</sup> Coloss. ii. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Doubtless it is both. The doctrine or the truth, apprehended by the mind, and received by the heart, produces the life, and the life sustains the doctrine. They act and react upon each other. The doctrine, indeed, may exist without the life, but not the life without the doctrine. To have light and heat, you need the sun. To have spiritual life, which is holy love, you must have the truth, which is the knowledge of God in Jesus Christ. "Faith worketh by love."

system, however perfect and magnificent, can save us. We are estranged from God, and must return to God, in order to live.' But how shall the finite, above all, how shall the fallen and the lost, reach God, but by the intervention of God himself? How shall we become one with him, unless, somehow, he make himself one with us? But the Gospel invites us to Christ. One with him, we are one with God. 'No man,' says he, 'cometh unto the Father but by me.' 'He that believeth in me shall never die.' It is only in this way that, practically and experimentally, we come to the knowledge of God. 'This is life eternal to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.'

"But how shall God become incarnate? How unite himself with a finite form? Above all, how shall he suffer in that finite form? How shall the just become the *unjust*—the *sinless*, the *sinful*—the ever-blessed and immortal, the crucified and slain? Ah! these are the secrets, the mysteries which baffle the profoundest intellects, and leave the mission of Jesus in a sacred obscurity. Yet, light is gleaming through the cloud; and philosophy itself can discern its beauty and glory. If ever God manifested himself in all the splendor of his infinite perfection, it was in the life and character of Christ. Long were the heavens covered with shadows; but they opened at last, and, through the rent, the Sun of Righteousness poured his radiance upon the world. But that Sun is too bright, and stretches too far into the depths above us, to be narrowly scanned by human eyes. It involves a dread and fathomless mystery.

"We say, then, in the first place, that the doctrine of the Incarnation, or of the Godhead of Christ, cannot be fully comprehended; nor is it meant to be comprehended, except by the affections. If the intellect does not quite understand it, we are sure the heart does—clinging to Christ, as brother, Saviour, friend—and not only so, but as Master and Sovereign. If reason has a limit and a difficulty here, the heart has none. Nay, this great mystery has solved all other difficulties with which the heart has long struggled in darkness and sorrow, opening up for it a luminous and blessed pathway to God and glory. Here it has found—what it long sought in vain—the infinite, the perfect and immortal."—pp. 144—147.

While the Incarnation is admitted to be a mystery, profound and inscrutable, Mr. R. shows that, in this respect, it takes rank with other great facts in nature and science, and vindicates itself by its entire adaptation to the nature and wants of the human soul.

"But the difficulty to the intellect is not greater than is found in a thousand things beside—things, too, which all men instantly admit. Indeed, there are no subjects, whether in the science of matter or of mind, which are not environed with difficulties. Inquiries can be started upon all matters of abstract and philosophical speculation, beyond the grasp of the finite intellect; nay, more, a child can ask questions about himself, or about the world around him, which baffle the profoundest thinkers. 'A grain of sand,' says the philosophical Vinet, 'is an abyss.' Every thing, indeed, in the whole range of animate and inanimate nature, is associated directly or indirectly with mysteries; every question in philosophy and morals can be run up to some insuperable difficulty, where the intellect must stop and confess its ignorance. Light and darkness, knowledge and mystery are associated in all the speculations of the finite mind. The day rests in the bosom of night. The stars are set in a firmament of gloom.

"Our knowledge, so far as it goes, may be definite, and the language in which it is expressed, clear and intelligible; yet that knowledge, like the segment of an infinite circle, links itself, at all points, to mysteries. Facts may be ascertained, and constantly recognized, in the ordinary avocations of life; but, as to their origin and mode of existence, we may be plunged in the deepest ignorance.

"Life only can produce life."—*Vinet*. To which we add, God only can reproduce his own image. Union with God is the soul's life.

Furthermore, some of these facts may appear to involve contradictions, and give rise to inquiries, before which the mightiest intellects fall prostrate. The science of mathematics, even, involves the infinite, and, in some cases, the impossible! It recognizes this sublime contradiction, that there may be two lines which ever approach, but never meet, and, finally, loses itself in the boundless depths of the 'infinitesimal calculus.' If chemistry does not involve, it certainly suggests the infinite. It has its agents imponderable and universal; its permanent basis, or substance, (*id quod stat per se*), in which all physical qualities adhere; its infinite divisibility of body, with its definite and immutable atoms. What is matter?—what its essence and mode of existence?—what its origin and its end? How does it link itself to spirit, and how can it give and receive impressions and motions? It seems essentially diverse from spirit, and yet they act and re-act upon each other. Matter, as it exists in space and time, the product of an infinite mind, 'from whom are all things,' is one of the profoundest mysteries that has ever engaged the attention of thoughtful men. What, moreover, is mind—spirit, especially as uncreated and eternal? What is our own mind, that mysterious something, which thinks, and feels, and wills, and suffers, and rejoices? What are its nature and essence, its mode of existence, its ineffable relation to God, and the creation around it? What, even, is the union of body and soul? How are they linked, and what strange power causes them to act in harmony?

But if these things occur in human science, what may we not expect in divine? If man is a mystery, what is God? If the life that now is presents enigmas and secrets the most profound and awful, what shall we find in 'the life to come?' If with propriety we can say, *Great is the mystery of nature, mind is manifest in matter*, may we not, with still greater propriety exclaim, *Great is the mystery of godliness, God was manifest in the flesh?* \* \* \*

"We are so constituted as to believe that every event must have a cause—that every quality must have a basis, that over against phenomena, there must be substance—over against relations, absolute existence—over against the finite, the infinite—over against multiplicity and change, absolute unity and permanent being; in other words, an infinite, self-existing God, the cause of all things, the Creator of the Heavens and Earth. From the very constitution of our minds, we must maintain the unity, the perfect, absolute, unalterable unity of such a being. To us, in this respect, there can be only 'one God.' But what distinctions and peculiarities exist in that unity, or in the manifestation of that unity, are questions utterly beyond us. Whether there is not in the very nature of God himself, some basis for a manifestation of himself as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, we cannot tell. The Scriptures may indicate such a basis, but we cannot explain it. The subject is one upon which reason is incompetent to say a word. Here it has approached the region of mystery, and must pause until God reveal himself.

"Whatever, then, has been revealed upon this subject in a well-authenticated Revelation, must be received with implicit submission, however difficult or mysterious, however contrary to our preconceived opinions, however repulsive to our ordinary habits of thinking and reasoning. A contradiction, of course, we cannot receive; but a mystery we can and must. I may know in general, that Jesus Christ is God incarnate, but how he is such may baffle all my inquiries. My heart seizes the ineffable idea, and exults under its influence; but my intellect cannot penetrate it, far less explain it. All that can be said upon the subject is, 'And without controversy great is the mystery of godliness, God was manifest in the flesh.'

"But it has been complacently said, that 'religion ends where mystery begins.' The antithesis is striking, but the sentiment is false. For, as has been justly remarked, you might as well say that traveling ends where the sea begins. Nay, we go further, and maintain that religion cannot exist without mystery. A religion without a mystery is a religion without a soul, a religion without a hereafter, a religion without a God! When we have discarded the

Divinity and incarnation of Christ, the expiation on the cross, and the resurrection of the dead, we have not rid the subject of mysteries, mysteries as profound and inscrutable as those we have rejected. Nay, let a man become an utter atheist, and he surrounds himself with a darkness more deep and terrible, a darkness illumed by no stars, followed by no dawn. He multiplies the secrets of nature a thousand fold, and loses himself in the abyss of a horrible and everlasting mystery.

"Had Christianity been a system without a mystery, no thoughtful man could believe it. Every such man, hungering after the perfect and the eternal, must rejoice that faith and adoration can advance, where science and philosophy are compelled to pause. Sometimes, nay, during his whole life, he may walk in darkness, but the stars are overhead, and the dawn of everlasting day is yet to break upon his vision. In the Gospel there are mysteries; but how magnificent and thrilling! Shadows, but shadows from the infinite, shadows gloriously penetrated with light supernal. How profound the secret of the Godhead, especially of the Godhead incarnate; but how august, how beautiful! Dark, indeed, but dark from excess of light; and it is only in lowliness and adoration we can see it, or feel it, in its all-transforming power. The highest intellects have adored it! Millions upon millions have trembled with joy, under its influence. In the night of time, these voyagers, storm-driven upon the ocean of life, have looked up into the infinite depths above them, and beheld 'that glory-beaming star,' radiant as at the first, when it was hymned by the angels on the plains of Bethlehem, and under its guidance have passed on, through tempest and darkness, to the haven of everlasting rest."—pp. 148, 151, 155, 157.

On the subject of the Atonement, Mr. Turnbull takes the ground of a vicarious or substitutionary expiation, a real sacrifice or propitiation on the part of Christ, on the ground of which God may be just and justify him that believeth in Jesus. This view he defends with no little ability, in opposition to Dr. Gannet, of Boston, and Dr. Bushnell. He shows that the divinity of Christ gave worth and efficacy to his sufferings for the redemption of man; that the sacrifice of the Son was the sacrifice equally of the Father; and hence, that in some modified, perhaps not fully revealed sense, 'the Divine' partook of or at least sympathized in the sufferings of 'the human.' Without adopting the theory of Mr. Griffin, so strikingly and ably set forth in his work entitled, 'The Sufferings of Christ, by a Layman,' who affirms that Christ endured the agonies of the lost, or those who but for him, would have been lost, 'pang for pang, spasm for spasm through all eternity,' and that the absolute Godhead of Jesus suffered all this, Mr. Turnbull insists that we have no right to separate the Divine from the Human in the crowning act of our redemption, nor to press the metaphysical, and, it may be, false assumption of the Divine impassibility.

'It will be observed,' he says, 'that thus far we have endeavored to establish a fact, without discussing the mode of it. We have affirmed the proposition that Christ suffered in his whole nature, but we have not ventured to affirm in a dogmatic way, what it was, or how it was he suffered. The external aspects of his suffering—the marred visage—the failing eye—the flowing blood—the contorted limbs—the agonizing cry—the drooping head—and the ghastly paleness of death are obvious to all. But these, it seems to us, are merely images and expressions of deeper sufferings within. 'His soul was exceeding sorrowful even unto death.' 'His soul was made an offering for sin.' What, then, was his agony? How, especially, did his pure and infinite spirit endure such suffering? To this we frankly reply, we cannot tell. The subject transcends our reasoning. We cannot speculate upon it. Better, far, kneel down in Gethsemane, with the suppliant sufferer, or, placing ourselves, in hum-

ble contrition, beneath his cross, exclaim with St. Thomas, 'my Lord, and my God!'—p. 236.

"Since the issue of the first edition of Theophany," Dr. Bushnell's 'God in Christ,' has made its appearance, and produced no little commotion in the theological world, from the novelty and boldness of his speculations, and the almost universally pronounced heretical tendency of his views, emanating as they do from so distinguished a source, and from the heart of New England piety and orthodoxy. Mr. Turnbull has subjected these Discourses to a sifting criticism, in a supplement to the second edition of his work, in which he shows, we think conclusively, that Dr. B. has greatly erred both as to matters of fact and matters of opinion. As to matters of fact, he shows that Dr. B. has grossly misrepresented the views of the orthodox or evangelical portion of the church, particularly those of Irenæus, and Calvin. As the following, touching the case of Irenæus, who is represented by Dr. B. as teaching, that "the death of Christ was a ransom paid to the devil," possesses a historical and theological interest, we give it a place.

"We have taken some pains to ascertain the real opinions of Irenæus, by a personal examination of his writings; and we do not hesitate to affirm that he nowhere teaches the gross absurdity ascribed to him by Dr. B. He everywhere represents the advent of Christ as a means of destroying the works of the devil, 'overturning Satan'—'overcoming the devil,' and, in one place, 'destroying (destruens nostrum adversarium) our adversary, the devil.' He figuratively speaks of Jesus Christ as God incarnate, 'who redeemed us by his blood,' who gave himself a ransom 'for the captives,' and rescued us 'from the dominion of Satan,' not by 'force,' but by 'justice,' speaking of this subject in a most edifying and scriptural manner.

"In justice, however, to Dr. B., to whose charge we are unwilling to lay more than is necessary, it ought to be stated here that he was probably led astray, with reference to the opinions of Irenæus, by Muenscher, a German writer on 'Dogmatics,' translated some years ago by Dr. Murdock. But the passages relied upon by Muenscher to sustain his affirmation, though slightly ambiguous, contain no such idea. Nay, they seem to teach us the very reverse. Whether he had personally examined these passages we know not; for, in the translation at least, nothing but the references are given. The principal of these occurs in *Adver. Hæres: Lib. V. Cap. 1.*—Irenæus here teaches, in opposition to the Valentinians and Ebionites, that Jesus Christ, God incarnate, can alone instruct us in divine things, and redeem us from the power of sin. He shows, therefore, that the Divine Word, 'perfect in all things,' being not only 'almighty,' but, also, 'truly man,' (verus homo) redeemed us by his own blood, in other words, 'gave himself a ransom for those who were led into captivity' by sin, (redemptionem semetipsum dedit pro his qui in captivitatem ducti sunt.) He then adds: 'Et quorum injuste dominabatur nobis Apostasia,' (he here uses the abstract for the concrete, meaning by Apostasia, or Apostasy, Apostatus, or the Apostate, that is, as he explains it in another place, *Satan the great Apostate*,) 'et cum natura essemus Dei omnipotentia, alienavit nos contra naturam, suos proprios nos faciens discipulos, potens in omnibus Dei Verbum, et non deficiens in sua justitia, juste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam, ea quæ sunt sua redimus ab ea (v. r. eo) non cum vi, quemadmodum illa initio dominabatur nostri, ea quæ non erant sua insatiabiliter rapiens; sed secundum suadelan, quemadmodum decebat Deum suadentem, et non vim inferentum, accipere quæ vellet, ut neque quod est justum confringeretur neque an-

<sup>1</sup> 'If the Scripture,' says Bishop Butler, with admirable wisdom, 'has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ somewhat mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for want of farther information, unless he can show his claim to it.'—Works, Eng. Ed. p. 179.

tiqua plasmatio Dei depiriret.' Now, in this passage, Irenæus simply teaches that Jesus Christ redeemed us from the unjust bondage of Satan, or of the great apostasia, apostasy, by which men fell under the dominion of the evil principle, not by *absolute force or violence*, but by *moral means*, thus vindicating justice, by the shedding of his blood, not as a ransom to the devil, but as a ransom to justice. The word *suadela*, used patristically, means *moral argument* or *influence*, rather than persuasion or eloquence, and covers the whole ground of what Christ did and suffered to redeem us from the bondage of sin. For Irenæus immediately adds, as if to put the whole matter beyond a doubt, 'Suo igitur sanguine redimente nos Domino, et dante animam suam pro nostra anima, et carnem suam pro nostris carnibus, et effundente spiritum,' &c. In this way, he shows that man, redeemed by the blood of Christ, and united to God incarnate, is restored to life and immortality; not by force or violence, but by a divine and moral influence, flowing to the soul through the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ. So far, then, from teaching the gross absurdity ascribed to him by Dr. B., he vindicates the essential truth of the Gospel, that in the very means to rescue man from sin, law and justice are maintained and established. Satan is vanquished, not by force, but by justice. His chains are loosened by the blood of the Son of God.

"Another passage referred to by Muenscher occurs, *Adver: Hæres: Lib. V. Cap. 21*; but so far from proving his point, proves the very reverse; for, there, Christ is represented as fulfilling that ancient prophecy, that 'the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head,' and thus vanquishing forever our spiritual adversary. How clear and pointed, for example, the following: "Dominus factus ex muliere, et destruens adversarium nostrum, et perficiens hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei."—*Supplement to Theophany*, pp. 53—55.

As to matters of opinion, Mr. Turnbull shows that Dr. Bushnell's theories of the Trinity, and the Atonement, are equally unsatisfactory; that they are based upon mere hypothesis and fancy, prove nothing, explain nothing; and while containing gleams and glimpses of truth leave the subject, to say the least, in a bewildering obscurity. As however, Dr. B. admits the Godhead of Christ, and professes, in a practical way, to rely upon His sacrifice as a means of life, Mr. T., while protesting against his dangerous errors, gives him in this single practical view, the hand of fellowship, and closes thus:

"Here, then, we cry out with Dr. B., meeting him once more on practical ground, and bending in reverence before the Cross of Christ, 'What infinite pains does he take to bring down His love to us!' Here, O sacred mystery! he opens to us the depths of his heart, penetrated with the love and sorrow of the one great sacrifice for sin. Here he unites himself to our wretchedness, and takes us to his bosom. O that we understood it as we ought, and felt its transforming power! In order to which, let us pray with the Apostle Paul, that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of Glory, may give unto us the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him; the eyes of our understanding being enlightened, that we may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints, and what is the exceeding greatness of his power to us ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every other name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come, and hath put all things under his feet, and given him to be the head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fullness of him that filleth all in all."—*Supplement*, pp. 76—77.

We have already transcended the usual space allotted to our short reviews, and can only add our hearty commendation of this work. We like its spirit;



we like its scriptural views on the great subject of which it treats ; and, not least, we like its spiritual practical character. 'God manifest in the flesh,' is presented here not as a mere doctrinal abstraction or scholastic theory, fitted only to amuse the curious and bewilder the thoughtful ; but as a Divine mystery and yet glorious reality—a momentous practical truth—to be received by faith, to be loved and cherished in the heart as the foundation of hope, and made the vital element of a religious life. Would that all of our theological literature and discussion partook more of the practical element, and the evangelical spirit of Christian Truth ! There would then be exhibited far less of rash and unprofitable speculation, and noisy and angry controversy, and infinitely more of the sanctified intellect and holy living which are the legitimate fruit of "the glorious gospel of the blessed God."

2.—*The Complete Works of John M. Mason, D. D. In four vols. Edited by his Son, EBENEZER MASON. New York : Baker and Scribner, 1849.*

DR. JOHN M. MASON possessed a mind of the highest order. Few men served their generation more effectively than he, or left a brighter and more enduring name to posterity. As a thinker, bold and original ; in argument, logical and able ; in manner, energetic and often highly eloquent ; a varied and profound scholar ; and honest and earnest in the utterance and vindication of the truth,—he made a deep impression while he lived, and has left, in his writings, a rich legacy of treasured influence to those that come after him. He seems to have been raised up for a special service, and nobly did he perform it. He was a man that discerned well his own times and wisely adapted himself to them. Many of these essays, addresses, and sermons were occasional in their character, i. e., they were called forth by special occurrences, or by something special in the public mind, and they were adapted primarily to meet these cases. And it is no mean proof of the power and greatness of the Author, that, while the exciting occasions have passed away, the interest and value of the writings remain.

As a controversialist, Dr. Mason was preeminent and always successful ; while as a divine and preacher he had few equals. After reading such sermons as "The Gospel for the Poor," "Messiah's Throne," and many others which might be named, we can appreciate the remark of Robert Hall, himself the prince of preachers, after hearing, we believe, one of the sermons named above, that he could never preach again. There is a breadth and depth, a grandeur and energy of thought, in many of these sermons, that is truly refreshing and stirring, even when read. We rank him with Hall and Chalmers, for massiveness and strength of thought, and energy and power of diction ; and regard his writings as among the most valuable of the theological literature of the American Church. We regret that we have only the earliest and the latest efforts of his pen. Twenty-five years, during the prime of his days, he lectured and preached without writing, and consequently the memorials of these years are to be found only in living hearts.

The present is a complete edition of Dr. M.'s works. It embraces, besides an Introduction by his Son, Rev. Ebenezer Mason, his celebrated Plea for Holy Communion on Catholic principles : Letters on Frequent Communion : Considerations on Lots : his celebrated Essays on Episcopacy, unrivaled to this day in power and excellence, and also those on the Church of God ; together with many of his best sermons, and various addresses and orations delivered on special occasions.

The edition is brought out in a very neat and substantial style. The four volumes embrace nearly 2400 octavo pages, and are sold for the low price of

<sup>1</sup> This was the sermon with which the "American National Preacher" started on its useful career, in June, 1826.

\$6.50. We commend these volumes to clergymen and students as among the most valuable of the recent issues of the press.

3.—*Gospel Studies.* By ALEXANDER VINET, D. D. *With an Introduction by* ROBERT BAIRD, D. D. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1849.

THIS book is a feast for thinking minds. It is full of philosophical, evangelical, and original thought. It is written in a style of remarkable simplicity and beauty. While the topics introduced are not new, the manner of treating them is fresh, striking, and often exceedingly happy. The book contains no new or novel views of Christian truth: as a merely theological work it possesses no extraordinary merit; there is no parade of learning, none of the dryness or stiffness of the schools, although these discourses were doubtless originally delivered as lectures to theological students while the lamented Author occupied the chair of Theology in the Academy of Lausanne. The peculiar excellence of these "Gospel Studies" consists in the philosophical manner in which the received truths of Christianity are presented. Dr. Vinet was an eminent metaphysician, not a great theologian, according to the English or American standard of judgment, and hence his thoughts always take the philosophical form: still are they scriptural, decidedly evangelical, and uniformly expressed with great simplicity. His writings will make one think, and impart new and striking views of many truths to those who read him attentively.

His discourses on various religious subjects, which Mr. Turnbull translated and introduced to the public some years since under the title of "Vital Christianity, by Vinet," made the author favorably known in this country. But the present work will serve to increase our estimate of his ability and excellence, and to enshrine his memory in the hearts of all who love the gospel in its simplicity and purity.

4.—*Is Christianity from God? or a Manual of Bible Evidence for the People.* By Rev. JOHN CUMMING, D. D. *Minister of the Scottish National Church.* *With an Introduction by* HON. THEODORE FREELINGHUYSEN. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1849.

THIS work is not designed for the learned but for the common reader of the Bible. It brings to light no new sources of argument in favor of the Bible; produces no original investigations of matters of evidence, and has nothing novel in its mode of treating this important and much-written-upon subject. Still it possesses decided merit, and is well adapted to secure the end it proposes. It is a condensed and happily-arranged summary of the well known argument for the truth of Christianity. The argument is presented in a clear, simple, and methodical manner, and is made perfectly intelligible to common minds, and even to children. It embraces all that is really needful to the mass of minds in the more extensive and learned works which are already before the world. It is just such a Manual of Bible evidence as is needed; and we hope it will quickly find its way into every family, Sabbath-school, and Bible-class in the land. Its brief and striking statement and elucidation of the common argument can scarcely fail to deepen the conviction of believing minds, and furnish them not only with the armor of defense, but also, with the weapons of successful assault upon infidelity.

5.—*The Genius of Italy; being Sketches of Italian Life, Literature, and Religion.* By REV. ROBERT TURNBULL, *Author of "Genius of Scotland," &c.* New York: George P. Putnam, 1849.

WE anticipated something fine from Mr. Turnbull, on Italy, and we are not at all disappointed. The present work, we think, will compare favorably with

his "Genius of Scotland," and "Orators of France and Switzerland." It is a beautiful and highly interesting sketch of Italian life, literature, and scenery. The Author is evidently quite at home in the History and Literature of that land of Art and Beauty; he has a heart to appreciate what is noble in her gifted sons and what is fine and grand in her thousand monuments of art and genius. He writes under the spell of her own inspiration—in full sympathy with her genial skies and lovely landscapes and artistic spirit and poetic fire—and with her past and present struggles for freedom. It is not strictly a history, nor is it a mere sketch of travel, although it embodies the information of the one and the life and interest of the other. The Author rapidly surveys Italy, past and present, in her social, political, and religious aspects: sketches the life and labors of many of her most distinguished statesmen, patriots, and poets, quoting many striking passages from the immortal works of the latter, and showing a just and almost enthusiastic regard for their genius and power; and in conclusion, glances at the recent changes and revolutions which at this moment make Italy the centre of interest to the civilized and Christian world.

The book is written in a style of great beauty and vivacity, and cannot fail to prove highly popular. Our readers may form a pretty good judgment of its merits, from an article which Mr. Turnbull recently contributed to this Review, on Dante and his immortal Epic, the substance of which is given in this volume. We commend it to our readers as at once an entertaining and valuable work on that remarkable country.

6.—*History of King Charles the Second, of England.* By JACOB ABBOTT. With Engravings. New York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS series of short and popular histories, by the Messrs. Abbott, increases in interest, we think, as it progresses. We have, in this volume, a well-drawn sketch of the life of the last of the Charleses.

It is a book of melancholy interest. The terrible fate of his father, and his own long and severe schooling in adversity, one might have supposed would have made the second Charles, when restored to the crown of his ancestors—a crown which had been forfeited and lost by extravagance and oppression—a most wise and virtuous prince. But what a character is here given him, for all that is vile and corrupt and trifling and contemptible and odious! (Macaulay has depicted it in still darker colors in his immortal history.) What a life for royalty to live when recalled from exile, poverty, and disgrace, by a generous people, to exercise sovereignty over them, and a sovereignty, for the abuse of which, his father had been sent to the scaffold, and monarchy for a season abolished. And above all, what a death was his to die! Suddenly stricken of God in the midst of a Sabbath-night's revel—stung with remorse at the recollection of his life of reckless pleasure and sin—receiving by stealth at the dead of night extreme unction at the hands of an obscure Catholic priest—and dying as "the fool dieth." The death-scene as Abbott here describes it, although it falls far short of Macaulay's vivid and minute description of it, is still intensely interesting, and reads a lesson to every man, be he king or peasant, which affectinglly illustrates and confirms the teachings of the wise man of old.

7.—*History of Maria Antoinette.* By JOHN S. C. ABBOTT. With Engravings. New York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS, in some respects, is the most interesting History in this highly popular series. Who has not admired the heroic virtues, and mourned the sad and terrible fate of the beautiful and high-born, but unfortunate and cruelly-treated Maria Antoinette! The daughter of the illustrious Maria Theresa, married to "XVI., of France, and raised to the throne of the most splendid and powerful monarchy on earth, a career of surpassing happiness and glory seemed to

flatter her ambition and dance before her ardent and naturally pleasure-loving mind. But the strange neglect of Louis, and the nation's jealousies and suspicions of the Austrian Queen, poisoned her first years : and the tempest of the fiercest and most fiendish revolution that ever up-turned a throne or deluged a nation in blood, beat upon her after-life and singled her out as a marked victim of its hatred and unearthly fury.

The annals of this world of crime and misery cannot show a darker, drearier, or more soul-harrowing picture of fallen fortune, extreme adversity, utter grief and destitution, and exquisite torture of human sensibilities and endurance of suffering. Some parts of this history possess a degree of melancholy interest which no romance ever equaled, and which imposes a painful contribution on one's sensibilities in the reading of them. We specify as particularly exciting and painful—the flight of the royal family from Paris, and their capture at Varennes, just as they were about to cross the frontiers of France : their slow march back to the Capitol amidst the jeers and insults of an infuriated populace ; the parting scene between Louis and his family in the prison of the Temple—the imprisonment of Antoinette in the horrible Conciergerie and her final execution—and last and the most diabolical of all, the murder by inches of the young and interesting Louis, after reducing him to idiocy and absolute brutality, as a matter of State policy. Did the sun ever look upon a darker scene of crime and woe ? As there is an avenging God on high we might expect that such deeds would call down a terrible baptism of blood !

8.—*Life in the Far West.* By GEORGE FREDERICK RUXTON, Author of "*Adventures in Mexico and the Rocky Mountains.*" New York : Harper & Brothers, 1849.

This book belongs to the class of the marvelous, and really lays no slight tax upon the reader's credulity. Its stories *may* be true, they are said to be, but few will believe them. Our opinion is, that to say the least, "*Life in the Far West*"—life among the "Trappers and the Indians," who inhabit the wild and immense regions known as the Rocky Mountains, and which this book attempts to describe—is greatly exaggerated, in its worst features, if not really caricatured. It is not without its interest however, as giving one view of life and character in that remote and little-known region, though we confess it is not much to our taste, either as a tale of real adventures or as a book of sheer fiction. This narrative of mountaineer life was originally published in *Blackwood's Magazine*. The Author was an English Lieutenant who had seen much of the world, and who died at St. Louis, last October, greatly lamented.

9.—*Stories about Animals, with Pictures to match.* By FRANCIS C. WOODWORTH. New York : D. A. Woodworth, 1849.

Few living writers are in our judgment so well adapted to interest, and at the same time instruct, the young in useful knowledge as the Author of this pleasing volume. He combines the entertaining with the instructive, the wholesome moral with the anecdote, in a rare degree. We never see anything in his writings to offend good taste, virtue, or piety, and always much that is refining, elevating, and beneficial to the social and religious feelings and sentiments of the young.

This volume urges no claim to originality, or scientific value. It is a group of anecdotes, many of them very interesting and striking, gathered from a great variety of sources, to illustrate the peculiarities of different animals. It is got up in a very neat and attractive style, and is bountifully embellished with well-executed engravings. We do not hesitate to commend it as of real interest and value to the young.

10.—*Home Evangelization ; a view of the Wants and Prospects of our Country, based on the facts and relations of Colportage.* By one of the Secretaries of the American Tract Society.

- 11.—*The Night of Toil ; or a familiar account of the labors of the first Missionaries in the South Sea Islands. By the Author of "Peep of Day."*
- 12.—*The Young Disciple ; or a Memoir of Anzonetta R. Peters. By. REV. JOHN A. CLARK.*
- 13.—*Hymns for Infant Minds. By JANE TAYLOR.*
- 14.—*Children Invited to Christ. By a LADY.*
- 15.—*Narratives of Pious Children. By REV. GEORGE HENDLEY.*
- 16.—*Memoir of Mrs. Eliza Astor Rumpff, and of the Duchess de Broglie, Daughter of Madame de Stael. By REV. ROBERT BAIRD, F. D. D.*

THE seven books whose titles are here given, are among the recent issues of the American Tract Society. They are all of them excellent in their way, and deserve the patronage of the religious community. The first is a Plea for our Country, in reference to Colportage that every patriot and Christian ought to read and ponder. The second is a most interesting and instructive narrative of the toils of the first missionaries to the South Sea Islands during a twenty years' trial of their faith and patience. The third is a memoir of a lovely youth who died at the age of eighteen ; a most striking example of intelligent, elevated, consistent piety—one of the sweetest memoirs we remember to have read : abridged from the fifth edition. The fourth is a collection of pleasing and beautiful hymns, designed for infant minds, by Jane Taylor. Many of these hymns are superior in their poetry and sentiment, and are adapted wisely to impress the lessons of piety on and instil its spirit into the minds of children. The fifth contains many sweet and precious invitations to children to come to Christ ; and the sixth is a remarkable record of pious children, which may well serve to stimulate parents to pray more earnestly and with greater faith for the blessings of the covenant in the early conversion of their children. The last, contains brief memoirs of two distinguished and eminently devoted Christian women, who, amid the gay scenes and corruptions of Paris and though surrounded by all the earth-alluring attractions of wealth, station and royal display and dissipation, walked steadily with God in the lowly path of holy living and active benevolence. Lady Huntingdon is said to have thanked God for the letter *m* in the word *many* in Paul's assertion : "not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called." It is refreshing and delightful to see piety so consistently and beautifully exemplified in high life, as it was in the case of these really noble women.

18. *An Elementary Treatise on Mechanics, embracing the theory of Statics and Dynamics, and its application to Solids and Fluids. Prepared for the Under-Graduate Course in the Wesleyan University. By AUGUSTUS W. S. SMITH, LL.D. New York : Harper and Brothers. 1849.*

An elementary work on analytical Mechanics, adapted to a college course of study, was really needed. The above work is designed to meet that want, and is the result of no little patient labor as well as experience in teaching.

The author advances no claim to originality. The materials have been sought, and freely taken from all available sources ; particularly from the works of Poisson, Francœur, Gregory, Whewell, Walker, Moseley, and Jamieson. These materials have been modified and arranged to suit "the specific object kept constantly in view—the preparation of a manual which should be simple in its character," and easily and thoroughly induct the student into the elementary principles of the science. Its peculiar merits, if we judge aright, are its simplicity, its thoroughness as to the elementary truths, and the peculiar facility it affords for the prosecution of this branch of study. It deserves to be extensively adopted as a text-book in our college course of studies.

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ARTICLE I.

LIFE AND TIMES OF LEO THE GREAT.

— By REV. EDWARD BEECHER, D.D., Boston.

History is made up of two elements, facts which transpire in this world, and the relations of those facts to the universal system. That there was such a man as Leo the Great, that he lived in the fifth century, that he was a leading spirit of his age, that he was engaged in divers controversies, and aimed at certain definite ends, these and similar things, are facts easily ascertainable, and capable of a definite and precise statement. Nor with regard to the leading facts of his life is there any controversy.

But when we pass to the consideration of the relations of these facts to the universal system, we enter at once a new world. Whilst generations of men die, higher and permanent orders of spiritual beings meet our eyes. Each generation of men has its principles, ends and aims, but no common intelligible human plan runs through the history of all ages. To discover such a plan we must pass into the invisible world, and study the designs of Him, of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things, and who worketh all things after the council of his own will.

To give the relations of the facts of history from this point of vision is by no means so easy as to state the facts. It leads us at once, upon controverted ground. The moment we raise this question as it regards Leo, we meet the great controversy of the age. To the partizans of Rome, he is Leo the Great; to their opponents he is but a prominent founder of a terrific and malignant anti-christian system which was matured and perfectly developed by Gregory VII. and Innocent III.

God only can write a perfect history of the world from this point of vision, and at the day of the revelation of his just judgment he will do it. Meantime there is to be even on earth, under the guidance of his Spirit a historical day of judgment. On no subject has more illusion and fraud been practiced, especially since the days of Christ, than on the history of this world. But the day cometh that shall burn as an oven. God is yet to reign, and He will reign by the truth and not by delusion and fraud. No one, therefore, is more concerned in promulgating and establishing correct views of the history of this world than he. In all our inquiries then let us entreat Him to dissipate all delusions, to open our eyes, to purify our hearts, and to touch our lips as with a coal from his own altar.

In the historical sketch which we have undertaken to present, we have chosen an individual to stand as the central figure of the picture, and yet our main design is, through him to evolve the principles and spirit of the age in which he lived.

Leo was chosen bishop of Rome A. D. 440, and died A. D. 461, after an eventful reign of twenty-one years. From 423 to 455, Valentinian III. was Emperor of the West, Maximus, Avitus, Majorianus, ruled during the remaining six years of his life. From 408 to 450, Theodosius II. was emperor of the East; Marcian from 450 to 457; Leo, also called the Great, from 457 to 474. Such were his cotemporary civil rulers.

As to his parentage and early education, little is known. He was a Roman by birth. His father's name was Quinctianus. His first appearance in history is just before his choice as bishop of Rome. He was sent by Pope Sixtus III. to effect a reconciliation between Aetius and Albinus, in Gaul, of which we shall soon speak. During his absence Sixtus died and Leo was chosen in his place.

The main characteristic of the age of Leo was the approaching destruction of those institutions of Roman civil society, which paganism had formed. Concerning these, Guizot remarks, "The civil society of the Roman world, to all outward appearances secured Christian, equally with the religious society. The great majority of the European nations and kings had embraced Christianity, but at the bottom the civil society was pagan. Its institutions, its laws, its manners, were all essentially pagan. It was entirely a society formed by paganism; not at all a society formed by Christianity. Christian civil society did not develop itself till a later period, till after the invasion of the barbarians. It belongs in point of time to modern history. In the fifth century, whatever outward appearances may say to the contrary, there existed between civil society and religious society, incoherence, contradiction, contest; for they were essentially different, both in their origin and in their nature.

"I would pray you never to lose sight of this diversity ; it is a diversity which alone enables us to comprehend the real condition of the Roman world at this period."

This political society, was enervated, and rapidly approaching dissolution and death—slavery, and the deep degradation of the masses of the people were the main cause of this state of things. The Barbarians were God's instruments for breaking in pieces that old fabric which was tottering to its fall, and ready soon to vanish away.

Hence the names of Alaric, Attila, and Genseric, begin to figure on the page of history, and the Vandals, Franks, Goths, Visigoths, and Burgundians, under the guidance of such leaders issue from the North to execute the purposes of God.

A period of political dissolution and chaos is to ensue—during which a new religious society is to exercise a centralizing and organizing power. Of this society Leo claimed to be the divinely ordained head—and his whole energies were put forth to develop and establish the principles of the papal monarchy. Never was there a point in which a great mind swayed by ambition and not controlled by a regard to truth, had a finer opportunity to exercise a creative and organizing power.

In various ways the bishop of Rome had already obtained great influence. But he was by no means monarch of the Christian world. Indeed, never was there a time when he had rivals so powerful as were now the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and especially of Constantinople.

The power of these bishops originated from two sources : one, political, the other, spiritual. The former was in fact the only source of the extraordinary and despotic powers they were intent on establishing. Of this we have a full illustration in the history of the see of Constantinople. The Bishop of Byzantium was at first, but a suffragan to the bishop of Heraclea—exarch of the diocese of Thrace.

But Constantine made Byzantium a new Rome, and lo the bishop of Byzantium, soon becomes the leading patriarch in all the East, for it was not fit that the emperor's bishop should be inferior in rank or power to any of the bishops of the East. His central political position too gave him the same means of augmenting his power, which the bishop of Rome enjoyed at the West, and diligently and skilfully did he use them, and rapidly did he gain on the bishops of Rome in the race.

And if the political basis of the bishop's power were to continue the main one, it was plain that if Old Rome fell, and New Rome stood, the patriarch of Constantinople might finally win in the race.

It was certainly a critical period ; some master-spirit was needed fully to develop and establish the doctrine that the power of



the bishop of Rome had a higher origin than that of the bishop of Constantinople, so that even if Old Rome fell his spiritual kingdom might not only remain unshaken, but take her place and rise upon her ruins.

Such a master-spirit was needed. In Leo he was found. A Roman by birth, of powerful intellect, indomitable will, dauntless courage, vivid imagination, great power of emotion, a finished education, extensive learning, a majestic person, and fervid eloquence, he was beyond all doubt immeasurably superior, in most of those elements which give power over mind, to all the men of his age. He is worthy to be placed side by side with Gregory VII. and Innocent III.

But considering the claims of the see of Rome to be the great preserver of the faith on earth, it is not a little remarkable that Leo is the first theological writer of any ability which the see of Rome produced—the first who has left any important works for the benefit of posterity, if we omit the apostle Peter, and the evangelical, and primitive Clement.

Before Leo, the leading champions of the faith did not come from the see of Rome. So far from it was the fact, that the faith would have been betrayed had it been left solely to the bishop of Rome. Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, was the great pillar of the doctrine of the trinity, whilst pope Liberius signed an Arian creed. Augustine, bishop of Hippo, was the great champion of the doctrine of human depravity and the sovereign grace of God, whilst pope Zosimus, became the champion of Pelagianism till compelled by the power and perseverance of Augustine to recant. Popes Julius and Felix, long before Eutyches, had promulgated the Eutychian doctrine, which the whole energy of Leo and after ages labored in vain utterly to overthrow and eradicate.

The great writers of the East and the West, Augustine and Basil, Athanasius, and Ambrose, the Gregories, and Chrysostom, had adorned their respective sees, whilst Rome remained in a state of comparative intellectual and theological barrenness, till Leo arose.

But the moment he appeared on the stage the centre of both ecclesiastical and intellectual power was no doubt at Rome. With a strong hand and a determined will, he grasped all the great questions of the age, and made an impress on the world, that is felt to this day. He gave a decided turn to theology and to the current of events, in favor of the see of Rome; nor, *judging by their standards*, have the partizans of that see erred, in calling him **LEO THE GREAT**.

The acts of his life may be arranged in five classes.

1. Those which related to the existing interests of the Roman Empire, as endangered by the Barbarians.

2. Those which relate to the powers of the see of Rome.

3. Those that relate to the vindication and establishment of the orthodox system of faith.

4. Those which relate to the use of force in the suppression of heresy.

5. Those which relate to the discipline of the Church.

It will be seen at a glance that all his acts, except those of the first class, related to principles destined to exert a vast influence on all future generations. Whatever may be thought of the character of the Romish Church, no one can deny that it was for ages the centre of intellectual and ecclesiastical power, for Christendom. No point of vision gives so comprehensive an insight into the religious and political condition of the Christian world for ages. An emotion of sublimity therefore fills the mind as we stand at the fountain-head of this great river of destiny, and watch the elements that are from time to time mingled with it by the presiding spirit at Rome.

1. We have excepted Leo's acts of the first class from the list of such as involve principles destined to affect future ages. They were indeed in his own day more thought of; they occupy a more prominent place in the histories of the age; but they affected simply the question of the earlier or later downfall of Rome. That mistress of the world was thoroughly corrupt. Her measure of iniquity was nearly full. All that Leo could do for her was, for a little time, to delay her fall. When, A. D. 440, under the weak rule of Valentinian, the safety of Rome was endangered by the alienation of Aetius, the greatest Roman general of the age, and Albinus a Gallic lord of great power, and thus at the very time when the empire was overrun by the Goths, Burgundians, Franks, and Hunns, Leo was chosen as qualified above all others by eloquence, sagacity, and tact to reconcile them. To effect this he was sent on an embassy to Gaul. He fulfilled his mission with such success that he stood conspicuous in the eyes of his own generation as a great peace-maker, and the saviour of the empire from impending ruin.

Again, A. D. 452, when Attila and his Hunns having been driven by Aetius out of Gaul, had invaded Italy, and having captured Aquileia, Pavier, and even Milan the imperial residence, were preparing to lay siege to Rome, Leo was sent at the head of an embassy to him, that he might exert the power of his effective eloquence and address upon the mind of the terrible leader of the Barbarians. Without the aid of a vivid imagination it is easy to invest this transaction with a peculiar and impressive dramatic interest. All hearts were dismayed: even Aetius trembled before the barbarian hosts, when lo the gates of Rome open, and her bishop, in sacerdotal robes, and with majestic aspect goes forth to try the force of intellectual and spiritual arms against the victorious leader of barbarian hosts. To the natural and inherent inter-

est of the scene, religious fiction has sought to superadd a new intensity, by introducing a miraculous appearance of Peter and Paul to second the eloquence of Leo. It is enough however for us to know that the embassy was successful. Attila retired and Rome for a time was saved. It is added by others that a pestilence in the camp of Attila, the invasion of his own country by Marcian, the prospect of speedy and powerful reinforcements for the Romans, and the stipulation of an annual tribute of two thousand pounds of gold, were the real influences that gave power to the eloquence of Leo. Be this as it may, the glory that he has derived from the success of this mission has been great. Yet after all it accomplished little for Rome, and still less for the world. It affected, as we have said, no great principle, and it caused but a brief delay of the downfall of Rome. Even the same Leo, at a later date in vain exerted his eloquence to deter Genseric from the sack of Rome. Summoned by Eudoxia, the widow of Valentinian, to avenge her on Maximus who had slain her husband, assumed his throne and compelled her to marry him, he plundered Rome, and carried away not only vast treasures but also many Romans as slaves. At the request of Leo he only consented to save the city from the flames.

2. Let us now come to those acts of Leo that related to principles, destined to increase in power till they should engulf all other power in their tremendous vortex. We have already remarked that the power of the bishop of Rome was originally based upon the political supremacy of Rome. Even Newman, in an argument designed to conduct his disciples into the bosom of Rome, is obliged to admit that the doctrine of the "*regalia Petri*," was undeveloped in the early ages. He intimates indeed that it slumbered *in the record*, ready to be developed when needed, but it is a very suspicious fact that the new basis of the claims of the pretended succession of Peter was not discovered till the political basis seemed to be in danger of being subverted by the superior political power of the bishop of Constantinople. Then the hidden sense of "*thou art Peter*," first proclaimed by Innocent I., A. D. 401-417, began to open rapidly on the mind of Leo, and with imperious energy he thus sets it forth in his letter to the bishops of Gaul. "It was the will of our Lord that all nations should hear the truth through the apostolic trumpet. Yet it was also his pleasure that the blessed Peter should preside over the other apostles in the discharge of this duty. So that all divine gifts should flow to the body from him as the head, so that none could partake of the blessings of the kingdom of God who should dare to depart from the rock Peter. This office of Peter Christ proclaimed when he said, '*thou art Peter*,' &c. Thus the structure of the eternal temple, by the wonderful grace of God, was made to rest on the rock Peter." In all this there is now no originality, but in the days

of Leo there was need of his master-mind to give currency to this doctrine. With reference to him Gieseler says, "By exalting the authority of the apostle Peter, and *by tracing all his rights to this source*, as well as by his personal qualities and good fortune, he did more than any of his predecessors, in extending and confirming the power of the Romish see."

Gieseler, also in § 92, says that "this view was first fully developed by Leo." But Bower has shown from a letter of Innocent I. to Alexander bishop of Antioch, that the merit or demerit of developing this idea belongs to Innocent. In that letter he derives the prerogatives, privileges and *jurisdiction* of the Roman see from St. Peter. In view of this Bower remarks: "Innocent may be justly said to have *pointed out* the ground on which the unwieldy fabric of the papal power was afterwards built." Still, however, it may be true as Gieseler asserts that Leo first **FULLY** developed this view. Thus then Innocent I. originated it, and accustomed the ears of men to hear it. Leo fully developed and to his utmost power enforced it. Nicholas I. added to its power. Gregory VII. erected the fabric, and Innocent III. reigned in the meridian splendor of papal glory.

Nor was Leo at all deficient in that unprincipled boldness and energy which were essential in order to enforce such claims of authority. This was especially seen in his encounter with that distinguished Romish saint, Hilary bishop of Arles, and exarch of the seven provinces of Narbonne. A council of bishops in which Hilary presided, had deposed Celidonius, bishop of Besançon. He appealed to Leo. Hilary denied the right of Leo to receive the appeal and review their proceedings; Leo maintained it. Hilary went to Rome to protest against it. Leo arrested and confined him there, and appointed a day for reviewing the case. Hilary escaped from confinement and fled to Arles, Leo, enraged at his contumacy, re-examined the case, and against notorious facts, declared Celidonius innocent and restored him to his office as bishop. Nor did he stop here; he excommunicated Hilary, deprived him of all jurisdiction, suspended his episcopal functions, and abolished the dignity of exarch, formerly conferred on the see of Arles. Even this did not suffice; he wrote to the Gallic bishops a slanderous letter designed to blast the character and destroy the influence of Hilary. It was in this letter that the doctrine of the divine supremacy of Peter and his successors was first fully developed. His next step was to enlist the imperial power on his side. The weak Valentinian, was induced by him to confirm by an imperial edict, all of his arrogant claims, and to state in notorious contravention of facts that the bishop of Rome had always exercised the powers claimed by Leo. This edict occurs in Leo's works and no doubt came from his pen. There is nothing in the forged decretals of a later age more thoroughly unprincipled than

this conduct of Leo. Hilary never yielded to him, but died under his ban. Yet he continued to exercise all the functions of his office, as before, respected by all who knew him as one of the most eminent Christians of the age. The Romish Church too has refuted the slanders of Leo by canonizing him, and even Leo, after the death of Hilary, was inconsistent enough to call him "Hilary of holy memory." Such was Leo the great! Such was the manner in which he toiled to lay the broad foundations of the papal power. Since the Romish Church has canonized Hilary the Romanists are greatly perplexed to know what to say of the conduct of Leo. One author of the life of Hilary omits his excommunication. Certainly if Hilary was a saint, Leo was not. Yet both have been canonized. Hilary perhaps deserved the honor; on the other hand the conduct of Leo was too profitable to Rome to pass without reward. It aided to lay the broad basis of all her powers. Therefore she has canonized him also. So then both Leo who excommunicated Hilary, and Hilary who died under his anathema, were both eminent saints. Consistent Rome!

The same traits of character were displayed by Leo in his obstinate resistance of the 28th canon of the Council of Chalcedon. In this was distinctly advanced the doctrine that the power of the bishop of Rome as well as of Constantinople, was solely of political origin. Of the dangerous tendency of this doctrine Leo was too well aware, and resisted it with implacable hostility. Yet it was impossible with any show of historical truth to resist the canon. Leo therefore supplied his lack of argument by imperious obstinacy and falsehood. But the canon of the council remains to this day an unanswerable proof of the real origin of that great central despotism, which at last claimed by Divine right the supremacy of the whole Christian world. That large œcumenical council of six hundred bishops expressly say, "Since the fathers, properly conceded eminent prerogatives to the episcopal throne of Old Rome, *because of the political supremacy of that city*, (διὰ τὸ βασιλεύειν τὴν πόλιν ἐκείνην,) the divinely beloved fathers of the council of Constantinople acting on the same principle, assigned equal prerogatives to the episcopal throne of New Rome; thinking it suitable that a city honored by imperial authority, and a senate, and enjoying equal political prerogatives with Old Rome, should possess an equal pre-eminence with her in ecclesiastical authority." The only difference admitted by the council between the two sees, was not one of authority—but of honorary precedence, which was naturally assigned to the see of the oldest of the two cities. This, it is plain, is a doctrine totally subversive of the theory of Leo, that the supremacy of the bishop of Rome is derived from the divine appointment of Peter to be the head of the church universal. But this is not all. The see of Constantinople was, by the Council of Chalcedon, invested with the right of re-

ceiving appeals from all other ecclesiastical tribunals whatever. This power, at least in words, was granted without any limitation. And even if with Bower we think that it had in reality reference to the Eastern church alone, yet it is plain, beyond a doubt, that the council decided that the bishop of Constantinople was entirely independent of the see of Rome. Still further, the universality of their language, gave to the bishop of Constantinople better ground to assume the title of universal bishop, and head of all the churches, and primate of the Christian world, than the bishop of Rome ever had. And when the Western empire fell, he did in fact put forth such claims, greatly to the terror of Gregory the Great, who felt that his own throne was tottering to its fall. When now we consider the notorious fact that all churches were at first independent and equal, we shall see how immense the chasm to be bridged over before the church of Rome could arrive at universal monarchy by divine right over all the churches of the earth. We shall also see that intrepid forgery and lying were the only materials out of which the necessary bridge could be constructed. The greatness then which is involved in founding the Romish power is of necessity based upon such elements, and for such greatness Leo, Nicholas the first, Gregory the seventh, and Innocent the third were eminently distinguished.

Leo could not resist the 28th canon of the Council of Chalcedon except by forgery, accordingly he forged, or caused to be forged an addition to the canons of the Council of Nice. The legates of Leo produced in the Council of Chalcedon a Latin translation of the sixth canon, in which the see of Rome was said always to have enjoyed the primacy. But the whole council regarded the addition as a forged interpretation,—and plainly they were right;—it is inconsistent with the context—and has been since omitted, in the best Latin translations of the canons. That Leo could retain any character or influence after such an infamous fraud had been exposed, throws a striking light on the morality of the age. The leprosy of religious lying had so corrupted the nominally Christian community, that to be exposed in it seemed to injure no man's character, standing or influence. Well has inspiration given as one trait of the great apostacy. "Speaking lies in hypocrisy." Leo, after the Council of Chalcedon, did not hesitate to profess a sacred regard to the Council of Nice, and to oppose the obnoxious chalcedonian decree by an appeal to his own forged addition to the decrees of Nice. And yet such was his personal influence and power, that he was feared alike by the Eastern and Western emperors and by all the civilians and ecclesiastics of the age.

In thus professing a supreme regard to the canons of Nice, he was guilty of a gross inconsistency, for the fifth of these canons ordered all appeals to be finally decided by the bishops of each

province. Yet he excommunicated Hilary for adhering to this very canon, and claiming final authority in the case of Celidonius against the imperious claims of the usurping bishop of Rome. Again we say, what can be conceived of, more unprincipled than the conduct of Leo! Yet for this very conduct Rome has ever regarded him as Leo the Great! And well may she, so long as she retains her arrogant claims, for they are founded on nothing else.

In the transactions which have passed under review, we see the germs of some of the greatest developments of subsequent ages. In St. Leo, we see the model of Nicholas I., Hildebrand and Innocent III.; in his contest with Hilary, a preparation for the great controversy as to the Gallic liberties which nearly lost France to the Romish Church; in his warfare with the see of Constantinople, the forerunner of the great Greek schism. Any one could easily have foreseen that Constantinople, the great rival of Old Rome would sooner consent to lie under her anathema, than tamely submit to her power.

3. From acts so discreditable to Leo we gladly turn to consider his influence on the doctrines of the church, for here we can find results of his intellectual powers, in which orthodox divines, both Romish and Protestant, concur to this day. We refer to his discussion of the great doctrine of THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST IN ONE PERSON. After what has been said of his unprincipled policy in extending the power of the see of Rome, it is perhaps little to the credit of the orthodox doctrine of the person of Christ, that he should be found to be its great champion, and to have done more than any one person of antiquity in giving it the form in which it is now held. But truth does not cease to be truth even if advocated by an unworthy defender.

The chief work of Leo upon this momentous theme, is his letter to Flavianus, bishop of Constantinople. The circumstances that called it forth were these: Eutyches, reacting from the reputed error of Nestorius, had maintained that the divine and human natures after their union in Christ became ONE NATURE. For this he was condemned and deposed by a provincial council at Constantinople under Flavianus, bishop of that see. Eutyches appealed from the decision to an œcumenical council. He addressed his appeal in particular to the bishops of Rome, Alexandria, Jerusalem and Thessalonica. It was in answer to this appeal and in prospect of this council, that Leo wrote his celebrated letter to Flavianus, in opposition to Eutyches, and developing the true doctrine. This letter was afterwards received as canonical by the council of Chalcedon, and by all the orthodox bishops. It was, says Bower, in the Western churches read during the advent with the Gospels. The council of Rome anathematized all who should reject even a word of it. Gregory the Great made it the standard

of orthodoxy on that point. The Council of Apamea styled it "the true column of the orthodox faith," and some even caused it to be read to them at the point of death, in proof that they died in the true faith of the Church. Such has been the fame and the power of this letter. Yet it was not at first received without opposition so violent as to require all the influence and energy of Leo to defend it.

Dioscorus, bishop of Alexandria, espoused the cause of Eutyches, and in the œcumenical Council called at Ephesus by Theodosius, presided by express order of the emperor. Being a man of powerful character, and moreover overbearing and despotic in the highest degree, by the aid of soldiers and monks with clubs, he overawed the council and compelled them to sign an unanimous acquittal of Eutyches, and vindication of his doctrine. He also deposed Flavianus, and all the prominent bishops hostile to Eutyches. Nor was this all: Flavianus for appealing from this decision was beaten, trodden under foot, and banished; and whilst going into exile, from the injuries received in the council he died. This council, though as regularly convened as any other œcumenical council, has ever been regarded with the utmost detestation by the Church of Rome, and was styled by Leo the gang of robbers and ruffians. Its developments were indeed worse than those of the other councils of the age, but its spirit was much the same. Be this as it may, the emperor Theodosius sanctioned the doings of the council, in spite of the earnest remonstrances of Leo, Valentinian, and his wife Eudoxia, daughter of Theodosius, and refused to call another to review its proceedings. Thus it seemed as if Leo was defeated and Eutyches, or rather Dioscorus, victorious. Still Leo persisted with unbroken energy to resist Dioscorus and his party, and was gradually inducing divers bishops to forsake him. On this Dioscorus calling a council of ten bishops excommunicated Leo for his contumacy. All this Leo treated with silent contempt, and persisted in his course, and by legates and letters sought to induce Theodosius to call a new council. But his efforts were fruitless.

At length the death of Theodosius effected an entire revolution in his favor. Marcian and the emperor's sister Pulcheria who became the wife of Marcian, were his successors, of whom the latter worshipped Leo, and had been fully indoctrinated by him in his new theory of the origin of his supreme authority from Peter. Another œcumenical council was soon called by the emperor at Nice, and transferred, in view of the invasion of the Huns, to Chalcedon, near Constantinople. In this council Leo of course was triumphant. Through it, though not present except by legates, he deposed Dioscorus, and banished him—condemned Eutyches and his heresy, restored those of his opponents whom the Ephesian gang of robbers had deposed, and established the true and



orthodox faith. The great and convincing argument with most of the bishops seemed to be a knowledge that the emperor favored Leo, for their creed obviously fluctuated with the opinions of the emperor for the time being. Thus was the orthodox faith established in accordance with the letter of Leo. It is indeed true that there were some vibrations after this, towards Monophysitism, and Monothelitism, i. e., the doctrines of one nature, and one will in Christ, but the church at last settled upon Leo's ground. It must be a matter of rational interest to read a letter the influence of which has been so great. We can find room however only for a short extract from it, noting at the same time, that such as desire to judge of the classical elegance of Leo's style must read it in the original. After stating the great fact of the incarnation, he thus proceeds. "The properties of each nature and substance were preserved, and *united in one person*. The humble condition of man was assumed by the divine majesty, his weakness, by the omnipotent, his mortality, by the eternal one. To pay our debt, the divine nature, which cannot suffer, was united to a nature capable of suffering, so that to effect our redemption, one and the same mediator between God and man, Jesus Christ, might die in one nature but could not die in the other. In the whole and perfect nature of a true man, the true God was born, complete in his own attributes, complete in ours." This view in the rest of the letter is presented with great enlargement, frequent repetitions, and much illustration. By the Council of Chalcedon, it is presented in a much much condensed and compact form; In this they recognize the "two natures, unconfounded, unchanged, undivided, inseparable;" (*ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιάφθως, ἀχωρίστως*) the distinction of natures not done away at all by the union; but rather the peculiar properties of each nature preserved, and combining into *one person*; not separated or divided into two persons, but one son, only begotten, God the word, the Lord Jesus Christ."

The same view, at a subsequent date, passed into what is called the Athanasian creed and has come through it down to us. "Although he is God and man, he is nevertheless not two, but one Christ. One, not by the change of divinity into humanity, but by the assumption of humanity into divinity. One, not by confusion of substances, but by *unity of person*. The same doctrine we find in the shorter catechism. "The Eternal Son of God became man, and so was and continued to be, God and man, *in two distinct natures and one person*, forever." In all these creeds too there is a distinct recognition of a human soul in opposition to the heresy of Apollinarius. Such then and so great was the influence of Leo, on this fundamental article of the Christian faith. The effects of it are felt through the Christian world to this day, though few know that they are to be traced back to him. In this respect therefore he comes into the same class with such men as Athanasius and

Augustine, and is distinguished from all other popes, none of whom have ever thus made their mark on the world as theologians.

But it must not be supposed that Leo after all was so sustained by the decision of the Council of Chalcedon, that he needed to put forth no more efforts. Marcian and Pulcheria were in fact his main supports, and when Leo the Great succeeded them, it became necessary for pope Leo to exert all his influence to sustain the Council of Chalcedon. Timothy the Cat, a disciple of Dioscorus, and a violent enemy of Leo, was elevated to the see of Alexandria by the Egyptian monks. He at once denounced both Leo and his Chalcedonian decisions: and although the emperor Leo was favorable to the Council of Chalcedon, yet many of his influential friends were so much opposed to it, that to pacify them he was strongly inclined to call another Council to review its decrees. This pope Leo could not endure. He wrote nearly twenty letters to expostulate against it, addressed to the emperor and to all the most influential bishops and civilians of the East, and finally by his utmost efforts succeeded in averting the danger. The emperor Leo simply ordered the bishops to examine the decrees of Chalcedon in provincial synods. Of these several were held, and all but one confirmed the decrees of Chalcedon. Still Timothy the Cat was in favor at the court, and wrote to the emperor a severe invective against Leo's letter and the Council of Chalcedon. The emperor on this proposed to pope Leo, at the request of Timothy, to debate the question through suitable champions, with such champions as might be chosen to defend the doctrines of Eutyches. This also Leo resolutely declined, preferring to hold fast to the decrees of Chalcedon.

When we consider the decided adherence of Leo to this Council, where its decisions coincided with his own will, it presents in a more striking light his inconsistency in declaring void its twenty-eighth canon as hostile to his claims for his own see, and his unblushing falsehood in declaring that that canon was passed by intimidation and constraint, whereas the whole council assured his legates that they passed it freely, and of their own accord. Of this Leo could not have been ignorant; yet he does not hesitate repeatedly to assert the contrary in his letters to emperors and bishops.

It is plain then that the doctrinal decrees of Chalcedon were simply a record of the previous decisions of Leo, and that on this ground he sustained them with all his intellect and influence. They may be true notwithstanding all this, but they are none the more true because they thus prevailed. Such was Leo's conflict with the Eutychians.

He was also exceedingly decided in his opposition to the Manicheans and Priscillianists, but as he relied chiefly on power for their suppression, and as the intellectual defence of the orthodox

system against Manicheism and similar errors belongs to Augustine rather than to Leo, we shall take no farther notice of his intellectual labors in defence of the faith of the church.

4. Here, however, our attention is naturally called to the influence exerted by Leo on the great question of the use of force, and the infliction of civil pains and penalties in the suppression of error. If any who were called at the origin of this question to investigate it, and to give form to the doctrine of the church on the subject, could have had a prophetic vision of such scenes as the massacre of St. Bartholomew, celebrated by the *te Deums* at Rome, or of the dungeons, stakes and *autos da fe* of the inquisition, had they at all weighed the import of that fearful symbol, a harlot drunk with blood, with what fearful solicitude would they have entered upon the investigation. But it was destined that early generations should sow the seeds of the system of religious persecution, and future ages reap the harvest of blood. To Leo the bad pre-eminence does not belong of having originated the system of persecution for opinion's sake. But it must be said of him, that he strengthened it when it was relatively weak, and sanctioned it by his great influence, when, if he had resisted it with all his power, he might have destroyed it forever.

The idea of inflicting civil pains and penalties for opinions, sprang naturally out of the union of church and state. In the early ages of Christianity it was utterly repudiated. One form of subsequent intolerance was so plausible, that it caused little apprehension; it was the suppression of paganism by law; the destruction of heathen temples and implements of idolatry; the confiscation of property consecrated to such uses; and fines on the use of frankincense and libations. These things were done in the reigns of Gratian and Theodosius. Constantine and his immediate successors were tolerant towards the pagans. The edict of Milan indicates the original views of Constantine. It was a charter of religious liberty to all. The spirit of persecution arose under the influence of THE HIERARCHY. Penal laws against heresy among Christians preceded the persecutions of pagans. Constantine issued two such laws, Theodosius fifteen, Arcadius twelve, Honorius eighteen. The Arians, Donatists, Pelageans, Manicheans, Priscillianists, and Paulicians, were among the more prominent persecuted heretical sects. The Arians in their turn, when in the ascendant, retaliated on the orthodox. But the Roman laws did not punish heresy by death. Banishment, fine, confiscation of goods, infamy, disqualification to buy or sell, exclusion from civil and military honor, were the common penalties. According to Mosheim, however, some of the Donatists were put to death, A.D. 316—the indignation of Constantine being aroused by their disregard of his decision against them, pronounced after a personal investigation; their case having been previously investigated by

two councils summoned by his authority, and they having been twice before condemned. Of this infliction, however, other historians say nothing, and Gieseler expressly says that the first instance of the judicial execution of a heretic was in the case of Priscillian, A.D. 385, who was, with others of his followers, tried and executed by the usurper Maximus, at the instigation of the bishops Idacius and Ithacius. Hagenback also says that the Priscillianists were the first heretics persecuted by the sword.

It is worthy of note, that this proceeding at that time *met with general reprobation*. In particular, Martin of Tours, and Ambrose of Milan, loudly condemned it, and the instigators of the deed were finally expelled from their bishopricks.

Such was the state of the Christian world on the subject of persecution when Leo was called to meet the question, by the flight of large numbers of the Manichees to Rome, from Carthage and the provinces which the Vandals under Genseric had overrun. A letter from Turribius,<sup>1</sup> bishop of Astorga, called his attention to the revival and spread of the heresy of Priscillian in Spain. Leo had now a glorious opportunity to set forth the true principles of religious liberty, and to rectify the errors of preceding years. There was, it is plain, deep feeling in the church against punishing heretics by death, and the guilt and folly of all civil pains and penalties, for erroneous opinions could have been clearly shown. The authority of the earlier fathers could have been easily adduced against them. Tertullian had said, "Religion does not compel religion"—Origen, "Christians should not use the sword"—Lactantius, "Coercion and injury are unnecessary, for religion cannot be forced. Barbarity and piety greatly differ from each other: nor can truth be conjoined with violence, or justice with cruelty. Religion is to be defended not by killing, but by dying; not by inhumanity, but by patience." Cyprian had ascribed to Christ alone the right to punish for opinions. Had Leo fallen back upon such authorities, and employed his great abilities in defence of religious liberty, how glorious had been his reward! He could have turned back the Christian world to the true and lofty ground on which they once stood, and averted the infamy of future ages. But how could a prelate, whose great object was to exalt the authority of his own see above that of all others, appreciate the dignity and glory of such an enterprise? Power, centralization, rule, were his great ideas; to subjugate the human mind to ecclesiastical authority, not to give it liberty, was his great aim. His conduct may be inferred from these principles. It may be also inferred from the fact that in later times Maimbourg appeals to the writings of Leo to prove that heresy is a capital crime, and may be justly punished with death. Leo then is one

<sup>1</sup> We follow the spelling found in Leo's works. Bower writes it Turribius

of the main fountain-heads from which has issued that river of blood which in after ages deluged the world. How little could he comprehend the influence on after ages, of a few words written by him in defence of the system of religious persecution.

It is true that in the case of the Manichees he did not resort to capital punishment. Nay, he says that it was repugnant to the spirit of the Church, and to that lenity in which she places her chief glory, abhorring to shed the blood even of the most detestable heretics. But the Church of Rome has in all ages made the same profession. She has never shed the blood of heretics—not she. The true test is this, has she ever justified the civil magistrate in shedding it? Has she ever enjoined it upon him so to do? So in this case, the true test to be applied to Leo is this—how did he regard the execution of Priscillian and others by Maximus? Did he justify and defend it? Or did he, like Martin of Tours, reprobate and abhor it? To answer these questions we only need to read his letter to Turribius, who had implored his assistance against the Priscillianists. In this he condemns their doctrines as impious and detestable, declares that all who tolerate heresies are no less guilty than those who embrace them, and justifies the execution of Priscillian and some of his disciples by Maximus. This is the letter to which Maimbourg appeals to prove that heresy may justly be punished by death.

But even where Leo did not resort to the penalty of death, he used every other form of persecution with the utmost severity. He stirred up Valentinian to pass a law confirming all the persecuting edicts of his predecessors, against the Manichees. Banishment, confiscation, exclusion from civil and military employments and honors, incapacity to give or receive by will, to sue at law or make a contract, and compelling the whole community to act as irresponsible informers against them, these were the penalties attached to these laws, and these Leo did not deem inconsistent with that lenity of the Church, in which she places her chief glory!

Some have indeed attempted to defend the execution of Priscillian on the ground of the immoralities of which he was guilty, and to which his system tended. But when we call to mind that the Romish party defend the murder of the Albigenses and Waldenses on the same ground, we ought to be suspicious of such a defence. The opinions of Priscillian were indeed grossly erroneous as they are now set forth. Neander says of them, that “so far as we can gain any knowledge of them from the meagre accounts of their adversaries, Dualism, and the emanation theory were combined together in them—elements related to Gnosticism and Manichæism. Their moral system as their doctrine required was rigidly ascetic. It enjoined austerities of all sorts, and in particular celibacy. The charges laid against them of dissolute conduct, are, to say the least, not sufficiently well authenticated.” Maximus indeed alleged that

Priscillian confessed his crimes. But Neander distrusts the confession if made, as probably involuntary and extorted by the rack. It should also be borne in mind that after heretics have been executed, there is a uniform tendency in their persecutors to defend themselves by bearing false witness against their victims. Indeed it is always easy to change heretical contumacy into the crime of rebellion against the civil powers.

It is however but fair to Leo to say, that his is not the only great name of that age to whom the advocates of persecution may appeal for support. On a name far greater than his own the same opprobrium rests, even that of Augustine, bishop of Hippo. He was originally tolerant in his views, but becoming as it would seem impatient in consequence of the perversity of the Manichees and Donatists, he was led to advocate and defend the use of force. "It was by Augustine," says Neander, "that the theory was proposed and founded, which contained the germs of that whole system of spiritual despotism, of intolerance and persecution, which ended in the tribunals of the inquisition." By this it cannot be meant that the practice of persecution had not begun before Augustine, but that he first devised those sophistical arguments, which in after ages were used in its defence. He did not defend it on the ground that force in itself tends to produce direct conviction of truth, but that by suffering the mind may be so affected, that it shall at last seek to know the truth. This he illustrated by a reference to the discipline of the providence of God, and of a father in his family. He seemed not to notice that such discipline is not for error but for sin, and that it involves no sense of violated rights, whereas all efforts to convince by force, do involve a sense of injustice and tend to reaction. But wretched as this sophistry is, falling in as it did with the tendencies of the age, it passed for argument. But sophistry much less subtle was resorted to by Leo in defence of the system of persecution to which he stood committed. In his letter to Turribius he says, with reference to the execution of Priscillian, "such a use of the sword has been advantageous to the exercise of the lenity of the church, who although content to give ecclesiastical decisions and averse to shed blood, is nevertheless aided by the severe laws of Christian princes, since those who fear bodily punishment, will be more readily disposed to seek spiritual salvation." One might almost suppose that these were the words of some gentle inquisitor of modern days, whose tender heart revolts from shedding blood, but is intent on saving the souls of his victims by the terrors of dungeons, the rack, the scaffold, and the fires of an *auto da fe*.

5. We now come to consider the fifth and last class of the acts of Leo, namely, those relating to the sacraments and discipline of the church.

These topics it must be conceded much occupied his thoughts,

and occur very frequently in his letters. And yet he accomplished little in these particulars, that left a bold and definite impress on future ages. Indeed some of his decisions have since been reversed and branded as heretical by the church of Rome. This is particularly true of his decision on the effects of the baptism of heretics. The present doctrine of the Romish church is, that such baptism is not devoid of saving power, but remits sin, confers grace, and sanctifies as really as the baptism of the church. But Leo decided that those baptized by heretics received nothing but the external form of baptism, and still need an imposition of hands, and an invocation of the Holy Ghost by the church, in order to receive the inward power and sanctification of baptism.

The celibacy of the clergy, one great pillar of the papal edifice, Leo found already enjoined by a decree of his predecessor Siricius, A. D. 385. He merely extended the prohibitions to subdeacons, who had before been exempt from the law. Here too Leo failed to exert his power to check the progress of the Gnostic and ascetic apostacy. This pernicious interdiction of marriage to the clergy, was totally unknown in the first three centuries. In the fourth, Jerome tells us that the married clergy were preferred to the unmarried by the majority of the community. In the celebrated council of Nice, A. D. 325, it was proposed to enjoin continence on the clergy who were already married, but Paphnutius one of the most eminent prelates of the time, himself unmarried, vindicated the purity of the marriage state and protested against imposing on the clergy burdens that they could not bear. The council, influenced by him, refused to enact the canon proposed. Still Paphnutius was in favor of celibacy in the clergy not already married. Sixty years after this decree of Siricius was promulgated enjoining celibacy on the clergy, and soon after it was enjoined by councils in Africa, Gaul, Spain and Germany. This resulted so directly from the spirit of the great Gnostic apostacy then coming to its crisis, that Leo might have utterly failed if he had opposed it. But it would have been glorious even to fail in such an attempt. But nothing of the kind could be rationally expected from him, nothing of the kind was attempted by him. He sanctioned a practice which has in all ages made the Romish church literally as well as spiritually, "the mother of harlots, and of abominations of the earth."

The practice of auricular confession alone was needed to complete the moral degradation of the clergy, and to make them in the strong language of Isaac Taylor, "the great common sewer of Christendom." But to Leo does not belong the infamy of establishing or sanctioning this part of the Romish despotism. In his days auricular confession *as now understood*, had never been even heard of. It grew up by degrees. To pope Innocent III., however, belongs the infamy of fully establishing in the council of the Lateran A. D. 1215, the existing Romish system.

From this survey of the acts of Leo, it is evident that his most beneficial influence on future ages was exerted through the council of Chalcedon. Of that council he was the father, the ruler, the inspiring spirit, and the intrepid champion. Of its doctrine concerning the person of Christ, he was till his death the indefatigable defender. In short, as Athanasius was to the Council of Nice, and to its doctrine of the divinity of Christ and the trinity, so was Leo to the Council of Chalcedon, and the doctrine of the union of two natures in one person in Christ. This view of the case is not commonly taken by Protestants. They allow the council of Chalcedon, as if it were a great centre of power, to eclipse Leo the Great, whereas had he not controlled the emperors of both the east and the west, it had never been held. Had he not opposed steadily the calling of another council to revise its decrees, they might have been reversed as were those of the Council of Ephesus; for it was long before the churches and monks of Egypt and Palestine ceased to war on that council, and to plot the overthrow of its decisions.

Indeed the successive councils at Ephesus and at Chalcedon, were but exponents of the victory or defeat of the great controversialists of Alexandria and of Rome. The question in its briefest form was this: Shall Dioscorus or Leo rule? One was patriarch of Alexandria, the other of Rome. Athanasius who led the war against Arianism, was bishop of Alexandria. Cyril who secured the condemnation of the Nestorian doctrine, which, as was alleged, too much separated the two natures of Christ, was also bishop of Alexandria.

Dioscorus his successor, felt called on to advocate his doctrines, and as the opposite of Nestorianism, he defended the doctrine of Eutyches, that there was but one nature in Christ, although it was admitted to be a nature compounded of the two natures that were previously united in him. When Leo decided that there were two natures in Christ, it was regarded by Dioscorus as virtual Nestorianism, although Leo insisted that these natures were united in one person.

Two combatants of great courage and energy being thus arrayed against each other, the issue of the battle depended upon the question which could secure the alliance of the emperor of the East. In the opening of the campaign, Dioscorus secured the favor of Theodosius II. By him he was made master of the Council of Ephesus, which Leo stigmatized as "*Latrocinium Ephesinum*." Yet had not Leo succeeded in gaining the favor of the successors of Theodosius, the Council of Ephesus might have been the rule of orthodoxy, at least in the Eastern church, to this day. The sneer of Gibbon is too truthful to admit of refutation, "*perhaps the Greeks would still be involved in the heresy of the Monophysites, if the emperor's horse had not fortunately stumbled!*" Theodosius expired; his orthodox sister Pulcheria, with a



nominal husband, succeeded to the throne." Then came the Council of Chalcedon; of this Leo in his delegates was master. Dioscorus was deposed, and orthodoxy was established.

If any are led to feel that such a victory of orthodoxy affords little if any presumption of its truth, we freely admit it. No one can study the early councils, and see the spirit of the bishops of that age, and the influences by which their decisions were controlled, without losing all respect for them as authority. Yet, inasmuch as these councils did in fact exert a vast influence on subsequent ages, there is reason to rejoice that if God so over-ruled events, that these decisions are found to agree with those doctrines which we can even now establish by an appeal to the word of God. Since they were to have great influence, it was well that it should be on the side of truth.

At the same time, it must be admitted that neither Nestorius nor Eutyches, if their language had been fairly and candidly explained, was guilty of any dangerous heresy. Giessler does not hesitate to assert that Nestorius never taught anything inconsistent with the confession of faith that Cyril signed, and that to justify his persecution, his contemporaries misrepresented his doctrine, and that his character was obscured by such slanders, till by modern scholars his faith and just reputation have been vindicated. Moreover, what Dioscorus opposed as Nestorianism in Leo, was at last decided to be orthodoxy at the Council of Chalcedon. If therefore Leo was orthodox, so was Nestorius, Dioscorus being judge. The real opinions of Eutyches are not perfectly clear. In reading some of his statements we are reminded of the opinions of a recent modern writer, whose speculations on this point have excited no little attention. When questioned before the Synod of Constantinople, to ascertain whether he truly admitted a distinct human nature in Christ, as well as a divine, he replied: "When I confess Christ as my God, and the Lord of heaven and earth, *I do not permit myself to investigate his physiological structure.*" (*φυσιολογεῖν ἱμαντὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω.*) Yet in his confession of faith sent to Leo, he says, "He who before the creation of the world was always perfect God, became in these last days perfect man, for us and our salvation." He also denied any change, or confusion of these natures in their unity. "The word descended from heaven without flesh, and became flesh in the womb of the virgin, deriving his body from the very flesh of the virgin, (in opposition to the idea charged on him, that Christ brought his body from heaven), and that without change or conversion of natures, (*incommutabiliter inconvertibiliter.*") Still he preferred not to enter into any speculations as to the interior structure of Christ, but said to Flavianus in the Synod of Constantinople, "I believe that Christ is perfect God and perfect man, but here I stop, and advise you to do so too." It seems also that those who agreed

with Eutyches in his views of Christ, were especially opposed to the idea of the *distinct and separate action* of the two natures of Christ after their union. Acacius, in a letter to Cyril, teaches that all Nestorians ought to be anathematized, "especially those who say that the two natures after their union had *each a distinct and separate action*, (*proprie unamquamque operantem.*") Compare with this the following statement of the writer referred to. "I only deny that his human soul or nature is to be looked upon as having a *distinct* subsistence, *so as to live, think, learn, worship, suffer by itself.* Disclaiming all thought of denying or affirming anything as regards the interior composition or construction of his person, I insist that he stands before us in simple unity, one person, the divine human, representing the qualities of his double parentage, as the Son of God and the son of Mary." "I shall not decompose him, and label off his doings, one to the credit of his divinity, and another to the credit of his humanity. I shall receive him in the simplicity of faith as my one Lord and Saviour." See "God in Christ," pp. 163, 164.

When Eutyches said that before the incarnation there were two natures, but after it one only, Neander interprets him as intending to say that two natures should be distinguished in conception; but in actual manifestation only the one nature of the Logos become flesh must be recognized. Dorner, as quoted by Hagenback, says that according to Cyril, with whom Eutyches and Dioscorus agreed, the human *was changed into the divine*, according to Nestorius they were only *joined together*. One he calls the SUPERNATURAL, the other the MECHANIC aspect of the union in question. Compare with this the following passage from the writer already quoted. "God is what we want not a man; God revealed through man that we may see his heart, and hide our guilty nature in the bosom of his love; God so identified with our race, as to signify the possible union and eternal *identification of our nature with his.*"—p. 127.

Yet there is reason to doubt whether this view of the doctrine of Eutyches is just; for as we have seen in his creed sent to Leo, he denies the change or conversion of either of the natures into each other. On the whole, the opinion of the learned and acute Bower seems to be preferable, that he was "at the bottom no less orthodox than Leo himself." For Dioscorus, who defended him, did anathematize in the Council of Chalcedon all "who admitted in the incarnation any change of the divine nature; or any confusion or mixture of the two natures." As to the expression, "the one incarnate nature of the word," Bower remarks that Cyril had already used it, that Flavianus, who first condemned Eutyches, owned that in one sense he did not reject it, and F. Petau plainly shows that it may be used in a catholic as well as in a heretical sense. To this we may add that pope Julius, one

of Leo's predecessors, had thus decided, "it must not be said that there are two natures in Christ after their union; for as the soul and body form but one nature in man, so the divinity and humanity form but *one nature* in Christ." If the words, "one nature," of pope Julius, can be taken in an orthodox sense as meaning what Leo meant by "one person," the same may be true in the case of Eutyches, and thus he ceases to be a heretic. It cannot, however, be denied, that the phrase, "one nature," was ill chosen, as tending to confusion, and that the expression "one person," is much to be preferred.

As to Eutyches, therefore what Leo called one *person*, he called one *nature*, made by the union of the divine and human. He denied, however, neither the original divinity, nor the assumed humanity of Christ, nor their union—but he chose to regard the result of the union as *one compound nature*, rather than one *person*. Had not the ambitious Cyril been jealous of Nestorius, who as patriarch of Constantinople eclipsed him, the heresy of Nestorianism would probably never have been heard of. Had there been no envious rivalry between Dioscorus and Leo, there might have been no need felt of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. Kind and Christian comparison of views, might have removed verbal differences, corrected real errors if any existed, and united all in the same words and truths, which were at last set forth at Chalcedon. But kind and Christian comparison of views was not the spirit of that age. It was the age of Gnostic asceticism, of sacramental regeneration, and sanctification, of demonolatry, of false miracles, of relics, shrines, and temples dedicated to saints. It was the age of pious frauds, and of morals degraded almost beyond conception. It was the age of rivalry between the patriarchs of the leading sees of the Roman world, each striving to distance his antagonist in the race. To conclude all with one fact, it was the age in which one deemed in other ages a madman, even Simeon Stylites, was revered as a saint, in which enthusiasts from the most remote provinces thronged around his pillar, with feelings of adoration, and even the emperors Theodosius and Marcian consulted him upon the most important affairs of the church.

Such was the age of Leo. It would have been for his eternal glory had he risen above such an age, and opposed its prevailing spirit. But if he did not; if he was guilty even of atrocious lying, to secure the power of the Roman see, it must be remembered that such a saint as Ambrose is involved in a similar condemnation, and that Jerome does not hesitate to defend lying in controversy. The sins of Leo were no doubt great, yet he must be judged in view of his age and education.

It remains that we say a few words concerning those works of his which have come down as a legacy to posterity.

The first thing that strikes us on surveying his works is, that he

was after all more of a statesman and religious politician, than a voluminous or profound divine. He who undertakes to read Augustine must gird himself for the work. With an energy, terrible to his adversaries, and with keen dialectics, he goes thoroughly and at great length into the subject to be discussed. His works have taxed the intellectual powers of all subsequent ages.

Nothing of this kind do we find in Leo. His discussions are all short. He relied more on authority than on argument. Standing as he conceived in the place of supreme arbiter among Christians, he rather propounded doctrines as the head of the church, than sustained them with a long and acute logical process. Even his celebrated letter to Flavianus, on the person of Christ, occupies but little more than two pages of the Venice edition of his works in folio 1748. At the close of his epistles, there is indeed a treatise of three pages and a half, against the errors of Eutyches and other heretics. But in this the essential parts of the letter to Flavianus are introduced verbatim, whilst other considerations are added. This letter then must be considered as his main theological treatise, and when we consider its brevity, it has certainly gained an unusual celebrity. Of it Neander says, that "it constitutes an epoch in the history of the doctrines of faith." This however is certainly not owing so much to its argumentative ability, as to the fact that Leo had influence enough with the emperor, to secure its adoption as the rule of faith by the Council of Chalcedon. But considering the influence exerted by it on the world, it deserves to be translated and illustrated with notes.

The sermons of Leo, which have been preserved, were delivered by him before the Roman people, on the leading religious festivals and fasts of the year. They are not as with us based on a text of Scripture. They are rather short addresses, the delivery of which would occupy from five to twenty minutes.

No plan of discussion is ever announced, but he introduces freely whatever topics, doctrinal, practical, or hortatory, he considers congruous with the occasion. With our standard of sermonizing few if any of them would be regarded as powerful performances, and yet the majestic person of Leo and his accomplishments as a speaker, may have invested them with deep interest to the Romans. Indeed there is something impressive even to us in the thought that we are reading sermons, delivered to the people of that proud city, once the centre of that iron empire that bruised and broke in pieces the whole earth, and in the midst of the undestroyed monuments of her ancient glory, whilst yet she stood upon the very verge of her final and irrevocable fall. The slavery of her people and even the death of her language, were near at hand, when the classic elegance of Leo shed a transient splendor over her last hours. He died but fifteen years before her fall.

But interesting as are the sermons of Leo, his letters are the

most valuable part of his works. In these we see the man fully developed, and read the history of his eventful life. We are not however to look for anything like the correspondence of Cicero or of Cowper in them. They are rather the diplomatic correspondence of one who assumed to himself the prerogatives of the earthly head of the church, the defender of faith and order, and the spiritual adviser and counsellor of emperors and kings. Such too was his influence, that he was consulted and courted, even by those who did not concede the validity of his claims. Hence his letters are filled with theological discussions, responses to questions concerning cases of conscience, decisions as to the discipline, festivals and order of the church, denunciations of such councils or canons as he does not approve, and the earnest advocacy of such as he sees fit to regard as sound and orthodox.

It seems to be admitted on all sides that his style is uncommonly finished and rhetorical, and that his Latinity is unusually pure for the age. But the Roman Catholic author of his life prefixed to his works, exalts him beyond all bounds. He calls him the Christian Demosthenes, the ecclesiastical Cicero, the Homer of theology, the Aristotle of divine philosophy, the Peter of the pontifical throne, and the Paul of the sacred desk. But pope Nicholas the first, a man in the image of Leo, sets forth his doctrinal services to the church in the following lofty style. "In the Ephesian synod of robbers, all the bishops and even the patriarchs fell from the faith. Then unless Leo the Great, following in the steps of him concerning whom it is said 'the Lion (Leo) of the tribe of Judah hath prevailed,' divinely inspired had uttered his voice; shaken emperors, and the world, and turned them back to piety, the religion of Christ had utterly perished."

Such is Leo to the Romanists. We dissent of course from their extravagance; nor can we regard him as in any sense the head of the church, yet no one can study his life and works, and not feel that he was one of the few men of power who mark and control the age in which they live. His position also and relations were such that his life and times cannot be thoroughly studied without great interest and permanent benefit. As the despotism that he helped to found is fast drawing near to its close, it cannot be without both interest and profit to study the manner in which its foundations were laid. As the doctrine of the incarnate nature and character of Christ is exciting new interest, a careful study of the earliest controversies on the subject cannot but richly reward the diligent student.

To what extent God overruled for good the existence of the centralizing and organizing power of the church of Rome, during the ages of ignorance, brutalism and general social dissolution that followed the downfall of the Western empire, our present limits will not permit us to inquire. Whatever the truth may be, Leo

contributed largely to whatever good or evil has flowed to the world from that tremendous ecclesiastical corporation.

To her system of pious fraud, and her unexampled and bloody persecutions even Guizot ascribes no good influence. In these respects therefore tremendous evils, unmixed with good, can be directly traced to Leo.

On the whole his efforts to vindicate the true doctrine of the incarnation of Christ, may be justly regarded as of all his acts least injurious in his own age, and as most permanently beneficial to the interests of mankind.

## ARTICLE II.

### THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.

By REV. MASON GROSVENOR, Springfield, Mass.

In a review of Prof. Finney's *Systematic Theology* in a recent number of one of our leading Theological Reviews', this subject is discussed at considerable length. Dissenting from the views therein expressed, and believing that the subject is intimately related to sound theology, we venture on some remarks in regard to it. This writer censures Mr. Finney for giving philosophy the lead in his investigations. He thinks that in so doing he greatly disregards the authority of the Bible. We are not disposed to deny that Mr. F's. assertions in regard to the validity of the deductions of reason, and, perhaps his confidence in them are open to censure. Our remarks however will have no reference to the errors of Mr. Finney, but to the opinions of the reviewer upon Philosophy as it stands related to Revelation. His opinion is that the doctrines and facts of the Bible must first be learned without allowing our philosophy to influence or control this investigation. He says (p. 240 ;) "The true and Christian method is to *begin* with the doctrines (that is of the Bible) and let them determine our philosophy, and not to begin with our philosophy and allow it to give law to the doctrines." And in accordance with this principle he remarks (p. 242 ;) "And we confess that when we see a system of theology beginning with *moral government* we take it for granted that the Bible is to be allowed only a very humble part in its construction." From these remarks and others which might be quoted, it is evident that the reviewer supposes that the true principles of interpreting the Bible do not require any *previous correct* philosophical views of the things of which it treats,—that a man can

<sup>1</sup> *Biblical Repertory*, Princeton, April, 1847.

arrive at a full understanding of revealed truth, let his philosophy be what it may, or whether he has any or not. For, however destitute he may be of philosophy or erroneous in his philosophical views, he must not *begin* with philosophy to obtain correct views in theology. The only "true and Christian method is to *begin* with the doctrines of Revelation," for they are so plainly stated that he will be likely to understand them whatever may be his philosophy. And if, in the progress of his inquiries, the doctrines of the Bible, thus interpreted, conflict with the philosophical conclusions to which his own understanding would lead him (and he anticipates they may) then the former must be assumed to be true and as he says "must determine our philosophy." Or as he says (p. 241.) such a man "will be constrained to *make* his philosophy agree with his theology." And thus the conclusions of philosophy must be forced to yield; not because they are proved to be false; but simply because they conflict with *his interpretation* of the doctrines of the Bible. The opposite method requires that every search after revealed truth should *begin* with an accurate knowledge, so far as practicable, of those elementary things treated in the Bible and be modified and controlled by it, which is true philosophy. Thus the conclusions on both these fields of investigation, when legitimately obtained will be harmonious. We shall offer some reasons for the correctness of the latter method and for the incorrectness of the former.

Our *first reason for adopting this method is, that Nature is an elementary book of truth, written by the hand of God.* Many persons seem to regard philosophy as some *profane work*, necessarily opposed to God and to revealed truth; as if it originated with devils, or with men made like them, which if a man reads or studies at all, he must be erroneous on all Divine and sacred subjects, if not corrupt in character. We are fully aware that there are, and have been systems, called philosophical systems, which are dangerous, full of error, opposed to God and to truth; and which if they did not originate with devils, originated with men of near kindred to them. But what have these false systems to do with true Christian philosophy? Is all philosophy necessarily erroneous and dangerous because they are? The reviewer's objections are not directed against the false and heathenish systems, but against true philosophy studied by a Christian theologian as necessary to a full and correct investigation of revealed truth. As such it is the study of Nature—this elementary work of God—no less a book of truth than revelation itself. Nature is only the substantial forms of *idealities*. Here the ideals which eternally existed in the mind of the Deity are put into actual existence, so that they can be cognized as having reality. Nature is thus the embodiment of truth written by the finger of God for man to study. There are no *things* in the Bible. It is a description of

things by the use of the signs of ideas ; ideas of a particular class, and of a particular combination of them. No revelation therefore could be given until abstract ideas had received distinct forms in actual existences, and the beings to whom it was to be made had become somewhat familiar with these forms, and learned to designate them by language. These ideas, of which the words in the Bible are the signs, either simple or complex, are the elements of which the Bible is composed, and which are combined in its doctrines and duties. And these elementary ideas are all *first* found written in the book of Nature, in substantial existences. Nature is therefore the more ancient work of God than Revelation, and is elementary to it. From this older book then must all the elementary ideas of the Bible be *first* learned. This learning is *Philosophy*. The lesson superficially learned is a superficial philosophy ; erroneously learned, it is a false philosophy ; but correctly learned, it is a true and divine philosophy. And the teachings of this book, thus correctly obtained, can never conflict with truth written in the book of Revelation. Indeed, how can the Bible be correctly interpreted and understood at all without a correct philosophy, a knowledge of this elementary book ? The words of the Bible are mere signs of ideas. But ideas must have objective reality in things. If we have no knowledge of these things, we can have no ideas of them, and having no ideas of these things, we can attach none to the language of the Bible. It is to us an unmeaning book. And if our ideas of things are imperfect or erroneous, then necessarily our ideas of the teachings of the Bible must be also imperfect or erroneous. A lesson erroneously learned in this book of Nature—this elementary work of God on subjects involved in the teachings of the Bible—will as certainly mislead the interpreter, as erroneous teaching in the elements of mathematics will mislead the astronomer or the natural philosopher. Is that then an enlightened reverence for the Divine authority of the Bible, which holds a man back from carefully and prayerfully reading this elementary work of God, and plunges him, while ignorant of it, into those depths of revealed truth which he is unprepared to fathom, and then leads him to believe that his knowledge of Revelation, thus imperfectly obtained, is so unerring that it must control and determine all the teachings of philosophy ? This well nigh equals that popish reverence which cannot give the Bible to the common people lest their ignorance should pervert it. On the contrary, by our method of interpretation, we manifest the highest regard for the doctrines of the Bible, by approaching them in the only legitimate way of arriving at a thorough understanding of them ; and when they are thus reached, a broad foundation is laid for them to rest securely upon, so that they will not be easily shaken.

Our method does not necessarily conflict with the true idea



expressed in the declaration that the "Bible is a plain book." It is so plain, that all its truths essential to a man's salvation may be understood by the most common mind. Indeed, its statements of philosophical truths, so far as it makes them, are in terms of plain common sense philosophy, which is true philosophy. And the common mind is the best philosopher so far as that mind goes, seldom committing errors in philosophy. It requires the mystic or the scholastic to introduce philosophical error and to pervert truth: the man who seeks for something profound, and in his selfish pride attempts to fathom the entire depths of truth before he is prepared, and without thorough examination throws off theories which involve him and others in midnight darkness. But though the Bible is a plain book, who will deny that it contains some things *hard* to be understood? Or that an entire system of theology coming from God, the Infinite Mind, will necessarily be difficult fully to understand and to harmonize? Will not the *Christian scholar* better understand and develop this Divine system than the unlearned man? A scholar is needed to read the original languages of the Bible—to understand and develop the customs and laws of eastern nations, and by the light of this kind of learning to give us clearer and more extended views than it was possible for the unaided common mind ever to obtain. But is this all the learning that is important? May not the true and Christian scholar in philosophy also *better* interpret this Divine system than he who has not studied these works of nature? What can pervert the understanding of any man of sense so much as to induce him to deny the truth of this proposition? What can array him in opposition to true philosophy as an important aid in the interpretation of Scripture doctrine, unless it be a wedded attachment to some theological notions with which that philosophy conflicts?

*Our second reason for adopting this method is, that the true principles of the interpretation of the Bible require it.* No principle is more important or of more universal application than that every book should be interpreted according to the *known nature* of the things ascribed in it. The Bible was written in the languages of the East. It necessarily employs terms expressive of the customs, laws, government and character peculiar to eastern nations. On these things many of its illustrations are founded. Of these things it treats. And no reasonable man will deny that a knowledge of these customs, laws and government is important, and even necessary, as a *preliminary acquisition* to a full and correct interpretation of the Scriptures. And on what principle is a knowledge of these things deemed necessary, except that every book must be interpreted according to the known nature of the things of which it treats?

But the Bible treats of other things; of the works of God, the

heavens, the earth, of mind, soul, spirit, moral action, moral obligation, moral government, etc., etc. It does not undertake to teach these things philosophically; but upon a correct knowledge of them, which it pre-supposes all may obtain, it bases duties and doctrines. And if revelation may be fully interpreted without a thorough knowledge of these things of which it so extensively treats, why not without a knowledge of the customs, laws and government of eastern nations? Why apply this principle of interpretation in the one case and reject it in the other? Who but the reviewer has a mind able to see how it gives to the Bible a more humble part in the construction of a system of theology to *begin with moral government*, than it does to begin with the laws and governments of the East?

Let a man apply himself to the interpretation of the passage, "God is a spirit." Who can have any idea of God from this passage unless he *first* obtain an idea of spirit? And how shall he obtain this idea? By the teachings of Revelation? But where is the original idea of spirit developed and taught in the Scriptures? They presuppose that this idea is and must be known separate from their teachings. And where does it originate? Is it found in the impressions of the material world given through the senses? Who then can know any distinction between matter and spirit? It is by the intuitive cognitions of our own minds that the idea of spirit is first given. It is thus common to all. But it may be more fully, correctly or erroneously developed by attention and reflection. And all correct knowledge acquired thus is philosophical knowledge. And is it then of no importance in the interpretation of this passage that we previously possess correct ideas of spirit? Will false notions on this subject, or none at all, answer as well as correct ones in aiding us in its interpretation? But *first* to obtain correct ideas of spirit is *beginning* with philosophy—with the knowledge of the nature of a moral being—the formation of moral government, and of course allows the Bible only a humble part. The same argument is equally applicable to those passages which describe the feelings, purposes and actions of God, the Infinite Spirit.

But let us hear the opinion of the reviewer on other philosophical subjects referred to in revelation. He says (page 241:) "There is a view of *free agency* and of the grounds and extent of moral obligation, which is perfectly compatible with the doctrines of original sin, efficacious grace and divine sovereignty, and there is another view of those subjects as obviously incompatible with those doctrines. There are two courses which a theologian may adopt. He may turn to the scriptures and ascertain whether those doctrines are really taught therein. If satisfied on that point and especially if he experience through the teachings of the Holy Spirit, their power on his own heart, if they become to him matters not

merely of speculative belief, but of experimental knowledge he will be constrained to *make* his philosophy agree with his theology. He cannot consciously hold contradictory propositions, and must therefore make his convictions harmonize as far as he can, and those founded on the testimony of the Holy Spirit, will modify and control his conclusions to which his own understanding would lead him." From this it is evident the reviewer supposes that a man may arrive at a full understanding, even an experimental knowledge of these doctrines, without *first* obtaining any correct views of the philosophical subjects of free agency and of moral obligation. For aught that appears he may regard man as a mere machine, free only to move as he is acted upon and responsible only for that which he cannot avoid; and yet he can arrive at a *clear and full* understanding of man's sinful character which ruins him and of divine, sovereign, and efficacious grace which saves him! Indeed his philosophy of these subjects is to be left unsettled—it may be one thing or another, it matters not what, until these revealed doctrines are studied and understood, and then they will teach him the true philosophy of these subjects. Thus he is to understand the language of the Bible without any knowledge of the *things* of which it treats—and then its mere language must teach him *things*.

But the reviewer seems to expect that there will be some philosophy, that the understanding will have some convictions, and that these will conflict with the doctrines of Revelation *thus* obtained. Yet "he must make his convictions harmonize," (rather a difficult task, however) but he must do it "as far as he can." And thus the understanding, without being convinced by an examination and correction of its philosophical conclusions, must be *forced or tortured* into harmony with these doctrines of Revelation whether it will or not. Now we say, judging from the reviewer's own language, that there is something wrong here. His mind does not operate harmoniously nor successfully—not as it will when all its powers are pursuing the right path in search of truth. There is a conflict between the understanding and the mind's regard for the authority of Revelation. And the cause is manifest. It is this attempt to establish these doctrines without applying the true principles of interpretation. A man may be satisfied that the general doctrines of "original sin, efficacious grace, and Divine sovereignty are taught in the scriptures;" and his views of them may be sufficiently accurate for the purposes of his own salvation, and no view of free agency or of moral obligation which any mind unprevented by a false philosophy would obtain, will conflict with these general views. But when he comes as a theologian to explain the relations of these doctrines to other truths and to put them into one harmonious system of theology it will be necessary that he have more accurate and extensive views than those of the common mind. And how shall he arrive at this correct and ex-

tended knowledge of these doctrines? They respect the moral actions of moral agents; are made what they are and receive all their distinctive features from the nature of moral action and of free agency. It is absurd therefore to suppose that any man can have a correct and at the same time an extended knowledge of these doctrines without some true knowledge of these philosophical subjects previously obtained. So intimately connected are these philosophical subjects with these doctrines that no man can frame a *system* of theology without obtaining *some* extended views of these subjects. He may set up a *dogma* of his own and this dogma he will bring along with him to the interpretation of these Scripture doctrines. But will he be as likely to arrive at the truth, guided by a mere dogma, as he would by a correct philosophical knowledge of these subjects first obtained by careful investigation? We say to him then, on our principle of interpretation, in order to arrive at a perfect knowledge of these doctrines, *begin* by making yourself thoroughly acquainted with the nature of free agency and moral obligation—things which require study and reflection—the very things which these revealed doctrines respect and which are written by the finger of God on the framework of every soul, and made visible to the eye of every man's consciousness. And do it with the heart of the Christian philosopher, ever ready to obey truth, and fully sensible of your responsibility for the results, knowing that your knowledge or your ignorance of these philosophical truths will and must modify your interpretation of these revealed truths. And if your knowledge of the former is first correct you will be *likely* to arrive at a correct understanding of the latter. And there will probably be no contradiction in your conclusions; no forcing of the understanding to agree with revelation, nor of revelation to agree with philosophy. This is the true and legitimate method it seems to us, and the only one which will carry any man harmoniously to the adoption of the truths of the Bible.

Another reason for adopting this method is, that the opposite one involves the mind in contradictions, and tends to error and infidelity. The two methods which we have contrasted involve contradictory propositions. And hence whatever tends to show the error of the one, contributes to establish the truth of the other. We have already seen that the method of the reviewer leaves unapplied a fundamental principle of interpretation. The consequence is inevitable, that the investigation conducted by this method will result in many erroneous conclusions. They will be errors not so much related to *general* views of the fundamental doctrines of the Bible, as in the particulars embraced under them. They do not necessarily involve a rejection of the gospel system, but they do destroy its harmony, and weaken its power over the world. But if error is thus wrought out and received as truth on the field of Revelation, what will be the result on the field of phi-

osophy? We can easily conceive that minds adopting the idea that philosophy is unnecessary and even dangerous to the interpretation of the Bible, should be satisfied with very little philosophy. And in such minds error may be easily and extensively introduced. For the doctrines of the Bible thus erroneously interpreted, must determine and shape what philosophy they do possess. It is quite possible that men, so destitute of accurate and comprehensive philosophical views, when interpreting certain passages of Scripture, should sincerely believe them to teach that sin is not voluntary, and that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity; and consequently adopt the corresponding error in philosophy, that ability is not necessary to moral obligation. And thus to such minds this method of interpretation opens an abundant source of confusion and error in philosophy.

But if there be any correct philosophical investigation, as it is possible there may be by some who adopt the method of the reviewer, then there will be *conflict* between the deductions of philosophy and the supposed teachings of the Bible. Truth, for aught that appears to one's mind in this position, has been ascertained by a correct philosophical investigation, and is firmly believed; while truth has also been thought to have been obtained from the Bible by what the reviewer regards as a correct application of all the principles of interpreting it. But the conclusions conflict with each other. And what shall be done? This is a most difficult question for any man to answer who is by this method, legitimately as he appears, seeking after truth. This writer says a man "cannot consciously hold contradictory propositions." Every one knows this. But what shall be done? So numerous must be these contradictory propositions in every mind who adopts this method of interpretation, that we are not surprised the reviewer seeks for a way of reconciliation, and seeking finds it. His mind in all these instances must, like a poised balance, remain in equilibrium without some weight to settle it. And how is this weight to be obtained? The writer tells us how. "He must therefore *make* his convictions harmonize, as far as *he* can." The weight must be *made*; for there is none in existence that will naturally settle this poising balance; there is no new evidence to show the error of the deduction of philosophy. But "the doctrines" (i. e. Revelation) "must determine his philosophy," they "will modify and control the conclusions to which his own understanding would lead him." Here is the weight manufactured expressly for the purpose, and laid away upon the shelf, to be thrown into the scale when needed. The *mere assumption*, when these two teachings conflict, that our interpretation of revealed doctrines is established truth, is the all-sufficient evidence to prove the otherwise true deductions of philosophy to be false. This is *infallibility* claimed not for the true doctrines of the Bible: but

for our *interpretation* of them. We are not surprised that the reviewer has inserted the clause, "as far as he can," thus plainly intimating that this weight will not fully settle all minds. And yet when so high authority as the Princeton Review teaches this assumption to be sufficient evidence for disbelieving the true deductions of philosophy, much will be done towards destroying faith in these deductions. It will make a wide sweep over this entire field, establishing error in the place of truth.

And when error has been adopted as philosophical truth by either of these classes of persons, its strongest defence will be the authority of the Bible. Its authority will be interposed not only to protect error in philosophy, but to prevent the development of truth. The passage in which is expressed the command of Joshua, requiring the sun to *stand still*, is applicable here. It was claimed, that the plain language of this passage taught that the sun was literally in motion, and upon the interposition of the prophet ceased to move. And without any previous philosophy to modify this language, who can deny that it did? And when philosophy began to teach an opposite doctrine, the authority of Revelation was interposed to prevent the development of truth. Philosophy must not *begin* to teach here, was urged in the most strenuous manner. This would be giving the Bible only a humble place, utterly disregarding its Divine authority, because it has already settled the truth by its plain declarations, and these "must determine our philosophy." And thus the claims of philosophy to modify, control, and set aside this interpretation of this passage were rejected, and its *true* deductions pronounced *untrue*, simply because they contradicted the language of the Bible, interpreted without any philosophy. And thus for a long time this very method of the reviewer did actually hold the world in error as it respects the true system of astronomy. And we do not hesitate to affirm, that had it not been disregarded by some, we should never have enjoyed the benefits of a development of truth in astronomical science.

But this is only a single instance of error in philosophy, maintained and defended, and probably introduced into many minds, by this erroneous principle of interpretation. Other errors might be mentioned, more truly perhaps having their *origin* in this false principle than this, and afterwards, like this, extended and maintained by the same means. This is not letting "each stand on its own foundation," as the reviewer says the rationalists have agreed to do, and as he supposes he maintains. It is indeed conducting the *investigations* independently; not allowing one to shed light upon and influence the other, but entirely separating them during the process of investigation. And it is this of which we complain, as violating a fundamental principle of true investigation. For so intimately connected are these two fields of research, that we contend they cannot be separated without giving most erroneous

results. But though the processes of inquiry are thus made independent, the conclusions, by the method of this reviewer, are not allowed to remain so. The deductions of philosophy are made to yield to the doctrines of the Bible; not to its light shed on philosophy, but to the mere assumption that our interpretation is infallible, and that the Bible is a surer source of evidence, though both these sources lie back in the same Being of infinite truth, and their waters are equally pure and true when legitimately and truly drawn. And thus the reviewer's supposed independence of the conclusions is by himself at once destroyed. It is destroyed by this exclusive claim of *infallibility* set up for our interpretations of the Bible. And we affirm that this exclusive claim greatly tends to shake all confidence in the firm foundations of the system of Revelation. For we think none can fail to see that a system which demands such concessions from philosophy, will be suspected of wanting a solid basis, and thus in the minds of some, infidelity will result from this method of making philosophy yield. Many others believing this method of interpretation to be a true one, because the *expounders* of the Bible promulgate it, will adopt it, and arrive like the reviewer at the same contradictory conclusions. But not having the same confidence with him in the authority of Revelation, will not be as ready as he to yield the deductions of philosophy. They will, as he tells us the rationalists have concluded to do, leave the deductions on each field to stand *conflicting with each other*, so long as they see no possible reason for yielding one to the other. And so long as this erroneous method is believed to be true and legitimate, they cannot see any; for it is the source of the error, and consequently of the conflict. And what will be the result? The foundations of Revelation will in this case also inevitably be undermined. By most minds, a book which is found so extensively to conflict with what *must* be regarded as the true deductions of philosophy, will be discarded as not of Divine authority. It may be regarded in many respects as teaching good morality, and most of its doctrines as true. But so much is found to conflict with philosophical truth, that they will not believe it to be *wholly* without corruptions, and without modifications, a book written by Him who is the Author of both philosophic and revealed truth. This is the sad result of what the reviewer calls the independent method—which he tells us is adopted by the rationalists in Germany, and is being adopted in this country, and which he hopes will become prevalent. We will not say that German philosophers and interpreters have adopted this method with *design* to shake the faith of many in the Divine authority of the Bible. But we do say that no method could be devised better adapted to accomplish this result. The numerous and radical errors of those who adopt the system of the rationalists, both in this country and in Germany, are precisely those which we have just described.

And we believe they are legitimately traced to this erroneous method of interpretation. And our wish is directly the opposite of that expressed by the reviewer. We do hope that it will never become established in this country. We should dread its results. And we do not believe that it will to any considerable extent, especially so long as the doctrines and practices of our early Puritan philosophers and theologians shall be remembered and warmly cherished.

But the method we advocate is liable to no such results. We claim that a correct knowledge of philosophical truth is important, and may be absolutely necessary to a full and correct interpretation of Bible truth, and therefore should, as far as possible, precede it. But after this method of investigation has been prosecuted, which we claim is the only correct method, and the least liable of all others to give contradictory conclusions, it is quite supposable that we may have reached conclusions that conflict with each other. But we do not like a man to assume either of them to be infallible truth, and call upon the mind to make the opposite conclusion harmonize with it. We assume directly the opposite, as it seems to us is proper to do. We assume that our finite capacities and our ignorance have given us *error* somewhere; that in the mind of the investigator, either some erroneous presentation of philosophical facts, or erroneous deduction from them, has given an erroneous conclusion on the field of philosophy; or that some error has been committed in the interpretation of the language of the Bible, which has given him an erroneous conclusion in theology. For truth is consistent with itself, and whether correctly obtained from philosophy or from Revelation, is equally God's truth, and must therefore harmonize. And while we say this we do not affirm that either conclusion is certainly true, and the other must yield to it whether it will or not. But we do say let such an investigator travel over the ground again, beginning, as before, with his philosophical field, and carefully sift every deduction of philosophy and alter where error is discovered, and then, with this knowledge of the things of which they suppose a doctrine of the Bible treats, come again to a fair and full application of all the principles appertaining to the interpretation of the language in question, and deduce from it the truth, and see if his conclusions will not harmonize. Few instances we believe will be found where they will not. And these will be in cases in which the mind knows it is not fully informed either respecting the philosophical subject, or the supposed doctrine of the Bible, or both. If it respects one mainly, then the mind will have a conviction where the error *probably* lies. But if it respects both, as in most instances it will where there is any such deduction as can give rise to conflict, then let neither of them be assumed to be true, and the other forced to yield; but let them stand, each liable



to be found erroneous. And thus it cannot be affirmed or even supposed that there is any conflict between Revelation and philosophy; and consequently no tendency can be seen in the operation or results of this method to shake the faith of any in the Divine authority of the Bible.

The last reason we shall offer in favor of this method is, *that it is the only legitimate and successful way of correcting error.* There are two methods by which error is brought out and adopted. One of these is the false method of interpreting the Scriptures advocated by this reviewer. It is a method, as we have seen, which not only introduces error in *theology*, but error in *philosophy* also, and then maintains and defends it, and thus prevents the development of truth. It is manifest that error introduced in this way, is not to be corrected by the same method which introduced it. It can only be done by the adoption of the opposite method, which is the only true and legitimate one. But there is still another way by which error has been propagated. It is the one mentioned by the reviewer, i. e. of carrying forward erroneous philosophical views into the field of revealed truth. In the language of this writer "He may begin with his philosophy and determine what is true with regard to the nature of man and his responsibilities, and then turn to the scriptures and *force* them into agreement with foregone conclusions." This method may be pursued by two classes of persons, the Christian and the unbeliever. The former adopting the principle of interpretation advocated by this writer, will not feel any serious necessity of a careful examination of philosophical subjects, as having any bearing upon divine truth, and consequently will be liable to *neglect* this field of investigation, especially if he feels it to be a dangerous source of error, so that his views of those subjects will be very indefinite and erroneous. This is the natural result as we have already seen, of adopting this method. But if he, nevertheless, pursue the investigation of philosophical subjects to some extent, he will do it only as a *philosopher*, not under the responsibility of a Christian philosopher, believing that his philosophy will modify his views of the doctrines of the Bible. His investigations will not be likely to be thoroughly made, nor his deductions true; certainly not as thoroughly nor as true as they would be, if he had seriously and earnestly read the book of Nature, this elementary work of God, with a view to arrive at a correct understanding of the teachings of Revelation. And when he comes to interpret the Bible, he will not *intend* to adopt any erroneous opinion, nor to allow its true teachings to be *forced* in the least degree. He may adopt and fully resolve to carry out the principle that his philosophy must not modify his interpretation of Scripture doctrines. But so deeply lodged in his convictions is the principle, that it is *first* necessary to know the things of which the language of the Bible treats, and so natural is it to employ our

already acquired ideas of things, true or false, in our present investigations, that it will be utterly impossible for him, even for the reviewer himself though he renew his resolution every day, to prevent his philosophy from modifying his interpretation of the Bible. And thus he will carry forward into the field of revealed truth his philosophical errors; and probably adopt erroneous views of the doctrines of Revelation.

The other class of persons is that of *unbelievers*. He who rejects the entire system of revelation as false, will not make any efforts to force or to pervert its doctrines to agree with his philosophy. He would make them *disagree*, and hence will aim to establish numerous *contradictions* between the true deductions of philosophy and the teachings of the Bible, so that he may overthrow the whole system. But there is another class of unbelievers, and one much more numerous. They profess to adopt the general system of revelation as true, yet possessing unbelieving hearts which dislike many of its doctrines, will endeavor to modify and pervert them to agree with their philosophy, *which may have been perverted and rendered erroneous* by the same selfish heart; and thus they will introduce error into the field of revealed truth. This, as the reviewer truly says, has in all ages been the course pursued by such errorists. And this very doctrine he urges has given license and added strength to this perverting practice. It is the practice of using a perverting influence, as this writer says, to *make* or to *force* doctrines to agree with the conclusions of philosophy. But says the philosopher, the deductions of philosophy, correctly obtained, are *true*, as true as the teachings of the Bible. And I do not see but my philosophical conclusions are correctly drawn; and if the interpreter of the Bible may assume *his interpretations* to be true, and *make* philosophy agree with them, why may not I assume the legitimate deductions of philosophy to be true, and *make* the doctrines of revelation, or at least my interpretation of them, to agree with these deductions? It is a poor rule that will not work both ways. But says the interpreter, the Bible is a purer source of truth. No, answers the philosopher, they both are pure sources of truth lying back in the Infinite source; and the whole question respects your interpretation and my deduction. And why may I not assume mine to be true as well as you assume yours? I have an experimental knowledge of my doctrines as well as you of yours. And thus the method gives license and strength to this perverting practice of the unbelieving philosopher, and aids and abets the introduction of error into the field of revealed truth by means of error first adopted in philosophy. This we believe is a most fruitful source of the error of which this writer complains.

But the question now is, by what method can error thus introduced be *successfully corrected*? The reviewer would not have

us begin with a thorough philosophical investigation where the error had its origin. This he says would be an "attempt to cure philosophy by philosophy," which "is a homœopathic mode of treatment in which he has very little confidence." He would have the process reversed. He would cure philosophy by revelation. And in doing it he would have the interpreter, though wholly untaught in philosophy and even erroneous in his philosophical views, come to a full and correct knowledge of the doctrines of the Bible, all the statements of which involve philosophical truths, or embrace things with which philosophy is intimately connected, so intimately that all the elementary *ideas* of these statements lie within the field of philosophy and a correct development and knowledge of them, necessarily require philosophical study. We call this not a homœopathic treatment, but *quackery*, an attempt to form a *judgment*, and to institute practice when a man has not learned the requisite preliminaries. As truly *quackery* as for a man to enter at once upon the interpretation and understanding of a description of a complicated *disease*, and to institute practice for its removal, without *first* having studied medicine; without having acquired any correct knowledge of the terms even, and much less of the properties of the articles which he uses; or of the nature, process and functions of the human system. As complete quackery, as to pretend to understand and to develop the true and sublime system of astronomy, without first having made himself master of the elementary principles of mathematics or of natural philosophy. It is therefore as absurd to attempt to correct errors in the doctrines which have resulted from errors in philosophy, without a previous correct philosophical investigation, as it is to attempt to rectify errors in the science of astronomy without such investigation. Philosophy once taught that the sun was in motion round the earth, which was an error in philosophy which gave a corresponding error in the language of revelation, though to no error in doctrine. But how would this writer, on his principles, correct the error? He must not begin with a correction of the philosophical error by any philosophical investigation; because this would be "curing philosophy by philosophy." He must let the Bible teach and correct his philosophy. But how much light does the Bible throw upon this philosophical error? It leaves it uncorrected, just as it does most other philosophical subjects—to be studied and corrected on its own field. It supposes this will be *first* correctly done before there is any attempt to arrive at a full understanding of its doctrines. Christianity thus not only acknowledges, but requires the aid of true philosophy, both to relieve it of the errors which a false philosophy has heaped upon it, and also to develop and establish its truths.

We believe that what the reviewer calls a "homœopathic method," is the one by which error has been corrected and truth

established, both in philosophy and revelation. It *has* actually secured these results in spite of all opposing principles and contrary efforts. Christianity immediately after Revelation was completed gained most signal triumphs and made rapid progress. It soon filled the earth with its doctrines. It burst upon the world as a novelty, claiming and receiving the support of Omnipotence, and errorists knew not how to meet it. They were not long, however, in ascertaining their vantage ground and in bringing all their batteries to bear upon this new system. Error claimed and possessed the field of *philosophical truth*, or rather, of philosophical investigation without much truth. It was a false philosophy. This vantage ground error used, and Christianity in her early ages was unable to occupy; especially so as to show the pretended deductions of philosophy to be false. As a consequence error delayed the church, so that for ages it exhibited the strange commingling of monkish stoicism, mysticism and fanaticism. The doctrines of the Peripatetics, with Aristotle at their head, had almost undisputed sway over the church and well nigh banished from it the true doctrines of Revelation. Christianity found herself weak and inefficient, easily held in bondage, so long as she was unable to occupy the field of philosophical investigation, and so long as she left it wholly in the hands of errorists. She was forced therefore to enter this field or abandon the work of converting the world even by a Divine Revelation. She did enter it and wrested from the hands of infidelity these weapons, so that philosophical truth is now held firmly in the hands of Christianity. But the conquest has been gained not by exploring and enforcing Divine truth, without any philosophical investigation, nor by making the doctrines of the Bible modify and control the deductions of philosophy: but by the reviewer's homœopathic method of curing philosophy by philosophy, by a correct and common sense philosophy, intimately connected with the true teachings of the Bible. Thus the long established errors of the schoolmen were corrected, and the authority and power of the doctrines of Revelation re-established. Gratitude is due to God, that in His providence Luther was especially prepared for the work of the reformation by being first called to the professorship of moral philosophy. And though he occupied this important post but a short period, yet the fact that he was prepared for it and entered on it is proof that he was a man of extended philosophical views, for one of his age. He discarded the prevalent philosophy and of course must have had some views of his own. Theology was his most delightful study. But nothing can be more absurd than the supposition which some make—because he prosecuted the study of theology and spoke against the philosophy of the schoolmen—that therefore he had none of his own and did not value philosophical investigation. He saw the bondage in which the church and the true doctrines of the Bible were held by

the false philosophy of the times ; and he burned to overthrow it and to deliver the church. He was not a mere interpreter of the language of the Bible, but a man of large, common sense, philosophical views, which gave him great power in expounding and enforcing its true doctrines. His discussions abundantly show this. He commenced his work early by breaking all the bands of human authority and thus giving truth freedom on every field. This was the spirit which eminently characterized Luther and by the aid of which the Reformation struggled into existence. He early began his assaults upon the philosophy of Aristotle. He said of him ; "For nothing does my heart so intensely burn as to unmask and expose to the many that old buffoon, who, with his Greek visor, has so long befooled the church. If I did not know Aristotle to be a man I should certainly take him for the devil himself." It was his effort as he says, to "unmask and expose" the errors of this false philosophy, not simply by arraying against it the doctrines of revelation, but by the exhibition of truth, developing its falsehood. And he was tolerably successful. The power of this philosophy was quickly broken in Germany.

And yet, had there been no more thorough and extended philosophical investigation than Luther was able to make, the light of the Reformation might have been enveloped in the darkness of false philosophy and become extinct. But the spirit of independent investigation which he introduced, gave birth to more full developments on the field of science and philosophy. Men of Christian hearts entered this field and by the principles appropriate to it, worked out the demonstrations of truth, so that more true deductions of philosophy were made and established within two centuries after the Reformation, than had previously been during the entire period of the world's existence. And these deductions have been the bulwarks of Christianity. They had their origin from this Christian spirit of independence, and have harmonized with the true doctrines of the Bible, and aided their development. From this source came the *correction* of the erroneous doctrines of Aristotle, that the sun revolves round the earth, which had so long held the world in error. It was not accomplished by making the deductions of philosophy bend to the interpretations of the Bible. This was attempted, and the very principle of the reviewer was put in full force ; a principle which had its origin in the dark ages, and was a main support of human authority against truth. Every attempt to correct this philosophical error by philosophy was resisted, because these new deductions of philosophy conflicted with the established interpretation of the language of the Bible. This was done by pains and penalties, which we are sure the reviewer would not advocate. But philosophy has, nevertheless, given an interpretation of this lan-

<sup>1</sup> Von Gerlock's Luther, 1.21—translated by Prof. Stowe.

guage which it otherwise could have never received. To the same independent spirit of the Reformation, also, may be traced some of the most important developments in the mental and moral sciences which the world has ever received. The Puritans, too, derived their principles of independent investigation from the same source, and have more or less clearly and vigorously maintained them to the present time. Within the last century, great investigations and developments have been made respecting the number and variety of languages spoken on the earth ; respecting the origin of the human species, and its several families ; and in the science of geology. In all these past developments of philosophy, the doctrines of the Bible have not taken the lead in correcting philosophical error, and in establishing truth, as this reviewer prescribes. This, indeed, was not the province of Revelation. But when these new developments of philosophy have appeared, numbers have been ready to pronounce them *false*, simply because they seemed to conflict with the interpretations of the Bible. And thus the erroneous principle of making the doctrines of Revelation modify and control philosophy, has, at every successive step in the progress of philosophical investigation been used to protect error, and to prevent the development of truth. It has for ages held bound in iron chains free investigation. But Christian philosophy has burst these chains, corrected philosophical error, and worked out on its own field its demonstrations of truth.

And what has been the effect on revealed truth? Just what we should anticipate, since truth everywhere is harmonious. It has never, in the slightest degree, shaken the foundation of Revelation, but has shed light upon its doctrines, and contributed much to a clearer understanding and a firmer establishment of them. Many views of revealed truth, before supposed to be sacred and immovably settled, have been greatly modified, or entirely displaced ; and others, better harmonizing with related truths, have taken their place. And thus the past history of the development of philosophy has repeatedly illustrated, in the fullest and clearest manner, the correctness of the method we advocate, that a thorough and correct understanding of philosophical truth is important and necessary to a full and correct understanding of revealed truth.

And yet in the face of all these facts this reviewer still maintains the doctrine, that philosophy must not be allowed to modify our interpretation of the doctrines of the Bible, but these doctrines, thus interpreted, must control philosophy. And this implies that the Bible is a book so plain, that man with any degree of knowledge can fully understand its teachings ; that he needs only to learn and read it correctly, as the child learns his lesson, and then the work of developing its sublime truths is done. How much learning does this method require of the expounder of the Bible ? He need not pretend to enter the field of philosophical

research, and carefully survey its ground, and see whether its deductions are true or false. He may abandon thus this entire field to the infidel, allowing him to occupy it, and to work out his own demonstrations, true or false, and then employ these tremendous engines to undermine the system of Revelation. And whenever the philosophical deductions of the infidel conflict with his interpretation of Scripture doctrine, all he has to do is to assume the *infallibility* of his interpretation, and call upon the deductions of philosophy to surrender: and then his work of expounding and defending the system of Revelation is perfected. In this he assumes that there is a contradiction between the deductions of philosophy and Revelation itself—that one or the other must be false—and he stakes the truth or falsehood of the entire system of Revelation on the issue, and that too while he is wholly ignorant of the field of philosophical investigation. This is yielding all that the infidel can claim. It is yielding first the field of philosophy as a field of investigation, and then the assumption that there is a necessary contradiction between the deductions of philosophy and Revelation itself. But there is no necessity of yielding this vantage ground. It is this false method of the reviewer that yields it. The infidel may legitimately be required to show that there is this necessary conflict, without our yielding or affirming it. The method we advocate assumes the doctrines of the Bible to be consistent with all *true* deductions of science, until they are proved to be inconsistent with them. But this is the work of the infidel, and we give him no undue advantage for doing this, by assuming the infallibility of our interpretation. From the *true* deductions of philosophy the firm believer in Revelation will have nothing to fear. If he fears that erroneous philosophical deductions will be introduced, and made to extend their perverting influence to the doctrines of the Bible, then our method at once dispels his fears. It requires him to take the only fair and honorable course—viz. to enter the field of investigation, and there correct erroneous deductions, and develop the truth as a prerequisite to a full interpretation of the doctrines of Revelation. By this means, instead of chaining down the Christian system in a place of concealment, he gives to her wings of truth, with which she is able to rise above the fog and mists of error, and show her heavenly origin.

But the reviewer seems to be moved with *great fear* lest this method should weaken the Divine authority of the Bible. We apprehend this is not the real ground of his fear. For if so, it would disclose a fearful want of confidence in the ability of Revelation to sustain its claims to truth in all its teachings, when brought to the fair and honorable test of truth on the field of philosophy. We believe his fear arises from an apprehension that some philosophical dogma which he has adopted cannot bear the test of scrutiny, and consequently some views which he has de-

rived from the Scriptures, by this erroneous method of interpretation, must be abandoned. We are not surprised that a man who adopts the dogmas that sin is inherited, and that ability is not necessary as a basis of moral obligation, should fear philosophical investigation. For these dogmas could not stand the test of true philosophy, and yet they are appropriate subjects of philosophical scrutiny. But the true Christian philosopher, ever solicitous to know the truth, and ready to modify his views whenever truth requires it, will manifest a very different feeling. Instead of shrinking from the light, or trembling at every breeze that blows from the land of philosophy, he will feel himself standing on firmer ground. He will affirm the Bible to be true, because he has evidence of its truth, and finds no necessary conflict between it and the true deductions of philosophy. As its "Author borrows not leave to be," so this book, on his principles of interpretation, asks no concessions from philosophy to support its truth. He will maintain that true philosophy is ever the handmaid of Revelation, and her aid is necessary to a full development of its teachings. This indeed requires a learned ministry, or at least some men qualified to traverse the whole field of philosophy, and develop its truths, as the opposite method does not. But there is no safety for Revelation—none for Christianity in any other course.

Here then is room for progress even in the development of the truths of Revelation; progress in a clearer understanding of its distinct and individual doctrines; progress in the knowledge of the relations of one truth to another, both within and without the field of revealed truth; and progress in giving perfect symmetry to all the parts of this system. As the developments of philosophy have been and may yet be slow, so we believe the developments of moral and revealed truth, which in no small degree depend upon them, will also be slow. There is yet much to be learned respecting those doctrines of Revelation which involve a correct knowledge of the science of mind, of moral obligation, and of moral government; and not a few of its doctrines relate to these subjects. We do not therefore censure Mr. Finney for the *manner* of constructing his Theological System, namely, by attempting first to establish the philosophical principles on which it is based. We believe this to be the true and Christian method, and whatever of error there may be in the system, it can only be overthrown by carefully examining and understanding these fundamental principles.



## ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN'S IMMORTALITY, AND OF THE ETERNAL PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED, AS SET FORTH IN THE ANCIENT SCRIPTURES.

By ASAHEL ABBOT, New York.

THAT the ancients were ignorant of a future state, or of the doctrine of eternal rewards and punishments, we should be slow to admit. The patriarchal saints are said to have "died in the faith;" which faith is also made to include "the resurrection of the dead." The oldest prophecy on record since the Fall, implies the same: "It shall bruise thy head." How? Plainly by undoing the works of the Serpent; of which temporal evil and death just before threatened, are a part; where "the seed of a woman" should break the bars of death and raise the bodies of his saints to glory and unfailing life. In the prophecy of Enoch it is said: "Behold the Lord cometh with ten thousands of his saints to execute judgment upon all the ungodly." How can this be unless they are immortal? In the Book of Job it is said: "Till the heavens be no more, they shall not be awakened out of their sleep." Thus to those early patriarchs was known both the resurrection and the end of the world; and it is not wonderful that we hear the same Job exclaim: "My Redeemer shall stand at the latter day upon the earth, and in my flesh shall I see God." To the same effect we find the Psalmist exulting even while he perceives the temporary greatness of ungodly men, as penetrated with a just sense of piety toward God, he exclaims: "I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness."

The vengeance which fell upon Cain for the murder of his brother had the same meaning. One brute might slay another at will and nothing said; but the moment man falls upon man it is shown that "man is better than a beast," by the terrible punishment inflicted upon the murderer. Abel had faith; and faith lays hold of God as the rewarder of them that diligently seek him. And certainly they who knew of the translation of Enoch, could not have remained ignorant of immortality, and the change of this corruptible into incorruptible, whether to the dead or the living. And they who saw the Son of God face to face, and communed with his angels as familiar friends, whether in Eden or in Ararat, in Arabia, Egypt or Canaan, they could not but know something of a life to come, and of the beings inhabiting that world where there is no more death.

We are told that there is nothing beyond the present world in the Books of Moses; for though we may have glimpses of a life to come in Job, the Psalms and the Prophets, yet the emigrants from

Egypt knew nothing of these, and Moses never refers to the bliss of the heavenly world as a motive to obedience. "Let the potsherds strive with the potsherds of the earth." Josephus affirms that the Hebrews never expected to find their rewards in earthly things, when obedient to their laws, but in things not appropriate to time and sense in the world of spirits. All other Jewish writers affirm the same. Jacob when dying exclaimed: "I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord." Was this uttered in mockery, or in the assured hope of a happy life to come? The latter is Paul's opinion, who plainly affirms that "they looked for a better country, that is an heavenly." So when Moses speaks of God to the captive Hebrews, he calls him, "The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob;" which words our blessed Lord interprets to mean that "the dead are raised up," since "God is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living," wherefore "all are alive before him."

And one of the most ancient forms of expression concerning death itself, has the same import and renders necessary a separate life to such as are departed out of this world. "Abraham died, and was gathered to his people." Surely he was not buried with his fathers, whether in Haran or Chaldean Ur; but his spirit was released from the bonds of his body and left free to soar among the just souls of his fathers, as they sing, "Holy, holy, holy," before the great white throne. "Isaac gave up the ghost, and was gathered unto his people, and his sons Esau and Jacob buried him." "Jacob gathered up his feet into the bed and yielded up the ghost, and was gathered unto his people." On the other hand it is said of the wicked man in Job: "He shall lie down, but he shall not be gathered;" i. e. he shall not be found with the souls of his earliest progenitors who were in covenant with God, and to whom good men are "gathered" at death. There is scarce any difference between Job's description of the wicked man after death and the Dives of the New Testament. "He openeth his eyes and he is not. Terrors take hold on him as waters, a tempest stealeth him away in the night. The east wind carrieth him away, and he departeth, and as a storm, hurleth him out of his place. For God shall cast upon him and shall not spare; he would fain flee out of his hand. They shall clap their hands at him, and shall hiss him out of his place."

There is little need, however, in our inquiry to consult authorities. Man is everywhere a religious being; and, as he alone of all animals knows that he must die, so he everywhere knows that he must live again. The Rabbins tell us that the book of Genesis begins with Beth (2) whose number is 2, because God created two worlds at once, viz: this world and the world to come. This "world to come," is sometimes put for the times of Christ, and at others for that world into which men depart at death. But who

ever heard of a religion that had not immortality for its reason? Men (says Josephus to the Gentiles) are exhorted to virtue and dissuaded from vice by the persuasion that souls are immortal, and though they should not meet their reward in this life yet they look for eternal rewards and punishments in the life to come.

Since this is so—and it is and has always been the firm belief of man that God rewards the deeds of men in an immortal state, if at all—we must recognize the belief in a future immortal state as existing wherever we find an altar and a service of God. Infidelity, or neglect of this, is invariably followed by a total disregard of all religion. Prove then that Adam, Abel, or Cain offered sacrifice; that in the days of Enos men began to be distinguished as worshippers of Jehovah, while others, (according to an old Jewish tradition) with Enos himself, paid service to the stars and spheres: prove that Noah, Shem, Abraham, and Moses offered prayers and sacrifices, and we have proved that where these were done there men believed themselves to be immortal and accountable.

It may be one mark of the divinity of the Scriptures that the sacred writers never show the least concern how their testimony is received by men. It is certainly a mark of the same that they never deal in curious questions, nor take pains to lay down fundamental principles in a technical form, since they wrote at a period comparatively late, and nearer to our own times than to the beginning of the world; and the doctrines that are fundamental to their teachings were all held in the ancient church from the first as they have been ever since and will be forever. Then, as now, the church was "the pillar and ground of faith;" and the words of the seers in the Scriptures only show what were the elements of all ancient theology and the leading forms of their development from age to age, from the Exodus of Israel until the exile of John in Patmos. Hence the Scriptures may well be allowed to treat of truth in a practical rather than in a speculative form; or if there be speculative passages they are ever joined to practical uses. In the poetical parts indeed we shall find glimpses of abstract spiritual truth: but these are never without an object, and they are ever made the basis of some important practical conclusion for the direction and right use of human life. The fundamental principles of theology then are taught mostly by implication in the Scriptures; and the question whether the most ancient church, or the people of the Exodus, knew of a life to come, so far as the Scriptures are concerned, must be mainly determined by the practical uses they make of that doctrine, and the figures with which they overlay it when they speak of human hopes and destinies; for the sacred writers will not stop to speculate concerning it: they leave this to the uninspired; to the heathen philosophers and presumptuous divines of every sort.

The moment we leave the inspired pages we find the whole

matter of immortality and its consequences under discussion in every tongue of man. Apochryphal books, philosophers, priests, Christian fathers and divines without end, all are filled with anxious inquiries concerning the nature and destiny of man. But God never admits in his teaching that the fundamental truths of his revealing are such as it can be reasonable to question, and he never becomes controversialist unless to ask, "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?" As the Grecians are said to have armed themselves with whips and not with warlike implements when they would quell a sedition among slaves, so God replies to refractory creatures, "Be still and know that I am God."

But what fundamental condition may we assume, and what principle shall we find everywhere taken for granted in those parts of the Scriptures that speak of man's immortality, since they never treat it as a mere question of truth dis severed from its practical bearings? We answer: *That fundamental condition is man's responsibility for a being that shall never end*; and that principle is, that *human actions are certain to be followed by eternal consequences*. We assume these as the only conclusions possible in regard to immortal beings. For God can never forget any of our works; but by necessity of nature must remember them, judge of them according to truth, and forever treat us according to his judgment of them.

On this principle and this fundamental condition are based all the known teachings of the ancient church. No religious Jew, from Moses to the present, has ever thought of calling them in question, or in the least abating from the faith of the fathers concerning things hoped or feared beyond the grave. Concerning the good laid up for just souls, let the wicked Aramite be witness of the views entertained even among the heathen, when he asks that he may "die the death of the just," because the final state of good men is peace. And concerning the same we hear Moses exclaim: "Lord, thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations." What? Has God proved himself a refuge and defence to the patriarchal exiles, or their enslaved progeny, through four hundred and fifty years, by leaving them to suffer innumerable hardships through their whole lives, only that they might perish in the grave like beasts? Again concerning punishment, he says: "Who knoweth the power of thine anger, or thy wrath as thou art terrible?" That is, Who can form an idea of wrath and punishment so terrible as to correspond with what God threatens against the violators of his laws? Nor are those memorable words of Christ himself stronger when he affirms that God is more to be feared than all the most doleful creatures that can be named both in earth and in hell; since they can act only by his permission, and at the utmost only afflict and dissolve the body, while he can plunge both soul and body entire into the perdition of hell.

But he proceeds with a practical conclusion from this view, and adds: "So teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom." The wisdom of a beast is to satisfy the animal instincts; but what wisdom is this? The same we shall find elsewhere in the Scriptures. "The fear of the Lord" is its beginning; the saving of the soul is its end. For in the study of truth an apostle will not have us so much concerned with the truth itself as with its consequences. He too assumes the terrible and eternal wrath of God's judgment as a fundamental truth not to be questioned, as necessary among "the principles of the doctrine of Christ," and instead of remaining like Ephraim "in the place of the breaking forth of children," he will have us learn to put all the principles of our faith to use at once, and so rise to the perfect development of all our faculties; lest, through a light and superficial knowledge of what is true, or a too familiar and careless treatment of it when known, we become hardened and incapable of being improved through its influence; as the earth, that receives sunshine and rain only the more to nourish a luxuriant and worthless growth of weeds, of briars and thorns, "is nigh unto cursing," and is destined to be burned over with fire. For he that will work by the light of the sun shall have the benefit of that light; but if instead of using it for the purposes of life, he turn to contemplate it where it shines, and strain his eyes to behold the body of the sun itself, he shall lose the power of seeing, and become blind from the excess of light. In like manner the right practice of Christian duties secures the right knowledge of Christian truth; and the neglect of those duties for the contemplation of the truth itself, has filled the world with errors and blind guides of every sort.

But the prophet prays for the reward of a wisely spent life: "Let the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us, and establish thou the work of our hands upon us." Not more clear is the prophet of later times when he says: "Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him; for they shall eat the fruit of their doings. Woe unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him." The 88th Psalm is commonly assigned to the period of Moses, and alone of all the Psalms is said to have no hope in it; yet the author holds fast his integrity, and will neither despair of help in the life to come, nor argue himself a beast by resorting to suicide, as was common among the heathen: "Unto thee have I cried, O Lord; and in the morning shall my prayer prevent thee." Precisely the same is that of patient Job when he says: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." Such was "the faith and patience of saints" from the earliest ages; while they never ceased to warn the wicked that the end of their course is evil. "The wicked is reserved to the day of destruction; they shall be brought forth unto the day of wrath."

Here Job affirms it as a known truth, that was repeated by every wandering minstrel that ever sung at the court of an Oriental Emir; and in another place he adds: "He will not stretch forth his hand to the grave, though they cry in his destruction."

Thus it is said in the Psalms: "The upright shall have dominion over the unjust in the morning;" but the "wicked shall go to the generation of his fathers, and they shall never see light:" "thou wilt not leave my soul in hell;" "men of the world have their portion in this life;" but "God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever." "Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterwards receive me to glory." "As a dream when one awaketh, so, O Lord, when thou awakest (them) shalt thou render their imaginations despicable:" "Thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down to destruction. How are they brought into desolation as in a moment! they are utterly consumed with terrors." So Moses is commanded of God to sing: "A fire is kindled in mine anger that shall burn to the lowest hell."

Such are the plain and earnest words of God, who wastes no time on triflers, while often he permits the most gifted of men to take themselves in their own craftiness, and to weary themselves to no end, while they would find how they may assail the pillars of his sanctuary; as when that most revelous and atheist crew were sent reeling with blindness and rage through the streets of Sodom to assault a hospitable door until the pious remnant should escape, and let down upon their foes a horrible tempest and intolerable streams of fire and brimstone "from the Lord out of heaven;" that an apostle declares to be for "an ensample unto those that after should live ungodly."

It might prove of no little interest were we able to trace to its origin the belief of mankind in a world to come, and show in what forms it was first held, with each new development of it, as one dispensation gives way to another, till it be fully revealed in the resurrection of Christ from the grave. But the oldest records are nearly three thousand years later than the Fall; and whatever forms of belief or of imagery relating to a future world may have obtained currency in the patriarchal ages, we shall find them inextricably mingled together in the whole Scriptures; and it is only by comparing each group of images found in them with the known order of events to which they relate, that we can in any degree arrive at a satisfactory conclusion concerning either the original belief, or the forms in which it was more customary to express that belief when applied to the future destinies of men, as times changed from age to age.

There is, however, one view of the case upon which we cannot lay too much stress. It is this. While the heathen, to a great extent, denied the resuscitation of the body, and speculated much

concerning the soul's immortality, and whether it should remain disembodied, or pass through other bodies to infinity, we can find no trace in the *Hebrew* mind of a doubt *whether the whole person should prove immortal*. Some few Jews, about the time of the coming of Christ, learned the Grecian philosophy, and came to speak of souls as immortal, and capable of existing without bodies in the life to come. But so foreign is this to the real Jewish mind, that it never found place in the Scriptures, unless it be with respect to the period between death and the resurrection; and this seems mostly, if not altogether, confined to the New Testament.

The Scriptural view of immortality then is this: *Man shall live and be judged in his own body. Man in both soul and body is immortal.*

At the beginning it is said that "*MAN became a living soul*:" and when the tree of knowledge became interdicted it was said, "*dying thou shalt die*." The whole person, soul and body, shall be given up to the curse. This style of thought runs through all the Scriptures, and the earliest versions of the Old Testament by the Chaldee Paraphrasts. It is the only one found in the Apocryphal books, and is prevalent in the New Testament, as well as in the whole current of Jewish and Christian writers until the present day. And this may in some measure account for the looseness with which the sacred writers speak regarding the soul, the body, the reins, &c. For the soul is sometimes put for the animal frame; as in the sixteenth Psalm; while the whole person or the life, is more commonly intended. The body or flesh also is often put for the whole person; and the reins are put for the soul. The heart also is used for the soul, the purpose of a man, the whole person, or the understanding. The spirit is also the soul. See Matt. 10: 28; Gen. 12: 5; Ps. 35: 9; Ps. 16: 10; Act 2: 27; Rom. 6: 12; 12: 1; Ps. 7: 9; 16: 7; 73: 21; 1 Sam. 12: 20; Ps. 45: 1; Isa. 7: 2; Hos. 7: 14; Matt. 15: 19; Acts. 7: 59; Ps. 32: 2; Luke 1: 47; John 13: 21; Acts 17: 16; 18: 5, 25; 19: 21.

Still our common distinction of the soul from the body is of unknown origin. It is found in Job, the oldest of known books, when he says of man, that "his soul within him shall mourn;" it is repeated in Isaiah, when he says of the Assyrian empire under the figure of a forest, it shall be consumed, "both soul and body;" it occurs again when Christ will have men to fear God, who "is able to destroy both soul and body in hell;" while men, though able to kill the body, "are not able to kill the soul;" and Paul makes a threefold distinction between body, soul and spirit, when he says, "your whole spirit and soul, and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ: "see also and compare Heb. 4: 12; with 1 Thess. 5: 23; Job 14: 22; Isa. 10: 18; Matt. 10: 28. But, as already intimated, we shall find the greater number of

Scripture expressions with regard to an immortal state to be such as are of a practical character, rather than otherwise; and such imagery is employed in each case as is most adapted to impress upon the human heart the sense it should entertain of eternal things, and to raise in each of us the highest and liveliest ideas of which we are capable concerning the good or evil laid up for us in a future world; while all vain and impertinent enquiry concerning that world is discountenanced and avoided.

The most ancient imagery used to foreshadow the heavenly state we shall find drawn from the memory of the first Paradise in Eden; though of this we have few or no clear traces in the earlier books. The same is true of the heathen world, who had their Atlantic gardens, their Hesperian fields, for the repose of good men after death, and carried about in the rites of Adonis vases of flowers mingled with serpents. At the same time the punishments due to sin were indicated by the cherubim with the flaming sword defending the tree of life; showing that heaven itself is barred off unless sin be removed by the shedding of blood, that now became an authorized hope to the whole race to be witnessed by sin-offerings; which Cain first refusing, he was expelled from the Divine presence to wander over the earth without rest. This would afford another and scarcely less impressive figure of souls left in sin to wander from God through all eternity without peace. This however is nowhere referred to in the Scriptures: for it was soon superseded by the drowning of his posterity, and the whole world that went after his errors: and here we have the first image of eternal destruction used in Scripture. Thus in Job, it is said: "Hast thou marked the old way which wicked men have trodden, whose foundation was overflowed with a flood?" And this is used to show that though God should delay for a long time to punish, and allow to the wicked great affluence of worldly goods, yet is their lot not to be desired. And from the same source we have also in Job the view of wicked souls trembling beneath the waters; whom he names *Rephaim*; and these the Septuagint render γίγαντες i. e. giants or earth-born (conf. Gen. 6: 4, where they are called Nephilim heroes, or violent doers, that all the most ancient versions render giants,) as well as πτῆνες ἀσεβείς, i. e. ghosts or impious persons; in Symmachus θεομάχων such as contend with God. See Job 26: 5; Ps. 88: 10; Prov. 2: 18; 9: 18; 21: 16; Isa. 14: 9; 26: 14, 19. It is upon some such tradition as this (which Moses also seems to intimate in Gen. 6: 4,) that the Hindus, Egyptians and Greeks, based their fables of the Titans, Aloides and others whom they assigned as examples of eternal punishment to wicked souls in Tartarus.

The destruction of Sodom afforded an emblem no less fearful of the same thing. Hence of the wicked it is said in Job, that "brimstone shall be rained upon his habitation," (18: 15,) and in another place, "fire shall consume the tabernacles of bribery." Hence



among all the other imagery of the Apocalypse, we have this of the lake of fire and brimstone. Rev. 21 : 8 ; and ab. conf. also Ps. 11 : 6 ; 140 : 10 ; 120 : 4 ; Ezek. 38 : 22 ; and al. In the heathen Tartarus also fire was assigned as one of the means of torment to the wicked, and Phlegethon rolled in waves of fire about the doors, to pour its lava afterwards into the abyss. Some allusions appear made to the confusion of tongues at Babel, as a figure of disappointment to such as devise mischief, and are not able to bring it to pass. See Ps. 55 : 9 ; Jer. 20 : 11 ; Ps. 35 : 4 ; 71 : 1 ; Isa. 45 : 17.

As time advances the imagery becomes changed ; though in many cases the more ancient maintains the preference. The parting of the Red Sea, and the passage thence, has become parabolical to the journey of life, that to the just ends in the passing of Jordan, and Canaan becomes heaven ; while the unjust fall by the way, and the pit that swallowed up the faction of Korah, the burning of Nadab and Abihu and others with fire ; the bite of fiery serpents and other plagues upon rebellious men in the wilderness, are made the paradigms of maledictions hereafter to fall upon such as will not remain at peace with God, and in charity with men. See 1 Cor. 10 : 1-12 ; Jude. 11 : Deut. 32 : 22-24. cf. Ps. 95 : 7 ad fin. and Heb. 3 : 7 ad fin. and 4 : 1-11. For although many things of this sort may seem less clear in the sacred text, they are still found there, and they flourish from age to age in the common language of the religious world, from which they are taken by the inspired penmen. Thus we have in our common language, the Ark of Noah with his Dove and Rainbow as emblems of Christ, who shelters us from the storms of infinite wrath that roll over the ungodly, and the Holy Spirit who brings to our souls the olive branch of peace in the assurance of pardoned sin, and above, the bow of hope sits upon the clouds to be our assurance, that we shall not be swallowed up by the floods of the wicked. Each of these we shall find glanced upon, as part of the imagery contained in the Divine Word. "Come my people, enter thou into thy chambers, and shut thy doors about thee—until the indignation be overpast." Isa. 26 : 20, 21. A dovelike form was seen hovering over Jesus by the Jordan, as an emblem of his peaceable character and kingdom ; and when to the beloved John in Patmos the heavens were opened, there was seen a rainbow skirting the excessive brightness of the throne. So when Satan is destined to be bruised under the feet of good men, we have it compared to the trampling of the woman's seed upon the serpent ; (cf. Gen. 3 : 15 ; with Ps. 91 : 13 ; ) though perhaps as often to the overthrow of Pharaoh at the Red Sea. "Thou hast broken Rahab in pieces as one that is slain." Ps. 89 : 10. "Jehovah with his sore, and great and strong sword shall punish Leviathan." Isa. 27 : 1. Conf. 51 : 9 ; Ps. 74 : 13, 14 ; Ezek. 29 : 3 ; though the figure is older and occurs in Job to denote any boastful and proud king. See Heb. 26 : 12.

After the times of David, the hill of Zion becomes the most eminent type and paradigm of the heavenly state; as we see in many places and have yet in our common religious language. Cf. Isa. 51: 11; 60: 14; and 66: 20; with Gal. 4: 26; Heb. 12: 22; Rev. 21: 1; and al. So a little later the pollutions of the vale of Hinnom gave rise to a new imagery concerning hell; as we find in the Chaldee Paraphrases, and the strictly Jewish portions of the New Testament. Conf. Matt. 5: 28, 29, 30; 10: 28; 18: 9; James 3: 6, and al. and the Targums in various places. Nor was it long until the Babylonish captivity furnished new imagery of a furnace of fire, wherein state criminals were wont to be consumed. Matt. 13: 42, 50. And when the Grecian became adopted as the sacred language, some from among the leading religious enigmas of that tongue were mingled with such as were of eastern origin; whence we are told of the rebellious angels hurled into Tartarus. II Pet. 2: 4.

And as to the true and natural idea of Tartarus itself among the ancients, there is little difference but that it was held by the later Hebrews in substantially the same form. For, according to the poets usually, Tartarus was an abyss, either below the southern pole, (as in the Georgics of Virgil,) or below the surface of the earth. But according to Lucian, Tartarus is that unformed and disorderly state of things which is supposed to exist beyond the bounds of organized life and motion and the light of the sun. So in the New Testament we have an abyss, and an outer darkness as the proper lot of fallen spirits and wicked souls after death. See and comp. with Numb. 16: 30; Job 17: 16; 33: 18, 24, 30; Ps. 28: 1; 9: 15; 30: 3; 40: 2; 55: 23; 69: 15; 88: 4; 140: 10; 143: 7; Prov. 1: 12; 28: 17; Isa. 14: 15; the following passages, Luke 8: 31; Rom. 10: 7; Matt. 22: 13; 8: 12; 25: 30; II Pet. 2: 4; Jude 6; Rev. 9: 1; 2: 11; 7: 17: 8; 20: 1, 3.

Opposed to this the joys of the heavenly state are often represented under the figure of a victorious king calling together his friends to celebrate his nuptials with a feast and sacrifice. See Matt. 22: 2; 25: 10; Rev. 19: 7, 9. So in the Old Testament, see Isa. 62: 4, 5; and al. *passim*.

The burning sands of the Arabian desert are often referred to as the dwelling-place of evil spirits, and thus also have we another image of hell. See Matt. 12: 43; Luke 11: 24; Jer. 17: 6. This seems to have been in use from early times; and here perhaps we have a clue to that mysterious personage, Azazel, falsely rendered the scape-goat or ἀποπομπαιος, in the Pentateuch. This seems to have been no other than Satan himself; who, as the God of this world, was named Azazus, Azizus, Azel, Azor, Asor, Azaz, (i. q. Isis) and many other such like names; all originating in עֶשֶׂה Esh, fire; whence also Estia, Hestia, or Vesta. The name is the

same as that of Hephæstus, the god of fire, or fire itself honored as an emblem of God. Of two goats (Lev. 16: 8) for a sin-offering, one was determined by lot as an offering unto God, while the other, with the sins of the people as it were imprecated upon his head, was let go under guard into the desert (v. 21) as a sign that all such as are rejected of God are doomed to the same destruction with the Devil and his angels.

Then we have all the leading images mingled together in various places. Thus the Apocalyptic river of life is anticipated in the visions of Ezekiel, while both are drawn from the stream of Siloa flowing from the foot of Zion and the temple: (comp. Rev. 22: 1-3; with Ezek. 47: 1-12;) the Paradise of the Gospels and Epistles is foreseen to be like Eden by Isaiah; (comp. Luke 23: 43; II Cor. 12: 4; Rev. 2: 7, with Isa. 51: 3;) while the Gehenna of the New Testament with its never-dying worms and unquenchable fire was well known to the prophets. Comp. Mark 9: 43, 44, with Isa. 66: 23. See also Judith 16: 17; for the same imagery.

Thus much for the leading images and types contained in the Scriptures concerning the life to come, and that set forth the things of the spiritual world to us in the most affecting manner by means of figures drawn from the things of nature here visible and evident to our senses. As to subordinate imagery there is almost no end. Whatever can delight the senses we shall find in some way used to foreshadow the joys of the beatific vision; and whatever is most horrible and destructive is called in to stand in the way of sin by making the state of lost souls more odious and terrible in its desolation to our senses; that being seasonably warned we may avoid those remediless plagues by turning away from the pursuit of sin and folly to the life hid with Christ in God, and the following after that holiness which is itself the only essential life and bliss.

But as in Scriptural imagery we shall find the popular imagery of the times when they were written, so the duration of the future world and the retributions there exhibited, is denoted by ordinary words taken in the sense they bear in the common language of life. No such thing as strict and technical language is to be found in the Scriptures; but as they are God's gift to all the *families* of the earth, so they are written in the common language of the family and of ordinary life; while dialectics and subtilty and logical accuracy of words is left to the philosophers, whose works are designed to be understood only by scholars. In *their* language we are told how God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent: though these and the like terms convey but a slight impression of what things they represent to the minds of the uneducated: but in the Scriptures there is no such difficulty of comprehending the words employed for the same purpose; for there it is said, "Is any.

thing too hard for the Lord?" "Whither shall I go from thy presence?" "Known unto God are all his works from the foundation of the world." So in the language of dialectics, heaven is a moral state not confined to time or place,—the symphony of created spirits with their Creator wherein there is no discord: and hell is also a moral state, equally independent of time and place—the discordance of the creature's will with that of God. But such language is found ineffectual with the people, and a figurative style of representation sets forth the things of eternity with life and power to creatures immersed in sense, until death changes our relations, and to our awakened senses it is clearly revealed that all things in heaven and hell are taught to men in similitudes; as if some guardian spirit would warn before his infant charge of approaching danger by a dream; while to every class of minds the evidence may be seen with equal clearness that both states are eternal; to the one by pure reason, to the other by the Word of God. Or if the mind be perverse, and take to itself the labor of showing how God can honor himself by disregarding moral relations and uttering pompous falsehoods, there is no difference; but the sophist is deceived by the most stupid reasoning, and the sensualist prefers the dictates of his own lust as a reason for God's action to all that conscience or Scripture can raise of most alarming imagery to awaken the fear of eternal death. The one refuses to allow Scripture to teach that our responsibilities are those of immortal beings, on the ground that God is dishonored by such responsibilities; while the other with far greater consistency rejects the Scriptures because they affirm the trial of the spirit for eternity in the present world, and following out the reasoning whereby this conclusion is reached he comes at last to the theory of the fool, that there is no God at all to direct the affairs of men, because they find the world filled with evils for which there seems no remedy.

The terms by which the ancients commonly denoted eternal duration were such as are also useful (even if their primary design was not) for the expression of secular relations. Indeed it is hard for men to comprehend what is eternal and unchangeable except by approximation and figures drawn from temporal things. Thus in the duration of the world and the life of men we have what needs only to be extended forward without end, or backward without beginning, to afford what idea we can have of eternity. Hence the word *Eternity* itself: as its Latin root *Ævum*, (or rather the Greek αἰών,) is taken at once to denote the life of man; the duration of the world, and the life of immortal beings. For although *ævum* and *ævitas* (*ætas*) be more commonly taken when human life is spoken of, yet *æternitas* their derivative, is taken when a long though limited time is denoted: as when Pliny makes the wood of cedar *eternal*, and in another place addresses the emperor

as one whose power is permanent, by the title of *Eternity*; though this last may refer to his honor as a God by the people. In like manner the Latin writers use their *seculum* to denote a race, an age, the life of man, a century, a long course of ages, and eternity. As the Latins had no other words so apt as these for the expression of eternal being, while they are taken in many other senses, (for such words as *semper* will not be thought worth putting in comparison with them,) so the Greeks knew no other words so useful to that end as their *αἰετ*, (or *αἰετ*), and such as are derived from it. Thus they said *ἀειβδαστεῖν*, to bud forth continually; *ἀειβρής*, ever-blooming; *ἀειγενεσία*, eternal existence; *ἀειγενής*, or *ἀειγενής*, eternal, *ἀειδίνητος*, continually turning; *ἀειδιδιος*, and *ἀίδιος*, everlasting; *ἀειδοῦδια*, perpetual slavery; *ἀειστοῦ*, eternal existence; *ἀειζῶτα*, eternal life; *ἀειζῶον*, evergreen, or houseleek; *ἀειζῶστος*, always girded; *ἀειθαλής*, ever-blooming, &c., &c., *αἰών*, eternity, time, space of time, life-time, man's estate, the world; *αἰώνιος*, eternal, of long duration, permanent. We need not look for authorities, (as Arist. de Coelo 1. 11) to decide the uniform theological sense of these words; for on the face of them, as used in the whole circle of religious writers, they show that their primary and proper meaning is eternity, or illimitable time, and all other senses are but secondary to this, and used by common consent in a manner more loose (*ἀμαυρότερον*) for temporal objects, while in religious matters they are usually to be taken more strictly (*ἀκριβέστερον*) for what is eternal and unchangeable. As *αἰών* may signify the life of man, so it may be taken for the vital parts of the body, by which it continues in life: as when Hippocrates names the spinal marrow *αἰών*. In like manner, when the Greeks would describe a thing as continued indefinitely, they could use *εἰς* in the sense of *more or farther*. Of the Scripture usage, more hereafter.

But when the Hebrews would use a word that should more than all others denote eternity, they preferred *סֵתֶר* *secret, hidden, unknown*; which, in reference to time, will always most aptly signify what is indefinite, or obscure as to its beginning or end. Besides which, they very frequently used for the same purpose *עַד* *passing, progress, hence duration, perpetual time, eternity, forever*. Sometimes both are taken at once as an intensive. Thus, "Jehovah shall reign (*עַד עַד*) forever and ever:" "thou hast put out their name (*עַד עַד*) forever and ever."—Ps. 9: 5 (6). See Ps. 119: 44; 145: 2; Mic. 4: 5; Ps. 10: 16; 21: 4, (5); 52: 8. So *עַד עַד* Isa. 45: 17.

Then as what is strong, splendid and glorious, has also the capacity of endurance, and what is *true, sincere, and faithful* must excel and outlast what is false, fraudulent and treacherous, so so used these ideas as parallelisms of what is eternal; and *מָשַׁח* takes place of the others. Thus they say of the Messiah,

"He shall swallow up death (לָמָוֶת) in victory." Isa. 25 : 8 ; and of the wicked wise man that has his portion in this life, and his godless ancestors, (עַד-דָּוָרָם) they shall never see light." Ps. 49 : 20.

And as they coupled עוֹלָם and עַד in the original Scriptures, so in the Septuagint we have αἰών followed by ἔτι, to denote the same thing. And as to ἔτι itself, when taken alone, it often denotes eternity ; especially when coupled with a negative ; as οὐκέτι, or μηκέτι, *no more* ; and in Scripture use without the negative : He that is unjust let him be unjust (ἔτι) *still*,—and he that is righteous let him *still* (ἔτι) work righteousness." Rev. 22 : 11. i. q. Let the unjust (οὐδέποτε) never work righteousness, and let the just never (μηδέποτε) do unjustly." i. e. in the times to come when Christ hath ceased to reign as mediator, (1 Cor. 15 : 24) while of the times previous it is said : "Let the wicked forsake his way—and let him return unto the Lord." Isa. 55 : 7.

Thus we have eternal things denoted by words the most apt we can conceive, while they may often be taken to denote what is temporal. For in all languages and in all books we find but these four general meanings to such words as we are now discussing.

1. When used to define the extent of personal rights or duties ; *during the present life*. Thus we have under the Mosaic law δαιδουλεία *perpetual servitude*, i. e. servitude for life ; as it is said in the New Testament to be the privilege of a son to remain in his father's house εἰς αἰῶνα, forever, i. e. during life, or through the whole period of his minority, while a servant is liable to be displaced at any time. Cf. Ex. 21 : 6 ; John 8 : 35.

"2. When used to define the duration of privileges or duties in states, *during the existence of the state*, or the dynasty under whose laws they exist and are in force. Thus we convey real estate in our title deeds from A to B, his heirs, executors, and assigns, "for his and their use and behoof *forever*." So under the Mosaic laws Palestine was assigned the Hebrews as an inheritance *forever*, and the priesthood of Aaron was ordained to be *forever*, as an *everlasting* priesthood ; i. e. until the coming of Shiloh to abolish the ancient exclusion and sit forever as High Priest to the world ; hence his office is described as *unchangeable* (ἀπαράβατος) or *untransferable*, and his life *indestructible*, or *indissoluble*, (ἀκατάλυτος) because he cannot die, and shall never have a successor.

3. When used to express the duration of things upon the earth that outlast the life of man, or the date of monarchies *during the existence of the globe itself, or a long and indefinite course of ages*. Thus the grave is named בֵּית עוֹלָם, *the long home*, or *eternal house* ; because the dead shall not arise "till the heavens be no more." So Jonah thought himself cut off from the living,

and hoped not that he might return from the bottom of the sea ; as he sings in honor of his deliverance : "I said, the earth with her bars is closed about me *forever*." To the same effect are the mountains named *everlasting* or *perpetual*. Cf. Eccl. 12 : 5 ; Jon. 2 : 4-6 ; Hab. 3 : 6 and al.

4. When taken to denote the duration of principles and the Divine nature, *the universal time of all things, duration without beginning or end*. Thus the elements of geometry are *eternal* truths ; as they depend not upon time or space, and can never change. So the obligation to love truth, holiness and righteousness, and to love God as the personification, and we may say, embodiment, of all true excellence, is *eternal* ; since they depend not upon time, place, or circumstances, and are attributes of Him who is unchangeably what he should be.

Of the just it is said they shall go into *everlasting* life, and of the wicked they shall go away into *everlasting* punishment. As this is uttered in the same sentence (Matt. 25 : 46), so both states must be deemed of equal duration. Both must exist during the life of those who are subjects of them ; if they be awarded in the future world, (as all, except a few presumers lately sprung up, have ever held), they must exist while that world endures. Since in that world the kingdom of Christ shall become merged in that of God, as all in all, (1 Cor. 15 : 24), so those states must endure with the duration of that kingdom.

There can therefore be no ground whatever for a religious life, unless there be an immortal state, and the retributions of that life must be final and eternal. As to all surmise of another probationary period beyond the grave to any portion of the race, if such scholars as Tholuck, while wishing to find it so, acknowledge they cannot find it in the Scriptures, we may well be excused if we can find no evidence of a satisfactory kind in the Divine Word to establish aught that looks like affirming that the dead have any more "a portion among the things that are done under the sun ;" of which the most important to us all is, to "seek the Lord while he may be found," that we may find pardon and life. Paul evidently knew nothing of all this, though he had been caught up into Paradise, and there heard "unspeakable words ;" for he affirms that "the things that are seen are *temporal*, but the things that are not seen are (*αίωρια*) *eternal*." II Cor. 4 : 18. Neither have we a single uninspired voice of the ancient and true church, nor of any claiming apostolic authority in early times, to hold forth any other view. For as to Origen and a few others in times long after the apostles, there is no clear evidence that they doubted the eternity of God's retributions ; and it is not claimed by any that they taught *openly* such doctrines as men of inferior scholarship infer from *hearsay* that they held in *secret*, and drew from the dreams

of Plato concerning the metempsychosis; by which they would have bad men subjected to alternations of good and ill forever.

But do we affirm that the souls and bodies of the resurrection world shall exist, and be pained or comforted so long as God exists? To this we would reply, (as Watts has done before), We know not that creatures shall exist so long. Eternity is an abyss too awful to be comprehended, or steadily contemplated by finite minds. God has not declared it in so many words; though the Church has always so received what he has taught concerning the immortality of soul and body beyond the grave. In no known religion is the soul held as perishable, or the beatific vision less than eternal to the just. Far be from us then the presumption to set limits to that of which we know so little; or for any regard to such as wilfully destroy themselves, to call in question the immortality of man, or for any cause deny that the belief of men in an immortal state of rewards and punishments is fundamental to all religion, and old as the world.

A certain class of writers indeed have imagined that they find more certainty of eternal duration in words of another class than in those we have considered. Thus they will have *עוֹלָם* to denote absolute eternity to God; while in reality it is (according to the best authorities) originally *עוֹלָם* *he is*, or *he shall be*; and when he speaks of himself to Moses, he uses only the first person of a kindred verb, (*אֲנִי*) *I am*, or *I will be*. So that this word derives its sense of eternal existence only from conventional usage; and because it is taken for his name *who is*, i. e., he who exists in himself and not in another.

Again they conclude that such words as *incorruptible, unfading, immovable, indissoluble, unchangeable*, (*ἀφθαρτος, ἀμάρτανος, ἀμάρτανος, ἀσάλευτος, ἀκαταλυστος, ἀπαράβατος*,) and the like, may be more certainly taken to signify what is eternal than *עוֹלָם*, *אֵל*, and their correlates. In this, however, they are not sustained by any known usage; neither have they much confidence in their own affirmations. For Luke describes the prow of a ship as becoming *immovable* (*ἀσάλευτος*) when it grounded upon the Maltese reefs. Acts 27: 41. And Paul speaks of *endless* genealogies, (*γενεαλογίαι ἀνέπαντος*) i. e. *useless, or worthless, things that are to no end*. I Tim. 1: 4. So Dionysius of Halicarnassus speaks of the *indissoluble* power of a proconsulship, (*ἀκαταλυστον κρείτος τῆς ἐπαρχίας*). Ant. 10: 31. Paul also uses *ἀφθορία* for *sincerity*, or *purity*. Eph. 6: 24. Its cognate *ἀφθομία* or *ἀδιαφθορία* is used for *integrity*. Tit. 2: 7. In early editions we have *αφθαροσία*. 'Αμάρτανος is also the name of a plant; (as the houseleek is called *ἀειζωον*;) and from the custom among a pastoral people of crowning with evergreens such as distinguished themselves for anything excellent in connection with their calling, we hear an apostle affirm that



"when the chief shepherd shall appear," they that have used well the office of a pastor shall be rewarded with an amaranthine crown of glory, (*ἀμαράντινον τῆς δόξης στέφανον*), i. e. the honor of an evergreen crown. As to *ἀνάρπατος* we find it applied to laws, oracles, etc., in the sense of *inviolable*, i. e. not *transgressed*, *observed*. See Epict. Enchir. 50, 2. Plut de Fato 1, and Def. of Orac. 3. Joseph. Ant. 18: 8, 2. In the New Testament it is taken for what is not transient; or, (as Theophylact renders it), *ἀδιόδοτος*, *untransferable*.

But if these words must be taken by Scripture usage for what is *eternal*, (which we do not admit without qualification) then also must hell be *eternal*, for it is represented under the figure of an *unquenchable fire*, (*τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἀσβεστον*) and worms that *never end life*, (*ὁ σκόληξ αὐτῶν οὐ τελευτᾷ*) Mark 9: 44 et al.

Still that there are some set terms taken by all usage as denoting what is everlasting and final there can be no doubt. Of this class are the reduplicated and intensive forms, met in the New Testament. These seem borrowed from the temple service, and are said to have been introduced into that service for this end, not far from the coming of Christ. For at the close of all prayers in the temple, it was customary to say עולם ועד, forever. But when the Sadducees arose, and said there was but one עולם, or world, then it was ordered to be said עולם ועד ועד עולם, from age to age, or forever and ever. i. q. עולם ועד Ex. 15: 18; and al. עולם ועד Isa. 45: 17. See also 1 Chron. 16: 36; 29: 10; Dan. 2: 20; Neh. 9: 5; Ps. 111: 8; and 148: 6; Isa. 30: 8; Dan. 7: 18; Jer. 7: 7; and 25: 5; Ps. 90: 2; and al. For as in the New Testament we have αἰὼν ὁ μελλών for the life to come, as well as for the times of Christ; (Cf. Matt. 12: 32; Mark, 10: 30; Luke 17: 30; 1 Cor. 10: 11; Eph. 1: 21; Heb. 2: 5; and 6: 4; a usage well known to the ancient Hebrews, and to this day common through all the Christian world. We have also ὁ αἰὼν τοῦ αἰῶνος, *the age of ages*; or οἱ αἰῶνες τῶν αἰώνων, *the age of ages*, i. e. a period containing all worlds and all ages, even the eternal time of all things; and this, according to New Testament usage, can signify nothing less than what is eternal in duration. Thus: Heb. 1: 8; Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, in Heb. עולם ועד, Ps. 45: 7; To whom be glory forever and ever, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Galatians 1: 5; see also Phil. 4: 20; 1 Tim. 1: 17; 2 Tim. 4: 18; Heb. 13: 21; Rev. 4: 9, 10, 10: 6; 15: 7; 5: 13; 7: 12; 11: 15; 22: 5; 14: 11; 19: 3; 20: 10. These three last express the duration of hell in the punishment of Satan, the beast, and the false prophet, the great fornicatrix Babylon, and such as wore their livery. Hence that punishment is declared to be as eternal as heaven is to the saints. In Eph. 3: 21, we have the singular expression, "until all periods of the

age of ages," *εις πάσας τὰς γενεάς τοῦ αἰῶνος τῶν αἰώνων*, a phrase, however, of similar import with the others; as it represents eternal futurity by the figure of successive generations, ages, or periods of time, and that, as already observed, constitutes the only method we have or can invent by which we can represent to ourselves infinite duration.

There are other words occasionally used to denote eternal or unchangeable duration. Thus it is said that Christ hath perfected forever, (*εις τὸ διηνεκές*) the saints;" Heb. 10: 14; and that "he is able to save (*εις τὸ παντελές*) to completeness, or to the uttermost all that come to God through him, since he ever (*πάντοτε*) liveth to make intercession for them." Heb. 7: 25. So in the Hebrew we are told that eternal life is "length of days evermore." *אֵלֶּיךָ וְעַד*, Ps. 21: 4 (5). But these are less adapted to denote eternity than *עוֹלָם*, *עַד*, *נֶצַח*, *אֵלֶּיךָ*, and their correlates, and hence are used but seldom in the Scriptures, while the latter are found in common use throughout the sacred text.

Thus much for a brief view of Scripture imagery concerning immortality and a life to come. That the doctrine of eternal punishment, and the soul's immortality that involves it, should both be questioned, we need not wonder; since "the natural man receiveth not the things of God's Spirit." What is sin in his eyes, that it should deserve eternal pains? What to him are the laws of God that only work wrath to him, while they lay the curb to his lusts? What to him is the beauty of holiness, or the glory of truth, that he should care for either, so long as he prefers what delights he can wring out from the dullest clods and grossest impurities of the world, before the fruition of God and the never-ending joys of the beatific vision? In such a world as ours, and among a race so depraved, the miracle is not that an eternal state of being, involving as it does sin and pain, should find questioners to rail at, or pervert the Scriptures because they repeat to us the voice of the ancient church, and the Angel of the Covenant that warns to flee from the wrath to come, and lay hold of eternal life, as a divine and gracious gift from the Father of our spirits; but rather that it should be received at all, and be found of least efficacy in ministering to personal sanctity by alarming us from the dreams of sin to find true rest for our spirits in the peace of God that passeth understanding; and that we should be drawn thence to take up and repeat the warnings, no less than the invitations, of God's Word, saying to the penitent, "*it shall be well with him, for they shall eat the fruit of their doings;*" and to the impenitent, "*it shall be ill with him, for the reward of his hands shall be given him.*"

## ARTICLE IV.

THE GOSPEL OF JOHN, AS INDICATING THE STATE OF  
THE CHRISTIAN SENTIMENT OF ITS TIMES.

Translated from the German of Baur, by ALFRED H. GUNANSEY, New York.

[FERDINAND CHRISTIAN BAUR, born in 1792, and since 1826, Professor-Ordinary of Theology in the University of Tübingen, deservedly occupies a high place among the latest German theologians. His labors have taken a historical or historico-critical direction; and in them he has manifested an extraordinary power of analysis and combination exerted upon a full survey of all the materials belonging to his subject. Among his numerous productions may be specified an essay on the "Christ-Party in the Church of Corinth," published in the "Tübinger Quartalschrift, für Theologie," in which he demonstrates that the apostle Peter never was at Rome, and, consequently, that the pope can in no sense be the successor of Peter. Other important questions bearing upon Catholicism he satisfactorily disposes of in his "Apollonius of Tyana and Christ, or, the Relations of Pythagoreanism and Christianity." On the other hand, he is no less opposed to the school of Hengstenberg than to Catholicism. In several works, among which are "Symbolism and Mythology, or, the Natural Religion of Antiquity;" "The Manichæan System;" "The Christian Gnosis, or, the Christian Philosophy of Religion in its Historical Development;" "The Christianity of Platonism, or, Socrates and Christ," he endeavors to develop and support the doctrine, that the history of religions is, throughout, but the history of God in the finite, and that all forms of belief are but phases in the development of the original idea of religion. Baur originally took his stand on the philosophy of Schleiermacher, and his work on the Natural Religion of Antiquity, may be considered as but an amplification of some hints thrown out in Schleiermacher's "Einleitung zur Glaubenslehre." In this work Baur displays so much eloquence and vigor of thought, that he may be regarded as the successor to his master's genius. The critical labors of Baur extend over the whole New Testament canon. The extract herewith given is from his latest work, entitled, "Critical Researches concerning the Canonical Gospels, their Relation to each other, their Character and Origin." All commentators have remarked the striking affinity, which, notwithstanding many diversities, exists between the first three Gospels; and the no less striking diversity between them and the Gospel of John. This diversity, as far as the exterior of the Gospels is concerned, relates to the questions of time and place, and is so great as to make it evident that in one, at least, the order of time has not been followed. Most commentators have followed the chronology of John, in their attempts at harmonizing the gospel narratives. Baur adopts the contrary view. He groups together the three Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, under the name of the *Synoptical Gospels*, and supposes them to be composed with a prevailing historical aim; while the Gospel of John he supposes to be composed with a metaphysical and dogmatical view; with the design not so much to relate actual events, as to set forth the nature of Christianity in its highest stage of development. It is an ideal rather than an actual narrative. He furthermore holds that it is not the composition of the apostle to whom it is attributed, but is in all respects an anonymous work, and he further considers the last chapter of it to be spurious. This, in brief, is the standpoint from which he surveys the Gospels. Affirming to the irreconcilable contradictions between these Gospels, and denying the authenticity of the last, which yet is the exponent of Christianity in its highest form—higher even than that set forth by the

apostle Paul—it is clear that he cannot admit of the inspiration of our canon, in any sense which we should admit to be answerable to the term. With these views he of course treats the Scriptures precisely as he would any other work under discussion, applying the same tests, and using the same liberty of comment. It is needless to say that this is not the standpoint of the Biblical Repository; and that, so far, it has no sympathy with the prevailing school of German commentators. But it cannot be denied, that from this standpoint some of the most acute and far-seeing surveys have been made into the domains of Biblical knowledge. What then shall be done? We may ignore all the labors of German scholarship. We may in lexicography refuse the aid of Gesenius, because of his “Neology,” and cling to Parkhurst; we may refuse, for the same reason, to avail ourselves of the labors of De Wette, Rosenmüller, and Baur, resting content with Scott, Henry, and Clarke. If we do not think this the wiser course, it only remains to take the Germans as they are; avail ourselves of their labors, and avoid their errors. Yet in all things evil there is a germ of good. Truth is so many-sided that if it be only looked at, even from a false standpoint, some new views must be obtained; and we have only to be careful not to adopt as true, views whose seeming truth arises from being gained from an erroneous point of observation. If a number of observers, from stations so widely apart from ours as that occupied by the German commentators, see precisely the same things that we do from ours, it surely is a strong corroborative argument for that view being correct. It would seem, for instance, that a Trinitarian, if he needed confirmation in his belief that the Gospel of John teaches the divinity of Christ, would receive it when he learned that a writer of the acuteness of Baur, looking at that Gospel from a point the whole diameter of its orbit distant from his own, should yet pronounce that the setting forth of this doctrine is the great object of the evangelist. An author like Baur is under no temptation to wrest the Scriptures for support to a favorite doctrine; for if they conflict with his views, he regards their teaching as incomplete or erroneous. He who believes a certain doctrine to be true; and also holds that the Scriptures teach all truth infallibly, lies under the danger of assuming that the given doctrine must be contained in them; and of searching the Scriptures for proof for his view, rather than to discover what they really teach. The error of the Germans may serve to detect our own opposite error; or, if our view accord with theirs on the teaching of the Bible on any point, it may convince us that we have not fallen into that error. On the whole, then, it seems to admit of no question that, as interpreters of such a school do exist, and as they bring into the support of their views those high resources of scholarship and talent, which cannot fail to produce many valuable results, the theological literature of our country cannot without loss to itself refuse to take cognizance of their labors.—TRANSLATOR.]

In the discourses of Jesus, as found in the Gospel of John, as we have shown, the high absolute importance which the evangelist ascribes to the person of Jesus, and which is expressed in the idea of the Logos, comes forth with all the energy of a consciousness filled with it. It is just this importance given to the person of Jesus which marks the position of this Gospel in the progressive development of the Christian sentiment of primitive times.

In the books of the New Testament canon, if we overlook the intermediary transitions, there may on the whole be distinguished three types of Christian doctrine, three principal forms of religious sentiment, which constitute so many stages in the progress of the development of that sentiment. The first of these forms is repre-

sented in the synoptic Gospels, and in those books of the New Testament cognate with them. Here we see that phase of Christianity which stands nighest to Judaism, is the most closely connected with it, and was the earliest to break away from it, and assume an independent significance of its own. Here the absolute significance of Christianity is this; that it is the Law spiritualized and made universal, with the new covenant of the forgiveness of sin, which Jesus, as the Messiah or the Son of God in the higher Messianic sense, had established through his death. The Epistles of Paul present the second form, in the contrast of the Law and the Gospel, and in the significance, higher than the synoptic conception of the Messiah or Son of God, which the ascended Christ has, as the object of faith in the Pauline sense, or as Lord of the church.

The Gospel of John raises itself above this form also; transcending even the doctrinal system of the minor Pauline Epistles, it presents Jesus, as the subject of the evangelical history, absolutely identical with the Logos, who was from eternity with God, and who himself was God. In the Pauline standpoint we have the nearest measure for that of John. The relation between these two standpoints may be thus defined:—That in the relations of men to God, which with Paul is the harmonizing of opposites, only effected by struggle and contest, is with John the repose of a unity lying above these opposites; and that in respect of the person of Christ, which with Paul is always a human-divine relation, is with John one absolutely divine. The chief opposition with which the Pauline system is concerned, is that which is developed in the theocratic history of the Jewish people, or of the old covenant, between the Law, or sin attaining its full power by means of the Law, and the grace of God in the gospel, forgiving sin, and doing away with it:—or, as far as the seat of sin is in the flesh, the anthropologic contest between the flesh and the spirit. Involved in this opposition, man can only attain the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin by faith in Christ, as the object of faith, who suffered and died for the sins of the world, and himself became sin and the curse of the law. By this faith man is justified before God, and becomes thereby one with Christ, so that he accomplishes in himself the same process of victory over sin, the slaying of its power, and enfranchisement from the Law, which constitute what is essential in the atoning death of Christ. And the chief significance of the person of Christ, consists in the fact that he has this significance for faith in him; or that he is the Son of God who died for the sins of the world, reconciling the world with God by his death; with which is intimately connected, that as having died and risen again, and now raised to the right hand of God, or ruling with the power of God, he is Lord of the church. Yet in his divine power and dignity he is essentially human. He is the

second or heavenly man, in contradistinction to the first or earthly; or, as the principle of sin, done away with through his death, is properly the flesh (*σάρξ*), in opposition to the spirit (*πνεῦμα*), he is the spiritual man, who, in distinction from the earthly has in himself the quickening spirit (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν*), or spirit of holiness (*πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης*).

If we compare the Pauline system in this respect with those two fundamental ideas of the synoptic standpoint—the fulfillment of the law in the gospel, and the forgiveness of sin subjoined to the law—it may be easily perceived, that this system is only the harmonizing development of those two opposing ideas, hitherto unharmonized. As soon as the forgiveness of sin and enfranchisement from the power of the law came to be considered in their more definite import, they could only be conceived of as a process of reconciliation accomplished in the death of Jesus; and the higher was the representation of the death of Jesus, and of the work of reconciliation fulfilled by it, in the same proportion must the importance of the person of Christ become greater. But nevertheless, as long as the ascending way, so to speak, from below upwards to the Divine power and dignity of Christ was followed, and the Divine in him, in its ultimate relations, could thus be considered as an accident subjoined to his substantial human nature—beyond which we are not justified in going by the undoubtedly authentic epistles of Paul—so long the Christian sentiment had not as yet attained its ultimate point. The Pauline Christ, in every stage of the conception, is but the man Christ Jesus, raised to the Divine dignity. Christ is essentially man, since even as coming from heaven, he is called at the same time man (1 Cor. 15: 47). It remains for this way, ascending from the finite to the absolute, to substitute the other way wherein the consideration proceeds from above downwards, and where the substantial thing in the person of Christ is not the human, but that which is in itself divine—is the *Logos*, identical with the absolute being of God. From this standpoint the whole aspect of the essential nature of Christianity becomes changed. The first and essential thing in Christianity is then, not that self-completing process—objective in the atoning death, subjective in the faith in its atoning power—a process rendered necessary by the power of the law and of sin, and succeeding through such stern opposition; but the very essence of Christianity is the revelation of the glory of God in the only-begotten of the Father, the fullness of the Father's grace and truth contained in the Incarnate One, in which everything incomplete, finite, and negative pertaining to the law given by Moses, is absolutely abolished. The manifestation of the only-begotten Son is itself the absolute working out of salvation, the immediate impartation to humanity of the Divine nature. The *Logos*, as the principle of light and life, entering into this contest between light and dark-

ness, attracts, as kindred to himself, all who by faith in him become children of God; and this union with him in faith, which as such is also a doing (*ποιεῖν ἀλήθειαν*, iii. 21), comprehends in itself simply everything which from the Pauline standpoint can only be conceived of as an opposition, only to be reconciled by a series of various crises. In short:—That which from the anthropologic standpoint of Paul, is the ever-deepening contest in the subjective consciousness of the individual, between the flesh and the spirit, the law and grace is from the metaphysical standpoint of John, the objective contest of the two principles, embracing the physical and moral world, of light and darkness, and the process of the *Logos* glorifying himself in conflict with the unbelief of the world, and in this very glorification bringing all back to absolute oneness with himself.

Whatever may be thought of the objective relations of these various standpoints, it is at least certain that the developed sentiment of John could have the Pauline standpoint only as its preparative. From the Pauline standpoint only could one proceed to that of John, but could not, on the contrary, turn back to the former from the latter. The Gospel of John must therefore belong to a period when an advance had been made beyond the Pauline form of Christianity. The same thing is shown by the relations which in this Gospel Christianity sustains to Judaism and Gentilism. According to the principal passage bearing upon this point—"Ye worship ye know not what, we know what we worship, for salvation is of the Jews," 4 : 22)—Judaism has indeed this absolute advantage over Gentilism, that its worship was one of knowledge, that is, it was directed toward the true object of the religious sentiment; while that of the Gentiles—to which in this passage the Samaritan is equivalent—was in relation to its object, an erring and ignorant worship. If, as is said in 17 : 3, it be eternal life that men should know the only true God, then had the Jewish people alone the absolute truth. Therefore the Messianic salvation could come from the Jews only (4 : 22); from them only could come the Messiah, who should be the Redeemer of the world (4 : 42). With the knowledge of the true God is therefore connected in the Old Testament a continual prophecy of and reference to him who should be sent from the only true God as the Redeemer of the world. Moses had written of the Messiah: "Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me; for he wrote of me."—5 : 46. In the writings of the prophets, the theme is the Messianic period: "It is written in the prophets, And they shall all be taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me."—6 : 45. Abraham rejoiced to see the day of the Messiah (8 : 52), and Isaiah, in the vision of his glory, prophesied of him (2 : 41). The Old Testament religion is shown to be the true one, because in the most

important points of the evangelical history, that only was fulfilled which had been in part expressly foretold, and in part typically represented in the Old Testament.<sup>1</sup>

The Judaism of the Old Testament thus indeed stands in the most intimate relation to Christianity. But the Gentiles have also a certain share in that light of the Logos which in the beginning shone in the darkness. For that light which came into the world before the Logos became flesh, lighted every man (1: 9); and when the evangelist with special emphasis (11: 52) declares that Jesus was not to die merely for the Jewish people, but that by his death he should also unite in one whole the scattered children of God, he presents these scattered children of God as being also in the Gentile world. The greater was the unbelief of the Jews, and the less therefore the object of the efforts of Jesus could be attained among them, so much the more must its accomplishment come to pass in the Gentile world, in which there was also a greater susceptibility for the word of God and for faith in Jesus, than among the Jews; and the evangelist actually in several passages distinguishes the Gentiles in this respect above the Jews.

This equal adaptation and capacity of the Gentiles for participation in the Messianic salvation, is with the evangelist a long-settled matter; a question which is no longer, as in the epistles of Paul, an occasion of contest, and of eager discussion, bringing into play all the feelings of the time. It is a question which has been answered by the fact that there was a Christian church, consisting of Jews and Gentiles, united in one whole. The evangelist repeatedly adduces this oneness of a Christian church, consisting of various elements, and considers it as something which could

<sup>1</sup> "And his disciples remembered that it was written, The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up."—2: 17. "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up."—3: 14. "Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Moses gave you not that bread from heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven."—6: 32. "He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow fountains of living water. But this he spake of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive, for the Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified."—7: 38, 39. "And Jesus, when he had found a young ass, sat thereon; as it is written, Fear not, daughter of Sion: because thy King cometh, sitting on an ass's colt." . . . "That the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed? Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory and spake of him."—12: 14, 15; 38—40. "After this, Jesus knowing that all things were now accomplished, that the Scripture might be fulfilled, saith, I thirst." . . . "That the Scripture should be fulfilled, A bone of him shall not be broken. And again another Scripture saith, They shall look on him whom they have pierced."—10: 36, 37.



only be effected by the death of Christ, considered as a publicly displayed signal, which should attract the observation of all men, in order to their believing in him ; or as the condition upon which his earthly existence, as it were the germ of a plant springing from him, might become the foundation of a community waxing greater and greater.<sup>1</sup> This would seem to prove that he saw this unity as a thing already realized before him. The evangelist could not herein so definitely perceive the immediate result of the death of Jesus—in 18 : 15, 16, with the laying down his life for the sheep, is immediately connected his bringing the other sheep which are not of this fold, that there might be one fold)—unless at the time when he wrote his Gospel, that death had actually produced this effect. As only in the unity of a Christian church, consisting indifferently of Jews and Gentiles, the evangelist could see the accomplishment of the object of the manifestation and labors of Jesus ; and as he must, in the accomplishment of this object, assign to the Gentiles a share the more important in proportion to the negative attitude which the Jews, in their unbelief—the portrayal of which forms the main theme of this Gospel—maintained toward this object ; so does that perfectly free position which the evangelist holds with respect to Judaism constitute one of his peculiar characteristics, and indicates a time in which Christianity, in its course of development, had overpassed the contradictions of the earlier period. Judaism already stands in the far distance, and everything positive which it has, as the Sabbath and circumcision, from the point of view where the evangelist stands, has become completely indifferent ;<sup>2</sup> and of the Mosaic Law itself he speaks most decisively, as of something which pertained only to the Jews, and which they only could call their own.<sup>3</sup> The evangelist, as

<sup>1</sup> "And this he spake not of himself : but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation ; and not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad."—1 : 51, 52. "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me. This he said signifying what death he should die."—1 : 32, 33. "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up : that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life."—3 : 14, 15. "The hour is come that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone ; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."—12 : 23, 24.

<sup>2</sup> "Jesus answered and said unto them, I have done one work, and ye marvel. Moses therefore gave unto you circumcision, (not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers ;) and ye on the Sabbath-day circumcise a man. If a man on the Sabbath-day receive circumcision, that the law of Moses should not be broken ; are ye angry at me because I have made a man every whit whole on the Sabbath-day ?"—7 : 21—23.

<sup>3</sup> "It is also written in your law, that the testimony of two men is true."—3 : 17. "Jesus answered them, Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods ?"—10 : 34.

well as the apostle Paul, does not overlook the higher inward signification of the Old Testament, nor the prior claim which the Jews might make on the Messianic salvation: they are the *idiot* his own, to whom the Logos came (1: 11); but it is equally evident to him that by the unbelief of the Jews, which had now become an established historical fact, the Gentiles had actually entered into the same right of possession. Thus we have precisely the Pauline view of the relations of Judaism to Christianity, only that here it does not appear as one which must be made good by contest and debate; but it has actually wrought itself out into objective reality, in the existence of a Christian church consisting of Jews and Gentiles. Christianity has now taken its place in its absolute significance above Judaism and Gentilism. In the words of Jesus (4: 21), that the hour had already come, when the Father should be worshiped neither on Mount Gerizim nor yet in Jerusalem, but that the true worshipers of God were they who worshiped him in spirit and in truth, the evangelist has given utterance to the sentiment of his own time. It has already become to him a historical truth, that both Judaism and Gentilism could stand but in the same negative relation to Christianity, as the only true religion; and that therefore both Jews and Gentiles had a like rightful portion in the Messianic salvation wrought out in the Christian church, so as, in the unity of the whole, to constitute the one flock under the One Shepherd.

In respect to the relations of the evangelist to Judaism, the peculiarity is worthy of note, that the standing name by which in this Gospel the opponents of Jesus are denoted, to how different classes soever they may belong, is "the Jews." There is no uniformity in this use, and therefore no limitation, no specification. There are passages where it would seem that the expression can only designate the members of the Sanhedrim; and others, again, where it is used interchangeably with "the Pharisees," whom the evangelist sometimes distinguishes from "the rulers." Then there are other passages where it can only signify the inhabitants of the capital, the evangelist marking a distinction between them and the "rulers." And finally "the Jews" seems to be interchanged with "the multitude," to whom, again, the name sometimes stands opposed. This designation is selected for all the opponents of Jesus, come they whence they may; whether they actually set themselves against him, or disputed with him. In Galilee as well as at Jerusalem, on the shores of the sea of Tiberias as well as in the temple, it was "the Jews" with whom Jesus had to do. He is the one, and they the other moral person, represented as speaking or acting. By the Synoptists, on the contrary, this designation is never used for any who might be the opponents of Jesus; they mark them out definitely and specially; it is with John only that

all possible opponents are comprehended under the one name, "the Jews."

It is believed that this fact—as also the characteristic of these opponents, answering to this name, in which concur all the individual qualities of the Jews, and all the separate motives of their opposition to Jesus in this one, that they did not believe in him, that their fundamental characteristic was unbelief—can only be rightly explained by the peculiarity of this Gospel as a whole, by its plan and object:—that its object, namely, to set forth the revelation of the glory of the incarnate Logos, could only be attained by means of contrast. And it is further believed, that this fluctuating, general use of the term "the Jews," to denote all the opponents of Jesus, taken in connection with the universal tendency to set forth the Jewish people in the mass as unbelieving, would seem to point out the later Gentile-Christian standpoint from which this Gospel has been composed:—that an eye-witness, a native of Palestine, one familiar with the domestic affairs of the nation, an acquaintance, moreover, of the high priest, would not have expressed himself so indeterminately:—that it does not elsewhere occur that this designation denotes the rulers or other separate parties of the Jews:—that the expression betrays rather the subsequent original observation of a distant time, and is, as far as it goes, an argument against the authenticity of the Gospel.

In this designation of the Jews are undoubtedly concentrated all the peculiarities of this Gospel; but from this name it only follows, when this peculiarity is considered by itself, that the author of this Gospel, be he who he may, composed the evangelical history which is the subject of his representation, not from a purely historical, but rather from a higher religious or dogmatic point of view. As he had before his eyes, as an established historical fact, the great contrast in which Judaism stood to Christianity, he carried it over to his evangelical history, and therefore denoted those opponents of Jesus, whom the Synoptists, living in the actual survey of the circumstances, designated by the special historical names of Scribes, Pharisees, and the like—by the general name of "the Jews;" in order by that name to trace back to its first beginning and cause, that, opposition as it subsequently developed itself; and to set forth the entire relation of Judaism to Christianity, from a general point of view rendered necessary by a wider survey. But that he should survey the historical relations of his time from this point of view; that, notwithstanding the Christian church contained in itself a considerable Jewish-Christian element, the complete breach between Judaism and Christianity should appear to him as a fact accomplished, could be possible only from the standpoint of an author who had not merely adopted the Pauline view of the relations of Judaism to Christianity, but had further developed himself in an independent spirit, and had pressed forward to the full per-

ception of the absolute idea of Christianity. So little with him is Christ the Son of David (*ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Δαβὶδ*, Rom. 1 : 3,) that he seems to reckon his birth at Bethlehem among the Jewish fictions.<sup>1</sup> In place of the Jewish genealogies, with him appears the universal humanity of the *σὰρξ γένεσθαι* of the Logos. Only in the scene of the entry into Jerusalem, does he bring forward prominently anything of a Messianic character, in the manner in which it is represented by the Synoptists; but this is with him but a new point in the testimony which the Jews in their unbelief, bear against themselves. If they, after the immediately preceding miracle of the raising of Lazarus—with which the entry into Jerusalem, and especially the following catastrophe stand in such close connection—could so little resist the impression of the divine dignity of Jesus, that they offered homage to him as the Messiah, it could be only a new proof of the overmastering, the irradicable power of their unbelief, that they would not, nevertheless, recognize him as the Messiah. What Jesus did and suffered to take place in respect to him of a Messianic character, is according to the representation of the evangelist, only an accommodation on his part, in order to take away from the Jews that pretext for their unbelief, that they could not believe on him on account of his lacking the Jewish criteria of the Messiahship.<sup>2</sup> But for the evangelist himself, and from his standpoint, everything Jewish has so little of a permanent and important significance, that as his idea of the death of Jesus shows, he looks upon the whole Old Testament as a period of religious history already accomplished, and therefore past away as far as relates to the Christian idea.

When we consider the great authority which the apostle Peter was for the Jewish-Christian portion of the Christian church, we shall not be surprised to find that an author who, on the question

<sup>1</sup> "Others said, This is the Christ. But some said, Shall Christ come out of Galilee? Hath not the Scripture said, That Christ cometh of the seed of David, and out of the town of Bethlehem, where David was?"—7: 40, 41.

<sup>2</sup> In this respect it is remarkable, that while with Matthew (21 : 1 sq.) the entrance into Jerusalem was a transaction carefully provided for by Jesus himself, as essential to the Messiahship, John (12 : 9 sq.), on the contrary makes of the scene only a ceremony transacted by the Jews, which Jesus, after the people had commenced the movement, made use of, in order not to be found wanting in this prophetically announced criterion of the Messiahship. We cannot here infer a different transaction from this difference in the narrative, and suppose as Schleiermacher does, a double entry. Strauss has shown the impossibility of this supposition (ii. 301 sq.) It is strange that the disciples only should not have known the Messianic nature of the transaction. But the remark of the evangelist in verse 16, parallel to the passage 2 : 22, should be thus understood: After the death of Jesus, the Messianic relation of what had taken place was first clear to them, for they then first comprehended it in the true sense, and perceived how it was to be taken; that an earthly king was no more to be imagined, than was an earthly temple in 2 : 19. They first attained a true knowledge, when they had thrown aside everything Jewish, and learned to apprehend it in its mere typical import.

as to the relation of Judaism to Christianity, had so decisively adopted that view where he could not stand without holding to the principles which had first been made good by the apostle Paul, should not leave this point of the historical circumstances of his time altogether untouched. If we may consider chapter xxi. to be genuine, this was done by the evangelist in a very significant manner. For however obscure it may be, how the tarrying of the disciple until the coming of the Lord (ver. 22 sq.) is to be understood, this much is plainly to be seen, that to the apostle Peter's glory of martyrdom is opposed some other distinguishing advantage belonging to the apostle John. Were it the express will of the Lord that he should tarry till He came, he was thereby raised above the requisition which might be made on him in respect of that martyrdom, and could in no wise be set below those apostles whose name, like that of Peter, shone in all the glory of a martyr's death. If he were the survivor of the apostles—the only remaining disciple—yet only so because he was awaiting the Lord—this would be a distinction peculiar to him, which would place him the higher, the less he shared it with others. He was the disciple, who, as the awaiter of the coming of the Lord, should not die. The correction, in verse 23, in respect of the saying which went abroad respecting the apostle John, only shows that the *οὐκ ἀποθνήσκειν* was a too positive interpretation given to the words of the Lord; but it says nothing of an actual dying. It is not said that he was actually dead nor that it was appointed for him also to die. He thus remains the disciple of whose death no one has anything to say—of which no one might speak—in whose name, as well as in whose Gospel, death was lost in life. This was unquestionably a decisive preference of the apostle John over even Peter; and the care which was taken thus to specify it, could only be caused by the wish, in the contest with the Jewish-Christian party, whose chief authority was the apostle Peter, to maintain at least an equal authority for their own apostle John. But as we consider chapter xxi. as an addition subsequently appended, we see indeed, in this parallel between John and Peter, how deep an interest was felt by the party which was based upon the principles of the Gospel of John; but this would seem to leave no connection with that Gospel itself.

But what is remarkable is, that in the last chapter a tendency is only more decidedly expressed, which can scarcely have been overlooked in several passages of the Gospel itself. Strauss was the first to point out that the fourth Gospel, in the relation in which John and Peter stand to each other, manifests a sort of premeditation; that in some places, in a peculiar manner, it endeavors, if not to place John before Peter, at least to set him by his side. The fourth Gospel alone, by the standing designation of *ὁ μαθητὴς ὃν ἠγάπα* or *ἐφίλει ὁ Ἰησοῦς*—of which the Synoptists, with whom Peter

maintains the undoubted primacy, know not the least—distinguishes John, to whom beyond all doubt the designation refers, in some sense beyond all the others; and this confidential relation of the beloved disciple, appears in those instances where Peter was obliged to have recourse to the mediation of John:—as for example, when he could only learn through John, whom Jesus intended by what he said of the approaching betrayal (13: 24.) Peter himself must here have recognized his own less intimate relations with Jesus. It is indeed, as Strauss remarks, a merely external advantage, without any connection with any closer relations with Jesus, that according to the fourth Gospel alone, it is John who, as known to the high priest, procured for Peter access to the palace, when Jesus was detained there (18: 5); but with this stands immediately connected, that the Synoptists ascribe especially to Peter and not to John also, the zeal which impelled him to follow his imprisoned master. Here also belongs the circumstance, likewise noticed by Strauss, that the fourth Gospel places John beneath the cross of Jesus, where none of the disciples appear in the Synoptists; and that he is there placed in a relation to the mother of Jesus, of which the others make no mention. This selection could only be the result of the intimate relation in which John stood to Jesus; and from this relation the effort is everywhere visible, whenever an opportunity occurs of comparing the two disciples, that John shall at least not be deferred to Peter. The author of the gospel touches most strikingly upon this rivalry in the narration in chapter xx., where something is continually said of each of the two, which brings the one into comparison with the other. The two disciples go to the sepulchre together, but John outran Peter and came first to the sepulchre, stooping down into which he saw the clothes lying, yet without going in. Peter then, who came after John, went into the sepulchre, and examined the clothes more narrowly, for he saw that the napkin was not with the linen clothes, but was wrapped up in a place by itself. Then the other disciple who first came to the sepulchre went into it, and here he did only what Peter had done before him; but then it is said of him only, not of Peter, that as the result of this seeing—for the faith of the disciples at this time was one which required sight, not an intelligent one,—that he believed.<sup>1</sup> It is indeed true as Strauss remarks, that the distinctions belonging to Peter, as the honorable surname given to him by Jesus (1: 43), his undoubting confession (6: 68), are no more passed over in silence in the fourth Gospel than are his weakness, and the rebuke received by him in consequence from Jesus; but if we take in the mass that which refers to the peculiar relations of these two disciples to each other, it will appear that when this

<sup>1</sup> The passage, John 20: 4, 5, is one of those in which this Gospel most closely coincides with that of Luke (compare Luke 24: 12); but Luke speaks only of Peter, without saying anything of John.

thing and the other is ascribed to Peter, which tend to place him—although still at the head of the disciples—in a not exactly favorable light, it is John as the author of the fourth Gospel, who mentions it, while it is not found in the Synoptists. It is remarkable that while all the evangelists relate that at the apprehension of Jesus, one of his followers drew a sword, and cut off an ear of the servant of the high priest, it is only the fourth evangelist who records this action, of which Jesus disapproved, as having been committed by Peter. And not merely is this related (18: 10), but the evangelist returns to it, after minutely detailing Peter's three acts of denial, in order to make use of this transaction as an occasion—which in the connection in which it stands, as Strauss correctly remarks, seems so careful and deliberate that its purpose can not be mistaken—for fastening upon Peter that stroke of the sword. The hesitation of Peter (13: 8) to suffer his feet to be washed by Jesus, affords indeed a fine testimony of his devotion to Jesus, but manifests, nevertheless, but little capacity for rightly understanding the deeper meaning of this transaction. Just as little for his credit was it that his thrice repeated denial should be again brought to mind in a manner so humiliating for him, by the threefold question put by Jesus (21: 15 sq.). If in all this we see but corrections and amplifications of the synoptic narration, then must this Gospel stand in a relation somewhat similar to the synoptical Gospels. But how improbable is it that all these traces concerning Peter and John should have utterly disappeared from the synoptical traditions. Could this relation to Jesus of the beloved disciple have been so unimportant, that they should have given no hint of it? And yet how can we doubt of it, when John himself as author of the Gospel, informs us of it? Then the question becomes still more pressing, Was he really the author?

However this may be decided, the particularity with which the relation of these two disciples to each other is narrated in this Gospel remains the same, and the ground of it can only lie in the historical circumstances of the times in which the composition of the Gospel took place: in the high authority which the apostle Peter had in so great a part of the Christian church. What then shall we think to have been the special design of the author of this Gospel?—Perhaps just this: To bring into recognition that particular form of the Christian sentiment which is set forth in this Gospel of John. But how else could this be done but in contrast to the prevailing direction of the existing forms of the Christian sentiment—which were, in general, the Pauline and the Petrine—to place itself above which was the necessary tendency of a Gospel, in which the principle of the Christian sentiment assumed an absolute significance so widely different. What then is the beloved disciple, who lay in the Lord's bosom, the confidant of his inmost thoughts, in comparison with whom even Peter stood at a distance—what

other is he than the bearer of that form of the Christian sentiment which is expressed in his Gospel—of the absolute idea of Christianity, as it is adequately conceived and expressed in John's doctrine of the person of Christ? Why should it seem strange that in the position which John and Peter seem to stand toward each other, may be recognized the high significance which that form of the Christian sentiment represented by John had assumed in the historical relations of the time?

As Peter is the representative of the twelve apostles, the position which the evangelist gives himself in respect to Peter, points out the relations in which he placed himself towards the other apostles. This deserves, however, a somewhat closer consideration, in order to place what has been before remarked in a still clearer light. A contradiction, a polemic attitude, like that which we perceive in Luke, does not here manifest itself; but so much the more does the evangelist represent the entire degree of knowledge and spiritual capacity which the apostles had attained during the life of Jesus, as one so low and imperfect, that it stands at an infinite distance from that standpoint, from which he looks back upon this earlier period. Here belong the texts in which the evangelist expressly affirms that the disciples did not at first understand the true and proper sense of what was said and done by Jesus; but only subsequently, after his death and resurrection. (Compare 2: 22.) After his resurrection the disciples remembered what he had said (verse 19), and then for the first time understood his meaning, and then believed the Scripture and the word of Jesus. So also (12: 16) the disciples did not at first understand the Messianic import of what occurred at the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem; but after he was glorified, it is added, then they remembered that these things were written of him, and that they had done these things unto him. Of the numerous misunderstandings of the words of Jesus, of the so often inept questions which they put to him, how many are laid to the charge of the disciples. (Compare 4: 31 sq.; 5: 5 sq.; 11: 8 sq., 16). The last discourse of Jesus to his disciples, especially, contains proofs of how little able were they to comprehend his meaning, and the evangelist seems to have taken pains to make their spiritual incapacity manifest. How unappreciative is that question of Thomas, "Lord, we know not whither thou goest, and how can we know the way?" (14: 5). How incomprehensible is the demand made by Philip, "Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us" (verse 8). How humiliating to the disciples the reply of Jesus, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip?" (verse 9; compare also 14: 23; 16: 17, 29). At so imperfect a stage of their spiritual life the disciples at that time found themselves, because they had not yet received the Spirit, which Spirit could only come after the glorification of Jesus (7: 39). The whole



scope of the parting discourse goes to indicate a period when the Spirit imparted to the disciples had raised them to quite another stage of knowledge and of spiritual sentiment. But the greater is the difference between this later and that earlier period: the greater is the more everything which raises the Christian sentiment to that higher standpoint, belongs to a period subsequent to the earthly life of Jesus; at so much greater distance does the evangelist stand from that Jewish view which would have the entire capability for the apostolical office conjoined to the earthly life of Jesus, and to the converse of the disciples with their immediately present Lord. Judaism took its stand on the personality of single individuals as conductors of the whole; on the apostles, and of these especially, on the apostle Peter. From opposition to this view arises the gentle irony of the evangelist towards the apostle Peter. In his view the Spirit, as the universal principle of the Christian faith and life, stands above the personal in the apostles; and the greater is the fullness of that spiritual life which had developed itself in the Christian church from this principle, first become operative after the departure of Jesus, so much the more do the apostles retreat into the background, for they who believed on him should also receive the Spirit (7: 39); and in the parting discourse it may hence be seen how the idea of the apostles passes over into the broader idea of the disciples, for the greater part of what is there said accords with the latter as well as with the former. In this respect it may here be worthy of notice, that the solemn title of *ἀποστόλοι* does not occur in this Gospel, and the twelve are only named where something depends upon their name which can excite no very high regard for them. Thus (6: 67) Jesus asks the twelve whether they also will go away from him; and honorable as is the confession of Peter, it is just here that the evangelist notices that Judas, the betrayer, had been one of the twelve. Thomas also, in the scene characterized by his unbelief, is introduced as one of the twelve.

Taking all these things together, we look upon the evangelist as an author who already stood at a distance from that oldest circle of Judaism.

## ARTICLE V.

. THE DEMAND AND DEMONSTRATION OF A FUTURE RETRIBUTION  
IN NATURAL THEOLOGY.

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It is a curious thing to compare the apparatus of Natural Theology with that of Revealed, and the idea of progress in the one with that of progress in the other.

Natural Theology is that which may be known of God from the things that are made, and from our experience of God's government. In considering the things that are made, we have, not only our senses, but our scientific apparatus, our instruments of examination. In considering our experience of God's government, we have to examine the moral nature of the creatures governed, and their relations to the Creator and Governor.

Now in considering the question, How far can Natural Theology go?—we have to remember that our admirable increase of means for examining the works of God, and our facilities of accurate and universal investigation, are greatly owing to the effect of Revealed Theology itself. Natural Theology can go farther now than it could in the time of Plato, as to minuteness and universality of demonstration; but it cannot go a whit farther as to the great points demonstrated. Plato could see those points—the goodness and justice of God, and the righteousness of his government, though he could not have written a book like Paley's Natural Theology.

And yet, from insight glances at conscience and God, and from meditation on the good and evil as related, Plato could perhaps have written a more powerful book than that, more overwhelmingly convincing than Paley's, more directly and triumphantly appealing to every soul's own convictions and intuitive certainties.

Progress in Natural Theology is of two sorts; first, the knowledge and comparative anatomy of facts, which men, with all the apparatus given by Christianity, and a science under the light of Christianity, can gather in regard to Nature discoursing of God; and second, the knowledge of the utmost and highest conclusions which men, under the light of Nature merely, and without the light of Revealed Theology, ever have drawn, or would draw, or could, from the same facts, so far as they have known or could know them.

Progress in Revealed Theology is simply the increased knowledge of the facts in God's Word, together with comparison and interpretation of them under the guidance of God's Spirit. Pro-

gress in Revealed Theology is shut up to the Divine Word, and the Divine Spirit in and by that Word.

And just so progress in Natural Theology is shut up to the study of the creation, and of governed creatures, which, together with experience of the government of God, is the Word in Natural Theology. *Thy judgments are as the light that goeth forth.* And we remark in regard to this progress also, as before, that it is not possible except under the guidance of the same Spirit of God; for except by Christianity, by the light of the Bible, and the teachings of God's Spirit, there could be no real, fundamental advance in Natural Theology, from the day and the light of Plato. The *apparatus* for the study of creation, and the *apparatus* for the study of the Bible, are both, in the ordinary acceptance, a series of mere external instrumentalities, dependent, for the manner of their use, upon the state of mind in the observer. The great important thing in both cases, is the inward apparatus in the state of the feelings, the habits of the soul.

And here comes in the fact to be considered, that it is the creatures themselves who are their own judges or jurors on the question of the sentence of Natural Theology. The guilty examine the guilty, the condemned of conscience the condemned; *set a thief to catch a thief.* It is impossible here to expect a fair, unfettered, unbiassed conclusion. The conclusion rests upon the examination of facts in our own consciousness and inward nature, as well as in our sight and knowledge of external nature. We know confidently, therefore, beforehand, that the conclusions of a Natural Theology made up by such critics, if they took into view at all the moral nature of man, and his relations to God, must be imperfect, to say the least, and would be most probably deficient in such a way, as to be actually some of them untrue. There would be a coloring of the facts, and a special, dishonest pleading in regard to them, except with beings in strict friendship with God, seen as he is. And if they did *not* take into view the actual moral nature of man, and its relations to the Divine government, that *neglect* alone would be enough to falsify the conclusions of a partial examination, because those conclusions would be still applied as universal, whereas they cannot cover the providence of God in regard to fallen creatures.

There is a Natural Theology in God's Word, especially in the Old Testament. David broached the highest province of it in the 189th Psalm. The Book of Job is a grand, glorious, mystic hymn of Nature and of Providence to God. And Solomon entered upon some of the knottiest and deepest questions and intricacies of Natural Theology, in the Book of Ecclesiastes. And when he "spake of trees, from the cedar-tree that is in Lebanon, even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall, and of beasts, and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes," he must have made

such a work, that if that book had remained, it is likely that Paley and the Bridgewater gentlemen would have been spared the time and labor given to their treatises, as a work in science quite of supererogation.

They went much farther and deeper in Natural Theology in those days, than most Natural Theologians have ever dreamed of doing. They grappled with great questions, and generally, when they erred, seem to have erred in defending God, rather than excusing man, which indeed they did not seek to do. Pursued with something of their spirit, the study of Natural Theology, to a mind that loves to behold God in his works, becomes, next to the pursuit of Revealed Theology, the most comprehensive and interesting study in the world. The definition of it, as a science, is simply this, according to the interpretation of terms as well as things, *the Word of Nature in regard to God*, or Nature discoursing of God. Comprehensively conceived, its study includes that of all other sciences, as necessary or subservient to its thorough prosecution. An extensive and profound knowledge of Natural History is requisite, not merely the history of all known living creatures and their habits, but the history and classification of ascertained facts in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, and of all revolutions and phenomena in the earth, the air, the sea, and the heavens. All possible histories of Nature, animate and inanimate, and all possible philosophies of natural history, furnish materials for the studies of the natural theologian.

A knowledge of Natural Philosophy is requisite, or the scientific investigation of the causes of material phenomena in the universe, the laws by which they are produced, and the harmony in which they are united. This department of Natural Science includes the divisions of Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Pneumatics, Acoustics, Optics, Electricity, Galvanism, Magnetism, and indeed the investigation of all forces that affect the senses, or are perceived to affect the external universe. Then comes the science of Chemistry, so filled with interest and crowded with discoveries, and elevated in importance by the investigations of the last half century. The science of Anatomy, individual and comparative, of man and of all creatures, and the researches of Physiology as to the nature and laws of life, and its connection with matter and spirit, are of the greatest importance. Last of all the natural sciences must be named Astronomy, the noblest, sublimest, and most perfect of them all, opening to the mind such boundless prospects of the glory of God in his created universe, in scenes of wisdom, power, and love, whose magnificence is indescribable and inexhaustible, and whose extent baffles all conception.

These are sciences, and departments of science, concerning the works of God in creation, exclusive of the science of the soul. And yet Natural Theology, as it has for the most part been pur-

sued, has been almost exclusively conversant with these sciences. And in truth, the slightest examination of any of the natural sciences will show how dependent we are upon a scientific knowledge of their principles for a knowledge of the manner in which the God of Nature is revealed in his works. The inventions of human art, produced in the prosecution of those sciences, may be considered useful just in proportion as they enable us to extend our knowledge of the universe, and through that our knowledge of God. Take, for instance, the inventions of the telescope and microscope, which have opened to us on either hand such amazing views both of the extent and minuteness of God's created universe. By the first of these instruments the mind is introduced to the knowledge of an extent of God's empire, of which before not the wildest imagination had dreamed, nor the most exalted and enlightened mind could conceive. We behold celestial wonders in regions of space, to which thought had never travelled. We see the operations of the Almighty extending with the illimitable expanse of creation to countless spheres and systems, to millions upon millions of other suns than ours, irradiating millions upon millions of other perfect worlds, revolving in the immensity of space, and wheeling orderly around the throne of God. We are thus made familiar with conceptions of infinite power and infinite wisdom, such as otherwise we could never have gained in this existence, from the created works of the Deity. We are introduced to a knowledge of the probable infinitude of God's universe, a point of immense importance in our Natural Theology; a point on which the mind of Dr. Chalmers in his *Astronomical Discourses* dwelt with so much power, with such a vast sweep of excursion into the field of the Divine attributes. These glorious excursions could not possibly have been made without the invention of the telescope, an instrument which is justly regarded by the devout mind as a providential gift from God to mankind for the greater knowledge of his own character.

But if by means of this instrument we are admitted to such amazing discoveries of the infinitude and boundless glory of God's created universe, and carried where we see the stars that at the world's creation sang together, performing their revolutions of glory in obedience to the great will of the Supreme, and where we may hear the music of their congregated spheres praising God, we are also introduced, by the intervention of the microscope, to discoveries not less amazing in the infinite minuteness with which the wisdom and power of God are manifested on a scale invisible to mortal sight, but equally perfect and complete with the exhibition of his glory in the rolling worlds. By the disclosures of this instrument we learn that every mote in the sunbeams may be as wonderful as a world in the sky; every particle of dust on the wing of a butterfly is an organization demanding omnipotence in minuteness

as directly, and demonstrating it as wonderfully, as the constitution of worlds millions of times larger than our globe. Every drop of green water on the surface of a stagnant pool is indeed a world teeming with thousands of inhabitants, needing as much care from God as the suns floating in infinite space; and every particle of mould is a forest of trees and plants, where the branches, leaves and fruit can be plainly distinguished, and must be formed by the same Almighty hand that hangs the planets in the sky, and whirls the suns of ten thousand world-systems on their swift career. All these microscopic revelations are wonders that confound us with a sense of the omnipresent and infinitely minute agency of God. They force upon our souls some sense of that attribute, through which not a hair of our heads can fall to the ground without God's notice.

But, minute and vast as these researches are, and wide and sublime as is the sweep of these contemplations, they carry us, as we have intimated, not much, if anything farther, in our conclusions in regard to God, than men went in the time of Plato. In his time, that which might be known of God from the creation of the world was clearly seen, wherever there was any heart to see it. And the great ideas of God demonstrated by the creation are as clearly known without the telescope as with it. If those ideas were not the intuitive product of the soul, on beholding the creation through the senses, neither telescopic nor microscopic vision or demonstration could ever produce them. And indeed the creation is given of God, not to produce those ideas, but simply to call them into action, set them at work; a great point of consideration, to which we shall refer a few pages farther on in this essay.

Now there is this subjective as well as objective Natural Theology; and the teachings of the subjective are greater, more sublime, more important by far, in many respects, than of the objective. The teachings of the subjective are necessary to put the teachings of the objective in their right light and position. I am fearfully and wonderfully made. What do the capacities, tendencies, faculties, and workings of my soul teach me in regard to God and a future state of existence? For a long period this question was entirely neglected, or deemed scarcely to be considered as having any connection with the depths of Natural Theology, which was limited to the consideration of evidences of design and goodness in the body and the globe.

But in truth it can be no other than almost a truism, that the science of Psychology, the science of the human soul, is perhaps more important for a right pursuit of Natural Theology, than the science of the whole universe beside. In the highest and noblest of his works God has left the clearest impress of his power and wisdom. It is nowhere said that the created universe was made

in God's image, but it is said that in the image of God created be man. And this refers unquestionably to man's spiritual essence, and not to his perishable body. Why then should the mechanism of the body merely be made the subject of examination in the pursuit of Natural Theology, while the faculties and life of the soul are relinquished to the province of the metaphysician. When it is said in the page of inspiration, I am fearfully and wonderfully made, we know of no reason for confining the exclamation of wonder at God's power and wisdom in the creation of man to the marvelous mechanism of his outward frame merely. Much more fearfully and wonderfully are we made in the soul than in the body. And far more amazing displays of Divine wisdom and goodness may be found in the structure of the mind, than in that of the physical frame which it inhabits. Here then, in the study of mind, is an incomparably nobler sphere for the conclusions of Natural Theology, than in the study of matter, or of mere animal life, or of the motions of the universe.

The connection between the mind and the body is yet greatly in the dark, and the evidences of design in the wise and benevolent adaptation of the one to the other, with the relations in which the physical and mental faculties mutually stand, and the influence which they mutually exert, are yet to be opened and exhibited. The same may be said in some degree of the connection between the mind, and the spiritual world for which it is fitted. If proofs of the Divine agency in wisdom and benevolence, are opened to us so abundantly, and of such absorbing interest in the relations between the mechanism of our bodies and the physical world we inhabit, in the adaptation of creation to our wants, and of our wants and faculties to the mechanism of creation, much more may we suppose would such proofs rise into view, more numerous and more glorious in the study of the relations between our souls and the spiritual world, the adaptation of that world to our spiritual existence, and of our spiritual wants and faculties to the nature of that world.

And as perhaps the existence of an external world might be demonstrated from the examination of the mechanism of the body merely; that is, take the structure of this body merely, supposing you were to find it somewhere in the immensity of space disconnected from the universe, and you could prove from its nature that there must be a particular world for which it is designed, and to which it belongs; just so, from an examination of the structure and faculties of the soul, there might be demonstrated the existence and nature of a spiritual world, for which the soul also is particularly designed and to which it belongs. And as the consequences of the infringement of the laws which regulate the connection between the body, and this world may be deduced from study and demonstration in the body alone as well as from experience, and even

before experience and the dreadful result may be clearly shown before-hand, which would follow from an inconsistency between the body and the world in their mutual relations, so the consequences of the infringement of the laws which regulate the connection between the soul and the spiritual world for which it is destined, might be deduced in like manner from study and demonstration as well as known from the pages of revelation. And from the nature of an immortal spirit the latter consequences might be shown to be as lasting as the soul itself, that is eternal, just as the former consequences are as lasting as the body itself, that is to its dissolution.

In such an examination, one of the first inductions on which we should set out would be necessarily the evidences of disorder and guilt in our nature ; and infallibly connected with these, the evidences of our accountability to God, and the internal pre-intimations of a judgment to come. An investigation of the nature and workings of the great reality of conscience, as a development of our being, would be another branch or chapter of our self-knowledge, as the material of a correct Natural Theology, leading to Revealed.

Condillac, in a passage which we shall quote at another point of our argument, makes the declaration, remarkable indeed for a metaphysical philosopher at that day, that *the state of the soul in the ignorance and concupiscence produced by the fall, is the only one that can properly be the object of philosophy, because it is the only one made known to us by experience.* But an impartial examination of the human soul as fallen, would require a philosopher under the influence and guidance of the spirit of God ; a regenerated heart, as well as an acute and far-seeing intellect. No other person could be fearless and unprejudiced in this tremendous investigation. There are steps to be taken, where a man's feet need to be shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. The adaptation of the memory to a future judgment ; the adaptation of remorse of conscience to a future retribution ; the adaptation of the law of association to the mind's education for eternity, and the influence of that law in such education ; the power of the body over the soul, and the imperceptible, gradual, but sure passing of the nature of the body into the character of the soul that is enslaved by it ; the incongruity between sensual habits formed upon the soul during its abode in this world, and the nature of the future world ; the impossibility of happiness in that world for a mind thus corrupted in this ; in fine, a tracing, so far as possible, the nature of our spiritual faculties, and of the laws that regulate our moral, intelligent, accountable being, and the consequences of the perversion of those faculties and the infringement of those laws ; —all these fields of fact and of thought would come into view, to be swept over in crossing and recrossing paths, full of thrilling and



solemn interest The science of physiology, pursued in close connection with that of psychology, would throw amazing light on such researches, and tend more fully to reveal God in his works. How interesting and instructive, with this great object in view, would be the collection and classification of all facts in reference to the development of the human mind in the human body! Indeed, the science of metaphysics, in such a mode of pursuing it, with such an object, instead of being a cold, dry, repulsive study, would be one of the most solemn, tangible, interesting pursuits in the world. It would be raised into an importance and solemnity second only to that of the investigation of the Scriptures themselves. And it would evidently become a science fit only for devout minds, or rather, which only devout minds would be capable of investigating, and not a science to be left merely to men of great acuteness of intellect and power of abstraction. Such powers are requisite, but without the devout spirit, they lead inevitably into error, and the greater the power, sometimes the greater the error.

It is manifest that the starting point in such investigations is everything. If we take man as he is, the great prominent fact first demanding our notice is that of sin and suffering; and to proceed aright, we must take our starting-point in the evidences of guilt and disorder in our nature. If we exclude or deny these, or slur them over in a hasty, superficial, unwilling consideration, our whole conclusions must be wrong; we shall go on in darkness. As in a *post mortem* examination, the surgeon finds the hidden proof of mortal disease, which could not have been counteracted, except by the immediate interposition of him who made the body, just so in our examination as natural theologians, we find in man, taking him as dead, (dead in trespasses and sins) accepting him as dead, and entering on the examination as a *post mortem*, we find the causes of death and the explanations of it, in his own system; but taking him as living, we either do not and cannot examine, or, satisfied with a superficial touch upon his pulse, we say there is no mortal illness. If we start with man as living, we come to a dead and false theology; if we start with man as dead, we come to a living theology, a theology that restores man to life, and explains all the otherwise inexplicable inconsistencies and contradictions of our system. If we take man as dead into the dissecting room, we operate boldly upon him, and discover the nature of his constitution; if we take him as alive, we are afraid to cut, and can discover nothing.

Now, starting in error as to this great point of guilt and ruin in man, or passing it by as not in the province of Natural Theology, we cannot possibly arrive at the true system. We may gain instruction from what sometimes happens in the investigation of the material universe. Sir Isaac Newton was near seventeen years

pursuing his vast and intense calculations in vain in regard to the system of the universe, in consequence of a slight mistake, a mistake not by himself indeed, but adopted from others, as to the measurement of the earth's circumference. Thus in theology, a man may fail utterly of learning the true system, and may be involved in inextricable miscalculation and error, because of a misconception as to his own character and place in that system; a mismeasurement of man's nature. He must take an accurate measurement of himself before he can learn God, or find a theology of salvation.

The passage from Natural to Revealed Theology therefore is through the soul of man; the bridge of connection is in our being, even our fallen being. We can pass from Natural Theology to Revealed in no other way. There is no other connection but that of human guilt. Natural Theology, excluding man's moral nature from its investigations, teaches nothing directly concerning sin, nor concerning a Redeemer from sin. It does so inferentially, for it presents the problem of misery in the creation, and suggests that sin in the creation somewhere must be the cause of misery; and finding sin in man, we have found the solution of this fact in Natural Theology; the great fact of suffering, and that two under the dominion of a benevolent God. But if we stopped short of the examination of human nature in our Natural Theology, we should have no passage whatever from Natural Theology to Revealed. There would be a great gulf fixed; nothing in Natural Theology to indicate the necessity or predict the character, or prepare the way of Revealed Theology. The doctrines of a Saviour and of the scheme of redemption stand perfectly isolated from the doctrines of the wisdom, benevolence, and power of God, as manifested in the material universe. And if there were nothing but mechanism in that universe, or nothing but intelligent and animal life, or if the researches of Natural Theology were restricted to the discovery of design and the proofs of a benevolent designer, the Revealed Theology would be without any requisition or counterpart in Natural Theology. Bringing the two together we should not find any evidence of union, no proof of their belonging to the same system, no mutual demonstration of each others truth. It would be like taking two parts of a note, which has been cut asunder, and which is to be presented for acceptance, and unexpectedly finding that the one has no connection with the other, and does not belong to it, and therefore the note cannot be paid as genuine. There is something lost between the two parts. Even though the hand-writing, so far as it goes, may be seen to be the same, yet the one part talks of obligations to which the other part has no response; and unless the lost portion of the note can be found, the two parts are comparatively useless.

Just so it is with Natural and Revealed Theology. They both centre in man, not in man's animal or material mechanism, but in

man's moral nature and character. They centre in man's fall and depravity, which is a truth not of Revealed Theology only, nor of Natural Theology only, but of both. The passage from Natural to Revealed Theology is through man's guilt and ruin, through the examination and knowledge of man as he now is, not as he came from the hand of his Maker. Natural Theology before the Fall could have had nothing to do with sin or suffering, and of course in that position of things, the revelation of a Saviour would have been irrelevant. It might have been a good revelation but not needed. The unfallen beings of this world would have said that there was some mistake, that the revelation must have been intended for some other world, that the note presented was not due in this world. The truth and power of it in this world must depend upon the correctness of the indictment against the inhabitants of this world; and if that fail, if there be no proof of that in us, then the scheme of theology does not belong to us, is one with which we have nothing to do. Natural Theology not only does not correspond to it, nor countersign it, but is against it, recognizing no such beings in existence, as those to whom it purports to be presented.

But Natural Theology, after the fall, has *everything* to do with sin and suffering. Natural Theology that does not take up and consider this great fact of sin and suffering is a lie. Natural Theology that goes on in its investigations, regardless of sin and suffering, is as sure to build a wrong system in its conclusions, as a natural astronomy, which should go on calculating on the theory of the attraction of cohesion, without any knowledge or regard of the principle of gravitation. But this great fact of sin and suffering exists, and is found in man as a moral being, in the present development both of his body and mind, in man as a shattered being, a being in disorder and ruin. And if man *as such a being* be excluded from consideration in Natural Theology, as for the most part has been the case, if Natural Theology be pursued to see what it tells of God, without the recognition of what it tells of our actual relation to God as fallen creatures, then there must be a palpable want of conformity, to say the least, between its conclusions and the presentations of Revealed Theology.

Indeed, Natural Theology can be but a jumble of contradictions, if it goes on without the recognition and investigation of man as a sinful being. For it is constantly stumbling against facts, which it has no possible way of explaining or accounting for, and which an infidel may push to the destruction of all certainty in its conclusions. The mere notorious facts of suffering and of death, in such painful and horrible forms, upset the system of Natural Theology, even as to its demonstration of the Divine benevolence and power, unless it takes in the consideration of man's depravity, and by this bridge passes over to its conclusions and

supports in Revealed Theology. For, death and suffering are inconsistent with goodness or with power, or with both. If God is infinitely good and powerful, whence a world of suffering? If he is good, but not infinite in power, he is not God; the demonstration of a God fails. If he is infinite in power, and permits suffering without sin, he is not infinite in goodness, and so again, he is not God. Natural Theology, without the recognition of man's guilt, might possibly drive a soul into atheism, but cannot demonstrate the being of a God. Natural Theology, without the recognition of man's guilt, demonstrates an evil being, somewhere, but not a perfectly good being, not God.

But let Natural Theology take up man as he is, man as a sinner, and its demonstration of God is perfect; and it leads, besides, directly to Revealed Theology, which, when it comes, joins it as perfectly as a keystone does the arch. Natural Theology, rightly built up, demands Revealed Theology for its completion and support, as the arch demands the keystone, and likewise, to a certain degree, predicts the *form* of the keystone. Even as this page, which we are now reading, if we tear it asunder, predicts, in the part which we have already read, the tenor of that which was torn off and was to come, and shows, in the outline of its torn edge, the general outline also, which the lost or invisible part of the page must possess in order to fit it, so the page of Natural Theology, where it breaks off, and leaves us, in its teachings towards God, waiting for the remainder of the page, demanding the remainder of the page, predicts the nature of the part which is to come. For Revealed Theology is but the continuation of Natural Theology, and is to bring forth the development and completion of the plan, of which we see already the commencement.

And as, if an author were to commence a story on a fixed plan and outline of fact from the beginning, but were to leave it unfinished with the first volume merely, an acute observer could judge from the development of character and the progress of events thus far what would probably be the tenor of the second volume, and what conclusion the form of the story as far as developed would demand; so it is, in some little measure, with our judgment from the first volume to the second of the story of our being, in regard to God and the future world. From the tenor of the first, from our book of Natural Theology alone, if we read it carefully, we can predict many things with much accuracy, can guess as to what is needed, as to what may be expected, and in some things can more than guess as to the conclusion, as to what *must* take place.

It is in some degree these principles, on which bishop Butler proceeded in the *Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion with the constitution and course of Nature*. But his great design was to answer and remove objections, by showing that the same objections lie against the ordinary course of God's providence, as

are brought by unbelievers against the course of religion, Natural and Revealed. Nevertheless, the objector receives the providence of God in this world as that of a just and righteous God, notwithstanding the acknowledged objections, and why should he not receive the system of religion? But bishop Butler did not show, nor undertake to show, the information which Natural Theology by itself actually *demonstrates* in regard to what will be, as shown in Revealed Theology, in another world. He reasoned that since things *are* so and so in the *constitution of nature*, under which we live, we see that they *may be* so and so, as religion teaches that they are, in that world to which men are advancing. But Natural Theology, so far as it goes, is demonstration, not mere probability; and the object of the natural theologian is to find out how far we can learn our relation to God and the attributes of God, without a Revelation; thence to see what we need in a Revelation; and from the comparison between Revealed and Natural Theology to establish the truth of both more clearly.

It is a solemn investigation on which we are entered. We shall find at every step that we are fearfully and wonderfully made. We shall find how fearfully, by finding how terrific the self-misery, how vast and irremediable the destruction, produced by the misuse and perversion of our spiritual powers. They are fearful, because they can be so fearfully perverted, because while the enjoyment for which they fit the soul in God is so exquisite and infinite, if they preserve their direction and allegiance towards Him, the destruction which they accomplish, and the retribution they produce, equally infinite and intolerable, if the soul be alienated from Him. We are fearfully made, because the wondrous capacities of our being are capacities as vast for evil as they are for good, as terrible for remorse and suffering, as they are wonderful for beatitude in the image and possession of the holiness of God. We carry about with us, in our very faculties, the ministers of heaven or hell, and in our own character the elements that are to determine which ministry we shall be under for eternity. Our faculties of being, in the frame-work of our nature, are as those fixtures in our buildings, which may convey the element of light and life, or the element of destruction. We ourselves are filling the fountain that is to supply these fixtures in our souls. They are not yet tried for eternity. The night has not yet come, it is day with us, and the filling of the fountain is not yet finished. But the elements are fast forming and pouring in. It remains yet to be seen what the development will be in the night of death, in the opening and kindling of these faculties, these fixtures of our immortal nature in the eternal world. It remains to be seen whether they burn eternally with seraphic fire, with a serene and steady flame of life and joy that is one with the atmosphere of light, love and bliss around the throne of God, or whether they kindle up only to flash

upon all our existence the lights of remorse and despair, and to envelop the whole building of our being in the flames of hell. There may be that development; there *will* be that development, if we have filled our being with the elements of character out of Christ. There must be that development, when the elements of sin in an immortal nature advance to God, for our God is a consuming fire; and if we go into eternity with the fixtures of our being filled with the element of sin, there can nothing follow *there*, but the spontaneous combustion of our spiritual nature in the elemental fire of the second death.

But here some might be disposed to say, you have already advanced upon the ground of Revealed Theology and taken a step, which you could not take, but by the light of the Word. We answer, no, by no means. We have gone no farther than men in a state of nature have gone, by the law written in their hearts, and by the light of an accusing conscience. But then, it is quite impossible, after a revelation has come, to see things in the light of Natural Theology merely. We cannot do it. The sun shines and we cannot help seeing his light, and seeing all things in his light. There is a very remarkable passage in the Psalms on this point, referring to God as our source of light. With thee is the fountain of life: IN THY LIGHT SHALL WE SEE LIGHT. In God's light only can we ever see and determine what is true light. When God's light shines, it embraces, surrounds, and takes up within itself all other light, and shows at once how far we saw in other light correctly. But when God's light in his Word is shining, and men see it, they cannot retreat out of it, and confine themselves to what is called the light of nature. They endeavor to do this, sometimes, but they inevitably carry into Nature the light which they have received from Revelation, so that in such a case what they say is the light of Nature is in reality the light of Revelation by which they examine nature. In this way sometimes men of an infidel spirit, wishing to exalt their own powers, and to deny the necessity of a revelation, are found stealing from Revelation itself a measure of light and knowledge, which they could not otherwise have possessed, but claiming that stolen light as their own, and setting it down to the credit of nature and themselves, in order that by this species of forgery, this moral and intellectual swindling, they may cast off the authority of Revelation, and set Nature and their own minds above it. But the truth is, men who have once known the light of Revelation, although they may deny it to be from God, cannot carry on a single process of their being, except in that light. They may shut their eyes, and say that they are working in their own light, but they have only been robbing God; that is, they have added God's light to their own, and deny him as the source of it. In God's light they see light, and yet, in God's light they deny light. In this way, deists have sometimes for a season successfully palmed

upon the world a system of Natural religion and morality of such apparent excellence, that by it they have sworn they could enter heaven, denying both the necessity and reality of any other revelation. This is one of the basest, most subtle, most hypocritical and detestable pieces of fraud ever practised.

But it is manifest that a man who possesses the light of Revelation to argue *against* cannot confine himself to the light of Nature to argue *by*. If I know the positions of my antagonist, my own positions will inevitably be very different from what they would or could have been, reasoning in total ignorance. It is impossible, after a Revelation has come and produced its claims, to see any longer in the light of Nature merely. A man might as well go up and down some crowded thoroughfare at noon, with a bundle of winking tapers in his hand declaring that he is walking by the light of those tapers, when in fact he can scarcely see them shine, because the light of the sun is so powerful. Or supposing the lamps on the sideways were lighted at noon-day, a man might as well undertake to tell you exactly how far and how much he can see by those lamps. It is obvious that while the sun is shining, he does not see anything by those lamps, nor is it possible to tell, until the sun is withdrawn, how much or how little, he can see by them. A lady might sit at the window of her parlor, into which the sun is shining, and place a lamp upon the table by her side, and pursue a difficult piece of needle-work, or study a book of elementary science printed in very fine type, supposing or asserting that she was pursuing her task by the light of that lamp, or that she could tell exactly how much light the lamp sheds upon the needle or the page. But it is obvious that this is impossible. And so it is impossible for us, in the full blaze of Revelation, to see by the light of Natural Theology merely, or to tell exactly how much light we should have, if Revelation were withdrawn.

There is in some respects more light, in some respects less than men are willing to allow. There is *more* light *sinned against* than we suppose. There is *less* light as to the way of acceptance with God, after sinning *against* light than the deists maintain. The light of nature is accusing, not redeeming; the light of revelation is both accusing and redeeming; but in the blaze of redemption, it is not possible to say how far the *accusing* light may at times have shone on towards the *direction* of the *redeeming* light. Nature reveals no Saviour, but a conscience burdened with sin feels the necessity of one.

Were the light of Revelation suddenly withdrawn from us, after having been long accustomed to it, we should feel as if there were no light at all in Nature, nor ever could have been; that is, if we might suppose it withdrawn as suddenly and entirely as we might suppose the light of day changed instantly into midnight. Men would grope as do the blind. Place yourself in a dark room with

a door partly opened into another room in which there is a very dim light burning, and remain there a while, and you will at length see with ease all the objects around you, even by that light. But now let an individual enter from the open sunlight, and at first he will not be able to see anything. He will not even see that there is a door partly open, or that light is shining through it; and if you should ask him to hand you a tumbler or any object in the room, he would grope as in a dungeon, neither able to see you nor the object you have requested him to give you. He will say that you have no light, and when he departs he will report you as living without light. It is somewhat so under the blaze of Revelation, with our conceptions of the degree of light possible to shine from the creation and from men's natural reason. They who believe, rejoice in, and walk by the light of Revelation, give men in the dark room credit for too little light; they who deny a Revelation give them credit for all the light there is in the world.

We are able, however, to reason from absolute fact in the case of man without Revelation, and to compare their situation both as respects light and darkness with Revelation itself. Next, we are able to study the nature of the human faculties, and to see how far, very nearly, their development goes in the intuitive or deductive acquisition of moral truth. And as to the argument from design in the works of nature, in regard to the being and attributes of God, that is almost purely an intellectual investigation and demonstration, the commencement of which is so far found even in pagan theology, that Paul not only declares that God's natural attributes may be known by man naturally from the things that are made, but he even goes further, and appeals to the stream of heathen poetry, for the proof of men's natural conviction and knowledge of the relation between themselves and their Creator.

Now in an endeavor to trace the stream of Natural Theology from the very beginning of the light of nature as it strikes on men's minds, including their own consciousness in the knowledge of their own minds, the very first marked, indisputable, universal phenomenon, after that of the being of a God, is that of conscience towards God, inwardly declaring guilt, corroborated by the testimony of observation and experience outwardly, demonstrating guilt, and followed by the testimony both of conscience and the course of nature predicting retribution. And the same inward consciousness and external evidence that proclaims man's guilt, proclaims likewise God's righteousness. In proportion as the nature of man is developed in Natural Theology, so are the attributes of God developed in relation to man, especially in relation to man's guilt.

Now it is clear that guilt is not a thing of God's creation, sin cannot be created. Sin is man's own product, not God's. Whatever God made must be good. God would not make anything not pleasing to himself; but nothing could be pleasing to God, which was contradictory to his own righteousness; therefore God could



never create a sinful creature. Man at the creation must have been upright. But man as he is, is not upright, but depraved. So therefore, between these two incontrovertible facts, the fact of man's uprightness as created of God, and man's depravity as he now is, there lies somewhere the inevitable fact of man's change from an upright to a sinful being, or in other words the fact of man's fall.

Now if Natural Theology can any where fix the commencement of that fact, Natural Theology can show the history of man's fall. There was a time when Natural Theology *could* do this ; for the first man who fell, and the first race of men who found themselves depraved, would know this without a revelation. But no such *record* in Natural Theology comes down to us. Nevertheless, Natural Theology teaches that there must have been a period when sin was introduced, and the race became sinful ; a period when the state of moral wrong, which we now find to be universal, began with man, for it could not begin with God. In regard to the demonstrations from Natural Theology, it makes no difference whether we fix, in accordance with Revelation, on the first man Adam, as the originator of the fall, or take a point lower down in the stream of human existence. But if we take, as the most likely supposition, the fact preserved for us by the Revelation of the sin of Adam, then from Adam downwards it is easy to see what must have been from the beginning the teachings of Natural Theology. On the supposition of Adam's fall, the first general truth demonstrated in Natural Theology is, that Adam's posterity were begotten in Adam's image. It is useless to deny or argue against universal experience. There is no dictate of Natural Theology clearer than this, that men inherit the moral character of their parents. If their parents had been holy angels, the offspring would be so likewise. If their parents had been fallen angels, and the race were continued, the children would partake of their parents' likeness. Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean ? If we should for a moment suppose a race of beings continued in hell, it would be inevitable that such a race, universally and individually, would perpetuate the characteristics of hell. Good angels would not be born in hell. Good men would not be born in hell. So with a depraved race on earth ; angels cannot be born of such a race ; good beings cannot. That which is born of the flesh is flesh. And so it began speedily to be found and to be recorded, that from Adam downwards the children of men beget sons in their *own* image, not in God's image.

Now this was a truth of Natural Theology. It really needed no revelation to show this. Adam knew that he was fallen. Perhaps he knew, perhaps not, that all his race would be born of him, *like* him. But whether he knew it beforehand or not, he discovered it speedily. And the evidence of it was increasing every

year. This conclusion of Natural Theology, rendered so infallible in the murderous propensities of Cain, was strengthening in regard to the whole race up to the time of the deluge. The information which Adam himself would give to his descendants respecting the fall and expulsion from Paradise, was living, natural information, the testimony of a living witness, by his own experience, for nearly a thousand years; and the *consequences* of the fall every man could observe and judge for himself. No information was needed from Adam on *that* point. The Natural Theology of the antediluvian world taught them incontrovertibly that man was a fallen, depraved, rebellious, race. It corresponded with what God has recorded in his Word, that every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart was only evil continually.

Certainly the Natural Theology of the antediluvians comprehended the fall and depravity of man. It comprehends the same now. It comprehends his depravity, without all controversy; and this by the clearest demonstration, comprehends his fall. Plato himself used to say that our good things are from God, but that of our evil things we alone are the authors, and cannot charge God with evil. So, it is against all our conclusions in regard to God to suppose that he made man a depraved being. But we must suppose this, unless we suppose that God made man upright, but that man has made himself depraved.

Dr. Chalmers undertakes a proof of the righteousness of God in our Natural Theology by the nature and operations of conscience; and in answer to the objection that conscience, although it be a representation of righteousness, is weak and ineffectual and often at fault, he contends that this does not destroy the argument from its evident design. Just as the regulator of a watch proves that it must have been put there to keep the watch right, even though in spite of it the watch may be out of order. This is well, so far as it goes. But the question might be asked, What proof is there that God himself did not make the human watch with just its present irregularities? If you suppose that he did, then the proof of his righteousness from the authority of conscience is all gone; if you suppose that he did, you turn the proof of his character into that of a malevolent being; for no contrivance for evil can be conceived of so dreadful a nature as a soul depraved. Therefore, even Natural Theology alone compels us to the conclusion that man is a fallen depraved being, in opposition to God's will. The fall of man must have been an axiom in Natural Theology, from the outset.

Men's Natural Theology after the deluge went on in the same way. There was no break, no interruption, but an increase in the evidence. From Noah downwards, the voice of Natural Theology, and of man's conscience, was an indictment of depravity. In that depravity, the greater part of mankind lost all

sight and knowledge of God, not being willing, says Paul, to retain Him in their knowledge, and fell into the worship of brutes, stones, and hideous images, driven on by a conscience defiled and darkened, but nevertheless, powerful to scourge them, and tortured into superstitious fears, glaring upon them through all their ignorance. Their Natural Theology, such as it was, and however hideously distorted, always kept this conviction of guilt uppermost, followed with the instinctive dread and prediction of punishment. You trace this gloomy portentous texture of human Theology in all forms and progresses of civilization and of barbarism. This lurid, grimly-burning, slow-consuming, sluggish, Tartarean stream, is the stream of Natural Theology in all ages. This conviction of guilt, and dread of punishment, is a universal characteristic of our race. It is stamped upon the most expressive part of classical literature; it is the very countenance of dramatic poetry, of tragedy, of history, of morals, of philosophy. This is the Natural Theology of a fallen world—guilt and punishment—just what we might have expected it would be, the premises being stated, even before the conclusion. This is the Natural Theology that followed the thunder of that sentence, In the day that thou eatest, thou shalt surely die! That penalty is in the deep under-consciousness of mankind, muttering its thunders, scattering its lightnings, scathing, burning; guilt and punishment—conviction of the one, and dread of the other: that unwritten consciousness of Natural Theology, which, in Revealed Theology, flames out in the clear, awful sentence, The wages of sin is death! This is Natural Theology, just predicting Revealed.

The same Natural Theology that predicts punishment looks round for some way of escape. But it does not foreshadow that way. It does not promise an escape; it cannot. There Revelation alone can supply its requisitions. The soul stands gazing into the future, in dread expectancy of terror; blank horror fills the horizon. It shrinks back in anguish from the prospect, and finds no relief. It cannot invent or imagine a way or a possibility of redemption. It is shut up in prison, in thick darkness, and cannot come out. Here, then, rises Revelation on the gloom, as a sun upon chaos. God's mercy in Christ, is the first ray of light. There has been—there could be, no anticipation of it. Natural Theology could, and must, anticipate retribution, but never redemption. Shut up to Natural Theology alone, man cannot even imagine an atonement. Any relics, or traces, or shadowings forth of such imagination, or intimations of such anticipation in Natural Theology, must be regarded as merely the result of the habit of sacrifices received among all nations by traditionary information of the right mode of approaching God. No other satisfactory, or even possible account of the matter can be given.

And, therefore, the instructive passage quoted by Dr. Chalmers,

from the first edition of Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, is correct only so far as regards its exposition and acknowledgment of men's natural convictions of guilt, and consequent dread and expectation of punishment. The doctrines of Revelation coincide with these anticipations, and also with all anticipations or demands growing out of the primeval revelation of sacrifices as a right of Divine worship. But that the human mind, without any revelation at all, would even make the suggestion of a Mediator, or an atonement, there is no proof, or reason to believe. The anticipation of an Intercessor, is not an original anticipation of nature, but is infinitely above nature. With this exception, the passage, as given by Dr. Chalmers, from the opinions of Adam Smith, is one of the most instructive and interesting in all the record of human philosophy.

How melancholy to see a mind that could approach so near to the borders of Revealed Truth, and be taken hold upon even by some yearnings after it, turned from this orbit of approximation to redemption, and whirled into the gulf of infidelity or atheism! Adam Smith apparently came, as Dr. Chalmers clearly intimates, within the sphere of one of those wandering planets, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever, and the attraction of earth prevailed over the commencing gravitation of the soul towards heaven. It is a fearful thing to see a strong immortal being thus hurried from the sphere of faith and mercy, into that of unbelief and ruin.

We repeat the passage, as given by Dr. Chalmers, from the first edition of Adam Smith's "*Theory of Moral Sentiments*,"—a passage afterwards suppressed by the author in all subsequent editions:—

"All our natural sentiments," says Dr. Smith, "prompt us to believe that as perfect virtue is supposed necessarily to appear to the Deity as it does to us, as for its own sake and without any farther view, the natural and proper object of love and reward, so must vice of hatred and punishment. That the gods neither resent nor hurt, was the general maxim of all the different sects of the ancient philosophy; and if by resenting be understood that violent and disorderly perturbation, which often distracts and confounds the human heart; or if by hurting be understood the doing of mischief wantonly, and without regard to propriety or justice, such weakness is undoubtedly unworthy of the Divine perfection. But if it be meant that vice does not appear to the Deity, to be for its own sake the object of abhorrence and aversion, and what, for its own sake, it is fit and reasonable should be punished, the truth of this maxim can by no means be so easily admitted. If we consult our natural sentiments, we are apt to fear lest before the holiness of God vice should appear to be more worthy of punishment, than the weakness and imperfection of

human virtue can ever seem to be of reward. Man, when about to appear before a Being of infinite perfection, can feel but little confidence in his own merit, or in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. In the presence of his fellow-creatures, he may often justly elevate himself, and may often have reason to think highly of his own character and conduct, compared to the still greater imperfection of theirs. But the case is quite different, when about to appear before his infinite Creator. To such a Being he can scarcely imagine that his littleness and weakness should ever appear to be the proper object either of esteem or of reward. But he can easily conceive how the numberless violations of duty, of which he has been guilty, should render him the proper object of aversion and punishment; neither can he see any reason why the Divine indignation should not be let loose, without any restraint, upon so vile an insect as he is sensible that he himself must appear to be. If he would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from the justice, but he must entreat it from the mercy of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition at the thought of his past misconduct, are, upon this account, the sentiments which become him, and seem to be the only means which he has left for appeasing that wrath which he knows he has justly provoked. He even distrusts the efficacy of all these, and actually fears lest the wisdom of God should not, like the weakness of man, be prevailed upon to spare the criminal by the most importunate lamentations of the crime. Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement, he imagines must be made for him, beyond what he himself is capable of making, before the purity of the Divine justice can be reconciled to his manifold offences. The doctrines of Revelation coincide in every respect with these original anticipations of nature; and as they teach us how little we can depend upon the imperfection of our own virtue, so they show us at the same time that the most powerful intercession has been made, and that the most dreadful atonement has been paid, for our manifold transgressions and iniquities."

This is, indeed, for many reasons, one of the most interesting passages in the history of literature. Vice is declared by Dr. Smith to be that which *for its own sake* it is fit and reasonable should be punished. It is, in his view, one of our natural moral sentiments that as virtue is, for its own sake, and without any further view, the natural and proper object of love and reward, on the part of the Divine Being, so vice is, by itself, and for its own sake, and without any farther view the natural and proper object of hatred and of punishment. Man's own personal conviction of guilt and immovable expectation of punishment are natural sequences from such a right view of God. This is what bears upon our present argument more directly than the supposed desire for

an atonement, coinciding with the doctrines of revelation; the anticipation, and even demand of retribution, being much more positive, plain, and universal, than any anticipation of relief.

"We deem it," remarked Dr. Chalmers, "a melancholy fact, that this noble testimony to the need of a gospel should have disappeared in the posterior editions of his work, revised and corrected as they were by his own hand. It is not for men to sit in the chair of judgment; and never should they feel a greater awe or tenderness upon their spirits, than when called to witness or to pronounce upon the aberrations of departed genius. Yet, when one compares the passage Dr. Smith could at one time have written, with the memoir, that, after an interval of many years, he gave to the world of David Hume, that ablest champion of the infidel cause,—one fears lest under the contagion of a near and withering intimacy with him, his spirit may have imbibed some of the kindred poison; and he at length have become ashamed of the homage that he once had rendered to the worth and importance of Christianity."

Now the argument as to the Divine wisdom and goodness from creation and providence, might be ever so strong, and ever so magnificently and minutely drawn out, and ever so splendidly illuminated; but if, while reason and conscience declare the demerit of sin, and demand retribution for it, it be found that in reality, under the government of God, sin *escapes* retribution, and is likely to continue so doing, what then is the conclusion? Between these two *judgments*, that of the infinite goodness of God, and that of the impunity of the wicked, there is forced out the conclusion, the *demonstration*, that when God's government has been carried on a little farther, there will come up a world of *perfect retribution*, where that which *seems* impunity now, will be found to be only an avenue to eternal justice. For men's natural idea of the perfect goodness of God, implies in him that *holiness*, which, as Dr. Chalmers has admirably defined it, is not mere negative delight in the happiness of the universe, but is also the "instant and determined recoil from evil, which hath affixed to him the denomination of holy;" a recoil not only *from* evil, but *against* it.

The argument from Natural Theology as to the righteousness and goodness of God must be sustained by evidence of *fact* as to God's *treatment* of the righteous and the wicked, or it cannot be satisfactory. And, indeed, apart from the demonstration or prediction of the Divine *justice*, the argument for the Divine *goodness* is not only inconclusive, but destructive of itself. Dr. Chalmers argues from the implantation by the Maker of our frame of a conscience within us disapproving wrong, that God himself is proved to hate wrong. This is good evidence if sustained by the actual manner of the Divine government. But with that disapproval of our conscience in the case of wrong, there is also a deserved punishment, and a fearful looking for of judgment. There is a conviction that

wrong-doing deserves not reward but *retribution*, not happiness but *misery*. The misery inflicted by conscience is not regarded by man as God's infliction, but as the *prediction* of God's retributive just interposition. It is the promise of the storm, and if the storm does not come, the indications of conscience are false, and God in his providence is demonstrated as a God *not* hating iniquity, nor punishing it as conscience and Natural Theology declare that it deserves. In proving a condemning conscience, and thus a condemning God, you prove too much, unless you can also demonstrate a retribution; because, without such demonstration there is no answer to the indications of conscience, no corroboration of it, under Divine providence, in the world. Nay, in many cases the wicked prosper, and the righteous are afflicted. They whose conscience condemns them are firm; they whose conscience approves them falter and fall, under God's superintending providence.

In just the degree in which you bring the power and right direction of conscience as a proof of God's righteousness, because it is God who is the author of the conscience, if you stop there in your arguments and go no further, you do in effect bring an accusation against God's justice, because he does not carry into effect what even the natural conscience demands, you leave man's conscience falsified by the terror of God's own government, if you have no other demonstration *than* conscience of God's hatred of sin. But Natural Theology is compelled to go further, and does unless belief go further. And it is surprising that even the most eminent writers often *have* stopped there, relinquishing their whole vantage ground, and as it were drawing away their forces when they were upon the point of having the whole citadel surrendered into their hands. The demonstration of Natural Theology goes much farther. The same inextricable compulsion of necessity from man's own constitution which breaks him down beneath his conscience as a sinner, and compels him to write out in his Natural Theology a sentence against himself, whirling him also into the bosom of an overwhelming conviction of coming retribution; the same dictate of Natural Theology which makes him feel that he is a sinner and that God is just, makes him feel also that God will *manifest* his justice. His very questions of scorning and impiety intimate this. When he asks, Where is the promise of God's coming? he knows in the deep-buried, slow-burning lava of his convictions, and fears that the desired consummation will come. His laughter is hollow; it is like the crackling of thorns under a pot; sometimes it is the painful effort of a soul

"Vaunting aloud, but racked with deep despair."

Dr. Chalmers has expatiated, and with great power and beauty upon the indestructible yearnings and expectings of the human

race after a state of peace, righteousness, and happiness on earth, as a proof of the deep confidence of the race in the goodness of the Deity ; and he has remarked the superiority of that conviction and confidence in our Natural Theology above all contradictory evidence, and all conclusions that seem to militate against it. But we are sure that a much more convincing argument is to be found in the universal expectation of a retribution for sin and injustice, for cruelty and wickedness. This deep indestructible conviction that God is just, and that a time of judgment, and of mighty wrath, is coming, is mightier by far in our Natural Theology, as an evidence of God's goodness, than any mere yearning for a state of holiness and peace ;—that is, mightier in a world of moral evil, in a state of rebellion. This expectation of a retribution, and even demand for it, in the natural conscience of mankind, prepares the race for a revelation of the terms of that judgment, of which God has fixed the bolt of the reality, so to speak, so deeply in the human consciousness, that it cannot be drawn out ; so deeply, that the chain of Revelation shall fasten to it with a force not to be broken, and draw the soul up to God. The conviction of sin and of judgment is the ground of the possibility of salvation.

But there are other ring-bolts, so to speak, in the texture of the soul, which God has fixed there, as indestructible as the soul itself, for revealed truth to fasten to, which Dr. Chalmers seems, by his metaphysical tendencies, to undervalue, but which are of invaluable power, in the true system of Natural Theology. These are the ideas which the soul forms, by the very necessity of its own constitution, by the inevitableness of the working of its own powers, whensoever and wheresoever they are developed. The ideas of God and eternity, for example, are not things manufactured by the mind, out of materials presented in the creation, and put together by reasonings *a posteriori* ; but they are a necessary subjective development in the soul, *occasioned* by the presentation of the objective phenomena of nature. There is a singular tendency in the Scottish mind to distrust these speculations, or a want of the fair and full appreciation of the intuitive power and value of them. And it is interesting to see how the tendency of a nation's mind, will in some degree thwart or imprison even some of the greatest intellects ever formed in our world, but developed under the national mould. The co-ordinate action of the imagination is an important medium for the just appreciation of high philosophic truth, in the direction opposite to the tendencies of materialism ; and certainly this faculty is not so predominant in the Scottish mind, as its disposition to keep close to facts and material calculations, and to work its logic without wings among them. But Dr. Chalmers' imagination was quite predominant and powerful, and it might have been supposed that he would have seized upon the great truths in the philosophic theory of the mind's own intuitive devel-



opment of certain great spiritual realities, and by them carried the argument from Natural Theology, as upon wings, flaming through all space, a manifest demonstration in the eye of the whole world. We wish it had been given him to do this. We seem sometimes in his works to see a giant of Atlantean shoulders, laboring under the weight of a philosophical system which forbade him to rise; yet taking up great truths, and carrying them onward, even with whole mountains of unnecessary toil upon them, with a strength and a spirituality, that, if they had been released from their moorings in a false philosophy, might have shot them blazing through the air to the gaze of nations.

In the philosophical system of Dr. Henry More, and other old English writers of his circle, there was much that might have been used with powerful advantage, by a great Scottish mind, for the spiritualizing of Natural Theology, when it was almost suffocated in the grasp of a materializing metaphysics. A man like Dr. Chalmers, taking the science of Natural Theology on the principles of a spiritual philosophy, and willing to adopt suggestions from such works as the masterly criticism of Locke by Cousin, might have made almost a new science out of it, might have made his work concerning it a much greater advance upon all preceding disquisitions than it was found to be.

The right philosophy of the mind is as important in its place for the pursuit of this subject, as deep piety. One cannot but feel that a mind like Lord Brougham's, even apart from the want of devout personal belief and feeling, was unfitted to behold it afar off, or to touch its sacred precincts. The right philosophy of the mind will carry a man high and dry over the summits of difficulties, up and down which a pedestrian in Mr. Locke's heavy iron-heeled boots moves slowly, and often sinks in bogs, even on level ground, almost to desperation. Indeed, the redemption of natural philosophy from its materialistic tendencies and errors on the one side, and its pantheistic outlawries on the other, would give such incalculably greater freedom and power in all the mind's excursions after truth, that no consummation is more fervently to be desired, short of the universal acceptance and knowledge of Divine truth, than the prevalence of a true philosophy.

On this point the words of Edwards, in his letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland, ought to be soundly weighed. "There is," he says, "no need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all concealed; nor is there any danger in *contemplation* and *profound discovery* in these things. So far from this, that the truth in this matter is of vast importance, and extremely needful to be known; and the more clearly and perfectly the real fact is known and the more constantly it is in view, the better. More particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that which is the true

■ Appendix to his work on the Freedom of the Will.

system of the universe in these respects, would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the true Christian scheme of Divine administration in the city of God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ in its most important articles. Indeed these things never can be well established, and the opposite errors—so subversive of the whole gospel, which at this day so greatly and generally prevail—be well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained answered, till these points are settled. While this is not done, it is to me beyond doubt, that the friends of those great gospel truths will but poorly maintain their controversy with the adversaries of those truths; they will be obliged often to shuffle, hide, and turn their backs; and the latter will have a strong fort from whence they never can be driven, and weapons to use from which those whom they oppose will find no shield to screen themselves: and they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of sound doctrine, and glory and vaunt themselves in their advantage over them; and carry their affairs with a high hand, as they have done already for a long time past."

Dr. Chalmers seemed always to underrate the *a priori* argument, even in Natural Theology, and to prefer the *a posteriori*, because the former had been carried into regions, where it seemed to him intangible, unreal, untenable, if not unintelligible. He had this conviction in regard to Clarke's demonstration of the being of a God. It was unfortunate that he acquired this prejudice generally, however just some of his views may have been in regard to that instance particularly. He kept to the Baconian induction, and was jealous of everything else; though it is very doubtful, if, had Bacon himself applied his system to mental as he did to natural philosophy, this induction would not have appeared in his hands a much more spiritual and *a priori* thing. "It is altogether a mistake," he says in his *Novum Organum*, "to assert that it is our senses that are the measure of things, for the testimony and information of the senses bear always a relation to man, and not to the universe." Again he remarks that "the mind, when affected by things through the senses, does not act in the most trustworthy manner, but inserts and mixes her own nature into that of things, whilst clearing and recollecting his notions." If Locke had remembered this truth, it might have taught him at least to modify his theory; it might have induced in him the discovery, that the ideas which he supposes to come into the mind solely from the senses, are rather the work of the mind itself by the *occasions* of the senses; "the nature of the mind, inserted and mixed with that of things, while clearing and recollecting her notions."

No language can describe the injury inflicted upon science by hypotheses instead of investigations, or hypotheses first, and investigations afterward. The acute mind of Locke was deceived by this "idol." Disgusted with the doctrine of "innate ideas," he

immediately framed an hypothesis of the opposite extreme, and used it as a man uses a dark lantern, which shows him only what is directly before him, what the light of his hypothesis falls upon. The object of his work being to demonstrate that sensation and reflection are the only sources of knowledge, he was effectually prevented from that rigorous analysis of the elements of reason, which, separating the nature of the mind from the notions of things would have distinguished the intuitive creations of the mind from the occasioning perceptions of the senses. It is remarkable that Condillac, who followed Locke in his hypothesis, has at the same time, in the most distinct manner, announced this separation; and if he had followed it, it would have led him on to great discoveries; but his previous hypothesis prevented him; and in order to reconcile his conviction of the nature of mind with this hypothesis, he resorts to the supposition of a change produced by the fall. The passage is very instructive, in more than one direction.

"The soul," says Condillac, "being distinct and different from the body, the latter can be only occasionally the cause of what it seems to produce in the former. From whence we must conclude that the senses are only occasionally the source of our knowledge. But whatever is only occasioned by a thing may be done without it; because in fact it depends on its occasional cause only in a certain case. The soul may therefore absolutely acquire knowledge, without the assistance of the senses. Before the fall it was under quite a different system from the present. Free from ignorance and concupiscence, it had a command over its senses, and suspended or modified their operation as it pleased; consequently it had ideas precedent to the use of the senses. But things are greatly changed through its disobedience. God has deprived it of this command; so that it is become as dependent on the senses, as if they were the physical cause of what they only occasion; and it has no knowledge, but what is conveyed by this channel. Hence arise ignorance and concupiscence. It is this state of the soul which I propose to enquire into; the only one that can properly be the object of philosophy, since it is the only one made known to us by experience. Whenever therefore I happen to say that we have no ideas but what come from the senses, it must be remembered that I speak only of the state into which we are fallen by sin."<sup>1</sup>

Some of the most interesting speculations in philosophy are clustered around this question of the origin of human knowledge. It has much to do with Natural Theology. We would rather believe that this universal frame of nature was designed to discipline man's mind, than to teach him knowledge; to call the powers of his soul into exercise, than to let in light upon it. We believe that to *educate*, and not to *inform* the soul is the great object for which the mind is surrounded with the senses. Through the senses the universe of material things draws forth its powers; it is the soul that clothes the universe with beauty, and not the universe that clothes the soul. These forms and colors of the loveliness of things are in part creations of the mind, modes of the mind's development,

<sup>1</sup> Condillac.—Origin of Human Knowledge, Part. I, Sec. 1.

existence, and seeing, rather than merely disclosures of sense to soul. Hence we say, this goodly frame of things, these pictured walls of sensible images, these *flammantia mœnia mundi* that encircle us around, are intended for our soul's education. They are not to fill us with knowledge, but to make us evolve it, as it were, in the exercise of our powers; they are but as the mulberry-leaf to the silk-worm, which feeds upon it, indeed, but spins its beautiful fabric from itself. They are not to teach us the idea of God, but to develop that idea in ourselves, and to lead our souls to our Creator.

It is the mistake of some philosophers to attribute to that external frame of creation the origin of those ideas, which are as it were, but the busy intuitive powers of our own minds, arranging on painting the drapery of nature. We hold that the *a posteriori* argument for the being and attributes of God, if not altogether inferior to the *a priori*, is at least worth very little without it; and that this fair creation of ours is rather as a slate or black-board, which God hath given us to draw upon it those lessons, conclusions, and demonstrations in regard to himself, which in the nature of mind he hath made inevitable, than a revelation to teach those demonstrations. Nature is the diagram presented to us, and the soul rejoices to meet it, and in its contemplation to evolve the demonstration in the exercise of its own powers. And this we say again, is God's gracious method in educating us; if he had written out the argument upon his works, it had not been half so good for us; it is all the difference between the education of a boy in geometry, by writing down the demonstration beneath the diagram, and merely setting him to read it, and on the other hand giving him the diagram, and making him evolve the demonstration from his own mind.

And this brings to mind that beautiful remark of Lord Bacon, that "with regard to the sciences that contemplate nature, the sacred philosopher declares it to be the glory of God to conceal a thing, but of the king to search it out; just as if the Divine Spirit were wont to be pleased with the innocent and gentle sport of children, who hide themselves that they may be found; and had chosen the human soul as a playmate out of his indulgence and goodness towards man."

There are then these grand steps in the science of being in relation to God. First, the constitution and course of nature, that is, of the whole universe so far as it is discoverable by us, and more especially of this world as ruled by God's ordinary providence. From the nature and constitution of the world as it is, we arrive at the conclusions of Natural Theology in regard to God and ourselves. Our Natural Theology arises out of the facts as they present themselves in the system of Nature, and in ourselves as a part of it. We reason first from ourselves to God, then from God to

ourselves, then from God and ourselves related we reason to the future unknown world. It is a process of as strict and severe reasoning as any process in mathematics, when from given known quantities you are to find unknown. Next, as the third grand step, Revealed Theology comes down from Heaven, to meet, assume, arrange, and bring life out of those facts in our Natural Theology, under which we are shut up in condemnation. Our Natural Theology is as the lightning-rod, pointing towards heaven. It predicts the lightning, and draws it from the skies; but, unlike the arrangement of our physical science, which, founded on our knowledge of the relation between the elements of heaven and earth, we make to shield ourselves *from* the lightning, conducting it away from ourselves, our Natural Theology *alone* is a conductor that draws it directly *upon* ourselves, and cannot suggest any possible way of escape from it. Our Revealed Theology only in coming out of Heaven and meeting the point of Natural Theology which demands it, reveals an element of *life* as well as of *destruction*; the lightning of Heaven passes by our Natural Theology into the earth's bosom, but, if we please, not as an element of destruction, but of life. But the life is pure revelation; it is an unexpected interposition, by which to our amazement, to the wonder, indeed, and admiration of the universe, these flashes from Heaven which Natural Theology predicted must destroy us, and for which it put its points to draw down the destruction upon us, are changed into the radiance of Divine love into the stream of infinite, costly, atoning mercy, bringing salvation instead of the consuming lightnings of retribution to our souls; putting salvation in our power if we will accept of it while the lightnings are withheld, or while they flash as yet only at a distance, until it can be known what disposition we make of the offer of mercy through the sacrifice of the Son of God. If that offer is rejected; then the lightnings *only* are in reserve; and both Natural and Revealed religion combine to direct them upon the soul by a necessity as inevitable as that of God's own existence and goodness, and with a burning infinitely more terrible, because the unexpected, undeserved interposition of infinite mercy was rejected. The revelation of mercy was wholly unknown before-hand; the revelation of retribution becomes a thousand-fold more certain, when the revelation of mercy being known, is with awful fixedness and hardihood of guilt rejected.

In our attempts to trace the light of Nature, the extent of its condemnation of us as sinners, and the information it gives us as to that retribution which is to come, we are made to see with great power and clearness the preciousness of the gospel. We are prepared to understand the force of Paul's question, How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation? Remark here the nature of the word used, *neglect*. It is not a deliberate rejection of the gospel which is needed to destroy the soul, but a sim-

ple neglect of it; just a neglect of its provisions, a passing them by untouched; that is enough. And that, viewed aright, comprehends a guilt, of the greatness of which we have no adequate conception. To think that the great God of the universe should interpose in pity to our lost, helpless, desperate condition, and interpose in such a way, at such a cost, with such infinite love, in so mighty a scheme of redemption, by the assumption of humanity in the person of his Son, and the death of that Son upon the cross, to hold back the retribution from our souls, and make the offer of deliverance both from sin and retribution forever, and that we, on our part, should treat this amazing arrangement and offer of infinite compassion with just as profound a neglect, just as heedless an unconcern, as if we had no interest in it! Ah, there will be retribution for that! If nature herself calls for the punishment of guilt beneath the light of nature, then all the powers and beings in the universe, all justice, all piety, all goodness, will call for and secure the reward of such ingratitude and contempt.

The problems of Natural Theology therefore may be stated thus. Given, the constitution and course of nature, to find out God and man, with their mutual relations. The grand known quantities resulting from this are, God, in his righteousness, man in his depravity. This found, the problem stands thus. As the course and constitution of nature are to the Divine and human attributes, with their relations, so these attributes and their relations are to the course and constitution of the future world. Or in other words, given, the righteousness of God and the depravity of man, with their relations, as gathered from the present course and constitution of nature, to demonstrate, from that righteousness on the one hand, and that depravity on the other, continuing as they are, the course and constitution of the future world. Now there being no shadow of evidence, promise, or expectation that either that righteousness or that depravity will change, but every proof that both will continue, and become clearer in their eternal relations, the demonstration hence resulting from guilt in this world of retribution in the next, is as strict and firm as the demonstration of God's and man's existence.

Now, then, let infidelity have its course in regard to Revelation, or the doctrines of Revelation: let it have its desire, and let Revelation be as though it had not been, and what is thereby gained, either to the race, or to a single individual of it, but absolute certainty of inevitable retribution? Undoubtedly, the reason why men ever wish to cast off the claims of Revelation, is because Revelation so clearly condemns and sentences mankind as sinners, and throws the whole race, as a lost race, upon the mere sovereign mercy and grace of God in Christ Jesus. But suppose you get rid of those claims, and throw yourself back upon the mercy of Nature, without a Revelation. Are you more secure?

You have got rid of a Saviour, but the condemnation of Nature remains. If, in throwing off Revelation and its terms of mercy, you could also throw off that condemnation, and establish your innocence, then indeed it were something for a wicked man to get rid of Revelation ; although a good man would choose the Revelation with its Saviour, rather than Nature with its innocence. But while you have thrown from you a Saviour, the condemnation of Nature falls back upon you. You have denied and rejected Christ, indeed, but you have Barabbas on your hands, notwithstanding. Is it not plain that your condition is incomparably more hopeless ? A demonstration which you cannot evade, a demonstration in yourself, in your race, and in God's providence, shuts you up to the conviction of guilt and the certainty of retribution. Without a Revelation, the certainty of retribution is the most perfectly demonstrated certainty in all your circle of spiritual knowledge. You are not more certain that there is a spiritual world, and that there are spiritual beings besides yourself in God's universe, than you are that in that world the attributes of God and of your own being will be more fully developed and clearly manifested than they are in this world. And such development can result in nothing but a more perfect retribution than is experienced here. Such development promises for sin nothing *but* retribution. Out of Revelation you are shut up to retribution. The system of Nature itself cuts you off from everything but that. Out of Revelation you have no claims on God but just only that he should do justice upon you for your sins.

We see, then, that the system of Revelation is infinitely more kind and merciful, with all its severity, than that of Nature. The system of Nature reveals guilt and retribution ; the system of Revelation opens a world of grace and mercy. The system of infidelity is more gloomy and dreadful than the most extreme caricature of Calvinism ever yet invented, for it cuts mankind utterly off from hope, and leaves nothing but the blackness of darkness forever. If the selfishness and malevolence of human depravity are shown in one thing more than another, they are in the attempt to put out the light of Revelation ; and if the *madness* of human depravity is anywhere especially manifested, it is in the rejection of Revelation, because it republishes the unmistakable condemnation of Nature. And hence the intense terms of detestation and contempt in which the infidel is branded in God's Word, as a creature whose light is turned into darkness, is putrefied into a glare of corruption, leading down to hell.

## ARTICLE VI.

## THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INTELLECT TO RELIGION.

By REV. CHARLES WHITE, D. D., President of Wabash College, Indiana.

THE value of intelligence and intellectual power to individuals and communities, has been the theme of constant discussion and eloquence in this country from the earliest foundation of our Institutions. Education has become here a household word. That extensive popular instruction and prevalent cultivation of the higher branches of learning lie underneath, as a large part of the effective basis of true liberty, of social order, of political eminence, is emphatically an American idea. Not more characteristic and national are even our scenery, our cities, our manners. Mental treasures and mental power open their influences into our republican society chiefly through their action on the great social reformer, true Christianity. By ministering largely to the potency and the diffusion among men of this powerful agent, they minister most effectively to a radical and general regeneration of the community. Here is suggested therefore an important subject of discussion viz., *The Contributions of Intellect to Religion*. This is a matter of deep interest alike to the Christian citizen and the Christian scholar. It constitutes a noble justification of the large appropriations of liberal-minded Christians to the cause of sound learning: it presents a great and constraining motive to the church to encourage liberal studies with a generous and hearty patronage.

I. A superior understanding is capable of making an essential contribution to religion by settling satisfactorily its evidences. This is to be done, first, by direct argumentation, and then by clearing away all opposing objections. These labors though two in name converge to the same great result, the establishment of Christians on a "foundation of God," immovable forever.

The proofs of religion do not lie in relief upon the surface, do not force themselves upon observation, do not compel conviction. In respect to internal evidences, it is true, a sincere, full-hearted piety affords such assistance to a just appreciation of the value and power of religious truth as partially to supercede research and reasoning. So rich in this case is the spirit's own experience of the Scriptural things of God, it either sees no need of following out elaborate argumentation, or, if such argumentation be followed, it admits conclusions with an unusual readiness, satisfaction, and heartiness. But the very communities, where an es-



tablishment of the truth of religion is specially important, are always those essentially deficient in godliness, and of course in needed heart-responses and confirmations of what God has revealed. Even in this department of the argument, therefore, Christianity must undergo the severest examination, and its internal proofs as well as others, be stated and urged by the profoundest skill, and under the forms of the fairest logic and the fullest elucidation.

The direct evidences of religion involve several important preliminary discussions. One of these respects the need and probability of *any* revelation from Heaven. This comprehends elaborate inquiries, philosophical and historical, in relation to the possible and actual influences upon man and society, of all other meliorating causes besides a direct Divine communication, as science, literature, government, human systems of morality. Another preliminary inquiry respects the being of a great First Cause. This includes a question in reference to the existence of spirit at all. In the direct establishment of the great fact that there is an uncreated, independent, eternal Creator and Upholder of all things, instruction and proof are to be sought from all reasonings and knowledges; from all matter, pebble or plant; from all mind, infants' or angels'; from outward handiworks or interior mysteries. Even these matters merely introductory to the evidences of Christianity, lead into very wide fields and demand much intellectual acquisition and ability.

In proceeding immediately to the evidences establishing the Scriptures as a Divine revelation, there meets us first, the extensive subject of the Genuineness and Authenticity both of the Old and the New Testaments. This includes a laborious and critical examination of many varieties of external proof. It comprehends the question of Authorship, and the whole subject of language, style, historic coincidence, uncorrupted preservation.

Next comes the Credibility of the Old and New Testaments. The discussion here embraces, the moral character of the sacred writers: their incapacity of being deceived or deceiving in relation to the facts which they declare: the admission of the same facts by thousands, both friends and enemies, who could at once have disproved them if false: collateral confirmations from Natural and Civil History, coins, medals and marbles.

Then follows the great subject of the Inspiration of the Scriptures. This involves an examination of all the miracles of the sacred Record, in respect to their nature, design and credibility, as also of all popish and pagan pretences to miraculous power. It also involves an investigation of the whole body of Prophecies included in the sacred Volume, along with their dates, interpretations, fulfilments. Lastly are the Internal Evidences alluded to as improper to be omitted in the discussion. This is no less a

subject than the character and power of all the doctrines and precepts which Infinite Wisdom and Goodness have revealed to the world.

This is but a mere allusion to subject-matters claiming attention in treating the evidences of religion—but a rapid reference to general heads, chiefly in the way of simple enumeration. Each topic here referred to, runs out into a great number of subordinate branches, and these subordinates have themselves their many ramifications. The most insignificant theme of the whole has thoughts for a volume. No department of human inquiry presents a field of greater width to be traversed and deeper mines to be explored than the Christian Evidences. There is no subject which requires to be more studied, more questioned, more argued. To be sifted, canvassed, scrutinized, by the most powerful minds of every age, was evidently the allotment designed for Christianity by its great Author. So he intended it should win its way and make its triumphs. Desiring for it no alliance with the State, no stipend from the public treasury, no authority from legislative decrees, Heaven committed it in a world of enemies to the sole advocacy of voluntary friends. This advocacy is itself an intellectual labor, massive and important enough for the most eminent talent which Divine Providence has already given or may be expected hereafter to bestow on the church. Whoever reads Warburton, Bently, Jones, Butler, Lightfoot, Watson, Michaelis, Eichhorn, Lardner, Marsh, and authors like them, numerous and illustrious, will be satisfied that the proof of religion demands more intense thought, more profound study, more accuracy and compass of learning, more power of argument and illustration than any other one subject, Divine or human. The connection of intelligence with Christianity in the matter of its evidences, is therefore indispensable, vital. As the earnest and able labors of intellect in settling the Divinity of Christianity settle the question of its existence, its acknowledgment, its power among men, the value of their labors can be measured only by measuring all the spiritual good on the earth attendant upon revealed religion. There is a vast debt already due from the people of God to gifted intellect, for disclosing to them what foundations lie immovable underneath their Christian faith and their eternal hopes. That debt is more likely to be augmented than diminished. So long as there shall be believing men and devout, of increasing zeal, there will be infidels and scoffers waxing bold and bitter against the truth. Whatever other labors of mind shall cease to be needed, therefore, these that settle and fortify Christianity can never be remitted. Whatever other intellectual achievements may be attempted or neglected, whatever other mental victories may be lost or won, the practical achievements and victories of mind in the sphere of Christian evidences will bear just the importance

and value which Christianity itself bears as the great regenerator of mankind. In the whole grand and protracted struggle here on the earth between darkness and light, evil and good, they pioneer and assure the immense result.

These remarks upon the contributions of intellect and learning to Christianity, have referred to direct proofs, to a settlement of its own foundation, not to alleged objections and hostile attacks. Elevated intellect and intelligence perform another important service in behalf of the Christian evidences by removing averred difficulties and repelling assailants. There is a good illustration of this service in the successful disposition which has been made of a plausible geological objection set up against the truth and authority of the Mosaic cosmogony.

The Christian world was startled a few years ago by the announcement on the part of Geologists, that the Scripture account of the creation is an egregious mistake, that Moses has given to the world "a fable of his own time, a mere tradition of a credulous age." The crust of the earth, they confidently asserted, has forty successive strata holding vegetable and animal remains. In some instances, they inform us, aquatic deposits alternate with terrestrial, indicating that inundation and subsidence, a wet and a dry state have, at unknown intervals, been made to follow each other. Each of these forty strata, it is with no less assurance affirmed, could have occupied no less than ten hundred thousand years. This makes the age of the creation at least forty millions of years, and the six thousand years as stated in the Bible no more than "a single hour of the almost innumerable centuries" which have elapsed since the worlds were made. Even the distinguished Babbage was confounded, we are told, by these unhesitating assertions of Geology and, abandoning the old interpretations of Moses, was driven to the confession that our ability to interpret the Hebrew records of the creation is not to be depended on. "They are," he states, "like an antique marble, the terms of a lost language which we cannot hope to recover." Powell tells us that "the Mosaic statement was intended indeed for an historical narrative and a literal history, but is the language of figure and poetry," so that Jehovah in accomplishing the work of creation is revealed as in the ritual dispensation, "under the veil of apologue and parable." But what then is to become of the simple faith of the Christian world? If the great mass of believers, lettered and unlettered, have been deluded by the apparently perspicuous narrative in the book of Genesis; if that be either an allegory that is inexplicable, or a plain statement that is false and groundless, what assurance have they that any part of the Scriptures is sober, intelligible truth or a communication from Heaven? There is no need of alarm. Whenever religion needs from the human mind a service, however great or difficult, intel-

lects of adequate power appear and perform it; whenever a cloud settles on the path-way of truth, a luminary of competent effulgence rises to scatter it all away. The unsophisticated people of God, awhile in sore dismay, saw the darkness which was shut down thick before them suddenly taken up and gathered in behind them in the face of their pursuers, so that their own way was left all opened and clear. Gifted servants of the church gave themselves to the interpretation of the Mosaic narrative, who dissipated the obscurity which had been created and presented the whole subject to the believers in the Bible in a form most intelligible, luminous and satisfactory. The exposition of the Scriptural account of the creation, now alluded to as an entire removal of the modern geological objection is concerned chiefly with the true import and relation of the first two verses of Genesis. The sacred Volume sententiously opens: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Here is the immense announcement, that at some epoch "in the flow of infinite duration," at some point not revealed, having an eternity previous to it, "so much of this world as first had existence came into being solely by the wisdom, the will, the power of the one and only God." In the beginning God *created* the heavens and the earth. The great act as here declared was no modelling, no second forming, no designating to a special purpose, but in the full and proper sense a *creation*—literally, without preëxistent materials, a creation.

The second verse, in sublime simplicity adds, "And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." Here it is pertinent and important to inquire, what is the connection of this statement with the previous one, of an actual, original creation. Hebrew scholars are all familiarly aware that the particle standing between the two announcements rendered *and* may be copulative, or disjunctive, or continuative. Some competent philologist who has examined the sacred text assures his readers, that on the first two leaves of the Hebrew Bible the word is translated thus, but, now, also. A most natural, fair, legitimate version of both passages therefore is this: "In the beginning God *created* the heavens and the earth, but the earth was formless and void. At one epoch, in the infinite past never to be revealed or known came the visible creation from the omnipotent hand of Jehovah: at another epoch comparatively recent where the Scriptural narrative begins, the earth was in a condition of disorganization and ruin. The next and third great fact in this history is, that in six natural days God renewed, re-adjusted, improved the earth and the heavens, for the residence and happiness of man, a more intelligent and dignified inhabitant than had ever before occupied it. How long a period elapsed from the proper creation as stated in the first announcement, to the waste and desolation stated in the second, out of which arose

the munificent arrangements of the six days of Almighty power, we have no information. Between these two points there might have revolved millions, tens of millions, or even hundreds of millions of years. Be it so then that Geologists are right in their judgment, that the present mineralogical constitution of the earth must have resulted from the working of unnumbered and almost incalculable centuries. We point them to this immense interval to which neither God nor man have stated the boundary. We allege that here was room and facility for all the changes which are alleged to have been wrought. There is nothing in the Divine Record to forbid the supposition that they were then effected but everything to permit it. Doubtless that unmeasured tract was largely occupied with production and deposition, submersion and elevation, the extinction of some races of plants and animals to leave their impressions, the creation of others to follow them. These successive cycles of growths and decays, of formations and re-formations, assisted unquestionably to fit the world for the higher order of physical life and of sentient being for which it seems to have been designed. No less probably did there accumulate in subterranean recesses coal, metals, and other materials for the denser population of the later and millennial centuries of the world. It seems well, wise, worthy of God, during those previous ages alluded to, thus to hoard up treasures for an exalted race of beings afterwards to be created: as also, when in fulness of time his noblest creature was actually formed, to make for him a fair and fitting residence by reducing the world to a more perfect order, to a higher illumination, fertility and beauty than it had ever known before.

Where now is the triumph of Geology over the truthfulness of the Scripture history of the creation? The sublime and graphic narrative of Moses is retained with its most simple and obvious interpretation, and yet a space of untold ages found, sufficient for all the stratification, deposition, upheaving, dissolution, which students of nature profess to have discovered in the crust of the earth.

This is a single instance in which in a pressure and an exigency the learned friends of religion have rallied and risen in power to her aid; in which intellect has met intellect, research met research, science met science, and thereby the Bible been rescued from the polluting hand and calumnious breath of the infidel and profane, and a new volume of light been gathered from the collision upon its great and sacred truths. Constant service of a similar character is urgently demanded of all strong educated minds devoted to the defence of religion. The Scriptures are exposed to all the insidious thrusts, the bold misrepresentation, the ingenious sophistry, the venomous sarcasm of which the most perverted and powerful intellects are capable. They are also

exposed to be rejected by great numbers in consequence of objections which act covertly and silently on the mind and heart. What doubting men are not able to substantiate as actual difficulties of revelation they hesitate to speak of, but nevertheless leave lying secretly in their minds unsolved to undermine and shake their faith to its foundations. It is not easy to measure the value of those researches, arguments, illustrations which, after the truth of religion has been settled solidly by direct proofs, then solve and clear away the pretended absurdities and imperfections arrayed against it by sneers, insinuations and open allegations. Through such intellectual contributions Christianity goes to an infidel world with new invincibility: to Christians unlettered as well as others with a fresh assurance not only that there is an immovable rock underneath them, but that no hostile endeavors shall ever be able to force them from their solid foundation.

II. Learning may bring important aid to Christianity by the exposure and removal of the erroneous systems of faith and counterfeit forms which ever attend its promulgation. The first effort against religion just now considered was designed to destroy it outright by invalidating directly or indirectly the proofs adduced of its Divine origin and character. Other endeavors, no less formidable and violent, are made to alloy its crystal purity, to mutilate its majestic form, to obscure its perfect light, to debase its glorious doctrines, to sink its infinite claims, to diminish its supreme authority.

Christianity has been often deeply vitiated and marred by the modellings and tings of false and visionary systems of philosophy. The indefensible novelties and theories of philosophical speculations, attractive by an obscurity taken for profoundness, impressive by a mysterious nomenclature taken for an extraordinary originality, have generally first deceived even their enthusiastic authors and advocates themselves. Then, under the bold impulse of personal confidence, and the quenchless ardor of personal sincerity, they push their erroneous and mischievous reasonings into every department of religious opinion. These false philosophies gain the more believers and become the more dangerous in consequence of their studied and boasted alliance with many fundamental, revealed, endeared truths. Suspicion is in this way laid asleep, and the most absurd and ruinous dogmas, because linked with principles precious to the heart, are extensively swallowed without struggling or fear.

The ideal philosophy, numbering among its believers some of the most distinguished of modern metaphysicians, as presented by Kant, Fichte and others, sets out with the great noble truth, that the thinking element in man is an existence which, though lodged in a physical frame, dwells in its own principles of life, action and

duration, isolated and independent. This is a glorious philosophy, exclaim its disciples. In making the spirit an essence, an energy, a being irrespective of the body, it makes it a true divinity within us. The next allegation, no less honorable and elevating to our spiritual nature is, that the soul, beside an endowment of independent powers, is capable of thoughts and emotions entirely foreign to the senses and to the material world. This is by far a greater exaltation. The spirit of man is now presented clean, high and superior above "all the grossness, all the fluctuations, all the dissolutions" of material things. Change and perish the heavy elements about it as they may, itself a richer and nobler existence pursues its inquiries and happiness in a sphere exclusively its own. This captivating idealism advances another step in its speculations. The soul, so independent of the body, so foreign and superior in many of its feelings and thoughts to the senses that minister to it and the materiality in the midst of which it lives, possesses, it asserts, innate thoughts, "thoughts before and without thinking," in other terms innate knowledge, "knowledge before and without studying." This is an ascription of attributes to the spiritual man decidedly and broadly in advance of the previous bold liberality. Here this plausible, insinuating system waxes utterly fearless and from these premises, regarded by it as high vantage ground, leaps to a hazardous and fatal conclusion. The little world within, constituted of elements so rich, so independent, so powerful, so original, so self-living, and self-advancing, it positively alleges, *is itself all that is really existence!* The external world, it assumes, is only forms of what exists in the mind so transferred by a beautiful fancy as to appear an outward scene. *The reality* of nothing, it is maintained, can be proved save our own minds. Objects without are inferences deduced from intellectual phenomena and exist solely as mental affections!! The philosophy of Cousin is of the same school, with some modifications. This writer admits the existence of things external, but insists strenuously that there is but one substance in the universe, and no substantial distinction between God, man, and the material world. Thus the French philosopher, notwithstanding some juster previous opinions, arrives at the same position which the German metaphysicians had reached before—cold, desolate, unmitigated Pantheism. Consistent with their peculiar reasonings, Kant and Fichte assert, that we neither know nor believe anything of God separately and independently of our own minds, and that the Divinity is nothing more than mind considered absolutely and not individualized in any particular being. Cousin, as just stated, sees no distinction between God, man, and gross, dead matter! This teaching is more than Pantheism. It is dark, absolute atheism. It shuts the Creator out of his own world. We had thought ourselves with exalted emotions evermore in the impres-

sive presence of his great infinite attributes. But this dreamy infidel idealism annihilates him! extinguishes all his sublime glories forever!

There is another philosophy, the direct opposite of this, which affirms that matter is the only real existence, mind only the principle of animal life or simply a refined faculty of the body, and the universe therefore naught but an assemblage of the forms and properties of matter. Hume and Helvetius are eminent among the advocates of this gross and infidel materialism. Condillac, a modified disciple of this school of reckless philosophizing, rather dogmatizing, first having planted himself upon the great doctrine of Locke, that sensation or reflection is the source of all our knowledge, jumps to the position at a single bound, that sensation comprehends man's whole being: that his intellectual faculties are modes of sensation, and all his perceptions and affections nothing more than sensations themselves. Man, according to this dreaming, morally and intellectually, is in reality the creation of this outward world! Any inanimate figure once endowed with susceptibility of sensation, even less than that of a polypus or an oyster, by the action of external objects in favoring positions and circumstances, will become without any other aid a Newton, a Bacon, a Locke!! The inspiration of the Almighty to breathe a spirit into man is superseded. Humanity is an irresponsible machinery—a favored lump of organized matter. The world is unpeopled. Immortality is extinguished!

The destructive influence of such reckless theories and speculations can neither be calculated nor conceived. They are deeply tincturing the philosophy and faith of our age. They have stolen to our firesides, and succeeded, to some degree, in giving character to the religious meditations and frame of spirit of the people of God themselves. Their tendencies and results on the irreligious world, God only can comprehend!

These wild systems are constantly putting on new phases and new names. In every form assumed however they claim to be angels of light. Whenever doubted of, in consequence of their strangeness of visage, they are at once asserted to be new orders of angelic visitants which have never before descended to our world. All these unsound and destructive teachings, whatever their claims to originality and truth, must be met and their real character and pregnant mischiefs be fully laid open. It is the function of intellect and learning to hold up the brilliances of truth to such errors and absurdities; if they walk in open day, to reveal the mask by which their true visage is hidden; if they lurk in dark corners, to follow them with a light clear enough to expose their rottenness and uncover the processes of their deleterious influence. It is not enough that cultivated and gifted minds attempt counteraction and cure when, having widely per-



vailed and injured, ruinous opinions *force* themselves upon their attention. Intellectual mixtures, at the moment of being offered to a credulous and incautious generation, must by analysis have their vices detected and exposed. As guardians of the public safety, these minds may exercise even an earlier vigilance. They may examine the shelves of our metaphysical apothecaries throughout, and label every noxious and deadly article poison, *before* it goes abroad on its work of evil. For this they are entirely competent as well as responsible. Let them therefore meet every new dogma and philosophy at its birth, and attend it to the threshold of its public circulation. Let them make men aware what speculations are seeking to enter their parlors, to find their way to the side of Locke and Edwards in their libraries, to mingle themselves in the ministrations of their pulpits. For this guardianship of men against dangerous intellectual impositions, properly committed to talents and learning, there is no other possible provision. Invaluable, wholly indispensable, therefore, are their contributions against the many stealthy errors which, under the guise of a fair philosophy threaten the deep and ruinous debasement of Christianity.

Christianity has also been frequently perverted and deteriorated under the two great counterfeits, formalism and fanaticism. The golden calf worship of Horeb and the service of strange fire by Nadab and Abihu, were early instances of these corruptions. No one appetency has ever appeared in human society stronger than that which has existed to the one or the other of these debasements of religion. Though apparent opposites, they are nearly allied, and as substitutes for evangelical faith and practice equally to be deprecated. Fanaticism is composed of spiritual fervors, elevations, reverences, abstractions, sentimentalities. It is not so much calm, clear gushings out of a deep well-spring of holiness in the interior of the soul, as flashes and impulses on the surface. It is not so much a reasonable, inextinguishable love toward God and man, as a pleasing, cherished ecstasy, confined to the heart where it has been awaked. It is more faithful to the suggestions of its own enthusiasm than to its sacred obligations. It seems often more ready to cross wide seas to make one proselyte than to save a whole community at home from eternal death. It seems more fervent in prayer for an angelic visit and Heaven's endorsement of a favorite dogma, than for Divine forgiveness, the indwelling of the Spirit, and personal sanctification. The man of fanaticism, deeming himself the special and privileged favorite of Heaven, the chosen of God to see visions, dream dreams, and receive revelations, is much blown up with spiritual pride, self-confidence, immense expectations, but much and alarmingly wanting in grace and ripeness for the kingdom of God.

Formalism is the natural offspring of fanaticism. Our sum of

excitability being quickly exhausted by extravagant enthusiasm, the moral system sinks to léthargy, just as debility follows fever; just as coldness of heart to actual wretchedness, succeeds extraordinary sensibilities in behalf of fictitious woe. The spirit, after flaming fanatical zeal, being left callous and petrified, outward religious services will be necessarily soulless forms. The grand depot of formalism is the same as in fanaticism, a destitution or exceeding depression of real godliness. Piety fainted or quite extinct, all the rest is ceremonial inevitably, as the juices ebbing or wholly gone, our tree is a dry form. It is true also that men, in consequence of being painfully sensible of interior deficiency, make active and eager search after some imposing externals and physicals as a pacification to the conscience. Wherever the tendency is to the outward as a substitute for piety, nearly in the proportion of men's departure from the healthy inner glow of godliness will be their adoption of ostentatious observances, just as we thicken our exterior costume when we recede from the fire. Formalism is attended by a peculiar metaphysical style of thinking and of religious inculcation. Metaphysics are fled to in the absence of a true inward life, in order to escape the law of the Lord which is exceeding broad, in order, amid unintelligible subtleties to hide away from the frowning visitations of the Almighty. In the same way diplomatists escape a present submission or an impending vengeance by inexplicable discriminations and mazy discussions of right.

The two great instances of fanaticism and formalism are Paganism and Papacy. But unfortunately these are not the only instances. In every place upon the earth where religion has had a settlement, in every condition to which religion has yet attained, there has been reckless enthusiasm, artificial fire, zeal without knowledge, as also excessive reliances upon forms, garniture, physical sanctity. Both these corruptions pervade all religious communities at the present time, and are working moral evils great and fatal. One is a scorching flame, the other is a shivering cold. What that is green or living of the fairest spiritual scene will be likely to remain without blight or injury from their presence? Assuming, as do their counterfeits, to occupy among men the place of true religion, to breathe her benign spirit, to possess her elements of power and to bear her treasury of blessings, unless their heartlessness and impotency are made to be distrusted and abandoned, little can be done to bring men under the legitimate transforming influence of a Scriptural faith, piety and worship. Why should they flee to the true ark, who deem themselves in a sound ship already? How shall true coin be made to circulate so long as a spurious currency is permitted to subserve the purposes of exchange? It is indispensable that these false and destructive substitutes for religion be swept clean away and

the ground be left free for all the accomplishments of power and mercy within the reach of a true evangelicism.

Mind in its best endowments is able to render here an invaluable service. Much to be relied on for the removal of fanaticism and formalism, it will be instantly decided in the encouragement of all that tends to give health, depth and vigor to existing religious susceptibility and piety. A large intelligence has decidedly such a tendency. Sound, able thinkers will be likely to preserve that calm, profound, equable, intense condition of the moral affections which must act strongly to secure themselves against a superstitious and spurious Christianity. The fact that a corrupted faith and worship sometimes have carried captive talents and learning does not prove talents and learning not conservative, only not resistlessly so. Besides self-preservation, good, ripe minds may be to wide communities the source of a general mental cultivation and liberal-mindedness, which serve strongly to resist and remove tendencies to ecclesiastical delusions. Such minds have in their power other forces against this drift of society towards extravagant fire and icy cumbrousness. They can moderate, rectify, guide. On the principle of preoccupation and substitution, they can offer to combustible zeal and staid ceremoniousness, objects and services which are sufficiently exciting, arousing, regular, imposing, at the same time that they are truly pure, philanthropic and ennobling. Christianity has glories and duties suiting such a purpose perfectly. As a dogma, a principle, a faith once delivered to the saints, it is not a body of cold facts and dry mathematical verities, but a system of doctrines and announcements possessing momentous, thrilling, unutterable, infinite interest. As a practice, a worship and an affection, it is not a matter of frigid and measured legalities, reverences, pharisaisms, but a spontaneous life, an ever-breathing devotion, a whole-hearted benevolence. If in this its own warm, spiritual, exalted character the religion of the Bible be presented, it may take up and appropriate to the noblest purposes most if not all the formal and fanatic material which exists in a community. This would be avoiding an explosion by opening an ampler chamber for the urgent element, an overflow of banks by making a more capacious channel for the current. This would be dissuading from reliance upon the image and the shadow by showing the original and the substance. Whenever men's susceptibilities to the beautiful, the sublime, the pure, have been skilfully ministered to by fair representations of the infinite grace and glory investing the objects and truths, the duties and hopes of religion, a false relish for the superficial and gorgeous without, and the visionary and ecstatic within have been vastly discouraged.

Let religion be set forth, therefore, by its learned friends as it is, a great light, and life and power. Let it be carried by them into

the hearts of men as an inspiration and a resurrection, so as to leave there a feeling soul "under the ribs of death." Let the cold and drowsy be made to feel it all about them as something which shines, sparkles, warms, awakes; the enthusiastic and impetuous, as something which bends the spirit to penitence for sins, insists on a full sanctification, moves to live soberly, righteously and godly.

The last remark in reference to living righteously and godly suggests that an injunction of earnest religious activities, by the guardians of a pure Christianity, will act as a valuable remedy against fanaticism and formalism. None disposed at all to religion are satisfied with mere faith and feeling. Without efficient service there is a painful consciousness of deficiency and a consequent strong longing and impulsion towards either actual or outward doing, the semblances and accompaniments of outward doing, or, in lack of these, an additional quantity of soul reveries and sallies of passion. If great labors for human good are not made to occupy and absorb and gratify men, they will become greedy of rituals and robes and processions and bodily subserviences and ghost visits and supernatural illuminations and spiritual ecstasies. Let the abettors of an uncorrupted religion learn a lesson here and undertake to satisfy the noble thirsting of the human spirit for action and accomplishment, by making men conscious under what an accumulation of obligations they live to employ every power possessed and attainable in promoting great, solid utilities around them. Let them seek to set men alive to the construction of society in nobler forms, to the awaking of masses of sleeping intellect, to self-sacrifices for the banishment of sins and woes, to the creation of a rich scene of moral life and heavenly righteousness. Let those inclined to become formalists and fanatics be urged to undertake a voyage of peril and shipwreck with Paul, to make a "circumnavigation of charity" with Howard, to spend days and nights in the deep, to plunge into infected atmospheres, to visit the sick and minister to the needy at the imminent risk of life; let them be pushed into sweating labors until they see appearing under their own hand, truth and honor, industry and thrift, enterprise and advancement, education and benevolence, godliness and worship—their unfavorable tendencies will have totally vanished, like incipient miasmas, the moment the underlaying exhalant waters are flowed briskly off to the irrigation of thirsty fields. Our Missionary, Tract, Bible and other eleemosynary movements are grand instrumentalities against superstitions in religion. Who ever heard of a stauuch, zealous operator in these great charities, or a missionary seated at the foot of the cross to offer light and life to fellow-men in the midnight of paganism, growing into a formalist or a fanatic. Even the Jesuit himself, though stereotyped into both long before he sets forth on his

mission, has his peculiarities, greatly meliorated in his new circumstances.

By the methods here suggested, by direct earnest encouragement of a sincere life-like godliness; by the active diffusion of a large and liberal intelligence; by unfolding to an excitable world, an exciting Christianity of great grandeurs, great illuminations, great ardors; by arousing mankind forth to all practicable activities, sacrifices, accomplishments—by these and other means not alluded to, intellect and learning may make truly important and munificent contributions in behalf of an uncorrupted religion.

III. Intellectual acquisition and power contribute essential assistance in giving religion influence on man and society. This aid is rendered in the first place by promoting a fuller understanding and appreciation of Divine truth. Of the vast and infinite things of Christianity, there will be a large and clear apprehension, other things being equal, in proportion as the mental faculties are expanded, invigorated, instructed. The minds of La Place and Bowditch in their tender childhood were incapable of the notion of such a globe as Jupiter. The figures which represent its circumference and diameter and superficies, through feeble capacity, could convey to them no adequate conception of so immense a world. But in the maturity of their powers those mathematicians weighed that orb, as in a balance. They measured it as they would their own paternal acres. Among the innumerable bodies which people the regions of space, it was almost as familiar to them as a geological specimen upon a shelf of their cabinets. So the great system of religious truth comes to be opened and apprehended as the mental powers wax in maturity and strength. It is not the more profound and exalted themes alone of which this is true. There is not one subject of Christianity that does not reveal a more precious wealth, as a more keen and penetrating vision is turned upon its interior depths. Many in their closer surveys of the Bible, have found pearls, apples of gold set in pictures of silver, upon that familiar ground over which their minds have continually passed without fixing upon a single jewel. Such truths as these:—God is a Spirit; the law of the Lord is perfect; Christ died for sinners; the dead shall be raised; there shall be no night there, for the Lord God giveth them light. Such truths often appear to the superficial biblical reader as common-place, spiritless, worn bare of all impressiveness, like oft-told proverbs, but to profound thought and inquiry, to an enlarged understanding, they develop a life and a light and a breadth and a fullness and a sublimity and an opulent meaning sufficient for the mind of the archangel. Should the aeronaut attempt to rise and look into one of the planetary orbs, the disc and circumference of the luminary would, as he drew nearer, con-

stantly expand and grow brilliant to his eye. So heavenly truth unfolds her great nature and splendors to the student, devoted and venerating, who pushes his intellectual powers farther and farther into the sanctuary of her inner elements. The great penetrating mind of Edwards, probably appreciated as much of the wonders of redemption when he died as many of the spirits whom he found in heaven, singing the song of the Lamb. To the holy enthusiasm of his great and unrivaled understanding, the exalted theme continually, as he studied, opened up immenser, diviner glories. To the Scriptural Payson, familiar with celestial things, the declaration, "There is no night there, for the Lord God giveth them light," was well-nigh, it may be, at his departure as full of rich and glorious meaning, as it was to the angels waiting at his pillow to conduct his spirit home. His earnest, expansive up-traveling thoughts had dwelt on the eternal illumination proceeding from the heavenly throne, in contrast with the physical and spiritual gloom of the present scene, until in holy rapture he was carried out of himself so as to seem almost as much acquainted with heaven as with earth. In the same manner does every prominent doctrine of Revelation discover truthfulness, interest, importance in proportion to the reach and power of the intellect employed upon its examination. That enlarged, strengthened intellect should thus augment man's appreciation of Christianity occurs on the simplest principle possible, the advance of appraisement on the development of new values. It is pleasant to know that, while more adequate apprehensions of the beauty and power of religion invariably reward the vigorous employment of great intellectual faculties, the field of Divine truth is large enough and rich enough for those faculties at their highest possible power, at their farthest practicable advancement. Christianity comes to men with rich interior excellencies, and with glorious exterior revelations, which none by searching can find out unto perfection, and which to the profoundest human inquirer are a depth ever deepening, a light ever waxing, a divinity ever diviner. They, who seek the invigoration and enlargement of their intellects, for the sake of entering personally into intenser radiations of sacred light, and of introducing themselves to a higher transforming religious power, act under the influence of a truly exalted motive.

But few feel the impulse of this grand, high inducement. While religion stands illustriously revealed—while presented to the world are her immense truths, her full treasury of Divine influence, her luminous instructions from nature, providence and the Bible, her munificent arrangements for the immortal hopes and infinite happiness of man—the majority of the population of even Christian lands, under an unnerving palsy and deep slumber of intellect, grope on almost unaware of the full religious light and vast heavenly power which are provided for them—almost un-

blest by either. Whoever assists to recover and elevate mind, so that it shall attain a superior understanding, and deeper enjoyment of the true elements and purposes of Christianity, has done a service like that which opens the eyes of the blind man upon the before unknown glories of this outward creation; like that which conducts untutored pupilage never before beyond the few bright points on our nocturnal sky, far out among the vast, brilliant, innumerable orbs composing the stellar universe of modern astronomy. He performs an infinitely higher service. Unwaked, unthinking intellect he opens upon a far grander and wider field, upon spiritual creations, designs, consequences, illuminations, beatitudes, infinities, perfections, which reduce to perfect insignificance this whole physical system of things, bear though it does the impress of the great Maker's hand. Intellect and religion ought never to be disjoined. While the latter is acknowledged and received for its divine excellencies, let the former be revered for its capacity to explore and appreciate them.

Besides assisting to a more adequate appreciation of Christianity, increased vigor, furniture and refinement of the mental faculties contribute important aid in giving religious truths and precepts power on man and society. This they do by opening accurate and intelligent views of human character, mental and moral, as also by furnishing a nice perception of the true modes of reaching and moulding it.

In every effort at influence it is as important to understand the nature of the materials to be acted on, as it is the capacities of the agency relied on for the result. A successful inculcation of religion as imperatively requires a full knowledge of man, the subject of influence, as of the treasury of Divine truth, the source of influence. The business of making Christianity effective upon men, is essentially the business of education—education in one of its highest departments. As in all other teaching, therefore, so here, a great radical qualification is a thorough acquaintance with the intellectual and moral powers which are to receive religious nutrition and training, as also a special tact in feeding, guiding, advancing them. Religion, beyond any other subject of inquiry, has its mysteries, its unrevealed, and to finite minds in this present world unrevealable objects, operations, purposes. In order to prevent a waste of intellect in fruitless researches, all teachers of religion need so to study and measure our mental faculties as to be able to lay down the boundaries beyond which it is impracticable for them to advance. In the present as well as former ages, time and mental energies incalculable, have been employed upon ethical and theological speculations in the form of attempts to sound the unfathomable, ascend the inaccessible, explore the undiscoverable. To conduct men amid the sublime doctrines of religion, hard to be understood, to open them into the immensities

and glories of Divine things just where and just so far as they have strength to go and power of vision to see, powerful and judicious minds are entirely indispensable. Such minds by means of their knowledge of the capacity of the pupil intellects committed to them, and by means of their skill in conducting their inquiries, will clear a pathway through many profound speculations, and over many high tracts of thought where otherwise they would have been in thick darkness and confusion. Thereby will they make them possessors of many rich, lofty and momentous truths which without this assistance would never have been attained. Religious instructors and guides must be accurate and skilful mental philosophers. Preposterous it would be in the business of secular education, to send dispensers of knowledge abroad so ignorant of the popular mind as to propose the doctrine of fluxion when they ought to teach the multiplication table: to unfold celestial mechanics when they ought to acquaint men with the value and relation to themselves of the simplest laws and agents of nature. Equally absurd would it be for Christian educators to attempt religious inculcations without such a deep insight into men and such a teaching skill as shall enable them to discourse their holy lessons with ingenious adaptations to intellectual capacity and spiritual want, and also with most luminous and attractive elucidations. Nothing less can make these lessons understood, welcome, powerful, transforming.

The teachers of religion should be able moral philosophers, skilful anatomists of the human heart, profound students of human obligations. Men have their religious prejudices and religious idiosyncrasies. These are by no means to be countenanced or cherished, but, in order to bring religion into full and legitimate action upon those under their influence, must be carefully studied and consulted. One class of men, in consequence of a peculiar pride of intellect, are wholly impregnable to religion by any address, however powerful, made to their understanding. No logic, human or Scriptural, can force a passage to their consciences. But through their hearts these persons may be the most quickly and easily accessible of all to whom the advocate of Divine truth brings his messages. The moment their sensibilities are appealed to, the full depths of their spirit are opened in living warmth to all the announcements and claims of God. There is an opposite description of men who are capable of being influenced almost solely through their mental faculties. To be dictated to and ruled by anything so inflammable and variable and ungovernable as human feeling, they regard as unmanly—ignoble. They bow only to unimpassioned intellections, to sober, solid thought, to clear, pure reason. The former of these classes thirst for the pathetic rather than the deliberative, the practical rather than the theoretical. Their souls are a life rather than an existence, an excitement



rather than a character. An hour at the cross originates in them a more effective impulse to duty than all the philosophizing upon the atonement ever given to the world. A brief experience of the joy and profit of the sincere worship of God, is more valued by them than libraries of metaphysical theology concerning the Divine attributes. The latter of these classes are at home in the bosom of the Westminster Catechism. Their hearts become most deeply moved in the presence of the sublime doctrines of Christianity, divine justice, divine purposes, divine sovereignty, divine law! Their moral temperament is a philosophy rather than a feeling, an obedient principle rather than a spontaneous enthusiasm. They turn to the crucified Jesus with the profoundest emotion at the end of a clear, cogent, naked argument on human depravity; they come to their firmest resolves to duty under the thunders of Sinai; they lift up the highest thanksgiving to the Almighty under the exhibitions of his eternal power and godhead. The chief business of Christian instruction is to reach the human heart. Here the grand effect is first to be produced. If teachers fail here they have done nothing; if they succeed here they have done everything. Carrying this is carrying the great central power, all that wait upon its influence go along with it; is carrying the capital, and the government with all dependencies are included in the capitulation. The surrender and consecration of the heart to the piety of Christianity, will invariably commit the understanding to the theory of Christianity, as also the physical man to its prescribed and visible labors. If the moral spirit of man occupies a position so vital, issues influences on our intellectual, religious and physical being so elemental and controlling, then is a profound study and full knowledge of this busy inner world, radical and most efficient in pushing the conquests of religion out upon mankind. The heart has a surface and a subsoil culture. The unskilled often waste labor by efforts upon the outside of the soul. The wise, spiritual sower, valuing little the premature, scorching, brief productions overgrowing strong places without much depth of earth, seeks to go down with his seed into the moist, nutritious, unexhausted depths. Germinated, rooted, nourished there, plants of righteousness spring and grow under his hand, thrifty, stable, luxuriantly fruitful. Dropping this figure, the intelligent moral instructor creates moral sensibilities, and works other renovations in the warm, prolific, protecting centre of the soul, where there is less liability to those untoward influences which efface superficial impressions. The introduction into this rich interior of the spirit of a religious infusion and power which shall outroot the corrupt, assuage the excessive, resuscitate the dead, refresh the parched and sterile—this is an accomplishment in which the student and teacher of the heart finds room for all his possible skill, and ordinarily, no doubt, the Holy Spirit, other things being equal, pro-

duces saving and sanctifying results proportionate to the amount of it which he employs.

The passions of the soul have their own appropriate language. In this, when free, they always speak: when addressed in this, they listen and wake and respond. The heart has no appreciative ear to the nomenclatures of the exact sciences, to the delicate distinctions of metaphysics, to the statistical accuracies of historic narrative. These are as illy fitted to arouse and instruct as Hebrew or Arabic lessons to effect the pleasure and education of the nursery. The human affections lie cold, unstirred, unheeding, until those chosen voices fall upon them in which they were ordained to breathe, and be addressed. "A stranger will they not follow, for they know not the voice of strangers." Here is presented a large opportunity for the use of intellectual furniture. To know thoroughly the best language of the passions, so as thereby to exert over them the highest acquirable power, is an attainment indispensable, rare and invaluable. The affections of the heart are reached and influenced through appropriate objects, made to be their stimulant and their food. At the presence of these, invariably they kindle, grow, control, impel. Proportionably as these are unfolded, augmented, exalted, emotion rises to affection, affection to passion. When, on the contrary, these are removed, obscured, depreciated, feeling cools, sleeps, passes into a mere susceptibility. In graphic detail, in descriptive amplification, develop to a neighborhood a deep, unprovoked, irreparable injury, and then, in full life and light, picture the malicious injurers. You have waked a turmoil and a fire which are almost uncontrollable. The excitement grew as you proceeded, first to indignation, then to resentment, next to rage, at last to active revenge. In the same manner before benevolence, present its own peculiar objects; call up for its charity the virtuous poor in their uncomplaining, unpitied sufferings; set down under its eye, for its sympathy, fellow-men in deep ignorance, in irrecoverable corruption, in despairing wretchedness. That benevolence is powerfully stirred; so stirred as no direct appeal and exhortation could at all succeed to stir it. It has become an augmented philanthropy, which many waters cannot quench. It is out and abroad, against all obstacles, with both hands full of blessings for them that need them. With what religious power is the advocate of Christianity invested, by means of a superior intelligence which first acquaints him familiarly with the large circle and variety of scenes, subjects and objects fitted to act thus almost irresistibly on the heart, and then endows him with a gift of living and life-giving description, adapted to develop and present in their full character and impressiveness, these excoiters of the soul.

The heart is a crowded world of antipathies and inclinations, repulsions and propensities, hates and loves, fears and aspirations,

apathies and sensibilities, self-approvals and moral regrets, sadnesses and joys, angers and gratitudes. Almost innumerable are its susceptibilities of emotion. These multitudinous capacities and states of the moral spirit are deeply and somewhat obscurely involved with each other. Each is a power influenced and influencing, whereby essential modifications are induced upon all of them. Often before a given and desired state of the moral spirit can be produced, powerful antagonist emotions are to be cooled and hushed. In some instances, an affection can best be reached and nourished by means of an influence on some cognate and sympathizing passion. Frequently a heat in one portion of the heart creates a fire in its immediate neighborhood, and at the same time a chill in a remoter region. Some passions seem born to rule, others obsequiously to obey. Some are excessively and dangerously combustible. Others are cold, heavy, phlegmatic. The human heart is a legion of powers, capabilities, appetencies, sedatives, explosives; it sets on fire the course of nature: it is set on fire of things visible and invisible, things real and unreal, things corrupt and incorrupt. What advantages has he, who is deeply read in the mysteries and capacities of the inner spirit, in bringing the revelations and interests of religion to bear on its character, to mould it into holy sympathy with God.

There is one spiritual attribute which more than any other renders a deep acquaintance with the powers and workings of the human soul essential in giving religion its highest power—we mean its susceptibility to sympathy. Than this no feature of the moral spirit is more marked and apparent, more inseparably part and parcel of our spiritual being. No one renders us so susceptible of being radically and powerfully influenced, and also capable of effecting transformations elementally in the hearts of other men. The soul seems to be but a congeries of sympathies. Sympathy is a part of all its parts, an attribute of all its attributes. Emotion is no sooner manifested than it is reproduced. Whether the manifestation be in the way of a description, or of a witnessed ebullition, the moment a passion is apparent, it is rekindled in other hearts, just as a luminary suddenly out in the heavens is instantly seen in the waters underneath. Joy in one heart, spontaneous or induced, has its echoes and re-echoes in as many hearts as can be placed within its electric circle. So grief witnessed, at once passes to be grief experienced, anger developed, to be anger provoked, gratitude visible, to be gratitude kindled, hope demonstrated, to be hope caught. So beyond the meaning of the apostle, as in water face answereth to face, does the heart of man to man. The resuscitation of a fervor in one spirit will be the first fruits of a wide resurrection of kindred feeling. He that can from himself evolve deep moral elements, or picture the powerful stirrings of others, has a key to all the hearts which he ad-

dresses, and the means of setting fire to every passion of which they are capable. He wields a power over human character and human worth in the hands of no other reformer. Shakspeare was superior to all other men chiefly in his life descriptions of the heart, whereby he reproduced that which he delineated. His passages, which have never been equaled, and which will never cease to be read as miracles of genius and eloquence, are his true and touching paintings of the deep heavings and breathings of the spirit of man in the great crimes, exigencies, ventures, fortunes of life. So various, so faithful, so graphic, so powerful, so human are these records of the soul's inner workings, more efficient if not more numerous lessons on moral philosophy may be drawn from the British dramatist than from any professed treatise on that science at present existing. The skill of this great master of the heart, possessed and employed by those charged with the propagation of religion will arm them with an influence more truly elemental, irresistible and abiding than any, than all other intellectual furniture within their capacity.

The value of a high appreciation of Divine Truth and a deep knowledge of man as qualifications for the business of inculcating Christianity and giving it power on man, may be illustrated by a reference to a few of the ordinary topics of religious teaching. One of these is the total corruption of mankind before God. In the hands of such mental endowments as have been already referred to, this becomes a fact far more fearful, more eventful, more impressive. True, the most feeble and sterile mind might announce from the Bible, "There is none that doeth good, no not one," "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually." Numerous similar solemn, graphic, alarming Divine declarations of human depravity might be announced and reannounced. A few persons might be disquieted and bestir themselves to obtain pardon and cleansing. Most, however, dead as they are in trespasses, would sleep on in their cold graves undisturbed. This doctrine fundamental, most important, from a mind in its best state of discipline, of treasured knowledge, of susceptibility, of action, may receive such establishment, unfolding, illustration, urgency, as to startle the most palsied population and turn the most ungodly and hopeless to the immense and amazing interests of salvation. If man's depravity has not a full and faithful exhibition, Christianity is largely robbed of its rich meaning, its plenary mercy. Measurement of the soul's leprosies is measurement of the gospel's remedies. Preaching the fall is preaching redemption. The minister of religion, possessed of a powerful mind and a large intelligence, is enabled to carry a revealing light into the regions and sepulchres of moral death which will be likely first to wake and alarm even lifeless corpses and perished bones, and then to prompt, to Him who is the resurrection and

the life, such an agonizing and sincere cry for deliverance as will not be left unheeded or unanswered. This theme, human depravity, holds clustered influences, in the opening of which upon mankind, the mind's whole attainable skill and power may be vigorously employed.

There is another theme embracing many subjects which rich and powerful intellect is capable of investing with a vastly augmented power on mankind. We refer to the great object of religion, Jehovah himself. Minds of the most exalted powers shrink from such an immense, incomprehensible Being, as a subject for communication and impression. Is not the infinite, they instinctively inquire, incapable of statement, and the perfect of illustration? The fool in every population has said, "There is no God." The majority of even Christian communities, though in words they acknowledge the Supreme Ruler, live almost as unawed, disobedient and undevout as if he had either no existence or no manifested attributes or claims. But however men may disregard, deny, withdraw from, the great Builder and Maker, He is, as was to have been anticipated, very largely revealed by the things that are made. Largely should he be recognized. It is a great service on the part of superior mental endowments to interpret the Divine exhibitions and present the Almighty truly and competently to the practical atheism which prevails. This service is rendered the more valuable and important by the fact, that many developments and traces of God are, to careless observation, partially out of sight. In the outward world of matter, are laboratories and elements and combinations; in the interior world of mind, capacities and workings and energies; in Providence and the Bible, depths and riches and perfections, which, because a little underneath the surface, are much overlooked by the unthinking and unstudious, although bearing exquisite and crowded traces of a Divine goodness and skill. Into these covert wonders of the infinite Author of all things, gifted, searching and curious minds are able to enter and read out to mankind glorious lessons of God, which had not been heard; and reveal a constant and irresistible Divine contriving and accomplishing within, around, above, beneath, of which there had been no consciousness. This would be in effect to remove clouds and darkness, and startle and impress men by a sight of the Deity right about their pathway, their bed, their going out and coming in, their down-sitting, their up-rising, their thoughts, their heart-movings.

There is a service of superior minds no less needful in presenting the Deity from those portions of nature, Scripture and providence which palpably reveal Him. Men fail to observe what one that runneth might read; they fail to understand what the wayfaring man though a fool need not err in. There are a thousand voices speaking of God which, though audible, multitudes do

not hear: there are a thousand things visible, bearing graphic memorials of him, which they do not see. Everything moving manifestly evinces a Divine mover: everything occurring has written upon it, in most readable characters, 'Thus saith the Lord:' the Bible is one universal remembrancer of the great Eternal, and yet people neither know nor consider. It is within the province and power of the gifted teachers of religion to present the grand scene of things created, things transpiring, things revealed, as one mighty mirror of God, and then turn the eye and the heart of man full upon the great, Divine character imaged to them there. Such an introduction of families and individuals into the actual presence of the Infinite One when his holy attributes are all visibly about him; when his eyes as a flame of fire are felt to be piercing into the heart and the life, must tend to awe, and ameliorate the most reckless and obdurate generation. Great impressiveness may be gained by selecting some single feature of the Divinity and making a special representation. All the excellencies of the Divine Being concentrated into one vast glory, are likely to dazzle rather than to impress and influence. As an illustration of this individualizing method of making a strong impression, suppose the other attributes to be neglected, and the great Eternal to be offered to contemplation in the character and relation of a Father. To assist in comprehending this grand and delightful idea of Jehovah a Father, let an earthly parent be thought of, in whom are united all possible excellencies which can be supposed capable of ennobling and adorning. Then let every element of his great, venerable, pure character be conceived to be exalted and enriched to the perfect and the infinite in the person of the supreme Ruler. This Being, gracious, munificent, affectionate, almighty, presented to the child and the man, to the afflicted and the prospered, to the sinning and the penitent, presented as a universal Father, at every step and hour of life close at hand, provident, observant, uplifting, guiding, needfully rebuking, forgiving, conducting to an everlasting home—this condescending, ever-blessing, ever-living paternal One so exhibited must be supposed to exert influences for good of incalculable and inconceivable power, influences better understood in heaven than on earth. The character of God as the compassionate and infinite Redeemer is kindred to that of Father, just referred to, and is of even higher and holier influence in the hands of competent intellectual abilities. There is no one of the Divine attributes which is not capable of being so unfolded and exhibited as to become the source of regeneration and the nutrition of the sublimest and most blessed piety. By means of these several practicable revelations of the Deity united, there may be exerted a still more mighty influence over human worth and human welfare. It is almost the action of the infinite upon the finite, of the omnipo-

tent upon the impotent, for it is exerted by taking the things of God and showing them to men. Who can overvalue or overstate the contributions of intellect to religion in thus offering to view the King to his subjects, the Benefactor to his beneficiaries, the Redeemer to his ransomed ones, the great Author to his own world?

The judgment day is another subject which, though in its simple announcement impressive and awful, in discussion by superior mental faculties, may be made far more effectively so. Its developments and consequences may be so truthfully and solemnly opened, that men shall almost seem to themselves to hear the call of the archangel, to see the eventful morning break, to feel themselves witnesses and partakers in the dread transactions that follow. A scene like this of the final judgment, pertaining not to one isolated population but to every kindred, nation, tongue and people; not to a single age but to every generation over which the stream of time shall have swept; a scene in which are settled the interests of Divine justice, and revealed the depths and mysteries of Divine love; a scene in which are present three worlds, the throne of the Eternal and the Judge of quick and dead; a scene embracing a solemn audit before the Almighty that knoweth the heart, the acquittal or condemnation of every human being, the reception of one part to heaven never more to weep, and the dismissal of the other to perdition never more to smile; a scene including the world in flames, the sea turned to blood, the elements melted, the heavens rolled together as a scroll, the close of the great drama of time, life and probation—such a portentous omnipotent scene, furnishing action for even angelic powers, in the hands of suitable and exalted human faculties, may be made to produce in a reckless, ungodly world, results truly incalculable, infinitely important. So may these faculties reveal the last day, that the deepest slumberers in all the domain of spiritual death can sleep no longer, and the most hardened victims that Satan ever deceived or bound, no more refuse instant supplication for mercy from the heart of infinite Love.

The religious teacher, with a vivacious and gifted intellect, thus taking up the great things of God and dispensing them to men, seems clothed almost with omnipotence. Certainly revealed truth, such as he announces in the ear of the world, God has often made almighty. All the subjects of religion are invested with influence partly at least in proportion to the intellectual energy and skill with which they are urged upon the consciences of mankind. Under the elucidations and conduct of such mental vigor and wisdom, more broad, pure, spiritual, will appear the law of God: more dreadful and glorious its sanctions: eternity be farther penetrated: more of its volumed ages be made to unroll their realities to the astonished hearts of men: hell be opened into lower depths of corruption, thicker blackness of darkness, more intolerable woes: heaven be discovered to possess richer crowns, fuller glories of the eternal, more of the fruit that droppeth every month,

a deeper river of life, a profounder holiness, a more perfect peace. Precious ore can intellect, studious and penetrating, bring up from the deep mines imbedded in the heart of religion : open refreshing waters from her abundant fountains to pour abroad upon fainting vegetation. Who can measure the power which such intellect may add to the inculcations of religion ! Edwards, Whitefield, Wesley, Chalmers, and great spirits like them in the same calling, through their superior powers, have moved the human mind, wrought on the human character, left permanent impressions on the general current of human affairs, contributed enlargement and power to the kingdom of Christ, to an extent which God only can fully comprehend. The influence over the world in quantity, to say nothing of quality, effected by Chatham, Burke, Fox, Johnson, Addison, and other orators and writers of kindred eminence and fame, bears no comparison to that which has been exerted by the great and sanctified intellects which have spoken to their age in behalf of the Christian religion. We do not assert or intimate, that piety, deep, fervent, constant, consistent, does not render a much larger and a more essential assistance in giving Christianity power upon mankind. We have discussed here another subject, the contributions of intellect to this vast and important design. If sincere godliness is a warm inspirer, lofty mental power is a great executor. If the former be the life within, the latter is the light abroad.

The whole preceding discussion, if just views have been taken, exhibits superior intellectual endowments, the high honor of our nature in every sphere, in that of religion where they act as contributors to its proofs, its purity, and its power, as charged with truly illustrious duties and an immense responsibility. Save truth and moral goodness, which they here subserve, there is nothing attainable or conceivable which confers so ennobling and desirable a distinction. And, in this ministry of holy beneficence, intellectual powers seem almost to partake of the pure spirit which they task themselves to inspire and build up in the heart of men. To enriched and invigorated minds, consecrated to the service of religion, as indicated in the present discussion, there is due a love and appreciation which they have certainly not always, not generally, received. There is within the church of Christ a vast mass of intellect, lying inactive, like precious ores in the heart of the earth, and almost as unwrought and unnoticed. The duty of bringing up much of it and working it into such form and power that it may serve well in establishing the character and aiding the great mission of Christianity seems immediate and imperious. That mission is worthy of the highest and best cultivated mind which Heaven ever bestows. Brilliant will be the day when the powerful and the gifted generally shall be the sincere lovers of truth, and shall bend their great endeavors to the cause of human progress and human redemption.



## ARTICLE VII.

## THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY, RATIONAL AND SCRIPTURAL.

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IN the very forefront of practical Christianity, stand certain words, which have in all ages not only originated, but rendered necessary a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. Those words are these. BAPTIZE IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER, AND OF THE SON, AND OF THE HOLY GHOST. This cannot be done intelligently till it is understood who or what the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are. The discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity then is not theoretical, secondary, and incidental, but practical, primary, and fundamental.

The public mind has of late been particularly directed to it. We avail ourselves of the existing interest to make it the subject of a few remarks.

Many objections we know are alledged against it. Some deny its *practical utility*, if true. What can it effect more than the unity? Others affirm that it is *absurd* and incredible. Others, less confident on these points, do not feel satisfied that it is *fully taught in the Bible*. It is so important, if true, that they wonder that it has not been taught more clearly.

In order fully to discuss the doctrine, we should accordingly attend to these points: its rationality—its Scriptural evidence—its utility. We propose, however, in this discussion to attend to its rationality and its Scriptural evidence. We consider first, its rationality, because it may remove from the minds of some, difficulties which diminish or destroy the force of Biblical evidence. For the doctrine has always been opposed by many as so irrational in itself as to be incapable of proof or belief.

Under this impression some have denied the inspiration of the Bible, because they seemed to see that the doctrine was there taught, and were unwilling to resort to the pitiful expedients adopted by many to evade its meaning. Others, unable to resist the evidences of inspiration, have either done violence to language, in order to escape its obvious sense, or else have rejected parts of the Bible as unreasonable.

While the minds of any are in this state it is of little use to quote the Bible. Priestly after trying to explain away the proof of the pre-existence of Christ, contained in John 3: 13, is not satisfied with his own solution; yet rather than believe the obvious import of the passage, on an article of faith of such magnitude, he prefers to call in question the correctness of John's recollection and representation of our Lord's language. So strange and in-

credible does the hypothesis of a pre-existent state seem, that he would sooner suppose an interpolation, or that the old apostle dictated one thing and the amanuensis wrote another. Socinus declared of the atonement that if it were not merely once but often written in the Scriptures, he would not believe it. Smalcus said, that if it were not merely once or twice but often and clearly written, that God became man, yet it would be better, because it is absurd, against reason and blasphemous, to invent some mode of interpretation by which these consequences might be avoided. In like manner a modern antagonist of the trinity says of the advocate of this doctrine, that he is compelled to defend his faith by the plea that God is honored by our reception of what shocks the intellect, violates reason, and prepares its advocates for worse and worse delusions.

We propose then to begin our labors by an effort to define the doctrine and to prepare the way for adducing Scriptural proof of its truth, by evincing its rationality. A definition in order to be complete, should show what the thing defined means, and what it does not mean; i. e. it should include its essential ideas and exclude all that are foreign to the subject.

The doctrine, therefore, means that the one God who made and governs the universe, exists in *three persons*, equal in every Divine attribute and claiming equal Divine honors and worship. It does not mean, as we understand it, that these persons are so separated as to destroy their unity, in essence or substance, nor so united as to destroy their separate existence as three persons. Of course it does not mean that they are three separate Gods and yet one God. Nor does it teach that they are in such a sense one God, as to prevent each person from exercising his own attributes and performing his own works.

We use the word *person*, because we think it the best word; and because we think it not liable to any reasonable objection. We are indeed aware that some in more modern writings on this subject have lamented its introduction because, they think it calculated to produce misunderstanding. In place of it, some would use the word *distinction*, as implying less than is meant by *person*, and as appearing less inconsistent with unity. But this seems needless. The word *person* is not liable to any fair objection, and does not mean too much. For, as we shall show hereafter, the Bible does reveal to us the nature of personality so far as the word *person* has a just meaning in our language, and all difficulties arise from assuming unreasonably that the word means more than it does. It implies less than the word *being*, but more than the word *distinction*, or than any other word in use.

When we speak of a *being* we include all that pertains to the *being*, and we cannot say that these separate beings are one being. On the other hand, if we eschew the word *persons* and only say

of a being that he has in himself three *distinctions* we convey no definite idea. Nor do we include as much as the Bible teaches, on the subject of the Trinity—for a being who is in every sense one, in essence, person and attributes, may yet have in himself three distinctions of some kind. The veriest Sabellian will admit three distinctions in God. But when we say of God, that he is one being and yet three persons, we mean that there are three persons properly speaking, so united as to be truly one being. To show that this is possible or reasonable, is evidently not a part of the definition. With equal clearness, to refute the inferences of others from this definition is not a part of the definition; this belongs to another head. We desire merely to state at this time what we mean—in what sense we use words—so that when others state our belief they may state our definition as we have stated it and guarded it, and not state their own *inferences*, as being the doctrine, as we hold it. If then some one should say, if you hold to three divine persons, it after all must mean three Gods—we reply, you can properly mean by this only that our definition leads to such a result, *as you view it*, certainly you cannot mean that we so teach, for we expressly assert that we do not. If any one therefore attempts to state our belief, the proper way is to state it as we define it. If he wishes to state his own inferences from it, he has our leave, only he should be careful to state honestly that we do not admit that these inferences can be fairly derived from our definition. If he attempt to prove that they can, we shall not object, only we shall attempt in return, in a proper place and way, to show the fallacy of his reasoning, and to vindicate the rationality of our definition by showing that the union of three persons in one being, so as to be properly one God, is not unintelligible, and implies no contradiction or absurdity, according to the common laws of language and usage of words.

We now proceed to show that the doctrine is reasonable. We place this subject next, not because we suppose that it is of course true, merely because it is reasonable: Nor because this alone determines the question whether the Bible teaches it. For the Bible does not of course teach all things which are true, and of course many things which are reasonable are not taught in the Bible; for it was not intended to teach all things, but only things needful for our salvation: Nor because it would follow of course, that the Bible does not teach it, if it is unreasonable, unless we first assume its plenary inspiration: for we can suppose as an argument against the Bible, that it should be proved that it is an unreasonable doctrine and yet that the Bible does teach it. Of course we do not suppose that this can in fact be done. But we place this topic here, because if it can be truly shown to be an unreasonable doctrine, in the proper sense of these words, it would be of no use to

attempt to prove it out of the Bible, for it would merely destroy its authority.

The most direct way to overturn the Bible would be, first to show clearly that a certain doctrine is truly unreasonable, and then as clearly to show that the Bible, when fairly interpreted, teaches it. This is plain, because our belief in the being of God and in revelation, is founded on the decisions of reason as to the relation of cause and effect. Reason teaches us that every effect must have a cause, hence, when we see the works of God, reason teaches us his existence, and the nature of his works and plan teaches us his attributes.

Again, our belief in revelation is founded in reason, and rests on the relation of cause and effect. We look at the system revealed, and find it to be so great, and glorious, and perfect, that man in the circumstances of its writers could not make it; and infer reasonably that God is its author. We look at miracles as effects surpassing human or finite power, and infer reasonably that God is their cause. We look at prophecies as surpassing human foresight, and infer reasonably, that He who formed the plan was the author of prophetic revelations. We look at the effects produced by the Bible and find them beyond human power, and conclude that God is the author of a book which he so signally owns and blesses. This is all correct reasoning.

Again our principles of interpretation are founded in reason. Words have a meaning assigned to them as signs of ideas; they are united in sentences on fixed principles, and are to be interpreted according to these principles. Therefore every act of interpretation requires the use of reason.

Now if any thing is presented to us which subverts the first principles of reason, no evidence can establish it, for the very laws of belief are subverted—and the book which teaches it can have no force.

And even if the evidence in favor of inspiration seems to remain, yet if the true interpretation compels us to believe that which is against reason, the mind must be balanced and cannot believe either. For example, should the evidence seem to be complete that the Bible is the Word of God, and should it yet assert that two and two are seven, or that a thing existed and did not exist at the same time, we must say: There seems to be evidence which I cannot remove to prove the inspiration of the Bible, yet the same reason that qualifies me to feel the force of this evidence as plainly shows that the thing revealed is false, and I cannot dispose of the *evidence* on the one hand, nor of the *interpretation* on the other. I must therefore let them neutralize each other, and follow the light of reason, or else I must give up the unreasonable part and take the rest. But if I give up one part as unreasonable, since it all rests upon the same authority, I cannot reasonably believe the rest

—so my faith must again be neutralized, and I must follow some other guide. Now this is fair and plain dealing, and is far more honorable than the conduct of those who profess to follow the Bible and yet admit that it contains unreasonable doctrines, or who torment its language by harsh and unreasonable interpretations, in order to escape its obvious meaning, and yet avoid a disavowal of its inspiration. It is far better to be honest on this point.

But as the consequences of proving an unreasonable doctrine in the Bible are so great, is it surely desirable to know what is meant by a *reasonable* doctrine. And here it is obvious to remark, that it is not of course one that accords with our feelings or wishes. This must be admitted by those who claim to be eminently rational, for they inveigh much against blind feeling. For, plainly, that cannot be pronounced unreasonable which causes a man to feel unpleasantly, if it is supported by evidence. Yet most who pride themselves on rationality are, we think, led to oppose the Trinity on such grounds, for the doctrine of the Trinity as taught in the Bible, always involves consequences which do not accord with the natural wishes and feelings of men, for it is always associated with the doctrine of human depravity, and is in the centre of a system glorious in holiness and justice in punishing the impenitent, as well as in love and mercy in forgiving the penitent through an atonement.

Nor can it be said that, that is reasonable which we should expect God to do and be, and that unreasonable which we should not expect him to be and do, for who is able to see and know all that ought to be, and all that is and may be? If any he can make a revelation, but surely he does not need one. Reason certainly teaches that we need a revelation, not to teach us what we might have known without it, but to teach us that which we could not know without it, and even if it teaches what we should not have thought of, it is no evidence that it is not true. Yet the reasoning of many against this doctrine seems to amount to this, that if it had never been revealed, they should never have found it out, for it is unlike anything which they ever saw or heard of.

But that is truly unreasonable which is against undeniable facts, or fair inferences from such facts, or against those fundamental intuitions, which precede all reasoning and are its basis. For, if it is not against facts, or fair inferences from facts, nor against the primary intuitions of the mind, surely it is not unreasonable. Let us try the doctrine as defined by these tests and see how it can endure the trial.

Is it then against fact? Now all that can be said here is, that so far as we have seen or known human beings, it is a fact that one person is always one being, and without revelation we do not know any other order of created beings. Now it is reasonable to say that it is a fact not observed by us, by the light of nature, that

one being should exist in three persons. But it is not reasonable to say that it is against fact, unless we assume that we know all facts in all worlds, for if we admit that there may be in other worlds facts not observed by us in this world, the very thing in question may be one of those facts, and to assume that it is not is to beg the question.

Is it against any intuitive perception of what is true in the nature of God? The question relates to the Divine mind. Now in order to show that it is against any such perception of what must be true in God's nature, we must know what that nature is.

We know of at least two existences, matter and mind. But we know only their properties and not their natures. No man can say what is the essence of matter. Nor can he of mind. Nor can he say in what manner mind can and must exist. If God chose to create a mind different from the human mind, could He not do it? It so happens that among men every mind has unity in essence and person. But suppose that God should wish to create a mind one in essence, and yet existing in three persons, each able to think, feel, choose, and love, and each equal to the rest—can any one say that it is impossible? If mind has an essence, who can deny the possibility of its existing thus?

If any one should say that such a mind would be three beings, we reply, If the essence is one, the being is one, even if the persons are three. If any one should say that three persons with distinct attributes and faculties of intellect, susceptibility, and will, cannot exist in one essence, we ask the proof. It is not an intuitive truth. To mention the case of the human mind is to no purpose, for how does it appear that this is the only mode in which a mind can exist?

It ought, however, to be observed that we do not at this point assert that it is possible, for the same reason that we cannot assert that it is impossible, namely, that we know nothing as to the nature and essence of mind; all that we know is its effects. The Creator alone understands fully the nature of things, for He gave them that nature. Hence if He asserts that the nature of mind is such that He can create an order of beings having each of them unity of essence, and three persons in that essence, who has the knowledge which can enable him to confront the assertion of God with a denial? Shall a creature, ignorant of his own essence, decide what God can create, and how it shall and must exist?

Angels are pure spirits. Suppose now one of them had insisted that the Creator could not create anything but spirit, because he could not conceive of anything else? Would it prove that God could not create matter? Suppose that the same spirit had reasoned on, after he had seen his first argument answered by fact, to show that matter and mind could not be united in one person, because he could not conceive of it, and because all beings so far as

he knew, and he might have said all beings before man was made had but one nature, besides it was absurd to think of uniting things so entirely different in one being. Yet still God had nothing to do but to make man, and all this plausible reasoning is overturned. Man *has* both body, spirit, and *animal life* besides, which is not like either, but results from both. Again, If any one should say that body and mind cannot be united without blood and the intervention of animal life, because he has never seen it and cannot conceive of it, still God might justly deem him a fool, as He did such an objector in the days of Paul, and silence him by uniting body and spirit, without the intervention of animal life, as he has declared that he will at the last day.

Now if a man should undertake to reason concerning pure spirits, and to show that as every body on earth has in it but one mind, and that every such mind is but one person ; therefore every spirit not united with a body must exist in the same way, and not in two or three and persons, having the one essence, he does not reason nor rest on reason—he merely darkens counsel by words without knowledge.

Still more, even if it were true of created beings that they could not exist in more persons than one, yet it would not of course be true of the uncreated mind. For it is impious to assert that nothing can belong to God as a spirit which does not belong to created spirits. The very fact that He exists in this way, i. e. in three persons, and one essence, may be one of his highest perfections. It may be the foundation of society in the Godhead, society perfect, and all-satisfying to the Infinite Mind, and so the Bible speaks of it. Until therefore reason fully understands the nature and essence of things, and especially of the Almighty God, she is best employed in deciding upon subjects where she has evidence, and not in deciding on things, which by reason of ignorance, she can neither prove nor disprove.

Is the Trinity then inconsistent with what the works of God teach? The works of God teach the existence of a First Cause, and as one God is an adequate cause, reason needs no more, and without a revelation every man is bound to admit the existence of one God, because there is evidence of the fact ; but there is in the works of God no evidence either for or against a plurality of persons in God. Of course it is not to be believed without evidence, nor denied against evidence. Let a person find a watch : of course he infers that it must have a maker, and that he has skill in contrivance. But can he tell by this everything else about him, whether he is good or bad, short or tall ; or whether he has both eyes or only one ? or can he contradict evidence on these points ? So God in his works has disclosed his being and various parts of his character ; but he has not indicated in the material world the mode of his existence. And there is a good reason for it ; there was

not the place. The revelation of the persons of the Trinity belongs to the moral world, for here the several persons act in disclosing the glory of God.

But certainly what God has not told in his material works he may disclose by revelation, without fear of contradicting himself. No one ever proved, or assigned even a plausible reason to suppose, that nature teaches the precise mode of Divine unity—or denies the Trinity, as we have explained it : she says nothing about it. God can teach as he pleases and in what ways he pleases. He did teach his unity by the works of nature, but it was not enough ; men were so depraved that they would not see and love him. But he knew of other perfections of his nature which could and would reclaim them. These are connected with the system of revealed religion, and are disclosed through three persons in the one God, engaged in a work of redemption, pardon, and sanctification. The last system is founded on the first, consistent with it, and discloses what that did not.<sup>1</sup>

We have discussed the rationality of the doctrine. We proceed now to consider the Scriptural evidence of its truth.

A few preliminary remarks are necessary on the principles of reasoning to be adopted.

1. The Bible is not a systematic treatise. It is a record of the facts which have taken place in the moral world ; and the principles on which we philosophize in the natural world apply here ;—arrange and classify facts, and these will determine the nature and laws of the system. The Bible was left in this state for our good, in order to produce examination, and quicken our attention to all parts of it. Hence as it regards the Trinity, we find no chapter or book devoted to a statement of the doctrine, but it is taught in different parts of the Bible as the occasion requires, whilst the disclosure of the great plan of God's government proceeds. This should not surprise us, for it is not reasonable to expect to find the doctrine taught in a way in which the Bible does not profess to

<sup>1</sup> In the following passage from John Howe will be seen a striking but entirely independent coincidence in the mode of proving the Trinity rational. It occurs after noticing the union of the unlike elements of matter and spirit in man.

"We are plainly led to apprehend that it is rather more easily possible there might be *two spirits* (so much more agreeing in nature) so united as to be *one thing*, and yet continuing distinct ; and if *two* there might as well be *three*, if the Creator pleased. And hence are led further to apprehend, that if such a made union, with continuing distinction, be possible in created beings, it is, for ought we know, not impossible in the uncreated, that there may be such an eternal *unmade union with continuing distinction*. And all this being only represented *as possible* to be thus, without concluding that *thus* it *certainly is*, sufficiently serves our purpose, that no pretense might remain of excluding the Eternal Word and the Eternal Spirit (from) the Godhead, as if a *trinity* therein were contradictory and impossible, repugnant to reason and common sense." Complete Works. I. 141 p.



teach any doctrine ; we are to enquire how God has taught it, and not to determine how he ought to teach it.

2. We are to expect that in all cases where the nature of the plan disclosed in the Bible would require it, this doctrine would be taught ; and if we find that it is taught in such cases we have all needed proof. This is in fact the best way of teaching it, for in this way it is interwoven into the very structure of the whole system, and indicates itself naturally.

3. Any doctrine which results from uniting the testimony of God as recorded in different parts of the Bible, is as true as if it had been taught systematically. It does not become a human dogma, or device, or invention, because men reduce the facts on which it rests to system, any more than the law of gravitation is a mere human invention, because it has been deduced from a systematic arrangement and classification of facts ; the facts exist and the law exists, independently of our classification ; but we classify in order to bring the whole subject before the mind and render our own conceptions of it more distinct. Hence we see the fallacy of much common-place declamation against this doctrine as a human invention, a mere theological dogma. Such declamation seems to be intended to break the force of the united testimony of the Bible on this subject ; as though a systematic arrangement of revealed facts rendered them less true than when they stand alone.

The passages of Scripture which have been supposed to teach the Trinity, may be arranged in three classes. 1. Those which imply or teach a plurality of persons in the Godhead, leaving the number indefinite. 2. Those that imply or assert in one and the same passage the existence of three persons. 3. Those, and they are far the largest class, which are employed in developing and illustrating the character, attributes, and works of the three persons considered separately. These three classes united, teach the doctrine as fully as we ought to desire ; the first *implying* personality, the second naming the persons, the third describing each person, particularly.

In the first class we place those passages in which the names and titles of God are used in the plural number, also those in which God speaks in the plural style, as if separate persons in the Divine being were consulting among themselves.

We are well aware that by the use of grammatical technics, such as "*pluralis excellentiæ*" and the like, these passages have been all set aside as of no value at all in any argument. We readily concede with Doederlein that an unjustifiable dependence was placed by the old writers upon passages of this class. But it is plain to us that there has been a reaction to an opposite extreme in throwing them entirely out of the discussion. Their proper place is to repel a presumption which could be raised against the doctrine if no such facts existed. If now, it could be said with

truth, that there are no peculiarities such as might result from a plurality of persons, in any of the names of God, or in any of his modes of speech, and that he always speaks as one God in one person, it would certainly be used as creating a fair and strong presumption against the doctrine. But when we read: "And God (plural) said let *us* make man in *our* image after *our* likeness," Gen. 1: 26. "And Jehovah (sing.) God (plural) said, behold the man is become as one of *us*, to know good and evil," Gen. 3: 22. "And Jehovah said, go to, let *us* go down and there confound their language," Gen. 11: 7. "Also I heard the voice of the Lord saying whom shall I send, and who will go for *us*?" Is. 6: 8,—this presumption is repelled. The same is true when we observe the fact, that there are at least seven appellations which are used in the plural when applied to God. These things are certainly peculiarities of language, and they are such as would naturally result from a plurality of persons in God. The presumption against the doctrine is therefore repelled, and the presumption is shown rather to exist in the opposite direction. For after all that has been said concerning a "*pluralis excellentiæ*," there are cases which it does not reach, even if it reaches any. This is felt to such a degree that those who are wont to use it, resort in some cases to the supposition that the reading of the text is not correct. In other cases a resort is had to the supposition that God is consulting with angels.

It is not our purpose here to investigate the philosophy of the alleged idiom as to a "*pluralis excellentiæ*." One thing is certain, that there is no natural tendency in the mind of man to express dignity in this way. No one would ever think of calling Charlemagne "*the great emperors*," to denote his peculiar and especial dignity. There is often great magic in a technical scientific name. Men think that a question is solved, when after all they have only made a dextrous use of such a technic. The reason why a watch-spring uncoils itself is to be found in its *elasticity*, i. e. in the fact that it does tend to uncoil itself. The real question to be solved is, how did so peculiar a mode of expressing dignity, or excellence, and one *which is plainly unnatural*, come into use? It is no solution of this to state that it is in use. Certainly the existence of a plurality of persons in God, is an adequate solution of such a fact. And after the idiom was once thus established, it could be imitated in other cases.

We however, are not disposed to rely on this class of facts, except to repel as we have said a presumption against the Trinity. They give to the Bible such a coloring as it would naturally have, if the doctrine were true. This is beautifully illustrated in the declaration of Moses to the assembled people of God, Deut. 6: 4. "Hear O Israel, Jehovah our God, (plural) is one Jehovah." We do not rely on this at all as *positively* proving the Trinity. But if a trinitarian were to say, "The self-existent one who exists in a

plurality of Divine persons is yet but one self-existent being, the form and coloring of his language would be exactly like those of Moses. In perfect accordance with this usage of language is the idea of a plurality of Divine persons, clearly conveyed in the Old Testament, by the distinction there broadly set forth between a Divine person who sends, and one who is sent, possessing Divine attributes and worshipped as God. Thus in Zechariah 2: 8. "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, *he* hath sent me unto the nations that spoiled you; for he that toucheth you toucheth the apple of his eye. For behold, I will shake my hand upon them, and they shall be a spoil to their servants; and ye shall know that the Lord of Hosts hath sent me." On this, Scott remarks: "There are evidently two persons here called 'The Lord of Hosts', one who is sent, and the other he who sent him: even the eternal Son of God, and the father who sent him as his willing messenger to be the Saviour of his people." Again (v, 10, 11); "Lo I come and I will dwell in the midst of thee, saith the Lord, and many nations shall be joined to the Lord in that day and shall be my people, and I will dwell in the midst of thee, and thou shalt know that the Lord of Hosts hath sent me unto you." Even Rosenmüller is compelled here to admit that the words, "I will shake my hand over the nations, and they shall be a spoil to their servants," and also "they shall be my people, and I will dwell in the midst of thee," neither the prophet nor a created angel could say concerning himself. All that he can allege is, that the words of a created servant of God, and those of God are mixed together in these verses, (*hisce versibus inter se misceri.*) This however is a mere assertion, not only without evidence but against evidence, for no created servant of God who was sent to the generation living in the days of Zechariah, could say to the people of God gathered from the future nations referred to in v, 11, "Thou shalt know that the Lord hath sent me unto thee." No, it is the Lord who will come to them who says to his future people, thou shalt know that the Lord of Hosts hath sent me unto thee. Moreover, those are but two cases out of very many similar cases throughout the Old Testament, and it is in vain to endeavor to destroy the cumulative force of this mode of speech, by an attempt to neutralize individual cases in detail, by arbitrary assertions and forced suppositions. In Zech. 3: 2, Rosenmüller admits that he who is called the angel or messenger of Jehovah in v, 1, is called Jehovah in v, 2. He says, however, it is because he acts for God, as the ambassador is called by the name of his king. But the ambassador of a king is not called by the name of his king. The ambassador of Nicholas of Russia, is never called either Nicholas or the emperor. It would be deemed grossly absurd so to speak. Moreover, if all created angels who act for God, may be directly called Jehovah on that ground, it would be proper to make it a general appellation of them all. Yet in no other case is an angel called Jehovah.

In Malachi, 3: 1, *the messenger or angel* of the covenant, is expressly identified with the Lord, and is said suddenly to come to his temple. On this passage Rosemüller attempts no evasion. He says מַלְאָכִי with the article always in other places denotes God. He therefore frankly admits, that it here denotes the Divinity of the Messiah, and refers for illustration to Is. 9: 6. "His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace." Worthy of particular attention are his remarks on these last words. "Beware of believing, that these lofty appellations, such as the arrogance of the later princes of Asia applied to themselves, were applied to any king of the Jews, Israelites or Syrians, in the simplicity of that ancient period in which the prophet lived. Such things as are said in this and the following verse apply to no man who is not also God."

We shall say no more on this class of texts, nor shall we insist on the coincidence between the idea of a trinity of persons and the trisagion of Is. 6: 3. We think it enough to have repelled all presumption against a plurality of Divine persons, by a reference to the language of the Old Testament, and to have created a presumption in its favor, also to have proved at least a two-fold personality in God, from the same source. We have the more prominently presented this view, because there is too great a tendency entirely to overlook the Old Testament in discussing this subject, and also because it has been recently asserted, "That there was no appearance of trinity in the revelations God had made of his being," till the incarnation of God in Christ. We admit that tri-personality does not as clearly appear in the Old Testament as in the New. But we do not admit that a *plurality* of persons in God, is not *clearly* developed in the Old Testament, even if not as clearly as in the New.

We now proceed to the second class of passages. The preceding class either taught or implied personality. This limits the number of persons to three. It ought however, to be borne in mind, that although we consider this class separately for the sake of throwing light on the number of the persons, their full strength is not seen till we view them in their relations to the third class, in which the persons are viewed separately, and their divine attributes clearly set forth. But we consider them now because they are useful to meet and repel what is sometimes urged as a presumption against the doctrine of the trinity, that the three persons are not often, or even any where so grouped together and presented in connection as we should expect, if the doctrine were true.

To this we reply, the three persons are so presented in what may well be called the great organizing command of the New Testament. They are there so presented that it was impossible that Christianity should develop and form itself in practice, except around the doctrine of the Trinity. Wherever the gospel came,

churches were to be formed—and this by express command of Christ, was to be done by baptism, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. And after the church was formed, all who desired to enter it saw over its portals, the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

All systems tend to some results, and however complicated in their parts, in order to go forth and secure those results, they must be condensed into some brief, working forms. Such in the baptismal command. Passages like these at the opening of a system must exert immense power. The practice of future ages, in all climes, will be adjusted by them. Wherever the gospel shall go, in ages early or late, in frigid or burning climes, among nations barbarous or refined, so soon as a man is converted and a church formed, they will present him something to do, for himself or his children, to express his views of his relations to the God of the system, and of its practical results on him or them. At least so far as external order is concerned, they are like the great water-wheels by which a whole system of subordinate wheels is moved. Of course in forming such passages, of all these practical bearings God must be fully aware, for not a sparrow falls to the ground without Him—and if he so carefully notices that which is least, how much more so will he that which in all its bearings and influences is so great? And what is clearly taught or implied in one such passage would have abundant proof though taught no where besides.

In all fundamental governmental documents, one clear and thorough statement is enough. A mode of naturalization—or of election—or the nature and relations of the ruling powers in the state, being used in one passage, clearly defined, it is enough. All men feel that they need no more. And is it not so with God? Is one statement from a human government sufficient and not from him? We say not this as though on this point we are so confined, but to reprove and repress a disposition far too common to augment the power of evidence by accumulation of numerous passages, instead of critically and clearly examining a sufficient number of satisfactory proofs. In whatever light, therefore, we view it, no passage is worthy of more careful attention than the baptismal command.

What then is baptism?

It is of the nature of a covenant transaction, involving a joint action of man towards God and of God towards man. In the case of infants, it implies an act of solemn consecration to God and a renewal of covenant by the parents. In the case of adults, it involves and presupposes confession of sin and calling on God for mercy. This is clearly stated in the command addressed to Saul, "Be baptized and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord." The same passage teaches us that it symbolizes and seals the granting of pardon and purity on the part of God and the res-

toration of rights and immunities corresponding to the return of loyalty.

As it is an external and visible act of homage to God, and involves an invocation of him, so his name must be known, otherwise invocations are impossible: for how can they call on him of whom they have not heard? Hence, here is the place above all others where we are to look for a full statement of the name of that God on whom they are to call. And as we should expect, that name is here given in full, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

The necessary impression of these facts on the human mind, is this, that the three all stand in precisely the same relation to the worshippers, and that if *ὁποῖα* denotes the personality of either of the three, it denotes that of all, and that in presenting to the worshippers the name of his God, it is absurd to unite a Divine person, a human person, and an energy or attribute, and that it is especially absurd to present an attribute or energy of one of the persons, as if it were not involved in the person, but were something distinct. As if an earthly monarch should say, you are forgiven in the name of myself, and of my Son, and of my energy or influence. Moreover an attribute or energy cannot in any sense be the subject of invocation or reverence. No view then is at all consistent or even tolerable but this, that this passage was designed to present to the mind the three Divine persons or agents by whom salvation is secured and the work of each in all its parts.

It would at once call for an opinion on all these points, and make a doctrine concerning these three persons coeval with Christianity itself. It is not a point on which the system could start with no opinions and allow gross error to grow up by applying a text long not used, to a use never dreamed of at first, as in the case of the celebrated text, "thou art Peter." Upon the baptismal formula the full-orbed vision of the church must have been turned from the first, and the first and earliest opinions on this text could not have been wrong.

What then were the facts? It did from the very first lead to an arrangement of the whole Christian system around the three persons of the Trinity. For they felt bound to tell, in answer to the natural and inevitable inquiry of those to be baptized, who the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost were. And from it all the early arrangements of truth took their form. Hagenbach says, "What is commonly called the Apostles' Creed is most probably composed of various confessions of faith used by the primitive church in baptism." He also says, "The doctrine of God *the Father*, God *the Son*, and God *the Holy Ghost* is the doctrine of primitive Christianity." He further remarks, that its import was not speculatively developed in the New Testament, but that it was to be understood by considering its connection with the Christian

economy and the history and work of Christ. "Accordingly," he proceeds, "the belief in Father, Son and Holy Ghost, was considered an essential part of the rule of faith, even apart from every speculative development of the doctrine of the Logos, and appears in what is commonly called the Apostles' Creed in this historico-epic form without any further allusion to the unity of the Deity."

The earliest uninspired description of the practice of the primitive church is that of Justin Martyr, who lived soon after the Apostle John, in the first part of the second century. He, in his Apology, states it as the practice of Christians to baptize in the name of the Father, who is God and ruler of the universe, and in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and in the name of the Holy Ghost, who by the prophets predicted the things of Christ, and who counsels and guides those who believe in him.

All of the earlier creeds without exception take their rise in connection with this mode of baptism. They were expositions of the Christian system as developed around the three persons of the Trinity as presented in the baptismal formula. The early public creeds of the churches of Jerusalem, Cesarea in Palestine, Alexandria, Antioch, Rome, and Aquileia, are of this kind. Similar creeds are found in the works of Irenæus, a pupil and associate of Polycarp, Origen, born A. D. 185, Tertullian, Cyprian, Gregory, Thaumaturges. There is also the creed of Lucian the Martyr, who died under Diocletian. Besides these there is in the Apostolical Constitutions a similar creed, to be used at baptism. The originals and translations of all these may be seen in Riddle's *Christian Antiquities*, pp. 423-425. Here then are at least twelve creeds, of which the greater number, if not all, were composed in the first three centuries. Some were probably of very great antiquity, especially those of the churches. Eusebius of Cesarea declares that he received the creed of that church from the bishops who were before him, both when he was catechised, or instructed in the first principles of the faith, and when he was baptized. Probably these bishops received it in the same way from their predecessors, and so back to the earliest antiquity; so it was no doubt in the other churches. These creeds are not copies of each other but independent creeds. They vary in length, style, and phraseology. But in two respects they all coincide. They regard the Father, and the Son and the Holy Ghost as three PERSONS, by whose concurrent agency the salvation of the baptized person was effected. These persons are sometimes directly asserted to be Divine, and it is always *implied* that they are Divine, and are to be worshipped as such.

Neander says, that the doctrine of Salvation "presupposes, in order to its being understood in its real significance for Christian consciousness, this fundamental article of the Christian faith, (i. e.

the Trinity :) and we recognize therein the essential contents of Christianity, summed up in brief." Again, "This shape of Theism, presents the perfect mean between the wholly extra mundane God of Deism, and the God brought down to and confounded with the world of Pantheism." He also says, and it deserves particular notice, that its ground-work is found in the Old Testament: "It was no accident that such a shaping of the consciousness of God, grew out of the germs already contained in the Old Testament,—a truth by some not duly attended to." He declares that it was at the outset a practical and experimental doctrine, and that it formed from the beginning "the fundamental consciousness of the Catholic Church" in its conflicts with heretics, and that "it is that which forms the basis of the true unity of the church and the identity of the Christian consciousness in all ages."

Such are the relations, and such has been the actual working of the baptismal command of Christ. If He meant to develop in the church the pure, and personal unity of God, he could not have adopted a mode less likely to produce that result. If He meant to develop the doctrine of the Trinity, he took a course exactly and powerfully adapted to effect it, and the results were such as might be expected.

It is also to be remembered, that this baptismal formula could not stand alone. It would at once call to mind all that Christ had said concerning the Holy Spirit in that remarkable passage in Jn. 14: 16, where his personality and work are clearly and fully set forth. It would recall all that John, and Paul, and the other apostles had taught of Christ. It would act as a lens, concentrating in one focus all the rays of light reflected from the Bible on the subject of the Trinity.

But besides this particular recognition of the three persons of the Trinity in their connection, there are other passages which, in view of the facts stated, would further develop and confirm the doctrine. We will present them side by side with the baptismal formula.

1. Matt. 28: 19; "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."

2. 1 Peter, 1: 2; Peter to those who are "elect according to the foreknowledge of *God the Father*, through sanctification of *the Spirit*, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of *Jesus Christ*."

3. Eph. 2: 18; "For by him (Christ) we both, (Jews and Gentiles) have access by one Spirit, unto the Father."

4. 1 Cor. 12: 4-6; "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit, and there are differences of administrations but the same Lord, and there are diversities of operations but it is the same God which worketh all in all."



5. 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; " The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all."

The first, as we have seen, indicates the God to whom those who are baptized are dedicated. The second passage indicates how each of the persons in the one God, operates in saving men. The Father elects, the Spirit sanctifies, the Son makes atonement. The third passage shows the experimental recognition of the three persons by Christians in prayer to God and communion with him. They come through Christ as mediator, and are assisted by the Spirit as sanctifier and comforter, and thus draw near as children unto the Father. The fourth passage explains how the church in the primitive age was peculiarly assisted by the three persons of the Trinity. They derived miraculous gifts from the Holy Spirit,—Christ acted as head or Lord of the church, and the Father directed the whole system, working all in all. The fifth passage is a prayer addressed to each person of the Trinity, imploring them to bless the Christian church.

These passages all occur in remarkable circumstances, and occupy a prominent part in the plan of the Bible. Baptism is a standing and public act of Divine worship, and if any where we might expect definite information concerning God, it is here.

The next three passages occur in communications from God to select bodies of his redeemed subjects, and treat of the most important of all topics ; how he chose, reformed and pardoned them, how they are to come into his presence, in what way he blesses his church with spiritual gifts, who is head of the church, and who presides over the whole plan.

In the last, one of his chosen ambassadors commends to him in a public prayer a body of his redeemed subjects, and implores his blessing upon them. In such cases as these, if any where, we should expect to find the doctrine of the Trinity disclosed, and here it is most clearly taught. This view of the subject now casts back light on those ascriptions of praise to God in which the word holy is thrice repeated, and on the fact that the high priest Aaron and his sons were directed to use a threefold blessing analogous to that in 2 Cor. 13 : 14. See Num. 6 : 22–27, after which the following words are subjoined, " They shall put my name upon the children of Israel and I will bless them." These things alone would not prove the doctrine, but they accord with it and are explained by it.

We know that all the texts under this head have been attacked piecemeal, and efforts made to explain them away, and what will not ingenuity and aversion to the truth wrest and attempt to explain away ? To notice all that has been said is inconsistent with our limits ; we can only at present advert to the leading features of the most plausible system of evasion. This makes the Son, here merely a Divine messenger ; and the Holy Spirit a name for Di-

vine influences figuratively used. Nothing but the love of a party would ever lead a man to unite God, and a creature, and Divine influences, as in these passages the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are united. It requires much dexterity in the use of language and a very cautious paraphrase to make it even seem plausible, but strip it of its dress of words and look at its essential ideas and the delusion vanishes. Moreover, in the passage from Corinthians the personality of the Spirit is plainly set forth, "*All these worketh that one and the self same spirit* dividing to every man severally *as he will.*" There are other passages of the same kind, but those already adduced must suffice.

The way is now prepared to consider the third class of passages, —those that disclose the nature and attributes of the three persons. A full quotation, discussion, exposition and vindication of all the passages contained in this class will not, of course, be expected. We shall merely advert to enough to illustrate and confirm the argument.

As it regards the divinity of the Father, no reasonable doubt exists among any, and this needs not to be discussed.

As it regards the Son, there is no need of establishing his personality, as it is not disputed. The point of inquiry, then, is this : Did he exist as a Divine person, before the man Christ Jesus was born, and is he, as it regards this nature, Divine ? These inquiries we answer by showing that the Bible directly calls him God, ascribes to him the *attributes* of God, omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence ; the *works* of God—creation, preservation, government, and the office of judging, rewarding and punishing ; the *worship* of God—prayer, faith and adoration, asserts his incarnation, and contrasts his human nature with his Divine. On all these points the Bible speaks fully, of which we shall soon give illustrations.

As it regards the Holy Spirit, the point of inquiry is, Can his separate personality and his Divinity be proved ? for, either it is denied that he is a person, or if it is admitted that he is, he is by unitrinarians, confounded with the Father, since, as they say, God is a holy spirit, or else his Divinity is denied. When his personality is proved, and it is made manifest that he is distinct from the Father and the Son, his Divinity is proved by showing that the Bible gives to him the names, attributes, works and worship of God, as in the case of the Son. On all these points the Bible speaks clearly and fully. The plan of the whole argument for a Trinity of persons in the one God, is now before us.

We will now, by way of illustration, suppose an early convert, induced by the baptismal formula to inquire, who is this Son into whose name I am to be baptized ? He turns to the Gospel of John, and reads, Jn. 1 : 1-3, 14, "In the beginning was the Word,

and the word was with God, and the word was God. All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made. *And the word became flesh, and dwell among us, full of grace and truth, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father.*" He turns to the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, and reads a list of the honors of the Jews, closed with this as the crowning one, that "of them, *as concerning the flesh*, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed forever." Rom. 9: 5. He turns again to the first Epistle of John, and reads concerning Jesus Christ, the Son of God, that "he is the true God and eternal life." 1 Jn. 5: 20. He turns to the Gospel of John, and hears Thomas, who had been doubtful, saying to Christ, "My Lord and my God," and hears Christ commend him for this exercise of faith. Jn. 20: 28, 29. He turns to Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, and finds humility and self-sacrifice inculcated by the example of Jesus Christ, "who, in the form of God, but not desirous of retaining a state of equality with God, made himself of no reputation, assumed the form of a servant, was made after the similitude of men, and being found in fashion as a man, humbled himself and became obedient to death, even the death of the cross." Phil. 2: 6-8. He turns to the Epistle to the Hebrews, and finds predicated of Christ, one of the most definite and sublime descriptions of the creation and final dissolution of the universe, that occurs in the Word of God, and one which is there predicated of the Jehovah of the Old Testament: "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of thy hands; they shall perish, but thou remainest; and they all shall wax old as a garment, and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail." The name Jehovah, creative power, eternity and immutability, he sees, are here ascribed to Christ, and that in perfect accordance with this, in the preceding verse, he is thus addressed: "Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever." Heb. 2: 8-12. He farther notices that, in numerous other instances, what is in the Old Testament ascribed to Jehovah, is, in the New, ascribed to Christ. The sublime account of the inauguration of Isaiah, (Is. 6,) presents Jehovah God of Hosts, as the majestic being whom the prophet saw; in whose presence the temple trembled and was filled with smoke, and whom the seraphim adored. Yet John does not hesitate to assert that it was Christ whose glory the prophet saw, and of whom he spake. Jn. 12: 41. Paul also asserts that it was Christ whom the Israelites tempted in the wilderness, and were destroyed of serpents, and yet the being tempted, in the Old Testament, was Jehovah. 1 Cor. 10: 9. The inquirer now notices that the grand characteristic of Divinity, in the Old Testament, is the creation of all things, and that God asserts that he created them alone and by himself. Is. 44: 24. He then no-

tices again that the ascription of creation to Christ is repeated by Paul in the most unlimited terms. Col. 1: 16. "By him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are upon earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers, all things were created by him and for him, and he is before all things, and by him all things subsist." He hears Christ saying, "All the churches shall know that I am he that searcheth the hearts." Rev. 2: 23. He then turns and reads, "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked, who can know it? I, JEHOVAH, search the heart." Jer. 17: 9, 10. And again, "Jehovah, thou, even thou ONLY, knowest the hearts of all the children of men." 1 Kings, 8: 39.

Again, he reads the sublime description of God as "dwelling in light unapproachable; whom no man *hath seen or can see*." 1 Tim. 6: 16. And yet he hears Christ declaring it to be his peculiar prerogative in contrast with men, that *he hath seen the Father*. "Not that any man hath seen the Father, except him who came from God, he hath seen the Father." He also sees, that to this corresponds the statement of John: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son that was in the bosom of the Father, he hath revealed him." He notices too, that this Son is that Creator of all things who was with God, and was God. John 1: 18. Christ also makes his knowledge of the Father commensurate with the Father's knowledge of him. "No one knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any one the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." Mat. 11: 27. He notices that in various other places the power of searching the heart is ascribed to Christ, John 2: 24, 25; and John 6: 64, and that the apostles prayed to him and said, when about to fill the place of Judas, "Thou Lord which knowest the hearts of all men, show which of these two thou hast chosen." Acts, 1: 24. He hears the dying Stephen praying to Christ, and commending to him his departing spirit, Acts 7: 59, 60. He hears Paul praying repeatedly to Christ, 2 Cor. 12: 8, 9; 1 Thess. 3: 11, 12; 2 Thess. 2: 16, 17. He hears Ananias, to whom Christ appeared in a vision, and also the apostle Paul, characterize Christians as *those who call upon the name of Christ*, 1 Cor. 1: 2; Acts 9: 14. He sees, too, that Christians were generally spoken of by this title, Acts 9: 21. Moreover, he hears Christ saying "that all men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father." John 5: 23. Once more he hears all the angels of God called on to worship him; he listens, and lo he hears angels and saints in heaven adoring Christ in the same lofty strains in which they worship the Father. Need we ask what must be the effect of these, and a great multitude of similar passages to which we cannot even allude, upon the mind of such an inquirer. Will he not with believing Thomas say to Christ, My Lord and my God,

and with adoring saints and angels unite in his worship? Need we wonder that Pliny the younger, in his letter to Trajan, represents the Christians of his day as singing hymns to Christ as God? The reign of Trajan extended through A. D. 98-117. Hence these Christians must have been nearly contemporary with the last part of the life of the apostle John.

In conducting a similar inquiry as it respects the Holy Spirit, the statements of Christ concerning him, in John 14 : 16, would, as we have remarked, be the leading passages. It is Christ's special object, in these, to set him forth as coming to more than make good his own place. He is there called the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, the Holy Ghost. He is spoken of as sent by the Father in the name of Christ, and as sent by Christ from the Father, and as coming from the Father to the disciples and dwelling in them. He is said to teach, to bear witness, and to bring to remembrance the words of Christ. He is said to convince the world of their sin for not believing in Christ, of the righteousness of Christ as evinced by his exaltation to the Father, and of the decision of God in favor of Christ in the great controversy between him and the prince of this world. He was not to speak or act on a separate or independent plan, but fully to comprehend all the designs of Christ and the Father, to glorify Christ and to guide the disciples into all the truth. Accordingly, in Acts 13 : 4, he is represented as calling and sending out ministers. "The Holy Ghost said, separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them." In Acts 20 : 28, Paul says, that the Holy Ghost made the elders of Ephesus overseers of the church of God. The Holy Spirit also is represented as directing the motions of ministers. Paul and Timothy were forbidden of the Holy Ghost to preach the word in Asia. They also assayed to go into Bithynia, "but the Spirit suffered them not." Acts 16 : 6, 7. Again, whilst Peter thought on a vision, "The Spirit said unto him, Behold three men seek thee, Arise, therefore, and get thee down, and go with them, nothing doubting, for I have sent them." Acts 10 : 19, 20. Of this Peter says, "The Spirit bade me go." Acts 11 : 12. So the Spirit sent Philip to baptize the eunuch, and after his baptism caught him away, Acts 10. He is often referred to as having spoken by the old prophets, 1 Peter 1 : 9-12; Acts 28 : 25. Christians are said to be his temple; of course he is to them an in-dwelling God. 1 Cor. 6 : 19; 2 Tim. 1 : 14. He is said to distribute spiritual gifts to them as he will. 1 Cor. 12 : 8-11. Christ told his apostles that the Spirit of the Father should speak in them, when called before rulers for his sake. Mat. 10 : 20. He uttered special warnings against blaspheming him. It is not possible to explain how an attribute can be blasphemed, or in what the peculiar guilt of such blasphemy consists. But if the Holy Ghost is a Divine person, if without his

influence all hope of salvation ceases, then the case is plain. Blaspheming a Divine person so employed, is a high, a fatal crime; but how frigid to apply it to an energy or attribute. Mark 3 : 28-30 : Mat. 12 : 31, 32. It is also absurd to speak of lying to an attribute, but Peter charged Ananias with lying to the Holy Ghost and asserted that this was lying to God. Acts 5 : 3, 4. Nor can an attribute be grieved. But Paul says, "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God by whom ye are sealed unto the day of redemption." Eph. 4 : 30. The Spirit who thus seals, he calls "*that Holy Spirit of promise*," Eph. 1 : 13, referring manifestly to the celebrated promises of those passages in which Christ fixed the eyes of the church, on the coming of the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth. Omniscience is ascribed to the Spirit when he is said to *search all things, even the deep things of God*. And in general to perform the works ascribed to him, to have a perfect view of the secrets of all hearts, to act simultaneously all over the world in convincing of sin, and in the regeneration, sanctification, illumination, and guidance of Christians, is a work that no one but an omniscient and omnipresent God can perform. He must be *he that searcheth the hearts*. Indeed the regeneration of those dead in trespasses and sins is spoken of as one of the highest illustrations of the exceeding greatness of Divine power. To go into any further details would exceed our limits. But from what has been said, this is plain. All that pertains to personality is clearly ascribed to each of the sacred Three. Each has a will, and chooses and plans. Each is capable of love, joy and grief. Each has intellectual powers adequate to the omniscient perception of all truth. Each could, if he pleased, form for himself a separate and independent plan of action, otherwise it would be absurd in Christ to say as he does, that they will not act on such a plan, but will act in perfect concurrence with the Father and each other. See John 16 : 13-15; John 5 : 19, 20. All of these things lie upon the face of the Bible, nor is it possible to describe personality nor supreme divinity more fully than it is described, in the case of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

It has been well said, that if the doctrine of Divine unity were not revealed, there would be full proof of the existence of three separate Gods. But when Moses says the Lord our God (plural) is one Jehovah, one self-existent being, then we avow on the evidence of these and similar testimonies, that these three Divine persons are in essence one God.

Such is a brief survey of the teachings of the Word of God on this interesting point. Does it not justify the assertion that this doctrine is taught in the Bible in the best manner? It is taught just as we should expect, when we look at the plan of the Bible, that it would be taught if true. When any subject has taken full possession of the mind of any one and he writes con-

cerning it, it shows itself not merely in direct assertions, but also in various other ways. It affects the whole structure of his writings, and tinges the whole body of his thoughts; there will be also numerous coincidences of thought seemingly accidental, so that not only the bold outlines of the subject will be seen but also its minuter features and various shades of coloring. So this subject is set forth in the Bible. The idea of a plurality of persons, not numerically fixed, presents itself in various forms more or less distinctly. In other passages this plurality is rendered more definite as it regards the number of persons, in others still, these persons are described fully as it regards names, attributes, words and works. In comparing various parts of the Bible on this subject we find various and striking coincidences, and it becomes more and more evident that the doctrine is wrought into the very structure of the plan of the Bible, and gives color to the whole.

May we not also assert that the mode of reasoning employed by us is strictly philosophical? In the natural world that theory is held to be true which accounts for all facts and gives harmony to the system. The law of gravitation is admitted on this ground, and the Newtonian theory of the motions of the solar system. The ancient systems seemed to account for some facts, but were justly rejected, because they did not account for all. Now although the system of the simple unity of God accounts for a part of the facts stated in the Bible, still for a great and fundamentally important class it does not at all account. The doctrine of a Trinity of persons united in one God, does give an easy and adequate account of all these facts, and unites all parts of the Bible in one system. It is therefore true. On all sound principles of reasoning it must be true.

Does not our argument also set forth the absurdity of a very common mode of endeavoring to disprove the doctrine? We refer to the mode employed by those who endeavor to explain away particular texts in detail, by showing that each taken alone need not of course imply the doctrine because it may possibly, by extreme verbal criticism, have a different meaning. We do not admit that the proof-texts can be thus explained away separately, but even if they could, it is unsound reasoning to suppose that all can be explained away, standing as they do in a system. One accidental expression may occur and not prove the doctrine, but if these expressions multiply and are closely connected in a system, especially in the word of the omniscient God, accident is impossible and design is implied. We admit this principle on all other subjects. Except in the exact sciences all evidence depends on an accumulation of probabilities arising from a combination of facts. One action may not fix a man's character, but a series of similar actions, each of which taken separately might

prove nothing, does fix it, and that undeniably. Yet multitudes neglect this obvious principle and expend all their ingenuity in criticism and in wresting language from its obvious sense, and when they have by fair and unfair means effected their purpose as it regards particular texts, they think they have done all that is necessary to disprove the Trinity. How would this principle operate in a court of justice? Let a man be arraigned, and let numerous circumstances make his guilt perfectly clear; then let his advocate endeavor to show that each fact taken separately and out of its relations would not prove the man guilty, and then infer that therefore all united cannot. Would he convince any jury of common sense men? Would it not be well to remind him that there was one momentous fact more which needed to be explained, viz., how so many unfortunate facts all tending in one direction, happened to be so united, as to form a moral certainty of guilt? And if he could not explain this fact, of what avail would be all his ingenuity? But the opposers of this doctrine are in a still more unfortunate condition, for they cannot do the one or the other. They cannot explain the facts separately on which the doctrine rests, much less can they explain their union in such a system.

¶ If, now, any one shall undertake to reprove us for saying that we do understand what the word person means, and that there are properly three persons in one God, as if we pretended, with our finite sounding-line, to fathom the infinite one, or with our square and compass to measure the illimitable recesses of his Divinity: to such a one, we will reply, Do you believe that the Bible reveals at all a personal God? If so, in what language is his personality revealed? Sure we are that no language can be found in which a personal God can be revealed, which is not used to denote the personality of the persons of the Trinity. If the personality is revealed in one case, it is no less in the other. We deny, therefore, that we have attempted to penetrate into the secrets of the Deity. The personality of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is not a secret. It is a thing revealed. We do not pretend that we have found out the Almighty unto perfection. But what the Almighty has clearly revealed, we do profess to read intelligently, and systematically to state.

If, now, another shall allege that all this language of personality belongs merely to the sphere of expression, and is designed merely to affect and impress the mind, but not to declare the existence of correspondent metaphysical realities; if he shall, to sustain this assertion, say that such personalities are finite, and cannot truly set forth God, the Absolute, the Infinite; to such an one we will reply, Your view makes a philosophical theory of the Absolute, which no Scripture sustains—a binding law of interpretation. This is not to be governed by Scripture, but it is to govern Scrip-



ture by philosophy. Again : We do not accept your philosophy. We see no incompatibility between the idea of personality, and that of infinity. Infinite power, creating all things ; infinite will, controlling all things ; infinite knowledge, infinite ends and plans, comprehending all time, all space, all existences ; infinite energy of affection and emotion, corresponding to such ends and plans ; these are the elements of infinite personality. These are the proper and natural counterparts to our ideas of infinity, in time, space, and number. The mind cannot be satisfied till it conceives of infinite personality to fill and use all time, all space, all things. Such is the only idea of God that the mind of man can form. He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. He filleth immensity ; he inhabiteth eternity ; of him, and through him, and to him, are all things. We reply once more : Your principles not only subvert personality in the Trinity, as a reality, but they subvert any personality in God, as a reality ; for no personality can be described, except in the same terms that are used to describe the persons of the Trinity ; and if these imply no real corresponding personality, because God is the absolute, the infinite, and personality is finite, then God neither is personal, nor can any language truly describe him as such. But if this is so, then all the names of the Divine attributes, that are intellectual, moral, and affectionate, cease to have any significance. For we cannot attach to such words as wisdom, will, knowledge, love, mercy, patience, justice, grace, any ideas that are not taken from our knowledge of our own personality. The necessary result is, that God becomes to us an impersonal, and an unknown God, not only now, but forever ; for personality in us will always be what it now is, and if it cannot now lead us to a true knowledge of God, it never can.

But if a third person shall say that any such speculative developments are needless, and lead to evil, we reply, Infinite personality is not a speculative development. It is the very thing revealed, concerning the Father, concerning the Son, and concerning the Holy Ghost. If this is not revealed, nothing is. We are aware that unauthorized speculative developments may be connected with this. To base a theory of generation on the names Father and Son—or of procession, on the going forth of the Spirit, as sent by the Father and the Son—this is a speculative development, and in it antiquity too freely indulged. But the doctrine can be stated in its rigid Scriptural simplicity, without it. It consists in the great, simple, majestic fact of infinite tri-personality.

But while we decline to adopt the generation and procession development of antiquity, we are free to confess, that we prefer it to the ground assumed by some, that we do not know what *person* means, in the doctrine of the Trinity, and that it is some unknown, three-fold *distinction* in a God whose essence, will, and

attributes are one. This is not what the Bible reveals. It sets aside the personal language of the Bible, as not meaning what it seems to mean. In place of it, it presents nothing intelligible to the mind. Its natural development is Sabellianism. Whatever defects existed in the ancient development, it certainly did not suppress personality. Nay, Prof. Stuart says that it virtually amounted to tritheism. Even if this is not so, it is certainly undeniable, that it preserved in its full power, the great idea of real tri-personality in God.

If, now, any one shall say, that this doctrine of a trinity injures the mind, and that the idea of absolute personal unity is best adapted to the wants of men, we beg leave to demur. Absolute, unmitigated personal unity in an infinite mind, is a cold, unsocial idea. It never has, in any age, been powerful on the human mind. To us, we confess that it is painful. The desire of an equal to love, does not strike us as an imperfection in an infinite person; nay, it would seem to us imperfect without it. If this is so, what would be the social state of an infinite, eternal, solitary mind? Who, in the universe, could worthily understand or reciprocate the love of an infinite heart? Towards whom could such a heart overflow? But when we read that the Father *knows* and *loves* the Son, even as the Son *knows* and *loves* the Father, we at once feel an infinite relief. When we read, "The Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things which himself doeth," we do not see inferiority or dependence, but the boundless joy arising from the interchange of infinite thought and infinite love. When we read of the only begotten Son, as "in the bosom of the Father," we are delightfully impressed with this affecting symbol of tender and ardent love. When we read of the Spirit as *searching* all things, *even the deep things of God*, and as "hearing" the views of the Father and of Christ, and as "speaking whatsoever he hears," we have no thought of inferiority, but of delightful intellectual intercourse, and of perfect unity in thought, feeling, plans and action, between the blessed persons of the Trinity.

These ideas lie upon the very face of the Scriptures. They are the very things that affect the mind. They are involved in any clear view of the plan of redemption. They are essential to any definite and affecting conception of the love of God. When it is said of the Father, that he spared not his own son, but gave him up for us all, or that he so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son; our whole power to feel or measure the love of God, lies in the reality which we attach to their separate personality and ardent mutual love. We must either really believe, or else for the time imagine this, or the language loses all its significance and all its power.

We are no tritheists. We are full believers in the essential unity of God. But so far as the wants of our own mind are con-

cerned, we would much sooner believe in three separate, infinite, self-existent spirits, than in one solitary God, who in the wide universe could find no equal to love. Intellect is not the great want, nor power, but love, reciprocated love, even in God himself. For can we conceive of the infinite Father as happy, without the love of the infinite Son?

We reject tritheism because it is not a fact ;—because the Bible does not teach it, but rather the essential unity of God.

But we are free to confess that such an idea of tritheism as we can form would be far better to us than such unity, as leaves only a Sabellian trinity as its ultimate logical development. There is something lovely, affecting, sublime, in the mutual love and perfect social intercourse of three infinite self-existent minds. It would not strike a repulsive chord in our mind if it were revealed in the Word of God. The unity of three such minds in infinite love, and intellectual intercourse, would give an idea of bliss unspeakable. The thought of it might well fill a universe with joy and elevate them to higher degrees of mutual love.

But we do not accept any unrevealed speculations. We go to the Bible and take what we find there. We do find there the same enrapturing idea of infinite society between Divine persons, and in addition to it essential unity, which we regard as a higher perfection than if these persons were essentially separate, because God in fact so exists.<sup>1</sup> From all human speculations in the announcement of the Trinity as a revealed doctrine we abstain, desiring only to learn and to teach the doctrine as it is revealed, and therefore to teach it solely through the words and thoughts which the Holy Ghost teacheth. This has been our simple aim in the present effort, and as we close we commend our humble labors to Him in whom alone is all our hope of success.

<sup>1</sup> "Have we not reason to conclude that this distinction of three in one is that in which the most perfect and happy society consists, in which love and friendship is exercised to the highest perfection and with infinite enjoyment and felicity. And that the most perfect and happy society of creatures, united together forever, in the kingdom of God, in the strongest sweetest love and friendship, is an emanation from this infinite THREE ONE, as the fountain and pattern of all happy society and friendships and the highest possible resemblance of it. This idea seems to be suggested, if not necessarily implied, in John 17 : 21-23."—*Dr. Hopkins*.

He also intimates that this "may be essential to the infinitely perfect being, and that otherwise he would not be absolutely perfect, all-sufficient and infinitely blessed." *Dr. Emmons* maintained the same general view.

## ARTICLE VIII.

## THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL.

By REV. ROBERT W. HILL, Mendon, N. Y.

CHRISTIANS are agreed that the Word of God is the means of sanctification. But what part of this Word is honored with an instrumentality so exceedingly important? Is it the Law, or the Gospel, or both unitedly and indiscriminately? A wise answer to these inquiries may be of service to the church and to the ministry.

In discussing this subject we shall institute and endeavor to answer the following questions: What is the Law as distinguished from the Gospel? Is there any evidence, that the truths of the Gospel as such possess a greater efficiency in the work of sanctification, than the truths of the Law? Does the Gospel receive any agencies not received by the Law? Is not the sanctification of Christians to be ascribed to the influence of those agencies? Does the Holy Spirit employ the Gospel more than the Law in the work of sanctification?

1. What then is the Law as distinguished from the Gospel? The word Law is used in the Scriptures with various latitudes of meaning. Sometimes it refers to the dictates of conscience. Hence it is said of those to whom no express revelation had been given, "which shows the works of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness." Again, it denotes those rites and ceremonies which were peculiar to the Jewish dispensation. This is "the law of commandments contained in ordinances," and which had only "the shadow of good things to come." To this the Saviour alludes when he says, "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill." It was enacted for a specific purpose, for a particular people, and for a limited time. The term Law, also means the Decalogue or the Ten Commandments delivered on Mount Sinai. "Love is the fulfilling of the law." It embraces all those great moral truths which are founded in the relations of intelligent creatures to God and one another, and which ought ever to regulate their feelings and conduct, so far as we can judge, is equally applicable to all, whether they be angels or men, whether they be holy or unholy, whether they exist in heaven, on earth, or in hell.

The word Gospel is more limited in its signification. It means "good news, or a joyful message." It is the revelation of the grace of God to fallen men through a Mediator. The distinction between the Law and the Gospel will be more clearly seen, by contemplating some truths which are common to them both, and then noticing the points in which they differ.

(1.) They both recognize the *existence* of God. Without this great and overwhelming truth, there could be no meaning to either of these terms. Hence, all the instructions contained in the Old Testament and the New, are founded on the glorious fact, that there is a God.

(2.) The Law and the Gospel teach, that God is a being of *infinite perfection*. His natural and moral attributes are described in glowing language. His power, his omnipresence, his knowledge, his independence;—his holiness, comprehending his goodness, wisdom, justice and truth, are in the highest sense without limit. Such is his glory, a glory immutably the same, that no one hath seen its full exhibition, nor can see it, and live. In proof of the Divine perfection, passages may be drawn, with equal readiness, and in equal number, from every part of the Bible.

(3.) The *government* of God is asserted in the Law and the Gospel. His *moral* government, which describes the duties of creatures, and presents motives to obedience, is nothing more nor less than a government of law. He commands certain actions, and forbids others; and then supports these commands and prohibitions by the most solemn considerations. But where do you find the duty of creatures, *as creatures*, most clearly illustrated, in the old, or new dispensation? Reason and modesty will not attempt a decision. Love, supreme love to God, and impartial benevolence towards man, is taught no more explicitly and enjoined by no higher motives, in the Gospel, than in the Law. As a system of moral administration, the Law is perfect. It is no part of the design of the Gospel to prescribe a purer code of morals. Instead of this, it magnifies the Law and honors it, by sustaining its penalty, and restoring the fallen creature to the image of its great Author. Its influence upon the *moral character* of the redeemed is simply restorative; inspiring them with that holiness which the Law demands; and thus making them the willing and active subjects of the moral government of Jehovah.

The same is true of the *providential* government of God. By inspired men who lived under the legal dispensation, it is written, "The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens; his kingdom ruleth over all. And all the inhabitants of the earth are represented as nothing; and he doeth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" In the testament of grace, it is written, "In him we live, and move, and have our being. Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father. The very hairs of your head are all numbered." It is the providence of God that clothes the grass of the field, feeds the fowls of heaven, directs the steps of man, stills the tumult of the people, controls the revolutions of empires, gives life, and takes it away.

(4.) The fallen and guilty condition of man is taught in the Law and in the Gospel. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. We have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin."

(5.) The Law and the Gospel also teach our obligations and accountability. In both, man is represented as sustaining such relations to God, as to prove him to be under natural, legal, and moral obligations. These obligations necessarily imply accountability. Hence the commands, threatenings, and promises of Revelation. "Be ye holy. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. Thou *shalt* love the Lord, thy God." Hence also the appointment of that day, which shall reveal the righteous judgment of God, and settle forever the destinies of moral agents. "God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil. For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad."

In attempting to show in what respects the Gospel differs from the Law, it is not our intention to speak of those truths which are exhibited *more clearly* in the former, than in the latter. Our object does not require this. But *what* truths does the Gospel reveal, concerning which the Law is silent? Whatever different answers might be given, they may all be comprehended in the following: The peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of the Gospel, is justification by faith, through a Mediator. It is a system of grace; and as such makes provision, on certain conditions, for the forgiveness of iniquity, transgression and sin. It furnishes no essentially new views of the character of God, or the character of man. Grace is indeed an exhibition of the Divine character unknown to the Law; and by it the *prospects* of sinners are greatly changed; but the grace of God is not in conflict with his justice. Each of these attributes is holy, or holiness itself, operating in different ways, but for the same grand object. Whether sin be pardoned, or punished, the ultimate design is the illustration of the Divine glory.

2. Is there any proof that the truths of the Gospel, as such, possess greater efficiency in the work of sanctification, than the truths of the Law?

(1.) No proof can be derived from the consideration, that the law *does not sanctify*. While this is freely admitted, it is still maintained, that even the truths of the Gospel never effect this desirable object. In this respect, the Law and the Gospel are on equal ground. Neither of them has the honor of plucking the prey from the mighty, or of transforming the creature into the image of God. As God never intended to make the rain and the

heat efficient causes in the production of vegetation ; so he never intended to make even his own Word an independent agent in the promotion of holiness. Neither commands nor invitations, threatenings nor promises, will ever break the flinty heart, or bow the stubborn will. Whether you place the sinner by the side of the cross, or at the foot of Sinai, the result will be the same. The exhibitions neither of grace nor of justice, will renew and sanctify the souls of men. "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil. For every one that doeth evil, hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved." No matter whether this light shine from Calvary or Sinai, it is never comprehended. By it, the sinner will never be savingly enlightened. Divine illumination is the work of God. "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give us the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ." The same sentiment is asserted in strong terms by our Saviour, "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." Paul acknowledges this truth. "I have planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the increase ; so then, neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth ; but God that giveth the increase."

(2.) No proof of the superior influence of the Gospel in sanctification can be drawn from the fact, that Christians must not rely on the Law, "as an effectual means" of promoting this end. An *effectual* means is one which, by its *own power*, produces a result. There is, however, no such power in truth. Its efficiency belongs exclusively to the Almighty Agent, who uses it. And is not this the proper idea to be attached to the word, means? To make it *effectual*, is to make it an agent ; but this involves an absurdity. It makes the instrument, and the producing cause, one and the same thing.

We are aware that Christians purify themselves in obeying the truth. But what is the *cause* of this obedience? "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, *through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience.*" Here we might rest the matter ; but suppose the Word of God to remain what it now is ; and suppose all the influence which it can exert, be poured upon the mind. "Yet, notwithstanding all this, such is the force of sinful desires and lusts, that they triumph over the precepts of the law," and the gospel, "and lead the unsanctified to continual opposition and transgression. Even against the voice of reason and conscience, as well as against the Divine precepts, does carnal desire prevail. We yield the moral self to the power of the carnal self, and plunge deeper into ruin, while the voice of God's Law is thundering in our ears," the voice of Divine grace calling upon us to return,

"and the voice of our own consciences loudly remonstrating against our conduct." "Let us break his bands asunder. Go thy way for this time: I pray thee have me excused: We will not have this man to reign over us," is the uniform language of the unrenewed heart. While our consciences testify to the excellence and purity of the Law, and to the grace and glory of the Gospel, we still gird ourselves for the conflict. God calls, by the voice of justice and mercy, and yet we will not hear. What folly, then, to rely upon the simple agency of truth, whether that truth be peculiar to the Law, or the Gospel, to stay the tide of unholy feeling, and to fix the affections, in supreme delight, upon invisible and eternal things? As well might you attempt to calm the agitated ocean, by the mere repetition of some scriptural truth. None but God can say, with a prevailing voice, "Hitherto shalt thou come, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed." He who relies upon truth, as an effectual means of sanctification, whether that truth be found in the Law or the Gospel, is, to all intents and purposes, a legalist.

(3.) No proof in favor of the Gospel can be derived from the consideration, that Christians are not under "the law as an efficacious means of deliverance from sin." They are not, in this sense, under the Gospel. It is indeed written, "Sin shall not have dominion over you, for ye are not under the law, but under grace." But does the word *grace* here mean nothing more than a system of *truth* peculiar to a dispensation of mercy? While God has distinctly taught that we ought to obey the law, and accept the provisions of the Gospel, he has never intimated that the publication of truth is all that he will do for the recovery of man from the ruins of the fall. Had his interposition on our behalf, been limited to this, we can see no necessity for the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus. Was an atonement necessary, in order that man should be taught his duty? Has this atonement altered the nature of truth, by clothing it with an inherent efficacy? We do indeed pray, that truth may have an effect; but in this prayer, we do not believe nor feel, that the agency which makes truth effectual, is in the truth itself. God has not placed us exclusively under the power of moral suasion, to break the bonds of sin; nor has he taught us to rely on this as the only, or the prominent source of encouragement and aid. This is not the constitution of the Gospel. Were it so, our hopes for sanctification would be vain. In this respect, the ministration of righteousness does not and cannot exceed in glory the ministration of condemnation. Who that contemplates the moral condition of a single individual, or of a single church, does not feel that a higher and mightier influence is necessary to growth in grace? And is not this the influence for which the believer prays, in the enjoyment of which he triumphs over



sin, and rejoices in the assurance that he shall finally take his seat among the ransomed of the Lord?

(4.) No proof of the superior influence of the Gospel, in the work of sanctification, can be derived from the fact, that sinners "always abuse the Law," and become more guilty under it. That the Law would be the occasion of aggravating our sins, might naturally have been expected. This necessarily follows from the abuse of increased light. "If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth." But if the Law, instead of delivering us from sin, is the occasion of our plunging deeper into it, we may certainly inquire, Why is it thus? Does this result necessarily follow? that is, is the nature of the Law such, that men cannot help multiplying their crimes under its influence? Does it produce sin, as naturally as poison produces death? Such an idea would impeach the wisdom and goodness of God. He certainly commanded Moses, and all who lived under the legal dispensation, to be holy; he blamed them for not being holy. But if the Law was naturally defective, how were sinners to blame for not being sanctified? Suppose that their powers were adequate to the task, under appropriate means; yet why withhold the means, and still require the tale of brick? Is there any wisdom, any goodness, any justice here? But "the law is holy, and the commandment is holy, and just, and good. Is then that which is good, made death unto" the sinner? "God forbid." The Law is never the direct and legitimate cause of sin. It was designed, and is adapted to lead men to holiness and happiness. It "was ordained to life." How plain, then, that its abuse and perversion is the cause of the sinner's increasing wickedness and guilt? It is an inadequate means of sanctification, because the fallen creature abuses it; and being abused, its thunders of wrath roll onward with increasing majesty and terror, waxing louder and longer.

But if the fact that the Law is the occasion of aggravating our guilt, "shows its insufficiency as a means of sanctification," the same mode of reasoning will prove that the Gospel also is inadequate to this important work. The facts are the same in both cases. Indeed, as the Gospel contains a fuller and richer exhibition of truth than the Law, the guilt of abusing the former is far more aggravated, than that of abusing the latter. "He that despised Moses' law, died without mercy under two or three witnesses; of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite to the spirit of grace." Our Saviour teaches the same affecting truth. "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin; but now have they no cloak for their sin. Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words

when ye depart out of that house, or city, shake off the dust of your feet. Verily I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah, in the day of judgment, than for that city." Both the Law and the Gospel, being perverted by the unrenewed man, work wrath, and bring forth fruit unto death. In these circumstances, they are always a source of death unto death. The fact is certain. The fault and consequences are ours.

(5.) It is difficult to conceive what sanctifying influence the Gospel can exert without the Law. The Law commands us to be holy, teaches us that we ought to be holy, and declares that we may justly be condemned for not being holy. It urges this duty by motives drawn from the authority of God, the glories of heaven, and the misery of hell. It surrounds the creature with all that is grand, awful and subduing, in the character of Jehovah, and the retributions of eternity. True, it says nothing of pardon. Its appeals to the understanding, the conscience and the heart, are founded upon the immutable principles of righteousness. And is not man so constituted as to feel the influence of these appeals? Is he not capable of being actuated by benevolent feelings? Though fallen, is he not still able to distinguish between good and evil; and can he not do right, for the *pleasure* of doing right? Or must he be urged to action by the additional hope of a gratuitous reward? Can he not admit that holiness is lovely, before he has any evidence of forgiveness? If not, then how can he be awakened and aroused by the influence of those motives which result from the offer of pardon? If there is nothing in man, upon which the demands of the Law can fasten, then it is certain that he will forever remain dead to the claims of the Gospel. The necessity and even desirableness of a dispensation of grace, is founded exclusively upon the equity, fitness and beauty of the legal dispensation. This the sinner must feel, before he can perceive any harmony between the legal and the mediatorial government of God. By the unrenewed man, the Law and the Gospel are regarded as in conflict with each other. He knows not, that here mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace kiss each other. But this glorious truth he must see and acknowledge. He must have some right affections towards the Law, before he can have any right feelings towards the Gospel. Where the former is hated, the latter is despised. The sinner cannot desire pardon, or be moved to action by the hope of forgiveness, till he admits that the demands and penalties of the Law are holy. When the ministration of condemnation appears glorious, then will the ministration of righteousness exceed in glory. The Gospel without the Law, presents no motive to action, and is utterly incapable of influencing the feelings of the heart. A man must feel that he is dead in trespasses and sins and is justly condemned,

before he will seek spiritual life, or admit, even, that he needs forgiveness. Here, then, we perceive with what perfect harmony the Law and the Gospel act upon the heart; and how necessary it is to combine their influence in our efforts to save men. Their effect upon the moral character is the same. They both aim to make men holy; and when not resisted or perverted by the obstinate will of man, they always produce this effect. It is not, however, for us to say which is the most easily resisted. Being parts of one great and glorious system of moral administration, the man who attempts to break assunder the bonds of the one, will lightly esteem the grace of the other. With the Law for its foundation, the Gospel does indeed reflect most clearly the glory of God, "for it is the power of God unto salvation;" but without the Law, it is an unintelligible display of severity and compassion. When seen in their just and proper proportions, they reflect light and honor upon each other. As a whole, containing and illustrating the principles of a perfect moral government, they exhibit the infinite wisdom of the Godhead. The heart that will pervert the truths peculiar to the one, will pervert those which are peculiar to the other, and vice versa.

3. Does the Gospel exert any agencies not exerted by the law? That truth is adapted to produce an effect upon man, i.e., that man is so constituted, that he ought to be influenced by truth, it is unreasonable to doubt. God, who is infinitely wise, would not use means, which have no adaptation to the end. But he does propose the everlasting truths of his Word, as the means of influencing the conduct of sinners; and the implication is found on every page of this Word, that men are criminal for not yielding to this influence.

This is the instrumentality, or influence, which the Law exerts. It meets man as a rational creature, makes upon him its demands; and by the presentation of motives, shows the reasonableness of these demands, and the infinite importance of immediate and complete obedience. Here, however, its influence ends. It offers not the interposition and aid of any foreign agent. It asks for no such aid. It admits of no such aid. By its own excellency, it seeks to control man's heart. If this influence be resisted, an influence perfect in its kind, and consisting only in moral suasion, it only remains for it to vindicate the Divine government, by the infliction of merited punishment. In this respect, it differs materially from the economy of grace. The Gospel also seeks to win to obedience by the presentation of truth to the mind. In doing this, it urges all those moving considerations which are peculiar to the Law, and in addition, those peculiar to itself. Passing beyond the boundaries of a merely legal dispensation, and securing to itself the highest possible degree of per-

suasive influence, with a weapon plucked from the armory of grace, it assaults the strongholds of sin. It speaks of sacrifices made for the ill-deserving, and of favors offered to them without money and without price. It points to a crucified, risen and reigning Saviour. It tells of a fountain, which purifies from sin and uncleanness. It offers rest to the weary; robes of fine-wrought linen, clean and white, to the naked; water to the thirsty; an inheritance to the poor; joy to the disconsolate; an exceeding and eternal weight of glory to the degraded and miserable. But exalted and affecting as are its themes, its hope of prevailing over the heart of sin is not in the truth itself, however wisely presented and fitted to secure such a result, but in that Divine Agent, who exerts an influence over and above that which arises from the truth, even the Holy Spirit of God.

And here is developed that peculiar glorious feature of the economy of grace, which warrants confidence in and secures efficiency to the instrumentality of truth. On the Spirit's influences we may rest in joyful hope, and unshaken confidence. As the coming of the Messiah was the great object of promise and expectation under the former dispensation,—so is the descent of the Spirit under the present. The death of Christ not only prepared the way for the offers of the Gospel, but rendered the advent of the Spirit, to carry into complete execution the designs of mercy, proper and certain. "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you." As the atonement of Christ is peculiar to the Gospel, so the agency of the Spirit, which is exerted in consequence of this atonement, also belongs to this dispensation. "*Received ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith?*" The gift of the Spirit is as really an act of grace, as the pardon of sin. His work has special reference to salvation. For this purpose, he renews the heart, reconciles to God, illumines the mind, imparts the spirit of adoption, sanctifies and seals the believer. "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." Hence Christians are said to "wait for the hope of righteousness through the Spirit."

The agency of the Spirit is secured to the world by prophecy and by promise. "And it shall come to pass, in the last days, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh." "I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance, but he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost." Christ alluding to these prophetic promises just before his ascension, commanded the apostles not to depart from Jerusalem, but to wait for the promise of the Father; which ye have heard of me. For John truly baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence. Thus early did he fix the expectations of his people upon the ministra-

tion of the Spirit. On the day of Pentecost, these promises began to be fulfilled in relation to the Jews. Their application to the Gentiles was made known, at a subsequent period. When Peter had been taught by a vision from heaven, "that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, partakers of God's promise in Christ, by the gospel, then," says he, "remembered I the word of the Lord, how that he said, John indeed baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost." To both Jews and Gentiles, then, the gospel secures the agency of the Spirit; an agency purely gracious, and, therefore, not contemplated in the Law. This is a marked and important feature of the dispensation of mercy; and it ought to awaken gratitude, and inspire hope. "When he, the spirit of truth is come, he shall guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak and he shall show you things to come. He shall glorify me; for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you."

4. Is not the sanctification of men to be ascribed to the agency of the Spirit, which is unknown to the law, but peculiar to the Gospel? "It is the *Spirit* that quickeneth." "*He* shall convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." "Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot see the kingdom of God." "I will put my *Spirit* within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes." "But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and *by the Spirit* of our God." "Now, the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, *through the power of the Holy Ghost*." "The *fruit of the Spirit* is love, joy, peace, long suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance." It were easy to multiply Scripture, in which regeneration, and all the steps of progressive sanctification are ascribed to the Spirit. But this is not necessary. Those already cited prove that it is his work to convince of sin, to restore to spiritual life, to beget hope and joy, and adorn the soul with the temper of heaven. Without his aid, all efforts and agencies, though wisely and efficiently put forth, will be ineffectual. Could you place the sinner in the focus of the universe, and concentrate upon him all the light which is reflected from its different parts, you might burn his conscience and inflame his heart, but you would fail to make him a new man, a holy being. So deeply sensible was the prophet of this, while standing over the dry bones, in the valley of vision. that the burden of his message, consisted in supplications for Divine aid. "Thus saith the Lord God, Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live. So I prophesied as he commanded me, and the breath came into them, and they lived, and stood upon their feet, an exceeding great army." The coming of the

breath of heaven was connected with the propheying of the man of God; but the living and moving of the dry bones were caused by the breath itself. It is not by might, nor by power, but by the Spirit of the living God, that sinners are quickened into life, and made fit subjects of heaven.

Of this every renewed soul is conscious. He renounces all dependence upon mere truth "as the effectual means of sanctification," and flies to the mediation of Jesus Christ. In this mediation is secured the efficacious agency of the eternal Spirit. Hence we see why "sanctification cannot be expected from the law; but only from a dispensation of grace." Did the Gospel only reveal the plan and proffers of mercy, without the doctrine of the agency of the Spirit, it would afford no securer ground of expectation than the Law. This expectation arises, not from the intrinsic power of truth, nor from the known laws of mind, but from the revealed and established fact, that the influences of the Spirit are secured to this fallen world. Observation, experience and revelation, all unite to prove that this is the only ground of hope. Though man is a complete moral agent, yet in his madness he refuses to yield to the claims of truth. While the Law pronounces condemnation, and leaves him to eat of the fruit of his own doings; the Gospel lifts the pall of death by introducing a mighty Agent, even the spirit of truth. Touched by his life-giving power, the indifferent are aroused, the sceptical convinced, the stubborn bowed in submission, the dead made alive.

5. Does the Spirit employ the Gospel more than the Law in the work of sanctification? Truth is the *means* of sanctification. There can be no holiness where there is no knowledge of God, or of his Son Jesus Christ. Remove all moral truth from the mind, and you render it incapable of holiness. Hence truth is the *sword* of the Spirit. It is an instrument, without which he never slays the carnal heart, and liberates the captive from the chains of death. "God has chosen us to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the *truth*." "Ye have purified your souls in obeying the *truth through the Spirit*. Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth." Here the agency of the Spirit and the instrumentality of truth are both asserted. But we are not told whether this truth is peculiar to the Law, or the Gospel. Nor is there anything in the Word of God which settles this point. The apostle says, "I have begotten you through the gospel." Again he declares, "The *law* is our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ." David also affirms, "The *law* of the Lord is perfect converting the soul." And with his eye surveying the whole compass of revelation, the apostle again says, "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is *profitable* for doctrine, for correction, for *instruction in righteousness*, that the man of God may be *perfect*, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." From the Bible itself then we can gain no evidence,

that either the Law or the Gospel is useless in causing the sinner to bring forth fruit unto holiness: on the contrary, both are eminently adapted and indispensably necessary to the accomplishment of such a work. Nor are we at liberty to conclude, that the one has any pre-eminence above the other.

Shall we appeal then to the *nature* of sanctification to settle this question? Here we find ourselves equally uninstructed. "Sanctification is the work of God's free grace, whereby we are renewed in the whole man after the image of God, and are enabled more and more to die unto sin, and live unto righteousness." In its progress, there are increasingly clear views of God, more fervent love to his character, deeper repentance for sin, a more vigorous faith in Christ, and more ardent desires for holiness. Christian experience is enlarged, and Christian duty more regularly and cheerfully performed. To sanctify is to make holy. Now the elements of holiness are love, repentance, faith, submission. But are not some of these feelings founded on doctrines peculiar to the Law, while others are founded on doctrines peculiar to the Gospel? The very nature of sanctification then requires the belief and practical improvement of those truths, which unfold the principles of justice and mercy. Without this there can be no conformity to the image of God; no preparation to join in the song of Moses and the Lamb. Who then has a right to say, that the Holy Spirit, in preparing souls for heaven, does not put equal honor upon the Law and the Gospel? He brings their combined influence to bear upon the heart; and by this means reconciles the creature to God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

It follows from this discussion that we are not at liberty to neglect any portion of the Scriptures. Many seize on a particular doctrine or duty, and undervalue others of equal importance. But such a course produces limited, and often erroneous views of the Divine character and government, enfeebles the intellect, prevents a harmonious development of the Christian graces, is conducive to pride, bigotry and censoriousness, and multiplies the dangers of deception. From this practice have arisen the most alarming heresies; such as Socinianism, Universalism, and Antinomianism. Besides, it is offensive to God. The whole Bible is his work. Both the Old Testament and the New bear the impress of his hand, and by him are honored in the work of saving men. Is it wise then, is it safe, to depreciate or neglect any part of the Scriptures? God's justice is as dear to him as his grace; his Law as his Gospel. Destroy the former, and what becomes of the latter? The desire of pardon cannot be cherished till the equity of justice is acknowledged. The holiness of the Gospel is founded on the same immutable principles as is the holiness of the Law. If therefore the latter is regarded as useless in the work of regeneration and sanctification, the same feelings will be cherished towards the for-

mer. To say, that the Law cannot be the means of sanctification, is to abandon it as a rule of duty : but when this is done, the Gospel is virtually abandoned as the ground of pardon. But this is lifting the government of God from this fallen world, producing universal freedom from the restraints of holiness, and giving unbounded license to every evil passion. Let us pause before we unchain the tiger, before we uncap the volcano, and let its heaving billows roll upward and onward, till its flames strike the stars, and its burning lava submerge the earth.

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ARTICLE IX.

## LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS.

BY THE EDITOR.

- 1.—*Two Lectures on the Connection between the Biblical and Physical History of Man.* By JOSIAH C. NOTT, M.D. New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1849.

DR. NOTT is a practising physician of Mobile, Alabama, and delivered the substance of this book, in the shape of Lectures, by invitation, from the chair of political economy of the Louisiana University, and before the Legislature of that state, in 1848; an incident worth noting.

We have certainly fallen upon strange times. Some great and many very little minds, are trying hard to subvert the Holy Scriptures, some by corrupting their fundamental doctrines, and others by attacking their historical veracity from the standpoint of "pure reason," or "pure science." Our author is among the latter, and so good, and learned, and scientific a man as one *Paul*, long since characterized the school to which he belongs, in those words, which never had an intenser meaning than now-a-days: "Avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called; which some professing, have erred concerning the faith."

The author starts with the theory, that the white and black races are so essentially unlike, that they could not have had a common origin. But finding much in the Scriptures to controvert his position, he has carried the war into Africa, and seeks, in this volume, to set aside their testimony as spurious and worthless. He professes to revere those parts of the Bible which are genuine, but let him take away all that he finds fault with, and, in the expressive language of another, "he may have the rest for two-and-sixpence." Carrying out his principles to their legitimate results, not a vestige of revelation remains. We regard it, therefore, as essentially infidel in its reasonings, conclusions, and tendencies, and of that class of infidel speculations which are most dangerous.

The author is not more rash and presumptuous, than self-confident, in this puny attempt against the Scriptures. "I ask no quarter from critics as to the matter of these pages; it is the result of much reading and reflection, and I stand armed with authority and with facts to sustain me." His main authority is manifestly the "Ethnological Journal" of London, which he specially commends, as containing "more solid learning, more bold, original thought, and more useful knowledge, than any other periodical of the day." But what says



a competent authority<sup>1</sup> of this same Journal, into whose spirit our author has so deeply drunk! It may not be amiss for Americans to know how it is regarded at home. Says the British Quarterly: "Luke Burke, Esq., the editor, and almost the sole contributor to the work, prides himself on being a man of pure science. \* \* \* He subjects the Hebrew Scriptures, in common with all other sources of evidence relating to his subject, to the most rigid scrutiny of this so-called pure science. The result is, that the accounts given in those Scriptures concerning the origin of the world, the origin of the human race, the great landmarks of ancient chronology, and the early distribution of the great families or races of men—all are worthless, worse than worthless, a huge accumulation of rubbish, which has to be swept out of the way before science can perform her office unimpeded by the impertinences of superstition. Our most scientific writers on this subject—such as Usher, Hales, Pritchard, and the gentlemen of the 'Edinburgh Review'—all are puling, timid souls, who are vainly endeavoring to prop up a 'theological assumption' taken from their Bibles, but against which the stream of modern science is bearing with a force that must, ere long, prove irresistible. \* \* \* No attack has been made in our language on the historical veracity of the early scriptures of the Old Testament more undisguised, more thorough, more determined. In this respect, the 'Ethnological Journal' may be placed beside 'Bayle's Dictionary,' and the 'French Encyclopædia.'" So much for his chief authority in science. In theology he seems to revere only Channing, Norton, Parker, Palfrey, etc. "It is men of this stamp," he says, directly referring to those just named and to the German commentators of the school of Strauss,—“men who alone possess the knowledge requisite for deciding such questions—that dare to teach that the old Bible mss. have not come down to us untarnished by human hands; and that the Pentateuch is an anonymous production of unknown origin, compiled many centuries after the time of Moses, and consequently of no authority in settling matters of science."

We will string together a few more detached sentences, giving our readers an idea of the drift of the book and of the authorities and facts which the author speaks of so vauntingly. After quoting the testimony of Mr. Gallatin in regard to the improvement of the Cherokees, he says, "*Not one word of which is strictly true;*" the labors of our honored missionaries among both them and the Choctaws are a total failure, according to him. "The whole history of creation, and of the human race, down to the epoch of the flood, is compressed into the first five chapters of Genesis, and human ingenuity could hardly originate anything more confused and contradictory than this account." "He (Hales) fell into the old error of supposing the *Mosaic records* to be the oldest records of time extant." "The discrepancies are great and utterly irreconcilable. We have said already that the Hebrew, Samaritan, and Greek texts, rest upon almost equal authority, and we might add, *no* authority. We do not give this as our individual opinion merely, but have no hesitation in asserting that the most competent authorities in the Church, and out of the Church, deny the strict authenticity of any copy of the Pentateuch which has reached us." "The chronology of Egypt, even for some centuries beyond Abraham, is no longer a matter of speculation, while that of Genesis vanishes before it." "We have shown that these writers were not directed by Divine inspiration in their geographical, historical, chronological, geological, and other scientific facts: and it cannot be proven that their information touching the physical history of man was more exact." "What becomes of Christianity, when its holy records are thus polluted and mutilated?"

These are fair specimens of the author's facts, reasonings, and conclusions. And such things are put forth as the teachings and demonstrations of modern science! The Bible is not only become antiquated—it is at length found to be

<sup>1</sup> British Quarterly, London, May, 1849, pp. 566, 567.

false, and is good for nothing but to bolster up "theological absurdities." "And this is not mere rhetoric. This class of men, many of them at least, possess ability, acuteness, and no little science; and earth and heaven, nature, philosophy and revelation are ransacked, and subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, to find evidence to overturn the Bible. We have no fears of the Bible from such attacks. It will gather lustre, and its evidence be made to brighten and appear grander and fuller as the secrets of nature are laid bare and science goes on to perfection. But we do tremble for multitudes of the young and inexperienced, the superficial and conceited, when the press is flooding the world with productions of this sort. It becomes the friends of sound learning and of the Bible to bestir themselves, and guard against the insidious onsets of "science falsely so called," as well as against the corruptions of false doctrines.

2.—*The History of the United States of America, from the Discovery of the Continent to the Organization of Government under the Federal Constitution.* BY RICHARD HILDRETH. In three volumes. Vols. I. II. 8vo. pp. 570, 579. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

WE are free to confess that we entered on the reading of this new, and, in size, formidable History of the United States, rather as a task than as a pleasure; but we had not progressed far before our feelings entirely changed; and as the result of our reading, we are prepared to express a decidedly favorable opinion of its merits. The history goes back to the discovery of America, dwells at length upon our colonial period, and brings the record down to the present time. The two volumes before us close with the incipient measures and struggles pertaining to the war of the Revolution, and it is of these only that we can speak.

The author, judging from his work, is well qualified for the important service he has put his hand to. He has evidently been industrious and thorough in collecting, arranging, and digesting his materials. He has full confidence in his own ability. He is independent in his investigations and opinions, dispassionate, and generally impartial in his statements, and if not philosophical and comprehensive in the matter of analysis and classification, he is at least careful, explicit, and full in the record of facts.

No other American history, worthy of the name, embraces so extended a period of time, or traverses so wide a circuit of investigation: the plan and arrangement, also, are somewhat peculiar, and certainly very happy. The author's labors in the field of our colonial history are especially valuable. He traces, at length, the successive steps of our early planting and growth, and enters fully into the subject of "the origin and shaping of our existing laws and institutions, state and national, the progressive, social, and intellectual development of our people."

The style of the work is of a high order, of its kind. It is pure, simple, transparent, concise, vigorous, without any adornment or attempt at brilliant display. It is the very opposite of Macaulay's great work, both in style and manner—not a philosophical, but a simple matter-of-fact history—not arranged with a master's skill, or executed with a rhetorician's power, but a full and orderly digest of the events, great and small, which make up our eventful national history. It can never, of course, be as popular a history as Macaulay's—nor will it take rank with it as a production of genius and intellect; still it is adapted to fill an honorable sphere, and subserve a most useful end. We are confident that when the merits of this history come to be known and appreciated, it will be extensively regarded as decidedly superior, all things considered, to anything that before existed on American history, and as a valuable contribution to American authorship.

The facilities for consulting it are unusually great. Besides a very full

table of contents in each volume, and a complete analytical index at the end of the work, the date of each event, in chronological order, is given in the margin. The *Publishers*, too, have done their best upon it—the paper, press-work, and binding are superior; indeed, the whole mechanical part is quite equal to the best London books. The three stately volumes, when completed, will be an ornament to any library, and no intelligent American can afford to be without the work. We have nobly patronized the great English history of the age; let us not fail to appreciate and patronize an American history so respectable and valuable as this certainly is.

We are far from thinking it perfect. We have space to note only two things which strike us unfavorably. One is, the absence of the usual references to authorities. The author does not give these with the text in passing, but promises "a list of the printed books chiefly used" at the end of volume III. Now we had much rather see the reference to authorities consulted or followed, at the bottom of the page; it inspires confidence; we feel as if we were treading on a more solid foundation; and we want the means of verifying his citations and assertions, if we chose to do so.—The other defect is of a far more serious character, and relates to evangelical religion, and to the memory of men the church and nation ought to revere. We know nothing of Mr. Hildreth except as the author of this history; but, judging of his religious opinions and feelings from all the light it affords, we should come to the conclusion that he is a Deist, if not an Atheist; at least, that he has no adequate appreciation of Divine Providence in history, and no real sympathy with evangelical doctrines or evangelical men. We hope these fears are groundless, and that our opinion, in this respect, is false. But we cannot account, in any other way, for his carefully shutting out God entirely; for the injustice he does to the motives of our Pilgrim Fathers, and, as we think, to their character in general; to the apparently half sneering manner in which he so often repeats religious phrases, as used by them; and the really ridiculous light in which he not unfrequently seeks to exhibit their religious faith and practices. It is not so much *what* he says, as his *manner* of saying it, that is objectionable.

3.—*Sermons by the late THOMAS CHALMERS, D.D., LL.D. Illustrative of different stages in his Ministry from 1798—1847.* Vol. VI. of the series. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

IN some respects this is the most interesting and instructive volume in this valuable series. It contains thirty-three sermons on various topics and occasions, prepared at different stages of his ministry from 1798 to 1847, and possessing various kinds and degrees of interest and ability. Judging homiletically of their merits, they are not generally superior—many of them indeed may be called very common and derogatory to his reputation as an able and effective preacher: but this is not their chief value, nor the main design of their publication. As illustrative of different stages of his ministry—as marking the progress of such a gifted mind in all that is great, and in the love of the truth, it is invaluable. Seven of these discourses belong to the early period of his ministry, during which he evidently had no experimental knowledge of Christ, and no just views of the gospel or its ministry; and they show the necessity of that change in his character and sentiments which made him both a new man and a new preacher. Let philosophy if it can, on its principles, account for that memorable revolution which marked the year 1810, in the history of this world-wide honored man and the blessed effects which followed it. The Chalmers that henceforth fills the pulpit, the professor's chair, and wields the pen, is not the Chalmers of the previous period: he speaks a new language—teaches new doctrines—breathes a new spirit—is animated by a new zeal—leads a new life—and wields a new and most subduing and transforming power over the

hearts and conduct of men. Whence came it? Was it a delusion? fanaticism? a new revelation? another person? Nothing of the kind. God in that memorable year converted Chalmers to the truth as it is in Jesus and brought him to experience its life-giving power, and henceforth he preaches not philosophy but Christ—not a gospel of negations and abstractions and dogmas and social virtues, but a gospel of inward love and faith and Divine power, teaching as its cardinal doctrines the radical and entire depravity of our nature and “the sinner’s free gratuitous justification before God through faith in the imputed righteousness of Christ.”

We know of no standpoint that commands a more interesting and instructive view of this great man than that which this volume affords. One cannot carefully follow so long a line of progress, and trace “the advancing footsteps of an intellect gifted with such superior power, and urged on by so simple and so strong a love of truth,” and not be made himself wiser and better.

4.—*Institutes of Theology, by the late THOMAS CHALMERS, D.D., LL.D.*  
Vol. I. and seventh of the series. New York: Harper & Brother, 1849.

INTELLECTUALLY considered, this is decidedly the most able and valuable volume of Chalmers’ posthumous works. In the previous volumes we have contemplated him mainly in retirement, as a humble, spiritually-minded Christian, devoutly meditating on God’s Word—the only exception being the last volume, which illustrated the different stages of his ministry. Now we are to view him where he long shone so conspicuously—in the chair of Theology. We have here the going forth of that great intellect in the field of investigation, surveying the whole subject of Natural and Revealed Theology, and gathering and systematically arranging and exhibiting the varied and demonstrative evidences of the being and perfections of God and of the truth of Christianity: and this first volume of “*Institutes of Theology*” is certainly worthy of his distinguished reputation in this department of knowledge and instruction, and equal to anything we have seen from his pen. Few have equalled Chalmers in originality and ability in the field of thought which this work covers, and we greatly misjudge if it does not take the very first rank in treatises on the evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion and on Systematic Divinity. We are assured that none of his published writings received so large a measure of care and thought in preparation as this, and that he looked forward to it when completed as his most matured contribution to the science of Theology.

This first volume treats of “*Natural Theology—Evidences of Christianity—Subject-Matter of Christianity.*” The *arrangement* in his course of Theological Lectures is a departure from the ordinary one, and admitted by him to be contrary to the “order of almost all the confessions and catechisms of Europe, and of the great majority of our authors.” His reasons for this are given at length, and claim the attention of theological instructors and writers on systematic divinity. There are two methods, he says, of arrangement. “The one proceeds chronologically in the order of the Divine administration, beginning with the constitution of the Godhead, and proceeding onward through the successive footsteps of a history which commences with the original purposes of the uncreated mind, and terminates in the consummation of all things. The other proceeds chronologically in the natural order of human inquiry, beginning, therefore, with the darkness and the probabilities and the wants of Natural Theology, and after having ascertained the Scripture to be a real communication from heaven to earth, seeking first after those announcements that are most directly fitted to relieve the distress and to meet the difficulties of nature. It is thus that in entering upon the record the first thing that would naturally attract the notice, is the confirmation which it lends to the apprehension and the anxieties of nature respecting the fearful extent both of man’s depravity

and of his danger; whence we should proceed to a consideration of the offered remedy; whence to the means by which that remedy is appropriated; whence to its operation both in reconciling God to man, and regenerating man in the likeness of God; whence to the progressive holiness of the life ripening and maturing, under the influence of the truth of Christianity, for the exercises and joys of a blissful eternity; whence to death and judgment, and the respective destinies of those who have embraced the Gospel of Jesus Christ and those who have rejected it." He adopts the latter, and hence makes man's state of guilt and moral depravation the initial doctrine of a systematic course of lectures on the subject-matter of Christianity.

5.—*Beneficence of Design in the Problem of Evil vindicated by the Law of Causation in the Physical Construction of Matter.* By A JOURNEYMAN. New York: Leavitt, Trow, & Co., 1849.

"A 'journeyman' author we should think—surely not a 'wise master-builder.' His book we pronounce a puerile conceit, and a libel on good sense and sound philosophy. It is an attempt to bring forth another 'Vestiges of Creation,' but lacking the show of profound science and the real ability of that readable, and, in some respects, remarkable production, it proves to be only a ridiculous and disgusting abortion. The author propounds a new theory of philosophy, natural, intellectual and moral; and seeks by it to solve various problems relating to mind and matter. Oxygen is assumed by him to be an immaterial principle containing the vital essence and generative law of all physical being. Water—the simplest form of matter—is the primary product of oxygen. Water deposits 'albumen,' and this in turn generates the several primary elements. Oxygen combining with these in various degrees brings forth vegetable and animal life, and finally man as 'the highest attainment.' 'An atom of albumen is the starting point of man.' So that oxygen, by an inherent and necessary law, is really the First Cause of all things material. But enough of this 'Problem of Evil.' The author's system is one of fatalism and materialism in their grossest forms.

The 'stormy reception' which the author anticipated for his book will hardly be realized. It is too shallow in its science and speculations; too stupid and puerile in its reasonings, to bewilder, convince, or astound the world. We marvel that so respectable a house should have put their imprimatur on such a semi-infidel and worthless a production.

6. *A compendium of Ecclesiastical History.* By JOHN C. L. GIESLER, Consistorial counsellor and ordinary Professor of Theology in Gottingen. From the fourth edition. Translated from the German by SAMUEL DAVIDSON, LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Ecclesiastical History in the Lancashire Independent College. Vols. I and II. 8 vo. pp. 396, 397. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

THE peculiarities and excellencies of this learned history are already well known to scholars. It is characterized by immense research and by the most rigid impartiality. The text is remarkably brief and condensed, and is accompanied by a vast mass of critical and learned notes, illustrative and corroborative. It is doubtless superior, as a whole, to Mosheim, and ranks next to Neander's in point of ability and value. It purports to be a compendium only, not an extended history like the latter. It has already passed to the fourth edition in Germany. An American translation of it exists, made as early as 1836, when the author had brought it down to the period of the Reformation. He has since revised and greatly extended the work, and Dr. Davidson has given us an excellent translation of the last German edition, thus availing the

English student of the full benefits of the author's complete labors. Few men are better qualified for such a service than Dr. Davidson. He is a perfect master of the German tongue and the German mind, and still has no sympathy with German errors. His recent learned work on the "Introduction to the New Testament" has made him most favorably known, not only at home but on this side of the Atlantic. He professes to have adhered closely to the original text.

We are glad that so valuable a text-book on Church History, and in so finished a state, is made accessible to the English student. The Publishers deserve many thanks for its mechanical execution : it is a noble specimen of fine book-making.

We note but a single deficiency—the want of a full analytical index. We had occasion recently to consult it extensively on a great variety of topics, and found it extremely difficult to find what we were in search of. It is greatly inferior to Mosheim in this particular. Such a facility for reference is indispensable in a work of this character.

7.—*Southey's Common-Place Book.* Edited by his Son-in-law, JOHN WOOD WARTER, B.D. New York : Harper & Brother. 1849. 8vo. 416 pp.

We have not read this work in course as we are wont to do those on which we pass our judgment ; it could not be expected of us. Still we have examined it enough to form an opinion of its general character and merits. It is a literary "curiosity-shop"—full of brief and often striking extracts from an endless variety of authors and on every conceivable subject. It evinces the extensive and careful reading of the renowned author, and is interesting as intimating his literary and moral tastes and habits, his industry and extensive attainments, and his real principles. We value the work highly. There is but one thing that strikes us unfavorably. It would seem from the character of many of these extracts, that Southey had no sympathy with decidedly evangelical ministers, nor with what we believe to be piety in its living and highest forms. Such ministers as Whitfield and Wesley, and Christians of the stamp of Lady Huntington, and whole denominations of evangelicals, as Presbyterians and Methodists, are held up to ridicule and grossly caricatured in many of these gleanings. True, they are not Southey's words, but why should he give them a place in a work sacred to his own private thoughts ? They lessen our regard for him, and lessen the value of the book to us.

8.—*History of Julius Cæsar.* By JACOB ABBOTT. With Engravings. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1849.

We have already more than once expressed our high appreciation of this series of popular Histories, which the Messrs. Abbott are engaged in writing, and the Harpers are bringing out in a style so exceedingly beautiful. We need only to say, in announcing another, that it is executed in a manner quite equal to the previous volumes, and fully sustains the interest of the series. The History of the great Roman General is here briefly but gracefully and graphically portrayed. The sketch is impartial and deeply interesting.

9.—*Dante's Divine Comedy: the Inferno.* A literal prose translation with the text of the original collated from the best editions, and explanatory notes. By JOHN A. CARLYLE, M. D. New York : Harper & Brothers, 1849.

MACAULAY says of this truly sublime Epic, that it is the only poem worthy to be compared with Milton's Paradise Lost. Scarcely any other human production has called forth so much writing in the shape of essays and commentaries. The translations also are numerous and into various languages. Carye's is no doubt the best English translation, if we except the present. The one before

us is a *literal prose* translation, and gives the meaning and spirit of the original in an eminently high degree. Dante we think could not have fallen into abler hands. Dr. Carlyle has evidently mastered all the sources of criticism, bearing upon the subject, and has expended a vast deal of labor to settle the text and give its meaning in our language. He has a profound appreciation of his subject as well as a thorough understanding of it. We have here the Italian Text, carefully collated from the best editions, the prose translation, and foot notes, either original or taken from the best sources, illustrative and explanatory. We have no doubt that this will be extensively regarded as the standard edition, in the English tongue, and will induce multitudes to read this immortal creation of genius who are yet ignorant of its merits.

10.—*The Histories of Caius Cornelius Tacitus: with Notes for Colleges.* By W. S. TYLER, Professor of Languages in Amherst College. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1849.

PROFESSOR TYLER'S previous labors in the field of classic literature are a sufficient guarantee of the scholarship and value of his present service. He has here produced a standard edition of the profound Tacitus. The typographical execution of the work is admirable. The text followed, with few deviations, is that of Orelli. The Notes are brief, pertinent, and touch upon the real difficulties in the text—aiding the student just when and where help is most needed. Much time and toil has evidently been given to the preparation of this work; and it cannot fail to prove highly acceptable to scholars, and to facilitate the study of this renowned author.

11.—*The Good and the Bad in the Roman Catholic Church. A Letter from Rome,* by REV. HENRY M. FIELD. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1849:

WE have read this little work with many painful reflections. It is our deliberate judgment that there is far more "bad" than "good" in the spirit and tendency of it, whatever may be the state of the case as to the *Romish Church*. All we have to say on that point, is simply this: We cannot look upon Rome, viewing it from the standpoint of either Prophecy or History, in any other light than as the great leading inveterate *anti-Christian* infidel Power of the world, now and ever, arrayed against the one true church, and therefore admitting of no *reformation*—long since cut off from the vine, and doomed to destruction, by the righteous judgment of God. We wish, therefore, to take no lessons of piety from such a source—we can see little in Rome, as a Christian, to admire, but everything that is vile and hateful.

Not so with our young Protestant traveler. The poetry and pageantry of Rome seem to have made a profound impression upon his romantic mind. Indeed, he quite falls in love with the "mother of harlots and of abominations," in the high-places of her wickedness—so many are her "*winning features*," and he would have the pure, the Protestant spouse of Christ copy some of her social and moral beauties and virtues! Alas for Protestantism, if we have in this young representative of it, a fair type of the generation of ministers now in the process of training for our Puritan altars. A notorious Puseyite of this region remarked to us, that he had read this author with surprise, seeing that he was a Protestant minister in good standing; that when *he* wrote in a similar strain, some years since, there was a loud outcry, and he watched with anxiety to see how this would be received. And *we* are surprised that such a Letter, dated from Rome at an epoch so remarkable, should go forth from the bosom of Protestantism without a rebuke, nay, with commendation.

We attach no sort of importance to this Letter, except as it develops what we believe to be a fact, namely, that the leaven of Puseyism is at work in more denominations than one, especially among our younger clergy and students of divinity, and that a certain class of minds, romantic and ambitious, and def-

cient, we fear, in real piety, are in no little danger of being deeply infected with it. We apprehend far more serious evil to the spirituality and doctrinal soundness of the next generation of ministers from this source, than from the infusion of German rationalism into our Theology—real and great as we believe that to be. And well does it become the church to watch this most insidious error, and one which finds so many congenial elements in the human heart, with a holy jealousy.

In contrasting the sentiment and spirit of this book with "*Mornings among the Jesuits at Rome*," from the pen of a minister of the established Church of England, we confess that our countryman puts the blush upon us. The one is the impression of a romantic and superficial observer, the other the serious testimony of one who searched Rome to her foundations, as with lighted candles, and found the vast superstructure, in its living as well as historic being, resting on nothing but superstition, error, and iniquity.

12.—*Mornings among the Jesuits at Rome.* By REV. M. HOBART SEYMOUR. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

THIS is really a somewhat remarkable book, both on account of its disclosures and the ability and originality of much of its reasoning against Romanism. The author is an English Protestant clergyman, who spent some time at Rome recently, and, while there, enjoyed peculiar and extended opportunities of access to, and acquaintance with, many renowned leading Jesuits of that city. This book contains the substance of his conversations with several of the most able, learned, and subtle of them, who were sent to reason away, as they supposed, the last obstacle in his mind to his joining the Church of Rome, on the main points of faith at issue between Romanism and Protestantism. Most wisely, and in a masterly manner, did our author manage the case, completely confounding and silencing those who were sent to finish the work of his conversion. There is a freshness, an originality, and a demonstrative power in his manner of stating and managing the argument on some of the points discussed, especially on the Pope's assumption of infallibility, in his conversation with the Professor of Canon Law in the Collegio Romano, that we have never seen equalled in this great controversy. It is an admirable book to put into the hands of the educated and thinking Romanist. Its representations, also, of the state of mind, even in the most learned and scientific circles of Rome, are startling, and contrary to the belief of the Protestant world. The author says: "I have learned, and must bear about me for ever the memory of the lesson, never again to regard the extremities of credulity as inconsistent with the most scientific attainments, or to suppose that what seems the most absurd and marvellous superstition, is incompatible with the highest education, or to think that the utmost prostration of the mind is inconsistent with the loftiest range of intellectual power."

13.—*Scenes where the Tempter has Triumphed.* By the Author of the "*Jail Chaplain*." New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

THE design of this book is good, and its tendency is good, and we have no fault to find with its spirit or style; and yet it seems to us that, in a great measure, it fails of its end. The fault is in the selection of the cases, and in the manner of narrating and arranging them for effect. The annals of crime certainly furnish many cases far more strikingly illustrative of his main point, "Be sure your sin will find you out," than many he has given—cases, too, of recent occurrence and living notoriety, while he has drawn his from history. The narrative is also too prosy, and the moral often but feebly drawn. With such a subject, and such materials as the author might have availed himself of, he might have made not only a more readable book, but one more effective for good."



- 14.—*Typee: A Peep at Polynesian Life, during a Four Month's Residence in a Valley of the Marquesas. The Revised Edition, with a Sequel.* BY HERMAN MELVILLE. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

THIS work is too well known to need any remarks upon it. Mr. Melville is a very racy and entertaining writer. His picture of "Polynesian Life" is strongly drawn, and it is certainly a remarkable one, if true, though we suspect a deep romantic feeling and a fertile imagination have given coloring, if not exaggeration, to the picture. We are glad to see that the good sense of the author has induced, and the moral sentiments of the world constrained him, in revising the work, to strike out those parts which related to missionary operations in Tahiti and the Sandwich Islands, which contained assertions reckless, and charges gratuitous and false.

- 15.—*The Theological Lectures of the late Rev. David Bogue, D.D., edited by the REV. JOSEPH SAMUEL C. F. FREY.* Second edition. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849. 8vo. 806, pp.

DR. BOGUE was, for many years, at the head of the Missionary Seminary at Gosport, England, where he himself educated, without any assistant teacher, by the aid of these lectures, more than four hundred ministers, among whom were Dr. Bennett, of London, John Angel James, Dr. Morrison, and others well known, and eminently useful. He was a great and a good man; profoundly versed in the Scriptures, and eminent as a theologian. These lectures contain the results of much well-directed reading and close thinking. They were evidently composed with great care, and are admirably adapted to instruct the student of divinity, and to furnish him thoroughly for the great work of preaching the gospel. They cover a vast range of investigation—Theology, Divine Revelation, Divine Dispensations, Church History, Jewish Antiquities, Sacred Geography, Composition of Sermons, and the Pastoral Office. There are, in all, more than three hundred lectures. They are not written out in full, but merely skeletons. The leading thoughts are sketched and methodically arranged, the Scripture references given, and the authors named whose works are to be consulted. The method is an admirable one, and the plan is executed with marked wisdom and ability. It is an invaluable work to theological students, and indeed to ministers in general; eminently suggestive of topics and matter for instructive and well-furnished sermons. We would not give it for all the volumes of "skeletons of sermons" we ever saw. It is brought out in a very neat and substantial form.

- 16.—*Franklin's Bible Cartoons, for the School and the Family.* New York: C. S. FRANCIS & Co.

A most worthy attempt to illustrate the more striking Scripture scenes and characters, so as to render them intelligible and interesting to children. The subjects, thus far, are well chosen, and executed with no little taste and skill. The work is sold at a low price, and the undertaking deserves to be encouraged.

- 17.—*The Claims of our Country on its Literary Men. An Oration before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University.* By GEORGE W. BETHUNE, D.D. Cambridge, 1849.

WE have seldom read a more finished and eloquent oration than this. Conceived in the finest taste, literary and moral; glowing with genius, sparkling with a keen and polished wit, full of noble and patriotic sentiments, and clothed in beautiful and graceful language, it was worthy of the occasion, and worthy of the author's distinguished reputation. Above all, we admire the Doctor's Christian manliness on the occasion. He was neither ashamed nor afraid to confess Christ even at Cambridge; he did not seek to blink his religious faith, or even soften down one of the features of his "stern Dordrechtian theology," in compliment to the tastes, prejudices and opinions of his auditory.

Indirectly and most felicitously he tells them "their fathers worshipped God in the simple Man of Nazareth." Nor did he give offence by so doing: seldom has a similar performance given more universal satisfaction. A man must respect and honor his own religious creed always, if he would have others respect either it or him. A frank and manly utterance of a man's truest and deepest convictions, so far as the circumstances of the case demand or justify it, will command the respect, and even praise, of those from whom he differs most widely, while silence, or a studious attempt at evasion or conciliation, will provoke their contempt.

18.—*An Inquiry into the Alledged Tendency of the Separation of Convicts, one from the other, to produce Disease and Derangement. By a Citizen of Pennsylvania.* Philadelphia: E. C. & J. Biddle, 1849.

A VERY powerful discussion of the rival systems of prison discipline. It covers the whole ground of the controversy which has so long existed between the advocates of what is known as the Philadelphia and the Auburn systems, and leaves little more to be said. It gives a most interesting history of the controversy, and reasons in favor of the Separate in preference to the Congregate system in so able a manner, that we cannot see how the author's conclusions can be set aside. We were not before aware that the Separate system had so completely triumphed in Europe. It is a grave subject, affecting broader and higher interests than superficial inquirers suppose. We are glad that our leading reviews are taking it up. The North American, and the Princeton reviews, and the Christian Examiner have already spoken. The labors of the immortal Howard are yielding precious fruits.

19.—*The Other Leaf of the Book of Nature and the Word of God.*

A SINGLE extract will show the drift of this production. "The opinion which, after a good deal of thought upon the subject, I have been led to form, is, that the divine right of kings, the divine right of landholders, the divine right of property in general, the divine right of slaveholders, (and by divine right, I mean a right sanctioned by religion, natural or revealed,) that all these are on the same footing, and must stand or fall together. There is no right or justice in either case; it is toleration merely on the part of Deity, and a necessity on ours. The man who is an abolitionist, unless he be one of those who can blow hot and cold with the same breath, if he be consistent and true to his principles, must necessarily be an Agrarian of the worst kind." We can by no means assent to much of the reasoning of this author—who is understood to be a Professor in a Southern college and a worthy divine—we can but think there is no little fallacy at the bottom of it; but we assure our readers that there is great ingenuity and ability evinced in the argument, and every word is characterized by the spirit of piety and Christian kindness and candor.

20.—*Protestantism in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century. Inaugural Address of SAMUEL M. HOPKINS, Professor in Auburn Theological Seminary.* Auburn: J. C. Ivison & Co., 1849.

A VERY eloquent and timely contribution to the great question of the age. We have been forcibly struck with some of the views herein expressed, and rejoice in the manly and decided tone in which they are spoken. We fear somewhat, that what with the tendencies of Puseyism and the pity and sympathy awakened for deluded papists individually, we shall come to lose much of our horror and detestation of the system of Popery. Prof. Hopkins' view of Romanism, we think the true one, and it is of immense importance that it be clearly understood, and treated accordingly. It is the view which Paul and John have delineated in language most unmistakable and forcible. Rome is not simply a corruption but radically infidel and anti-Christian: not susceptible of reformation but hopelessly bad and doomed: He says:

"Both Heathenism and Islam, in short, are simply unchristian. Romanism is anti-christian. All other systems of belief are worn out, and have lost their hold on the popular mind. This rears itself up with the old dragon malignity

against the Church of God. The struggle, as between active and opposing elements, is confined to Christianity and Popery; and Popery concentrates in itself the venom of all the other unchristian systems—the godless idolatry, and the Christless reliance upon rites and penances, and a priesthood characteristic of Paganism—the fanatical propagandist zeal of the Moslem,—and the bitter intelligent hate of Infidelity against the peculiarities of the Gospel system. Popery is simply Infidelity, with the sword which Islamism brandished in the right hand, and the image which Islamism trod upon in the left.”

Prof. H. takes a hopeful view of the relative strength and prospects of Protestantism and Popery. Two hundred years ago, at the peace of Westphalia, the active struggle between the two rival systems ceased. The line of division was then strongly drawn, and has not since been changed. Still the strength of the systems does not remain what it was in 1648. The Reformation has grown stronger and Romanism weaker by all that “society has gained of knowledge and experience since that time; by all the influence of successful colonization, of successful self-government, of more general education, of an improved art of printing, of vastly increased facilities for travel and intercommunication.” And not only has the numerical strength of Protestantism far outstripped Rome, but in vital power and resources it has an immense advantage. The genius of popery is not congenial with the spirit of the age. The masses are every where rising up and demanding liberty. The attempt to resuscitate the life of Romanism is vain. It is infallibly arrested in Europe. It encounters a new and mighty foe in Protestant America. And on the basis of these and similar facts, we may confidently reckon on the rapid progress and speedy triumph of Protestant Christianity. God has been accumulating agencies and influences, during the last two hundred years, which, when developed, are to act with wide and sudden energy.

We wish we had space for more of the great thoughts which this address embodies. We had hoped to give the entire address to our readers, as it was kindly offered to us, but its publication in this form has defeated our wish. We commend it as a tract for the times on the most vital and important question which Prophecy and Providence are urging upon the attention of the Christian church.

- 21.—*History of the American Bible Society, from its organization to the present time.* By W. P. STRICKLAND, one of the Society's Agents. With an Introduction by REV. N. L. RICE, D.D., of Cincinnati. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

THIS is a full and reliable history of this noble Institution. It has evidently been prepared with no little care and pains, from official documents and other sources, and is highly interesting and instructive. It is a blessed record, tracing this now broad river of life up to its humble source in the piety and faith of a few individuals. The origin and history of the various benevolent institutions of the Christian world, constitute one of the brightest and most remarkable chapters in the book of Divine Providence. It would be doing a good work for some writer qualified for the task, to bring into a single view the striking views and lessons of Providence to be gathered in this field.

- 22.—*The Magic of Kindness; or the Wondrous Story of the Good Huan.* By the BROTHERS MAYHEW. Illustrated by Cruikshank and Kenny Meadows. Harper & Brothers.

THIS work is written much in the style of “Arabian Nights’ Entertainment.” The design and tendency of it are good. Although fictitious, its marvelous stories are based on corresponding facts; and it hits off some sins and evils, historic and living, with most remarkable effect. Its end is to illustrate the power of Kindness in meliorating the condition of mankind. The plot of the story is faulty, lacking naturalness and unity, but, bating some extravagance of manner, and certain expressions of sentiment, it is pretty well told.

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